Papers by Nirmalangshu Mukherji
Philosophy East & West, 2024
This intriguing and original work may be viewed as something like a conjoined
study of certain ... more This intriguing and original work may be viewed as something like a conjoined
study of certain obscure issues in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
and some ideas and images in Rabindranath Tagore’s literary pieces, especially
his mystical poems and plays. As the title suggests, the work is pretty much
restricted to just one lingering theme from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and the
possibility of grasping this obscure theme in poetic terms of Tagore, rather than
in terms of the standard discourse of analytic philosophy. The author deserves a
round of applause for conceiving this work.
The author embarks on the project by setting aside the so-called
“resolute” reading of the Tractatus proposed by Cora Diamond and James Conant
in the Realistic Spirit (MIT, 1991). According to Diamond and Conant, the
enigmatic propositions of the Tractatus are to be viewed as a “therapy” against
the human urge to philosophize. Without getting into the intricate, and often
obscure, discussion that followed Diamond and Conant’s work, Sarkar simply
adopts a non-resolute reading of the Tractatus under which the propositions of
the Tractatus are metaphysically significant. Sarkar’s main evidence in favour of
the non-resolute reading consists of a flurry of remarks from Wittgenstein himself
on what he considered to be the significant aspect of the book (pp. 3-6). One is
thus motivated to directly engage with the purported metaphysical significance
of perhaps the most enigmatic theme in the Tractatus.
The theme under study is Wittgenstein’s puzzling remark, “What we cannot
talk about, we must pass over in silence.” Adopting a non-resolute understanding
of the remark, the author suggests that Wittgenstein advocates a limit to what
can be expressed in language. However, following the non-resolute reading,
Wittgenstein cannot be viewed as advocating that whatever is thus passed over
in silence lacks significance. In fact, citing Wittgenstein (pp. 6-7), Sarkar contends
that drawing the limits of what can be expressed cannot indicate boundaries of
thought because that will mean thinking the unthinkable. Once a limit is drawn,
what falls on the unexpressed side of thought—the silent thought—necessarily
becomes ineffable in the context of the language in use. One may then undertake
an inquiry into the significance of the ineffable.
Springer eBooks, 2017
The discipline called philosophy of mind aims to study the so-called mentalistic concepts like co... more The discipline called philosophy of mind aims to study the so-called mentalistic concepts like consciousness, belief, knowledge, perception and intentionality. The mind is also the subject of scientific inquiry in the cognitive sciences—most prominently in terms of the study of the brain and the nervous system. The study of consciousness lies at the center of the joint enterprise. However, the scientific study of the concept of consciousness is beset with so many fundamental problems that we might wonder if there is a genuine study of consciousness at all. Why is the concept in universal use then? What role does it play in our common life? We suggest that consciousness could be a concept whose importance and use in our common life need not mean that it picks out some property of some delineable object. The concept plays a singular role in anchoring the concept of a person; the concept shows up the moment we wish to extend the concept of a person to fetuses and fauna. We need the concept to form some conception of an ethical order consisting of fellow beings just as we need the concept of beauty to form a conception of an aesthetic order. Those needs are essentially normative with no demand for descriptive truth; hence, there is no demand for a theory.
We all wonder about the relations between science, philosophy and common life, but the topics pre... more We all wonder about the relations between science, philosophy and common life, but the topics present such a wide variety of unconnected thoughts that we despair to have any clear insights. Nirmalanghsu Mukherji's compelling book, Reflections on Human Inquiry, brings forth the relations between science, philosophy and common life in ways that are scientifically well-informed, philosophically rich and seamlessly connected to each other. The book has twelve chapters, with the initial chapters (1 to 5) dealing with what is described as the Galilean style and skepticism thereof and the later chapters dealing with the various problems that philosophers deal with regarding the nature of knowledge, belief, consciousness. Then two chapters (11 and 12, respectively) offer reflections on the relation between literature and philosophy and what kind of education is right for our species. The book has many fundamental insights. To mention just a few: an intelligible space is made for skepticism, some light is thrown on the way the history of philosophy and science are intertwined, remarks are made on the nature and history of Indian philosophy which are surprising and suggestive and a distinction is drawn between the order of things which humans inquire into and the needs of humans.
