We can reasonably conclude that, contrary to the teachings of libertarian philosophers, there is ... more We can reasonably conclude that, contrary to the teachings of libertarian philosophers, there is no contradiction between determinism, causality and the concepts of freedom, free will and responsibility in the common sense. But the extension of the denial of free will in the philosophical sense to itself leads to paradox and should be avoided. You, dear reader, who are reading me, have no free will in the philosophical sense of the word, because you are a material system, your mind a mere product of your brain function. But I, who am speaking to you, have a free mind, guided by my own thoughts. (Of course, you can say the same of me.) If the physicalist position of compatibilism on free will applies to itself, then this position eliminates the concept of truth by reducing the mind to physical functioning. By this reduction, it also eliminates truth itself. I say what I say and I believe what I believe because it follows from the functioning of my brain, it follows from the functioning of a very complex physical system, but there is no guarantee that this belief of mine is true. There is no evolutionary advantage to the correct philosophy. We are in a paradoxical situation: if I am right in the materialistic conception of the mind, then there is no truth, there is only physical functioning. Let’s face it, a mind independent of brain function, and free will in the philosophical sense, is a necessary working hypothesis with logical reasons, not metaphysical ones. It is as useful an assumption as the belief in the existence of numbers in mathematics. False, but a useful myth.
Deterministic finite state automata can be adequate models for a large part of physical objects. ... more Deterministic finite state automata can be adequate models for a large part of physical objects. This is not a philosophical theory, it is an engineering and scientific practice that all engineers and scientists learn. My study interprets the metaphysical concept of ‘possibility’ and ‘necessity’ based on the conceptual framework of automata, while also assuming an answer to the question of what a physical object is. The answer is closest to the approach that an physical object is nothing other than the way it behaves in its environment, in other words, a physical object is nothing else then a system of dispositional properties and some essential actual properties. Since there is no physical object without an environment, the actual empirical properties can be interpreted as values of dispositions in a given environment (e.g., the temperature or colour of an object). This is not an alternate modal logic, this is an alternate metaphysics explanation. Following the scientific practice, I will use a model to explicate the metaphysical meaning of the concepts of possibility and necessity.
The fact I am sitting on my terrace in my armchair on the afternoon of 21 September 2024 in Balat... more The fact I am sitting on my terrace in my armchair on the afternoon of 21 September 2024 in Balatonkenese is a physical event - let's call it 'e1' - that has happened in the history of the visible universe, and that it has happened is an eternal truth that will never change. (You can go back in time, perhaps, but not in a way that an event that has happened becomes an event that has not happened.) The history of the universe is such that this event e1 happened, and because it happened, event e1 is a possible event. Since event e1 is a possible event, and it is an event that has happened, it is certain that the probability of e1 is greater than zero. Suppose that the universe extends infinitely beyond the visible universe. Then what rules out the possibility that another event e2 with probability greater than zero, similar to event e1, could happen somewhere in the distance, and I could exist as another instance somewhere in the distant universe. But if it is possible for me to exist in one more instance, why can't I exist in two? Or three? Or in a hundred and a thousand? Why couldn't there be a counterpart of me who differs from me in that he goes from technical college to economics university? (I was offered this once.) And there could be another Earth somewhere in the distance, where Hungarian history is different and we win at Mohács in 1526. What rules all this out if the world is infinite in space?
Bevezetés Tegyük logikai-filozófiai elemzés tárgyává Váci Mihály egyik verscímét : "Valami nincs ... more Bevezetés Tegyük logikai-filozófiai elemzés tárgyává Váci Mihály egyik verscímét : "Valami nincs sehol." 1 Először a tradicionális logika, majd a modern, szimbolikus logika és a társalgási logika szemléletével közelítjük meg a problémát. Végül futólag, a létezés kérdését is érintjük.
