Chapter III Statutes

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Chapter III:

Interpretation and Construction in


Relation to Language of Statute
Legislative Intent Determined from Language of Statute

 The only mode in which the will of the


legislature is spoken is in the statute
itself.
 Hence in the construction of statutes, it
is the legislative intent manifested in
the statute that is of importance and
such intent must be determined
primarily from the language of the
statute, which affords the best means
for its exposition.

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Legislative Intent Determined from Language of Statute
 This principle must be extraneous circumstances that the
legislature intended to enact something very different
from that which it enact.
 An obscurity cannot be created to be cleared up by
construction and hidden meanings at variance with the
language used cannot be sought out.
 To attempt to do so is a perilous undertaking, and is quite
apt to lead to an amendment of a law by judicial
construction.
 To depart from the meaning expressed by the words is to
alter the statute and legislate, not to interpret.
 And it is NOT for the courts to determine whether a
statute is wise and expedient or to administer a law as
they think it ought to be.
 It may be harshly worded and cause hardship, but it must
be administered in accordance with its express terms.
Dura lex sed lex. November 12, 202 Page 3
Plain Meaning in the Statute

 As a general rule, words do not


acquire a peculiar and different
meaning when used in a statute.
 Ordinarily, they are to be given
their usual, natural, plain,
ordinary and commonly
understood meaning.

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Ordinary Meaning of Words
 The natural and ordinary meaning of words will HOWEVER be
disregarded in favor of a statutory meaning or a well
established technical meaning , or when it is plain and clear
from the statute or from the context of the words within the
statute that a DIFFERENT MEANING was intended, or when to
observe the commonly accepted meaning would DEFEAT the
manifest intention of the legislature or result in absurdity.
 Indeed, it is an old and well-established maxim that words
ought to be more subservient to the intent, and not the
intent to the words.

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Meaning as of Time of Enactment
 Because it is easy to be wise after one sees the
result of experience, there is always a tendency to
construe the language of a statute in the light in
which it appears when the construction is made.

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Meaning as of Time of Enactment
 But since construction aims to
discover the meaning which the
legislature attached to the words
employed, SUCH WORDS MUST BE
TAKEN IN THE SENSE IN WHICH
THEY WERE UNDERSTOOD AT THE
TIME OF ENACTMENT, and the
statute must be construed as it was
intended to be understood when it
was passed.

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The Doctrine of Associated Words
(Noscitur a Sociis).

 Where a particular word or phrase in a


statute is ambiguous in itself or is equally
susceptible of various meanings, its true
meaning may be made CLEAR AND SPECIFIC
by considering the company in which it is
found or with which it is associated.
 Noscitur a sociis; one is known by his
companions.

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ILLUSTRATION (by Black):
• An English act required licenses for “houses rooms, shop, building, kept
open for public refreshment, resort, entertainment.”
• It was adjudged that the word “entertainment,” in this connection, did not
necessarily mean a concert, dramatic performance, or other advertisement,
nor did it necessarily imply the furnishing of food or drink.
• But that, judged from it association, it meant the reception and
accommodation of the public.
• So where a policy of marine assurance is specified to protect the assured
against “arrests, restraints, and detainments of all kings, princes, and
people,” the word “people” means that ruling or governing power of the
country, the signification being impressed upon it by its association with the
words “kings” and “princes.”
• Again, in a statute relating to imprisonment for debt, or undue preference
to one creditor to the prejudice of another,” the word “undue” means
fraudulent “gift transfer or delivery” of property shall constitute an act of
bankruptcy, applies only to such deliveries as are in the nature of a gift-
such as change of the ownership of the property, to the prejudice of
creditors; it does not include a delivery to bailee for safekeeping.

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When Rule is NOT Appicable?
 The rule “noscitur a sociis” like all other
rules of interpretation and construction of
statutes, does NOT apply where the statute
is clear and unambiguous.
 Moreover, a court has no right to resort to
such maxim for the purpose of reading into a
statute a distinction which the legislature
neither made nor intended to make, or when
to do so would render general words
meaningless.

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Ejusdem Generis
 Where the general words follow the
designation of particular things, or classes
of persons or subjects, the general words
will usually be construed to include only
those persons or things of the same class
or general nature as those specifically
enumerated.
 This rule is founded upon the idea that if the
legislature intended the general words to
be used in an unrestricted sense the
particular classes would not have been
mentioned.
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Ejusdem Generis
• General terms commonly used in statute are: “and others,”
“and the like,” “and similar things.
• “Particularization followed by a general expression will
ordinarily be restricted to the former” is based on the fact in
human experience that usually the minds of parties are
addressed specially to the particularization, and that the
generalities, though broad enough to comprehend other fields
if they stood alone, are used in contemplation of that upon
which the minds of the parties are centered.

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When Rule Not Applicable
 Being merely an aid to
interpretation or construction, the
rule of ejusdem generis will NOT
apply where the words of the
statute are plain or
unambiguous.
 It is not universally applicable and
must yield to the manifest
intention of the legislature.

