PFMEA

How to Do
 Process FMEA
• Path 1: Team -- Scope -- Purpose
Identify Failure Modes
Effects -- Severity
Select / Manage Actions
• Path 2: Causes -- Occurrence
Select / Manage Actions
Paths 1-2-3 Special Characteristics
• Path 3: Process Controls
Assessing Risk
Select / Manage Actions
 Process FMEA -- Scope
• Create macro flow diagram

• Identify boundary for analysis

• Create micro flow diagram

• Confirm support team composition.

 Headlamp Assembly -- Macro

Assemble Bulb to 50
Assemble Bulb 10 Reflector
Holder
Bulb Test 60
Assemble Lens 20
to Reflector Assemble Rear Cover 70
Assemble Vertical
30
Trimmer to Reflector Photometric Test 80

Assemble Horizontal
Trimmer to Reflector 40
Load onto Pallet

Inspection Operation Storage Transportation

 Headlamp Assembly -- Micro

Op 30 - Assemble Vertical Trimmer to Reflector

Locate and fix (2 screws)
30.1
base plate to reflector

Insert nose and positively

locate pre-assembled 30.2
screw and spring

Visually inspect trimmer 30.3

assembly
 Process Purpose Statements
Potential
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
___ System

Scope Design Responsibility: FMEA Number:

___ Subsystem Page 1 of 1
Key Date:
___ Component Prepared by:
Model Year / Vehicle(s): FMEA Date ( Orig): (Rev)

Team
Core Team:
Process Action Results
Function Potential Potential S C Potential O Current D R Responsibility & S O D R
Failure Effect(s) e l Cause(s)/ c Design e P Recommended Target Actions e c e P
Mode of Failure v a Mechanisms c Controls t N Action(s) Completion Date Taken v c t N
s Failure u e
Requirements s r c
 Define Process Purpose
• What does the process do at this operation?

• Ensure that all process purposes are

considered.
 Micro Flow -- Process Purpose
Purpose
Locate and fix (2 screws) base plate • Locate base plate --
to reflector 30.1 correct orientation
• Secure 2 screws to
Insert nose and positively locate specified torque(1.2Nm)
pre-assembled screw and spring • Insert nose to correct
position per visual aid
30.2
Visually inspect trimmer assembly • Positively locate
screw/spring
sub-assembly
• Visually inspect (to
comply with part
30.3 drawing): screw, spring,
location, fixing
Determine What Can Go Wrong
Potential
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
___ System FMEA Number:
Design Responsibility:
___ Subsystem Page 1 of 1
Key Date:
___ Component Prepared by:
Model Year / Vehicle(s): FMEA Date ( Orig): (Rev)
Core Team:
Process Action Results
Function Potential Potential S C Potential O Current D R Responsibility & S O D R
Failure Effect(s) e l Cause(s)/ c Design e P Recommended Target Actions e c e P
Mode of Failure v a Mechanisms c Controls t N Action(s) Completion Date Taken v c t N
s Failure u e
Requirements s r c
 Potential Failure Modes
Potential
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
___ System FMEA Number:
Design Responsibility:
___ Subsystem Page 1 of 1
Key Date:
___ Component Prepared by:
Model Year / Vehicle(s): FMEA Date ( Orig): (Rev)
Core Team:
Action Results
Item Potential Potential S C Potential O Current D R Responsibility & S O D R
Failure Effect(s) e l Cause(s)/ c Design e P Recommended Target Actions e c e P
Mode of Failure v a Mechanisms c Controls t N Action(s) Completion Date Taken v c t N
Function s Failure u e
s r c

Function
1

Function
2

Potential Failure Modes:

• No Function
• Partial Function
Function
n
• Intermittent Function
• Unintended Function
 Potential Failure Modes
• Are the ways in which a Process can fail to
achieve its purpose, these are listed below:

• PURPOSE NOT ACHIEVED

PURPOSE ACHIEVED BUT AT A
•
DEGRADED LEVEL OVER TIME
• PURPOSE PARTIALLY ACHIEVED
•
PURPOSE ACHIEVED BUT
IN EXCESS OF INTENT
 Potential Failure Modes
• Are the ways in which a Process can fail to
achieve its purpose, these are listed below:

• PROCESS PURPOSE INTERMITTENTLY

ACHIEVED

• UNINTENDED PURPOSE ACHIEVED

•
 Process Purpose and Potential
Failure Modes
Purpose: Secure 2 screws to specified torque (1.2Nm)

Failure Mode Type Potential Failure Mode

Purpose not achieved Screws not fitted / torqued to 1·2Nm

Screws fitted but torqued to a

lower value over time (Degraded)
Purpose partially
achieved
Screws fitted and over torqued (Over)
 Process Purpose and Potential
Failure Modes
Purpose: Secure 2 screws to specified torque (1.2Nm)

Failure Mode Type Potential Failure Mode

Purpose intermittently Screws sometimes fitted / torqued to
achieved 1·2Nm

Unintended purpose X
achieved
 Potential Effects of
Failure Modes
Potential
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
___ System FMEA Number:
Design Responsibility:
___ Subsystem Page 1 of 1
Key Date:
___ Component Prepared by:
Model Year / Vehicle(s): FMEA Date ( Orig): (Rev)
Core Team:
Process Action Results
Function Potential Potential S C Potential O Current D R Responsibility & S O D R
Failure Effect(s) e l Cause(s)/ c Design e P Recommended Target Actions e c e P
Mode of Failure v a Mechanisms c Controls t N Action(s) Completion Date Taken v c t N
s Failure u e
Requirements s r c
 Potential Effects of
Failure Modes
Potential
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
___ System FMEA Number:
Design Responsibility:
___ Subsystem Page 1 of 1
Key Date:
___ Component Prepared by:
Model Year / