This study addresses the dynamics of how states employ proxies to achieve their strategic goals i... more This study addresses the dynamics of how states employ proxies to achieve their strategic goals in the so-called gray zone between normal competition and armed conflict. The basic question is whether the use of proxies by the challenger in a crisis decreases the probability that the defender state will respond with violence. We start by examining a broad set of crises where the initial triggering act is either nonviolent or violent, to assess whether defenders respond to proxy triggers or triggers by the challengers themselves with a greater propensity for violence (hypothesis A). We also consider a narrower set of cases, where the triggering act is violent, asking whether the defender is more likely to respond in a tit-for-tat manner to a proxy, or to a state challenger (hypothesis B). We find that proxy use is associated with a higher probability of defender violence, regardless of whether the initial crisis trigger was itself violent. In addition, when the trigger is violent, defenders are more likely to respond in a tit-for-tat manner when a proxy does the triggering. Proxy usage actually leads to violent escalation, potentially questioning the assumption that challengers may minimize damage through the use of proxies. Este estudio aborda la dinámica de cómo los Estados emplean subsisiarios (proxies) para alcanzar sus objetivos estratégicos en la llamada “zona gris” entre la competencia normal y el conflicto armado. La pregunta básica es si el uso de subsidiarios por parte del retador en una crisis disminuye la probabilidad de que el Estado defensor responda con violencia. Comenzamos examinando un amplio conjunto de crisis en las que el acto inicial desencadenante es no violento o violento, para evaluar si los defensores responden a los desencadenantes de los subsidiarios o a los desencadenantes por parte de los propios atacantes con una mayor propensión a la violencia (hipótesis A). También consideramos un conjunto más reducido de casos, en los que el acto desencadenante es violento, y nos preguntamos si es más probable que el defensor responda de manera fulminante a un subsidiario o a un estado atacante (hipótesis B). Comprobamos que el uso de subsidiarios se asocia con una mayor probabilidad de violencia por parte del defensor, independientemente de si el desencadenante de la crisis inicial fue en sí mismo violento. Además, cuando el desencadenante es violento, los subsidiarios son más propensos a responder en forma de “ojo por ojo” cuando el desencadenante es un subsidiario. El uso de subsidiarios conduce, en realidad, a una escalada violenta, lo que cuestiona potencialmente la suposición de que los atacantes puedan minimizar los daños mediante el uso de subsidiarios. Cette étude aborde les dynamiques de la façon dont les États emploient des mandataires pour atteindre leurs objectifs stratégiques dans ce que nous qualifions de « zone grise » entre la concurrence normale et le conflit armé. La question fondamentale est de savoir si le recours à de mandataires par un opposant dans une crise réduit la probabilité que l’État défenseur réponde par la violence. Nous commençons par examiner un large éventail de crises dont l'acte déclencheur initial a été soit non violent, soit violent, afin d’évaluer si les défenseurs répondent aux déclencheurs des mandataires ou aux déclencheurs des opposants eux-mêmes par une plus grande propension à la violence (hypothèse A). Nous étudions également un éventail plus étroit de cas dont l'acte déclencheur a été violent en nous demandons si le défenseur est davantage susceptible de répondre du tac au tac à un mandataire ou à un opposant étatique (hypothèse B). Nous constatons que le recours à des mandataires est associé à une probabilité plus élevée de violence de la part du défenseur, que le déclencheur initial de la crise soit lui-même violent ou non. De plus, lorsque le déclencheur est violent, les défenseurs sont davantage susceptibles de réagir du tac au tac lorsqu'un mandataire est à l'origine du déclenchement. Le recours à des mandataires mène en réalité à une escalade de la violence, ce qui remet potentiellement en question l'hypothèse selon laquelle les opposants pourraient minimiser les dégâts en recourant à des mandataires.
While emotional content predicts social media post sharing, competing theories of emotion imply d... more While emotional content predicts social media post sharing, competing theories of emotion imply different predictions about how emotional content will influence the virality of social media posts. We tested and compared these theoretical frameworks. Teams of annotators assessed more than 4000 multimedia posts from Polish and Lithuanian Facebook for more than 20 emotions. We found that, drawing on semantic space theory, modeling discrete emotions independently was superior to models examining valence (positive or negative), activation/arousal (high or low), or clusters of emotions and was on par with but had more explanatory power than a seven basic emotion model. Certain discrete emotions were associated with post sharing, including both positive and negative and relatively lower and higher activation/arousal emotions (e.g., amusement, cute/kama muta, anger, and sadness) even when controlling for number of followers, time up, topic, and Facebook angry reactions. These results provid...