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When Rule Not Applicable
 It does not apply where, on consideration of the whole law on
the subject and the purpose sought, it appears that the
legislature intended the general words to go beyond the class
specifically designated.
 Nor is the rule to be followed where specific words
enumerate subjects which greatly differ from each, or they
exhaust all the subjects of the class mentioned.

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Expressio Unius Est Exlucio Alterius (Express Mention is Implied Exclusion).

 The express mention of


one thing in a law will, as a
general rule, mean the
exclusion of the others not
expressly mentioned.
 This rule, as a guide to a
probable legislative intent,
is based upon rule of logic
and the natural workings
of the human mind.

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Expressio Unius Est Exlucio Alterius (Express Mention is Implied Exclusion).

 Thus, where a statute clearly sets forth the various grounds for
eviction of agricultural tenants, no other grounds for eviction
will be considered EXCEPT those falling within the designated
categories.
 Similarly, where the law enumerates the persons disqualified to
contact marriage, a person not expressly mentioned, such as a
priest, will NOT BE considered disqualified to marry.
 And where the law has enumerated the rights of an adopted
child, and acquisition of the citizenship of the adopting parent is
not one such rights, the naturalization of the latter CANNOT be
held to benefit the former.
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When the Rule is NOT APPlicable
 This rule should be applied with great caution, and should
never followed where to do so would defeat the plain
intent of the legislature.
 It does not apply where words are mentioned merely by
way example or the remove doubts.

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When the Rule is NOT Applicable
 Thus, where a law enumerates
acts which shall be construed as
unprofessional, immoral or
dishonorable conduct of
physicians, it cannot be contended
that aside from the five examples
specified there can be no other
conduct of a physician which
would warrant the revocation of
his license.

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When the Rule is NOT Applicable
 The maxim expression unius est exclusion alterius is not to be
applied with same rigor in construing a constitution as a
statute and only those things expressed in such positive
affirmative terms as plainly imply the negative of what is not
mentioned will be considered as inhibiting the power of the
legislature.
 The maxim is only a rule of interpretation and not a
constitutional command.

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Doctrine of the Last Antecedent.
Under this rule, relative and
qualifying words, phrases, and
clauses are to be applied to the
words or phrase immediately
preceding and are not to be
construed as extending to following
words.
But this rule will not be adhered to
where extension to a more remote
antecedent is clearly required by
consideration of the entire act.
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Casus Omissus; Exceptions
Casus Omissus; Exceptions.
 Under this rule, a person, object
or thing omitted from an
enumeration in a statute must be
held to have omitted
intentionally.
 For is not the office of the court
to insert in a statute that which
has been omitted; what the
legislature omits the courts
cannot supply.
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Casus Omissus; Exceptions
 Words or phrases may however be supplied by the courts and
inserted in a statute where that is necessary to obviate
repugnancy or inconsistency, or to complete the sense
thereof, or where the omission was made through clerical
error, or by accident or inadvertence.
 But they will supply an omission only where the same is
palpable and omitted words are plainly indicated by the
context or verifiable from other parts of the statute

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“Sec. 4. Pre- trial agreements
must be signed – no
agreement or admission made
or entered during the pre-trial
conference shall be used in
evidence against the accused
unless reduced to writing and
signed by him and his
counsel.”

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Negative words VS Affirmative words
 By its very language, the rule is mandatory. Under the rule of
statutory construction, negative words and phrases are to be
regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely
directory (McGee vs. Republic, 94 Phil. 820 (1954).
 The use of the term “shall” further emphasizes its mandatory
character and means that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty
which may be enforced (Bersabal vs. Salvador, No. L-359 10, July 21,
1978, 84 SCRA 176).
 And more importantly, penal statutes whether substantive and
remedial or procedural are, by consecrate rule, to be strictly applied
against the government and liberally in favor of the accused
(People vs. Terrado, No. L-23625, November 25, 1983, 125 SCRA 648).
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The conclusion is inevitable, therefore, that the omission of the
signature of the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily
required by the Rules, renders the stipulation of Fact,
inadmissible in evidence. The fact that the lawyer of the
accused, in his memorandum, confirmed the Stipulation of
Facts, does not cure the defect because Rule 118 requires both
the accused and his counsel to sign the Stipulation of Facts.

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What the prosecution should have done, upon discovering that
the accused did not sign the Stipulation of Fact, as required by
Rule 1 18, was to submit evidence to establish the elements of
the crime, instead of relying solely on the supposed admission
of the accused in the Stipulation of Fact. Without said evidence
independent of the admission, the quilt of the accused cannot
be deemed established beyond reasonable doubt.

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Consequently, under the circumstances obtaining in this case,
the ends of justice require that evidence be presented to
determine the culpability of the accused. When a judgment has
been entered by consent of an attorney without special
authority, it will sometimes be set aside or reopened (Natividad
vs Natividad, 51 Phil. 613 (1928).

