Published Papers by Kwangchul Kim
This paper investigates Foucault’s interpretation of Kant in the former’s early works, “Introduct... more This paper investigates Foucault’s interpretation of Kant in the former’s early works, “Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology” and The Order of Things. In both these works, Foucault discovered the new modern human concept in Kant’s philosophy by an archeological interpretation. Foucault pointed out that the new human concept born in the modern épistémè has the following characteristics, clearly revealed in Kant’s philosophy. First, Foucault describes the modern human as not only a limited, finite being but also the founder of its own finitude. Kant described a human being as finite because a human being’s theoretical cognition is limited to the domain of experience. The conditions enabling a human’s finite cognition are the space and time and the categories which are human’s forms of sensibility and understanding. For Kant, therefore, a human’s finite cognition is established by elements of finitude in human. Second, the modern human represents itself as an empirico-transcendental doublet. In other words, the human is an “empirical object” and “transcendental subject” who constructs experience at the same time. Regarding this feature, Kant theoretically regarded the human as a “cognized empirical object” and an “a priori condition establishing cognition,” while practically he investigated the human as a “juridical object” subordinate to juridical rules and as a “moral subject” legislating universal moral laws with transcendental freedom. Third, the modern human invariably has an aspect that cannot clearly be understood by a cogito. Kant distinguished transcendental apperception from empirical apperception, insisting that the former cannot be cognized by my thought, although it is a basis for constituting my experience.
This paper compares the ethics of Xunzi and Kant, aiming to show that their thoughts on morality ... more This paper compares the ethics of Xunzi and Kant, aiming to show that their thoughts on morality are similar. First, we consider how Xunzi emphasizes the roles of both the conscious exertion(僞) of mind and natural emotion(性) in moral change. Second, we reflect on how Kant considers the functioning of the emotions in the practice of moral law as well as the reason's autonomy that establish moral law. Therefore, Xunzi and Kant lay stress on both the inborn human's passive 'emotion' and active 'autonomy' performing conscious exertion that is independent from the aspect of emotion. They insist that the genuine morality is impossible with only one of the two aspects and that genuine morality can be achieved when the two elements cooperate.
This paper aims to ensure the coherence of Kant's critique of idealism achieved in the Critique o... more This paper aims to ensure the coherence of Kant's critique of idealism achieved in the Critique of Pure Reason by demonstrating the consistency between "Critique of Paralogism of Ideality" in the frist edition and "Refutation of Idealism" in the second. In elucidating the consistency of
these two chapters, the significant controversial issue is the theoretical status of 'persistent thing'(das Beharrliches) which is presented in "Refutation of Idealism". I examine two interpretations of the 'persistent thing'. The one regards the 'persistent thing' as the thing in itself, while the other interprets it as an object or appearance which is independent of the subject.
By considering these two interpretations, the following conclusion is drawn: First, the 'persistent thing' is not the thing in itself, but a substance as outer appearance. Second, if the 'persistent thing' is considered from the point of view of the empirical realism it is an outer object which is independent of empirical subject. However, on the standpoint of the transcendental idealism, it is a subjective representation relying upon the transcendental subject. Therefore, "Critique of Paralogism of Ideality" and "Refutation of Idealism" don't contradict each other, since the transcendental idealism and the empirical realism are both sides of the same position and the only difference between two chapters is merely that of emphasis. Only according to this interpretation, we can not only grasp the Kant's original intention but also secure a consistency between the two chapters.
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Published Papers by Kwangchul Kim
these two chapters, the significant controversial issue is the theoretical status of 'persistent thing'(das Beharrliches) which is presented in "Refutation of Idealism". I examine two interpretations of the 'persistent thing'. The one regards the 'persistent thing' as the thing in itself, while the other interprets it as an object or appearance which is independent of the subject.
By considering these two interpretations, the following conclusion is drawn: First, the 'persistent thing' is not the thing in itself, but a substance as outer appearance. Second, if the 'persistent thing' is considered from the point of view of the empirical realism it is an outer object which is independent of empirical subject. However, on the standpoint of the transcendental idealism, it is a subjective representation relying upon the transcendental subject. Therefore, "Critique of Paralogism of Ideality" and "Refutation of Idealism" don't contradict each other, since the transcendental idealism and the empirical realism are both sides of the same position and the only difference between two chapters is merely that of emphasis. Only according to this interpretation, we can not only grasp the Kant's original intention but also secure a consistency between the two chapters.
Books by Kwangchul Kim
these two chapters, the significant controversial issue is the theoretical status of 'persistent thing'(das Beharrliches) which is presented in "Refutation of Idealism". I examine two interpretations of the 'persistent thing'. The one regards the 'persistent thing' as the thing in itself, while the other interprets it as an object or appearance which is independent of the subject.
By considering these two interpretations, the following conclusion is drawn: First, the 'persistent thing' is not the thing in itself, but a substance as outer appearance. Second, if the 'persistent thing' is considered from the point of view of the empirical realism it is an outer object which is independent of empirical subject. However, on the standpoint of the transcendental idealism, it is a subjective representation relying upon the transcendental subject. Therefore, "Critique of Paralogism of Ideality" and "Refutation of Idealism" don't contradict each other, since the transcendental idealism and the empirical realism are both sides of the same position and the only difference between two chapters is merely that of emphasis. Only according to this interpretation, we can not only grasp the Kant's original intention but also secure a consistency between the two chapters.