ARTICLE 12

-KRUSHA BHATT

1
INTRODUCTION

 Fundamental Rights can be enforced against the ‘State’ by approaching the High Court of a state under Article 226
or directly the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. It is therefore important to understand what
exactly is comprised of ‘State’ constitutionally.
 What is the constitutional definition of “state” under Article 12? What are the tests to decide whether “other
authorities” could be considered as agencies or instrumentalities of the state?
 Can the Fundamental Rights be claimed against non-state actors/private persons?
 Does the concept of state need expansion in the wake of privatization/globalization?

2
 “In this Part, unless the context otherwise
requires, “the State” includes the

ARTICLE 12: Government and Parliament of India and the

Government and the Legislature of each of
the States and all local or other authorities
DEFINITION within the territory of India or under the
control of the Government of India.”

3
DEFINITION OF ‘STATE’ (ARTICLE 12)
 Article 12 defines the term ‘State’ as used in the different Articles of Part III of the Constitution. It says that unless
the context otherwise requires the term ‘State’ includes the following:
1. The Government and the Parliament of India, i.e. Executive and Legislature of the Union
2. The Government and the Legislature of each States, i.e. Executive and Legislatures of the States
3. All local and other authorities within the territory of India
4. All local and other authorities under the control of Government of India
 The term ‘State’ thus includes the executive as well as the legislative organs of the Union and States. It is
therefore, the actions of these bodies that can be challenged before the Courts for violating fundamental rights.
 The actions of any of the bodies comprised within the term ‘state’ as defined in Art. 12 can be challenged before
the courts under Art. 13(2) on the ground of violating Fundamental Rights.
 The most significant expression used in Art. 12 is “other authorities”. This expression is not defined in the
Constitution. It is, therefore, for the Supreme Court to define this term. It is obvious that wider the meaning4
attributed to the term “other authorities” in Art. 12, wider will be the coverage of the Fundamental Rights, i.e.,
more and more bodies can be brought within the discipline of the Fundamental Rights.
DEFINITION OF ‘STATE’ (ARTICLE 12) (CONTINUED)
 The present Article 12 was introduced originally as Article 7 before the draft committee. And it was proposed by
Naziruddin Ahmad that the words `and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the
control of the Government of India' be deleted and reintroduce them in a separate clause. In article 7 "State" is
defined to mean the Parliament of India and the Government of the Legislature of each of the State i.e., the
provinces and Indian States and other States and all local and other authorities within the territory of India.
 “Therefore what I have attempted to do is to remove these words from the article which should be renumbered as
clause (1) of the article and add clause (2) just to say that "the provisions of this Part shall, so far as may be, apply
to all local or other authorities etc." This avoids the anomaly of describing the local bodies as `States' and at the
same time attains the same object by removing those words from the body of article 7 and relegating them to
clause (2). I submit this will remove the anomaly of District boards etc., being described as `State' and at the same
time serve the purpose.”

5
DEFINITION OF ‘STATE’ (ARTICLE 12) (CONTINUED)

 To which Dr. B. R. Ambedkar replied that, “The object of the Fundamental Rights is two-fold. First, that every
citizen must be in a position to claim those rights. Secondly, they must be binding upon every authority - I shall
presently explain what the word "authority" means - upon every authority which has got either the power to make
laws or the power to have discretion vested in it. Therefore, it is quite clear that if the Fundamental Rights are to
be clear, then they must be binding not only upon the Central Government, they must not only be binding upon the
Provincial Government, they must not only be binding upon the Governments established in the Indian States,
they must also be binding upon District Local Boards, Municipalities, even village panchayats and taluka boards,
in fact, every authority which has been created bylaw and which has got certain power to make laws, to
make rules, or make by-laws.”

