KNOWLEDGE AND REALITY

Lecture IX
Nilanjan Das
[email protected]
 CONTENTS

• Free Will and Determinism

• The Argument for Incompatibilism
• Are We Free To Break The Laws?
• Rejecting the Ability Condition
• Asymmetrical Freedom
• A Final Challenge
FREE WILL AND DETERMINISM
 FREE WILL

If an agent exercises free will in her choices or actions, her

choices or actions are up to her.
 EXAMPLE 1

You face a choice between a blueberry muffin and a chocolate

muffin.
• You like both, but you can’t have both.
• You lean first towards one, then the other; you might even
wonder which one you will chose.
• Finally, you pick the blueberry muffin.
It seems you could have chosen the chocolate muffin.
 EXAMPLE 2

Every time you have to speak publicly, you get extremely scared.
• You say “umm” a lot.
• You flail your arms about excessively.
• Since English isn’t your first language, you make grammatical errors
that you wouldn’t otherwise make.
• You have noticed these patterns of behaviour, and have repeatedly tried
to correct them.
All your attempts have failed: you just can’t help it.
 THE INTUITION

In Example 1, you exercise free will; in Example 2, you

don’t. This seems to support:

The Ability Condition. If an action is/was up to an agent, then

she could do/could have done otherwise.
 DETERMINISM

According to determinism, the conjunction of the

physical laws and the state of the world at any time
t1 entails what the state of the world is at any time
t2.
 DETERMINISM (MORE CAREFULLY)

Suppose
• L is a proposition that describes the physical laws of the
world.
• S1 and S2 are two propositions that describe the states of the
physical world at any two times t1 and t2 respectively.
Then, the conjunction of L and S1 entails S2.
 TWO VIEWS

Compatibilism. Free will and determinism are

compatible.

Incompatibilism. Free will and determinism are

incompatible.
THE ARGUMENT FOR
INCOMPATIBILISM
 VAN INWAGEN’S CLAIM

If The Ability Condition is true, then

incompatibilism is true.
 A CASE OF FREE WILL

Yesterday, at the department meeting, we took a vote

on a proposal.
Since I was opposed to the proposal, I didn’t raise
my hand to vote in favour of it.
It seems to me that I did so freely to express my
sincerely held view.
 THE SETUP

Let t be the time at which I didn’t raise my hand. Suppose:

• L is the proposition that describes the physical laws.
• S0 is the proposition that describes the initial conditions of the
physical world.
• S describes the state of the physical world at t.
Since S is a comprehensive description of the world at t, it
entails that I don’t raise my hand at t.
 TWO BRIDGE PREMISES

Bridge Premise 1. If I were to raise my hand at t, then

S would be false (since S entails that I don’t raise my
hand at t).

Bridge Premise 2. If Bridge Premise 1 is true, then I

could raise my hand at t only if I could render S false.
 AN INTERMEDIATE CONCLUSION

Together, these two premises entail:

Conclusion 1. I could raise my hand at t only if I

could render S false.
 TWO MORE PREMISES

Bridge Premise 3. If I could render S false and the

conjunction of S0 and L entails S, then I could render
the conjunction of S0 and L false.

The Determinist Premise. The conjunction of S0

and L entails S.
 AN INTERMEDIATE CONCLUSION

Together these premises give us:

Conclusion 2. If I could render S false, then I could

render the conjunction of S0 and L false.
 A PLAUSIBLE ASSUMPTION

But I can neither influence the past, nor change the

physical laws. So,

The Inability Premise. I could not render the

conjunction of S0 and L false.
 AN INTERMEDIATE CONCLUSION

Combining this with Conclusion 2, we get:

Conclusion 3. I could not render S false.

 AN INTERMEDIATE CONCLUSION

But, according to Conclusion 1, I could raise my

hand only if I could render S false. So,

Conclusion 4. I could not raise my hand.

 CONNECTION WITH FREE WILL

• If I exercise free will in not raising my hand at t, it’s

up to me not to raise my hand at t.
• According to the Ability Condition, not raising my
hand can be up to me only if I could raise my hand at t.
• Given Conclusion 4, it follows that I don’t exercise free
will in not raising my hand at the department meeting.
 RECAP: STEP 1

Bridge Premise 1. If I were to raise my hand at t, then S would be

false (since S entails that I don’t raise my hand at t).

