GUIDELINES IN

CONSTRUCTION &
INTERPRETATION
ATTY. RENA JOY C. CASTIGADOR
A. LEGISLATIVE INTENT
* Meaning & intention of the legislature = enforce

(1) Language itself

(2) Taken as a whole – not detached or isolated
A. LEGISLATIVE INTENT
• Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of
the statute

a. Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals & Garcia

Civil case turned to criminal (secret tape recording of private
conversation)
Civil: Damages
Criminal: Violation of RA 4200
A. LEGISLATIVE INTENT
Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.

a. Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals & Garcia

Ramirez’ Defense: Act punished under RA 4200 is one communicated

by a person other than the parties to the communication.

RTC: Quashed Information (Ramirez)

CA: Declared RTC’s decision NULL and VOID
SC: Affirmed CA’s decision
A. LEGISLATIVE INTENT
Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.

a. Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals & Garcia

Issue: WON it is the legislative intent for RA 4200 not to apply to

taping of private conversation by one of the parties of the conversation.

Decision: No, the lawmakers contemplated to make illegal,

unauthorized tape recording of private conversations taken either by the
parties or by third parties.
A. LEGISLATIVE INTENT
Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.

a. Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals & Garcia

SC: Sec. 1 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for ANY

person, not authorized by ALL the parties to any private
communication to secretly record such communication by means
of a tape recorder.
A. LEGISLATIVE INTENT
Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.

a. Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals & Garcia

SC: xxx The statute’s intent to penalize ALL persons

unahtoirzed to make such recording is underscored by the used
of the qualifier “any”. Law makes no distinction as to the
parties.
B. VERBA LEGIS
• Plain Meaning Rule
The primary rule in addressing any problem relating to the
understanding or interpretation of a law is to examine the law itself
to see what it plainly says . This is the plain meaning rule of
statutory construction.
B. VERBA LEGIS
The primary rule in addressing any problem relating to the understanding or interpretation of a law is to
examine the law itself to see what it plainly says.

b. Request of Court of Appeals Justices for Computation

/Adjustment of Longevity Pay

Section 42, BP 129, Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980

B. VERBA LEGIS
The primary rule in addressing any problem relating to the understanding or interpretation of a law is to
examine the law itself to see what it plainly says.

b. Request of Court of Appeals Justices for Computation /Adjustment of Longevity Pay

ISSUE: WON Section 42 of BP 129 contemplates of awarding

longevity pay for services rendered outside judiciary.

HELD: No.
B. VERBA LEGIS
The primary rule in addressing any problem relating to the understanding or interpretation of a law is to
examine the law itself to see what it plainly says.

b. Request of Court of Appeals Justices for Computation /Adjustment of Longevity Pay

SC: As written, the language and terms of this provision are VERY
CLEAR and UNEQUIVOCAL; longevity pay is grantd to a judge or
justice (and to none other) who has rendered five years of continuous,
efficient and meritorious service in the Judiciary.
B. VERBA LEGIS
The primary rule in addressing any problem relating to the understanding or interpretation of a law is to
examine the law itself to see what it plainly says.

b. Request of Court of Appeals Justices for Computation /Adjustment of Longevity Pay

SC: The plain reading of Section 42 shows that longevity pay is not available even to a
judicial officer who is not a judge or justice. It is likewise not available, for greater reason,
to an officer in the Executive simply because he or she is not serving as a judge or justice. It
cannot also be available t o a judge or justice for past services he or she did not render within
the Judiciary as services rendered outside the Judiciary for purposes of longevity pay is not
contemplated by law.
B. VERBA LEGIS
The primary rule in addressing any problem relating to the understanding or interpretation of a law is to
examine the law itself to see what it plainly says.

c. Globe-Mackay Cable Corporation vs. NLRC & Salazar

Labor case = illegal dismissal case

(1) LA = (+) illegal dismissal = reinstate, full backwages & 50K moral
damages
(2) NLRC = (+) illegal dismissal = reinstate, backwages to 2 years
(3) SC = affirmed NLRC
B. VERBA LEGIS
The primary rule in addressing any problem relating to the understanding or interpretation of a law is to
examine the law itself to see what it plainly says.

c. Globe-Mackay Cable Corporation vs. NLRC & Salazar

Issue: WON Salazar is entitled to reinstatement & full backwages as

a result of illegal dismissal.

Held: Yes.
B. VERBA LEGIS
The primary rule in addressing any problem relating to the understanding or interpretation of a law is to
examine the law itself to see what it plainly says.

c. Globe-Mackay Cable Corporation vs. NLRC & Salazar

B. VERBA LEGIS
The primary rule in addressing any problem relating to the understanding or interpretation of a law is to
examine the law itself to see what it plainly says.

c. Globe-Mackay Cable Corporation vs. NLRC & Salazar

Held: In the first place the wording of the Labor Code is clear and
unambiguous: "An employee who is unjustly dismissed from
work shall be entitled to reinstatement. . . . and to his full
backwages. . . ."  Under the principles of statutory construction, if a
statute is clears plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
B. VERBA LEGIS
• Plain Meaning Rule
When the language of the law is clear, it should be given its
natural meaning.

d. Basbacio vs. Office of the Secretary, Department of Justice

B. VERBA LEGIS
When the language of the law is clear, it should be given its natural meaning.

d. Basbacio vs. Office of the Secretary, Department of Justice

Basbacio acquitted of the frustrated murder

Filed a claim for compensation with Board of Claims of DOJ
under Sec. 3 (a) of RA No. 7309
(1) BOC = Denied, (+) probable clause
(2) Secretary of DOJ = affirmed BOC ruling
(3) SC = Affirmed BOC & DOJ rulings
B. VERBA LEGIS
When the language of the law is clear, it should be given its natural meaning.

d. Basbacio vs. Office of the Secretary, Department of Justice

RA 7309 - AN ACT CREATING A BOARD OF CLAIMS UNDER THE

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS OF UNJUST
IMPRISONMENT OR DETENTION AND VICTIMS OF VIOLENT
CRIMES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
B. VERBA LEGIS
When the language of the law is clear, it should be given its natural meaning.

d. Basbacio vs. Office of the Secretary, Department of Justice

Issue: WON “unjustly convicted” refers to all manners of accusation, including

acquittal based on failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Held: No.
B. VERBA LEGIS
When the language of the law is clear, it should be given its natural meaning.

d. Basbacio vs. Office of the Secretary, Department of Justice

SC: Sec. 3(a) requires that the claimant be "unjustly accused, convicted

[and] imprisoned." The fact that his conviction is reversed and the
accused is acquitted is not itself proof that the previous conviction was
"unjust." An accused may be acquitted for a number of reasons and his
conviction by the trial court may, for any of these reasons, be set aside.
B. VERBA LEGIS
When the language of the law is clear, it should be given its natural meaning.

d. Basbacio vs. Office of the Secretary, Department of Justice

SC: Sec. 3(a) does not refer solely to an unjust conviction as a result
of which the accused is unjustly imprisoned, but, in addition, to an
unjust accusation. The accused must have been "unjustly accused, in
consequence of which he is unjustly convicted and then imprisoned.
C. STATUTES AS A WHOLE
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that legislative intent
must be ascertained from a consideration of the statue as a whole and
NOT merely of a particular provision.

A provision or section, which is unclear by itself, may be clarified

by reading and construing it in relation to the whole statute.
C. STATUTES AS A WHOLE
In interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part be
given effect.

e. JMM Promotions & Management, Inc. vs. NLRC & Delos Santos

(1) POEA – (+) illegal dismissal

(2) NLRC – dismissed JMM appeal; failure to post appeal bond
(3) SC - Affirmed NLRC
C. STATUTES AS A WHOLE
In interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part be given effect.

e. JMM Promotions & Management, Inc. vs. NLRC & Delos Santos

Issue: WON JMM is still required to post of an appeal bond to

perfect its appeal from the POEA decision to the NLRC despite
posting a total bond of P150,000.00 and placed in escrow the amount
of P200,000.00 as required by the POEA Rules.

Held: Yes. The POEA Rules are clear.

C. STATUTES AS A WHOLE
In interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part be given effect.

e. JMM Promotions & Management, Inc. vs. NLRC & Delos Santos
C. STATUTES AS A WHOLE
In interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part be given effect.

e. JMM Promotions & Management, Inc. vs. NLRC & Delos Santos
C. STATUTES AS A WHOLE
In interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part be given effect.

e. JMM Promotions & Management, Inc. vs. NLRC & Delos Santos

Held: The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily shows
that in addition to the cash and surety bonds and the escrow money,
an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award is
required to perfect an appeal from a decision of the POEA.
Obviously, the appeal bond is intended to further insure the payment
of the monetary award in favor of the employee if it is eventually
affirmed on appeal to the NLRC.
C. STATUTES AS A WHOLE
In interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part be given effect.

e. JMM Promotions & Management, Inc. vs. NLRC & Delos Santos

Held: It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a

statute (or a set of rules as in this case), care should be taken that
every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted
as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting
provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat.
C. STATUTES AS A WHOLE
In interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part be given effect.

e. JMM Promotions & Management, Inc. vs. NLRC & Delos Santos

• Held: Under the petitioner's interpretation, the appeal bond required by Section 6 of the
aforementioned POEA Rule should be disregarded because of the earlier bonds and escrow money it
has posted. The petitioner would in effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity but we do not see any
such redundancy; on the contrary, we find that Section 6 complements Section 4 and Section 17.
The rule is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead,
apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated
and harmonious whole.
• Accordingly, we hold that in addition to the monetary obligations of the overseas recruiter
prescribed in Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules and the escrow agreement under Section
17 of the same Rule, it is necessary to post the appeal bond required under Section 6, Rule V, Book
VII of the POEA Rules, as a condition for perfecting an appeal from a decision of the POEA.
D. SPIRIT & PURPOSE OF THE LAW
When the interpretation of a statute according to the exact and literal import of its
word would lead to absurd or mischievous consequences, or would thwart or
contravene the manifest purpose of the legislature in its enactment, it should be
construed according to its spirit and reason disregarding or modifying, so far as may
be necessary, the strict letter of the law.

• Courts have the power to:

a. Declare that a case which falls within the letter of a statute is not governed by a
statute
b. Include cases not within the literal import of their terms, if plainly meant to be
included – within the intention of the legislature is as if it it were within the letter
of the statute
D. SPIRIT & PURPOSE OF THE LAW
A construction that gives to the language used in a statute a
meaning that does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute
was enacted should be rejected.

g. De Guia vs. COMELEC

D. SPIRIT & PURPOSE OF THE LAW
A construction that gives to the language used in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish the
purpose for which the statute was enacted should be rejected.

g. De Guia vs. COMELEC

R.A. 7166: "An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing
Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes."
Sec. 3. Elections of Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan. — The
elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected as
follows:
(a) For provinces with two (2) or more legislative districts, the elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall be
elected by legislative districts . . .
(b) For provinces with only one (1) legislative district, the Commission shall divide them into two (2) districts for purposes of
electing the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan . . .
(c) The number and election of elective members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan in the Metro Manila
Area, City of Cebu, City of Davao and any other city with two (2) or more legislative districts shall continue to be governed by
the provisions of Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act No. 6636 . . . Provided, further, That, the Commission shall divide each of
the municipalities in Metro Manila Area into two (2) districts by barangay for purposes of representation in the Sangguniang
Bayan . . . . and,
(d) For purposes of the regular elections on May 11, 1992, elective members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang
Bayan shall be elected at large in accordance with existing laws. However, beginning with the regular elections in 1995, they
shall be elected by district . . . .
D. SPIRIT & PURPOSE OF THE LAW
A construction that gives to the language used in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish the
purpose for which the statute was enacted should be rejected.

g. De Guia vs. COMELEC

De Guia: Second proviso of par. (c), Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166, which requires the apportionment into districts
of said municipalities does not specify when the members of their Sangguniang Bayan will be elected by
district. Based on par. (d) of Sec. 3 to support his view that the elected members of these municipalities
mentioned in par. (c) should continue to be elected at large in the May 11, 1992 elections.

