INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

GOLDEN RULE OF
INTERPRETATION

Submitted To: Submitted By: -

Dr. Anupam Acharya Pulkit Jain
MDU CPAS,Gurugram Roll No. 2805
BA LLB(H) 5th Year, Sec A
INTRODUCTION

Interpretation is the method by which the true sense or the meaning of the word is
understood. The meaning of an ordinary word of the English language is not a question of law.
The proper construction of a statute is a question of law. The purpose of the interpretation of the
statute is to unlock the locks put by the legislature. For such unlocking, keys are to be found out.
These keys may be termed as aids for interpretation and principles of interpretation.

According to Gray, the process by which a judge (or indeed any person, lawyer or layman, who
has occasion to search for the meaning of a statute) constructs from words of a statute book, a
meaning which he either believes to be that of the legislature, or which he proposes to attribute to
it, is called ‘interpretation’.

The primary object in interpreting a statute is always to discover the intention of the legislature
and in England the rules of interpretation, developed there , can be relied on to aid the discovery
because those whose task is to put the intention of the legislature into language, fashion their
language with those very rules in view. Since framers of statutes couch the enactments in
accordance with the same rules as the judicial interpreter applies, application of those rules in the
analysis of a statute naturally brings up the intended meaning to the surface. It is at least doubtful
whether in a case of framers of Indian statutes of the present times, specially of the provincial
legislature, the same assumption can always be made.

Interpretation is of two kinds – grammatical and logical. Grammatical interpretation is arrived at

by reference to the laws of speech to the words used in the statute; in other words, it regards only
the verbal expression of the legislature. Logical interpretation gives effect to the intention of the
legislature by taking into account other circumstances permissible according to the rules settled
in this behalf. ‘Proper construction’ is not satisfied by taking the words as if they were self-
contained phrases. So considered, the words do not yield the meaning of a statute.

According to Gray, grammatical interpretation is the application to a statute of the laws of

speech; logical interpretation calls for the comparison of the statute with other statutes and with
the whole system of law, and for the consideration of the time and circumstances in which the
statute was passed. It is the duty of the judicature to ascertain the true legal meaning of the words
used by the legislature. A statute is the will of the legislature and the fundamental rule of
interpretation , to which all others are subordinate, and that a statute is to be expounded,
according to the intent of them that made it. The object of interpretation is to find out the
intention of the legislature.
GOLDEN RULE OF INTERPRETATION

The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. It
is yet another rule of construction that when the words of the statute are clear, plain and
unambiguous, then the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning, irrespective of the
consequences. The rule was defined by Lord Wensleydale in the Grey v Pearson (1857) as:
“The grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to unless that would lead to
some absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument in which
case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified so as to avoid the
absurdity and inconsistency, but no farther.”

So, The Golden Rule is a modification of The Literal Rule to be used to avoid an absurd
outcome.

The Golden Rule was used in the R v Allen (1872). In this the defendant was charged with
bigamy (s.57 of offences against the person act 1861) which, under statutes states: ‘whosoever
being married shall marry any other person during the lifetime of the former husband or wife is
guilty of an offence’. Under The Literal Rule, bigamy would be impossible because civil courts
do not recognise second marriages, so The Golden Rule was applied to determine that the word
‘marry’ should be seen as ‘to go through ceremony’ and the conviction was upheld.

The Golden Rule was applied in the Adler v George (1964). Under section 3 of the official
secrets act (1920) it was an offence to obstruct HM Forces in the vicinity of a prohibited area.
Adler was arrested for obstructing forces whilst in a prohibited area. Under The Literal Rule,
Adler was not in the VICINITY of the area – he was IN the area – and so was not infringing the
terms of the act. The Golden Rule was applied to extend the meaning of ‘vicinity’ and avoid the
possible absurd outcome.