Every truth function corresponds to an isomorphic digital circuit. Consequently, the logical stru... more Every truth function corresponds to an isomorphic digital circuit. Consequently, the logical structure of every proposition can be presented within the range of propositional logic as an equivalent digital circuit. Provided that the logical values `true' and `false' correspond to the `high' and `low' voltage levels, the output of a circuit being equivalent with contradiction is always low level for every input state, whereas the output of a circuit corresponding to a tautology is always high level, irrespective of the input states. On the other hand, the remaining propositions correspond to circuits whose output is high-level if and only a few of the atomic components of the proposition are true, and the rest of the atomic sentence is false. The inputs equivalents to the atomic propositions are either high or low level. However, what logical circuits are equivalent to a circulating statement or argumentation? The propositions are true or false irrespective of time, whereas the voltage level of the circuits can change over time. To be more precise, we can say that the input levels of the circuits are high or low depending on whether we valuate the atomic formulae of the formula expressing the logical structure of the proposition true or false. The voltage level of the output of the circuit and the truth value of the formula results from it. I will call `combinational automaton' the digital circuit that may model the formulae of propositional logic. Formulae connected with truth functions yield formulae again. Although there are always corresponding automata for them, the situation is not simple in this case. We do not get combined automata joined to each other in each case, and it is also possible that we do not get an automaton---operating machine or circuit---at all. There are digital circuits whose output is not a function of their input. The range of automata is wider than that of combinational automata. It includes machines whose input states do not determine unambiguously the output states, that is, the output is not a function of the input. It is because the circuit has feedback. Most digital circuits belong to this latter group. I will call them `sequential automata'. The question arises whether there is a logical structure of circulating statement which corresponds to such a sequential automaton (or sequential circuit). In my view the logical structure of the Liar Paradox coincides with the operation of a sequential automaton irrespective of the logical correctness of the paradox itself. The analysis also examines possibilities of how the model could be further developed.
Some experimental theories of quantum gravity, such as loop quantum gravity, propose a discrete o... more Some experimental theories of quantum gravity, such as loop quantum gravity, propose a discrete or quantized structure for space-time at very small scales. These theories hypothesize that space-time is fundamentally made up of discrete units or atoms of space, in a similar way to how matter is fundamentally made up of discrete particles. In the context of space-time, the term atomic structure is used metaphorically to suggest a discrete or granular nature at extremely small scales. In Einstein's special theory of relativity, there is a maximum limit of speed, beyond which no point of mass in an inertial reference frame can travel. In the following, I will demonstrate that in a given inertial reference frame, in addition to the existence of an upper limit velocity of the motion of a point of mass, there are also logical reasons to think that space and time have an atomic structure. The basic idea of this argument was suggested by Zeno's well-known aporias.
Bognár írásából nem derül ki egyértelműen, hogy most akkor az „1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + 1/16 …1/∞ = 1” á... more Bognár írásából nem derül ki egyértelműen, hogy most akkor az „1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + 1/16 …1/∞ = 1” állítás igaz vagy hamis? Ha hamis, akkor miért hamis, miért hibás a matematika, hol a hiba a középiskolában tanultakban, abban, amit ő is tanít? Bognár nem mondja meg, hogy szerinte ennek a sorozatnak a határértéke miért nem pontosan 1, és ha nem 1, akkor mennyi? Hogy lehet az, hogy a gyakorlatban jól működik amit Newton és Leibniz és mások föltaláltak, másrészt nem tökéletes, valami hiányzik belőle. Mi hiányzik?
Felfigyeltem egy könyv fülszövegére (ami valójában a hátlapján van): " Talán meglepően hangzik, d... more Felfigyeltem egy könyv fülszövegére (ami valójában a hátlapján van): " Talán meglepően hangzik, de a filozófusok is szerszámokkal dolgoznak. Persze nem vésővel vagy Excel-táblázatokkal, hanem jóval kifinomultabb eszközökkel: egyedi, csak rájuk jellemző gondolkodásmóddalés megközelítési módszerekkel, amelyek megtanulhatók,és azélet minden területén alkalmazhatók... . " 1 Hát ez igazánérdekes, merténépp ellenkezőlegúgy gondolom, hogy több filozófiai kérdéskört is nagyon
Some experimental theories of quantum gravity, such as loop quantum gravity, propose a discrete o... more Some experimental theories of quantum gravity, such as loop quantum gravity, propose a discrete or quantized structure for space-time at very small scales. These theories hypothesize that space-time is fundamentally made up of discrete units or atoms of space, in a similar way to how matter is fundamentally made up of discrete particles. In the context of space-time, the term atomic structure is used metaphorically to suggest a discrete or granular nature at extremely small scales. In Einstein's special theory of relativity, there is a maximum limit of speed, beyond which no point of mass in an inertial reference frame can travel. In the following, I will demonstrate that in a given inertial reference frame, in addition to the existence of an upper limit velocity of the motion of a point of mass, there are also logical reasons to think that space and time have an atomic structure. The basic idea of this argument was suggested by Zeno's well-known aporias.
