User:Waylon1104/條目翻譯5

凡爾登戰役
第一次世界大戰西方戰線的一部分
戰役態勢圖
日期 1916年2月21日-12月18日 (9个月3周又6天) 地点 法國凡爾登防區 49°12′29″N 5°25′19″E 结果 法國勝利
参战方
德國	法國
指挥官与领导者
埃里希·馮·法金漢 威廉皇储 馮·克諾貝爾斯多夫 埃瓦爾德·洛克豪 馬克斯·加爾維茨 格奧爾格·德馬維茲	約瑟夫·霞飛 愛德華·卡斯泰爾諾 菲利普·貝當 羅貝爾·尼維爾 阿道夫·吉約馬 夏爾·芒然
兵力
50個師	75個師 (輪換制)
伤亡与损失
336,000–355,000人 143,000人死亡	379,000–400,000人 163,000人死亡 216,000人受傷
凡爾登 凡爾登，位於法國東北部大東部大區默茲省

凡爾登戰役（法語：Bataille de Verdun；德語：Schlacht um Verdun）乃第一次世界大戰西方戰線之要役，發生於法國東北凡爾登防區。此役由法國第二軍團與德國第五軍團交鋒，為一戰歷時最久之戰事，亦為軍事史上死傷最甚者之一。

1916年2月21日，德軍發動「審判行動」（德語：Unternehmen Gericht），奉德軍總參謀長埃里希·馮·法金漢所擬消耗戰略，以圖攻取凡爾登防區（Région Fortifiée de Verdun）中默茲高地之險要地利，冀迫法軍重兵來援，欲以「流血至死」之法致其頹敗。至2月底，德軍已攻占杜奧蒙要塞，迫臨默茲高地之麓，然未及法軍大部隊抵達之前攻下高地。3月，德軍整編兵馬，轉攻默兹河西岸，法軍砲兵則積極應敵，阻德軍前進。其後，法軍屢試奪回杜奧蒙要塞，德軍亦欲擴大其攻勢，然成果僅限於奪取沃要塞。7月1日，英法聯軍於索姆河戰役開辟新戰場，牽制德軍。7月12日，法金漢指揮之大規模進攻再遭挫敗，遂令第五軍團轉入守勢，法金漢亦於8月29日解職。至10月下旬，法軍發動總攻，先後收復杜奧蒙要塞、沃要塞及東岸廣袤疆域，終使凡爾登戰役告捷，法軍威聲大振。

背景

戰略形勢

1914年9月，德軍西線右翼主力於第一次馬恩河戰役遭法軍阻擊，繼之雙方展開一系列運動戰，自法國東北延及英吉利海峽。至第一次伊珀尔战役後，戰局僵持，形成堑壕战之局。其後，協約國屢對德軍陣地發動攻勢，然皆未能破其戰略膠著。於此背景之下，德軍總參謀長埃里希·馮·法金漢以為，德軍雖難於取得決定性勝利，然若能損耗法軍有生之力，則德國終可奪取戰爭之主導權。法金漢料定，若德軍攻凡爾登，則法軍必舉預備之兵力悉數馳援，英軍亦當於法國北部掀起輔助攻勢。屆時，德軍憑藉其砲兵之顯著優勢，將可於兩線戰場並重削弱敵軍元氣，遂致其無以為繼。

關於法金漢之計略，荷蘭軍事情報早有所覺，遂於12月通報英國。德軍所謀者，非以大規模進攻求勝，因為先前法英之猛攻已證明此法徒然招致損耗，徒勞無功。法金漢有意仗重砲之威力，以殺傷敵軍大量人員為主。其計畫以凡爾登為限，意欲誘致法軍反覆反攻，耗其戰略儲備，並於英軍力圖支援之徒勞攻勢中挫敗其後援，致使法國無奈之下另行媾和。倘若法軍拒絕議和，則戰略將進入第二階段，由德軍乘敵疲敝之時，徹底擊潰法英聯軍，掃清法軍餘部，並逐英軍出歐洲。為實現此計，法金漢需留足戰略儲備，以應對法英聯軍之支援攻勢，並繼之以反擊，故能調往第五軍團為執行「審判行動」（Unternehmen Gericht）之兵力亦有限。

凡爾登防禦區乃1914年德軍入侵所成之突出部。時法軍總司令約瑟夫·霞飛因比利時列日戰役及那慕爾圍城戰中，比利時要塞迅速失陷，遂認定德軍重砲已使傳統防禦工事不敷使用。1915年8月5日，法軍總參謀部令削減凡爾登防區54座砲台及12萬8千發彈藥，並擬定計畫炸毀杜奧蒙堡與沃堡以防其落入敵手，至德軍於2月21日進攻之際，杜奧蒙堡內已埋設重達五噸之炸藥。凡爾登周圍十八座要塞及諸多砲台僅餘不到三百門火砲，彈藥儲備匱乏，守備兵力亦縮減至僅維修之需 。此處要塞群南向通凡爾登市區之鐵路自1914年弗利雷之戰後已為德軍所切斷，圣米耶勒亦為其所占；而西通巴黎之鐵路亦於1915年7月中旬被德軍第三軍團攻克，該軍自新年以來，自阿戈訥森林南襲，直抵欧布雷维尔。

凡爾登防區

凡爾登戰場地圖

凡爾登城倚默兹河而建，歷數世紀，為法國腹地之重鎮，守御之要衝。五世紀時，匈人王阿提拉圍城而未克；843年，經《凡尔登条约》，加洛林帝国分裂，該城入神圣罗马帝国版圖；至三十年戰爭之《威斯特伐利亚和约》，凡爾登歸屬法國。城中堡壘，為法國工兵名將塞巴斯蒂安·德·沃邦於十七世紀所建，設防甚固。其外築有雙重環形防線，包括二十八座要塞及小型工事，依地勢高處而立，高出河谷至少150米，距城堡2.5至8公里。1870年代，拉維耶爾制定計劃，建兩道防線，自贝尔福通埃皮纳勒，自凡爾登連图尔，環繞諸城，以為反攻之基。凡爾登之諸要塞，多經改建，尤抗砲之堅固大增。自1880年代起，杜奧蒙堡等處展開加固工程，增設沙墊，並覆以厚達2.5米之鋼筋混凝土，外覆1至4米土層。諸堡與工事彼此相望，互為犄角，外環防線周長約45公里。外圈要塞備有砲位79座，其中置於防彈砲塔內之重砲，輕砲與機槍二百餘門，守護要塞周圍之壕溝。此外，六座要塞設有155毫米可升降砲塔，十四座具雙聯75毫米升降砲塔。

裝載在列車上的SK L/45 38釐米艦砲（綽號長馬克斯）

至1903年，杜奧蒙堡新設混凝土掩體「布爾日火砲室」 (Casemate de Bourges)，置75毫米野砲二門，以掩護西南方進路及冷土堡工事（Ouvrage de Froideterre）。自1903年至1913年間，又增設四座可升降鋼砲塔，具全方位射擊之能。東北與西北角設有小型砲塔，各置雙聯哈奇开斯轻机枪；堡壘東側砲塔中，則安裝短管155毫米重砲，向北與東北瞰射，另有砲塔內置雙聯75毫米砲，以掩護鄰近要塞間之間隙。杜奧蒙堡與其村落、六座工事、五處掩蔽所、六座混凝土砲台、一座地下步兵掩蔽所、二座彈藥庫及若干混凝土步兵壕塹，構成一完整之防禦體系。凡爾登要塞體系之間，遍布混凝土步兵掩蔽所、裝甲觀測哨、砲台、指揮所與地下掩體，銜接成網絡。其砲兵力量約有1,000門，其中預備砲250門；要塞間以電話、電報、窄軌鐵路及公路相連。凡遇戰時，凡爾登防禦區駐軍66,000人，糧餉可支半年。

