Defining Pragmatics DS 1
Defining Pragmatics DS 1
Defining Pragmatics DS 1
Finding satisfactory definitions for any academic field is not an easy task and that these definitions are not easily
available. The best one can do is to read the works of researchers in the field without trying to formulate a
definition.
We already know that syntax is ‘the study of the combinatorial properties of words’ and semantics ‘the study of
meaning’.
Pragmatics can be defined in a similar way as: the study of language usage. This definition, however, is quite
vague because it does not tell us concretely what pragmatics is.
Another possible definition is that Pragmatics is the study of language from a FUNCTIONAL perspective
which means that pragmatics attempts to explain the use of language with reference to non linguistic causes.
The weakness of this definition, however, is that it fails to distinguish pragmatics from the other linguistic fields
which are interested in functional approaches to language such as sociolinguistics, psycholinguistics etc…
A more reliable definition has been proposed by Katz and Fodor (1963) who have
observed that pragmatics should be interested in principles of language usage.
The definition suggests that pragmatics would essentially be concerned with the
disambiguation of sentences by the contexts in which they were uttered.
Another idea stresses on context and deals with the dividing line between
semantics and pragmatics: assuming that we have a clear idea of the limits of
semantics, then pragmatics studies all the non semantic features that are
encoded in languages, and these features are aspects of context.
To be much clearer, let us consider the following definition:
Pragmatics is the study of all those aspects of meaning not captured in a
semantic theory.
To make this definition clearer, we have to add that a great deal of the general
field of meaning is left unexplained by a restricted semantic theory.
This residue is accounted for by pragmatics.
‘So the notion that pragmatics might be the study of aspects of meaning not
covered in semantics certainly has some cogency (truth).
However, we still need to know how the broad sense of meaning, on which
the definition relies, is to be delimited.
This broad sense should include the ironic, metaphoric and implicit
communicative content of an utterance, and so it cannot be restricted to the
conventional content of what is said (Levinson, 1983:15).
Bearing in mind that the dividing line between semantics and pragmatics is found
in sentences (the domain of study in semantics) and utterances (the domain of
study in pragmatics), we can add that a sentence is an abstract theoretical entity,
while an utterance is the issuance of a sentence in an actual context.
This leads us to the following: semantics should be concerned with meaning
out of context, and pragmatics with meaning in context.
Levinson (1983) states that this distinction between sentence meaning and utterance meaning
cannot be relied upon to clarify the distinction between semantics and pragmatics.
He then came up with another definition which says that pragmatics is the study of the
relations between language and context that are basic to an account of language
understanding.
‘Language understanding’ is used here to mean not only the meaning of words and their
grammatical relations but also to have knowledge of the world, mutual knowledge and the
ability to make inferences.
The strength of this definition is that it tells us that it is mainly concerned with inferences; i.e.,
for any linguistic form uttered in a context, a pragmatic theory must account for the inference
of implicatures, presuppositions etc…
Another quite similar definition is based on the notion of exploitation of Grice’s
(1975) maxims (quantity, quality, relevance and manner).
Normally, speakers do not observe these maxims. They rather violate or exploit them.
E.g. : if someone sleeps till 1 p.m. and you tell him ‘good morning’, then this would
be irony and in irony we don’t say what we mean and we don’t mean what we say.
Pragmatics, therefore, should be concerned with studying hidden meanings.
Pragmatics should be much concerned precisely with such mechanisms whereby a
speaker can mean more than, or something quite different from, what he actually
says, by inventively exploiting communicative conventions (Levinson, 1983:26-27).
Other Definitions
requests,
warnings,
invitations,
promises,
apologies,
predictions,
and the like.
For condition B(i) to take effect the words uttered must be the conventionally correct ones. The
answer to the next question will not do in the Church of England marriage ceremony:
Curate: Wilt thou have this woman to thy wedded wife…so long as ye both shall live?