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A. AUTHORITIES

 Literally ‘authority’ means a person or body exercising power or having a legal right to command and be obeyed.
An ‘Authority’ is a group of persons with official responsibility for a particular area of activity and having a moral
or legal right or ability to control others. If a particular cooperative society can be characterized as a “State”
under Article 12, it would also be “an authority” within the meaning of Article 226 of the Constitution.
 “Authority” means a public administrative agency or corporation having quasi-governmental powers and
authorized to administer a revenue producing public enterprise. It is wide enough to include all bodies created by a
statute on which powers are conferred to carry out governmental or quasi-governmental functions.
 “Authority” in law belongs to the province of power. The word “State” and “Authority” used in Article 12 remain
among “the great generalities of the Constitution” the content of which has been and continues to be applied by
Courts from time to time.
 In context of Article 12, authority means (i) government and parliament of India and (ii) government and
legislatures of each States.
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B. LOCAL AUTHORITIES
 The definition of “local authority” given in S. 3(31) of the General Clauses Act which runs as follows: “Local
authority’ shall mean a municipal committee, district board, body of port commissioners or other authority legally
entitled to, or entrusted by the Government with, the control or management of a municipal or local fund.”
 Local authorities are under the exclusive control of the States, by virtue of Schedule 7, List II, entry 5:- “Local
government, that is to say, the constitution and powers of municipal corporations, improvement trusts, districts
boards, mining settlement authorities and other local authorities for the purpose of local self- government or
village administration.”

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C. OTHER AUTHORITIES

 The interpretation of the term ‘other authorities’ in Art. 12 has caused a good deal of difficulty, and judicial
opinion has undergone changes over time. Today’s government performs a large number of functions because of
the prevailing philosophy of a social welfare State.
 The Government acts through natural persons as well as juridical persons. Some functions are discharged through
the traditional governmental departments and officials while some functions are discharged through autonomous
bodies existing outside the departmental structure, such as, companies, corporations etc.
 While the government acting departmentally, or through officials, undoubtedly, falls within the definition of ‘state’
under Art. 12, doubts have been cast as regards the character of autonomous bodies. Whether they could be
regarded as ‘authorities’ under Art. 12 and, thus, be subject to Fundamental Rights?
 An autonomous body may be a statutory body, i.e., a body set up directly by a statute, or it may be a non-statutory
body, i.e., a body registered under a general law, such as, the Companies Act, the Societies Registration Act, or a
State Co- operative Societies Act, etc. Questions have been raised whether such bodies may be included within the
coverage of Art. 12. 9
C. OTHER AUTHORITIES (CONTINUED)

 For this purpose, the Supreme Court has developed the concept of an “instrumentality” of the state. Any body
which can be regarded as an “instrumentality” or “agent” of the state falls under Art. 12.
 The reason for adopting such a broad view of Art. 12 is that the Constitution should, whenever possible, “be so
construed as to apply to arbitrary application of power against individuals by centres of power. The emerging
principle appears to be that a public corporation being a creation of the state is subject to the Constitutional
limitation as the state itself.”

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CASE LAWS

11
1. RAJASTHAN ELECTRICITY BOARD V MOHAN LAL, AIR 1967
SC 1857- FACTS
 Facts: In 1958, the services of respondents I and 4 to 14, who were permanent employees of the State
Government holding posts of foremen were provisionally placed at the disposal of the State Electricity Board
(appellant), constituted under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, The Electricity Board was directed to frame its
own grades and service conditions, but this was never done. In 1960, the first respondent was taken on deputation
from the Board and posted to the P.W.D. of the State Government retaining his lien in the Electricity Board. The
first respondent remained with the P.W.D. for about three years, and during that time, the Electricity Board
promoted respondents 4 to 14 as Assistant Engineers under the Electricity Board. In 1963, the State Government
directed the reversion of the first respondent to his parent department, namely, the Electricity Board; and the latter
posted him as one of its foremen. Zen big request that he was also entitled to be considered for promotion as
Assistant Engineer was rejected, he moved the High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution the ground
that there was a violation of Arts. 14 and 16; and the High Court allowed the petition.
 In appeal to this Court, the appellant-Board contended that :
(1) the first respondent never became its permanent servant and so could not claim to be considered along with
respondents 4 to 14 ; and
(2) the appellant-Board could not be held to be "State" as defined in Art. 12 and consequently no direction could 12
be issued to it under Art. 226 and 227.
1. RAJASTHAN ELECTRICITY BOARD V MOHAN LAL AIR 1967
SC 1857- ISSUE I
 The words "deputation" and "reversion" used in the orders of the State Government and the Electricity Board
implied that the first respondent was being sent back to his parent department, namely, the Electricity Board, from
the P.W.D. where he had been sent on deputation. Moreover in the case of respondents 4 to 14 who were
identically placed with the first respondent, there was nothing to show that after their services were provisionally
placed at the disposal of the Board, any order was passed permanently transferring them to the Board, and yet they
were treated as permanent employees of the Board.
 Thus, both the Government and the Board, in dealing with respondent 1 and 4 to 14, treated them as if they had
become employees of the Board. Since the Board did not frame any new grades or service conditions, these
respondents continued to be governed by identical rules, namely, the old grades and service conditions applicable
to them when they were servants of the State Government and therefore, the first respondent was entitled to be
considered for promotion under the Board on the basis of equality with respondents 4 to 14.

