Geography and Planning

Using a 1996 national survey of housing in China and a multilevel modelling technique, we examine housing tenure choice in transitional urban China where households have been granted limited freedom of choice in the housing market since the housing reforms of 1988. We nd that both market mechanisms and institutional forces affect households' tenure choice in urban China. While some socioeconomic factors such as age, household size, household income and housing price have similar effects on tenure choice as in the West, others such as the number of workers and marital status have rather different effects. In addition, factors characterising institutional relationships among the state, work units and households, such as hukou, job rank and work unit rank, still play important roles in tenure choice. Youqin Huang is in the . The authors are very grateful to Donald Treiman who provided them with the nationa l survey data-set. They also wish to thank Cindy Fan for her comments and anonymous referees for their suggestions. 0042-098 0 Print/1360-063 X On-line/02/010007-26 Ó 2002 The Editors of Urban Studies

Conventional views on marriage migration consider it primarily family-related, and portray female marriage migrants as mostly passive, tied movers. Marriage as an economic strategy is seldom studied. We argue that a structural framework enables analysis of the complexities underlying female marriage migration, stressing institutional, economic, and sociocultural factors that impose constraints on and provide opportunities for women's mobility. A review of the historical and social roles of marriage in China shows that its transactional nature undermines women's status but offers disadvantaged women an opportunity to achieve social and economic mobility. Based on statistical analyses of a one-percent sample of China's 1990 Census, we show that peasant women in poor areas are constrained by their institutional positions, rural origins, and low education and status, shutting them out from cities and the urban labor market. Yet in the face of these constraints, many women, in exchange for economic opportunities and agricultural work, pursue migration by marrying into rural areas in more developed regions and by moving over long distances. These rural brides in well-defined migration streams are testimony to the roles of social and kinship networks and of brokers in the marriage market. Men who are socially and/or economically disadvantaged but locationally privileged are able to draw brides from afar. Despite the neoclassical overtone of the notion that marriage migration is an economic strategy, we argue that a structural approach is necessary for understanding the complexities underlying female migration and for explaining the recent phenomenon of long-distance female marriage migration in China.

Urban sprawl has been at the center of current debate on urban structure. Compared to the rich literature on urban sprawl in Western cities, relatively little is known about whether Chinese urban expansion is excessive or inefficient. This paper provides an integrated analysis of two seemingly contradictory phenomena in China's urban development in recent two decades, namely development zones and semi-urbanized villages, and presents Beijing as a case study. Both types of urban expansion cannot be easily explained by traditional theories of either normal suburbanization or excessive urban expansion in the West. First, Chinese local governments have set up a large number of 'development zones' that are often so large and discontinuous from cities, especially when considering the mass transportation mode in China, that they can best be characterized as leapfrog development at macro-level. Despite their fancy titles, the boasted impact of these development zones on the local economy is doubtful and large amount of land inside these development zones remains vacant. 1 The second type of urban expansion is the expansion of urban population, especially migrant workers and temporary urban residents such as students, and accompanying 'illegal' construction into rural villages on the urban fringe that gradually become ghetto-like, sprawling migrant enclaves. While these places still physically look like rural villages and lack urban infrastructure and services, most of their residents work in cities and have an urban lifestyle. Population growth in these villages is not accommodated by new development but rather by crowding of 0305-9006/$ -see front matter q

C W. A. V. and H Y. (2004) Linking migration and mobility: individual and contextual effects in housing markets in the UK, Regional Studies 38, 617-628. Most migration work continues to separate long-and short-distance moves and their outcomes, but clearly, they are part of a complex process of relocation across different scales. While we know that long-distance moves are largely driven by labour market differences and moves at the local scale are the way in which households translate those long-distance moves into residential satisfaction in local housing markets, we know very little about the link between the two processes and their likelihoods. Some studies have suggested that long-distance moves are followed by local adjustment moves at an early point after the relocation. This paper evaluates those empirical findings in the context of the British housing market. It takes up a number of previously unexamined issues related to these linkages and to the timing of the links between the two moves. We show that the classic notion of a long-distance move followed by a short-distance adjustment move is far from the common experience. Additionally, we show that adjustment is only one of many outcomes of long-and short-distance relocations. Overall, repeat movers seem to account for much of the movement after long-and short-distance moves. Also clear is the finding that migration and mobility are absolutely embedded in the complex of life-course decisions.

This paper aims to understand how renters make their housing decisions in urban China, where market mechanisms are being introduced into a previously welfareoriented housing system. It is argued that while renters now enjoy more housing options, their choices are constrained not only by socio-economic factors as is the case in the West, but also by persisting socialist institutions such as the hukou system and work units. Using a national survey carried out in 1996 and a technique of multi-level modelling, the empirical study suggests that while private housing is becoming an important option, renters who can access public housing are still more likely to choose public housing because of heavy subsidies. Yet, renters with rural and temporary hukou, and those working in low-ranking work units are at a disadvantage in the housing market. In general they do not qualify for public housing, and private housing is their only option. Although the socialist housing system is under reform, it still defines renters' housing access and thus shapes their behaviour in the late 1990s.

This paper provides a conceptual framework emphasizing the role of culture and the state in understanding gating in different countries, and applies it to examine the long-existing and widespread neighborhood enclosure and gating in Chinese cities. It is argued that the collectivist culture deeply embedded in Chinese society and tight political control actively pursued by the government contribute to the widespread character of gating in China, whereas dominant Western-based theories such as the discourse of fear and private provision of public services are less applicable, even though they are becoming increasingly important in the new gated private housing. Gating and neighborhood enclosure in China help to define a sense of collectivism and foster social solidarity. Thus gating per se does not necessarily lead to residential segregation, although it begins to reinforce segregation in the reform era. Gating also facilitates political control through neighborhood-level governments whose jurisdiction often corresponds to enclosed neighborhoods but forms change between different political-historical periods. Thus, while the physical form of gating is similar between China and the United States, the underlying sociopolitical constructs and implications are quite different.

This paper aims to understand residential mobility in non-market economies by conducting a case study of Chinese cities, a socialist society in transition. It is argued that residential mobility in China is mainly triggered by changes in housing supply and housing qualification, both of which are determined by housing policies. Using a retrospective survey in 20 Chinese cities, it was found that while the overall mobility is low, it has fluctuated significantly over time with a recent rising trend, which corresponds to historical changes in housing policies. The longitudinal models show that while some factors such as change of marital status and work units have consistent effects on mobility over time, indicating the persistency of the socialist housing system, others such as housing tenure have different effects over time, demonstrating changes in the Chinese housing system. The results share some similarities with the Western models, yet they demonstrate significant differences despite recent market penetrations. A framework that emphasizes the roles of the state and housing policies, and their change over time is needed to better understand residential mobility in China.

This paper argues that the low-income housing programme in China has so far failed to provide adequate housing for the poor for three main reasons: the central government's failure to define a clear mission; a lack of commitment from local governments; and an exclusionary policy towards migrants. A systematic review of low-income housing policy in China shows that the central government juggles its economic and socio-political goals thereby causing constant changes in low-income housing policy. Meanwhile, the existing public finance system, the performance evaluation system and localization in policy implementation have all resulted in a lack of commitment from local governments to low-income housing. Inadequate provision is made worse by problems with allocation. Despite encouraging changes since 2010, many factors underlying the government's failures remain unchanged, thus the fate of low-income housing remains uncertain.