Bridegroom: ? Yes. (wrong answer)
I will (the convention requires one to say:, I will)
For condition B(ii) to take effect one must do what the condition requires fully. For
example: while naming a ship, the utterance: I hereby christen this ship The Titanic
must be accompanied by the action of breaking a bottle of champagne against the
ship.
For C(i): to witness against someone accusing him of a crime while you know that he
is innocent is a violation of C(i).
And to promise to do something which one has no intention whatsoever of doing
would be a straightforward violation of C(ii).
Violations of conditions A and B are called misfires i.e. the intended action fails to
come off.
Violations of conditions C(i) and C(ii) are called insincerities or abuses. Abuses are
not easily detected at the moment of speaking. We say, then, that the action is
performed infelicitously or insincerely.
As a conclusion to what we have seen so far, one can say Austin believes that
performatives are special sentences because
a) uttering them does things, and does not merely say things (i.e. report state of
affairs); and
(b) these performative sentences achieve their corresponding actions because there are
specific conventions linking the words to institutional procedures.
Performatives are, if one likes, just rather special sorts of ceremony.
And unlike constatives, which are assessed in terms of truth and falsity, performatives
can only be assessed as felicitous or infelicitous, according to whether their felicity
conditions are met or not.
Perfomatives vs. Constatives
-Let us now go back to our list of performative sentences and try to find out what makes
them different from the other sentences, which Austin (1962) calls constatives.
1- I promise to come on time. (performative)
2-I take my breakfast in cafés. (constative)
for a sentence to be performative it needs the following:
-‘I‘ or ‘we’ (first person singular or plural)
- indicative mood (states facts in the form statement ; questions)
- active
- present tense
Both 1 and 2 have these properties, yet 1 is performative while 2 is not.
Another device to distinguish performatives from constatives is to use the adverb hereby :
-I hereby promise to come on time.
-? I hereby jog ten miles on Sundays.
This means that when the verb of the sentence collocates with the adverb ‘hereby’ the
sentence is, then, performative, and the verb is, thus, called a performative verb.
Later on in his investigation, Austin (1962) stopped distinguishing between performatives and constatives and
joined them under illocutionary acts of which the various performatives and constatives are just special sub-
cases (Levinson, 1983:231).
These two types of sentences have, then, been joined in a single family of speech acts which Austin called The
Speech Acts Theory.
Austin has observed that there are sentences in the form of ‘Go’ where only the verb is used. Even though
such a sentence is not in the first person, indicative active, present simple, it is a performative
sentence because it can perform the giving of advice, ordering etc… according to context. Austin has called
these sentences implicit performatives.
Austin has now conceded that utterances can be performative without being in the normal form of explicit
performatives, he suggests that performative verbs are still the best way into a systematic study of all the
different kinds of performative utterance.
This suggestion seems to rely on the claim that every non-explicit performative could in principle be put
into the form of an explicit performative.
Another point that urged Austin to make this change is that he observed that constatives can also be
infelicitous,
E.g.: All of John’s children are students.
This sentence presupposes that John is married since his children are students.
But if we know John and know that he is not married, and that he doesn’t have children, then, there is a
presupposition failure which makes the sentence infelicitous because it violates condition A (ii). Namely, the
circumstances and persons must be appropriate.
Austin concludes that the dichotomy between statements as truth-bearers, and performatives, as action-
performers, can no longer be maintained.
‘The dichotomy between performatives and constatives is thus rejected in favour of a general full-blown
theory of speech acts’ (Levinson, 1983: 235).
We saw earlier that by saying or producing an utterance one is also doing something or
performing an action. How does this take place?
Austin observed that there are three ways thanks to which one says something and at the same
time performs an action. He, therefore, distinguishes three types of acts that are simultaneously
performed:
(i ) Locutionary Act: the utterance of a sentence with determinate sense
and reference i.e. non-ambiguous meaning, and reference.
