Books by Kateryna Pishchikova
This report revisits the paradigms of liberalism and democracy, and questions the ways in which l... more This report revisits the paradigms of liberalism and democracy, and questions the ways in which liberal and democratic values are expressed domestically and promoted The authors examine the dynamics of democracy, and the forces and mechanisms that derail or obstruct democratic development, or, alternatively, foster democratic sustainability at the national and international levels. The atrophy observed today in more or less established democracies forces us to revisit the question of how core liberal democratic features can be enhanced. The authors reject the argument that these challenges are merely fleeting or shallow, or that they are simply an ongoing part of democracy’s normal travails. They are new, and they have created novel circumstances that liberal democracies must confront. The focus of the paper lies in the messy and ever-changing world of contemporary liberal democracies in the transatlantic realm as well as on the phenomena of hybrid regimes and democratic regressions.
The core argument is that serious problems co-exist with greater potential for re-energizing democracy across the transatlantic area. The juncture is one of both threat and possibility. The key to developing the positive potential lies in enhancing the participatory vibrancy that represents the cornerstone of high quality democracy. The authors offer ideas for how the dynamics of participation and representation can be better connected. The way forward for democracy is unlikely to be smooth and will undoubtedly be subject to sobering constraints and disappointing setbacks. Yet, the faint stirrings of democratic renewal can be detected. With sufficiently innovative reimagining, democracy’s future may not be as bleak as many prophesy.
The Democratic Disconnect – Citizenship and Accountability in the Transatlantic Community, the 2012 collaborative report by North American and European fellows of the Transatlantic Academy, analyzes the state and future of the liberal order in the Atlantic community. It assesses the new challenges, dangers, and opportunities faced by Western governments and civil societies as they confront severe economic and financial constraints, demographic shifts, and an increasingly globalized, multipolar world. The study argues that the solution to democracy’s crisis lies in reinvigorating liberalism, not in searching for or accepting the inevitability of authoritarianism. Western democracy can and must be renewed, and the starting point should be a focus on reconnecting citizens with their public institutions.
“Democratic crises are not new but what is different today is the cumulative and accelerating impact of globalization, technology and markets on democratic accountability and concepts of citizenship. The major trends and challenges behind this new democratic crisis is what the Transatlantic Academy fellows grapple with in this study, as they offer ways for the transatlantic community to reinvigorate its democracies,” said Stephen F. Szabo, executive director of the Transatlantic Academy, in introducing the study. "
Considerable material and human resources are devoted to building democratic institutions around ... more Considerable material and human resources are devoted to building democratic institutions around the world. Why, then, do assistance programs fail to meet their proclaimed goals? And why aren't these programs changed or abandoned when they fail? Using US assistance to women's NGOs in postcommunist Ukraine as a case study, Kateryna Pishchikova shows why democracy promotion programs have a limited or even negative impact on democracy in recipient countries. Combining analysis of policy documents with in-depth interviews and observations, she explains the persistence of aid despite the disillusionment of its beneficiaries.
Articles & chapters by Kateryna Pishchikova
L’Ucraina alla ricerca di un equilibrio, Dec 16, 2019
This chapter focuses on the military conflict in the Donbas area of Ukraine over the period from ... more This chapter focuses on the military conflict in the Donbas area of Ukraine over the period from February 2014 to April 2019 that spans from the beginning of the conflict to the end of the Presidency of Petro Poroshenko, Ukraine’s post-Euromaidan president. By process-tracing the conflict, it brings to light its hybrid nature and argues that the conflict is a result of destabilization tactics, military and political, and of failed diplomatic attempts by state and non-state actors on both sides. In other words, neither the nature nor the territory of the conflict had been preordained at its start and its current shape does not reflect pre-existing societal or identity cleavages.
