Published Papers by Ben Sheredos
Synthese, 2018
I argue (1) that what (ontic) New Mechanistic philosophers of science call mechanisms would be ma... more I argue (1) that what (ontic) New Mechanistic philosophers of science call mechanisms would be material Gestalten, and (2) that Merleau-Ponty’s engagement with Gestalt theory can help us frame a standing challenge against ontic conceptions of mechanisms. In short, until the (ontic) New Mechanist can provide us with a plausible account of the organization of mechanisms as an objective feature of mind-independent ontic structures in the world which we might discover – and no ontic Mechanist has done so – it is more conservative to claim that mechanistic organization is instead a mind-dependent aspect of our epistemic strategies of mechanistic explanation.
TopiCS in Cognitive Science, 2017
In many fields of biology, both the phenomena to be explained and the mechanisms proposed to expl... more In many fields of biology, both the phenomena to be explained and the mechanisms proposed to explain them are commonly presented in diagrams. Our interest is in how scientists construct such diagrams. Researchers begin with evidence, typically developed experimentally and presented in data graphs. To arrive at a robust diagram of the phenomenon or the mechanism, they must integrate a variety of data to construct a single, coherent representation. This process often begins as the researchers create a first sketch, and it continues over an extended period as they revise the sketch until they arrive at a diagram they find acceptable. We illustrate this process by examining the sketches developed in the course of two research projects directed at understanding the generation of circadian rhythms in cyanobacteria. One identified a new aspect of the phenomenon itself, whereas the other aimed to develop a new mechanistic account. In both cases, the research resulted in a paper in which the conclusion was presented in a diagram that the authors deemed adequate to convey it. These diagrams violate some of the normative “cognitive design principles” advanced by cognitive scientists as constraints on successful visual communication. We suggest that scientists’ sketching is instead governed by norms of success that are broadly explanatory: conveying the phenomenon or mechanism.
Husserl Studies, 2017
Husserl famously retracted his early portrayal, in Logische Untersuchungen, of phenomenology as e... more Husserl famously retracted his early portrayal, in Logische Untersuchungen, of phenomenology as empirical psychology. Previous scholarship has typically understood this transcendental turn in light of the Ideen's revised conception of the ἐποχή, and its distinction between noesa and noemata. This essay thematizes the evolution of the concept of mental acts in Husserl's work as a way of understanding the shift. I show how the recognition of the pure ego in Ideen I & II enabled Husserl to radically alter his conception of mental acts, coming to understand them all in terms of genuine *acts* (doings or performances) in a way that had been essentially precluded for descriptive psychologists (Brentano, Natorp, and the early Husserl) so long as the pure ego was denied. This reading challenges a widespread assumption in the secondary literature that "mental act" is a merely technical term or misnomer.
Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in the History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 2017
Scientists' graphical practices have recently become a target of inquiry in the philosophy of sci... more Scientists' graphical practices have recently become a target of inquiry in the philosophy of science, and in the cognitive sciences. Here I supplement our understanding of graphical practices via a case study of how researchers crafted the graphics for scientific publication in the field of circadian biology. The case highlights social aspects of graph-ical production which have gone understudied – especially concerning the negotiation of publication. I argue that it also supports a challenge to the claim that empirically-informed " cognitive design principles " offer an apt understanding of the norms of success which govern good scientific graphic design to communicate data and hypotheses to other experts. In this respect, the case-study also illustrates how " descriptive " studies of scientific practice can connect with normative issues in philosophy of science, thereby addressing a central concern in recent discussions of practice-oriented philosophy of science.
Human Studies, 2017
Merleau-Ponty's appropriation of Gestalt theory in The Structure of Behavior is central to his en... more Merleau-Ponty's appropriation of Gestalt theory in The Structure of Behavior is central to his entire corpus. Yet commentators exhibit little agreement about what lesson is to be learned from his critique, and provide little ex-egesis of how his argument proceeds. I fill this exegetical gap. I show that the Gestaltist’s fundamental error is to reify forms as transcendent realities, rather than treating them as phenomena of perceptual consciousness. From this, reductivist errors follow. The essay serves not only as a helpful guide through parts of /The Structure of Behavior/ for newcomers, but also offers a corrective to recent trends in philosophy of mind. Such influential commentators as Hubert Dreyfus, Taylor Carmen, and Evan Thompson have, I argue, risked serious misunderstanding of Merleau-Ponty’s view, by mistakenly treating “circular causality” as central to Merleau-Ponty’s own acausal (dialectical) view of forms.
