Publications and papers by E. Maasland
Veiling van vergunningen voor commerciële radio-omroep, 2016
Advisory report written for the Dutch Ministery of Economic Affairs recommending models of auctio... more Advisory report written for the Dutch Ministery of Economic Affairs recommending models of auctions for licenses for local, regional and national commercial radio via FM and DAB+ in the Netherlands. At the time of the report the policy choice for auctioning was still an option.
in: W. Dolfsma and R. Nahuis (Eds.), KVS Pre-adviezen pp. 117-140. , 2005
Papers by E. Maasland
This paper analyzes empirically whether and if so to what extent later entrants in the European m... more This paper analyzes empirically whether and if so to what extent later entrants in the European mobile telephony industry have a disadvantage vis-a`-vis incumbents and early mover entrants. To analyze this question a dynamic model of market share development and a series of static models are considered. There is clear evidence of early mover advantage, mainly caused by the influence of the penetration rate: it pays to enter when still few people have acquired a mobile telephone. Another important determining factor is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index at the moment of entry: it is significantly easier to enter a highly concentrated industry. Finally, there are important differences between countries, possibly indicating the relative strength of the national regulators.
Medium Econometrische Toepassingen, 2005
... Sander Onderstal is assistant professor at the faculty of economics and econometrics of the U... more ... Sander Onderstal is assistant professor at the faculty of economics and econometrics of the University of AmM sterdam. ... (2002) respectively. 4William Vickrey earned the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 1996 primarily for his work on auction theory. ...
De Economist, 2006
This paper provides a swift tour of auction theory and its applications. Among the questions it c... more This paper provides a swift tour of auction theory and its applications. Among the questions it considers are: How much do bidders bid in commonly studied single-object auctions? How e¢ cient are these auctions? How much revenue do they generate? Which single-object auction maximizes the seller's expected revenue? What is the best way to auction incentive contracts? And, how e¢ cient and complex are multi-object auctions?
Marktprikkels in het …, 2006
... vervolgopleidingen. De vraag of bij de overige zes opleidingen die deel uitmaken van de eerst... more ... vervolgopleidingen. De vraag of bij de overige zes opleidingen die deel uitmaken van de eerste tran-che van het opleidingsfonds andere marktprikkels meer voor de hand liggen, komt in het afsluitende hoofdstuk kort aan de orde. ...
AUCTIONS AND BEAUTY CONTESTS …
7 MOBILE TELEPHONY (3G) Tilman Börgers, Emiel Maasland and Benny Moldovanu TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 IN... more 7 MOBILE TELEPHONY (3G) Tilman Börgers, Emiel Maasland and Benny Moldovanu TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION 113 2 AUCTIONS VERSUS BEAUTY ... In particular they will enjoy a positive cash-flow also during the years till full deployment of 3G services. ...
We construct optimal auctions when bidders face financial externalities.In a Coasean World, in wh... more We construct optimal auctions when bidders face financial externalities.In a Coasean World, in which the seller cannot prevent a perfect resale market, nor withhold the object, the lowest-price all-pay auction is optimal.In a Myersonean World, in which the seller can both prevent resale after the auction, and fully commit to not selling the object, an optimal two-stage mechanism is derived.In the first stage, bidders are asked to pay an entry fee.In the second stage, bidders play the lowest-price all-pay auction with a reserve price.In both worlds, the expected revenue is increasing in the financial externality, and each bidder's expected utility is independent of the financial externality.
Auctioning Public Assets Analysis …, 2004
... 192 Emiel Maasland and Benny Moldovanu artificially reduce their demand on that last unit. ..... more ... 192 Emiel Maasland and Benny Moldovanu artificially reduce their demand on that last unit. ... Complemen-tarities among the auctioned goods are usually a hindrance to efficiency (see McAfee and McMillan (1996) and Cramton (1997) for some US experience) and also create ...
In this paper we analyze empirically whether and if so to what extent later entrants in the Europ... more In this paper we analyze empirically whether and if so to what extent later entrants in the European mobile telephony industry have a disadvantage vis-à-vis incumbents and early mover entrants. To analyze this question we consider a series of static models and a dynamic model of market share development. We find a clear early mover advantage, mainly caused by the influence of the penetration rate: it pays to enter when still few people have acquired a mobile telephone. Another important determining factor is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index at the moment of entry: it is significantly easier to enter a highly concentrated industry. Finally, there are important differences between countries possibly indicating the relative strength of the national regulators. For example, it turns out that it is relatively difficult to enter the mobile telephony sector and gain market share in the Scandinavian countries.
tpedigitaal.nl
... voormalig CPB-er, maakt een sprong dit jaar van 26 naar 15, al moet gezegd dat hij deze spron... more ... voormalig CPB-er, maakt een sprong dit jaar van 26 naar 15, al moet gezegd dat hij deze sprong voornamelijk te ... Erik Schut, die naast hoogleraar gezondheidseconomie aan het Instituut Beleid & Management Gezondheidszorg (iBMG) van de Erasmus Univer-siteit Rotterdam ...
This note studies a version of the Stackelberg model in which the Leader has more information abo... more This note studies a version of the Stackelberg model in which the Leader has more information about demand than the Follower. We show that there exists a unique D1 equilibrium and that this equilibrium is perfectly revealing. We also give a full characterization of the equilibrium in terms of the posterior beliefs of the Follower and show under which condition there is first mover disadvantage.
Demand-side financing is a way in which the government can finance private consumption of certain... more Demand-side financing is a way in which the government can finance private consumption of certain goods. In contrast to supply-side financing, where the public money goes directly to suppliers, under demand-side financing consumers receive a certain amount of money for specific expenditures. In this report we discuss several instruments of demand-side financing, like vouchers, flat-rate subsidies and money and we analyze their impact on consumer surplus, supply side and the government budget. We show among others that the effect of introducing demand-side financing depends on the degree of competitiveness. In a competitive market, introducing demand-side financing leads to higher welfare and/or lowering of government expenditure, but in an uncompetitive market the effects can be opposite.
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Publications and papers by E. Maasland
Papers by E. Maasland