The words of the statute are to be construed so as to ascertain the mind of the legislature from the
natural and grammatical meaning of the words which it has used. ‘The essence of the Law’,
according to Salmond:

Lies in its spirit, nor in its letter, for the letter is significant only as being the external
manifestation of the intention that underlies it. Nevertheless in all ordinary cases the courts must
be content to accept the litera legis as the exclusive and conclusive evidence of the sententia
legis. They must, in general, take it absolutely for granted that the legislature has said what it
meant, and meant what it has said. Ita scriptumest is the first principal of interpretation. Judges
are not at liberty to add to or take from or modify the letter of the law simply because they have
reason to believe that the true sententia legis is not completely or correctly expressed by it. It is
to say, in all ordinary case grammatical interpretation is the sole form allowable.
LORD WENSLEYDALE’S GOLDEN RULE

Lord Wensleydale called it the ‘golden rule’ and adopted it in Grey v Pearson and thereafter it
is usually known as Lord Wensleydale’s Golden Rule. This is another version of the golden rule.
His Lordship expressed himself thus:

I have been long and deeply impressed with the wisdom of the rule, now I believe universally
adopted at least in the courts of law in Westminster Hall that in construing wills, and indeed
statutes and all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be
adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency with
the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be
modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further.It is a very useful rule in
the construction of a statute to adhere to the ordinary meaning of the words used, and to
the grammatical construction, unless that is at variance with the intention of the legislature to be
collected from the statute itself, or leads to any manifest absurdity or repugnance, in which case
the language may be varied or modified so as to avoid such inconvenience, but no further.

Thus, if the meaning of the words is at variance with the intention of the legislature to be
collected from the statute itself and leads to some absurdity or repugnance, then the language
may be varied or modified so as to avoid such inconvenience, absurdity or repugnance and no
further. The modern positive approach is to have a purposeful construction, which is to effectuate
the object and purpose of the Act. In other words ambiguity, inconsistency, incompleteness in
literal interpretation leads modification of language so as to avoid such inconvenience. When in
construing a word literally, there exist variance with the intention of the legislature to be
gathered from the subject or context of the statute, the language may be varied or modified in
such a case, but no further. Ambiguity here means double meaning, a word’s expression capable
of more than one meaning. A word is inconsistent when it is incompatible with other words or
gives separate meaning when read with other parts of the statute. The word ‘absurdity’ also
means ‘repugnance’: Repugnancy appears when there is a direct conflict or inconsistencies like
one provision says, “do” and other says, “don’t.” A situation may be reached where it is
impossible to obey the one without disobeying the other. In all such cases, the statute becomes
equivocal i.e., double meaning or questionable, suspicious or uncertain in nature. Whenever the
meaning of the word, phrase, expression or sentence is uncertain, it may be a case of departing
from the plain grammatical meaning, and there may be need for application of golden rule. It is
however reiterated in every concerned case, that the province of the judge is very different one of
construing the language in which the legislature has finally expressed. If they undertake the other
province, which belongs to the legislature who, have to endeavor to interpret the desire of the
country, the courts are in danger of going astray in a labyrinth to the character of which they
have no sufficient guide. And in this order again, the only safe course is to read the language of
the statute in what seems to be its natural sense. When we say that the ordinary and grammatical
sense of the words must be adhered to in the first instance, it means that most words have
primary meaning in which they are generally used, and such a meaning should be applied first.
Words have a secondary meaning
LITERAL GOLDEN RULE

There are two fundamental rules suggested in the English Cases:

Firstly, the literal rule that, if the meaning of section is plain, it is to be applied whatever the
result.

The Second is “golden rule” that the words should be given their ordinary sense unless that
would lead to some absurdity or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument; and the “mischief
rule” which emphasizes the general policy of the enactment and the evil at which it was
directed.”

For the application of literal rule a clear and unequivocal meaning is essential. In Jugal Kishore
Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd. The Supreme Court held that the cardinal rule of construction of
statutes is to read the statutes literally, that is by giving to the words their ordinary, natural and
grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are
susceptible of another meaning, the court may adopt the same. But when no such alternative
construction is possible, the court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation.

