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Peter Fazekas

Aarhus University, Philosophy and History of Ideas, Associate Professor

Aarhus University, Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Research Associate

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I am an Associate Professor at the Research Unit of Robophilosophy and Integrative Social Robotics and a Research Associate at the Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience at Aarhus University, Denmark.

Previously, I was an FWO Postdoctoral Fellow at the Centre for Philosophical Psychology at the University of Antwerp (Belgium), a visiting scholar at the Department of Philosophy at New York University, and a DFF-Mobilex Postdoctoral Fellow at the Department of Philosophy and at the Cognitive Neuroscience Research Unit at Aarhus University.

My PhD is from the School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences at the University of Edinburgh. My supervisors were Jesper Kallestrup, Andy Clark, and Mark Sprevak. My external reviewer was Tim Bayne.

My main research interests lie in the intersection of philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, cognitive science and artificial intelligence research. I focus on conscious experiences (both 'online' perceptual and 'offline' spontaneous varieties like creative idea generation, mind-wandering and dreaming): how brain processes might bring them about, and how they might be implemented in machines. I am also interested in how explanations work in inter-theoretical scientific contexts and in the case of algorithmic decision-making.

I have degrees, and research and teaching experience in engineering physics, philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science.

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Gergely Kertész

Hungarian Academy of Sciences

Saarland University

University of Rochester

University of Groningen

Thomas Lodewyckx

University of Antwerp

Diego Azevedo Leite

Michele Paolini Paoletti

University of Macerata

Laura Franklin-Hall

New York University

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Papers by Peter Fazekas

Flat Mechanisms: A Reductionist Approach to Levels in Mechanistic Explanations

Philosophical Studies, 2022

The mechanistic framework traditionally comes bundled with a multi-level view. Some ascribe ontol... more The mechanistic framework traditionally comes bundled with a multi-level view. Some ascribe ontological weight to these levels, whereas others claim that characterising a higher-level entity and the corresponding lower-level mechanism are only different descriptions of the same thing. The goal of this paper is to develop a consistent metaphysical picture that can underly the latter position. According to this flat view, mechanistic wholes are modules that together with their parts are embedded in the same network of interacting units. The flat view preserves the original virtues of the mechanistic approach and is able to avoid the problems associated with the multi-level view.

Hallucinations as intensified forms of mind-wandering

Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 2021

This paper argues for a novel way of thinking about hallucinations as intensified forms of mind-w... more This paper argues for a novel way of thinking about hallucinations as intensified forms of mind-wandering. Starting from the observation that hallucinations are associated with hyperactive sensory areas underlying the content of hallucinatory experiences and a confusion with regard to the reality of the source of these experiences, the paper first reviews the different factors that might contribute to the impairment of reality monitoring. The paper then focuses on the sensory characteristics determining the vividness of an experience, reviews their relationship to the sensory hyperactivity observed in hallucinations, and investigates under what circumstances they can drive reality judgements. Finally, based on these considerations, the paper presents its main proposal according to which hallucinations are intensified forms of mind-wandering that are amplified along their sensory characteristics, and sketches a possible model of what factors might determine if an internally and involuntarily generated perceptual representation is experienced as a hallucination or as an instance of mind-wandering.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘Offline perception: voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation’.

Offline perception: an introduction

Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 2021

Experiences that are self-generated and independent of sensory stimulations permeate our whole li... more Experiences that are self-generated and independent of sensory stimulations permeate our whole life. This theme issue examines their similarities and differences, systematizes the literature from an integrative perspective, critically discusses state-of-the-art empirical findings and proposes new theoretical approaches. The aim of the theme issue is to foster interaction between the different disciplines and research directions involved and to explore the prospects of a unificatory account of offline perception in general.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘Offline perception: voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation’.