(c) The number and election of elective members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan
in the Metro Manila Area, City of Cebu, City of Davao and any other city with two (2) or more legislative
districts shall continue to be governed by the provisions of Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act No.
6636 . . . Provided, further, That, the Commission shall divide each of the municipalities in Metro Manila
Area into two (2) districts by barangay for purposes of representation in the Sangguniang Bayan  . . . . and,
(d) For purposes of the regular elections on May 11, 1992, elective members of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large in accordance with existing laws . However,
beginning with the regular elections in 1995, they shall be elected by district . . . .
D. SPIRIT & PURPOSE OF THE LAW
A construction that gives to the language used in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish the
purpose for which the statute was enacted should be rejected.

g. De Guia vs. COMELEC

Issue: WON Sec 3 (a) to (d) of RA 7166 intends for members of Sangguniang Panlalawigan
and Bayan to be elected at large.

Held: No. We have carefully examined pars. (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, and its
precursor bills on synchronized elections x x x and We realize the web of confusion
generated by the seeming abstruseness in the language of the law. Hence, We can
understand why petitioner would interpret Sec. 3 as he would. But if we pursue his course,
we may conclude in absurdity because then there would have been no reason for R.A.
7166 to single out the single-district provinces referred to in par. (b), and the
municipalities in the Metro Manila Area mentioned in the second proviso of par. (c), to
be apportioned at once into two (2) districts each if the members of their respective
sanggunian after all would still be elected at large x x x.
D. SPIRIT & PURPOSE OF THE LAW
A construction that gives to the language used in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish the
purpose for which the statute was enacted should be rejected.

g. De Guia vs. COMELEC

Held: No law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless,

much less inutile. We must therefore, as far as we can, divine its
meaning, its significance, its reason for being.  x x x A construction
should be rejected that gives to the language used in a statute a
meaning that does not accomplish the purpose for which the
statute was enacted, and that tends to defeat the ends which are
sought to be attained by the enactment. 
D. SPIRIT & PURPOSE OF THE LAW
A construction that gives to the language used in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish the
purpose for which the statute was enacted should be rejected.

g. De Guia vs. COMELEC

Held: Thus, a careful analysis of the provisions of Sec. 3 shows that the
purpose of districting/apportionment of the sanggunian seats is to
reduce the number of positions to be voted for in the May 11, 1992,
synchronized elections and ensure the efficiency of electoral process.
Considering that the single-district provinces and the municipalities in the
Metro Manila Area, which are all single-districts, and under pars. (b) and
(c) have already been apportioned into two (2) districts, they will
henceforth be electing the members of their Sangguniang Panlalawigan
and Sangguniang Bayan by district in the coming May 11, 1992, elections.
D. SPIRIT & PURPOSE OF THE LAW
Between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves
the purpose of the law should prevail.

g. Spouses Salenillas vs. Court of Appeals & Guerra

D. SPIRIT & PURPOSE OF THE LAW
Between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail.

g. Spouses Salenillas vs. Court of Appeals & Guerra

Public Land Act:

• Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent
or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to
repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs within a
period of five years from the date of the conveyance.
D. SPIRIT & PURPOSE OF THE LAW
Between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail.

g. Spouses Salenillas vs. Court of Appeals & Guerra

Guerra’s Interpretation: Elena Salenillas (daughter of original

owners Spouses Enciso) does NOT belong to the 3 categories =
transfer is NOT inheritance BUT through sale.

Spouses Salenillas’ Interpretation: Legal heir so allowed to

repurchase
D. SPIRIT & PURPOSE OF THE LAW
Between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail.

g. Spouses Salenillas vs. Court of Appeals & Guerra

Issue: WON Salenillas have the righ to repurchase the contested property under
Section 119.

Held: The petitioners-spouses are the daughter and son-in-law of the Encisos,
patentees of the contested property. At the very least, petitioner Elena Salenillas,
being a child of the Encisos, is a "legal heir" of the latter. As such, and even on this
score alone, she may therefore validly repurchase. This must be so because Section
119 of the Public Land Act, in speaking of "legal heirs," makes no distinction.  Ubi
lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
D. SPIRIT & PURPOSE OF THE LAW
Between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail.

g. Spouses Salenillas vs. Court of Appeals & Guerra

Held: The petitioners-spouses are the daughter and son-in-law of the

Encisos, patentees of the contested property. At the very least,
petitioner Elena Salenillas, being a child of the Encisos, is a "legal
heir" of the latter. As such, and even on this score alone, she may
therefore validly repurchase. This must be so because Section 119 of
the Public Land Act, in speaking of "legal heirs," makes no
distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
D. SPIRIT & PURPOSE OF THE LAW
Between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail.

