We argue that the most plausible characterisation of the norm of truth--it is permissible to beli... more We argue that the most plausible characterisation of the norm of truth--it is permissible to believe that p if and only if p is true--is unable to explain Transparency in doxastic deliberation, a task for which it is claimed to be equipped. In addition, the failure of the norm to do this work undermines the most plausible account of how the norm guides belief formation at all. Those attracted to norma-tivism about belief for its perceived explanatory credentials had better look elsewhere.
David Owens objected to the truth-aim account of belief on the grounds
that the putative aim of b... more David Owens objected to the truth-aim account of belief on the grounds that the putative aim of belief does not meet a necessary condition on aims, namely, that aims can be weighed against other aims. If the putative aim of belief cannot be weighed, then belief does not have an aim after all. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen responded to this objection by appealing to other deliberative contexts in which the aim could be weighed, and we argued that this response to Owens failed for two reasons. Steglich-Petersen has since responded to our defence of Owens’s objection. Here we reply to Steglich-Petersen and conclude, once again, that Owens’s challenge to the truth-aim approach remains to be answered.
Cause and Chance Causation is one of the oldest topics in philosophy, and has been a central prob... more Cause and Chance Causation is one of the oldest topics in philosophy, and has been a central problem for philosophers since David Hume. Most of the work done in this area has attempted to understand causation in deterministic worlds. But what about the unpredictable and ...
Worldviews, Science and Us: Studies of Analytical Metaphysics - A Selection of Topics from a Methodological Perspective - Proceedings of the 5th Metaphysics of Science Workshop, 2010
Counterfactual theories of causation are standardly put forward by proponents of the doctrine of ... more Counterfactual theories of causation are standardly put forward by proponents of the doctrine of Humean Supervenience. Nevertheless, the plausibility of such counterfactual theories does not rely upon, nor does it entail, the truth of Humean Supervenience. To ...
Abstract Scott Sturgeon has claimed to undermine the principal argument for Physicalism, in his w... more Abstract Scott Sturgeon has claimed to undermine the principal argument for Physicalism, in his words, the view that'actuality is exhausted by physical reality'(Sturgeon 1998, p. 410). In noting that actuality is exhausted by physical reality, the Physicalist is not claiming that all ...
One diagnosis of what is wrong with the Knowledge Argument rests on the Ability Hypothesis. This ... more One diagnosis of what is wrong with the Knowledge Argument rests on the Ability Hypothesis. This couples an ability analysis of knowing what an experience is like together with a denial that phenomenal propositions exist. I argue against both components. I ...
Abstract In Causing Actions, Pietroski defends a distinctive view of the relationship between min... more Abstract In Causing Actions, Pietroski defends a distinctive view of the relationship between mind and body which he calls Personal Dualism. Central to his defence is the Argument from Differential Vagueness. It moves from the claim that mental events have different ...
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1997
Abstract The paper defends Functionalism against the charge that it would make mental properties ... more Abstract The paper defends Functionalism against the charge that it would make mental properties inefficacious. It outlines two ways of formulating the doctrine that mental properties are Functional properties and shows that both allow mental properties to be ...
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback), 2001
The Uncontrollability Thesis is that it is metaphysically impossible consciously to believe that ... more The Uncontrollability Thesis is that it is metaphysically impossible consciously to believe that p at will. I review the standard ways in which this might be explained. They focus on the aim or purpose of belief being truth.
... It just holds if we are practically rational. Thus If S believes that it is right for him or ... more ... It just holds if we are practically rational. Thus If S believes that it is right for him or her to do A in circumstances C and S is practically rational, then S is motivated to do A in C (Korsgaard (1986), pp. 8-9; Smith (1994), pp. 61-63). ...
We argue that the most plausible characterisation of the norm of truth--it is permissible to beli... more We argue that the most plausible characterisation of the norm of truth--it is permissible to believe that p if and only if p is true--is unable to explain Transparency in doxastic deliberation, a task for which it is claimed to be equipped. In addition, the failure of the norm to do this work undermines the most plausible account of how the norm guides belief formation at all. Those attracted to norma-tivism about belief for its perceived explanatory credentials had better look elsewhere.