Dreaming, Mind-Wandering, and Hypnotic Dreams

by Peter Fazekas and Georgina Németh

Frontiers in Neurology, 2020

Hobson's AIM theory offers a general framework for thinking about states of consciousness like wa... more Hobson's AIM theory offers a general framework for thinking about states of consciousness like wakefulness, REM dreaming and NREM mentations in terms of a state space defined by the dimensions of the level of brain activity, the source of input, and the type of neurochemical modulation. This account inspired theoretical models of other altered states of consciousness-including hypnosis-claiming that studying REM dreaming can advance our understanding of these phenomena as well. However, recent developments showed that hypnosis is not a sleep like stage, and that the REM-centric attitude toward dreaming is mistaken. At the same time, the advancement of the neuro-cognitive theory claiming that dreaming and mind-wandering are on a continuum both underlain by default-mode network activity called many aspects of the AIM theory into question. Our aim in this paper is to show that certain hypnotic states-hypnotic dreams (experiences that subjects have in a hypnotic state as a result of an explicit suggestion to have a dream)-can, nevertheless, be highly relevant for the neuro-cognitive theory, and that their comparison with dreaming and mind-wandering has the potential to advance the field in unexpected ways.

Perceptual representations and the vividness of stimulus-triggered and stimulus-independent experiences

by Peter Fazekas and Georgina Németh

Perspectives on Psychological Science, 2020

In recent years, independent subfields have started to engage with the idea that the same cortica... more In recent years, independent subfields have started to engage with the idea that the same cortical regions that contribute to online perception are recruited during and underlie offline activities like information maintenance in working memory, mental imagery, hallucinations, dreaming, and mind wandering. Accumulating evidence suggests that in all these cases the activity of posterior brain regions provide the contents of experiences. This paper is interested in moving one step further by exploring specific links between the vividness of experiences, which is a characteristic feature of consciousness regardless of its actual content, and certain properties of the content-specific neural activity patterns. Investigating the mechanisms that underlie mental imagery and its relation to working memory, and the processes responsible for mind wandering and its similarities to dreaming form two clusters of research that are in the forefront of recent scientific study of mental phenomena, yet cross-talk between these two clusters have been surprisingly sparse. Here our aim is to foster such a cross-talk by articulating a hypothesis about the fine-grained phenomenological structure determining subjective vividness and its possible neural basis that allows us to shed new light on these mental phenomena by bringing them under a common framework.

A Dynamical Systems Approach to Causation

by Peter Fazekas, Gergely Kertész, and Gábor Hofer-Szabó

Synthese, 2019

Our approach aims at accounting for causal claims in terms of how the physical states of the unde... more Our approach aims at accounting for causal claims in terms of how the physical states of the underlying dynamical system evolve with time. Causal claims assert connections between two sets of physicals states-their truth depends on whether the two sets in question are genuinely connected by time evolution such that physical states from one set evolve with time into the states of the other set. We demonstrate the virtues of our approach by showing how it is able to account for typical causes, causally relevant factors, being 'the' cause, and cases of overdetermination and causation by absences.

Multidimensional degrees of consciousness: Qualities of experiences during wakeful perception, working memory tasks, mental imagery, mind wandering and dreaming

by Georgina Németh and Peter Fazekas

Overgaard, M., Mogensen, J., & Kirkeby-Hinrup, A. (eds.): Beyond the Neural Correlates of Consciousness. Psychology Press., 2019

Consciousness comes in degrees in the sense that the quality of conscious experiences — the appea... more Consciousness comes in degrees in the sense that the quality of conscious experiences — the appearance of their content — can gradually change along different dimensions like vividness, specificity and stability. These changes correspond to modulations of features of the underlying neural representations such as their intensity, precision and maintenance. This paper clarifies these correspondence relations and supports them by reviewing a series of novel findings from different strands on research focusing on wakeful perception, working memory, mental imagery, mind wandering and dreaming. These correspondence relations might allow us to move beyond traditional correlational claims with regard to consciousness, and establish tighter links between neural processes and subjective experiences.