The EU in a Trans-European Space, 2019
After the so-called eastern crisis engulfed the EU Neighbourhood, attention was drawn in particul... more After the so-called eastern crisis engulfed the EU Neighbourhood, attention was drawn in particular to the mismatch between eastern neighbours’ needs and vulnerabilities and the EU assistance, to the changing geopolitical context in the region as well as to the limits of the EU transformative power. This chapter focuses on six countries—Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan—that fall under the EU-Eastern Partnership framework. It takes stock of the ‘pre-crisis’ evolution of the European Neighbourhood Policy in the east by crossing two dimensions: the outside-in policies promoted by the EU vis-a-vis its eastern neighbours and the inside-in practices of adaptation, contestation, or subversion of EU programmes by local actors. This exploration helps illuminate broader questions about the limits and enabling conditions for the EU’s transformative power in its neighbourhood.
Civil Society in Post-Euromaidan Ukraine: From Revolution to Consolidation, 2018
Over the past several years a number of alarm bells have been sounded on the issue of the closing... more Over the past several years a number of alarm bells have been sounded on the issue of the closing space for civil society. By looking at the case of post-Euromaidan Ukraine, this chapter shows how, in a non-authoritarian “hybrid” regime, the competition over legitimacy and authority between the state and civil society involves a number of “closing space” tactics. These tactics pertain to both the legal and extralegal realms and are aimed at obstructing the activities of certain civil society groups as well as at discrediting them and questioning their commitment to the public good. The possibility of arbitrary administrative and criminal prosecution pushes civil society groups to scale back or redirect their activities, while the threat of harassment and public vilification encourages self-censorship and contributes to greater polarization rather than reconciliation in the Ukrainian public sphere. The closing space measures in post-Euromaidan Ukraine seem to be on the rise despite the reputational risks, both international and domestic, for the ruling elite that positions itself as pro-reform and pro-European. Looking at the Ukrainian case contributes to untangling the puzzle of why non-authoritarian regimes engage in these tactics despite their high costs.
https://www.ibidem.eu/en/civil-society-in-post-euromaidan-ukraine.html
The International Spectator, 2017
Some dismiss the recent EU Global Strategy as a “triumph of hope over experience”, an impracticab... more Some dismiss the recent EU Global Strategy as a “triumph of hope over experience”, an impracticable and therefore ultimately irrelevant statement; others are enthusiastic about what they see as perseverance and renewed ambition in the face of the present crisis. Although the 2016 Strategy appears more modest than its 2003 predecessor in operational terms, the range of deliberations that fed into it and the quality of the document itself demonstrate a greater maturity of reflection on foreign policy. A critical reading of the document shows that concepts such as normative power and differentiated inclusion of neighbours in the EU’s system of governance have all but disappeared. The emerging EU identity appears to be debilitated by the centrifugal processes of internal contestation and a drastically downsized claim for external power projection. An alternative plan for action will have to deal with the Union’s vulnerabilities and carve out a role that is distinct, yet in line with this new self-understanding.
Democratisation in the 21st Century: Reviving Transitology
Political transitions of the twenty-first century - from the so-called Arab Spring to the changes... more Political transitions of the twenty-first century - from the so-called Arab Spring to the changes in Myanmar and Ukraine - are distinct from the previous "waves" of political transformations around the world and yet, they pose some familiar challenges. Richard Youngs and I look at two cases - Egypt and Ukraine - in order to draw out a number of lessons about the course of these political transformations and to provide an update to the literature on democratization.
Raffaele Marchetti and Nathalie Tocci (eds) "Conflict Society and Peacebuilding: Comparative Perspectives", 2011
VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 2014
Complex or multi-stakeholder partnerships-those that include several actors of different types, i... more Complex or multi-stakeholder partnerships-those that include several actors of different types, i.e. public, private or civic-are becoming increasingly popular in different contexts and across policy domains. This is also the case in countries emerging from armed conflict, where many donors are actively promoting partnerships of different kinds that are seen as a solution to a number of concerns from efficiency and effectiveness to empowerment, trust building and local ownership. However, the actual evidence supporting these assumptions remains scarce. This article focuses on several core characteristics of intra-partnership dynamics through original empirical research on complex partnerships operating in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and the DRC. It concludes by showing that real existing complex partnerships in countries emerging from armed conflict demonstrate compositional characteristics typically attributed to complex partnerships but not the modes of governance expected of such partnerships, failing to exploit their added value as a result.
