Government and International Development

This study underscores the strategic role -both political and economic -of banking sector reform in the overall pursuit of economic development and democratization. It compares trajectories of banking sector reform in Middle Eastern and African countries that have remained on the margins of the new global economy. A close look shows that their governments' willingness to embrace reform has differed across contexts, as has the extent and pace of reform. Meanwhile, the effects of reformwhether and how legal change produced the developmental changes predicted by liberalization's proponents -have also been very uneven.

This study aims at a better understanding of the politics of economic reform in countries that have remained on the margins of the globalising economy. The article identifies cross-national differences in patterns of financial sector reform in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in the 1980s and 1990s. We argue that these differences are traceable, in part, to variations in the strength and autonomy of private capital in each country. These social-structural differences are registered, albeit imperfectly, in measures of concentration and ownership structure in the commercial banking sector. Using these measures, we propose a typology of variation in banking structure in the MENA and SSA, and argue that each type tends to be associated with a characteristic pattern of financial sector reform (or non-reform). We find that the biggest struggles over banking reform occurred in countries with a history of antagonistic relations between a relatively strong domestic private sector and the state.

The different contributions to this issue exhibit a great variety in the dynamics of the constitution of authority over territory, property and persons. The general literature into which these contributions feed confirms this variation, and this should make us quite cautious about simple explanations of dynamics, causalities and outcomes. I recognize that some highly informed analysts have argued that African land regimes differ so much and so intricately that each can be thought of as sui generisland rules 'only apply in the groups where they have developed' (Reyna and Downs 1988: 10-11). Nonetheless, there is much to be said for attempting to move toward broader theoretical generalizations about how land conflicts vary in form and political expression in Africa. Analysing property regimes, how they vary, and how they are changing may contribute to a better understanding of the structures and processes by which rural Africa is governed and incorporated into the modern state.

This paper considers implications of the neoliberal shift for forms of national integration that were achieved during the era of state-led development. These national integration strategies (1960s-1980s) helped define and manage regional competition within the juridical boundaries of the territorial state. In today's "open economy" settings, old strategies of national integration are difficult to sustain. What has emerged is a new territorial politics, which revolves around attempts to consolidate power within subunits of the state and reorder relations among them, to enforce political control within communities, and to reorder rural property rights. Côte d'Ivoire provides a case in point.

Administrative and political decentralization have emerged as high developmental priorities in Africa and elsewhere. Although the possible benefits of such reforms have been well theorized, the actual politics of decentralization are not well understood. Often there are large gaps between reform rhetoric and governments' real commitment to decentralization. And often legal changes have not produced decentralization's supposed political and administrative benefits. These dynamics have been especially clear in rural Africa, where a decade of decentralizing reforms has produced generally disappointing results. When do regimes pursue state-building strategies that involve real devolution of political and administrative prerogative? This article addresses this question and proposes an answer for rural West Africa. The author employs a political economy approach to propose a model of regional variation in the political capacities and interests of rural societies and rural notables and argues that these differences shape the institution-building strategies governments choose trying to entrench their power.

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Electoral populism in the context of weak property rights is a configuration common to parts of sub-Saharan Africa. In Côte d'Ivoire rulers threatened by electoral competition have used promises to allocate and reallocate rural property rights in attempts to win the support of key electoral constituencies and to build a winning electoral coalition. Analysis of Côte d'Ivoire's recent political trajectory points to a threat to sustainability of multiparty competition that is present in many African countries. In much of sub-Saharan Africa, the narrowness of private property regimes in the rural sector means that land is easily mobilized as a patronage resource. Land rights can be allocated and reallocated by regimes seeking electoral advantage by rewarding their constituencies at the expense of losers, rivals, or minorities. The threat or reality of expropriation can provide a material base for exclusionary nationalisms, minority-threatening majoritarianism, and forms of politics in which losers have few incentives to abide by outcomes generated through elections.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. This content downloaded from 158. 143.192.135 on Wed, Sub-Saharan Africa's current economic crisis calls for a reassessment of the role of the state in shaping patterns of postcolonial economic development. This reassessment requires a departure from the structural and instrumental models of the state that now dominate the literature on capitalism in Africa. These models are predicted on the assumption that the state in Africa performs functions necessary for the reproduction of "structural features" of neocolonial or dependent capitalist economies. In the face of the pervasive process of economic decay which is a striking feature of Africa's current crisis, this functionalist assumption becomes difficult to sustain. The contours of the current crisis suggest that structural and instrumental models have directed attention away from aspects of state power and its use that play an important role in shaping economic structures in contemporary Africa.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. This content downloaded from 158. 143.192.135 on Wed,