White dreams are made of colours: What studying contentless dreams can teach about the neural basis of dreaming and conscious experiences

by Peter Fazekas and Georgina Németh

Sleep Medicine Reviews, 2019

Reports of white dreams, the feeling of having had a dream experience without being able to speci... more Reports of white dreams, the feeling of having had a dream experience without being able to specify this experience any further, make up almost one third of all dream reports, yet this phenomenon—until very recently— had not yet been in the focus of targeted investigations. White dreams are typically interpreted as forgotten dreams, and are sidelined as not being particularly informative with regard to the nature of dreaming. In this review article, we propose a paradigm shift with respect to the status of white dreams arguing that focusing on this phenomenon can reveal fundamental insights about the neural processes that occur in the dreaming brain. As part of this paradigm shift, we propose a novel interpretation of what white dreams are. This new interpretation is made possible by recent advancements in three different though interrelated fields focusing on dreaming, mental imagery, and wakeful perception. In this paper, we bring these different threads together to show how the latest findings from these fields fit together and point towards a general framework regarding the neural underpinnings of conscious experiences that might turn out to be highly relevant not just for dream research but for all aspects of studying consciousness.

Beyond the REM-NREM dichotomy: A multi-dimensional approach to understanding dreaming

by Georgina Németh and Peter Fazekas

Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2018

Traditionally, dream research focuses on accounting for typical psychological features of dream e... more Traditionally, dream research focuses on accounting for typical psychological features of dream experiences characteristic of different sleep stages in terms of the global physiological features of the sleep stages in question. However, as subtle differences got into the forefront of enquiry, as, for example, in questions concerning between stage similarities and within stage differences of mentations, this methodology became insufficient. What recent findings and theoretical developments suggest is that understanding mental activity during sleep requires studying the fine-grained characteristics of the phenomenal features of individual dreams, which, in turn, demands identifying specific neural processes that might underly different characteristics of the experiences, and tracking their changes not just between, but also within standard sleep stages. The paper argues that such a shift of focus from describing global stages to understanding the significance of local changes results in a true paradigm shift in dream research that can break away from the tradition of thinking about sleep mentation in terms of discrete categories (e.g. REM/NREM, or high/low global activity level), and offers a novel way of looking at dreams (and other conscious experiences) as forming a multi-dimensional continuum.

Attention is Amplification, not Selection

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2018

The paper argues that recent empirical findings and theoretical models shed new light on the natu... more The paper argues that recent empirical findings and theoretical models shed new light on the nature of attention. According to the resulting Amplification View, attentional phenomena can be unified at the neural level as the consequences of the amplification of certain input signals of attention-independent perceptual computations. The paper demonstrates that this way of identifying the core realiser of attention is able to evade standard criticisms often raised against sub-personal accounts of attention. Moreover, the paper argues that this approach also reframes our thinking about the function of attention by shifting the focus from the function of selection to the function of amplification.

Are higher mechanistic levels causally autonomous?

by Peter Fazekas and Gergely Kertész

Philosophy of Science, 2019

This paper provides a detailed analysis and explores the prospects of the arguments for higher-le... more This paper provides a detailed analysis and explores the prospects of the arguments for higher-level causal autonomy available for the proponents of the mechanistic framework. Three different arguments (a context-based, an organisation-based, and a constraint-based) are distinguished. After clarifying previously raised worries with regard to the first two arguments, the paper focuses on the newest version of the third argument that has recently been revived by William Bechtel. By using Bechtel's own case study, it is shown that not even reference to constraints can establish the causal autonomy of higher mechanistic levels.

Dream experiences and the neural correlates of perceptual consciousness and cognitive access

by Peter Fazekas and Georgina Németh

Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 2018

This paper approaches the debate whether perceptual consciousness requires cogni-tive access from... more This paper approaches the debate whether perceptual consciousness requires cogni-tive access from the perspective of dream studies, and investigates what kind of findings could support the opposing views of this debate. Two kinds of arguments are discussed, one that claims that the hypoactivity of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in REM sleep is directly relevant, and another that proposes that locating the neural correlates of dream experiences can indirectly inform the debate. It is argued that under closer reflection neither the classical claim about dorsolateral prefrontal cortex hypoactivity nor the more recent emphasis on general posterior hot zone activity during dreaming stand up to scrutiny. White dreaming is identified as the phenomenon that, nevertheless, holds the most promise to have an impact on the debate. Going beyond the topic if studying dreams can contribute to this debate, it is argued that cognitive access is not a monolithic phenomenon, and its neural correlates are not well understood. There seems to be a relevant form of cognitive access that can operate in the absence of activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and maybe also in the whole frontal region. If so, then exclusive posterior activation during conscious experiences might very well be compatible with the hypothesis that perceptual consciousness requires cognitive access.

Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access: An introduction

Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 2018

The problem of perceptual consciousness -the question of how our subjective experiences (colours ... more The problem of perceptual consciousness -the question of how our subjective experiences (colours as we see them; sounds as we hear them; tastes, etc. as we feel them) could be accounted for in terms of brain processes -is often regarded as the greatest unsolved mystery of our times. In recent literature, one of the most pressing questions in this regard is whether the neural basis of perceptual consciousness is independent of the neural basis of cognitive access mechanisms that make reporting and reflecting on conscious experiences possible. The Theme Issue focuses on this central problem of consciousness research, and aims to contribute to the field by critically discussing state-of-the-art empirical findings, identifying methodological problems, and proposing novel approaches.

Pre-Cueing Effects: Attention or Mental Imagery?

by Peter Fazekas and Bence Nanay

Frontiers in Psychology, 2017

Much has been written recently about cognitive penetration. If there are perceptual computations ... more Much has been written recently about cognitive penetration. If there are perceptual computations that are directly influenced by the information content of certain cognitive states such that the changes in the output of these computations can be accounted for in terms of the content of the penetrating cognitive states, we can talk about the cognitive penetration of perceptual processing. 1 When considering the possible mechanisms that could mediate cognitive penetration, attention, traditionally, is quickly sidelined as a phenomenon that is trivially unable to exert the right kind of effect on perception. Even if the allocation of goal-directed (top-down, endogenous) attention is driven by the content of certain cognitive states (i.e., goal representations), it does not have a direct influence on perceptual processing itself. For, according to the traditional characterization, attention acts as a filter, a gatekeeper , or a spotlight ) that selects and enhances certain signals (corresponding to attended stimuli) while attenuating or filtering out competing signals "prior to the operation of early vision" (Pylyshyn, 1999: p. 344).

Attention and Aesthetic Experience

Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2016

This paper critically analyses a recent attempt to account for what is special about aesthetic ex... more This paper critically analyses a recent attempt to account for what is special about aesthetic experiences in terms of how one deploys one's attentional resources, i.e. how so-called aesthetic attention is exercised. While the paper defends this general framework of thinking about aesthetic experiences, it argues that the specific characterization of aesthetic attention that has been proposed is unsatisfactory, since it is incompatible with recent empirical findings on how the allocation of attention works. The major aim of this paper is to explore empirically plausible ways of attending, and to determine what scientifically legitimate kind of attention could account for at least some of the distinctive features of aesthetic experiences. The paper argues that the rapid sequential reallocation of the focus of attention to different properties of a single object plays a crucial role in this context.

A Multi-Factor Account of Degrees of Awareness

Cognitive Science, 2018

In this paper we argue that awareness comes in degrees, and propose a novel multi-factor account ... more In this paper we argue that awareness comes in degrees, and propose a novel multi-factor account that spans both subjective experiences and perceptual representations. At the subjective level, we argue that conscious experiences can be degraded by being fragmented , less salient, too generic, or flash-like. At the representational level, we identify corresponding features of perceptual representations—their availability for working memory, intensity, precision, and stability—and argue that the mechanisms that affect these features are what ultimately modulate the degree of awareness. We conclude the paper by demonstrating why the original interpretations of certain empirical findings that apparently pose problems for our account are, in fact, flawed.

Multidimensional Models of Degrees and Levels of Consciousness

Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2016

Can No-Report Paradigms Extract True Correlates of Consciousness

by Morten Overgaard and Peter Fazekas

Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2016

The Sensory Basis of the Epistemic Gap: An Alternative to Phenomenal Concepts

by Peter Fazekas and Zoltán Jakab

Philosophical Studies, 2016

The phenomenal character of conscious experience has long been regarded as the major problem for ... more The phenomenal character of conscious experience has long been regarded as the major problem for physicalist accounts of consciousness. In recent years, defenders of physicalism have typically been relying on the so-called Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) to avoid dualism. In this paper, we argue with PCS that cognitive-physicalistic explanations can account for the peculiarities of phenomenal character. However, we think that the conceptual features PCS investigates are not the genuine causes of the special characteristics of phenomenal consciousness but only symptoms, which can themselves be explained in terms of the features of the sensory-perceptual representations underlying conscious experiences, namely that some, but not all, of these states are representationally unstructured.