Respectable scientific opinion holds that the human species is on the verge of untimely extinctio... more Respectable scientific opinion holds that the human species is on the verge of untimely extinction. Species become extinct due to what may be viewed as natural reasons that are external to the species. At the current stage of knowledge, there is no definite prediction that the human species is about to become extinct due to the convergence of natural background factors or some catastrophic event, such as the striking of a giant asteroid. The extinction of the species will most likely be caused by the suicidal behaviour of the species itself. The species-terminating behaviour is the result of the most sophisticated thinking pursued for hundreds of years in great centres of learning. In that sense, there is a direct correlation between the culture of enlightenment and the untimely extinction of the species. According to Noam Chomsky, the so-called least advanced people are the ones taking the lead in trying to protect all of us from extinction. Informed by their ancient knowledge-systems, indigenous populations across the world are resisting the plunder of the planet. However, indigenous knowledge-systems are in radical conflict not only with global capitalism but with modern education itself, thus raising the issue of radical choice. This is because the so-called enlightened conception of education, which is primarily responsible for bringing the species to the brink of extinction, is uncritically assumed to be the only one we have. The issue goes much beyond the classical domain of the pedagogy of the oppressed.
The MIT Press eBooks, 2010
Abbreviations Glossary of Local Terms Acknowledgement Introduction 1. Dark Clouds over Dandakaran... more Abbreviations Glossary of Local Terms Acknowledgement Introduction 1. Dark Clouds over Dandakaranya 2. Fragile Democracy 3. Role of Intellectuals 4. Arms over People 5. Forms of Resistance 6. Quest for Peace Appendix I: Interview with Ganapathy Appendix II: Sanhati Statement on Operation Green Hunt Notes References Index
sacw.net | 12 November 2008 The Batla house operation by the special cell of Delhi police has reo... more sacw.net | 12 November 2008 The Batla house operation by the special cell of Delhi police has reopened unanswered questions about the functioning of this agency. Familiar Story Killings and…
The concept of mind is an elusive one. Attempts to understand mind as a separate substance, a rep... more The concept of mind is an elusive one. Attempts to understand mind as a separate substance, a repertoire of behavioural dispositions, and as states of the brain, remain unsatisfactory. In this dismal scene, the folk concept of belief promised understanding of the mind without stepping into any of these options. The folk concept of belief has been viewed as designating mental states with some formally identifiable content, namely, the content of propositional attitudes. Thus, the concept of belief displays the character of mind by characterizing its states. A series of problems plague the prospect of determining contents of mental states. Moreover, ascription of beliefs does not seem to furnish a genuine science of the mind if beliefs are viewed in psychological terms. A very different view of beliefs emerges once they are freed from their alleged psychological role. In the alternative framework, the folk concept sorts beliefs into different kinds to highlight the believer, the kind of person she is. Since the sorting is always in context depending on the agents and their histories, no partitioning of beliefs is possible in advance. In that sense, belief is a concept designed for social-normative function; it is not meant to designate some ‘genetic’ property of the human mind. The non-psychological view explains why radical scepticism, a scepticism that disbelieves everything, is genuinely possible.
Why didn’t modern science develop independently in India despite impressive achievements in lingu... more Why didn’t modern science develop independently in India despite impressive achievements in linguistics, logic, and computational techniques? One aspect of this very complex socio-historical inquiry concerns the philosophical issue of which epistemological categories are prominently available in the intellectual culture of a tradition. After rejecting a number of options, the discussion focuses on the concept of knowledge advanced by Plato, which has been formulated in contemporary times as justified true belief (JTB). It seems this concept of knowledge never found prominence in Indian philosophy. A detailed examination of JTB suggests that it does not work as a psychological theory of the epistemic subject. However, the theory seems to be normatively significant in prescribing who may be ascribed knowledge in the face of large-scale scepticism. The theory may be viewed as a set of conditions that a knowledge-claim must satisfy in order to convince the sceptic of the validity of the claim. Theoretically, this concept will not be needed in a culture in which there is already settled agreement on what counts as knowledge in terms of texts that may not be questioned. It is likely that the authority of the Vedas in the Indian tradition foreclosed the possibility of inquiry that could have led to modern science.