In New India Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar, the Apex Court had
held: “It is a recognized rule of interpretation of statutes that expressions used therein should
ordinary be understood in a sense in which they best harmonies with the object of the statute and
which effectuate the object of the legislature. Therefore, when two constructions are feasible, the
court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppress the mischief as the legislature
envisioned. The Court should adopt a project oriented approach keeping in mind the principle
that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits.”

In Newspapers Ltd. v. State Industrial Tribunal, the Supreme Court said: “in order to get true
import of the statute, it is necessary to view the enactment in retrospect, the reasons for enacting
it, the evils it was to end and the object it was to sub-serve. The Act has therefore to be viewed as
a whole and its intention determined by construing all the construing parts of the Act together
and not by taking detached section as to take one word here and another there.”
Interpretative Process

Crawford has discussed the various ways by which the meaning of statutes is to be
ascertained. He writes:

The first source from which the legislative intent is to be sought is the words of the statute. Then
an examination should be made of the context, and the subject matter and purpose of the
enactment. After the exhaustion of all intrinsic aids, if the legislative intent is still obscure, it is
proper for the court to consult the several extrinsic matters for further assistance. And during the
consideration of the- various sources of assistance, further help may, of course, be found on the
use of the numerous rules of construction.

Austin divided the interpretative process into three sub-processes:

finding the rule;

finding the intention of the legislature; and

extending or restricting the statute so discovered to cover cases which should be covered.

De Sloovere recommended the following steps:

finding or choosing the proper statutory provisions;

interpreting the statute law in its technical sense; and

applying the meaning so found, to the case in hand.

APPLICATION OF GOLDEN RULE

INDIAN CASES
In India there are several good examples where the Supreme Court or High Courts have applied
the Golden Construction of Statutes. Certain confusion one may face when it appears that even
for literal rule, this rule is named. As golden rule initially starts with the search of literal meaning
of the provision, and if there is unequivocal meaning, plain and natural and no repugnancy,
uncertainty of absurdity appears, apply the meaning. But when there is possibility of more than
one meaning, we have to go further to avoid the inconvenience by even modifying the language
by addition, rejection or substitution of words so as to make meaning accurate expounding of
intention of the legislature.

In Uttar Pradesh Bhoodan Yagna Samiti v. Brij Kishore, the Supreme Court held that the
expression “landless person” used in section 14 of U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1953 which made
provision for grant of land to landless persons, was limited to “landless laborers”. A landless
labour is he who is engaged in agriculture but having no agricultural land. The Court further said
that “any landless person” did not include a landless businessman residing in a city. The object
of the Act was to implement the Bhoodan movement, which aimed at distribution of land to
landless labourers who were verged in agriculture. A businessman, though landless cannot claim
the benefit of the Act.

In Lee v. Knapp, section 77(1) of the Road Traffic Act, 1960 provided that “a driver causing
accident shall stop after the accident”, the interpretation of the word “stop” was in question. In
this case, the driver of the motor vehicle stopped for a moment after causing an accident and then
ran away. Applying the golden rule the court held that the driver had not fulfilled the
requirement of the section, as he had not stopped for a reasonable period so as to enable
interested persons to make necessary inquires from him about the accident at the spot of accident

In Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar in construing section 6 of the Probation of

Offenders Act, 1958, the Supreme Court laid down that the crucial date on which the age of the
offender had to be determined is not the date of offence, but the date on which the sentence is
pronounced by the trial court An accused who on the date of offence was below 21 years of age
but on the date on which the judgment pronounced, if he was above 21 years, he is not entitled to
the benefit of the statute. This conclusion reached having regard to the object of the Act. The
object of the Statute is to prevent the turning of the youthful offenders into criminals by their
association with the hardened criminals of mature age within the walls of the prison. An accused
below 21 years is entitled to the benefit of the Act by sending him under the supervision of the
probation officer instead of jail.
Criticism of Golden Rule

The Golden Approach can be criticized:

The United Kingdom Law Commissions commented in their report that:

“There is a tendency in our systems, less evident in some recent decisions of the courts but still
perceptible, to over emphasise the literal meaning of a provision (i.e. the meaning in the light of
its immediate and obvious context) at the expense of the meaning to be derived from other
possible contexts; the latter include the ‘mischief’ or general legislative purpose, as well as any
international obligation of the United Kingdom, which underlie the provision”.