Bridge Premise 2. If Bridge Premise 1 is true, then I could raise

my hand at t only if I could render S false.
Therefore:
Conclusion 1. I could raise my hand only if I could render S false.
 RECAP: STEP 2

The Determinist Premise. The conjunction of S0 and L entails S.

Bridge Premise 3. If I could render S false, and the conjunction
of S0 and L entail S, then I could render the conjunction of S 0 and
L false.
Therefore:
Conclusion 2. If I could render S false, then I could render the
conjunction of S0 and L false.
 RECAP: STEP 3

Conclusion 2. If I could render S false, then I could

render the conjunction of S0 and L false.
The Inability Premise. I could not render the
conjunction of S0 and L false.
Therefore:
Conclusion 3. I could not render S false.
 RECAP: STEP 4

Conclusion 1. I could raise my hand only if I could

render S false.
Conclusion 3. I could not render S false.
Therefore:
Conclusion 4. I could not raise my hand.
 THE UPSHOT

Since this argument can be repeated for any action

(or choice) that putatively involves the exercise of
free will, it shows that free will (at least, when
understood in terms of ability to do otherwise) is
incompatible with determinism.
 THREE SALIENT RESPONSES

Option 1. Reject the Determinist Premise.

Option 2. Reject the Inability Premise.
Option 3. Reject the Ability Condition.
 OPTION 1

In order to reject the Determinist Premise, we would have

to reject determinism.
 OPTION 1

Quantum mechanics does provide some reason for thinking that

determinism is false.
(i) According to some interpretations of quantum mechanics, the
initial conditions of the physical world plus the laws don’t entail
what the physical world will be like later.
(ii) At best, the laws only determine a chance distribution over
possible states of the physical world given its initial conditions.
So, there is room for indeterminacy.
 OPTION 1

This doesn’t help.

• Indeterminacies appear to be only important at the
microscopic level. At the macroscopic level, the physical
world behaves as if determinism were true.
• When quantum mechanics rejects determinism, it replaces
it with randomness. But an action that involves the exercise
of free will isn’t random.
 OPTION 1

Upshot: Option 1 doesn’t work. Let’s explore the other

options.
ARE WE FREE TO BREAK THE
LAWS?
 OPTION 2

In order to reject the Inability Premise, we would have to

show that I am able to render false either the description of
the initial conditions of the universe, or the description of the
laws of nature.
 OPTION 2

Let’s suppose that I have no control over the initial

conditions of the universe. But am I able to render false the
description of the physical laws?

David Lewis says “Yes.”

 TWO WAYS OF BREAKING A LAW

I could render the description of the laws false in two ways:

Way 1. I could cause an event such that if it were to occur,
it would cause a law to be broken.
Way 2. I could cause an event such that if it were to
happen, a law would be broken.
Lewis thinks I can’t render the description of the laws false
in the first way, but I could do so in the second way.
 LEWIS ON ABILITY MODALS

For Lewis, any sentence of the form “I could v” is true iff

there is a nearby possibility (i.e., a hypothetical scenario
sufficiently similar to the actual world) where I v.
(i) I could lift this chair iff there is a nearby possibility
where I lift this chair.
(ii) I could fly iff there is a nearby possibility where I fly.
 WHY I CAN’T BREAK A LAW IN WAY 1

There is no nearby possibility where I cause an event such

that if it were to happen, it would cause the laws of physics
to break.
So, I am not able to cause an event which causes the laws of
physics to break.
Therefore, I couldn’t render the description of the physical
laws false in Way 1.
 WHY I CAN BREAK A LAW IN WAY 2

But there is a nearby possibility where the history of the

world almost exactly like the history of the actual world but
the laws of physics are different.
In this possibility, some time before t, the history of the
world in that nearby possibility could diverge from that of the
actual world, thereby allowing me raise my hand at t.
Given that there is such a possibility, I could indeed cause an
event such that if it were to happen, the laws of physics
would be false.
 UPSHOT

This effectively allows us to reject the Inability Premise.