The Scientific Imagination: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives
Some proponents of mechanistic explanation downplay the significance of how-possibly explanations... more Some proponents of mechanistic explanation downplay the significance of how-possibly explanations. We argue that developing accounts of mechanisms that could explain a phenomenon is an important aspect of scientific reasoning, one that involves imagination. Although appeals to imagination may seem to obscure the process of reasoning, we illustrate how, by examining diagrams (including drafts researchers construct in the course of research) we can gain insights into the construction of mechanistic explanations.
Brentano Studien, 2016
Brentano's Psychology constantly refers to mental phenomena as "mental acts," yet there has been ... more Brentano's Psychology constantly refers to mental phenomena as "mental acts," yet there has been surprisingly little effort devoted to discerning the significance of the term "act" in this context. A widespread implicit view is (1) that it is merely a technical term, and does not literally invoke any connotations of action at all. But since many regard the Psychology as riddled with Aristotelian assumptions, some also suggest (2) that Brentano's talk of "mental acts" is a significant holdover from his Aristotelian pedigree. Here I argue, negatively, that both claims are deeply problematic. First, traditional readings of Brentano (by, e.g., Oskar Kraus) in terms of (1) are incapable of supporting some of Brentano's most central commitments regarding inner perception and the method of psychology. Second, Brentano's own conception of Aristotelianism is such that if (2) were true, (1) would be false. Finally, if (2) were true in any significant sense, then Brentano would simply fail to do what he sets out to do in his empirical psychology. I thus call for renewed attention to Brentano's conception of "mental acts."
Erkenntnis, 2016
Recent attempts to reconcile the ontic and epistemic approaches to explanation propose that our b... more Recent attempts to reconcile the ontic and epistemic approaches to explanation propose that our best explanations simply fulfill epistemic and ontic norms simultaneously. I aim to upset this armistice. Epistemic norms of attaining general and systematic explanations are, I argue, autonomous of ontic norms: they cannot be fulfilled simultaneously or in simple conjunction with ontic norms, and plausibly have priority over them. One result is that central arguments put forth by ontic theorists against epistemic theorists are revealed as not only question-begging, but ultimately self-defeating. Another result is that a more nuanced reconciliation of the epistemic and ontic views is required: we should regard good explanatory practice as a dynamic process with distinct phases of epistemic and ontic success.
We explore the crucial role of diagrams in scientific reasoning, especially reasoning directed at... more We explore the crucial role of diagrams in scientific reasoning, especially reasoning directed at developing mechanistic explanations of biological phenomena. We offer a case study focusing on one research project that resulted in a published paper advancing a new understanding of the mechanism by which the central circadian oscillator in Synechococcus elongatus controls gene expression. By examining how the diagrams prepared for the paper developed over the course of multiple drafts, we show how the process of generating a new explanation vitally involved the development and integration of multiple versions of different types of diagrams, and how reasoning about the mechanism proceeded in tandem with the development of the diagrams used to represent it.
Diagrams
have
distinctive
characteristics
that
make
them
an
effective
medium
for
commu... more Diagrams
have
distinctive
characteristics
that
make
them
an
effective
medium
for
communicating
research
findings,
but
they
are
even
more
impressive
as
tools
for
scientific
reasoning.
Focusing
on
circadian
rhythm
research
in
biology
to
explore
these
roles,
we
examine
diagrammatic
formats
that
have
been
devised
(a)
to
identify
and
illuminate
circadian
phenomena
and
(b)
to
develop
and
modify
mechanistic
explanations
of
these
phenomena.
