Although there is universal consensus both in the science education literature and in the science... more Although there is universal consensus both in the science education literature and in the science standards documents to the effect that students should learn not only the content of science but also its nature, there is little agreement about what that nature is. This led many science educators to adopt what is sometimes called ''the consensus view'' about the nature of science (NOS), whose goal is to teach students only those characteristics of science on which there is wide consensus. This is an attractive view, but it has some shortcomings and weaknesses. In this article we present and defend an alternative approach based on the notion of family resemblance. We argue that the family resemblance approach is superior to the consensus view in several ways, which we discuss in some detail.
Acknowledgements. Introduction R. Nola, H. Sankey. A Selective Survey of Theories of Scientific M... more Acknowledgements. Introduction R. Nola, H. Sankey. A Selective Survey of Theories of Scientific Method R. Nola, H. Sankey. How We Know About Electrons J. Norton. How We Know About Electrons. The Rationality of the Chemical Revolution A. Pyle. Kuhn, Bayes and 'Theory Choice': How Revolutionary is Kuhn's Account of Theoretical Change? J. Worrall. With Friends Like These..., or What is Inductivism and Why is it Off the Agenda? J. Fox. Is Epistemology Adequate to the Task of Rational Theory Evaluation? L. Laudan. Naturalism Logicized K. Kelly. Methodological Pluralism, Normative Naturalism and the Realist Aim of Science H. Sankey. The Hard Problems in the Philosophy of Science. Notes on Contributors. Index.
ABSTRACT History of science is an interesting and growing subject in its own right. Philosophers ... more ABSTRACT History of science is an interesting and growing subject in its own right. Philosophers of science have, in the last twenty years or so, become much more aware of the historical studies that have been made in the subject of which their philosophy is meant to be the 'philosophy of'. A number of writers have made extensive studies in both history and philosophy of science, particularly Kuhn, Feyerabend, Toulmin, and in France a writer such as Michel Foucault. What, if anything, has philosophy to do with all of this history? When philosophers survey the recent historiography of science do they find that there is no particularly philosophical question arising out of the history itself? Or do they find that some peculiarly philosophical question does arise, and that philosophy is needed along with the history? Certainly if historians of science make remarks of the kind quoted, above from Kuhn then at least some philosophical therapy is needed. But some philosophers, and many historians themselves, suggest that more is needed from philosophy than just therapy. They suggest that some version of the idealist/realist controversy quickly surfaces out of all this history, especially that part of it which deals with scientific revolutions. How this happens can be shown by the following considerations. Some of our philosophical and scientific ancestors believed that many things exist that we, from our current theoretical standpoint, do not believe exist at all. There were gods, the Holy Trinity, witches and reincarnated souls. There were, in various early sciences, phlo
The view that observations in science are theory-laden is critically evaluated in this paper. A n... more The view that observations in science are theory-laden is critically evaluated in this paper. A number of theses are distinguished concerning the alleged theory-ladenness of claims of the form 'P observes X' and 'P observes that X is A' that derive from some remarks of Hanson; each thesis is shown to be untenable. However a modicum of theory-ladenness is supported in the claim that some observation-that reports depend for their truth on other claims which in turn depend for their truth on a piece of scientific theory. Resume Est evaluee dans cet article de facon critique la conception selon laquelle les observations scientifiques sont imprkgnees de theorie (theory-laden). Un certain nombre de thtses sont distinguees concernant la soi-disant impregnation theorique d'enonces tels que 'P observe X' et 'P observe que X est A'. Ces theses derivent de remarques de Hanson et on montre qu'aucune ne peut &tre soutenue. Cependant, la constatation que certaines observations-que dependent, quant a leur veritC, d'autres enoncts qui a leur tour dependent, quant a leur verite, d'une partie de theorie scientifique, justifie un peu d'impregnation theorique. Zusammenfassung Es wird die Auffassung, wonach Beobachtungen in der Wissenschaft theoriegeladen sind, einer kritischen Beurteilung unterzogen. Verschiedene Thesen beziiglich der Theoriegeladenheit von Behauptungen der Form 'P beobachtet X' und 'P beobachtet, dass X ein A ist' werden im Anschluss an Hanson unterschieden; alle erweisen sich als unhaltbar. Eine abgeanderte Auffassung von Theoriegeladenheit wird vorgeschlagen, nach welcher Berichte uber 'Beobachtung, dass. . .' hinsichtlich ihrer Wahrheit von weiteren Aussagen abhangig sind, die ihrerseits von einem Stuck wissenschaftlicher Theorie abhangen.
International Handbook of Research in History, Philosophy and Science Teaching, 2013
The idea of family resemblance, when applied to science, can provide a powerful account of the na... more The idea of family resemblance, when applied to science, can provide a powerful account of the nature of science (NOS). In this chapter we develop such an account by taking into consideration the consensus on NOS that emerged in the science education literature in the last decade or so. According to the family resemblance approach, the nature of science can be systematically and comprehensively characterized in terms of a number of science categories which exhibit strong similarities and overlaps among diverse scientific disciplines. We then discuss the virtues of this approach and make some suggestions as to how one can go about teaching it in the classroom.