The ‘Deployment of Extra Processing’ Account of Attention

The paper formulates an alternative view about the core function of attention claiming that atten... more The paper formulates an alternative view about the core function of attention claiming that attention is not selection but the deployment of extra processing capacity. This way of thinking about attention has greater explanatory power, since it proposes a common implementation both for selection and modulatory effects, and it offers a unificatory perspective on the workings of perception and cognition.

Flat Mechanisms: A Reductionist Approach to Levels in Mechanistic Explanations

Philosophical Studies, 2022

The mechanistic framework traditionally comes bundled with a multi-level view. Some ascribe ontol... more The mechanistic framework traditionally comes bundled with a multi-level view. Some ascribe ontological weight to these levels, whereas others claim that characterising a higher-level entity and the corresponding lower-level mechanism are only different descriptions of the same thing. The goal of this paper is to develop a consistent metaphysical picture that can underly the latter position. According to this flat view, mechanistic wholes are modules that together with their parts are embedded in the same network of interacting units. The flat view preserves the original virtues of the mechanistic approach and is able to avoid the problems associated with the multi-level view.

Hallucinations as intensified forms of mind-wandering

Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 2021

This paper argues for a novel way of thinking about hallucinations as intensified forms of mind-w... more This paper argues for a novel way of thinking about hallucinations as intensified forms of mind-wandering. Starting from the observation that hallucinations are associated with hyperactive sensory areas underlying the content of hallucinatory experiences and a confusion with regard to the reality of the source of these experiences, the paper first reviews the different factors that might contribute to the impairment of reality monitoring. The paper then focuses on the sensory characteristics determining the vividness of an experience, reviews their relationship to the sensory hyperactivity observed in hallucinations, and investigates under what circumstances they can drive reality judgements. Finally, based on these considerations, the paper presents its main proposal according to which hallucinations are intensified forms of mind-wandering that are amplified along their sensory characteristics, and sketches a possible model of what factors might determine if an internally and involuntarily generated perceptual representation is experienced as a hallucination or as an instance of mind-wandering.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘Offline perception: voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation’.

Offline perception: an introduction

Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 2021

Experiences that are self-generated and independent of sensory stimulations permeate our whole li... more Experiences that are self-generated and independent of sensory stimulations permeate our whole life. This theme issue examines their similarities and differences, systematizes the literature from an integrative perspective, critically discusses state-of-the-art empirical findings and proposes new theoretical approaches. The aim of the theme issue is to foster interaction between the different disciplines and research directions involved and to explore the prospects of a unificatory account of offline perception in general.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘Offline perception: voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation’.

Dreaming, Mind-Wandering, and Hypnotic Dreams

by Peter Fazekas and Georgina Németh

Frontiers in Neurology, 2020

Hobson's AIM theory offers a general framework for thinking about states of consciousness like wa... more Hobson's AIM theory offers a general framework for thinking about states of consciousness like wakefulness, REM dreaming and NREM mentations in terms of a state space defined by the dimensions of the level of brain activity, the source of input, and the type of neurochemical modulation. This account inspired theoretical models of other altered states of consciousness-including hypnosis-claiming that studying REM dreaming can advance our understanding of these phenomena as well. However, recent developments showed that hypnosis is not a sleep like stage, and that the REM-centric attitude toward dreaming is mistaken. At the same time, the advancement of the neuro-cognitive theory claiming that dreaming and mind-wandering are on a continuum both underlain by default-mode network activity called many aspects of the AIM theory into question. Our aim in this paper is to show that certain hypnotic states-hypnotic dreams (experiences that subjects have in a hypnotic state as a result of an explicit suggestion to have a dream)-can, nevertheless, be highly relevant for the neuro-cognitive theory, and that their comparison with dreaming and mind-wandering has the potential to advance the field in unexpected ways.