前奏

德軍準備

凡爾登市與郊區的地圖

自1914年起，凡爾登三面被圍，幾近孤立。1915年7月中旬，德軍第五軍團右翼部隊（由威廉皇儲指挥）經連番局部攻勢，進抵「死女嶺」（La Morte Fille）與285高地山脊，切断了横贯阿戈讷森林、连接巴黎至凡尔登的铁路干线。由此，巴黎—圣默努—萊西萊特—阿戈訥地區克萊蒙—奥布雷维尔—凡尔登的铁路运输彻底中断。法国方面仅余窄轨铁路维持大宗物资的运输，而德军控制的铁路干线距前线仅24公里。第五軍團調動一軍至前線，以充勞役，為攻勢作準備。德軍驅逐當地法國居民，徵用房舍，鋪設數千公里之通信电缆，隱秘儲備彈藥糧秣，佈置砲位並巧妙偽裝。更修築十條新鐵路及二十座車站，開鑿深4.5至14米之地下掩體，足容千餘步兵安置其中。

德軍第三軍、第七預備軍及第十八軍悉数调至第五軍團，各军增援2,400名经验丰富的老兵及2,000名训练有素的新兵。第五军则置于前线之后，待攻势部队向前推进时作为支援力量。第十五军（下辖两个师）作为第五軍團預備隊，准备在法军防线崩溃时立即发起清剿行动。為維持高密度火砲攻擊，德軍特設計每日調度33列半運彈車，首6日運送彈藥足供發射二百萬發，後續12日再備二百萬發。前線附近設五所修理廠，以減少砲兵維修之延誤，德國境內之工廠亦待命，隨時修復損壞嚴重之火砲。砲兵重新部署方案經詳慎制訂，野戰砲及重型流動火砲於臼砲與超重型火砲掩護之下，逐步向前推進。凡爾登前線集結火砲1,201門，其中三分之二為重砲及超重砲，多從西線其他戰場抽調而來，以老式砲及俘獲之俄、比火砲替換。这些火炮可从三个方向轰击凡尔登突出部，同时保持分散部署于外围。

德軍計劃

德國第五軍團預計分為數組作戰區域，第8預備軍將佔領「甲區」、第18軍將佔領「乙區」、第3軍將佔領「丙區」、第15軍將佔領「丁區」。德軍砲兵預計於2月12日上午開始轟擊，而「甲區」至「丙區」的德軍部隊則在當天下午5時開始推進。凡能占領者，法軍前沿陣地皆應予以占據，並對第二道防線進行偵察，以便次日炮火轟擊。德軍極力減少步兵傷亡，采取緊隨大規模炮擊後推進的策略，以炮兵為主導，實施多次「有限目標進攻」，以維持對法軍的持續壓力。其初步目標為默茲高地，於該處接連弗魯瓦德泰爾、蘇維爾堡與塔萬堡，以建堅實之防禦據點，以御法軍反攻。「持續壓力」一詞為第五軍團司令部提出，增加了攻勢目標的模糊性。埃里希·馮·法金漢主張占領能由炮兵控制戰場的土地，而第五軍團則傾向於迅速攻占凡爾登。此一目標上的分歧，最終由各軍司令部自行協調解決。

炮兵的指揮權通過《炮兵與迫擊炮行動命令》統一，由各軍的重炮將軍負責局部目標的選擇，而鄰近軍的側翼炮火協調及特定炮位的射擊則由第五軍團總部掌控。攻法軍之防垒，尤需重型榴彈炮及側射之火力。重炮遠轟，旨在截法軍之補給，擾其集結；反炮火之應對，則專以化學彈為之。炮兵與步兵的協同尤為強調，其中炮火精度優先於射速。開戰前的炮擊逐步加強，直至最後一小時才達到「鼓聲式炮擊」（Trommelfeuer），即炮彈爆炸聲匯成連續隆鳴。步兵推進時，炮兵將逐步延伸火力，以摧毀法軍第二道防線。炮兵觀察員隨步兵推進，並通過戰地電話、信號彈及彩色氣球與炮兵保持聯絡。攻勢開始後，法軍將遭到持續轟炸，夜間則以騷擾性炮火不斷施壓。

法軍準備

1916年2月至3月的默茲河東岸

1915年，凡爾登防禦區（RFV）之諸堡，內中237門火炮及657公噸之彈藥悉被撤去，唯餘具可伸縮炮塔之重炮。該區開始由線性防禦改造為常規壕堑與鐵絲網，但因為資源調往凡爾登西側以應第二次香檳戰役，而進展甚緩。至1915年10月，築壕始及第一、第二及第三防線；1916年1月，法軍總參謀長愛德華·德·卡斯泰爾諾檢視後，雖報新防線大體完備，然仍有三處小隙，未臻完美。此時諸堡駐軍已簡化為維持之工役人員，部分堡壘更設有炸藥，以備棄守。維持人員隸屬巴黎中央軍事機構，故當第三十軍司令保羅·克雷蒂安將軍於一九一六年一月試圖檢視杜奧蒙堡時，竟遭拒入。該堡壘為RFV中最大之堡壘，至1916年2月，僅餘七十五毫米及一百五十五毫米之炮塔火炮與壕溝防衛之輕炮。堡中駐有68名技工，由砲臺守衛官舍諾（Chenot）准尉率領，一旋轉一百五十五毫米炮塔部分有人值守，另一則已棄置。堡內霍奇克斯機槍收於箱中，四門七十五毫米堡壘炮亦已撤除。吊橋因德炮所擊，長年下垂未修；壕堑之火力堡（coffres）亦無人防守，而堡中更置有超過五噸之炸藥，備於棄堡時引爆之。時埃米爾·德里昂上校駐凡爾登，頻譴霞飛將軍撤去諸堡火炮與步卒守備，霞飛不為所動。然德里昂得戰爭部長约瑟夫·加列尼之支持，訴其言不謬，至德軍攻勢始驗其正也。

1916年初，法軍情報獲悉德軍於凡爾登之實力與意圖，然霞飛以為該攻勢僅為佯動，因其乏明確之戰略目的。德軍進攻之時，霞飛原預料主攻在他處，然終於屈於政壓，於1月23日調第七軍往凡爾登，以扼默茲河西岸之北。第三十軍據守默茲東岸之突出部，第二軍則守東岸高地。弗里德里克-喬治·赫爾將軍統八個半師於前線，另二個半師置於近後備。中央集團軍（Groupe d'armées du centre）由朗格勒·德·卡里將軍統轄，備第一、第二十軍各兩師為後備，以及第十九師的大部分兵員；霞飛總計有25個師之戰略後備軍可動員。法軍炮兵增援後，凡爾登地區炮數增至388門野炮及244門重炮，然德軍有炮1201門，其三分之二為重型及超重型，包括十四寸（360毫米）及部分十六寸（410毫米）之迫擊炮。另有八個專用火焰噴射連調往第五軍團。

戰鬥

第一階段：2月21日-3月1日

2月21日–26日

戰役前的杜奧蒙要塞，由德軍航空兵攝

「審判行動」（Unternehmen Gericht）原定於2月12日展開，然因濃霧、暴雨及狂風而延宕，直至2月21日上午7時15分，德軍方始以808門火炮展開十小時的猛烈轟擊。此役德軍沿三十公里長、五公里寬之戰線施射，炮彈數近百萬枚。其中主炮火集中於默茲河東岸，並動用二十六門超重型遠程火炮，口徑達四百二十毫米，轟擊凡爾登之堡壘及城區，其聲隆然，遠播160公里外猶可聞之。

午間德軍炮擊暫歇，蓄意誘使倖存之法軍暴露其蹤跡，並遣炮兵觀察機於戰區上空偵巡，而法軍之飛機未能阻撓。當日下午四時，德軍第三軍、第七軍及第十八軍發起進攻。德軍運用火焰噴射器，並以突擊步兵（Stormtroopers）緊隨其後，肩懸步槍，專以手榴彈攻滅殘存守軍。法軍餘部奮勇抵抗，然德軍僅受傷亡約六百人之輕損。

戰鬥後的杜奧蒙要塞

2月22日，德軍已挺進五公里，攻克法拉巴斯村邊之科爾森林（Bois des Caures）。法軍兩營堅守此林兩日，然後撤至薩莫尼厄、博蒙及奥尔讷。德軍攻勢猛烈，法軍第56及59步兵營之指揮官德里昂陣亡，僅118名獵兵（Chasseurs à pied）得以突圍。由於通訊不暢，法軍統帥部至此方始察覺攻勢之嚴重性。德軍雖攻占欧蒙，然其進攻埃貝布瓦森林（Bois de l'Herbebois）卻遭法軍擊退。2月23日，法軍欲奪回科爾森林之反攻亦被挫敗。