But you might think this response is counterintuitive: there is

no ordinary sense of “could” in which I could render the
description of the physical laws of physics false.
REJECTING THE ABILITY
CONDITION
 OPTION 3

This leaves us with Option 3, i.e., the strategy of

rejecting the Ability Condition.

Along with a plausible assumption about the link

between free will and moral responsibility, the
Ability Condition seems to entail what Frankfurt
calls the Principle of Alternate Possibilities.
 MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

Moral Responsibility. An agent is morally responsible for

performing an action iff
(i) she deserves praise if the action is morally right, and goes
beyond what can be reasonably expected of that
person and 
(ii) she deserves blame if the action is morally wrong and the
agent has no acceptable excuse for performing the action.
 FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY

One might think there is a deep connection between moral

responsibility and free will.

Freedom and Moral Responsibility. If an agent is morally

responsible for an action, then she exercises free will in
performing that action.
 THE PRINCIPLE OF ALTERNATE
POSSIBILITIES

Now if the Ability Condition is true, we get what Frankfurt

calls:

The Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP). If an agent

is morally responsible for an action, then she could have
done otherwise.
 FRANKFURT’S CLAIM

Frankfurt shows that the Principle of Alternate Possibilities

is subject to counterexamples.
 FRANKFURT-STYLE CASES

Black is a brilliant American neurosurgeon and diehard

liberal.
While performing an operation on Jones to remove a brain
tumour, Black inserts a chip into Jones’s brain that allows
Black to monitor and control Jones’s activities, especially his
voting behaviour.
Jones doesn’t know this.
 FRANKFURT-STYLE CASES

• If Jones were to show any inclination to vote for Trump,

then Black, using the chip in Jones’s brain, would intervene
to ensure that he actually decides to vote for Clinton and
does so vote.
• But if Jones decides on his own to vote for Clinton, Black
does nothing but continue to monitor (without interference)
Jones’s head.
 FRANKFURT-STYLE CASES

Suppose Jones decides on his own to vote for Clinton. We

may say that Jones is morally responsible for this action. But
he couldn’t have done otherwise.
This is a counterexample to the Principle of Alternate
Possibilities.
 UPSHOT

Since the link between free will and moral responsibility is

difficult to deny, counterexamples to the Principle of
Alternate Possibilities should us give us reason to reject the
Ability Condition.
ASYMMETRICAL FREEDOM
 WOLF ON FREEDOM AND MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY

1. Wolf acknowledges that there is a condition of freedom

on moral responsibility. But she points out that this
condition doesn’t have the same shape for morally
praiseworthy and morally blameworthy actions.
2. It validates a restricted version of the Principle of
Alternate Possibilities for morally blameworthy actions
but not for morally praiseworthy ones.
 MORAL PRAISEWORTHINESS

According to Wolf,
• When an agent performs morally right actions for the right
reasons (and the actions go beyond what can reasonably
expected of the agent), they are morally praiseworthy.
• In such cases, even though the agent’s actions might be
psychologically determined by her character and other
motives, that doesn’t prevent her from being morally
responsible for the actions.
 MORAL PRAISEWORTHINESS

In such cases, the kind of freedom that is necessary for moral

responsibility only requires sensitivity to moral reasons. This
supports:

Freedom Condition 1. If a morally right action deserves moral

praise, then the agent could (and perhaps would) have acted
otherwise if there were sufficiently strong moral reasons for
performing some other action.
 MORAL BLAMEWORTHINESS

By contrast, when an agent performs a morally wrong action

and it’s clear to us that they couldn’t have acted in
accordance with the moral reasons, we don’t blame them.
This supports:

Freedom Condition 2. A morally wrong action deserves

moral blame only if the agent could have acted in
accordance with moral reasons.
 MORAL BLAMEWORTHINESS

The victim of the deprived childhood who, say, embezzles

some money, provides the most poignant example of all. For
this agent is not coerced nor overcome by an irresistible
impulse. He is in complete possession of normal adult
faculties of reason and observation. He seems, indeed, to
have as much control over his behavior as we have of ours.
He acts on the basis of his choice, and he chooses on the
basis of his reasons. If there is any explanation of why this
agent is not responsible, it would seem that it must consist
simply in the fact that his reasons are determined. (Wolf
1980, p. 155)
 A CONSEQUENCE

Note that Freedom Condition 2 yields a restricted version of

the Principle of Alternate Possibilities.