The MIT Press eBooks, Mar 5, 2010
The MIT Press eBooks, Mar 5, 2010
Eliding the Noun in Close Apposition, or Greek polydefinites Revisited 129 MARIKA LEKAKOU & KRISZ... more Eliding the Noun in Close Apposition, or Greek polydefinites Revisited 129 MARIKA LEKAKOU & KRISZTA SZENDROI Relatives and Pronouns in the English Cleft Construction 157 MATTHEW REEVE Japanese wa-phrases that aren't topics 183 REIKO VERMEULEN iv Semantics and Pragmatics Generativity, Relevance and the Problem of Polysemy INGRID LOSSIUS FALKUM Subsentential utterances, ellipsis, and pragmatic enrichment ALISON HALL Plurals, possibilities, and conjunctive disjunction NATHAN KLINEDINST Logic in Pragmatics 285 HIROYUKI UCHIDA Appendices Contents of UCLWPL vols. 1-16 UCLWPL subscription/exchange
It is not surprising that all forms of human reflective enterprise, such as science, philosophy, ... more It is not surprising that all forms of human reflective enterprise, such as science, philosophy, literature, music and the fine arts, will display some convergence somewhere in the total reflective spectrum. However, there is a lingering intuition that there is more to the convergence of literature and philosophy than what is captured in the general idea. How do we conceptualise this special bond? Since both literature and philosophy are ancient, complex and richly varied forms of human thought with indefinite contours often tinged with conflicting cultural expectations, it is unlikely that some 'essentialist' answer to the question raised above could be non-trivially reached. So I will refrain from either defining "literature" and "philosophy" or attempt to locate their respective areas of operation via necessarily biased selection of texts. Instead, assuming large areas of convergence, I will ask: is there a penchant for some goal which is not directly open to other forms of reflective endeavour, especially science, but without which the understanding of the human condition remains significantly incomplete? Supposing there to be an answer to this question, does the answer relate to or explain some empirical fact common (perhaps only) to literature and philosophy? As the title suggests, I will argue that an understanding at once of common life with all its richness and complexity forces a rather specific notion of textuality which governs both literature and philosophy; it does not govern any other reflective form as far as I can see.
Page 1. Noam Chomsky LA ARQUITECTURA LENGUAJE^ 2-Edición Page 2. OTROS LIBROS KAIRÓS: G Bateson, ... more Page 1. Noam Chomsky LA ARQUITECTURA LENGUAJE^ 2-Edición Page 2. OTROS LIBROS KAIRÓS: G Bateson, R. Birdwhistell, E. Gofrman, ET Hall, P, Watzlawick, 1). Jackson, A. Scheflen y oíros I \M EVA COMÍ NICACIÓN ...
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this p... more The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals), Sep 1, 2011
Biolinguistics, Sep 26, 2011
Even if the human species is not the only one that has a mind, it may be the only one that knows ... more Even if the human species is not the only one that has a mind, it may be the only one that knows that it does. Fascination with our own mind, with what we feel, sense, and think, lies at the heart of human nature and has unsurprisingly become a major part of scientific inquiry itself. Rigorous scientific inquiry into the character of mind has been a part of all major traditions in scientific thought, but the character of these inquiries varied across different traditions, some of which have also been essentially separate for millennia and are only being rediscovered now. Thus, the formal study of grammar was an essential ingredient in the Indian Classical tradition, leading to more than a thousand years of rich and intense discussions in linguistics and philosophy of language in the hands of Vyakaranvadis (grammarians) such as Pāṇini, Tolkappiyar, and other authors in their traditions respectively in northern and southern India (Matilal 1990). There is essentially no parallel to this in the Ancient Greek tradition, where not grammar but geometry was the entry point to science. And although Aristotle developed a model of the sentence that has proved relatively stable for two thousand years of linguistic theory (Moro 1997), the first tradition of Universal Grammar in the Western world emerged not before the 1200s in Paris (Covington 2009), where Modistic grammarians viewed grammar as a formatting principle for a species-unique kind of thought. Flourishing across much of Northern Europe by the end of the 13 th century, it eclipsed after less than a hundred years when nominalist doctrines entered the scene and logic took pride over grammar again as a meta-theoretic framework. Interestingly, a similar eclipse happened with the grammarian tradition in India as the logico-empiricist framework of the Nyayaikas (logicians) became dominant. The next tradition in scientific thinking about human grammar, namely Port Royal, emerged within Cartesian rationalism in the 17 th century, and was taken up by Noam Chomsky in the 20 th (Chomsky 1966). With this last tradition we associate the term 'second cognitive revolution', which now is little more than 50 years old. To review it was part of the goals of an international conference convened by Nirmalangshu Mukherji, Wolfram Hinzen, Funding from the grant 'Un-Cartesian Linguistics' (AHRC/DFG, AH/H50009X/1, to Hinzen), which went into the preparations for the conference and into the writing of this report, is gratefully acknowledged.