In: Costruire la pace tra Stato e territorio: I dilemmi del peacebuilding, 2014
Le partnership complesse, o multi-stakeholder (MSP), si sono imposte, recentemente, come nuovo pa... more Le partnership complesse, o multi-stakeholder (MSP), si sono imposte, recentemente, come nuovo paradigma in una varietà di contesti, dalla cooperazione multilaterale allo sviluppo locale, e portando avanti diversi obiettivi, dal decision making all'erogazione di servizi pubblici. Il termine multi-stakeholder partnership fu introdotto per la prima volta nel 1992 durante la Conferenza delle Nazioni Unite su Ambiente e Sviluppo, svoltasi a Rio de Janeiro. Da allora è entrato prepotentemente nel linguaggio sullo sviluppo delle organizzazioni internazionali, organizzazioni non governative (ONG) e mezzi di comunicazione. La Conferenza, e i vari altri eventi che la seguirono, rappresentarono una svolta su scala globale verso un approccio multilaterale al decision making e al problem solving. Un cambiamento di tale entità fu causato, fondamentalmente, dalla globale insoddisfazione per il modo in cui organizzazioni internazionali e nazionali avevano affrontato le complesse sfide dei decenni precedenti. Questo cambiamento ha comportato, inoltre, l'ulteriore consapevolezza che problemi di tale complessità richiedono soluzioni fondate su un principio di interdipendenza -soluzioni che networks formati da diversi attori possono conseguire molto più semplicemente.
Working Papers & Studies by Kateryna Pishchikova
ISPI Analysis, 2022
While the new Agenda for the EU-Eastern Partnership Cooperation remains highly relevant for each ... more While the new Agenda for the EU-Eastern Partnership Cooperation remains highly relevant for each EaP country as well as the region as a whole, Brussels needs to update its initiatives in each of these countries in a way that addresses the multiple crises unleashed by the war. It also needs to strengthen the agenda’s multilateral component in a way that could jump-start regional integration once the conflict is over. While institutional reforms will have to be implemented individually, many environmental and “green” transition projects will require a region-wide approach.
GMF Policy Paper, 2020
In the first years of transition after the collapse of the Soviet Union, civil society in the six... more In the first years of transition after the collapse of the Soviet Union, civil society in the six EaP countries developed similarly. From the second half of the 1990s, they experienced different political trajectories, and so did their respective civil societies in ways strongly influenced by the nature of each political regime.
Georgia and Ukraine developed hybrid regimes with a relatively pluralistic and competitive political environment, in a process punctuated by instances of mass mobilization against autocratizing tendencies. In Armenia, political power was centralized in the hands of a ruling elite that was never fully authoritarian but maintained control over key political and economic resources until 2018. Moldova has maintained a relatively pluralistic political system with free and fair elections and quite free media. However, it has also all the worst features of the post-communist model, including corruption, absence of rule of law, oligarchic clans, poverty, high unemployment and huge emigration. Azerbaijan remains a rich authoritarian state, ruled by the Aliyev dynasty. Belarus has had since 1994 a highly personalistic authoritarian regime that has pursued policies quite different from those in other post-Soviet states.
The number of CSOs has grown considerably in all the EaP countries over the last decade. However, civil society remains weak if measured by the level of membership in these. The EaP countries continue to be affected by considerable civic apathy and disengagement, despite recurrent protests and moments of mass mobilization, especially around elections. Between such moments, though, civic apathy remains prevalent because most citizens do not believe that their engagement in civil society is likely to change anything. Across the EaP countries, there is a mixed picture when it comes to citizens’ opinion of and trust in civil society. Recent polls show that, to varying degrees, they hold more positive views of CSOs than some narratives suggest. At the same time, trust in CSOs appears to be lower—sometimes significantly so.
The disconnect between CSOs and societies is greatest when it comes to people’s passive, if not outright negative, attitudes toward political activism and issues. The civic apathy and distrust in institutions in the EaP countries increases citizens’ susceptibility to conspiracy theories and vulnerability to propaganda and disinformation.
“Post-Sovietness” is often invoked to explain the state of civil society in the EaP countries, but the latter is more the product of their trajectories over the past thirty years. Three decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the generational change in which many observers of Eastern European civil society placed their hopes has mostly taken place.