Some experimental theories of quantum gravity, such as loop quantum gravity, propose a discrete o... more Some experimental theories of quantum gravity, such as loop quantum gravity, propose a discrete or "quantized" structure for space-time at very small scales. These theories hypothesize that space-time is fundamentally made up of discrete units or "atoms" of space, in a similar way to how matter is fundamentally made up of discrete particles. In the context of space-time, the term "atomic structure" is used metaphorically to suggest a discrete or granular nature at extremely small scales. In Einstein's special theory of relativity, there is a maximum limit of speed, beyond which no point of mass in an inertial reference frame can travel. In the following, I will demonstrate that in a given inertial reference frame, in addition to the existence of an upper limit velocity of the motion of a point of mass, there are also logical reasons to think that space and time have an atomic structure. The basic idea of this argument was suggested by Zeno's well-known aporias.
At the entrance to heaven, there is a long queue; everyone has a number to avoid quarrels. Saint ... more At the entrance to heaven, there is a long queue; everyone has a number to avoid quarrels. Saint Peter will only open the gate if the following rule is fulfilled: (i) Anyone has a hat on his head if and only if no one behind him has a hat on his head.
What does it mean to give a philosophical explanation? It means creating texts and nothing else. ... more What does it mean to give a philosophical explanation? It means creating texts and nothing else. Wanting to explain the concept of truth regarding the connection between facts and sentences requires your explanation to contain only sentences and nothing else. Explaining the concept of time with relevance to series A and B requires your explanation to contain only sentences and nothing else. However, it does not necessarily have to be so. Why not use cyberspace or computer software, which are as portable as text on paper? Unlike dead letters, these two are living media. You can simulate time in cyberspace. You can simulate the connection between facts and sentences and explain the concept of truth using logical circuits or spreadsheet software.
The Russell's paradox concerns the foundations of naive set theory. This short short paper is abo... more The Russell's paradox concerns the foundations of naive set theory. This short short paper is about how it can be interpreted in other contexts and has significance in the world of commands. Understanding the paper assumes that the reader is broadly familiar with the foundations of set theory and its history. The text contains many formulas and therefore the reader should be comfortable in the world of logical formulas.
My example is somewhat similar to the barber paradox. There, too, we are puzzled by the feasibility of a task. In the case of the barber paradox there is a solution: the barber is a woman, in my example there is no such escape.
A little green Maritan arrives from Mars with the task of assessing the mathematical, physical an... more A little green Maritan arrives from Mars with the task of assessing the mathematical, physical and medical knowledge of the Earthlings. After he was done with that, he tried to decipher what “philosophy” meant, something that human beings have been studying for thousands of years, but it seems to no avail. Our little green man randomly selects books from libraries that have been labelled “philosophy”. These writings came into his hands:
Aristotle: Organon
Saint Augustine: Confessions
Saint Thomas Aquinas : On Being and Essence
Spinoza: Ethics
Kant: Critique of Pure Reason
Hegel: Phenomenology of Mind
Engels: Anti-Dühring
Nietzsche: Also sprach Zarathustra
Martin Buber: I and Thou
Heidegger: Being and Time
Carnap: The Logical Syntax of Language
Wittgenstein: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
Ryle: The Concept of Mind
Michel Foucault: The Order of Things
Barbara Vetter: Potentiality: From Dispositions to Modality
The little green man studied these writings carefully to find answers to the following questions:
1. If all these writings are philosophical works, what are the common themes and common questions they address?
2. If all these writings are philosophical works, what is the common background knowledge that an understanding of these texts presupposes?