The MIT Press eBooks, Mar 5, 2010
Philosophical Psychology, Jun 1, 2003
C HL is Noam Chomsky's shorthand for "Single Computational System of human language.&quo... more C HL is Noam Chomsky's shorthand for "Single Computational System of human language." C HL is that part of the faculty of language (FL) that integrates lexical information to form linguistic expressions at the interfaces where language interacts with other cognitive systems. In this paper, I am asking whether the elements of FL are dedicated to language alone, or whether significant parts of FL might apply beyond language. From a close examination of the properties of the principles of C HL , I argue that they might well apply to a class of natural symbol systems that includes language and other cognitive systems. This issue of linguistic specificity differs from a similar issue raised recently by Chomsky. For Chomsky, while the "elements" of the linguistic system per se are drawn from all over nature, general principles of computational efficiency control the operation of the system. Currently, there is little empirical motivation for this vast generalization to all of nature. The more restricted generalization proposed here looks better suited to the current form of inquiry on language and related system.
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Papers by Nirmalangshu Mukherji
study of certain obscure issues in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
and some ideas and images in Rabindranath Tagore’s literary pieces, especially
his mystical poems and plays. As the title suggests, the work is pretty much
restricted to just one lingering theme from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and the
possibility of grasping this obscure theme in poetic terms of Tagore, rather than
in terms of the standard discourse of analytic philosophy. The author deserves a
round of applause for conceiving this work.
The author embarks on the project by setting aside the so-called
“resolute” reading of the Tractatus proposed by Cora Diamond and James Conant
in the Realistic Spirit (MIT, 1991). According to Diamond and Conant, the
enigmatic propositions of the Tractatus are to be viewed as a “therapy” against
the human urge to philosophize. Without getting into the intricate, and often
obscure, discussion that followed Diamond and Conant’s work, Sarkar simply
adopts a non-resolute reading of the Tractatus under which the propositions of
the Tractatus are metaphysically significant. Sarkar’s main evidence in favour of
the non-resolute reading consists of a flurry of remarks from Wittgenstein himself
on what he considered to be the significant aspect of the book (pp. 3-6). One is
thus motivated to directly engage with the purported metaphysical significance
of perhaps the most enigmatic theme in the Tractatus.
The theme under study is Wittgenstein’s puzzling remark, “What we cannot
talk about, we must pass over in silence.” Adopting a non-resolute understanding
of the remark, the author suggests that Wittgenstein advocates a limit to what
can be expressed in language. However, following the non-resolute reading,
Wittgenstein cannot be viewed as advocating that whatever is thus passed over
in silence lacks significance. In fact, citing Wittgenstein (pp. 6-7), Sarkar contends
that drawing the limits of what can be expressed cannot indicate boundaries of
thought because that will mean thinking the unthinkable. Once a limit is drawn,
what falls on the unexpressed side of thought—the silent thought—necessarily
becomes ineffable in the context of the language in use. One may then undertake
an inquiry into the significance of the ineffable.
study of certain obscure issues in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
and some ideas and images in Rabindranath Tagore’s literary pieces, especially
his mystical poems and plays. As the title suggests, the work is pretty much
restricted to just one lingering theme from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and the
possibility of grasping this obscure theme in poetic terms of Tagore, rather than
in terms of the standard discourse of analytic philosophy. The author deserves a
round of applause for conceiving this work.