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1. RAJASTHAN ELECTRICITY BOARD V MOHAN LAL AIR 1967
SC 1857- ISSUE II
 The appellant-Board is "other authority" within the meaning of Art. 12 and therefore, is "State" to which
appropriate directions could be given under Arts. 226 and 227.
 The expression "other authority" is wide enough to include within it every authority created by a statute, on which
powers are conferred to carry out governmental or quasi- governmental functions and functioning within the
territory of India or under the control of the Government of India. It is not at all material that some, of the powers
conferred may be for the purpose of carrying on commercial activities, because, under Arts. 19(1) (g) and 298
even the State is empowered to carry on any trade or business.
 Every constitutional or, statutory authority on whom powers are conferred by law is not "other authority" within
the meaning of Art. 12. It is only those authorities which are invested with sovereign power, that is, power to take
rules or regulations and to administer or enforce them to the detriment of citizens and others that fall within the
definition of "State" in Art. 12 : but constitutional or statutory bodies invested with power but not sharing the
sovereign power of the State are not "State" within the meaning of that Article.
 The State Electricity Board has the power of promoting coordinated development, generation, supply and
distribution of electricity and for that purpose is invested by the State with extensive powers of control over
electricity undertakings, The power to make rule and regulations and to administer the Act is in substance the14
sovereign power of the State delegated to the Board. Since the Board is an authority invested by the Statute with
sovereign powers of the State it is "other authority" within the meaning of Art. 12.
2. SUKHDEV V BHAGATRAM AIR 1975 SC 1331- FACTS
 There are two questions for consideration in these appeals. First, whether an order for removal from service
contrary to regulations framed under the Oil and Natural Gas Commission Act, 1959; the Industrial Finance
Corporation Act, 1948; and the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 would enable the employees to a declaration
against the statutory corporation of continuance in service or would only give rise to a claim for damages. Second
whether an employee of a statutory corporation is entitled to claim protection of Articles 14 and 16 against the
Corporation. In short the question is whether these statutory corporations are authorities within the meaning
of Article 12.
 Three statutory bodies, viz., Life Insurance Corporation, Oil and Natural Gas Commission and the Finance
Corporation, were held to be “authorities” and, thus, fall within the term ‘state’ in Art. 12. These corporations do
have independent personalities in the eyes of the law, but that does not mean that “they are not subject to
the control of the government or that they are not instrumentalities of the government.”

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2. SUKHDEV V BHAGATRAM AIR 1975 SC 1331- ARGUMENTS
ON BEHALF OF THE STATE
 The contentions on behalf of the State are these. Regulations are framed under powers given by the statute
affecting matters of internal management. Regulations do not have a statutory binding character. Terms and
conditions of employees as laid down in the regulations are not a matter of statutory obligations. Regulations are
binding not as law but as contract. Regulations have no force of law. Regulations provide the terms and conditions
of employment and thereafter the employment of each person is contractual.
 On behalf of the State it is contended that these Corporations cannot be said to be "other authority" contemplated
in Article 12 for two principal reasons. First, one of the attributes of a State is making laws. The State exercises
governmental functions and the executive power of the State is co-extensive with the legislative power of the
State. Second, authority as contemplated in Article 12 means a body of persons established by statute who are
entitled as such body to command obedience and enforce directions issued by them on pain of penalty for
violation. On these grounds it was said that these corporations cannot make laws like a State and cannot enforce
directions.