3. If all these writings are philosophical works, what is the common language and conceptual apparatus used by these texts?
4. If all these writings are philosophical works, what are the ways of thinking, research and problem-solving tools, theories and practices that the philosophical writers of these texts use?
Tarski's interpretation of the concept of truth seems simple in its baselines, but it is not. I ... more Tarski's interpretation of the concept of truth seems simple in its baselines, but it is not. I will now attempt to explain the basic idea. I have corrected a few errors.
We can reasonably conclude that, contrary to the teachings of libertarian philosophers, there is ... more We can reasonably conclude that, contrary to the teachings of libertarian philosophers, there is no contradiction between determinism, causality and the concepts of freedom, free will and responsibility in the common sense. But the extension of the denial of free will in the philosophical sense to itself leads to paradox and should be avoided. You, dear reader, who are reading me, have no free will in the philosophical sense of the word, because you are a material system, your mind a mere product of your brain function. But I, who am speaking to you, have a free mind, guided by my own thoughts. (Of course, you can say the same of me.) If the physicalist position of compatibilism on free will applies to itself, then this position eliminates the concept of truth by reducing the mind to physical functioning. By this reduction, it also eliminates truth itself. I say what I say and I believe what I believe because it follows from the functioning of my brain, it follows from the functioning of a very complex physical system, but there is no guarantee that this belief of mine is true. There is no evolutionary advantage to the correct philosophy. We are in a paradoxical situation: if I am right in the materialistic conception of the mind, then there is no truth, there is only physical functioning. Let’s face it, a mind independent of brain function, and free will in the philosophical sense, is a necessary working hypothesis with logical reasons, not metaphysical ones. It is as useful an assumption as the belief in the existence of numbers in mathematics. False, but a useful myth.
Deterministic finite state automata can be adequate models for a large part of physical objects. ... more Deterministic finite state automata can be adequate models for a large part of physical objects. This is not a philosophical theory, it is an engineering and scientific practice that all engineers and scientists learn. My study interprets the metaphysical concept of ‘possibility’ and ‘necessity’ based on the conceptual framework of automata, while also assuming an answer to the question of what a physical object is. The answer is closest to the approach that an physical object is nothing other than the way it behaves in its environment, in other words, a physical object is nothing else then a system of dispositional properties and some essential actual properties. Since there is no physical object without an environment, the actual empirical properties can be interpreted as values of dispositions in a given environment (e.g., the temperature or colour of an object). This is not an alternate modal logic, this is an alternate metaphysics explanation. Following the scientific practice, I will use a model to explicate the metaphysical meaning of the concepts of possibility and necessity.
The fact I am sitting on my terrace in my armchair on the afternoon of 21 September 2024 in Balat... more The fact I am sitting on my terrace in my armchair on the afternoon of 21 September 2024 in Balatonkenese is a physical event - let's call it 'e1' - that has happened in the history of the visible universe, and that it has happened is an eternal truth that will never change. (You can go back in time, perhaps, but not in a way that an event that has happened becomes an event that has not happened.) The history of the universe is such that this event e1 happened, and because it happened, event e1 is a possible event. Since event e1 is a possible event, and it is an event that has happened, it is certain that the probability of e1 is greater than zero. Suppose that the universe extends infinitely beyond the visible universe. Then what rules out the possibility that another event e2 with probability greater than zero, similar to event e1, could happen somewhere in the distance, and I could exist as another instance somewhere in the distant universe. But if it is possible for me to exist in one more instance, why can't I exist in two? Or three? Or in a hundred and a thousand? Why couldn't there be a counterpart of me who differs from me in that he goes from technical college to economics university? (I was offered this once.) And there could be another Earth somewhere in the distance, where Hungarian history is different and we win at Mohács in 1526. What rules all this out if the world is infinite in space?