The author embarks on the project by setting aside the so-called
“resolute” reading of the Tractatus proposed by Cora Diamond and James Conant
in the Realistic Spirit (MIT, 1991). According to Diamond and Conant, the
enigmatic propositions of the Tractatus are to be viewed as a “therapy” against
the human urge to philosophize. Without getting into the intricate, and often
obscure, discussion that followed Diamond and Conant’s work, Sarkar simply
adopts a non-resolute reading of the Tractatus under which the propositions of
the Tractatus are metaphysically significant. Sarkar’s main evidence in favour of
the non-resolute reading consists of a flurry of remarks from Wittgenstein himself
on what he considered to be the significant aspect of the book (pp. 3-6). One is
thus motivated to directly engage with the purported metaphysical significance
of perhaps the most enigmatic theme in the Tractatus.
The theme under study is Wittgenstein’s puzzling remark, “What we cannot
talk about, we must pass over in silence.” Adopting a non-resolute understanding
of the remark, the author suggests that Wittgenstein advocates a limit to what
can be expressed in language. However, following the non-resolute reading,
Wittgenstein cannot be viewed as advocating that whatever is thus passed over
in silence lacks significance. In fact, citing Wittgenstein (pp. 6-7), Sarkar contends
that drawing the limits of what can be expressed cannot indicate boundaries of
thought because that will mean thinking the unthinkable. Once a limit is drawn,
what falls on the unexpressed side of thought—the silent thought—necessarily
becomes ineffable in the context of the language in use. One may then undertake
an inquiry into the significance of the ineffable.
These essays are a fragile and essentially personal effort to come to grips with this overwhelming question. Although most of the essays involve scholarly and investigative engagement, and I do urge certain ways of looking at the massive issues confronting humanity today, there are no blue-prints. These are expressions of anguish and anger, perhaps even fear, directed at mounting insanity; celebration of little glimmers of hope; attempts to analyze, understand, expose, locate the ground, and act. Stepping out of the reclusive study, one met anguished members from one’s own privileged community of intellectuals, yearning to do something. Groups were formed, petitions drafted, meetings organized. As more and more hands joined, the contours of a focused struggle emerged: the horrors of 9-11 merged into the terror of December 13 and its aftermath.
The essays are placed in roughly chronological order; they are organized in five groups with some narrative unity imposed under broad headings for each group. The Introduction lays out the context of these essays and strives to explain how these groups of essays lead from one broad topic to the next, but I have refrained from summarising individual essays. Since the essays were individually written in a disjoint fashion for specific intervention in grim national and international contexts during the last two decades, there are inevitably some repetitions in the narrative. The essays are carefully chosen to minimize repetitions, but I have not tampered much with the remaining ones since most of the essays, not all, are prominently published. For the same reason, I have not interfered with the mention of timing, such as recently, last week, next month etc. in the individual essays. Since the origin of each essay is clearly mentioned along with the title, the timings can be easily inferred.
As noted, the essays mostly originated with the catastrophic events of 9/11. As such, there is some general review of the global scene at certain points. However, as we move from the horror of 9/11 to the terror of December 13, most investigative pieces in the collection focus on the character of the Indian state, its legal system, the police, electoral politics, resistance movements, and the like. Several essays contain strong, documented indictments of aspects of governance in India including the functioning of the current right-wing regime headed by Narendra Modi. Some other essays are very critical of resistance movements such as the Maoist insurgency; others raise probing questions for the liberal democratic forces, including the left. It is natural thus that the collection ends with sustained reflections on some aspects of Gandhian thought which may well be the panacea for the continuation of the human race unless it is already too late.
When these essays are read together, they do bring out the significance of three general themes around which the essays are woven: (i) the rise of murderous regimes endangering the survival of the species, (ii) responsibility of intellectuals in the absence of classical democratic resistance and (iii) forms of available resistance. Under these broad concerns, the essays try to convey a personal narrative of the Indian socio-political scene, with an eye on the collapsing world order, as they evolved in the rather turbulent decades of this century.
Call the mind at work, The Generative Mind. What constitutes the generative mind? For the simplest explanation, suppose the generative mind constitutes of a single principle that puts ideas together in different domains, apparently without limit; call it Principle G. How do we characterize Principal G?
No doubt, in terms of spread and social significance, human language is the most obvious and dominating example of the generative mind. Some classical philosophers suggested that language is the mirror of the mind. Moreover, after centuries of investigation beginning with Panini and the Greeks, we know something about how the linguistic mind works. So maybe we can find an entry into the intriguing phenomenon of music—not to mention elusive phenomena of knitting and painting—by studying the generative structure of language. In this work thus we propose to examine the generative mind through the lens of language. For example, we will inquire if the generative principle of language, called Merge, may be viewed as Principle G.