When planning to deal with any adversary or potential adversaries, it is essential to understand ... more When planning to deal with any adversary or potential adversaries, it is essential to understand who they are, how they function, their strengths and vulnerabilities, and why they oppose us. Events over the course of the last year and a half highlight the importance of those factors as they relate to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or Da'esh). One of Da'esh's obvious strengths is its ability to propagate tailored messages that resonate with its audiences. If the US Government and our allies are to counter Da'esh effectively, we must attack this center of gravity. The Joint Staff J-39 Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) branch has been evaluating options in "Cognitive Space" to conduct Information Operations to disrupt Da'esh's ability to command and control forces, neutralize its ability to maintain or increase moral, political, and financial support as well as recruit foreign fighters. This SMA effort continues to identify methods to psychologically isolate Da'esh leaders from one another and their respective constituencies inside and outside of the organization. Furthermore, this SMA effort has been assessing the value of "integrated neuro-cognitive-narrative maneuver" approaches to develop messages and actions that are more likely to have intended effects and less likely to have undesirable unintended or collateral effects, as well as to evaluate message delivery methods more effectively and efficiently by developing campaigns that achieve undercutting effects. The cornerstone of the effort was the execution of a simulation facilitated by the University of Maryland ICONS team, which sought to a. support the Psychological Operations (PSYOP) community in meeting training requirements in ways that reinforce the PSYOP process and enhance counter-Da'esh messaging. b. support the PSYOP community in integrating neuro-cognitive and social science concepts to refine counter-Da'esh message content and increase the effectiveness of the Information Operations (IO) campaign. c. assist the PSYOP community with understanding the operational environment (OE) and the human networks operating in the OE: friendly, threat, and neutral. Possible examples include providing a (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure) PMESIIframed OE analysis and center of gravity analysis. This white paper is a compilation of the key findings from the simulation.
Should the U.S. respond with military means to a limited Russian incursion in the Baltics? This p... more Should the U.S. respond with military means to a limited Russian incursion in the Baltics? This paper explores Western attitudes towards such a hypothetical grey zone crisis. Using survey experiments and crisis simulations we find considerable reluctance to use military tools in order to support a Baltic ally, and surprisingly little variation across the audiences. The underlying reluctance to get the U.S. involved in an armed conflict with Russia in the hopes that such acquiescence may help preserve global stability indicates that the conflict in Ukraine only had a fundamentally limited impact on Western strategic thought on deterring Russia.
This study addresses the dynamics of how states employ proxies to achieve their strategic goals i... more This study addresses the dynamics of how states employ proxies to achieve their strategic goals in the so-called gray zone between normal competition and armed conflict. The basic question is whether the use of proxies by the challenger in a crisis decreases the probability that the defender state will respond with violence. We start by examining a broad set of crises where the initial triggering act is either nonviolent or violent, to assess whether defenders respond to proxy triggers or triggers by the challengers themselves with a greater propensity for violence (hypothesis A). We also consider a narrower set of cases, where the triggering act is violent, asking whether the defender is more likely to respond in a tit-for-tat manner to a proxy, or to a state challenger (hypothesis B). We find that proxy use is associated with a higher probability of defender violence, regardless of whether the initial crisis trigger was itself violent. In addition, when the trigger is violent, def...
Crisis communication research emphasizes the necessity for organized, informed, and effective str... more Crisis communication research emphasizes the necessity for organized, informed, and effective strategies when engaging audiences. However it is often difficult to apply best practices from academic literature in real life situations. One way to bridge this gap is with an interactive simulation, which lets participants to test their ability to operate in a crisis. This paper describes the creation and implementation of an online crisis communication simulation developed for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The simulation uses a server-side software platform called ICONSnet™, which allows complexity in its design with both minimal overhead costs and human facilitation difficulties.
Crisis communication research emphasizes the necessity for organized, informed, and effective str... more Crisis communication research emphasizes the necessity for organized, informed, and effective strategies when engaging audiences. However it is often difficult to apply best practices from academic literature in real life situations. One way to bridge this gap is with an interactive simulation, which lets participants to test their ability to operate in a crisis. This paper describes the creation and implementation of an online crisis communication simulation developed for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The simulation uses a server-side software platform called ICONSnetTM, which allows complexity in its design with both minimal overhead costs and human facilitation difficulties.