David Owens objected to the truth-aim account of belief on the grounds
that the putative aim of b... more David Owens objected to the truth-aim account of belief on the grounds that the putative aim of belief does not meet a necessary condition on aims, namely, that aims can be weighed against other aims. If the putative aim of belief cannot be weighed, then belief does not have an aim after all. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen responded to this objection by appealing to other deliberative contexts in which the aim could be weighed, and we argued that this response to Owens failed for two reasons. Steglich-Petersen has since responded to our defence of Owens’s objection. Here we reply to Steglich-Petersen and conclude, once again, that Owens’s challenge to the truth-aim approach remains to be answered.
Cause and Chance Causation is one of the oldest topics in philosophy, and has been a central prob... more Cause and Chance Causation is one of the oldest topics in philosophy, and has been a central problem for philosophers since David Hume. Most of the work done in this area has attempted to understand causation in deterministic worlds. But what about the unpredictable and ...
Worldviews, Science and Us: Studies of Analytical Metaphysics - A Selection of Topics from a Methodological Perspective - Proceedings of the 5th Metaphysics of Science Workshop, 2010
Counterfactual theories of causation are standardly put forward by proponents of the doctrine of ... more Counterfactual theories of causation are standardly put forward by proponents of the doctrine of Humean Supervenience. Nevertheless, the plausibility of such counterfactual theories does not rely upon, nor does it entail, the truth of Humean Supervenience. To ...
Abstract Scott Sturgeon has claimed to undermine the principal argument for Physicalism, in his w... more Abstract Scott Sturgeon has claimed to undermine the principal argument for Physicalism, in his words, the view that'actuality is exhausted by physical reality'(Sturgeon 1998, p. 410). In noting that actuality is exhausted by physical reality, the Physicalist is not claiming that all ...
One diagnosis of what is wrong with the Knowledge Argument rests on the Ability Hypothesis. This ... more One diagnosis of what is wrong with the Knowledge Argument rests on the Ability Hypothesis. This couples an ability analysis of knowing what an experience is like together with a denial that phenomenal propositions exist. I argue against both components. I ...
Abstract In Causing Actions, Pietroski defends a distinctive view of the relationship between min... more Abstract In Causing Actions, Pietroski defends a distinctive view of the relationship between mind and body which he calls Personal Dualism. Central to his defence is the Argument from Differential Vagueness. It moves from the claim that mental events have different ...
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1997
Abstract The paper defends Functionalism against the charge that it would make mental properties ... more Abstract The paper defends Functionalism against the charge that it would make mental properties inefficacious. It outlines two ways of formulating the doctrine that mental properties are Functional properties and shows that both allow mental properties to be ...
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback), 2001
The Uncontrollability Thesis is that it is metaphysically impossible consciously to believe that ... more The Uncontrollability Thesis is that it is metaphysically impossible consciously to believe that p at will. I review the standard ways in which this might be explained. They focus on the aim or purpose of belief being truth.
... It just holds if we are practically rational. Thus If S believes that it is right for him or ... more ... It just holds if we are practically rational. Thus If S believes that it is right for him or her to do A in circumstances C and S is practically rational, then S is motivated to do A in C (Korsgaard (1986), pp. 8-9; Smith (1994), pp. 61-63). ...
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Papers by Paul Noordhof
that the putative aim of belief does not meet a necessary condition on aims, namely, that aims can be weighed against other aims. If the putative aim of belief cannot be weighed, then belief does not have an aim after all. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen responded to this objection by appealing to other deliberative contexts in which the aim could be weighed, and we argued that this response to Owens failed for two reasons. Steglich-Petersen has since responded to our defence of Owens’s objection. Here we reply to Steglich-Petersen and conclude, once again, that Owens’s challenge to the truth-aim approach remains to be answered.
that the putative aim of belief does not meet a necessary condition on aims, namely, that aims can be weighed against other aims. If the putative aim of belief cannot be weighed, then belief does not have an aim after all. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen responded to this objection by appealing to other deliberative contexts in which the aim could be weighed, and we argued that this response to Owens failed for two reasons. Steglich-Petersen has since responded to our defence of Owens’s objection. Here we reply to Steglich-Petersen and conclude, once again, that Owens’s challenge to the truth-aim approach remains to be answered.