... Kingsbury and McKeown-Green's chapter, “Jackson's Arm-chair: The Only Chair in Town... more ... Kingsbury and McKeown-Green's chapter, “Jackson's Arm-chair: The Only Chair in Town ... to a number of objections to Jackson's version of Canberra Plan reductive analysis. Their contention is that Jackson conceives of conceptual analysis almost exclusively as the analysis of ...
Explanation, many say, is one of the central aims of science; a few add that it is the central ai... more Explanation, many say, is one of the central aims of science; a few add that it is the central aim. So it is no wonder that much attention has been devoted to an analysis of the nature of explanation within philosophy of science for at least the last 60 years. Within science education the notion of explanation is, of course, important and it has a wide range of uses; but its analysis has not been given much direct attention. Perhaps appropriately so as those working in the field have been focused on other matters; and in any case there is the work by philosophers upon which to draw. The latest such philosophical work is Michael Strevens's Depth, a book which by its size and length alone merits its title. This review will serve as a brief introduction for those in science education who will need some signposting to navigate their way through an important book which plumbs the philosophical depths of the nature of explanation. However, the book is clearly written so is accessible to those whose main area of work is not philosophy. But that does not mean that all the elements that go into the account of explanation developed in the book are clear and unproblematic. Part I of the book will be useful to those in science education as it is a survey of several theories of explanation that have been proposed in recent years such as the following: subsumption accounts such as Hempel's deductive-nomological model in which explanations are in terms of more general patterns such as laws operating in particular conditions; causal accounts such as those of Reichenbach and Salmon (to mention a few); the counterfactual and causal history account of Lewis; the manipulation account of causation and explanation proposed by Woodward. All of these set the scene for Strevens's own ''kairetic'' account of explanation developed from Part II onwards. Part IV of the book sets out his ''kairetic'' account of probabilistic explanation; as important as this is, it will not be discussed in this review which is confined to deterministic accounts of explanation. Strevens proposes a tight linkage between understanding and explanation: 'I take scientific understanding to be that state produced, and only produced, by grasping a true explanation' (p 3). The psychologistic word 'grasping' is important here as Stevens also distinguishes between explanation understood as a communicative act in which
Although there is universal consensus both in the science education literature and in the science... more Although there is universal consensus both in the science education literature and in the science standards documents to the effect that students should learn not only the content of science but also its nature, there is little agreement about what that nature is. This led many science educators to adopt what is sometimes called ''the consensus view'' about the nature of science (NOS), whose goal is to teach students only those characteristics of science on which there is wide consensus. This is an attractive view, but it has some shortcomings and weaknesses. In this article we present and defend an alternative approach based on the notion of family resemblance. We argue that the family resemblance approach is superior to the consensus view in several ways, which we discuss in some detail.
Acknowledgements. Introduction R. Nola, H. Sankey. A Selective Survey of Theories of Scientific M... more Acknowledgements. Introduction R. Nola, H. Sankey. A Selective Survey of Theories of Scientific Method R. Nola, H. Sankey. How We Know About Electrons J. Norton. How We Know About Electrons. The Rationality of the Chemical Revolution A. Pyle. Kuhn, Bayes and 'Theory Choice': How Revolutionary is Kuhn's Account of Theoretical Change? J. Worrall. With Friends Like These..., or What is Inductivism and Why is it Off the Agenda? J. Fox. Is Epistemology Adequate to the Task of Rational Theory Evaluation? L. Laudan. Naturalism Logicized K. Kelly. Methodological Pluralism, Normative Naturalism and the Realist Aim of Science H. Sankey. The Hard Problems in the Philosophy of Science. Notes on Contributors. Index.