Bevezetés Tegyük logikai-filozófiai elemzés tárgyává Váci Mihály egyik verscímét : "Valami nincs ... more Bevezetés Tegyük logikai-filozófiai elemzés tárgyává Váci Mihály egyik verscímét : "Valami nincs sehol." 1 Először a tradicionális logika, majd a modern, szimbolikus logika és a társalgási logika szemléletével közelítjük meg a problémát. Végül futólag, a létezés kérdését is érintjük.
Every truth function corresponds to an isomorphic digital circuit. Consequently, the logical stru... more Every truth function corresponds to an isomorphic digital circuit. Consequently, the logical structure of every proposition can be presented within the range of propositional logic as an equivalent digital circuit. Provided that the logical values `true' and `false' correspond to the `high' and `low' voltage levels, the output of a circuit being equivalent with contradiction is always low level for every input state, whereas the output of a circuit corresponding to a tautology is always high level, irrespective of the input states. On the other hand, the remaining propositions correspond to circuits whose output is high-level if and only a few of the atomic components of the proposition are true, and the rest of the atomic sentence is false. The inputs equivalents to the atomic propositions are either high or low level. However, what logical circuits are equivalent to a circulating statement or argumentation? The propositions are true or false irrespective of time, whereas the voltage level of the circuits can change over time. To be more precise, we can say that the input levels of the circuits are high or low depending on whether we valuate the atomic formulae of the formula expressing the logical structure of the proposition true or false. The voltage level of the output of the circuit and the truth value of the formula results from it. I will call `combinational automaton' the digital circuit that may model the formulae of propositional logic. Formulae connected with truth functions yield formulae again. Although there are always corresponding automata for them, the situation is not simple in this case. We do not get combined automata joined to each other in each case, and it is also possible that we do not get an automaton---operating machine or circuit---at all. There are digital circuits whose output is not a function of their input. The range of automata is wider than that of combinational automata. It includes machines whose input states do not determine unambiguously the output states, that is, the output is not a function of the input. It is because the circuit has feedback. Most digital circuits belong to this latter group. I will call them `sequential automata'. The question arises whether there is a logical structure of circulating statement which corresponds to such a sequential automaton (or sequential circuit). In my view the logical structure of the Liar Paradox coincides with the operation of a sequential automaton irrespective of the logical correctness of the paradox itself. The analysis also examines possibilities of how the model could be further developed.
Some experimental theories of quantum gravity, such as loop quantum gravity, propose a discrete o... more Some experimental theories of quantum gravity, such as loop quantum gravity, propose a discrete or quantized structure for space-time at very small scales. These theories hypothesize that space-time is fundamentally made up of discrete units or atoms of space, in a similar way to how matter is fundamentally made up of discrete particles. In the context of space-time, the term atomic structure is used metaphorically to suggest a discrete or granular nature at extremely small scales. In Einstein's special theory of relativity, there is a maximum limit of speed, beyond which no point of mass in an inertial reference frame can travel. In the following, I will demonstrate that in a given inertial reference frame, in addition to the existence of an upper limit velocity of the motion of a point of mass, there are also logical reasons to think that space and time have an atomic structure. The basic idea of this argument was suggested by Zeno's well-known aporias.
Bognár írásából nem derül ki egyértelműen, hogy most akkor az „1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + 1/16 …1/∞ = 1” á... more Bognár írásából nem derül ki egyértelműen, hogy most akkor az „1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + 1/16 …1/∞ = 1” állítás igaz vagy hamis? Ha hamis, akkor miért hamis, miért hibás a matematika, hol a hiba a középiskolában tanultakban, abban, amit ő is tanít? Bognár nem mondja meg, hogy szerinte ennek a sorozatnak a határértéke miért nem pontosan 1, és ha nem 1, akkor mennyi? Hogy lehet az, hogy a gyakorlatban jól működik amit Newton és Leibniz és mások föltaláltak, másrészt nem tökéletes, valami hiányzik belőle. Mi hiányzik?