g. Spouses Salenillas vs. Court of Appeals & Guerra

Held: xxx To indorse the distinction made by the private respondent and the
appellate court would be to contravene the very purpose of Section 119 of the
Public Land Act which is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to
preserve for himself and his family the land that the State had gratuitously given
him as a reward for his labor in clearing and cultivating it. xxx allowing (Elena)
and her husband to repurchase the property would be more in keeping with the
spirit of the law. We have time and again said that between two statutory
interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should
prevail. 
D. SPIRIT & PURPOSE OF THE LAW
When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases.

h. B/Gen. Commendador, et al. vs. Gen De Villa

 Military men and officers court martial for failed coup detat during Aquino
administration
• AW 67 (Mutiny)
• AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentlemen
• AW 94 (Various Crimes) in r/t Article 248 of RPC (Murder)
D. SPIRIT & PURPOSE OF THE LAW
When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases.

h. B/Gen. Commendador, et al. vs. Gen De Villa

 GR No. 96948: Certiorari against GCM No. 14 ruling of denying them the
right to preemptory challenge as granted Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408.

Issue: WON right to peremptory challenge is allowed.

GCM No. 14: Peremptory challenges had been discontinued.

B/Gen Comendador: Peremptory challenge is allowed.
D. SPIRIT & PURPOSE OF THE LAW
When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases.

h. B/Gen. Commendador, et al. vs. Gen De Villa

Coming now to the right to peremptory challenge, we note that this was originally provided
for under Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War), as amended by Rep. Act No. 242,
on June 12, 1948, to wit:

Art. 18. Challenges. — Members of general or special courts-martial may be challenged

by the accused or the trial judge advocate for cause stated to the court. The court shall
determine the relevancy and validity thereof, and shall not receive a challenge to more than
one member at a time. Challenges by the trial judge advocate shall ordinarily be presented and
decided before those by the accused are offered. Each side shall be entitled to the peremptory
challenge, but the law member of the court shall not be challenged except for cause.
D. SPIRIT & PURPOSE OF THE LAW
When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases.

h. B/Gen. Commendador, et al. vs. Gen De Villa

• September 27,1972 = President Marcos issued General Order No. 8 empowering the Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces to create military tribunals "to try and decide cases of military
personnel and such other cases as may be referred to them.

• November 7,1972 = P.D. No. 39 (Governing the Creation, Composition, Jurisdiction,

Procedure, and other matters relevant to military Tribunals).
No peremptory challenge shall be allowed. Challenges for cause may be entertained to insure
impartiality and good faith. Challenges shall immediately be heard and determined by a
majority of the members excluding the challenged member. A tie vote does not disqualify the
challenged member. A successfully challenged member shall be immediately replaced.
D. SPIRIT & PURPOSE OF THE LAW
When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases.

h. B/Gen. Commendador, et al. vs. Gen De Villa

• June 11, 1978 = President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 1498, or the National
Security Code, which was a compilation and codification of decrees, general orders,
LOI and policies intended "to meet the continuing threats to the existence, security
and stability of the State." The modified rule on challenges under P.D. No. 39 was
embodied in this decree.
• January 17,1981 = President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the
termination of the state of martial law throughout the Philippines. The proclamation
revoked General Order No. 8 and declared the dissolution of the military tribunals
created pursuant thereto upon final determination of the cases pending therein.
D. SPIRIT & PURPOSE OF THE LAW
When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases.

h. B/Gen. Commendador, et al. vs. Gen De Villa

Held: P.D. No. 39 was issued to implement General Order No. 8 and the
other general orders mentioned therein. With the termination of martial law
and the dissolution of the military tribunals created thereunder, the reason
for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically.
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the
law ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa
lex. This principle is also expressed in the maxim ratio legis est anima: the
reason of law is its soul.
D. SPIRIT & PURPOSE OF THE LAW
When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases.

h. B/Gen. Commendador, et al. vs. Gen De Villa

Held: Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the

right to peremptory challenge in L P.D. No. 39 became ineffective
when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the
issuance of Proclamation No. 2045, As a result, the old rule
embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was automatically
revived and now again allows the right to peremptory challenge.
E. IMPLICATIONS
Doctrine of Necessary Implications

What is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that

which is expressed.

i. Chua vs. CSC

j. City of Manila vs. Judge Gomez & ESSO Philippines, Inc.
E. IMPLICATIONS
What is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed.

j. City of Manila vs. Judge Gomez & Esso Philippines, Inc.