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2. SUKHDEV V BHAGATRAM AIR 1975 SC 1331- ARGUMENTS
ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

 The contentions on behalf of the employees are these. Regulations are made under the statute. The origin and
source of the power to make regulations is statutory. Regulations are self binding in character. Regulations have
the force of law inasmuch as the statutory authorities have no right to make any departure from the regulations.

17
2. SUKHDEV V BHAGATRAM AIR 1975 SC 1331- HELD
 The question whether a public corporation of the nature of Oil and Natural Gas Commission, Life Insurance
Corporation or Industrial Finance Corporation is a 'state' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution is
one of far reaching importance. A state is an abstract entity. It can only act through the instrumentality or agency
of natural or juridical persons. Therefore, there is nothing strange in the notion of the state acting through a
corporation and making it an agency or instrumentality of the State.
 The fact that these corporations have independent personalities in the eye of law does not mean that they are not
subject to the control of government or that they are not instrumentalities of the government. These corporations
are instrumentalities or agencies of the state for carrying on businesses which otherwise would have been run by
the state departmentally. If the state had chosen to carry on these businesses through the medium of government
departments, there would have been no question that actions of these departments would be 'state actions'. Why
then should be actions of these corporations be not state actions ?
 The ultimate question which is relevant for our purpose is whether such a corporation is an agency or
instrumentality of the government for carrying on a business for the benefit of the public. In other words, the
question is, for whose benefit was the corporation carrying on the business ? When it is seen from the
provisions of that Act that on liquidation of the Corporation, its assets should be divided among the shareholders,18
namely, the Central and State governments and others, if any, the implication is clear that the benefit of the
accumulated income would go to the Central and State governments.
3. R.D. SHETTY V AIRPORT AUTHORITY AIR 1979 SC 1628-
FACTS
 The first respondent, by a public notice, invited tenders for putting up and running a second-class restaurant and
two snack bars at the International Airport, Bombay. The notice stated in Paragraph (1) that sealed tenders in the
prescribed form were invited from registered second class hoteliers having at least five years' experience for
putting up and running a second class restaurant and two snack bars at the Bombay Airport for a period of three
years. Paragraph (8) stated that acceptance of the tender would rest with the Airport Director who does not bind
himself to accept any tender and reserves to himself the right to reject all or any of the tenders received without
assigning any reasons therefore. Out of the six tenders received only the tender of the 4th respondents was
complete and offered the highest amount as licence fee. All the other tenders were rejected because they were
incomplete. Since the fourth respondents did not satisfy the description of "registered second class hoteliers
having at least S years' experience" prescribed in para graph (1) of the tender notice, the 1st respondent called
upon the fourth respondents to produce documentary evidence whether they were registered second class hoteliers
having at least 5 years' experience. The fourth respondents stated once again that they had considerable experience
of catering for various reputed commercial houses, clubs, messes and banks and that they had Eating Houses
Catering Establishment (Canteen) Licence. Satisfied with the information given by the fourth respondents, the first
respondent accepted their tender on the terms and conditions set out in its letter.
19

