Papers by stephen darwall
Essays in Second-Personal Ethics I, 2013
Journal of The History of Philosophy, 2012
Only in the last twenty-five years have scholars begun to appreciate Samuel Pufendorf’s importa... more Only in the last twenty-five years have scholars begun to appreciate Samuel Pufendorf’s importance for the history of ethics. The signal element of Pufendorf’s ethics for recent commentators is his idea that morality arises when God imposes his superior will on a world that can contain no moral value of or on its own. But how, exactly, is “imposition†accomplished?
Ethics, 2010
... Now the Razian idea of a preemptive reason includes that of an exclusionary reason. ... 3. St... more ... Now the Razian idea of a preemptive reason includes that of an exclusionary reason. ... 3. Stephen Darwall, Authority and Second‐Personal Reasons for Acting, in Reasons for Action, ed. David Sobel and Steven Wall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 13454. ...
Essays in Second-Personal Ethics II, 2013
Essays in Second-Personal Ethics I, 2013
Ethics, 1997
William Frankena contributed as widely to moral philosophy and its neighboring areas as anyone in... more William Frankena contributed as widely to moral philosophy and its neighboring areas as anyone in that remarkable group that dominated English-speaking ethics from the end of World War II well into the 1980s. From metaethics, the history of ethics, and normative ethical theory, to ...
Ethics, 2006
The Press is pleased to announce the appointment of Catherine M. Galko, PhD, as the new Managing ... more The Press is pleased to announce the appointment of Catherine M. Galko, PhD, as the new Managing Editor of Ethics, effective January 1, 2009. Dr. Galko recently completed her doctorate in philosophy at the University of Florida, where she wrote her dissertation, "Identity, Persons, and ...
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 2000
Philosophy & Public Affairs, 2006
Philosophical Studies, 2006
Social Philosophy and Policy, 2010
Abstract Is the fact that an action would be wrong itself a reason not to perform it? Warranted a... more Abstract Is the fact that an action would be wrong itself a reason not to perform it? Warranted attitude accounts of value suggest buck-passing about value, that being valuable is not itself a reason but passes the buck to the reasons for valuing something in which its ...
Moral Psychology and Human Agency: Philosophical Essays on the Science of Ethics (J. D'Arms & D. Jacobson, eds.), 2014
Recent work in moral philosophy has emphasized the foundational role played by interpersonal acco... more Recent work in moral philosophy has emphasized the foundational role played by interpersonal accountability in the analysis of moral concepts such as moral right and wrong, moral obligation and duty, blameworthiness, and moral responsibility (Darwall 2006; 2013a; 2013b). Extending this framework to the field of moral psychology, we hypothesize that our moral attitudes, emotions, and motives are also best understood as based in accountability. Drawing on a large body of empirical evidence, we argue that the implicit aim of the central moral motives and emotions is to hold people - whether oneself or others - accountable for compliance with the demands of morality. Moral condemnation is based in a motive to get perpetrators to hold themselves accountable for their wrongdoing, not, as is commonly supposed, a mere retributive motive to make perpetrators suffer (§2). And moral conscience is based in a genuine motive to hold oneself accountable for behaving in accordance with moral demands, not, as is commonly supposed, a mere egoistic motive to appear moral to others (§3). The accountability-based theory of the moral motives and emotions we offer provides better explanations of the extant empirical data than any of the major alternative theories of moral motivation. Moreover, conceiving of moral psychology in this way gives us a new and illuminating perspective on what makes morality distinctive: its essential connection to our practice of holding one another accountable (§4).
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Papers by stephen darwall