Issue: WON the additional one-half percent (½%) realty tax

imposed by the City of Manila is legal.

Held: Yes.
E. IMPLICATIONS
What is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed.

j. City of Manila vs. Judge Gomez & Esso Philippines, Inc.

a. June 18, 1949: Section 64 of the Revised Charter of Manila (RA

No. 409) = annual realty tax at 1.5 %
b. January 1, 1969: Section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law, (RA
No. 5447) imposed "an annual additional tax of one per centum on
the assessed value of real property in addition to the real property
tax regularly levied thereon under existing laws" but "the total real
property tax shall not exceed a maximum of three per centrum.
E. IMPLICATIONS
What is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed.

j. City of Manila vs. Judge Gomez & Esso Philippines, Inc.

c. December 26, 1971 – Municipal Board of Manila created Ordinance No.

7125 – imposing an additional 1.5% realty tax

RA 409 = 1.5 %
Ordinance 7125 = 1.5%
Total = 3% realty tax

Esso = Paid under protest additional 1.5% & filed recovery of amount = VOID
E. IMPLICATIONS
What is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed.

j. City of Manila vs. Judge Gomez & Esso Philippines, Inc.

Held: In this connection, it is relevant to note that section 39(2) of the Real
Property Tax Code, Presidential Decree No. 464, which took effect on June 1,
1974, provides that a city council may, by ordinance, impose a realty tax "of
not less than one half of one percent but not more than two percent of the
assessed value of real property". Section 41 of the said Code reaffirms the
one percent tax on real property for the Special Education Fund in addition to
the basic two percent realty tax. So, there is no question now that the additional
one-half percent realty tax is valid under the Real Property Tax Code.
E. IMPLICATIONS
What is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed.

j. City of Manila vs. Judge Gomez & Esso Philippines, Inc.

Held: What is in controversy is the legality of the additional one-half percent realty
tax for the two-year period from the third quarter of 1972 up to the second quarter of
1974.

We hold that the doctrine of implications in statutory construction sustains the City
of Manila's contention that the additional one-half percent realty tax is
sanctioned by the provision in section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law that
"the total real property tax shall not exceed a maximum of three per centum.
E. IMPLICATIONS
What is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed.

j. City of Manila vs. Judge Gomez & Esso Philippines, Inc.

Held: While the 1949 Revised Charter of Manila fixed the realty tax at one and
a half percent, on the other hand, the 1968 Special Education Fund Law
definitively fixed three percent as the maximum real property tax of which one
percent would accrue to the Special Education Fund. 

The obvious implication is that an additional one-half percent tax could be

imposed by municipal corporations. Inferentially, that law fixed at two
percent the realty tax that would accrue to a city or municipality.
F. CASSUS OMISSUS
Rule of Casus Omissus

The rule of “casus omissus pro omisso habendus est” can operate
and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly
established.

k. People vs. Manantan

F. STARE DECISIS
Doctrine of Stare Decisis

Under the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere, a point of law already
established will, generally, be followed by the same determining court and by all
courts of lower rank in subsequent cases where the same legal issue is raised.

- to promote stability in the law

- blind adherence to precedents, simply as precedent, no longer rules
- more important than anything for the court to be right so it may abandon any
doctrine found to be in violation of the law in force
F. STARE DECISIS
Doctrine of Stare Decisis

Stare Decisis et non quieta movere, which means to adhere to

precedents, and not to unsettle things, which are established.

l. Arnado vs. COMELEC

F. STARE DECISIS
Doctrine of Stare Decisis

Stare Decisis. Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has
been settled. Matters already decided on the merits cannot be
relitigated again and again.

l. JM Tuasan and Co., Inc. vs. Judge Gomez, et al.