 The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court challenging the decision of the first respondent in
accepting the tender of the fourth respondents. But it was rejected.
3. R.D. SHETTY V AIRPORT AUTHORITY AIR 1979 SC 1628-
HELD
 The action of the first respondent in accepting the tender of the fourth respondents, who did not satisfy the
standard or norm, was clearly discriminatory since it excluded other persons similarly situate from tendering for
the contract and it was arbitrary and without reason. Acceptance of the tender was invalid as being violative of the
equality clause of the Constitution as also of administrative law inhibiting arbitrary action.
 In this case Bhagwati, J., preferred and rightly, the broader test as suggested by Mathew, J., in Sukhdev v.
Bhagatram case. In this case the Court held that if a body is an agency or instrumentality of government it may be
an ‘authority’ within the meaning of Article 12 whether it is a statutory corporation, a government company or
even a registered society.
 The International Airport Authority Act, 1971 empowers the Central Government to constitute an authority called
the International Airport Authority. The salient features of the Act are: the Authority, which is a body corporate
having perpetual succession and a common seal, consists of a Chairman and certain other Members who are
appointed by the Central Government. The Central Government has power to terminate the appointment or to
remove a member from the Board of the Authority. Although the Authority has no share capital of its own, capital
needed by it for carrying out its functions is provided wholly by the Central Government. All non-recurring,
expenditure Incurred by the Central Government for or in connection with the purposes of the airports up to the20
appointed date and declared to be capital expenditure by the Central Government shall be treated as capital
provided by the Central Government.
3. R.D. SHETTY V AIRPORT AUTHORITY AIR 1979 SC 1628-
HELD
 A conspectus of the provisions of the Act clearly shows that every test down by this Court in deciding whether a
statutorily authority comes within the purview of Art. 12 of the constitution is satisfied in the case of the first
respondent. They leave no room for doubt that it is an instrumentality or agency of the Central Government and
falls within the definition of State. Therefore, having regard both to the constitutional mandate of Art. 14 and the
judicially evolved rule of administrative law, the first respondent was not entitled to act arbitrarily in accepting the
tender of the fourth respondents but was bound to conform to the standard or norm did down in paragraph I of the
notice inviting tenders.

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4. AJAY HASIA V KHALID MUJIB AIR 1981 SC 487- FACTS

 The question regarding the status of a non-statutory body was finally clinched in this case, where a society
registered under the Societies Registration Act running the regional engineering college, sponsored, supervised
and financially supported by the Government, was held to be an ‘authority’.
 Admission to Jammu & Kashmir Regional Engineering College, Srinagar, registered as a society under the Jammu
& Kashmir Registration of Societies Act, 1898- Whether a "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution and
amenable to writ jurisdiction.

22
4. AJAY HASIA V KHALID MUJIB AIR 1981 SC 487- HELD
 Having regard to the Memorandum of Association and the Rules of the Society, the respondent college is a State
within the meaning of Article 12. The composition of the Society is dominated by the representatives appointed by
the Central Government and the Governments of Jammu & Kashmir, Punjab, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh with
the approval of the Central Government. The money required for running the college are provided entirely by the
Central Government and the Government of Jammu & Kashmir and even if any other money is to be received by
the Society, it can be done only with the approval of the State and the Central Governments. The Rules to be made
by the Society are also required to have the prior approval of the State and the Central Governments and the
accounts of the Society have also to be submitted to both the Governments for their scrutiny and satisfaction. The
Society is also to comply with all such directions as may be issued by the State Government with the approval of
the Central Government in respect of any matters dealt with in the report of the Reviewing Committee.
 The control of the State and the Central Governments is indeed so deep and pervasive that no immovable property
of the Society can be disposed of in any manner without the approval of both the Governments. The State and the
Central Governments have even the power to appoint any other person or persons to be members of the Society
and any member of the Society other than a member representing the State or the Central Government can be
removed from the membership of the Society by the State Government with the approval of the Central23
Government.
4. AJAY HASIA V KHALID MUJIB AIR 1981 SC 487- HELD

 The Board of Governors, which is in charge of general superintendence, direction and control of the affairs of the
Society and of its income and property is also largely controlled by nominees of the State and the Central
Governments. The State Government and by reason of the provision for approval, the Central Government also
thus have full control of the working of the society.
 Therefore, the Society is merely a projection of the State and the Central Governments. The voice is that of the
State and the Central Governments. The Society is an instrumentality or the agency of the State and the
Central Governments and it is an "authority" within the meaning of Article 12. If the Society is, an
"authority" and, therefore, the "State" within the meaning of 12, it must follow that it is subject to the
constitutional obligation under Article 14.