德軍轉而自瓦夫里森林（Bois de Wavrille）側擊，迫法軍放棄埃貝布瓦森林之守備。德軍於進攻福斯森林（Bois de Fosses）時損失慘重，而法軍尚守住薩莫尼厄。2月24日，德軍攻勢續行，迫使法軍第三十軍撤出第二道防線。巴尔富里耶將軍所率法軍第二十軍適時抵達，急速前推救援。同日晚間，卡斯泰爾諾將軍建議霞飛調遣菲利普·贝当指揮之第二軍團至凡爾登地區。彼時，德軍已攻占博蒙村、福斯森林及科雷爾森林（Bois des Caurières），並沿哈蘇勒溝谷向杜奧蒙要塞進發。

2月25日日下午三時，德軍布蘭登堡第24團之步兵發起進攻，其第二、第三營並肩前進，每營各列雙波攻勢，每波以兩連為組成。由於側翼部隊接令遲滯，第三營未得支援即獨自進攻。德軍憑藉隱蔽於埃米塔日森林（Bois Hermitage）邊緣之機槍火力，突襲法軍於森林及347高地之陣地，俘虜眾多守軍。法軍於347高地兵力遭側擊，乃退守杜奧蒙村。德軍步兵僅用20分鐘即抵既定目標，並追擊法軍，惟於杜奧蒙教堂遭法軍機槍火力阻擋。一些德軍士兵受阻後尋求掩護，退入森林及溝谷，然德軍炮兵卻誤將此地轟擊。數支德軍小隊為了躲避己方砲火遂冒險突進，分別進入要塞。彼時法軍杜奧蒙要塞內僅有少量維修人員，由一位准尉率領。此皆因1914年列日戰役中比利時堡壘被德軍「大貝莎」420毫米巨炮轟毀後，法軍已撤除大部分凡爾登堡壘之重火炮。

1916年2月21日－26日的凡爾登，該地位於默茲河東岸

德軍約百人之隊伍嘗試以信號彈與砲兵聯繫，然黃昏降臨，雪霰飄飛，信號遂被遮蔽。部分隊伍決定直接進攻堡壘，遂始割斷堡壘周圍之鐵絲網。此時法軍村中機槍射擊忽止，疑誤德軍為自378高地撤退之法軍祖阿夫兵。德軍得機進逼堡壘東北端，法軍待再度開火時，德軍已抵壘下。德軍尋得堡壘壕溝上方欄杆之間隙，攀緣而下，壕溝四角之機槍堡（法稱「逆坡堡」）皆無人防守，遂未遭射擊。數隊德軍再尋隙進入壕溝掩體，終由棄守之掩體而入堡，抵其中央之防壘街（Rue de Rempart）。

德軍潛入堡中，聽聞聲響，乃俘獲一在觀察哨之法軍士兵，迫使其引領至下層。於其間，捕得法軍舍諾准尉及約25人，皆為堡壘之留守兵，遂盡數拘擒。至2月26日，德軍已於十公里正面上推進三公里。法軍損失約24,000人，德軍亦損失近25,000人。法軍旋即發動反攻，欲奪回杜奧蒙堡，然攻擊未克。菲利普·贝当遂命令諸軍，勿再嘗試攻取堡壘，當於現存戰線整固防禦，並令諸堡壘重加武裝，儲備糧械，以備遭圍時能堅守久拒。

2月27日–29日

由於融雪致地面泥濘，德軍於2月27日之進攻舉步維艱，幾無寸進。法軍援兵陸續抵達鞏固陣地防禦，尤增其勢。德軍火砲有者因泥濘而滯，難以施用，有者竟陷於淤泥之中不能自拔。德軍步兵亦因久戰疲乏，加之傷亡慘重而困頓不堪。僅於杜奧蒙村之戰，德軍即折損五百餘命。2月29日，因大雪覆地，加以法國第33步兵團之固守，德軍於杜奧蒙遭遇挫折，攻勢受阻。此一延誤，令法軍得以從巴勒迪克緊急調運9萬名士兵和2.1萬公噸彈藥至凡爾登，備作防禦之用。泥濘之害，使德軍火砲移動極為遲緩，而步兵之進軍又已遠超火砲有效射程。進攻之部隊南推之勢，反而暴露於默茲河西岸法軍炮火之範圍內，遂受重創，損失尤甚於此前諸役。

第二階段：3月6日-4月15日

3月6日–11日

勒莫羅姆與304號山

法金漢在攻勢發起前預估西岸的法軍砲兵將會被德軍砲火壓制，但最終未能成真。其中德軍設立了一支特別砲兵部隊以反擊西岸法軍的砲兵，但未能減少德軍步兵的傷亡。第五軍團在2月下旬向法金漢要求更多援兵，但出於德軍在東岸順利的進攻，以及保留有生力量以發起另一波攻勢的考量，法金漢拒絕了他們的提議。德軍在2月27日的受阻使法金漢必須思考將叫停攻勢或繼續進攻。2月29日，第五軍團參謀長馮·克諾貝爾斯多夫從預備隊中挑選了兩個師，以佔領西岸的高地。由第10預備軍支援的第6預備軍計劃攻佔阿沃库尔以南、304號山以北、勒莫羅姆、屈米耶爾森林和205號山一線，如果成功控制該線，法軍在西岸的砲兵即可被德軍摧毀。

西岸德軍兩個軍組成的攻擊群由25個重砲連支援，由一將統一指揮，東岸炮兵亦得策應。

兩軍對壘於西岸，攻擊集團之炮兵增強至二十五重炮連，並由一將統一指揮，東岸炮兵亦得策應。攻擊計劃由亨利希·馮·戈斯勒將軍擘劃，分二期而行，首於三月六日攻取摩爾特山及265高地，繼以三月九日進攻阿沃庫爾與304高地。德軍炮火之猛，竟將304高地之頂自原三百四公尺削至三百公尺。摩爾特山內藏法軍野炮陣地，對德軍自右岸逼近凡爾登之路徑多所阻撓，且其山勢險峻，俯瞰左岸全境，為形勢所必爭。。德軍初奪「烏鴉林」，旋遭法軍反攻而失之，隨即於三月九日再自貝坦庫爾西北方攻擊摩爾特山。經激烈鏖戰，德軍再克「烏鴉林」，然死傷慘重。至三月十四日，德軍攻陷摩爾特山部分區域，並奪取304高地、居米耶及沙唐庫爾數地。

3月11日-4月9日

1916年5月31日德軍在凡爾登的部署

德軍進攻一週後，已達成首日既定目標，然而發現法軍在馬爾山丘與布魯斯森林後方的砲兵仍在運作，對東岸的德軍造成重大傷亡。德軍遂將砲兵轉移至265號山，卻遭法軍系統性的砲火壓制，迫使德軍必須展開西岸攻勢的第二階段，以保護首階段所得之地。德軍的攻勢由此轉變為窄正面、有限目標的小規模作戰，而非大範圍的全面攻擊。

3月14日，德軍攻占莫罗姆西端的265高地，然而法軍第75步兵旅堅守東端的295高地不退。3月20日，德軍經由13,000發壕溝迫擊砲彈的轟擊後，第11巴伐利亞師與第11預備師向阿沃庫爾森林與馬朗庫爾森林發起進攻，迅速到達初始目標。指揮官戈斯勒遂下令暫停攻勢，以鞏固所得之地，並準備次日的大規模轟炸。3月22日，兩個師向304高地附近的「白蟻山」發起攻擊，卻遭遇法軍密集砲火，不僅攻擊受挫，其集結地與後勤線路亦受重創，最終使德軍無法進一步推進

The limited German success had been costly and French artillery inflicted more casualties as the German infantry tried to dig in. By 30 March, Gossler had captured Bois de Malancourt at a cost of 20,000 casualties and the Germans were still short of Côte 304. On 30 March, the XXII Reserve Corps arrived as reinforcements and General Max von Gallwitz took command of a new Attack Group West (Angriffsgruppe West). Malancourt village was captured on 31 March, Haucourt fell on 5 April and Béthincourt on 8 April. On the east bank, German attacks near Vaux reached Bois Caillette and the Vaux–Fleury railway but were then driven back by the French 5th Division. An attack was made on a wider front along both banks by the Germans at noon on 9 April, with five divisions on the left bank but this was repulsed except at Mort-Homme, where the French 42nd Division was forced back from the north-east face. On the right bank an attack on Côte-du-Poivre failed.