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The phrase “may be promulgated”
used in Section 16 (c) of C.A.
No.146 should not be construed to
mean “shall” or must’

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It has been ruled that the use of the word “may” in Article 548
of the Code of Commerce shows that it is not mandatory on the
part of the dispossessed owner of a lost instrument payable to
bearer to apply to the judge of the court of competent
jurisdiction for the issuance of a duplicate of the lost
instrument.

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Article 213 of the Family Code provides
that no child under seven years of age
“shall” be separated from the mother,
unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise. The use of
the word “shall” in said provision, it
has been held, connotes a mandatory
character; this is in view of the basic
need of a child for his mother’s loving
care.

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Rules of Grammar
 The ordinary rules of grammar
will be applied for the
purpose of ascertaining the
meaning of statute, but they
are not controlling when an
intent in conflict therewith is
disclosed, and must thereupon
be disregarded so as to give
effect to the legislative
intention.

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Rules of Grammar
 Nonetheless, courts as a rule cannot presume that the
lawmaking body does not know the meaning of words and the
rules of grammar.
 Consequently, the grammatical reading of a statute must be
presumed to yield its correct sense.
 Thus, where a pension law uses the words “retired and paid
gratuity” in referring to the members of the armed forces who
might take advantage of its provisions, the court cannot, in the
absence of any ambiguity in the law itself, construe the said
words as including military personnel who would yet retire and
paid their lump sum gratuity after the law takes effect.

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Implications.
 Every statute is understood to contain, by
implication, if not by express terms, all such
provisions as may be necessary to effectuate
its object and purpose or to make effective
the rights, powers, privileges, or jurisdiction
which it may grant and also such collateral
and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly
and logically inferred from its terms.
 Indeed, that which is plainly implied in a
statute is as much as part of it as that which
is expressed.
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Implications
 The reason for allowing the court to give effect to necessary
implications is quite apparent.
 Many matters of minor detail are often omitted from
legislations.
 If these details could not be inserted by implication, the
drafting of legislation would be an interminable process and
the legislative intent would likely be defeated by a most
insignificant omission.

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Implications
 But a power not expressly granted by statute will be implied
only where it is so essential to the exercise of same power
expressly conferred;
 in other words, the implied power must be necessary, not
merely convenient.

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Constitutionality
• A legislative act should be construed whenever possible in a
manner that will avoid conflict with the constitution.
• So that if it is reasonably susceptible of two interpretations, one
constitutional and the other unconstitutional, it is the duty of
courts to adopt the construction in favor of its constitutionally.
• Moreover, if the words of a law are susceptible of more than one
meaning, absurdity which would result from accepting one of
the meanings is an argument against its adoptions.
• That which will save, not that which will destroy, commends
itself for acceptance. To doubt is to sustain.

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Computation of Time
Sec. 53 Computation of
Time. – Article 13 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines
provides that:

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Computation of Time
• “When the laws speak of years, months days and nights, it
shall be understood that years are of three hundred and sixty-
five days each; months, of thirty days; days of twenty-four
hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise.
• “If the months are designated by their name, they shall be
computed by the number of days which they respectively
have.
• “In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded and the
last day included.

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English VS Spanish Texts
Sec.54. English and Spanish
Texts of Philippines Statutes.
– Section 15 of the Revised
Administrative Codes
provides:

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English VS Spanish Texts
• “Language that should prevail in the interpretation of laws.
• In the interpretation of a law officially promulgated in English and Spanish,
the English text shall govern, but in case of ambiguity, omission, or
mistake, the Spanish may be consulted to explain the English text.
• The converse rule shall, however, be applied if so provided in the
particular statute.
• Provided however, that in the interpretation of laws enacted by the
Philippine Legislature after October sixteenth, nineteen hundred and
sixteen, the language of the text used by the House that finally passed
the same shall prevail, and in case of ambiguity, omission, mistake, the
official translation filed in the office of the Secretary of the said House
may be consulted.”

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English VS Spanish Texts
 Thus, it has been held that where an act was finally approved
in English, the English text is controlling in its construction
not withstanding a somewhat variant Spanish translation.
 But in as much as the Revised Penal Code was originally
enacted in Spanish, and approved in that form in Spanish text
governs against the English. However, since the Judiciary Act
of 1948 was discussed and approved in English that version of
the law must be considered as controlling as against the
Spanish translation.

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English VS Other Languages
 The Constitution of the Philippines
(1973) provides that it shall be
officially promulgated in English
and in Pilipino, and translated into
each dialect spoken by over fifty
thousand people, and into Spanish
and Arabic.
 In case of conflict, the English
text shall prevail.

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English VS Other Languages
• The 1987 Constitution shall be promulgated in Filipino
languages, Arabic and Spanish.
• Sec. 20, Chapter5, Book 1 of the Administrative Code of 1987
provides:

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Interpretation of Laws and Administrative Issuances
• In the interpretation of a law or
administrative issuance
promulgated in all official
languages, the English text shall
control, unless otherwise
specifically provided.
• In case of ambiguity, omission or
mistake, the other texts may be
consulted.’

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Thank you for listening!
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