It is unlikely that, beginning with the study of language, we will be able to cover, within the space of a book, the largely uncharted ground to the distant phenomena of knitting, cooking, Yoga, and gardening. Yet there is a strong intuition that, at some abstract level of design, these things exhibit the same human competence. The hope is that the method of inquiry might at least suggest a meaningful direction for a wider coverage beyond language. In that sense, this work essentially sketches a program for mapping out the territory of the generative mind for further exploration. The basic steps of the project is sketched in the Introduction.
A preliminary study of these themes was attempted nearly two decades ago in a largely hesitant and incomplete monograph which remained unceremoniously stacked in the warehouses of an old building (Mukherji 2000). There are glaring problems of organization and presentation in that book, yet I was surprised to find recently how much of it continues to be valid. The present book vastly extends the scope of that early study. Although bits and pieces of this book are borrowed from earlier publications, especially in Chapters One, Two, and Five, most of the work reported here remained unpublished. In fact, very little was discussed in seminars and meetings because this work was mostly pursued in the shadows.
Some of the research reported here was carried out in several extended visits to the Indian Institute of Advanced Study located in Shimla. There were also shorter visits to the Institut Jean Nicod in Paris and the Institute of Advanced Studies in Durham University, England. I am grateful to the directors of these institutes—Peter Desouza, Pierre Jacob, Francois Recanati and Ash Amin—for these very pleasant visits. Thanks also to Roberto Casati and Wolfram Hinzen for much help during our stay in Paris and Durham respectively.
During the long gestation, this work has benefitted from comments, suggestions, criticism and encouragement from many people for nearly two decades. For this version in particular, I am indebted to Noam Chomsky, Ian Tattersall and Norbert Hornstein for detailed, often severely critical, comments on Chapters Three, Four and Five. I am also thankful to the reviewers for some fine suggestions regarding the organization of the volume. The remaining mistakes have obvious agency.
This volume was scheduled for publication in 2018. Unfortunately, a series of unforeseen events, including long spells of serious illness in the family, delayed the publication by several years. I am indebted to my editors at Bloomsbury for their patience and empathy during this turbulent period. As I look back, there is very little resemblance between what was planned four years ago and the final version. I hope the intervening years added more structure to the otherwise elusive search for the human mind.
At one point in human history it was thought that modern science, especially theoretical physics, is the paradigm of human inquiry. Where does this form of inquiry significantly apply? Are there limits on its claims of truth and objectivity? How much of the vast canvas of human experience does it cover? Where do other forms of inquiry, such as philosophy, religion, and the arts, attain their salience?
With the emergence of scientific study of the human mind itself, these critical questions have taken a more intriguing form in recent decades. Can human inquiry investigate its own nature? Can the scientific theory of language explain the richness of human expression? Can a science of the mind account for human experience?
These probing questions on the scientific enterprise are usually addressed from the outside, as it were, by humanists and critical theorists. In these essays, they are examined from the inside by a philosopher whose primary academic work concerns the study of the human linguistic mind. In that sense, the sceptical inquiry turns on itself.
– Noam Chomsky
The terrorist attack on Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001 posed a test-case for Indian democracy. This book tells the story of how civil institutions in India – the media, the police, the political executive and the judiciary – failed the test. As a result, the question ‘who attacked Parliament’ remained unanswered, and the human rights of the accused were seriously violated. The following issues, among others, are examined in detail: complicity between the media and the police; actions of the NDA government in promoting fear and prejudice; largescale fabrication and concoction by the investigating agency; biased trial and judgment in the POTA court and ‘balancing act’ of the High Court
The discussion is supported with extensive documentation from newspaper reports, judicial statements, public statements, and some important but little-known literature on the subject published earlier. Most of these are included in the Annexures. The book ends with a strong appeal for a comprehensive parliamentary inquiry.
We develop some preliminary considerations to suggest that the Chomsky-Berwick proposal is radically false. There is no thought without antecedent sound/gesture. Sound/gesture gives the ‘body’ to thought; sound/gesture enables thought to come to being, so to speaks. If time permits, a range of consequences will be sketched.