德軍步兵對勒莫羅姆的進攻

In March the German attacks had no advantage of surprise and faced a determined and well-supplied adversary in superior defensive positions. German artillery could still devastate French defensive positions but could not prevent French artillery fire from inflicting many casualties on German infantry and isolating them from their supplies. Massed artillery fire could enable German infantry to make small advances but massed French artillery fire could do the same for French infantry when they counter-attacked, which often repulsed the German infantry and subjected them to constant losses, even when captured ground was held. The German effort on the west bank also showed that capturing a vital point was not sufficient, because it would be found to be overlooked by another terrain feature, which had to be captured to ensure the defence of the original point, which made it impossible for the Germans to terminate their attacks, unless they were willing to retire to the original front line of February 1916.

By the end of March the offensive had cost the Germans 81,607 casualties and Falkenhayn began to think of ending the offensive, lest it become another costly and indecisive engagement similar to the First Battle of Ypres in late 1914. The 5th Army staff requested more reinforcements from Falkenhayn on 31 March with an optimistic report claiming that the French were close to exhaustion and incapable of a big offensive. The 5th Army command wanted to continue the east bank offensive until a line from Ouvrage de Thiaumont, to Fleury, Fort Souville and Fort de Tavannes had been reached, while on the west bank the French would be destroyed by their own counter-attacks. On 4 April, Falkenhayn replied that the French had retained a considerable reserve and that German resources were limited and not sufficient to replace continuously men and munitions. If the resumed offensive on the east bank failed to reach the Meuse Heights, Falkenhayn was willing to accept that the offensive had failed and end it.

第三階段：4月16日-7月1日

4月

《凡爾登，世界的血泵》
1916年的德軍宣傳獎章

The failure of German attacks in early April by Angriffsgruppe Ost, led Knobelsdorf to take soundings from the 5th Army corps commanders, who unanimously wanted to continue. The German infantry were exposed to continuous artillery fire from the flanks and rear; communications from the rear and reserve positions were equally vulnerable, which caused a constant drain of casualties. Defensive positions were difficult to build, because existing positions were on ground which had been swept clear by German bombardments early in the offensive, leaving German infantry with very little cover. General Berthold von Deimling, commander of XV Corps, also wrote that French heavy artillery and gas bombardments were undermining the morale of the German infantry, which made it necessary to keep going to reach safer defensive positions. Knobelsdorf reported these findings to Falkenhayn on 20 April, adding that if the Germans did not go forward, they must go back to the start line of 21 February.

Knobelsdorf rejected the policy of limited piecemeal attacks tried by Mudra as commander of Angriffsgruppe Ost and advocated a return to wide-front attacks with unlimited objectives, swiftly to reach the line from Ouvrage de Thiaumont to Fleury, Fort Souville and Fort de Tavannes. Falkenhayn was persuaded to agree to the change and by the end of April, 21 divisions, most of the OHL reserve, had been sent to Verdun and troops had also been transferred from the Eastern Front. The resort to large, unlimited attacks was costly for both sides but the German advance proceeded only slowly. Rather than causing devastating French casualties by heavy artillery with the infantry in secure defensive positions, which the French were compelled to attack, the Germans inflicted casualties by attacks which provoked French counter-attacks and assumed that the process inflicted five French casualties for two German losses.

In mid-March, Falkenhayn had reminded the 5th Army to use tactics intended to conserve infantry, after the corps commanders had been allowed discretion to choose between the cautious, "step by step" tactics desired by Falkenhayn and maximum efforts, intended to obtain quick results. On the third day of the offensive, the 6th Division of the III Corps (General Ewald von Lochow), had ordered that Herbebois be taken regardless of loss and the 5th Division had attacked Wavrille to the accompaniment of its band. Falkenhayn urged the 5th Army to use Stoßtruppen (storm units) composed of two infantry squads and one of engineers, armed with automatic weapons, hand grenades, trench mortars and flame-throwers, to advance in front of the main infantry body. The Stoßtruppen would conceal their advance by shrewd use of terrain and capture any blockhouses which remained after the artillery preparation. Strongpoints which could not be taken were to be by-passed and captured by follow-up troops. Falkenhayn ordered that the command of field and heavy artillery units was to be combined, with a commander at each corps headquarters. Common observers and communication systems would ensure that batteries in different places could bring targets under converging fire, which would be allotted systematically to support divisions.

法軍步兵從戰壕中出擊

In mid-April, Falkenhayn ordered that infantry should advance close to the barrage, to exploit the neutralising effect of the shellfire on surviving defenders, because fresh troops at Verdun had not been trained in these methods. Knobelsdorf persisted with attempts to maintain momentum, which was incompatible with casualty conservation by limited attacks, with pauses to consolidate and prepare. Mudra and other commanders who disagreed were sacked. Falkenhayn also intervened to change German defensive tactics, advocating a dispersed defence with the second line to be held as a main line of resistance and jumping-off point for counter-attacks. Machine-guns were to be set up with overlapping fields of fire and infantry given specific areas to defend. When French infantry attacked, they were to be isolated by Sperrfeuer (barrage-fire) on their former front line, to increase French infantry casualties. The changes desired by Falkenhayn had little effect, because the main cause of German casualties was artillery fire, just as it was for the French.

5月4日–22日

自5月10日起，德軍攻勢漸趨局部，或因應法軍四月上旬各地反攻，或取具戰略價值之要地。貝當將軍於五月晉升中央集團軍司令，駐守凡爾登之第二軍團則改由羅貝爾·尼維爾將軍統領。自5月4日至24日，德軍於西岸莫爾翁附近展開攻擊。其於4日攻克304高地之北坡，5日與6日力挫法軍之反攻，至七日擊退304高地之頂法軍，惟因法軍炮火密集轟擊，德軍步卒亦難以奪取全線脊樑。時法軍展開對杜奧蒙要塞之反擊，屈米耶爾及考雷特於5月24日被德軍佔領。

5月22日–24日

1916年5月的勒莫羅姆前線

五月間，尼維爾將軍接掌第二軍團後，下令第五師師長夏爾·芒然策劃奪回杜奧蒙要塞的反攻計畫。起初的計畫是以3公里的正面發起攻擊，但數次德軍的小規模進攻改變了局勢。他們先後奪取了要塞東南側的福斯科特峽谷和西側的庫勒沃峽谷，隨後又佔領了庫勒沃峽谷南側的山脊，這不僅為德軍提供了更便捷的反擊路徑，還使其能有效觀察法軍在南部和西南方向的防線部署。芒然因此提議先進行一次初步攻擊，奪回峽谷周邊地區，以封鎖德軍可能對要塞進行反擊的路徑。然而，由於法軍需保留足夠兵力參與即將展開的索姆河攻勢，高層拒絕調派更多部隊支援，芒然僅能動用一個師進攻，另有一個師作為預備隊。尼維爾隨後將攻擊規模縮減，目標範圍集中於摩爾歇戰壕（Morchée Trench）、埃夫克神父之帽、豐丹戰壕、杜奧蒙要塞、一處機槍塔和翁格魯瓦戰壕。此行動計劃需在寬1,150公尺的戰線上推進500公尺，以完成攻勢目標

1916年在凡爾登戰役中的法軍防空炮，由奧托克羅姆技術拍攝的彩色影像

III Corps was to command the attack by the 5th Division and the 71st Brigade, with support from three balloon companies for artillery observation and a fighter group. The main effort was to be conducted by two battalions of the 129th Infantry Regiment, each with a pioneer company and a machine-gun company attached. The 2nd Battalion was to attack from the south and the 1st Battalion was to move along the west side of the fort to the north end, taking Fontaine Trench and linking with the 6th Company. Two battalions of the 74th Infantry Regiment were to advance along the east and south-east sides of the fort and take a machine-gun turret on a ridge to the east. Flank support was arranged with neighbouring regiments and diversions were planned near Fort Vaux and the ravin de Dame. Preparations for the attack included the digging of 7.5 mi（12 km） of trenches and the building of large numbers of depots and stores but little progress was made due to a shortage of pioneers. French troops captured on 13 May, disclosed the plan to the Germans, who responded by subjecting the area to more artillery harassing fire, which also slowed French preparations.