They also stated that to place undue emphasis on the literal meaning of words is to “assume an
unattainable perfection in draftsmanship” This was written in 1969 and in the light of more
recent judicial developments, it seems that the courts have shifted somewhat from the literal
approach. Zander contends that:“The main principles of statutory interpretation-the literal rule,
the golden rule and the mischief rule-are all called rules, but this is plainly a
misnomer(A misnomer is a term that suggests an interpretation known to be untrue). They are
not rules in any ordinary sense of the word since they all point to different solutions to the same
problem. Nor is there any indication, either in the so-called rules or elsewhere, as to which to
apply in any given situation. Each of them may be applied but need not be” Zander, in his more
recent book, criticized the golden rule for being silent as to how the court should proceed if it
does find an unacceptable absurdity

It suffers from the same difficulties as the literal approach vis lack of wider contextual
understandings of “meanings.”

The idea of “absurdity” covers only a very few cases. Most cases involve situations where
difficult choices have to be made between several fairly plausible arguments, not situations
where the words lead to obvious absurdities.

The use of the “absurdity” safety valve can be very erratic as pointed out by Professor Willis in
his famous article, “Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell” (l938) l6 C.B. Rev.l. Willis at l3-l4:

What is an ‘absurdity’? When is the result of a particular interpretation so ‘absurd’ that a court
will feel justified in departing from a ‘plain meaning’? There is the difficulty. ‘Absurdity’ is a
concept no less vague and indefinite than plain meaning’: you cannot reconcile the cases upon it.
It is infinitely more susceptible to the influence of personal prejudice. The result is that in
ultimate analysis the ‘golden rule’ does allow a court to make quite openly exceptions which are
based not on the social policy behind the Act, not even on the total effect of the words used by
the legislature, but purely on the social and political views of the men who happen to be sitting
on the case …

What use do the courts make of the ‘golden rule’ today? Again the answer is the same – they use
it as a device to achieve a desired result, in this case as a very last resort and only after all less
blatant methods have failed. In those rare cases where the words in question are (a) narrow and
precise, and (b) too ‘plain’ to be judicially held not plain, and yet to hold them applicable would
shock the court’s sense of justice, the court will if it wishes to depart from their plain meaning,
declare that to apply them literally to the facts of this case would result in an ‘absurdity’ of which
the legislature could not be held guilty, and, invoking the ‘golden rule,’ will work out an implied
exception. It was defined in Grey v. Pearson “the ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to,
unless it would lead to absurdity, when the ordinary sense may be modified to avoid the
absurdity”
CONCLUSION

The ‘Golden rule’ could, thus, be explained as follows:—

It is the duty of the Court to give effect to the meaning of an Act when the meaning can be fairly
gathered from the words used, that is to say, if one construction would lead to an absurdity while
another will give effect to what common sense would show, as obviously intended, the
construction which would defeat the ends of the Act must be rejected even if the same words
used in the same section, and even the same sentence, have to be construed differently. Indeed,
the law goes so far as to require the courts sometimes even to modify the grammatical and
ordinary sense of the words, if by doing so absurdity and inconsistency can be avoided.

The Court should not be astute to defeat the provision of the Act whose meaning is, on the face
of it, reasonably plain. Of course, this does not mean that an Act or any part of it can be recast. It
must be possible to spell the meaning contended for, out of the words actually used.

Unless the words are without meaning or absurd, it would be safe to give words their natural
meaning because the framer is presumed to use the language which conveys the intention and it
would not be in accord with any sound principle of construction to refuse to give effect to the
provisions of a statute on the very elusive ground that to give them their ordinary meaning leads
to consequences which are not in accord with the notions of propriety or justice entertained by
the Court.