Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part O: Journal of Risk and Reliability, 2017
More attention has recently been given to Human Factors in petroleum accident investigations. The... more More attention has recently been given to Human Factors in petroleum accident investigations. The Human Factors areas examined in this article are organizational, cognitive and physical ergonomics. A key question to be explored is as follows: To what degree are the petroleum industry and safety authorities in Norway focusing on these Human Factors areas from the design phase? To investigate this, we conducted an innovative exploratory study of the development of four control centres in Norwegian oil and gas industry in collaboration between users, management and Human Factors experts. We also performed a literature survey and discussion with the professional Human Factors network in Norway. We investigated the Human Factors focus, reasons for not considering Human Factors and consequences of missing Human Factors in safety management. The results revealed an immature focus and organization of Human Factors. Expertise on organizational ergonomics and cognitive ergonomics are missing ...
IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology, 2016
This chapter discusses digital vulnerabilities and resilience in the Norwegian oil and gas infras... more This chapter discusses digital vulnerabilities and resilience in the Norwegian oil and gas infrastructure. The Norwegian oil and gas sector is a part of the European Union's critical infrastructure because Norway supplies approximately 10% of the European Union's oil and 30% of its gas. Hidden, dynamic and emergent risks are considered and resilience engineering is suggested as a framework for handling, recovering from and adapting to unexpected incidents.
Safety and Reliability – Safe Societies in a Changing World, Jun 15, 2018
Autonomous transport systems in all modes-road (i.e. autonomous cars), aviation (i.e. drones), sh... more Autonomous transport systems in all modes-road (i.e. autonomous cars), aviation (i.e. drones), shipping and rail are coming. Regulation and testing are ongoing in Norway. Risks of autonomous systems are uncertain due to missing data, emerging technology and variation in framework conditions. However, accidents of autonomous cars seem to be 1/3 or 1/2 of current levels. Incidents are different, needing outside interventions sometimes. Based on review of experiences across the modes and regulations, we suggest agile and transparent learning in the whole autonomous ecosystem, between all modes. System certification are needed, and system responsibilities must be clarified. Structures for orchestrating transport (i.e. control of many autonomous vehicles with possible common failures) and marking autonomous transport, should be established. In the interfaces between humans and systems there are differences in autonomy as imagined vs. performed, leading to new incidents and accidents. Emerging safety/security issues must be explored.
ASCE-ASME J Risk and Uncert in Engrg Sys Part B Mech Engrg
Accidents and incidents, such as the capsizing of the anchor handling vessel Bourbon Dolphin in 2... more Accidents and incidents, such as the capsizing of the anchor handling vessel Bourbon Dolphin in 2007 and the unintended list of the drilling rig Scarabeo 8 in 2012, underline the need for addressing sensemaking in safety-critical situations in the maritime domain to reduce risks. Sensemaking and risks must be understood as a part of the organizational context of the incidents. This paper presents the results of a comprehensive qualitative literature review conducted to establish more knowledge on sensemaking in the context of safety-critical situations and on the relation between the concepts of sensemaking and resilience. In the obtained literature sensemaking is used as a frame of reference for understanding accidents; it is used in relation to critical situations or complex operations in general; it is described by some as a process creating situational awareness; and it is explained by others mainly in terms of how it relates to resilience. Sensemaking creates the context for be...
The accident levels in helicopter transportation vary between geographical regions and types of o... more The accident levels in helicopter transportation vary between geographical regions and types of operations. In this paper, we develop some hypotheses regarding the factors that may explain this variation. The aim of this paper is to improve safety in helicopter transportation through better understanding of the causes leading to fatal accidents. We provide an analysis of three segments of helicopter transportation in Norway (i.e., offshore transportation; onshore ambulance/police, and onshore transportation). This analysis refers to international research on helicopter accidents. The number of fatal accidents per million flight hours in Norwegian offshore helicopter transportation was 2.8 in 1990-1999 and zero in 2000-2015. In Norwegian onshore helicopter transportation, the fatal accident rate was 13.8 in the period 2000-2012. Twenty-three onshore helicopters crashed to the ground; seven of these crashes were fatal, killing 16 people. It is reasonable to question why there is such a significant difference in accident rates between offshore and onshore helicopter transportation. We have approached this question by comparing how the different segments of helicopter transportation are organized and managed. Our analysis shows that there are major differences both at the "sharp" end (i.e., in actual operations) and the "blunt" end (i.e., rules, regulations and organization). This includes differences in regulations, market conditions, work organization (i.e., training, employment conditions, and qualifications of the crews), operations and technology. A central argument is that differences in the market conditions and requirements stipulated by the users explain some of these differences. The same differences can be found internationally. If we use best practice and expert judgments, there is an opportunity to improve helicopter safety through improving the socio-technical system (i.e., organizational issues, improved design, improved maintenance of critical components and more focus on operational factors). A reasonable goal is that the international helicopter transportation industry could reduce the accident level to less than one fatal accident per million flight hours (Considering the oil and gas industry internationally, this would reduce the average of 24 fatalities annually to 4 per year, thus saving 20 lives each year).