The French preliminary bombardment by four 370 mm mortars and 300 heavy guns, began on 17 May and by 21 May, the French artillery commander claimed that the fort had been severely damaged. During the bombardment the German garrison in the fort experienced great strain, as French heavy shells smashed holes in the walls and concrete dust, exhaust fumes from an electricity generator and gas from disinterred corpses polluted the air. Water ran short but until 20 May, the fort remained operational, reports being passed back and reinforcements moving forward until the afternoon, when the Bourges Casemate was isolated and the wireless station in the north-western machine-gun turret burnt down.

Conditions for the German infantry in the vicinity were far worse and by 18 May, the French destructive bombardment had obliterated many defensive positions, the survivors sheltering in shell-holes and dips of the ground. Communication with the rear was severed and food and water ran out by the time of the French attack on 22 May. The troops of Infantry Regiment 52 in front of Fort Douaumont had been reduced to 37 men near Thiaumont Farm and German counter-barrages inflicted similar losses on French troops. On 22 May, French Nieuport fighters attacked eight observation balloons and shot down six for the loss of one Nieuport 16; other French aircraft attacked the 5th Army headquarters at Stenay. German artillery fire increased and twenty minutes before zero hour, a German bombardment began, which reduced the 129th Infantry Regiment companies to about 45 men each.

法軍火砲連被德軍部隊佔領（可能為第34步兵師）

The assault began at 11:50 a. m. on 22 May on a 0.62 mi（1 km） front. On the left flank the 36th Infantry Regiment attack quickly captured Morchée Trench and Bonnet-d'Evèque but suffered many casualties and the regiment could advance no further. The flank guard on the right was pinned down, except for one company which disappeared and in Bois Caillette, a battalion of the 74th Infantry Regiment was unable to leave its trenches; the other battalion managed to reach its objectives at an ammunition depot, shelter DV1 at the edge of Bois Caillette and the machine-gun turret east of the fort, where the battalion found its flanks unsupported.

Despite German small-arms fire, the 129th Infantry Regiment reached the fort in a few minutes and managed to get in through the west and south sides. By nightfall, about half of the fort had been recaptured and next day, the 34th Division was sent to reinforce the French troops in the fort. The attempt to reinforce the fort failed and German reserves managed to cut off the French troops inside and force them to surrender, 1,000 French prisoners being taken. After three days, the French had suffered 5,640 casualties from the 12,000 men in the attack and the Germans suffered 4,500 casualties in Infantry Regiment 52, Grenadier Regiment 12 and Leib-Grenadier Regiment 8 of the 5th Division.

5月30日-6月7日

主条目：攻佔沃要塞

拉紹姆要塞視角東北方的凡爾登戰場，1917年

1916年5月下旬，德軍攻勢由西岸莫罗姆及304高地轉向東岸杜奧蒙要塞之南。德軍攻抵法軍最後一道防線弗勒里山脊，其意在奪取法軍東北防線之蒂奧蒙要塞、弗勒里、蘇維耶要塞及沃要塞。此區自戰端開啟以來，每日為約八千顆炮彈所轟擊。六月初，德軍出動步卒萬人，於6月2日攻佔沃要塞之頂。戰鬥激烈，法軍守軍堅守至水源耗盡，存者僅574人，於6月7日被迫投降。然德軍亦損失慘重，傷亡與失蹤者達2,742人。沃要塞淪陷之訊傳至凡爾登，市民與守軍緊急於城郊掘壕築防。西岸方面，德軍自304高地、莫羅姆及屈米耶爾一線，向法軍所控之阿沃库尔與沙唐库尔進擊。時值大雨，德軍攻蘇維耶要塞之勢受阻。此地戰況激烈，雙方往復爭奪，兩月之間交替易手，未有定局。

6月22日–25日

德國第五軍團從2月至6月佔領的凡爾登地區

6月22日，德軍砲兵向法軍砲兵陣地發射超過11.6萬發双光气化學武器，導致超過1,600人傷亡和大量火砲的暫時停火。 隔天清晨5點，德軍向五公里長的防線發動攻擊，並建立一個3乘2公里的突出部。攻勢進行得十分順利，直到上午9點時一些法軍部隊才得以進行後衛行動。在南方的蒂奧蒙要塞和富瓦德特爾要塞被德軍佔領，弗勒里和沙佩勒聖凡村被控制。攻勢發生於自4月以來遭到3.8萬顆砲彈襲擊的蘇維耶要塞附近，德軍此時距離凡爾登要塞僅剩下5公里。

1916年6月23日，尼維爾下令

Vous ne les laisserez pas passer, mes camarades（他們絕不能通過，我的戰友們。）

沙佩勒聖凡迅速重歸法軍的控制，德軍的進攻被迫停止。德軍步兵的供水補給陷入危機，突出部在三面受到打擊下變得脆弱，德軍在缺乏雙光氣補給的情況下無法繼續進攻，沙佩勒聖凡成為德軍在凡爾登戰役中到達的最遠處。6月24日英法聯軍開始對索姆河岸進行轟炸。 弗勒里自6月23日至8月17日被法德雙方交替控制了十六次，同時四個法國師從索姆河調至凡爾登。6月24日，法軍火砲恢復到足以切斷德軍前線與後方的聯繫。到了6月25日雙方陷入膠著，克諾貝爾斯多夫下令停止進攻。

第四階段：7月1日-12月17日

主条目：布鲁西洛夫攻势和索姆河戰役

5月結束時在凡爾登的法軍傷亡已達到18.5萬人，德軍傷亡則在6月達到20萬人。 法國和英國聯軍在索姆河战役初期的突破以及布鲁西洛夫攻势對奧匈軍隊的打擊，使德軍將部分火砲從凡爾登轉移，法國獲得了戰略性的成功。

7月9日–15日

法軍步兵在砲火下進攻

蘇維耶要塞控制了弗勒里東南方1公里的山峰，是2月攻勢的原先計畫目標之一。佔領該要塞將使德軍德以俯視凡爾登。 德軍於7月9日開始進行預備砲擊，試圖利用超過6萬發毒氣砲彈壓制法軍的砲火，但由於法軍裝備改良的M2防毒面具效果微乎其微。 蘇維耶要塞和其周圍被超過30萬枚砲彈轟炸，包含直接打擊要塞的500枚360毫米炮彈。

7月11日，德軍三個師發起進攻，但德軍步兵擠在前往蘇維耶要塞的道路上並遭到法軍炮兵的砲擊，倖存的部隊則被佔據要塞上層的60名法軍士兵射擊。來自第140步兵團的30名士兵成功在7月12日抵達要塞頂，德軍士兵已經可以看到凡爾登市建築的屋頂和大教堂的尖塔。在由克萊貝爾·迪皮中尉領導的反擊後，入侵的德軍部隊皆投降或撤退。 7月11日，法金漢下令威廉皇儲將部隊轉入守勢。7月15日，法軍發動一次大型反擊但未能奪回領土。在此月的下半月，法軍僅發動一些小型攻勢。

8月1日-9月17日

8月一日，德軍對蘇維耶要塞發動900公尺的突擊，使法國發動長達兩週的反擊，奪回一些被佔據的領土。 8月18日，弗勒里被法軍收復。到了9月，法軍已經奪回於7月和8月損失的領土。 8月29日，保罗·冯·兴登堡和第一軍需將軍埃里希·鲁登道夫取代法金漢成為總參謀長。 9月3日，法軍對弗勒里兩翼的進攻使法軍防線推進數百公尺，德軍9月4日和5日的反擊以失敗告終。法軍在9月9日、13日和15日至17日持續進攻，除了在9月4日於塔瓦訥隧道因火災導致474名法軍士兵死亡以外，整體傷亡十分輕微。