(ii) Illocutionary Act: the making of a statement, offer, promise, etc. in uttering a sentence, by
virtue of the conventional force associated with it. i. e; performing an act by uttering a sentence
(iii) Perlocutionary Act: the bringing about of effects on the audience by means of uttering the
sentence, such effects being special to circumstances of utterance(the effects the sentence
might have: the perlocution).
(Note that the force (i.e. intention) of a sentence is what it achieves when uttered, e.g.: Come
here. It can have the force of an order, an invitation, a piece of advice etc. depending on context)
Locutionary, Illocutionary and Perlocutionary
Acts
The locutionary act is the act of saying something with a certain sense and reference;
The illocutionary act is the act performed in saying something, i.e. the act named and identified by the
explicit performative verb.
Example.
The phrase "Don't do that!", a locutionary act with distinct phonetic, syntactic and semantic features, which corresponds to
meaning, is an utterance serving as warning to the listener to not do the thing they are currently doing or about to do.
The perlocutionary act (or perlocutionary effect) is the effect of an utterance on an interlocutor. Examples of
perlocutionary acts include persuading, convincing, scaring, enlightening, inspiring, or otherwise affecting the interlocutor.
LOCUTION vs. ILLOCUTION
From Searle's view (1968), there are only five illocutionary points that speakers can achieve on
propositions in an utterance, namely: the assertive, commissive, directive, declaratory and expressive
illocutionary points.
Speakers achieve the assertive point when they represent how things are in the world,
the directive point when they make an attempt to get hearers to do something,
the declaratory point when they do things in the world at the moment of the
utterance solely by virtue of saying that they do and
The expressive point when they express their attitudes about objects and facts of the world
(Cf. Vanderkeven and Kubo, 2002).
5 types of speech acts by Searle
Declarative - The speaker declares something that has the potential to bring about a change in the world.
• 'I now declare you husband and wife.‘ 'You're fired!‘
Assertives - The speaker asserts an idea, opinion, or suggestion. The speaker presents 'facts' of the world, such
as statements and claims.
• 'Paris is the capital of France.‘ 'I watched a great documentary last night.‘
Expressives - The speaker states something about their psychological attitudes and their attitudes towards a
situation. This could be an apology, a welcome, or an expression of gratitude.
• I'm so sorry about yesterday. ‘ 'I really appreciate your help.‘
Directives - The speaker intends to get the listener to do something. This could be by giving an order, offering
advice, or making a request.
• 'Pass me the salt please.‘ 'You should not drink that!‘
Commissives - The speaker commits to doing something in the future. This could be making a promise, a plan, a
vow, or a bet.
• 'I'll see you at 6 tomorrow‘ 'I do!'
When we use the term speech act, it is the second type of act ,namely the
illocutionary act that we mean.
Let us now take an example and try to distinguish between the three types of acts:
Example: “Shoot her.”
It can have the illocutionary force of ordering, urging, advising the hearer to ‘shoot
her’.
Its perlocutionary effect can be to persuade, to force or to frighten the addressee
into shooting her.
‘I promise to come.’
It has the illocutionary force of promising but the perlocutionary effect of pleasing.
There are five basic types of actions that one can perform while speaking, by
means of the following five kinds of utterance:
In Other words…
Assertives (representatives) commit the speaker to the truth of the expressed
proposition(e.g.: asserting, concluding)
2-Directives are attempts by the speaker to get the addressee to do something
(e.g.: requesting, questioning)
3-Commissives commit the speaker to some future course of action (e.g.:
promising, threatening, offering)
4-Expressives express a psychological state (e.g.: thanking, apologising,
welcoming, congratulating)
5-Declarations effect immediate changes in the institutional state of affairs and
which tend to rely on elaborate extra-linguistic institutions (e.g.:
excommunicating, declaring war, christening, firing from employment)
The Conversational Principle (Grice, 1975)
Imagine John and Peter talking about their friend William who works at a bank. John asks Peter how William
is getting on in his job and Peter answers:
-Oh quite well, I think, he likes his colleagues, and he hasn’t been to prison yet.