... Management; Torgeir Haavik, NTNU Social Research AS; Stig Ole Johnsen, SINTEF Safety Research... more ... Management; Torgeir Haavik, NTNU Social Research AS; Stig Ole Johnsen, SINTEF Safety Research; Jan Eivind Danielsen, Bouvet AS; Mike Herbert, ConocoPhillips ... An opportunity is also seen for improved quality and use of data with a possibility to run What-If scenarios on ...
Integrated operations are increasingly used in oil and gas production facilities to improve yield... more Integrated operations are increasingly used in oil and gas production facilities to improve yields, reduce costs and maximize profits. They leverage information and communications technology (ICT) to facilitate collaboration between experts at widely dispersed locations. This paper discusses the safety and security consequences of implementing integrated operations for oil and gas production. It examines the increased accident risk arising from the tight coupling of complex ICT and SCADA systems, and proposes technological, organizational and human factors based strategies for mitigating the risk.
Remote operations, remote support and use of new technology introduce new ways of operating oil a... more Remote operations, remote support and use of new technology introduce new ways of operating oil and gas fields. These new practices are often called "field of the future" or "integrated operations" -IO. These new practices are being implemented on the Norwegian Continental Shelf, leading to increased hydrocarbon recovery and increased collaboration between onshore and offshore sites. IO is raising new challenges related to HSE (Health, Safety and Environment), but IO should not increase the risks of major accidents or increase the risks of HSE.
IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology, 2010
Resilience is the ability of a system to react to and recover from disturbances with minimal effe... more Resilience is the ability of a system to react to and recover from disturbances with minimal effects on dynamic stability. Resilience is needed as systems and organizations become more complex and interrelated and the consequences of accidents and incidents increase. This paper analyzes the notion of resilience based on a literature survey and an exploration of incidents. In particular, resilience involves the ability of systems to undergo graceful and controlled degradation, the ability to rebound from degradation, the presence of redundancy, the ability to manage margins close to the performance boundaries, the establishment and exploration of common mental models, the presence of flexibility in systems and organizations, and the reduction of complexity and coupling. The paper describes how resilience can be included in system development and operations by considering organizations, technology and human factors. Also, it shows how past strengths and weaknesses can be considered in risk analysis to enhance safety, security and resilience.
International Journal of Performability Engineering, 2007
Remote IT-based support and operations of offshore oil and gas installations are increasing. The ... more Remote IT-based support and operations of offshore oil and gas installations are increasing. The motivation for remote operation is the potential for increased income, cost reductions and improved safety. The technology used to support operations is changing from proprietary closed process control systems to standardize IT systems built on PCs and MS Windows, connected to internal networks and the Internet. In addition, a network of companies is increasingly performing operations and management. PCs and MS Windows have more vulnerability than the proprietary systems used earlier, and the increased connections and participants in the networks increase the vulnerability. The new organisations and the increased number of vulnerabilities create the need for improved information security and improved safety. Our hypothesis is that an important contribution to improved information security and safety is an improved safety and security culture and improved information sharing during operations and incident handling. Such a safety and security culture should be explicitly directed towards actions that support learning.
Http Dx Doi Org 10 1080 13669870903041474, Dec 1, 2010
In this paper we have tried to identify the main safety challenges in a major change processes. W... more In this paper we have tried to identify the main safety challenges in a major change processes. We have explored actual large-scale changes during deregulation of aviation and rail, and we have explored large-scale changes in the oil and gas industry.
Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part O: Journal of Risk and Reliability, 2017
More attention has recently been given to Human Factors in petroleum accident investigations. The... more More attention has recently been given to Human Factors in petroleum accident investigations. The Human Factors areas examined in this article are organizational, cognitive and physical ergonomics. A key question to be explored is as follows: To what degree are the petroleum industry and safety authorities in Norway focusing on these Human Factors areas from the design phase? To investigate this, we conducted an innovative exploratory study of the development of four control centres in Norwegian oil and gas industry in collaboration between users, management and Human Factors experts. We also performed a literature survey and discussion with the professional Human Factors network in Norway. We investigated the Human Factors focus, reasons for not considering Human Factors and consequences of missing Human Factors in safety management. The results revealed an immature focus and organization of Human Factors. Expertise on organizational ergonomics and cognitive ergonomics are missing ...
IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology, 2016
This chapter discusses digital vulnerabilities and resilience in the Norwegian oil and gas infras... more This chapter discusses digital vulnerabilities and resilience in the Norwegian oil and gas infrastructure. The Norwegian oil and gas sector is a part of the European Union's critical infrastructure because Norway supplies approximately 10% of the European Union's oil and 30% of its gas. Hidden, dynamic and emergent risks are considered and resilience engineering is suggested as a framework for handling, recovering from and adapting to unexpected incidents.
Safety and Reliability – Safe Societies in a Changing World, Jun 15, 2018
Autonomous transport systems in all modes-road (i.e. autonomous cars), aviation (i.e. drones), sh... more Autonomous transport systems in all modes-road (i.e. autonomous cars), aviation (i.e. drones), shipping and rail are coming. Regulation and testing are ongoing in Norway. Risks of autonomous systems are uncertain due to missing data, emerging technology and variation in framework conditions. However, accidents of autonomous cars seem to be 1/3 or 1/2 of current levels. Incidents are different, needing outside interventions sometimes. Based on review of experiences across the modes and regulations, we suggest agile and transparent learning in the whole autonomous ecosystem, between all modes. System certification are needed, and system responsibilities must be clarified. Structures for orchestrating transport (i.e. control of many autonomous vehicles with possible common failures) and marking autonomous transport, should be established. In the interfaces between humans and systems there are differences in autonomy as imagined vs. performed, leading to new incidents and accidents. Emerging safety/security issues must be explored.
ASCE-ASME J Risk and Uncert in Engrg Sys Part B Mech Engrg
Accidents and incidents, such as the capsizing of the anchor handling vessel Bourbon Dolphin in 2... more Accidents and incidents, such as the capsizing of the anchor handling vessel Bourbon Dolphin in 2007 and the unintended list of the drilling rig Scarabeo 8 in 2012, underline the need for addressing sensemaking in safety-critical situations in the maritime domain to reduce risks. Sensemaking and risks must be understood as a part of the organizational context of the incidents. This paper presents the results of a comprehensive qualitative literature review conducted to establish more knowledge on sensemaking in the context of safety-critical situations and on the relation between the concepts of sensemaking and resilience. In the obtained literature sensemaking is used as a frame of reference for understanding accidents; it is used in relation to critical situations or complex operations in general; it is described by some as a process creating situational awareness; and it is explained by others mainly in terms of how it relates to resilience. Sensemaking creates the context for be...
The accident levels in helicopter transportation vary between geographical regions and types of o... more The accident levels in helicopter transportation vary between geographical regions and types of operations. In this paper, we develop some hypotheses regarding the factors that may explain this variation. The aim of this paper is to improve safety in helicopter transportation through better understanding of the causes leading to fatal accidents. We provide an analysis of three segments of helicopter transportation in Norway (i.e., offshore transportation; onshore ambulance/police, and onshore transportation). This analysis refers to international research on helicopter accidents. The number of fatal accidents per million flight hours in Norwegian offshore helicopter transportation was 2.8 in 1990-1999 and zero in 2000-2015. In Norwegian onshore helicopter transportation, the fatal accident rate was 13.8 in the period 2000-2012. Twenty-three onshore helicopters crashed to the ground; seven of these crashes were fatal, killing 16 people. It is reasonable to question why there is such a significant difference in accident rates between offshore and onshore helicopter transportation. We have approached this question by comparing how the different segments of helicopter transportation are organized and managed. Our analysis shows that there are major differences both at the "sharp" end (i.e., in actual operations) and the "blunt" end (i.e., rules, regulations and organization). This includes differences in regulations, market conditions, work organization (i.e., training, employment conditions, and qualifications of the crews), operations and technology. A central argument is that differences in the market conditions and requirements stipulated by the users explain some of these differences. The same differences can be found internationally. If we use best practice and expert judgments, there is an opportunity to improve helicopter safety through improving the socio-technical system (i.e., organizational issues, improved design, improved maintenance of critical components and more focus on operational factors). A reasonable goal is that the international helicopter transportation industry could reduce the accident level to less than one fatal accident per million flight hours (Considering the oil and gas industry internationally, this would reduce the average of 24 fatalities annually to 4 per year, thus saving 20 lives each year).