Perceptual representations and the vividness of stimulus-triggered and stimulus-independent experiences

by Peter Fazekas and Georgina Németh

Perspectives on Psychological Science, 2020

In recent years, independent subfields have started to engage with the idea that the same cortica... more In recent years, independent subfields have started to engage with the idea that the same cortical regions that contribute to online perception are recruited during and underlie offline activities like information maintenance in working memory, mental imagery, hallucinations, dreaming, and mind wandering. Accumulating evidence suggests that in all these cases the activity of posterior brain regions provide the contents of experiences. This paper is interested in moving one step further by exploring specific links between the vividness of experiences, which is a characteristic feature of consciousness regardless of its actual content, and certain properties of the content-specific neural activity patterns. Investigating the mechanisms that underlie mental imagery and its relation to working memory, and the processes responsible for mind wandering and its similarities to dreaming form two clusters of research that are in the forefront of recent scientific study of mental phenomena, yet cross-talk between these two clusters have been surprisingly sparse. Here our aim is to foster such a cross-talk by articulating a hypothesis about the fine-grained phenomenological structure determining subjective vividness and its possible neural basis that allows us to shed new light on these mental phenomena by bringing them under a common framework.

A Dynamical Systems Approach to Causation

by Peter Fazekas, Gergely Kertész, and Gábor Hofer-Szabó

Synthese, 2019

Our approach aims at accounting for causal claims in terms of how the physical states of the unde... more Our approach aims at accounting for causal claims in terms of how the physical states of the underlying dynamical system evolve with time. Causal claims assert connections between two sets of physicals states-their truth depends on whether the two sets in question are genuinely connected by time evolution such that physical states from one set evolve with time into the states of the other set. We demonstrate the virtues of our approach by showing how it is able to account for typical causes, causally relevant factors, being 'the' cause, and cases of overdetermination and causation by absences.

Multidimensional degrees of consciousness: Qualities of experiences during wakeful perception, working memory tasks, mental imagery, mind wandering and dreaming

by Georgina Németh and Peter Fazekas

Overgaard, M., Mogensen, J., & Kirkeby-Hinrup, A. (eds.): Beyond the Neural Correlates of Consciousness. Psychology Press., 2019

Consciousness comes in degrees in the sense that the quality of conscious experiences — the appea... more Consciousness comes in degrees in the sense that the quality of conscious experiences — the appearance of their content — can gradually change along different dimensions like vividness, specificity and stability. These changes correspond to modulations of features of the underlying neural representations such as their intensity, precision and maintenance. This paper clarifies these correspondence relations and supports them by reviewing a series of novel findings from different strands on research focusing on wakeful perception, working memory, mental imagery, mind wandering and dreaming. These correspondence relations might allow us to move beyond traditional correlational claims with regard to consciousness, and establish tighter links between neural processes and subjective experiences.

White dreams are made of colours: What studying contentless dreams can teach about the neural basis of dreaming and conscious experiences

by Peter Fazekas and Georgina Németh

Sleep Medicine Reviews, 2019

Reports of white dreams, the feeling of having had a dream experience without being able to speci... more Reports of white dreams, the feeling of having had a dream experience without being able to specify this experience any further, make up almost one third of all dream reports, yet this phenomenon—until very recently— had not yet been in the focus of targeted investigations. White dreams are typically interpreted as forgotten dreams, and are sidelined as not being particularly informative with regard to the nature of dreaming. In this review article, we propose a paradigm shift with respect to the status of white dreams arguing that focusing on this phenomenon can reveal fundamental insights about the neural processes that occur in the dreaming brain. As part of this paradigm shift, we propose a novel interpretation of what white dreams are. This new interpretation is made possible by recent advancements in three different though interrelated fields focusing on dreaming, mental imagery, and wakeful perception. In this paper, we bring these different threads together to show how the latest findings from these fields fit together and point towards a general framework regarding the neural underpinnings of conscious experiences that might turn out to be highly relevant not just for dream research but for all aspects of studying consciousness.