Cognitive scientists have shown increased interest in diagrams in recent years, but most of the f... more Cognitive scientists have shown increased interest in diagrams in recent years, but most of the focus has been on spatial representation, not conventions for representing time. We explore a variety of ways in which time is represented in diagrams by one research community: scientists investigating circadian rhythms at the behavioral and molecular levels. Diagrams that relate other variables to time or indicate a mechanism's states across time use one or two spatial dimensions or circles to represent time and sometimes include explicit time markers (e.g., the hours on a clockface).
(2013). Proceedings of the 35th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.
Recent research has begun to explore the role of diagrams as cognitive tools. Here I develop new ... more Recent research has begun to explore the role of diagrams as cognitive tools. Here I develop new conceptual and methodological resources for exploring the sociality of cognition involving diagrams. First, I distinguish two varieties of group-dependent cognition. Second, extending Nersessian's method of cognitive-historical analysis, I show how a suitably-informed "literature review" of diagrams published in scientific articles offers a window into the group-dependent cognition of scientists. I end by sketching future avenues of inquiry, and how this approach may inform science education.
Frontiers in Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology
Psychological Inquiry
Traditionally, identity and supervenience have been proposed in philosophy of mind as metaphysica... more Traditionally, identity and supervenience have been proposed in philosophy of mind as metaphysical accounts of how mental activities (fully understood, as they might be at the end of science) relate to brain processes. Kievet et al. (this issue) suggest that to be relevant to cognitive neuroscience, these philosophical positions must make empirically testable claims and be evaluated accordingly—they cannot sit on the sidelines, awaiting the hypothetical completion of cognitive neuroscience. We agree with the authors on the importance of rendering these positions relevant to ongoing science. We disagree, however, with their proposal that a metaphysical relationship (identity or supervenience) should “serve as a means to conceptually organize and guide the analysis of neurological and behavioral data” (p. 69). Instead, we advance a different view of the goals of cognitive neuroscience and of the proper means of relating metaphysics and explanation.
Other by Ben Sheredos
unpublished, 2019
This is a (likely incomplete) transcendental phenomenology of professional failure. You can read ... more This is a (likely incomplete) transcendental phenomenology of professional failure. You can read it, if you like. Or don't.
unpublished, 2019
In a recent article published in Ergo and entitled "Ontic explanation is either ontic or explanat... more In a recent article published in Ergo and entitled "Ontic explanation is either ontic or explanatory, but not both," Cory Wright and Dingmar van Eck have sought to undermine any ontic approach to explanation, providing three arguments to show that an epistemic approach is "the only game in town." I show that each of their arguments is straightforwardly question-begging. For brevity, I make my counter-arguments by showing how the claims of Sheredos (2016)- whom Wright & van Eck cite as an ally - undermine each of their own arguments. The consumer update is: there is no new decisive argument against an ontic view, the epistemic view is not the only game in town, and reconciliation between the ontic and epistemic views remains possible.
A free system built on Google Drive & Google Sheets that standardizes job applicants' records and... more A free system built on Google Drive & Google Sheets that standardizes job applicants' records and makes it very easy for a placement director to compile a "Joint Report" (with 2 clicks) that integrates job application data from multiple applicants. The Joint Report can then be shared with faculty in the department at large to keep them informed about applicants' activities. The system runs on scripts that are embedded in google sheets, but is very user-friendly. (Nobody ever needs to see the scripts).
Book Reviews by Ben Sheredos
Philosophical Psychology, Mar 25, 2014
Open-Access Educational Resources by Ben Sheredos
Sheredos, Ben, and Harrison, Liz. "3 - Phase response curves." YouTube video, 7:31. Posted by "Th... more Sheredos, Ben, and Harrison, Liz. "3 - Phase response curves." YouTube video, 7:31. Posted by "The BioClock Studio," March 7, 2016. https://youtu.be/gib7_ppLpXI.
Uploads
Published Papers by Ben Sheredos
have
distinctive
characteristics
that
make
them
an
effective
medium
for
communicating
research
findings,
but
they
are
even
more
impressive
as
tools
for
scientific
reasoning.