10月20日–11月2日

第一次凡爾登攻勢，1916年10月24日–9月2日

1916年10月20日，法國發動第一次凡爾登攻勢（1ère Bataille Offensive de Verdun）以奪回杜奧蒙要塞，成功推進超過2公里。22個位於凡爾登的師有7個在10月中旬被替換，法軍步兵排重組為包含步槍手、擲彈兵和機槍手的混合部隊。在為期六天的初步砲擊中，700門法軍野戰砲與榴彈砲發射855,264枚砲彈，包含超過50萬枚75毫米野戰砲彈、10萬枚155枚中型砲彈和373枚370毫米與400毫米超級重砲彈。

位於西南方13公里的貝萊考的兩門法國聖沙蒙列車炮發射400毫米超重型砲彈，每枚重達0.91公噸。 法軍已經識別位於東岸的800門火砲所在，這些火砲足以支持德軍第34、第54、第9和第33預備步兵師，以及作為預備隊的第10與第5師。 至少有20枚法軍超重型砲彈擊中德軍控制的杜奧蒙要塞，其中六枚穿過屋頂並在倉庫中爆炸，引發火災並摧毀7,000枚手榴彈。

法軍步兵重奪杜奧蒙

芒然將軍指揮的法國第38、第133和第74師於10月24日上午11點40分發動攻擊。 法軍步兵在火砲彈幕和霧氣的掩護下衝出戰壕，並利用尼維爾將軍研發的徐進彈幕推進。 法軍在第38師指揮官阿瑟·德·薩蘭的率領下佔領杜奧蒙要塞，並推進至沃要塞附近。法軍在一系列的行動中損失輕微，成功俘虜超過6,000名敵軍和15門重砲。 10月25日對沃要塞的進攻失敗了，但法軍得以轉移他們的火炮至沃要塞附近，這將對下週的軍事行動產生積極影響。

歐迪奧蒙採石場、蒂奧蒙要塞、蒂奧蒙農場、杜奧蒙村、凱萊特森林、沃池塘、布瓦菲米東側和當盧炮台等一系列地區被收復。 法軍重砲於11月2日開始轟炸沃要塞，德軍在一次由220毫米炮彈引起的爆炸後撤出了要塞。法軍偶然竊聽到德軍宣布撤離的無線電電報，一個法軍步兵連在不開一槍的情況下成功進入要塞。11月5日，法軍推進至原先2月24日的戰線，並停止進攻行動直到12月中旬。

12月15日–17日

第二次凡爾登攻勢，1916年12月15–16日

第二次凡爾登攻勢（2ième Bataille Offensive de Verdun），由貝當與尼維爾策劃，指揮重任由夏爾·芒然將軍承擔。法軍動員第126師、第38師、第37師及第133師，並以四個預備師及740門重砲支援，展開猛烈攻勢。經六日密集砲火壓制，827門火砲共發射117萬枚砲彈，至12月15日上午10時，法軍發起總攻。最終轟擊階段，藉由偵察機精確引導，砲火直擊德軍戰壕、掩體及觀察哨，德軍防線陷入危機。彼時德軍有五個師駐守，配備533門火砲，佔據防線陣地，前線集結約三分之二的兵力，其餘則作預備隊使用。

然而，德軍部分師兵力不足，僅有三千步兵，遠低於常規七千之編制。法軍藉重砲火掩護，展開多層次攻擊：第一波榴霰彈火力覆蓋距法軍前線64公尺處，隨後以爆裂彈轟擊140公尺處的德軍第二道防線，切斷其撤退路徑並阻撓援軍接近。德軍防線迅即崩潰，五個師共損失13,500人，或傷亡或被俘，其中大量士兵困於掩體內，最終成為法軍步兵的俘虜。

儘管天氣惡劣，法軍依然成功收復於二月失陷的瓦什罗维尔、盧沃蒙、奧道蒙及卢沃蒙-科特迪普瓦夫尔等地。德軍預備隊直至黃昏方能抵達前線，而兩個奉命於傍晚前增援的反擊師，更於夜幕降臨時仍距前線23公里之遙。至12月16日夜，法軍已在杜奧蒙要塞北方二至三公里間建立堅實新防線，自伯宗沃延伸至盧沃蒙-科特迪普瓦夫尔，成功奪取該地後即刻鞏固防勢，使德軍反擊師來不及發起攻勢。法軍修復杜奧蒙要塞內的重砲，進一步加強攻勢火力。至此，德軍最接近凡爾登之陣地已被逼退至7.5公里以外，其主要觀察點悉數為法軍奪回。此次戰役，法軍共俘虜德軍11,387人，繳獲火砲115門。部分德軍軍官曾向芒然抱怨囚室不夠舒適，芒然答道：「先生們，我們為此深感抱歉，未料會有如此多俘虜。」第五軍團司令洛克豪與第十四預備軍司令約翰·馮·茨維爾於12月16日被撤職。

後果

分析

法金漢在他的回憶錄寫道，他在1915年12月向德皇表達對戰略局勢的看好

法國的弦已經達到臨界點。大規模突破（無論如何都超出我們的能力）是不必要的。我們在能力所及之內仍可保留部分力量，法國總參謀部則將被迫投入他們所有的人力。如果他們這麼做，法國將會流血至死。

——法金漢

The German strategy in 1916 was to inflict mass casualties on the French, a goal achieved against the Russians from 1914 to 1915, to weaken the French Army to the point of collapse. The French had to be drawn into circumstances from which the Army could not escape, for reasons of strategy and prestige. The Germans planned to use a large number of heavy and super-heavy guns to inflict a greater number of casualties than French artillery, which relied mostly upon the 75 mm field gun. In 2007, Robert Foley wrote that Falkenhayn intended a battle of attrition from the beginning, contrary to the views of Wolfgang Foerster in 1937, Gerd Krumeich in 1996 and others but the loss of documents led to many interpretations of the strategy. In 1916, critics of Falkenhayn claimed that the battle demonstrated that he was indecisive and unfit for command, echoed by Foerster in 1937. In 1994, Holger Afflerbach questioned the authenticity of the "Christmas Memorandum"; after studying the evidence that had survived in the Kriegsgeschichtliche Forschungsanstalt des Heeres (Army Military History Research Institute) files, he concluded that the memorandum had been written after the war but that it was an accurate reflection of Falkenhayn's thinking at the end of 1915.

法軍的補給馬匹在前往凡爾登的途中在河邊休息

Krumeich wrote that the Christmas Memorandum was fabricated to justify a failed strategy and that attrition had been substituted for the capture of Verdun only after the attack failed. Foley wrote that after the failure of the Ypres Offensive of 1914, Falkenhayn had returned to the pre-war strategic thinking of Moltke the Elder and Hans Delbrück on Ermattungsstrategie (attrition strategy), because the coalition fighting Germany was too powerful to be defeated decisively. Falkenhayn wanted to divide the Allies by forcing at least one of the Entente powers into a negotiated peace. An attempt at attrition lay behind the offensive in the east in 1915 but the Russians had refused to accept German peace feelers, despite the huge defeats inflicted on them by the Austro-Germans.

With insufficient forces to break through the Western Front and to overcome the reserves behind it, Falkenhayn tried to force the French to attack instead, by threatening a sensitive point close to the front line and chose Verdun. Huge losses were to be inflicted on the French by German artillery on the dominating heights around the city. The 5th Army would begin a big offensive but with the objectives limited to seizing the Meuse Heights on the east bank, on which the German heavy artillery would dominate the battlefield. The French Army would "bleed itself white" in hopeless attempts to recapture the heights. The British would be forced to launch a hasty relief offensive and suffer an equally costly defeat. If the French refused to negotiate, a German offensive would mop up the remnants of the Franco-British armies, breaking the Entente "once and for all".