-John might well think about what Peter implied by saying that William ‘hasn’t been to prison yet’.
From the context it is clear that Peter implied something of the sort that William is the sort of person who may
be tempted by stealing money, or that his colleagues are wicked and treacherous people who may play a trick
on him and send him to prison.
We have ended up now by having one example but two different meanings: the one which is said and the one
which is implied:
-he hasn’t been to prison yet. (said)
-kind of dishonest person. (implied)
It is necessary to introduce at this stage the verb implicate and the related noun implicature.
Conversational Implicature
Conversational implicature is a form of indirect speech: the speaker may mean more than they actually
say.
It’s the act of suggesting that you feel or think something is true, without saying so directly.
Conversational implicature is the phenomenon whereby a speaker says one thing and thereby conveys
(typically, in addition) something else.
For example, in (1) below, Harold says that Sally should bring her umbrella, but further conveys
that (he believes that) it is likely to rain.
Our discussions are not disconnected pieces of language. They are, rather, talk exchanges that have a purpose or a goal which
makes them cooperative.
While talking, therefore, speakers make cooperative efforts to achieve their communicative goals.
This means that some possible conversational moves would be excluded as conversationally unsuitable, e.g.: How is John? I
live in London.
We have now reached a stage where we can say that participants in a talk exchange do their best to cooperate in their talk
exchange by observing the Conversational Principle (CP).
Let us now consider the following example to have a more concrete idea about implicatures:
What can a semantic theory tell us about how to understand this exchange?
All it can do is to tell us that there is a reading that can be paraphrased as follows:
A: Do you have the ability to tell me the time of the present moment, as standardly on
a watch, and if so please do so tell me. (conveyed)
B: No, I don’t know the exact time of the present moment, but I can provide some
information from which you may be able deduce the approximate time, namely the
milkman has come. (conveyed)
We should make it clear at this point that an utterance may have more than one
inference.
The question is: are we going to consider all these inferences implicatures?
The answer is no, only the intended inferences can be considered implicatures.
These inferences are beyond the semantic or literal meaning of the utterance.
These inferences can be worked out only by finding the non literal meaning of the utterance.
The question which imposes itself now is the following: How is it possible for speakers to produce inferences?
In this exchange the unstated connection between A’s and B’s remarks is so obvious that we cannot say that the
maxim of relevance has been infringed or violated. The implicature or inference in this example is that John has
or may have a girl friend in New York. Grice calls the implicatures which are generated by observing the
maxims Standard Implicatures.
2-A second way to generate implicatures is by flouting or exploiting maxims,
e.g.:
Dear Sir,
Mr. X’s command of English is excellent, and his attendance
at tutorials has been regular. (Quantity and Relevance flouted)
The writer of this letter is not opting out. He had the choice not to write at all.
Since he is X’s teacher, then he knows more than he has written about X. He also
knows that more information about X is wanted.
We may wonder now why he has preferred to write the example above instead of
not writing at all.
He must, therefore, be wishing to impart information that he is reluctant to write in a
reference letter. He is, therefore, dropping an implicature, which is that X is not good at
his subject.
A: Let’s get the kids something.
B: Okay, but I veto I C E C R E A M S (Manner flouted)
By spelling out the words ‘ice creams’ the speaker exploits/flouts the manner maxim and,
as a consequence, generates the implicature that he prefers not to mention the words ‘ice
creams’ in the presence of children for fear they ask for some.
According to an Islamic proverb, each word we utter should have to pass through three
gates before we say it. At the first gate, the gatekeeper asks, “Is it true?” (Quality) At the
second gate, he asks, “Is it necessary?” (Manner) and at the third gate, “Is it kind?”
(Idiomaticity)