Felfigyeltem egy könyv fülszövegére (ami valójában a hátlapján van): " Talán meglepően hangzik, d... more Felfigyeltem egy könyv fülszövegére (ami valójában a hátlapján van): " Talán meglepően hangzik, de a filozófusok is szerszámokkal dolgoznak. Persze nem vésővel vagy Excel-táblázatokkal, hanem jóval kifinomultabb eszközökkel: egyedi, csak rájuk jellemző gondolkodásmóddalés megközelítési módszerekkel, amelyek megtanulhatók,és azélet minden területén alkalmazhatók... . " 1 Hát ez igazánérdekes, merténépp ellenkezőlegúgy gondolom, hogy több filozófiai kérdéskört is nagyon
Some experimental theories of quantum gravity, such as loop quantum gravity, propose a discrete o... more Some experimental theories of quantum gravity, such as loop quantum gravity, propose a discrete or quantized structure for space-time at very small scales. These theories hypothesize that space-time is fundamentally made up of discrete units or atoms of space, in a similar way to how matter is fundamentally made up of discrete particles. In the context of space-time, the term atomic structure is used metaphorically to suggest a discrete or granular nature at extremely small scales. In Einstein's special theory of relativity, there is a maximum limit of speed, beyond which no point of mass in an inertial reference frame can travel. In the following, I will demonstrate that in a given inertial reference frame, in addition to the existence of an upper limit velocity of the motion of a point of mass, there are also logical reasons to think that space and time have an atomic structure. The basic idea of this argument was suggested by Zeno's well-known aporias.
Some experimental theories of quantum gravity, such as loop quantum gravity, propose a discrete o... more Some experimental theories of quantum gravity, such as loop quantum gravity, propose a discrete or "quantized" structure for space-time at very small scales. These theories hypothesize that space-time is fundamentally made up of discrete units or "atoms" of space, in a similar way to how matter is fundamentally made up of discrete particles. In the context of space-time, the term "atomic structure" is used metaphorically to suggest a discrete or granular nature at extremely small scales. In Einstein's special theory of relativity, there is a maximum limit of speed, beyond which no point of mass in an inertial reference frame can travel. In the following, I will demonstrate that in a given inertial reference frame, in addition to the existence of an upper limit velocity of the motion of a point of mass, there are also logical reasons to think that space and time have an atomic structure. The basic idea of this argument was suggested by Zeno's well-known aporias.
At the entrance to heaven, there is a long queue; everyone has a number to avoid quarrels. Saint ... more At the entrance to heaven, there is a long queue; everyone has a number to avoid quarrels. Saint Peter will only open the gate if the following rule is fulfilled: (i) Anyone has a hat on his head if and only if no one behind him has a hat on his head.
What does it mean to give a philosophical explanation? It means creating texts and nothing else. ... more What does it mean to give a philosophical explanation? It means creating texts and nothing else. Wanting to explain the concept of truth regarding the connection between facts and sentences requires your explanation to contain only sentences and nothing else. Explaining the concept of time with relevance to series A and B requires your explanation to contain only sentences and nothing else. However, it does not necessarily have to be so. Why not use cyberspace or computer software, which are as portable as text on paper? Unlike dead letters, these two are living media. You can simulate time in cyberspace. You can simulate the connection between facts and sentences and explain the concept of truth using logical circuits or spreadsheet software.
The Russell's paradox concerns the foundations of naive set theory. This short short paper is abo... more The Russell's paradox concerns the foundations of naive set theory. This short short paper is about how it can be interpreted in other contexts and has significance in the world of commands. Understanding the paper assumes that the reader is broadly familiar with the foundations of set theory and its history. The text contains many formulas and therefore the reader should be comfortable in the world of logical formulas.
My example is somewhat similar to the barber paradox. There, too, we are puzzled by the feasibility of a task. In the case of the barber paradox there is a solution: the barber is a woman, in my example there is no such escape.