This study addresses the dynamics of how states employ proxies to achieve their strategic goals i... more This study addresses the dynamics of how states employ proxies to achieve their strategic goals in the so-called gray zone between normal competition and armed conflict. The basic question is whether the use of proxies by the challenger in a crisis decreases the probability that the defender state will respond with violence. We start by examining a broad set of crises where the initial triggering act is either nonviolent or violent, to assess whether defenders respond to proxy triggers or triggers by the challengers themselves with a greater propensity for violence (hypothesis A). We also consider a narrower set of cases, where the triggering act is violent, asking whether the defender is more likely to respond in a tit-for-tat manner to a proxy, or to a state challenger (hypothesis B). We find that proxy use is associated with a higher probability of defender violence, regardless of whether the initial crisis trigger was itself violent. In addition, when the trigger is violent, defenders are more likely to respond in a tit-for-tat manner when a proxy does the triggering. Proxy usage actually leads to violent escalation, potentially questioning the assumption that challengers may minimize damage through the use of proxies. Este estudio aborda la dinámica de cómo los Estados emplean subsisiarios (proxies) para alcanzar sus objetivos estratégicos en la llamada “zona gris” entre la competencia normal y el conflicto armado. La pregunta básica es si el uso de subsidiarios por parte del retador en una crisis disminuye la probabilidad de que el Estado defensor responda con violencia. Comenzamos examinando un amplio conjunto de crisis en las que el acto inicial desencadenante es no violento o violento, para evaluar si los defensores responden a los desencadenantes de los subsidiarios o a los desencadenantes por parte de los propios atacantes con una mayor propensión a la violencia (hipótesis A). También consideramos un conjunto más reducido de casos, en los que el acto desencadenante es violento, y nos preguntamos si es más probable que el defensor responda de manera fulminante a un subsidiario o a un estado atacante (hipótesis B). Comprobamos que el uso de subsidiarios se asocia con una mayor probabilidad de violencia por parte del defensor, independientemente de si el desencadenante de la crisis inicial fue en sí mismo violento. Además, cuando el desencadenante es violento, los subsidiarios son más propensos a responder en forma de “ojo por ojo” cuando el desencadenante es un subsidiario. El uso de subsidiarios conduce, en realidad, a una escalada violenta, lo que cuestiona potencialmente la suposición de que los atacantes puedan minimizar los daños mediante el uso de subsidiarios. Cette étude aborde les dynamiques de la façon dont les États emploient des mandataires pour atteindre leurs objectifs stratégiques dans ce que nous qualifions de « zone grise » entre la concurrence normale et le conflit armé. La question fondamentale est de savoir si le recours à de mandataires par un opposant dans une crise réduit la probabilité que l’État défenseur réponde par la violence. Nous commençons par examiner un large éventail de crises dont l'acte déclencheur initial a été soit non violent, soit violent, afin d’évaluer si les défenseurs répondent aux déclencheurs des mandataires ou aux déclencheurs des opposants eux-mêmes par une plus grande propension à la violence (hypothèse A). Nous étudions également un éventail plus étroit de cas dont l'acte déclencheur a été violent en nous demandons si le défenseur est davantage susceptible de répondre du tac au tac à un mandataire ou à un opposant étatique (hypothèse B). Nous constatons que le recours à des mandataires est associé à une probabilité plus élevée de violence de la part du défenseur, que le déclencheur initial de la crise soit lui-même violent ou non. De plus, lorsque le déclencheur est violent, les défenseurs sont davantage susceptibles de réagir du tac au tac lorsqu'un mandataire est à l'origine du déclenchement. Le recours à des mandataires mène en réalité à une escalade de la violence, ce qui remet potentiellement en question l'hypothèse selon laquelle les opposants pourraient minimiser les dégâts en recourant à des mandataires.
While emotional content predicts social media post sharing, competing theories of emotion imply d... more While emotional content predicts social media post sharing, competing theories of emotion imply different predictions about how emotional content will influence the virality of social media posts. We tested and compared these theoretical frameworks. Teams of annotators assessed more than 4000 multimedia posts from Polish and Lithuanian Facebook for more than 20 emotions. We found that, drawing on semantic space theory, modeling discrete emotions independently was superior to models examining valence (positive or negative), activation/arousal (high or low), or clusters of emotions and was on par with but had more explanatory power than a seven basic emotion model. Certain discrete emotions were associated with post sharing, including both positive and negative and relatively lower and higher activation/arousal emotions (e.g., amusement, cute/kama muta, anger, and sadness) even when controlling for number of followers, time up, topic, and Facebook angry reactions. These results provid...