There are key trends in the development of civil society that the EaP countries share despite the differences in their political and economic evolution over the past thirty years. Perhaps the most fundamental problem for the development of a more vibrant civil society—and for the efforts of donors such as the EU and the United States that try to encourage this—is an enduring societal vicious circle. Low sense of agency and low interest in, and dislike of, politics on the part of citizens combine to breed civic apathy. This in turn entrenches low levels of civic engagement.
The underlying dynamics affecting attitudes to civil society and the way they manifest themselves pose tremendous challenges not only to domestic civic actors in their operations and in their attempts to change people’s behavior but even more so to donors that support them. Bearing this in mind, there are nonetheless measures that can help societal attitudes change toward active citizenship and thus a healthier civil society. This paper concludes therefore with three sets of recommendations through with donors can help make civic engagement more attractive, reduce mistrust of CSOs, and reducing civic actors’ vulnerabilities.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Working Paper, Oct 29, 2013
European support for democracy is at a crucial juncture. Just as the eurozone crisis complicates ... more European support for democracy is at a crucial juncture. Just as the eurozone crisis complicates the European Union’s (EU’s) efforts to support democratic reform around the world, new forms of political transition are confounding the EU’s traditional approach to democracy building. The EU must embrace a wider variety of tactics, models, actors, and strategies, or it risks losing credibility and traction in the field of democracy support.
The European Union’s (EU’s) relationship with Eastern Europe and the Caucasus is at a turning poi... more The European Union’s (EU’s) relationship with Eastern Europe and the Caucasus is at a turning point. Russia’s increasingly assertive tactics have chipped away at the ties that bind the six Eastern Partnership countries to the EU, and the entire Eastern Partnership is on the verge of unraveling. To rescue its association with its Eastern partners, the EU must deliver more tangible results. Europe can be both geopolitical and committed to reform—but to strike the right balance, the EU must be more strategic.
FRIDE Working Paper, Jul 23, 2014
The MH17 air-crash disaster of July 17 is likely to have a severe impact on the development of th... more The MH17 air-crash disaster of July 17 is likely to have a severe impact on the development of the Donbas conflict in Ukraine as well as on EU-Russia relations. Written before the tragedy, this FRIDE working paper argues that the ‘Euromaidan’ protests, that occurred between December 2013 and February 2014, have provoked two fundamental changes that give grounds for cautious optimism about Ukraine’s incipient transition to democracy. First, after more than two decades of civic apathy and low impact, Ukrainian civil society seems to be on the rise. Second, state-society relations are being reconfigured, with citizens demanding greater oversight of and accountability from state institutions, and civic activists pushing for a greater role in policy-making. These new societal and political trends should be further supported by the European Union.
FRIDE Policy Brief, Dec 2, 2013
The Vilnius summit was overshadowed by Russia’s zero-sum policies and disappointment over Ukraini... more The Vilnius summit was overshadowed by Russia’s zero-sum policies and disappointment over Ukrainian President Yanukovich’s unwillingness to sign an Association Agreement with the EU, resulting in mass protests in Kyiv. Nonetheless, there was some good news, such as the initiation of Association Agreements and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area Agreements with Georgia and Moldova. Now it is necessary to shape a more consistent EU approach to its Eastern neighbours; advance with association and deep and comprehensive trade agreements, based on genuine democratic reform; and broaden Eastern citizens’ mobility and civil society engagement.
ISPI Analysis, Mar 2014
After the turmoil of the Maidan protests, the removal of President Yanukovich and the annexation ... more After the turmoil of the Maidan protests, the removal of President Yanukovich and the annexation of Crimea by Russia, Ukraine is undergoing profound political changes and is facing difficult challenges. Identity issues and regional dynamics in Ukraine are at the heart of its domestic politics as well as its geopolitical orientation. Although many ethno-linguistic stereotypes often cited in the media do not withstand scrutiny, Ukraine is indeed diverse and pluralistic. This is both good and bad news for its future. The Maidan protests contributed greatly to forging a unifying state-building agenda for Ukraine. If this agenda prevails in the post-revolutionary phase, the inherent pluralism and diversity of the Ukrainian society will be the best safeguard against the centralisation of power by another autocrat. At the same time, a worrying rise of nationalistic discourses and actors as well as tensions in some regions of Ukraine may undermine the newly found sense of unity. A fractured Ukraine is also less likely to remain on the path of further democratic reform.
