US Hegemony and ‘Liberal’ In-

ternational Order
 Themes
• Debates on the future of the end of the Cold War between IR theories

• Tracing Back to the Nature and Sources of the Post-War International Order

• Five Components of the Liberal International Order by Deudney and Ikenberry.

• Engagements in IR Theories Where Possible.

• Reflections and Weaknesses

 The End of the Cold War

• The end of the Cold War triggered new debates about interna-
tional relations theory.

• Realist theorists argued that

• Liberal theorists argued that

 Questions Addressed
• Will the end of the Cold War lead to the end of cohesive and co-
operative relations among the Western liberal democracies?

• Will major Western political institutions, such as NATO decay and

fragment?

• Will ‘semi-sovereign’ Germany and Japan revert to traditional

great power status?
Realism and the End of the Cold
War
• Realism advances the pessimistic answers to the questions.

• It provides two powerful explanations for cooperation within the West:

the balance of power and hegemony.

• Realists hold that Western institutions are the result of balancing to

counter the Soviet threat, which provided the incentives for Western
countries to cooperate.

• It was expected that the end of the Cold War would weaken Western
security cooperation such as NATO and eventually return to a pattern
of strategic rivalry.
 Liberalism and the End of the Cold
War
• Many liberal theorists attempted to explain the distinctive features of
the Western political order.

• They emphasized democratic peace, complex interdependence, and in-

ternational trade

• While offering important insights into the Western order.

• The future is too optimistic and, as in realism, they miss important fea-
tures of the post-war international order.
 In Order To Answer These Questions,
• They wanted to trace back to the origin of the post-war interna-
tional order

• What constitutes the post-war international order?

• What was missing in the making of the post-war international order,

not adequately captured by two dominant schools of international
relations theory?
 What Are the Distinctive Features of the
Post-War International Order?
• Not captured by realism and liberalism.

• The distinctive features of the post-war international order are as

follows.

• Any guess?
The Five Features of the Post-War Interna-
tional Order as Distinctive
• The prevalence of co-binding security practices over traditional balanc-
ing

• The penetrated and reciprocal nature of US hegemony

• Semi-sovereignty and partial great powers

• Economic openness associated with capitalism

• Distinctive civic identity

 Realism and Security
• The core of neorealism is that

• States are in an anarchical system will pursue a strategy of bal-

ancing

• Anarchy means that there is no central government that political

units (states) can rely on for security

• In such a situation, states seeking security will balance against

others which are perceived as threats to their security.
 Realism and Security
• Balancing has both internal and external dimension

• Internally, it takes the form of the domestic mobilization of power

resources (via armament)

• Externally, balancing typically takes the form of ad hoc, counter

hegemonic alliances in which states join together with others.

• Successful balancing by undercutting the concentration of power

at the system level tends to reinforce and reproduce anarchy
 Realism and the Western order

• This pattern of balancing in anarchy characterizes the Western

state system both in its early modern, Europe-centered phase as
well as in the global system in late-modern times.

• Realists expect balancing to be pervasive in international politics

wherever there is anarchy (182).
 However,
• Western states have produced a distinctive structure unlike anar-
chy in the post-war era.

• They attempt to tie one another down by locking each other into
institutions that mutually constrain each other.
 Security Co-Binding (1)
• Western liberal states practice a more mutual and reciprocal co-
binding that overcomes the effects of anarchy.

• By establishing institutions of mutual constraint, co-binding re-

duces the risks and uncertainties associated with anarchy.

• Co-binding practices are particularly suited to liberal states be-

cause their institutions constrain state autonomy

• The rule of law, civil society, competing parties, and others.

Co-Binding as an Important Feature of
the Western Liberal Order
• After WWII, the US and liberal states in Europe sought to bind them-
selves through NATO.

• Although the Soviet threat provided much of the political impetus to

form NATO,

• The Western states (alliances) advocated the additional purpose of

constraining the European states vis-à-vis each other and tying ‘Ger-
man problem’ as it was a counter to the Soviet Union.

• The purpose of NATO was to keep the ‘Russians out, the Germans
down, and the Americans in.’ (183).
 Furthermore, Economic-Binding
• The desire to overcome the dynamics of anarchy gives rise to an
agenda for economic-binding.

• The European union movement sought to achieve economic interde-

pendence between Germany and her neighbors in order to make mili-
tary competition more costly and difficult.

• The first fruit of this program was the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity.

• The US provided the Marshall Plan to encourage economic interdepen-

dence among Europeans.
 Security Co-Binding

• It resulted in the creation of a political order that successfully mit-

igated anarchy within the West in ways that neorealist theory
fails to appreciate.
 Penetrated US Hegemony (2)
• In a broad sense,

• Hegemonic theories (neorealism) holds that order arises from

concentrations of power.

• In international systems, concentrations of power produces

hegemony, which is perceived as a system organized around
asymmetrical power relations (184).
 Penetrated US Hegemony
• The American-centered Western order exhibits far more reciproc-
ity and legitimacy than coercion.