A little green Maritan arrives from Mars with the task of assessing the mathematical, physical an... more A little green Maritan arrives from Mars with the task of assessing the mathematical, physical and medical knowledge of the Earthlings. After he was done with that, he tried to decipher what “philosophy” meant, something that human beings have been studying for thousands of years, but it seems to no avail. Our little green man randomly selects books from libraries that have been labelled “philosophy”. These writings came into his hands:
Aristotle: Organon
Saint Augustine: Confessions
Saint Thomas Aquinas : On Being and Essence
Spinoza: Ethics
Kant: Critique of Pure Reason
Hegel: Phenomenology of Mind
Engels: Anti-Dühring
Nietzsche: Also sprach Zarathustra
Martin Buber: I and Thou
Heidegger: Being and Time
Carnap: The Logical Syntax of Language
Wittgenstein: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
Ryle: The Concept of Mind
Michel Foucault: The Order of Things
Barbara Vetter: Potentiality: From Dispositions to Modality
The little green man studied these writings carefully to find answers to the following questions:
1. If all these writings are philosophical works, what are the common themes and common questions they address?
2. If all these writings are philosophical works, what is the common background knowledge that an understanding of these texts presupposes?
3. If all these writings are philosophical works, what is the common language and conceptual apparatus used by these texts?
4. If all these writings are philosophical works, what are the ways of thinking, research and problem-solving tools, theories and practices that the philosophical writers of these texts use?
Tarski's interpretation of the concept of truth seems simple in its baselines, but it is not. I ... more Tarski's interpretation of the concept of truth seems simple in its baselines, but it is not. I will now attempt to explain the basic idea. I have corrected a few errors.
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Papers by Ferenc ANDRÁS
By this reduction, it also eliminates truth itself. I say what I say and I believe what I believe because it follows from the functioning of my brain, it follows from the functioning of a very complex physical system, but there is no guarantee that this belief of mine is true. There is no evolutionary advantage to the correct philosophy.
We are in a paradoxical situation: if I am right in the materialistic conception of the mind, then there is no truth, there is only physical functioning. Let’s face it, a mind independent of brain function, and free will in the philosophical sense, is a necessary working hypothesis with logical reasons, not metaphysical ones. It is as useful an assumption as the belief in the existence of numbers in mathematics.
False, but a useful myth.
other than the way it behaves in its environment, in other words, a physical object is nothing else then a system of dispositional properties and some essential actual properties. Since there is no physical object without an environment, the actual empirical properties can be interpreted as values of dispositions in a given environment (e.g., the temperature or colour of an object). This is not an alternate modal logic, this is an alternate metaphysics explanation. Following the scientific practice, I will use a model to explicate the metaphysical meaning of the concepts of possibility and necessity.
The propositions are true or false irrespective of time, whereas the voltage level of the circuits can change over time. To be more precise, we can say that the input levels of the circuits are high or low depending on whether we valuate the atomic formulae of the formula expressing the logical structure of the proposition true or false. The voltage level of the output of the circuit and the truth value of the formula results from it. I will call `combinational automaton' the digital circuit that may model the formulae of propositional logic.
Formulae connected with truth functions yield formulae again. Although there are always corresponding automata for them, the situation is not simple in this case. We do not get combined automata joined to each other in each case, and it is also possible that we do not get an automaton---operating machine or circuit---at all.
There are digital circuits whose output is not a function of their input. The range of automata is wider than that of combinational automata. It includes machines whose input states do not determine unambiguously the output states, that is, the output is not a function of the input. It is because the circuit has feedback. Most digital circuits belong to this latter group. I will call them `sequential automata'.
The question arises whether there is a logical structure of circulating statement which corresponds to such a sequential automaton (or sequential circuit). In my view the logical structure of the Liar Paradox coincides with the operation of a sequential automaton irrespective of the logical correctness of the paradox itself. The analysis also examines possibilities of how the model could be further developed.
My example is somewhat similar to the barber paradox. There, too, we are puzzled by the feasibility of a task. In the case of the barber paradox there is a solution: the barber is a woman, in my example there is no such escape.