Beyond the REM-NREM dichotomy: A multi-dimensional approach to understanding dreaming

by Georgina Németh and Peter Fazekas

Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2018

Traditionally, dream research focuses on accounting for typical psychological features of dream e... more Traditionally, dream research focuses on accounting for typical psychological features of dream experiences characteristic of different sleep stages in terms of the global physiological features of the sleep stages in question. However, as subtle differences got into the forefront of enquiry, as, for example, in questions concerning between stage similarities and within stage differences of mentations, this methodology became insufficient. What recent findings and theoretical developments suggest is that understanding mental activity during sleep requires studying the fine-grained characteristics of the phenomenal features of individual dreams, which, in turn, demands identifying specific neural processes that might underly different characteristics of the experiences, and tracking their changes not just between, but also within standard sleep stages. The paper argues that such a shift of focus from describing global stages to understanding the significance of local changes results in a true paradigm shift in dream research that can break away from the tradition of thinking about sleep mentation in terms of discrete categories (e.g. REM/NREM, or high/low global activity level), and offers a novel way of looking at dreams (and other conscious experiences) as forming a multi-dimensional continuum.

Attention is Amplification, not Selection

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2018

The paper argues that recent empirical findings and theoretical models shed new light on the natu... more The paper argues that recent empirical findings and theoretical models shed new light on the nature of attention. According to the resulting Amplification View, attentional phenomena can be unified at the neural level as the consequences of the amplification of certain input signals of attention-independent perceptual computations. The paper demonstrates that this way of identifying the core realiser of attention is able to evade standard criticisms often raised against sub-personal accounts of attention. Moreover, the paper argues that this approach also reframes our thinking about the function of attention by shifting the focus from the function of selection to the function of amplification.

Are higher mechanistic levels causally autonomous?

by Peter Fazekas and Gergely Kertész

Philosophy of Science, 2019

This paper provides a detailed analysis and explores the prospects of the arguments for higher-le... more This paper provides a detailed analysis and explores the prospects of the arguments for higher-level causal autonomy available for the proponents of the mechanistic framework. Three different arguments (a context-based, an organisation-based, and a constraint-based) are distinguished. After clarifying previously raised worries with regard to the first two arguments, the paper focuses on the newest version of the third argument that has recently been revived by William Bechtel. By using Bechtel's own case study, it is shown that not even reference to constraints can establish the causal autonomy of higher mechanistic levels.

Dream experiences and the neural correlates of perceptual consciousness and cognitive access

by Peter Fazekas and Georgina Németh

Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 2018

This paper approaches the debate whether perceptual consciousness requires cogni-tive access from... more This paper approaches the debate whether perceptual consciousness requires cogni-tive access from the perspective of dream studies, and investigates what kind of findings could support the opposing views of this debate. Two kinds of arguments are discussed, one that claims that the hypoactivity of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in REM sleep is directly relevant, and another that proposes that locating the neural correlates of dream experiences can indirectly inform the debate. It is argued that under closer reflection neither the classical claim about dorsolateral prefrontal cortex hypoactivity nor the more recent emphasis on general posterior hot zone activity during dreaming stand up to scrutiny. White dreaming is identified as the phenomenon that, nevertheless, holds the most promise to have an impact on the debate. Going beyond the topic if studying dreams can contribute to this debate, it is argued that cognitive access is not a monolithic phenomenon, and its neural correlates are not well understood. There seems to be a relevant form of cognitive access that can operate in the absence of activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and maybe also in the whole frontal region. If so, then exclusive posterior activation during conscious experiences might very well be compatible with the hypothesis that perceptual consciousness requires cognitive access.

Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access: An introduction

Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 2018

The problem of perceptual consciousness -the question of how our subjective experiences (colours ... more The problem of perceptual consciousness -the question of how our subjective experiences (colours as we see them; sounds as we hear them; tastes, etc. as we feel them) could be accounted for in terms of brain processes -is often regarded as the greatest unsolved mystery of our times. In recent literature, one of the most pressing questions in this regard is whether the neural basis of perceptual consciousness is independent of the neural basis of cognitive access mechanisms that make reporting and reflecting on conscious experiences possible. The Theme Issue focuses on this central problem of consciousness research, and aims to contribute to the field by critically discussing state-of-the-art empirical findings, identifying methodological problems, and proposing novel approaches.