• The US hegemony is a liberal state which enables other stats to

participate in policy-making for the overall system.

• Subordinate actors in the system have a variety of channels and

mechanism for registering their interests with the hegemon.
 Penetrated US Hegemony
• The US state has a decentralized structure, which provides numerous
points of access to competing groups both domestic and foreign.

• Transnational relations (multinational corporations, international orga-

nizations, and transgovernmental experts) are a vital component of the
Western system.

• This system provides transparency, access, representation, and com-

munication and consensus-building mechanisms.

• Overall, transnational networks serve to forge a consensus and lobby

policy-makers through the system.
 Semi-Sovereignty and Partial Great
Powers (3)
• The distinctive status of Germany and Japan as semi-sovereign
and partial great powers.

• They have ‘peace institutions’ that were initially imposed by the

US and Western allies after WWII

• But, they have come to be embraced by the German and Japa-

nese publics as acceptable and even desirable features of their
political systems.
 ‘Peace Institutions’ in Ger-
many and Japan
• The two major states do not follow the expected realist pattern, but
rather semi-sovereign and partial great powers.

• Because they accepted a role in international relations that was self-

constrained in major ways.

• They were able to gain juridical sovereignty only because they were will-
ing to eschew the full range of great power roles and activities.

• Their domestic political structures that were created in occupation fea-

tured parliamentary democracy, federalism, and independent judiciary –
similar to the liberal US state.
 ‘Peace Institutions’ in Ger-
many and Japan
• These domestic structures facilitate binding linkages, transna-
tional interaction, and political integration.

• These features committed the states to pure defensive military

orientations (voluntarily foregoing nuclear weapons)

• Their defensive postures are integrated into multilateral ar-

rangements.
 Economic Openness (4)
• Another major feature of the Western liberal order is the prevalence of capitalist
economies and international institutions dedicated to economic openness.

• Western states have political reasons to maintain an open economic order.

• The collapse of the world economy in the Great Depression, the rise of fascist states, rival
economic blocs, and ultimately the second world war.

• In reaction to these upheavals,

 Economic Openness
• The principal architects of the post-WWII liberal order employed economic open-
ness as a strategy to avoid regional blocs, trade wars, and imperial rivalry (192).

• The establishment of the BWS in 1945

• General Agreement on Trade and Tariff

• The architects of the liberal system is much more compatible with US interests
and the survival of democracy and capitalism.
 Civic Identity (5)
• Throughout the Western world,

• There is an overwhelming consensus in favor of political democ-

racy, market economies, and personal freedom.

• The convergence of political practices and identities within the

countries of the West is an important feature.
 Civic Identity
• A widespread civic identity that is distinct from national, ethnic
and religious identities.

• It is a set of norms and principles, most importantly, political

democracy, constitutional government, individual rights, private
property-based economic systems, and toleration of diversity.

• Across the advanced industrial world, capitalism has produced a

culture of market rationality that permeates all aspects of life.

• Consumerism reaches into every aspect of daily existence.

 Civic Identity
• The symbolic content of day-to-day life is centered on the images of
commercial advertising.

• It contributes to the homogenization of identities and the avoidance

of polarizing ethnic or religious traits.

• The widespread circulation of elites and educational exchange (and

tourism) contributes to an increasingly common identity and culture.

• In short, the identities of Westerners are largely secular and mod-

ern: an ethic of toleration, diversity and diversity.
 Civic Identity
• The increase in anti-immigrant violence in Western Europe
demonstrates that

• The West is not immune to ethnic violence.

• Measured by the standard of the past (ex, the 1930s),

• These episodes are marginal

• The strong majorities committed to a liberal civic order.

 Reflections
• Indeed,

• They provide an excellent explanation for the origin and sources of the post-
war international order, not captured by realism and liberalism.

• The five components of the post-war liberal order are very convincing.

• Are they entirely convincing?

• Do you find some are less convincing?

 Reflections on US Hegemony
• US IR scholars (security and IPE) misunderstand the decline of US power in the 1970s
and 1980s.

• Which in turn produces the idea of HST in the US, in particular, after the end of the BWS
in the early 1970s.

• But, according to non-US scholars such as Susan Strange.

• The decline of the US in the 1970s and 1980s was a myth.

• See also Eric Helleiner and others including my paper too.

 Reflections on US Hegemony
• Understanding US hegemony through HST (neorealism) is not adequate.

• It is largely accepted that the US has structural dimensions of power in interna-

tional relations and international economy (Strange and many others).

• The many aspects of the post-war international order are organized to increase US
power, though providing some degree of mutual and reciprocal relations to others.

• International relations have hierarchical dimensions in the world economy

 Reflections on Penetrated US Hegemony
and Economic Openness
• Legitimacy?

• Economic openness produces a high degree of economic interdependence which

is not necessarily mutual and reciprocal

• Others argue that powerful states such as the US and China weaponize economic
interdependence (Farrell and Newman 2019)

• Why many people in both advanced and developing countries are not happy?: the
widening gap between the rich and the poor in and across borders.
US Responses to Rising China and Russia?