Aristotle: Organon
Saint Augustine: Confessions
Saint Thomas Aquinas : On Being and Essence
Spinoza: Ethics
Kant: Critique of Pure Reason
Hegel: Phenomenology of Mind
Engels: Anti-Dühring
Nietzsche: Also sprach Zarathustra
Martin Buber: I and Thou
Heidegger: Being and Time
Carnap: The Logical Syntax of Language
Wittgenstein: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
Ryle: The Concept of Mind
Michel Foucault: The Order of Things
Barbara Vetter: Potentiality: From Dispositions to Modality
The little green man studied these writings carefully to find answers to the following questions:
1. If all these writings are philosophical works, what are the common themes and common questions they address?
2. If all these writings are philosophical works, what is the common background knowledge that an understanding of these texts presupposes?
3. If all these writings are philosophical works, what is the common language and conceptual apparatus used by these texts?
4. If all these writings are philosophical works, what are the ways of thinking, research and problem-solving tools, theories and practices that the philosophical writers of these texts use?
By this reduction, it also eliminates truth itself. I say what I say and I believe what I believe because it follows from the functioning of my brain, it follows from the functioning of a very complex physical system, but there is no guarantee that this belief of mine is true. There is no evolutionary advantage to the correct philosophy.
We are in a paradoxical situation: if I am right in the materialistic conception of the mind, then there is no truth, there is only physical functioning. Let’s face it, a mind independent of brain function, and free will in the philosophical sense, is a necessary working hypothesis with logical reasons, not metaphysical ones. It is as useful an assumption as the belief in the existence of numbers in mathematics.
False, but a useful myth.
other than the way it behaves in its environment, in other words, a physical object is nothing else then a system of dispositional properties and some essential actual properties. Since there is no physical object without an environment, the actual empirical properties can be interpreted as values of dispositions in a given environment (e.g., the temperature or colour of an object). This is not an alternate modal logic, this is an alternate metaphysics explanation. Following the scientific practice, I will use a model to explicate the metaphysical meaning of the concepts of possibility and necessity.
The propositions are true or false irrespective of time, whereas the voltage level of the circuits can change over time. To be more precise, we can say that the input levels of the circuits are high or low depending on whether we valuate the atomic formulae of the formula expressing the logical structure of the proposition true or false. The voltage level of the output of the circuit and the truth value of the formula results from it. I will call `combinational automaton' the digital circuit that may model the formulae of propositional logic.
Formulae connected with truth functions yield formulae again. Although there are always corresponding automata for them, the situation is not simple in this case. We do not get combined automata joined to each other in each case, and it is also possible that we do not get an automaton---operating machine or circuit---at all.
There are digital circuits whose output is not a function of their input. The range of automata is wider than that of combinational automata. It includes machines whose input states do not determine unambiguously the output states, that is, the output is not a function of the input. It is because the circuit has feedback. Most digital circuits belong to this latter group. I will call them `sequential automata'.
The question arises whether there is a logical structure of circulating statement which corresponds to such a sequential automaton (or sequential circuit). In my view the logical structure of the Liar Paradox coincides with the operation of a sequential automaton irrespective of the logical correctness of the paradox itself. The analysis also examines possibilities of how the model could be further developed.
My example is somewhat similar to the barber paradox. There, too, we are puzzled by the feasibility of a task. In the case of the barber paradox there is a solution: the barber is a woman, in my example there is no such escape.
Aristotle: Organon
Saint Augustine: Confessions
Saint Thomas Aquinas : On Being and Essence
Spinoza: Ethics
Kant: Critique of Pure Reason
Hegel: Phenomenology of Mind
Engels: Anti-Dühring
Nietzsche: Also sprach Zarathustra
Martin Buber: I and Thou
Heidegger: Being and Time
Carnap: The Logical Syntax of Language
Wittgenstein: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
Ryle: The Concept of Mind
Michel Foucault: The Order of Things
Barbara Vetter: Potentiality: From Dispositions to Modality
The little green man studied these writings carefully to find answers to the following questions:
1. If all these writings are philosophical works, what are the common themes and common questions they address?
2. If all these writings are philosophical works, what is the common background knowledge that an understanding of these texts presupposes?
3. If all these writings are philosophical works, what is the common language and conceptual apparatus used by these texts?
4. If all these writings are philosophical works, what are the ways of thinking, research and problem-solving tools, theories and practices that the philosophical writers of these texts use?