In a revised instruction to the French Army in January 1916, the General Staff (GQG) wrote that equipment could not be fought by men. Firepower could conserve infantry but attrition prolonged the war and consumed troops that had been preserved in earlier battles. In 1915 and early 1916, German industry quintupled the output of heavy artillery and doubled the production of super-heavy artillery. French production had also recovered since 1914 and by February 1916 the army had 3,500 heavy guns. In May Joffre began to issue each division with two groups of 155 mm guns and each corps with four groups of long-range guns. Both sides at Verdun had the means to fire huge numbers of heavy shells to suppress the opposing defences before risking infantry in the open. At the end of May, the Germans had 1,730 heavy guns at Verdun and the French 548, sufficient to contain the Germans but not enough for a counter-offensive.

「凡爾登的保衛者」讓·納瓦拉的紐波特11戰鬥機

French infantry survived bombardment better because their positions were dispersed and tended to be on dominating ground, not always visible to the Germans. As soon as a German attack began, the French replied with machine-gun and rapid field-artillery fire. On 22 April, the Germans suffered 1,000 casualties and in mid-April, the French fired 26,000 field artillery shells against an attack to the south-east of Fort Douaumont. A few days after taking over at Verdun, Pétain ordered the air commander, Commandant Charles Tricornot de Rose to sweep away German fighter aircraft and to provide artillery observation. German air superiority was reversed by concentrating the French fighters in escadrilles rather than distributing them piecemeal across the front, unable to concentrate against large German formations. The fighter escadrilles drove away the German Fokker Eindeckers and the two-seater reconnaissance and artillery-observation aircraft that they protected.

The fighting at Verdun was less costly to both sides than the war of movement in 1914, when the French suffered 约 850,000 casualties and the Germans 约 670,000 from August to the end of 1914. The 5th Army had a lower rate of loss than armies on the Eastern Front in 1915 and the French had a lower average rate of loss at Verdun than the rate over three weeks during the Second Battle of Champagne (September–October 1915), which were not deliberately fought as battles of attrition. German loss rates increased relative to losses from 1:2.2 in early 1915 to close to 1:1 by the end of the battle, a trend which continued during the Nivelle Offensive in 1917. The penalty of attrition tactics was indecision, because limited-objective attacks under an umbrella of massed heavy artillery fire could succeed but led to battles of unlimited duration. Pétain used a noria‎ (rotation) system quickly to relieve French troops at Verdun, which involved most of the French Army in the battle but for shorter periods than the German troops in the 5th Army. The symbolic importance of Verdun proved a rallying point and the French did not collapse. Falkenhayn was forced to conduct the offensive for much longer and commit far more infantry than intended. By the end of April, most of the German strategic reserve was at Verdun, suffering similar casualties to the French army.

The Germans believed that they were inflicting losses at a rate of 5:2; German military intelligence thought that by 11 March the French had suffered 100,000 casualties and Falkenhayn was confident that German artillery could easily inflict another 100,000 losses. In May, Falkenhayn estimated that French casualties had increased to 525,000 men against 250,000 German and that the French strategic reserve was down to 300,000 men. Actual French losses were 约 130,000 by 1 May; 42 French divisions had been withdrawn and rested by the noria‎ system, once infantry casualties reached 50 percent. Of the 330 infantry battalions of the French metropolitan army, 259 (78 per cent) went to Verdun, against 48 German divisions, 25 percent of the Westheer (western army). Afflerbach wrote that 85 French divisions fought at Verdun and that from February to August, the ratio of German to French losses was 1:1.1, not the third of French losses assumed by Falkenhayn. By 31 August, the 5th Army had suffered 281,000 casualties and the French 315,000.

位於凡爾登的304號山的法軍戰壕

In June 1916, the French had 2,708 guns at Verdun, including 1,138 field guns; from February to December, the French and German armies fired 约10,000,000 shells, weighing 1,350,000 long ton（1,370,000 t）. By May, the German offensive had been defeated by French reinforcements, difficulties of terrain and the weather. The 5th Army infantry was stuck in tactically dangerous positions, overlooked by the French on both banks of the Meuse, instead of dug in on the Meuse Heights. French casualties were inflicted by constant infantry attacks which were far more costly in men than destroying counter-attacks with artillery. The stalemate was broken by the Brusilov Offensive and the Anglo-French relief offensive on the Somme, which Falkehayn had expected to begin the collapse of the Anglo-French armies. Falkenhayn had begun to remove divisions from the Western Front in June for the strategic reserve but only twelve divisions could be spared. Four divisions were sent to the Somme, where three defensive positions had been built, based on the experience of the Herbstschlacht. Before the battle on the Somme began, Falkenhayn thought that German preparations were better than ever and the British offensive would easily be defeated. The 6th Army, further north, had 17+1⁄2 divisions and plenty of heavy artillery, ready to attack once the British had been defeated.

The strength of the Anglo-French attack on the Somme surprised Falkenhayn and his staff, despite the British casualties on 1 July. Artillery losses to "overwhelming" Anglo-French counter-battery fire and the German tactic of instant counter-attacks, led to far more German infantry casualties than at the height of the fighting at Verdun, where the 5th Army suffered 25,989 casualties in the first ten days, against 40,187 2nd Army casualties on the Somme. The Russians attacked again, causing more casualties in June and July. Falkenhayn was called on to justify his strategy to the Kaiser on 8 July and again advocated the minimal reinforcement of the east in favour of the "decisive" battle in France; the Somme offensive was the "last throw of the dice" for the Entente. Falkenhayn had already given up the plan for a counter-offensive by the 6th Army and sent 18 divisions to the 2nd Army and to the Russian front from the reserve and from the 6th Army; only one division remaining uncommitted by the end of August. The 5th Army had been ordered to limit its attacks at Verdun in June but a final effort was made in July to capture Fort Souville. The attack failed and on 12 July Falkenhayn ordered a strict defensive policy, permitting only small local attacks to limit the number of troops the French could transfer to the Somme.

Falkenhayn had underestimated the French, for whom victory at all costs was the only way to justify the sacrifices already made; the French army never came close to collapsing and causing a premature British relief offensive. The ability of the German army to inflict disproportionate losses had also been overestimated, in part because the 5th Army commanders had tried to capture Verdun and attacked regardless of loss. Even when reconciled to the attrition strategy, they continued with Vernichtungsstrategie (strategy of annihilation) and the tactics of Bewegungskrieg (manoeuvre warfare). Failure to reach the Meuse Heights left the 5th Army in poor tactical positions and reduced to inflicting casualties by infantry attacks and counter-attacks. The length of the offensive made Verdun a matter of prestige for the Germans as it was for the French and Falkenhayn became dependent on a British relief offensive being destroyed to end the stalemate. When it came, the collapse in Russia and the power of the Anglo-French attack on the Somme reduced the German armies to holding their positions as best they could. On 29 August, Falkenhayn was sacked and replaced by Hindenburg and Ludendorff, who ended the German offensive at Verdun on 2 September.

傷亡

1919年發現的士兵遺骸

In 2013, Paul Jankowski wrote that since the beginning of the war, French army units had produced numerical loss states (états numériques des pertes) every five days for the Bureau of Personnel at GQG. The Health Service (Service de Santé) at the Ministry of War received daily counts of wounded taken in by hospitals and other services but casualty data was dispersed among regimental depots, GQG, the Registry Office (État Civil), which recorded deaths, the Service de Santé, which counted injuries and illnesses and Renseignements aux Familles (Family Liaison), which communicated with next of kin. Regimental depots were ordered to keep fiches de position (position sheets) to record losses continuously and the Première Bureau of GQG began to compare the five-day états numériques des pertes with the records of hospital admissions. The new system was used to calculate losses back to August 1914, which took several months; the system had become established by February 1916. The états numériques des pertes were used to calculate casualty figures published in the Journal Officiel, the French Official History and other publications.

The German armies compiled Verlustlisten (loss lists) every ten days, which were published by the Reichsarchiv in the deutsches Jahrbuch of 1924–1925. German medical units kept detailed records of medical treatment at the front and in hospital and in 1923 the Zentral Nachweiseamt (Central Information Office) published an amended edition of the lists produced during the war, incorporating medical service data not in the Verlustlisten. Monthly figures of wounded and ill servicemen that received medical treatment were published in 1934 in the Sanitätsbericht (Medical Report). Using such sources for comparison is difficult because the information recorded losses over time, rather than place. Losses calculated for a battle could be inconsistent, as in the Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War 1914–1920 (1922). In the early 1920s, Louis Marin reported to the Chamber of Deputies but could not give figures per battle, except for some by using numerical reports from the armies, which were unreliable unless reconciled with the system established in 1916.

