Books by S. Stewart Braun
Virtues and reasons are two of the most fruitful and important concepts in contemporary moral phi... more Virtues and reasons are two of the most fruitful and important concepts in contemporary moral philosophy. Many writers have commented upon the close connection between virtues and reasons, but no one has done full justice to the complexity of this connection. It is generally recognized that the virtues not only depend upon reasons, but also sometimes provide them. The essays in this volume shed light on precisely how virtues and reasons are related to each other and what can be learned by exploring this relationship.
Virtue’s Reasons is divided into three sections, each of them devoted to a general issue regarding the relationship between virtues and reasons. The first section analyzes how the virtues may be related to, or linked with, normative reasons in ways that improve our understanding of what constitutes virtuous character and ethical agency. The second section explores the reasons moral agents have for cultivating the virtues and how the virtues impact moral responsiveness or development. The final section examines how reasons can be employed in understanding the nature of virtue, and how specific virtues, like modesty and practical wisdom, interact with reasons. This book will be of major interest to scholars working on virtue theory, the nature of moral character, and normative ethics.
Papers by S. Stewart Braun
In his new book, The Inheritance of Wealth, Daniel Halliday (2018) argues that the taxation of be... more In his new book, The Inheritance of Wealth, Daniel Halliday (2018) argues that the taxation of bequest and inheritance is justified on the grounds of preventing dynastic concentrations of wealth harmful to both democratic equality and fair equality of opportunity. Although Halliday's claims are convincing, he neglects the role that solidarity should play in justifying a robust tax on bequest. In this paper, I develop an argument for taxing and regulating bequest on the grounds of solidarity, linking the argument back to the thought of both Marx and Rawls.
Virtue’s Reasons, 2017
I. BACKGROUND TO THE VOLUME Over the past thirty years or so, virtues and reasons have emerged as... more I. BACKGROUND TO THE VOLUME Over the past thirty years or so, virtues and reasons have emerged as two of the most fruitful and important concepts in contemporary moral philosophy. Virtue theory and moral psychology, for instance, are currently two burgeoning areas of philosophical investigation that involve different, but clearly related, focuses on individual agents' responsiveness to reasons. The virtues themselves are major components of current ethical theories whose approaches to substantive or normative issues remain remarkably divergent in other respects. The virtues are also increasingly important in a variety of new approaches to epistemology. Many writers have commented on the close connections between virtues and reasons: for instance between the ethical virtues-justice, courage, temperance, honesty, and so on-and the different ranges of morally relevant reasons that seem to be intimately, or even conceptually, tied to them. 1 Even so, the relationship is complicated, and it seems safe to say that no one has yet done justice to the complexity of the interconnections between virtues and reasons. To compound matters, the more recent growth of virtue epistemology, with its focus on the intellectual virtues, only makes the interconnections between virtues and reasons that much more challenging for anyone attempting to understand their relationship.
[Extract] “…it is a notorious truth that a modest person does not act under the title of modesty”... more [Extract] “…it is a notorious truth that a modest person does not act under the title of modesty” – Bernard Williams¹ In the above quote, Williams alludes to what I call the paradox of modesty. According to the paradox, modesty cannot be deliberately cultivated since directly aiming at the virtue requires an acknowledgement of the virtue that is self-defeating. An agent that acknowledges her modesty or attempts to develop it seemingly undermines her claim to modesty by acknowledging that she is accomplished or by highlighting her own virtuousness. Prominent accounts of modesty have dealt with the paradox by treating modesty as a virtue that cannot be consciously cultivated or developed. For instance, Julia Driver has famously argued that an agent is modest because she is ignorant of the value of her own accomplishments.² Other theorists, although disagreeing with Driver that modesty requires ignorance of one’s accomplishments, have nevertheless held that a modest person keeps things in their proper, limited perspective.³ Or, in other alternative accounts, the modest agent is depicted as deemphasizing his accomplishments out of a concern to prevent envy.⁴ So although these accounts differ in important respects, they all treat modesty as a virtue that is not aimed at or developed, but has instrumental value nonetheless
Theological Studies, 2020
This article explains how Pope Francis’s economic views are both radical and practical. His views... more This article explains how Pope Francis’s economic views are both radical and practical. His views are practical in the sense that they are sensitive to social realities, not theoretical abstractions; and they are radical in the sense that they undermine traditional economic ideologies. To demonstrate these points, I show how Francis’s pronouncements are consistent with “economic democracy.” In economic democracy efforts are made to create a more equal dispersal of capital assets and the economy is more squarely oriented around fundamental human ends, including the common good, human dignity, equality and opportunity, meaningful work, ecological responsibility, and solidarity.