The Restricted Principle of Alternate Possibilities. If an

agent is morally responsible for a morally wrong action and
deserves moral blame for it, then she could have acted in
accordance with the moral reasons.
 PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERMINISM

Psychological Determinism. The motives that explain our

actions always are (partly) explainable in terms of physical
and psychological factors that are beyond our control.
 PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERMINISM

If psychological determinism is true, then we don’t have

control over whether or not we act on morally good motives.
So, according to the Restricted Principle of Alternate
Possibilities, we never deserve blame for morally wrong
actions!
That is bad.
 UPSHOT

It’s unclear if the strategy of rejecting the Ability Condition

succeeds.
We can still show that at least in the case of morally wrong
actions, the kind of freedom that is necessary for moral
responsibility is incompatible with psychological
determinism.
A FINAL CHALLENGE
 PEREBOOM’S CASES

We can turn this last point into a challenge for the

compatibilist.

I will borrow some cases from Derk Pereboom here.

 PEREBOOM’S CASES

Case 1. Mr. Green is like an ordinary human being, except

that he was created by neuroscientists. These scientists can
control him directly through the use of radio-like technology.
They manipulate Mr. Green to undertake a rationally egoistic
deliberative process that results in his having the desire to
kill Ms. Peacock (which he also reflectively endorses).
Acting on this desire, he kills Ms. Peacock.
 PEREBOOM’S CASES

Case 2. Mr. Green is like an ordinary human being, except

that he was created by neuroscientists. These scientists
cannot control him directly, but have programmed him to be
a rational egoist, so that, in any circumstances like those in
which he now finds himself, he is causally determined to
undertake a rationally egoistic deliberative process. This
process invariably causes him to have the desire to kill Ms.
Peacock. Acting on this desire, he kills Ms. Peacock.
 PEREBOOM’S CASES

Case 3. Mr. Green is an ordinary human being, except that he

was determined by the rigorous training practices of his
home and community to be a rational egoist. His training
took place at too early an age for him to have had the ability
to prevent or alter the practices that determined his character.
His training is such that in any circumstances like those in
which he now finds himself, he is causally determined to
undertake a rationally egoistic deliberative process. This
process invariably causes him to have the desire to kill Ms.
Peacock. Acting on this desire, he kills Ms. Peacock.
 PEREBOOM’S CASES

Case 4. Physical determinism is true. Mr. Green is a

rationally egoistic but (otherwise) ordinary human being,
raised in normal circumstances. Mr. Green engages in a
rationally egoistic deliberative process, which causes him to
form the desire to kill Ms. Peacock. Acting on this desire, he
kills Ms. Peacock.
 THE PROBLEM

It seems that in Cases 1-3, we don’t have the intuition that

Mr. Green is morally blameworthy, but he is morally
blameworthy in Case 4.

What explains this?

 PEREBOOM’S PUZZLE

The explanation cannot be that other agents are playing a role

in determining Mr. Green’s motives. For we could construct
versions of Cases 1-3, Mr. Green’s motives are conditioned
by a mindless machine.
 THE CHALLENGE

The challenge for the compatibilist is to explain how Case 4

is different from Cases 1-3.
 CONCLUSION

We have done three things:

• We looked at an argument given by van Inwagen for the
claim that free will and determinism are incompatible.
• We looked at two possible strategies for responding to it,
and shown that we can resolve the problem by rejecting the
Ability Condition.
 FURTHER READING

Lewis, David (1981). Are we free to break the laws?

Theoria 47 (3):113-21.
McKenna, M. (2016). Reasons-responsive theories
of freedom. In The Routledge Companion to Free
Will (pp. 49-62). Routledge.
Pereboom, Derk (1995). Determinism al dente. Noûs
29 (1):21-45.