Pre-Cueing Effects: Attention or Mental Imagery?

by Peter Fazekas and Bence Nanay

Frontiers in Psychology, 2017

Much has been written recently about cognitive penetration. If there are perceptual computations ... more Much has been written recently about cognitive penetration. If there are perceptual computations that are directly influenced by the information content of certain cognitive states such that the changes in the output of these computations can be accounted for in terms of the content of the penetrating cognitive states, we can talk about the cognitive penetration of perceptual processing. 1 When considering the possible mechanisms that could mediate cognitive penetration, attention, traditionally, is quickly sidelined as a phenomenon that is trivially unable to exert the right kind of effect on perception. Even if the allocation of goal-directed (top-down, endogenous) attention is driven by the content of certain cognitive states (i.e., goal representations), it does not have a direct influence on perceptual processing itself. For, according to the traditional characterization, attention acts as a filter, a gatekeeper , or a spotlight ) that selects and enhances certain signals (corresponding to attended stimuli) while attenuating or filtering out competing signals "prior to the operation of early vision" (Pylyshyn, 1999: p. 344).

Attention and Aesthetic Experience

Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2016

This paper critically analyses a recent attempt to account for what is special about aesthetic ex... more This paper critically analyses a recent attempt to account for what is special about aesthetic experiences in terms of how one deploys one's attentional resources, i.e. how so-called aesthetic attention is exercised. While the paper defends this general framework of thinking about aesthetic experiences, it argues that the specific characterization of aesthetic attention that has been proposed is unsatisfactory, since it is incompatible with recent empirical findings on how the allocation of attention works. The major aim of this paper is to explore empirically plausible ways of attending, and to determine what scientifically legitimate kind of attention could account for at least some of the distinctive features of aesthetic experiences. The paper argues that the rapid sequential reallocation of the focus of attention to different properties of a single object plays a crucial role in this context.

A Multi-Factor Account of Degrees of Awareness

Cognitive Science, 2018

In this paper we argue that awareness comes in degrees, and propose a novel multi-factor account ... more In this paper we argue that awareness comes in degrees, and propose a novel multi-factor account that spans both subjective experiences and perceptual representations. At the subjective level, we argue that conscious experiences can be degraded by being fragmented , less salient, too generic, or flash-like. At the representational level, we identify corresponding features of perceptual representations—their availability for working memory, intensity, precision, and stability—and argue that the mechanisms that affect these features are what ultimately modulate the degree of awareness. We conclude the paper by demonstrating why the original interpretations of certain empirical findings that apparently pose problems for our account are, in fact, flawed.

Multidimensional Models of Degrees and Levels of Consciousness

Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2016

Can No-Report Paradigms Extract True Correlates of Consciousness

by Morten Overgaard and Peter Fazekas

Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2016

The Sensory Basis of the Epistemic Gap: An Alternative to Phenomenal Concepts

by Peter Fazekas and Zoltán Jakab

Philosophical Studies, 2016

The phenomenal character of conscious experience has long been regarded as the major problem for ... more The phenomenal character of conscious experience has long been regarded as the major problem for physicalist accounts of consciousness. In recent years, defenders of physicalism have typically been relying on the so-called Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) to avoid dualism. In this paper, we argue with PCS that cognitive-physicalistic explanations can account for the peculiarities of phenomenal character. However, we think that the conceptual features PCS investigates are not the genuine causes of the special characteristics of phenomenal consciousness but only symptoms, which can themselves be explained in terms of the features of the sensory-perceptual representations underlying conscious experiences, namely that some, but not all, of these states are representationally unstructured.

The ‘Deployment of Extra Processing’ Account of Attention

The paper formulates an alternative view about the core function of attention claiming that atten... more The paper formulates an alternative view about the core function of attention claiming that attention is not selection but the deployment of extra processing capacity. This way of thinking about attention has greater explanatory power, since it proposes a common implementation both for selection and modulatory effects, and it offers a unificatory perspective on the workings of perception and cognition.