ISPI Commentary , 2023
In 2013, Ukraine's suspension of an EU Association Agreement sparked the Euromaidan protests agai... more In 2013, Ukraine's suspension of an EU Association Agreement sparked the Euromaidan protests against President Yanukovych's rule. The three-month standoff marked a civic awakening and influenced Russia's regional strategy.
Strategic Europe, 2023
Early in the war, one photo became quite popular. It was of a placard from a pro-Ukraine poster t... more Early in the war, one photo became quite popular. It was of a placard from a pro-Ukraine poster that read: "If Russia stops fighting, there will be no war. If Ukraine stops fighting, there will be no Ukraine." Almost a year later, this still holds true. It is also increasingly clear that there will be no winners in this war and that Ukraine's future is ever more fragile. After its initial plans for a blitzkrieg failed in March 2022, Russia shifted its strategy. A devastating war of attrition with indiscriminate bombings and violence against civilians became one of its key tactics. Ukrainian counteroffensives in early September marked the beginning of an escalation phase, in which Russian attacks on the Ukrainian civilian population and infrastructure intensified, including through the use of Iran-supplied drones.
Strategic Europe, 2022
Policymakers should increase their support for Ukraine and reassess the nature of this war. Putin... more Policymakers should increase their support for Ukraine and reassess the nature of this war. Putin may be consolidating a totalitarian regime that will try to subjugate as many peoples in its neighborhood as possible.
Translated in Spanish by Política Exterior: "Después de Bucha, Occidente debe revisar sus supuestos" (https://www.politicaexterior.com/despues-de-bucha-occidente-debe-revisar-sus-supuestos/)
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Books by Kateryna Pishchikova
The core argument is that serious problems co-exist with greater potential for re-energizing democracy across the transatlantic area. The juncture is one of both threat and possibility. The key to developing the positive potential lies in enhancing the participatory vibrancy that represents the cornerstone of high quality democracy. The authors offer ideas for how the dynamics of participation and representation can be better connected. The way forward for democracy is unlikely to be smooth and will undoubtedly be subject to sobering constraints and disappointing setbacks. Yet, the faint stirrings of democratic renewal can be detected. With sufficiently innovative reimagining, democracy’s future may not be as bleak as many prophesy.
The Democratic Disconnect – Citizenship and Accountability in the Transatlantic Community, the 2012 collaborative report by North American and European fellows of the Transatlantic Academy, analyzes the state and future of the liberal order in the Atlantic community. It assesses the new challenges, dangers, and opportunities faced by Western governments and civil societies as they confront severe economic and financial constraints, demographic shifts, and an increasingly globalized, multipolar world. The study argues that the solution to democracy’s crisis lies in reinvigorating liberalism, not in searching for or accepting the inevitability of authoritarianism. Western democracy can and must be renewed, and the starting point should be a focus on reconnecting citizens with their public institutions.
“Democratic crises are not new but what is different today is the cumulative and accelerating impact of globalization, technology and markets on democratic accountability and concepts of citizenship. The major trends and challenges behind this new democratic crisis is what the Transatlantic Academy fellows grapple with in this study, as they offer ways for the transatlantic community to reinvigorate its democracies,” said Stephen F. Szabo, executive director of the Transatlantic Academy, in introducing the study. "
Articles & chapters by Kateryna Pishchikova
https://www.ibidem.eu/en/civil-society-in-post-euromaidan-ukraine.html
Working Papers & Studies by Kateryna Pishchikova
Georgia and Ukraine developed hybrid regimes with a relatively pluralistic and competitive political environment, in a process punctuated by instances of mass mobilization against autocratizing tendencies. In Armenia, political power was centralized in the hands of a ruling elite that was never fully authoritarian but maintained control over key political and economic resources until 2018. Moldova has maintained a relatively pluralistic political system with free and fair elections and quite free media. However, it has also all the worst features of the post-communist model, including corruption, absence of rule of law, oligarchic clans, poverty, high unemployment and huge emigration. Azerbaijan remains a rich authoritarian state, ruled by the Aliyev dynasty. Belarus has had since 1994 a highly personalistic authoritarian regime that has pursued policies quite different from those in other post-Soviet states.