... Management; Torgeir Haavik, NTNU Social Research AS; Stig Ole Johnsen, SINTEF Safety Research... more ... Management; Torgeir Haavik, NTNU Social Research AS; Stig Ole Johnsen, SINTEF Safety Research; Jan Eivind Danielsen, Bouvet AS; Mike Herbert, ConocoPhillips ... An opportunity is also seen for improved quality and use of data with a possibility to run What-If scenarios on ...
Integrated operations are increasingly used in oil and gas production facilities to improve yield... more Integrated operations are increasingly used in oil and gas production facilities to improve yields, reduce costs and maximize profits. They leverage information and communications technology (ICT) to facilitate collaboration between experts at widely dispersed locations. This paper discusses the safety and security consequences of implementing integrated operations for oil and gas production. It examines the increased accident risk arising from the tight coupling of complex ICT and SCADA systems, and proposes technological, organizational and human factors based strategies for mitigating the risk.
Remote operations, remote support and use of new technology introduce new ways of operating oil a... more Remote operations, remote support and use of new technology introduce new ways of operating oil and gas fields. These new practices are often called "field of the future" or "integrated operations" -IO. These new practices are being implemented on the Norwegian Continental Shelf, leading to increased hydrocarbon recovery and increased collaboration between onshore and offshore sites. IO is raising new challenges related to HSE (Health, Safety and Environment), but IO should not increase the risks of major accidents or increase the risks of HSE.
IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology, 2010
Resilience is the ability of a system to react to and recover from disturbances with minimal effe... more Resilience is the ability of a system to react to and recover from disturbances with minimal effects on dynamic stability. Resilience is needed as systems and organizations become more complex and interrelated and the consequences of accidents and incidents increase. This paper analyzes the notion of resilience based on a literature survey and an exploration of incidents. In particular, resilience involves the ability of systems to undergo graceful and controlled degradation, the ability to rebound from degradation, the presence of redundancy, the ability to manage margins close to the performance boundaries, the establishment and exploration of common mental models, the presence of flexibility in systems and organizations, and the reduction of complexity and coupling. The paper describes how resilience can be included in system development and operations by considering organizations, technology and human factors. Also, it shows how past strengths and weaknesses can be considered in risk analysis to enhance safety, security and resilience.
International Journal of Performability Engineering, 2007
Remote IT-based support and operations of offshore oil and gas installations are increasing. The ... more Remote IT-based support and operations of offshore oil and gas installations are increasing. The motivation for remote operation is the potential for increased income, cost reductions and improved safety. The technology used to support operations is changing from proprietary closed process control systems to standardize IT systems built on PCs and MS Windows, connected to internal networks and the Internet. In addition, a network of companies is increasingly performing operations and management. PCs and MS Windows have more vulnerability than the proprietary systems used earlier, and the increased connections and participants in the networks increase the vulnerability. The new organisations and the increased number of vulnerabilities create the need for improved information security and improved safety. Our hypothesis is that an important contribution to improved information security and safety is an improved safety and security culture and improved information sharing during operations and incident handling. Such a safety and security culture should be explicitly directed towards actions that support learning.
Http Dx Doi Org 10 1080 13669870903041474, Dec 1, 2010
In this paper we have tried to identify the main safety challenges in a major change processes. W... more In this paper we have tried to identify the main safety challenges in a major change processes. We have explored actual large-scale changes during deregulation of aviation and rail, and we have explored large-scale changes in the oil and gas industry.
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Papers by Stig Johnsen