Focusing
on
circadian
rhythm
research
in
biology
to
explore
these
roles,
we
examine
diagrammatic
formats
that
have
been
devised
(a)
to
identify
and
illuminate
circadian
phenomena
and
(b)
to
develop
and
modify
mechanistic
explanations
of
these
phenomena.
Other by Ben Sheredos
Book Reviews by Ben Sheredos
Open-Access Educational Resources by Ben Sheredos
have
distinctive
characteristics
that
make
them
an
effective
medium
for
communicating
research
findings,
but
they
are
even
more
impressive
as
tools
for
scientific
reasoning.
Focusing
on
circadian
rhythm
research
in
biology
to
explore
these
roles,
we
examine
diagrammatic
formats
that
have
been
devised
(a)
to
identify
and
illuminate
circadian
phenomena
and
(b)
to
develop
and
modify
mechanistic
explanations
of
these
phenomena.
In cognitive science, the majority of relevant research examines how non-expert subjects (undergraduates) consume finished graphics. Some work has also examined how non-expert subjects produce their own graphics, though this is rare. In general, this research treats graphical practice as an individualistic affair. And there is little examination of how expert scientists, themselves, produce and consume graphics. Nonetheless, cognitive scientists have recently begun leveraging their empirical results to formulate prescriptive “cognitive design principles” for how one ought to construct effective graphics. (For review of all these points, see Tversky 2011 and Hegarty 2011). To provide a simplistic summary of these design principles, one basic recommendation is to “keep graphics simple” by removing any information which is not task-relevant, making intended meaning readily accessible, and keeping a basic visual style constant between graphics. Another recommendation is to use to use space in ways which are “natural,” or which are held to reflect everyday embodied experience – e.g., use vertical axes for valuations, with up meaning more/better and down less/worse, and use horizontal axes for neutral dimensions.
Meanwhile, philosophical investigations of scientific graphics typically examine experts' finished products. (See, e.g., Nersessian 2008; Perini 2005, 2012; Griesemer 2012; Sheredos et
al., 2012). The practices which led to graphics' production are largely inferred and not observed. Moreover, there has been a tendency to focus on graphics produced by influential individuals (Maxwell, Darwin, etc.). As a result, we again have a set of methodologies which are ill-suited for uncovering the details of expert production, and we again have a tendency towards an individualistic conception of graphical practice.
In this talk I supplement our understanding of scientists' graphical practices via a novel case-study of how researchers crafted a peer-reviewed research publication in a top biology journal (what I shall call “the target article”). My data-set (provided by the authors of the target article) consists of 12 different drafts of the target article and its graphics, plus reviewer comments on the penultimate draft, as well as the authors' own revisions and rejoinders in response to reviewers. The target article is a publication in the biology of circadian rhythms, and thus this case-study finds robust context in, and was facilitated by, recent work in collaboration with William Bechtel. I show that the development of the target article involved social and communalized strategies of graphical production which previously methodologies have left understudied – especially concerning the negotiation of publication. I also argue the case supports a challenge to the claim that “cognitive design principles” offer an apt understanding of the norms of success which govern scientists’ graphical practices: scientists’ own practices of revision and drafting suggest that they work under a different conception of what good graphical practice aims to accomplish. I offer some clarification of the norms of good graphical practice, and call for renewed attention to this issue.
Meta-representational competence must be acquired. Novices can, as shown by cognitive scientists like Tversky and Hegarty, complete various tasks of diagram comprehension best if the distribution of ink on the page has a “natural mapping” to the semantic structure of a theoretical domain. It is thus often suggested that educators and working scientists alike would do well to design graphics so as to exploit any “natural mappings” which are available. I aim to add nuance to this view, by pointing out that in the course of coming to emulate expert practice, aspiring scientists must carefully learn to temper their reliance upon “natural mappings.” Distinct sub-regions of space-on-the-page within a single diagram often require distinct mappings to a variety of theoretical domains. A great source of diagrams' utility in biology consists in enabling researchers to coordinate these theoretical domains, but this requires a bifurcation of the total space-on-the-page into multiple spaces which each support an independent mapping. As I show by example, there is frequently no sensible way to perform a “global” mapping from total space-on-the-page to theoretical domains.