Journal of Social Philosophy, 2021
Journal of Social Philosophy, 2021
Journal of Value Inquiry, 2021
Theological Studies, 2020
This paper explains how Pope Francis’ economic views are both radical and practical. His views a... more This paper explains how Pope Francis’ economic views are both radical and practical. His views are practical in the sense that they are sensitive to social realities, not theoretical abstractions; and they are radical in the sense that they undermine traditional economic ideologies. To demonstrate these points, I show how Francis’ pronouncements are consistent with ‘economic democracy’. In economic democracy efforts are made to create a more equal dispersal of capital assets and the economy is more squarely oriented around fundamental human ends, including the common good, human dignity, equality and opportunity, meaningful work, ecological responsibility, and solidarity.
Journal of Applied Philosophy, 2015
Public Affairs Quarterly, 2012
Law and Philosophy, 2010
... 4, 2010), http://www.ombwatch.org/node/10674, accessed January 25, 2010; Gary Therkildsen, &#... more ... 4, 2010), http://www.ombwatch.org/node/10674, accessed January 25, 2010; Gary Therkildsen, 'Enemies of the Estate Tax Assemble', OMB Watch (Jan. ... 1984): 407–419; Ernest Partridge, 'Posthumous Interests and Posthu-mous Respect', Ethics 91 (Jan. ...
Book Chapters by S. Stewart Braun
Beyond Consent: Limits and Alternatives to Respect for Autonomy in Human Research Ethics and Law , 2019
Virtue's Reasons: New Essays on Virtue, Character, and Reasons, 2017
Virtue’s Reasons: New Essays on Virtue, Character, and Reasons, 2017
Over the past thirty years or so, virtues and reasons have emerged as two of the most fruitful an... more Over the past thirty years or so, virtues and reasons have emerged as two of the most fruitful and important concepts in contemporary moral philosophy. Virtue theory and moral psychology, for instance, are currently two burgeoning areas of philosophical investigation that involve different, but clearly related, focuses on individual agents’ responsiveness to reasons. The virtues themselves are major components of current ethical theories whose approaches to substantive or normative issues remain remarkably divergent in other respects. The virtues are also increasingly important in a variety of new approaches to epistemology. ...
Uploads
Books by S. Stewart Braun
Virtue’s Reasons is divided into three sections, each of them devoted to a general issue regarding the relationship between virtues and reasons. The first section analyzes how the virtues may be related to, or linked with, normative reasons in ways that improve our understanding of what constitutes virtuous character and ethical agency. The second section explores the reasons moral agents have for cultivating the virtues and how the virtues impact moral responsiveness or development. The final section examines how reasons can be employed in understanding the nature of virtue, and how specific virtues, like modesty and practical wisdom, interact with reasons. This book will be of major interest to scholars working on virtue theory, the nature of moral character, and normative ethics.
Papers by S. Stewart Braun
Book Chapters by S. Stewart Braun
Virtue’s Reasons is divided into three sections, each of them devoted to a general issue regarding the relationship between virtues and reasons. The first section analyzes how the virtues may be related to, or linked with, normative reasons in ways that improve our understanding of what constitutes virtuous character and ethical agency. The second section explores the reasons moral agents have for cultivating the virtues and how the virtues impact moral responsiveness or development. The final section examines how reasons can be employed in understanding the nature of virtue, and how specific virtues, like modesty and practical wisdom, interact with reasons. This book will be of major interest to scholars working on virtue theory, the nature of moral character, and normative ethics.