Some French data excluded those lightly wounded but some did not. In April 1917, GQG required that the états numériques des pertes discriminate between lightly wounded, treated locally for 20 to 30 days and severely wounded evacuated to hospitals. Uncertainty over the criteria had not been resolved before the war ended. Verlustlisten excluded lightly wounded and the Zentral Nachweiseamt records included them. Churchill revised German statistics by adding 2 per cent for unrecorded wounded in The World Crisis, written in the 1920s and James Edmonds, the British official historian, added 30 per cent. For the Battle of Verdun, the Sanitätsbericht contained incomplete data for the Verdun area, did not define "wounded" and the 5th Army field reports exclude them. The Marin Report and Service de Santé covered different periods but included lightly wounded. Churchill used a Reichsarchiv figure of 428,000 casualties and took a figure of 532,500 casualties from the Marin Report, for March to June and November to December 1916, for all the Western Front.

The états numériques des pertes give French casualties as 348,000 to 378,000 and in 1930, Hermann Wendt recorded French Second Army and German 5th Army casualties of 362,000 and 336,831 respectively from 21 February to 20 December, not taking account of the inclusion or exclusion of lightly wounded. In 2006, McRandle and Quirk used the Sanitätsbericht to increase the Verlustlisten by 约 11 per cent, which gave 373,882 casualties, compared to the French Official History record to 20 December 1916, of 373,231 French casualties. The Sanitätsbericht, which explicitly excluded lightly wounded, compared German losses at Verdun in 1916, averaging 37.7 casualties per thousand men, with the 9th Army in Poland 1914 which had a casualty average of 48.1 per 1,000, the 11th Army in Galicia 1915 averaging 52.4 per 1,000 men, the 1st Army on the Somme 1916 average of 54.7 per 1,000 and the 2nd Army average for the Somme 1916 of 39.1 per 1,000 men. Jankowski estimated an equivalent figure for the French Second Army of 40.9 men per 1,000 including lightly wounded. With a 约 11 per cent adjustment to the German figure of 37.7 per 1,000 to include lightly wounded, following the views of McRandle and Quirk; the loss rate is similar to the estimate for French casualties.

1927年的杜奧蒙墓地

In the second edition of The World Crisis (1938), Churchill wrote that the figure of 442,000 was for other ranks and the figure of "probably" 460,000 casualties included officers. Churchill gave a figure of 278,000 German casualties, 72,000 fatal and expressed dismay that French casualties had exceeded German by about 3:2. Churchill wrote that an eighth needed to be deducted from his figures to account for casualties on other sectors, giving 403,000 French and 244,000 German casualties. In 1980, John Terraine calculated 约 750,000 French and German casualties in 299 days; Dupuy and Dupuy (1993) 542,000 French casualties. In 2000, Hannes Heer and Klaus Naumann calculated 377,231 French and 337,000 German casualties, a monthly average of 70,000. In 2000, Holger Afflerbach used calculations made by Hermann Wendt in 1931 to give German casualties at Verdun from 21 February to 31 August 1916 as 336,000 German and 365,000 French at Verdun from February to December 1916. David Mason wrote in 2000 that there had been 378,000 French and 337,000 German casualties. In 2003, Anthony Clayton quoted 330,000 German casualties, of whom 143,000 were killed or missing; the French suffered 351,000 casualties, 56,000 killed, 100,000 missing or prisoners and 195,000 wounded.

Writing in 2005, Robert A. Doughty gave French casualties (21 February to 20 December 1916) as 377,231 and casualties of 579,798 at Verdun and the Somme; 16 per cent of the casualties at Verdun were fatal, 56 per cent were wounded and 28 per cent missing, many of whom were eventually presumed dead. Doughty wrote that other historians had followed Winston Churchill (1927) who gave a figure of 442,000 casualties by mistakenly including all French losses on the Western Front. R. G. Grant gave a figure of 355,000 German and 400,000 French casualties in 2005. In 2005, Robert Foley used the Wendt calculations of 1931 to give German casualties at Verdun from 21 February to 31 August 1916 of 281,000, against 315,000 French. (In 2014, William Philpott recorded 377,000 French casualties, of whom 162,000 had been killed; German casualties were 337,000 and noted a recent estimate of casualties at Verdun from 1914 to 1918 of 1,250,000).

紀念

凡爾登戰役紀念獎章

凡爾登戰役，已為法國對第一世界大戰之象徵。安托萬·普羅斯說道：「凡爾登如奥斯威辛集中营，皆象徵對人類境遇之極限侵害。」自1918年至1939年間，法國舉行兩次大規模之紀念。其一於戰場建碑，援引羅貝爾·尼維爾所述「他們絕不能通過」之愛國言辭，表彰烈士；其二則倖存者追憶戰友死難，傷殘犧牲，意在反思劫後之人道精神。又於1920年，於凡爾登城堡舉行儀式，簡選一烈士遺骸，葬之於凱旋門下無名戰士墓。

杜奧蒙附近的凡爾登紀念碑，開放於1967年，獻給陣亡士兵與平民

法國凡爾登境內，有6村於第一次世界大戰中毀滅，迄未重建，然被賦予特別地位，成為無人居住之市镇，即凡尔登地区博蒙、伯宗沃、屈米耶尔-勒莫尔奥姆、弗勒里德旺杜欧蒙、萨莫尼厄附近欧蒙及卢沃蒙-科特迪普瓦夫尔。阿蘭·德尼佐（Alain Denizot）收錄當時攝影圖像，顯示其間地面覆滿炮彈痕跡，範圍約百平方公里，彌覆殆盡。

至1930年代，此地造林，現多為密林所掩，然紅色地帶（Zone Rouge）遺址猶存，成為一片廣闊之墓場，埋葬十餘萬失蹤將士之遺骸，惟有少數經法國林務部發現，移入杜奧蒙骨庫供奉。至1960年代，凡爾登轉而成為法德和解之象徵，兩國以共通之苦難作為紀念。1980年代，凡爾登更被譽為和平之都，諸多機構於此成立，陳舊博物館亦改奉和平與人權之理念。1984年9月22日，德國總理赫尔穆特·科尔與法國總統弗朗索瓦·密特朗冒著滂沱大雨，於杜奧蒙墓園攜手數分鐘，以表彰法德兩國之和解。科爾之父曾於凡爾登戰役中參戰，密特朗亦於第二次世界大戰時於鄰近地區為俘。

畫廊

• 
  凡爾登戰役的紀念品，上有一名法軍士兵
• 
  2005年拍攝的凡爾登戰場的一部分，顯示火砲轟炸的痕跡
• 
  《凡爾登戰役的場景》，由費利克斯·瓦洛東繪製於1917年

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期刊

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延伸閱讀

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期刊

• Bruce, Robert B. To the Last Limits of Their Strength The French Army and the Logistics of Attrition at the Battle of Verdun 21 February – 18 December 1916. Army History (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History). 1998, 45 (45): 9–21. ISSN 1546-5330. JSTOR 26304799. 

論文

• Sonnenberger, M. Initiative Within the Philosophy of Auftragstaktik: Determining Factors of the Understanding of Initiative in the German Army 1806–1955 (学位论文). Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College. 2013 [12 June 2014]. OCLC 875682161. 

外部連結

• NASA satellite map
• Map of the Verdun battlefield, showing fortifications
• Underground at Verdun
• The Battle of Verdun
• Info from firstworldwar.com
• Verdun (excerpt)
• Dutch/Flemish Forum
• Verdun, A Battle of the Great War
• Douaumont Bataille Ossuaire Three panoramas
• Map of Europe, 1916
• The Battle of Verdun – The Greatest Battle Ever
• Sturm-Bataillon Nr. 5 (Rohr) at German Wikipedia
• Contemporary Schneider artillery catalogue
• Chlumberg, H. "The Miracle at Verdun"