The number of CSOs has grown considerably in all the EaP countries over the last decade. However, civil society remains weak if measured by the level of membership in these. The EaP countries continue to be affected by considerable civic apathy and disengagement, despite recurrent protests and moments of mass mobilization, especially around elections. Between such moments, though, civic apathy remains prevalent because most citizens do not believe that their engagement in civil society is likely to change anything. Across the EaP countries, there is a mixed picture when it comes to citizens’ opinion of and trust in civil society. Recent polls show that, to varying degrees, they hold more positive views of CSOs than some narratives suggest. At the same time, trust in CSOs appears to be lower—sometimes significantly so.
The disconnect between CSOs and societies is greatest when it comes to people’s passive, if not outright negative, attitudes toward political activism and issues. The civic apathy and distrust in institutions in the EaP countries increases citizens’ susceptibility to conspiracy theories and vulnerability to propaganda and disinformation.
“Post-Sovietness” is often invoked to explain the state of civil society in the EaP countries, but the latter is more the product of their trajectories over the past thirty years. Three decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the generational change in which many observers of Eastern European civil society placed their hopes has mostly taken place.
There are key trends in the development of civil society that the EaP countries share despite the differences in their political and economic evolution over the past thirty years. Perhaps the most fundamental problem for the development of a more vibrant civil society—and for the efforts of donors such as the EU and the United States that try to encourage this—is an enduring societal vicious circle. Low sense of agency and low interest in, and dislike of, politics on the part of citizens combine to breed civic apathy. This in turn entrenches low levels of civic engagement.
The underlying dynamics affecting attitudes to civil society and the way they manifest themselves pose tremendous challenges not only to domestic civic actors in their operations and in their attempts to change people’s behavior but even more so to donors that support them. Bearing this in mind, there are nonetheless measures that can help societal attitudes change toward active citizenship and thus a healthier civil society. This paper concludes therefore with three sets of recommendations through with donors can help make civic engagement more attractive, reduce mistrust of CSOs, and reducing civic actors’ vulnerabilities.
Commentary by Kateryna Pishchikova
Translated in Spanish by Política Exterior: "Después de Bucha, Occidente debe revisar sus supuestos" (https://www.politicaexterior.com/despues-de-bucha-occidente-debe-revisar-sus-supuestos/)
The core argument is that serious problems co-exist with greater potential for re-energizing democracy across the transatlantic area. The juncture is one of both threat and possibility. The key to developing the positive potential lies in enhancing the participatory vibrancy that represents the cornerstone of high quality democracy. The authors offer ideas for how the dynamics of participation and representation can be better connected. The way forward for democracy is unlikely to be smooth and will undoubtedly be subject to sobering constraints and disappointing setbacks. Yet, the faint stirrings of democratic renewal can be detected. With sufficiently innovative reimagining, democracy’s future may not be as bleak as many prophesy.
The Democratic Disconnect – Citizenship and Accountability in the Transatlantic Community, the 2012 collaborative report by North American and European fellows of the Transatlantic Academy, analyzes the state and future of the liberal order in the Atlantic community. It assesses the new challenges, dangers, and opportunities faced by Western governments and civil societies as they confront severe economic and financial constraints, demographic shifts, and an increasingly globalized, multipolar world. The study argues that the solution to democracy’s crisis lies in reinvigorating liberalism, not in searching for or accepting the inevitability of authoritarianism. Western democracy can and must be renewed, and the starting point should be a focus on reconnecting citizens with their public institutions.