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4. AJAY HASIA V KHALID MUJIB AIR 1981 SC 487- HELD

 In Ajay Hasia, The Supreme Court laid down the following tests to adjudge whether a body is an instrumentality
of the government or not:
a. If the entire share capital of the body is held by the government, it goes a long way towards indicating that the
body is an instrumentality of the government.
b. Where the financial assistance given by the government is so large as to meet almost entire expenditure of the
body, it may indicate that the body is impregnated with governmental character.
c. It is a relevant factor if the body enjoys monopoly status which is conferred or protected by the state.
d. Existence of deep and pervasive state control may afford an indication that the body is a state instrumentality.
e. If the functions performed by the body are of public importance and closely related to governmental functions, it
is a relevant factor to treat the body as an instrumentality of the government.
 It is immaterial for this purpose whether the corporation is created by a statute or under a statute. The test is
whether it is an instrumentality or agency of the Government and not as to how it is created. The enquiry has to be25
not as to how the juristic person is born but why it has been brought into existence.
5. ZEE TELEFIMS V UOI (2005) 4 SCC 649- FACTS
 The background facts in that case was that Zee Telefilms had bid for telecast rights for certain tournaments which
had been cancelled by BCCI. Against this, Zee Telefilms had filed a Civil Writ Petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India on the ground that the Board being recognized by the Union of India, Ministry of Youth
Affairs and Sports could be considered to be 'other authority' for purpose of Article 12 of the Constitution of India
and therefore capable of coming under Article 32/226 of the Constitution of India.
 The question involved was whether the Board of Cricket for Control in India was ‘State’ within the meaning of
Article 12.
 The Board was not formed as part of the share capital held by the Government. It was also not created by any
statute. There was practically no financial assistance given to the Board by the Government and even then the
Board did enjoy a monopoly status in the field of cricket. The control, if any, was only regulatory in nature as
applicable to other similar bodies. All the functions of the Board were not public functions nor they were closely
related to governmental functions. The Board was not created by the transfer of a Government owned Corporation
and was an autonomous body. The Board was not financially, functionally or administratively dominated by or
under the control of Government so as to bring it within the expression ‘State’ in Article 12. 26
5. ZEE TELEFIMS V UOI (2005) 4 SCC 649- ISSUES

1. Whether Writ Petition against Board of Control for Cricket in India is maintainable?
2. Whether Board is a State within meaning of Art.12?

27
5. ZEE TELEFIMS V UOI (2005) 4 SCC 649- HELD

 A seven-judge Bench of the Court in Pradeep Kumar Biswas v Indian Institute of Chemical Biology (2002) 5 SCC
111laid down the following tests for the purpose of determining the nature of activities which would make the
body come within the definition of ‘State’ :
1. Formation of body;
2. Objects and functions;
3. Management and control;
4. Financial aid, etc.
 The Court observed that the combination of State aid and furnishing of an important public service may result in a
conclusion that the operation should be classified as a State agency. In finding a State action, the existence or non-
existence of State financial aid might be irrelevant even if the give function is closely related to government or is
of public importance. If the function does not fall within such a description, then mere addition of State money
would not influence the conclusion.
28
5. ZEE TELEFIMS V UOI (2005) 4 SCC 649- HELD
 The facts established in this case shows the following :-