ABSTRACT History of science is an interesting and growing subject in its own right. Philosophers ... more ABSTRACT History of science is an interesting and growing subject in its own right. Philosophers of science have, in the last twenty years or so, become much more aware of the historical studies that have been made in the subject of which their philosophy is meant to be the 'philosophy of'. A number of writers have made extensive studies in both history and philosophy of science, particularly Kuhn, Feyerabend, Toulmin, and in France a writer such as Michel Foucault. What, if anything, has philosophy to do with all of this history? When philosophers survey the recent historiography of science do they find that there is no particularly philosophical question arising out of the history itself? Or do they find that some peculiarly philosophical question does arise, and that philosophy is needed along with the history? Certainly if historians of science make remarks of the kind quoted, above from Kuhn then at least some philosophical therapy is needed. But some philosophers, and many historians themselves, suggest that more is needed from philosophy than just therapy. They suggest that some version of the idealist/realist controversy quickly surfaces out of all this history, especially that part of it which deals with scientific revolutions. How this happens can be shown by the following considerations. Some of our philosophical and scientific ancestors believed that many things exist that we, from our current theoretical standpoint, do not believe exist at all. There were gods, the Holy Trinity, witches and reincarnated souls. There were, in various early sciences, phlo
The view that observations in science are theory-laden is critically evaluated in this paper. A n... more The view that observations in science are theory-laden is critically evaluated in this paper. A number of theses are distinguished concerning the alleged theory-ladenness of claims of the form 'P observes X' and 'P observes that X is A' that derive from some remarks of Hanson; each thesis is shown to be untenable. However a modicum of theory-ladenness is supported in the claim that some observation-that reports depend for their truth on other claims which in turn depend for their truth on a piece of scientific theory. Resume Est evaluee dans cet article de facon critique la conception selon laquelle les observations scientifiques sont imprkgnees de theorie (theory-laden). Un certain nombre de thtses sont distinguees concernant la soi-disant impregnation theorique d'enonces tels que 'P observe X' et 'P observe que X est A'. Ces theses derivent de remarques de Hanson et on montre qu'aucune ne peut &tre soutenue. Cependant, la constatation que certaines observations-que dependent, quant a leur veritC, d'autres enoncts qui a leur tour dependent, quant a leur verite, d'une partie de theorie scientifique, justifie un peu d'impregnation theorique. Zusammenfassung Es wird die Auffassung, wonach Beobachtungen in der Wissenschaft theoriegeladen sind, einer kritischen Beurteilung unterzogen. Verschiedene Thesen beziiglich der Theoriegeladenheit von Behauptungen der Form 'P beobachtet X' und 'P beobachtet, dass X ein A ist' werden im Anschluss an Hanson unterschieden; alle erweisen sich als unhaltbar. Eine abgeanderte Auffassung von Theoriegeladenheit wird vorgeschlagen, nach welcher Berichte uber 'Beobachtung, dass. . .' hinsichtlich ihrer Wahrheit von weiteren Aussagen abhangig sind, die ihrerseits von einem Stuck wissenschaftlicher Theorie abhangen.
International Handbook of Research in History, Philosophy and Science Teaching, 2013
The idea of family resemblance, when applied to science, can provide a powerful account of the na... more The idea of family resemblance, when applied to science, can provide a powerful account of the nature of science (NOS). In this chapter we develop such an account by taking into consideration the consensus on NOS that emerged in the science education literature in the last decade or so. According to the family resemblance approach, the nature of science can be systematically and comprehensively characterized in terms of a number of science categories which exhibit strong similarities and overlaps among diverse scientific disciplines. We then discuss the virtues of this approach and make some suggestions as to how one can go about teaching it in the classroom.
... Kingsbury and McKeown-Green's chapter, “Jackson's Arm-chair: The Only Chair in Town... more ... Kingsbury and McKeown-Green's chapter, “Jackson's Arm-chair: The Only Chair in Town ... to a number of objections to Jackson's version of Canberra Plan reductive analysis. Their contention is that Jackson conceives of conceptual analysis almost exclusively as the analysis of ...
Explanation, many say, is one of the central aims of science; a few add that it is the central ai... more Explanation, many say, is one of the central aims of science; a few add that it is the central aim. So it is no wonder that much attention has been devoted to an analysis of the nature of explanation within philosophy of science for at least the last 60 years. Within science education the notion of explanation is, of course, important and it has a wide range of uses; but its analysis has not been given much direct attention. Perhaps appropriately so as those working in the field have been focused on other matters; and in any case there is the work by philosophers upon which to draw. The latest such philosophical work is Michael Strevens's Depth, a book which by its size and length alone merits its title. This review will serve as a brief introduction for those in science education who will need some signposting to navigate their way through an important book which plumbs the philosophical depths of the nature of explanation. However, the book is clearly written so is accessible to those whose main area of work is not philosophy. But that does not mean that all the elements that go into the account of explanation developed in the book are clear and unproblematic. Part I of the book will be useful to those in science education as it is a survey of several theories of explanation that have been proposed in recent years such as the following: subsumption accounts such as Hempel's deductive-nomological model in which explanations are in terms of more general patterns such as laws operating in particular conditions; causal accounts such as those of Reichenbach and Salmon (to mention a few); the counterfactual and causal history account of Lewis; the manipulation account of causation and explanation proposed by Woodward. All of these set the scene for Strevens's own ''kairetic'' account of explanation developed from Part II onwards. Part IV of the book sets out his ''kairetic'' account of probabilistic explanation; as important as this is, it will not be discussed in this review which is confined to deterministic accounts of explanation. Strevens proposes a tight linkage between understanding and explanation: 'I take scientific understanding to be that state produced, and only produced, by grasping a true explanation' (p 3). The psychologistic word 'grasping' is important here as Stevens also distinguishes between explanation understood as a communicative act in which
Uploads
Papers by Robert Nola