“Democratic crises are not new but what is different today is the cumulative and accelerating impact of globalization, technology and markets on democratic accountability and concepts of citizenship. The major trends and challenges behind this new democratic crisis is what the Transatlantic Academy fellows grapple with in this study, as they offer ways for the transatlantic community to reinvigorate its democracies,” said Stephen F. Szabo, executive director of the Transatlantic Academy, in introducing the study. "
https://www.ibidem.eu/en/civil-society-in-post-euromaidan-ukraine.html
Georgia and Ukraine developed hybrid regimes with a relatively pluralistic and competitive political environment, in a process punctuated by instances of mass mobilization against autocratizing tendencies. In Armenia, political power was centralized in the hands of a ruling elite that was never fully authoritarian but maintained control over key political and economic resources until 2018. Moldova has maintained a relatively pluralistic political system with free and fair elections and quite free media. However, it has also all the worst features of the post-communist model, including corruption, absence of rule of law, oligarchic clans, poverty, high unemployment and huge emigration. Azerbaijan remains a rich authoritarian state, ruled by the Aliyev dynasty. Belarus has had since 1994 a highly personalistic authoritarian regime that has pursued policies quite different from those in other post-Soviet states.
The number of CSOs has grown considerably in all the EaP countries over the last decade. However, civil society remains weak if measured by the level of membership in these. The EaP countries continue to be affected by considerable civic apathy and disengagement, despite recurrent protests and moments of mass mobilization, especially around elections. Between such moments, though, civic apathy remains prevalent because most citizens do not believe that their engagement in civil society is likely to change anything. Across the EaP countries, there is a mixed picture when it comes to citizens’ opinion of and trust in civil society. Recent polls show that, to varying degrees, they hold more positive views of CSOs than some narratives suggest. At the same time, trust in CSOs appears to be lower—sometimes significantly so.
The disconnect between CSOs and societies is greatest when it comes to people’s passive, if not outright negative, attitudes toward political activism and issues. The civic apathy and distrust in institutions in the EaP countries increases citizens’ susceptibility to conspiracy theories and vulnerability to propaganda and disinformation.
“Post-Sovietness” is often invoked to explain the state of civil society in the EaP countries, but the latter is more the product of their trajectories over the past thirty years. Three decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the generational change in which many observers of Eastern European civil society placed their hopes has mostly taken place.
There are key trends in the development of civil society that the EaP countries share despite the differences in their political and economic evolution over the past thirty years. Perhaps the most fundamental problem for the development of a more vibrant civil society—and for the efforts of donors such as the EU and the United States that try to encourage this—is an enduring societal vicious circle. Low sense of agency and low interest in, and dislike of, politics on the part of citizens combine to breed civic apathy. This in turn entrenches low levels of civic engagement.
The underlying dynamics affecting attitudes to civil society and the way they manifest themselves pose tremendous challenges not only to domestic civic actors in their operations and in their attempts to change people’s behavior but even more so to donors that support them. Bearing this in mind, there are nonetheless measures that can help societal attitudes change toward active citizenship and thus a healthier civil society. This paper concludes therefore with three sets of recommendations through with donors can help make civic engagement more attractive, reduce mistrust of CSOs, and reducing civic actors’ vulnerabilities.
Translated in Spanish by Política Exterior: "Después de Bucha, Occidente debe revisar sus supuestos" (https://www.politicaexterior.com/despues-de-bucha-occidente-debe-revisar-sus-supuestos/)
Panel 1: Liberal International Order: Conceptual and Policy Approaches from Europe and China
Speakers:
Jan-Werner Mueller, Princeton University
May-Britt Stumbaum, Free University of Berlin
Discussant:
Bruce Kogut, Columbia University
Chair: Jean L. Cohen, Columbia University
Panel 2: Confrontation and Cooperation in the European Neighborhood
Speakers:
Michael Leigh, Transatlantic Academy
Christina Lin, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University
Kateryna Pishchikova, Cornell University
Discussants:
Cynthia Roberts, Columbia University
Jack Snyder, Columbia University
Chair: Victoria de Grazia, Columbia University
Co-sponsored by the European Institute and the Transatlantic Academy.
On the basis of an historical and conceptual survey of the concept of citizenship, the project utilized questionnaire survey and focus group interview techniques to gain an understanding of citizenship in the context of women’s experiences in their own countries. Mechanisms were identified in which information and information technologies assist as well as hinder women from pursuing democratic participation. Women’s preferences of traditional and new information technologies, and their means of optimization to generate greater political participation, are taken as offering grounds for new visions of alternative citizenship to germinate