1. Board is not created by a statute.

2. No part of the share capital of the Board is held by the Government.
3. Practically no financial assistance is given by the Government to meet the whole or entire expenditure of the
Board.
4. The Board does enjoy a monopoly status in the field of cricket but such status is not State conferred or State
protected.
5. There is no existence of a deep and pervasive State control. The control if any is only regulatory in nature as
applicable to other similar bodies. This control is not specifically exercised under any special statute applicable to
the Board. All functions of the Board are not public functions nor are they closely related to governmental
functions.
6. The Board is not created by transfer of a Government owned corporation. It is an autonomous body.
29
 Thus it was held that the Board cannot be construed as a State for the purpose of Article 12.
5. ZEE TELEFIMS V UOI (2005) 4 SCC 649- ANALYSIS
 While granting of "State" recognition to Sports Federations, (as opined in the dissenting judgment of Zee
Telefilms) is still far away, and which would have been a real game-changer, what BCCI, does is that it expands on
the "floodgates principle" by looking at the "nature of functions and duties test" and arriving at a reasoned
determination of what would amount to be "State".
 All sports federations and other institutions having a similar mode of operations have therefore, been covered by
the instant judgment.
 This while liberalising Sports Administration within the Indian sub-continent, is nevertheless an effective
arrangement till future determinations finally hold Sports federations to be "State". It is not in dispute that the
jurisprudence of "State" has shifted from holding that the sports federations are not "State" to stating that "while
they may not be state, they are nevertheless amenable to Article 226." It is now, but a short step to holding that
sports federations can be considered to be "State" in the years to come.

30
6. JANET JEYAPAUL VS. SRM UNIVERSITY AND OTHERS [(2015) 16
SCC 530- FACTS
 The petitioner (an employee of the SRM University) in the SRM Case had invoked the writ jurisdiction of the
High Court of Madras (“HCM”) under Article 226 challenging the notice issued by the SRM University
terminating her services. The Single Judge of HCM allowed the writ petition by quashing the notice of termination
and directing reinstatement of the petitioner. However, order of the Single Judge was set aside by the Division
Bench of HCM, without considering merits of the case, holding that the SRM University was neither a State nor
an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the COI.
 The amicus curie appointed by the SC on behalf of the petitioner submitted that while deciding the question as to
whether the writ lies under Article 226 of the COI against any person, juristic body, organization, etc., the test, in
the first instance, is to examine the object and purpose for which such body/authority/organization is formed as
also the activity which it undertakes to fulfil the said object/purpose. The approach of the court while deciding this
question is to assess as to whether the concerned body is formed for discharging any “public function” or “public
duty” and if so, whether it is actually engaged in any public function or/and performing any such duty. If the case
complies with this twin test, such person /organization, as the case may be, would be subjected to the writ
jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the COI. It was further contented that the expression “any
person or authority” used in Article 226 of the COI are not confined only to statutory authorities and31
instrumentalities of the State but may in appropriate case include any other person or body performing public
function/duty.
6. JANET JEYAPAUL VS. SRM UNIVERSITY AND OTHERS [(2015) 16
SCC 530- FACTS
 It was further pointed out that the SRM University is a juristic body engaged in imparting education in higher
studies and is conferred with a status of “Deemed University” by the Central Government under Section 3 of the
University Grant Commission Act, 1956 (“UGC Act”) and “imparting education to students at large” is a “public
function” and, therefore, if any authority is found to have been engaged in the activity of imparting education to
the students at large then irrespective of the status of any such authority, it should be made amenable to writ
jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the COI.
 One of the submissions made on behalf of the SRM University was that if this court holds that the SRM
University is amenable to writ jurisdiction then apart from employees even those who are otherwise dealing with
the SRM University would start invoking writ jurisdiction which would open the flood gate of litigation in courts.

32
6. JANET JEYAPAUL VS. SRM UNIVERSITY AND OTHERS [(2015) 16
SCC 530- HELD

 The SC held that the division bench of the High Court erred in holding that the SRM University is not subject to
writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the COI.
 While rejecting the view of the Division Bench of HCM, the SC observed that the SRM University is engaged in
imparting education in higher studies to students at large and therefore it is discharging “public function” by way
of imparting education.
 Further, it is notified as a “Deemed University” by the Central Government under Section 3 of the UGC Act, and
being a “Deemed University”, all the provisions of the UGC Act are made applicable to the SRM University
which, inter alia, provides for effective discharge of the public function namely education for the benefit of
public. Once the SRM University is declared as “Deemed University” whose all functions and activities are
governed by the UGC Act, alike other universities then it is an “authority” within the meaning of Article 12 of the
COI and once it is held to be an “authority” as provided in Article 12 then as a necessary consequence, it becomes
amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the COI.

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