When planning to deal with any adversary or potential adversaries, it is essential to understand ... more When planning to deal with any adversary or potential adversaries, it is essential to understand who they are, how they function, their strengths and vulnerabilities, and why they oppose us. Events over the course of the last year and a half highlight the importance of those factors as they relate to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or Da'esh). One of Da'esh's obvious strengths is its ability to propagate tailored messages that resonate with its audiences. If the US Government and our allies are to counter Da'esh effectively, we must attack this center of gravity. The Joint Staff J-39 Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) branch has been evaluating options in "Cognitive Space" to conduct Information Operations to disrupt Da'esh's ability to command and control forces, neutralize its ability to maintain or increase moral, political, and financial support as well as recruit foreign fighters. This SMA effort continues to identify methods to psychologically isolate Da'esh leaders from one another and their respective constituencies inside and outside of the organization. Furthermore, this SMA effort has been assessing the value of "integrated neuro-cognitive-narrative maneuver" approaches to develop messages and actions that are more likely to have intended effects and less likely to have undesirable unintended or collateral effects, as well as to evaluate message delivery methods more effectively and efficiently by developing campaigns that achieve undercutting effects. The cornerstone of the effort was the execution of a simulation facilitated by the University of Maryland ICONS team, which sought to a. support the Psychological Operations (PSYOP) community in meeting training requirements in ways that reinforce the PSYOP process and enhance counter-Da'esh messaging. b. support the PSYOP community in integrating neuro-cognitive and social science concepts to refine counter-Da'esh message content and increase the effectiveness of the Information Operations (IO) campaign. c. assist the PSYOP community with understanding the operational environment (OE) and the human networks operating in the OE: friendly, threat, and neutral. Possible examples include providing a (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure) PMESIIframed OE analysis and center of gravity analysis. This white paper is a compilation of the key findings from the simulation.
Should the U.S. respond with military means to a limited Russian incursion in the Baltics? This p... more Should the U.S. respond with military means to a limited Russian incursion in the Baltics? This paper explores Western attitudes towards such a hypothetical grey zone crisis. Using survey experiments and crisis simulations we find considerable reluctance to use military tools in order to support a Baltic ally, and surprisingly little variation across the audiences. The underlying reluctance to get the U.S. involved in an armed conflict with Russia in the hopes that such acquiescence may help preserve global stability indicates that the conflict in Ukraine only had a fundamentally limited impact on Western strategic thought on deterring Russia.
This study addresses the dynamics of how states employ proxies to achieve their strategic goals i... more This study addresses the dynamics of how states employ proxies to achieve their strategic goals in the so-called gray zone between normal competition and armed conflict. The basic question is whether the use of proxies by the challenger in a crisis decreases the probability that the defender state will respond with violence. We start by examining a broad set of crises where the initial triggering act is either nonviolent or violent, to assess whether defenders respond to proxy triggers or triggers by the challengers themselves with a greater propensity for violence (hypothesis A). We also consider a narrower set of cases, where the triggering act is violent, asking whether the defender is more likely to respond in a tit-for-tat manner to a proxy, or to a state challenger (hypothesis B). We find that proxy use is associated with a higher probability of defender violence, regardless of whether the initial crisis trigger was itself violent. In addition, when the trigger is violent, def...
Crisis communication research emphasizes the necessity for organized, informed, and effective str... more Crisis communication research emphasizes the necessity for organized, informed, and effective strategies when engaging audiences. However it is often difficult to apply best practices from academic literature in real life situations. One way to bridge this gap is with an interactive simulation, which lets participants to test their ability to operate in a crisis. This paper describes the creation and implementation of an online crisis communication simulation developed for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The simulation uses a server-side software platform called ICONSnet™, which allows complexity in its design with both minimal overhead costs and human facilitation difficulties.
Crisis communication research emphasizes the necessity for organized, informed, and effective str... more Crisis communication research emphasizes the necessity for organized, informed, and effective strategies when engaging audiences. However it is often difficult to apply best practices from academic literature in real life situations. One way to bridge this gap is with an interactive simulation, which lets participants to test their ability to operate in a crisis. This paper describes the creation and implementation of an online crisis communication simulation developed for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The simulation uses a server-side software platform called ICONSnetTM, which allows complexity in its design with both minimal overhead costs and human facilitation difficulties.
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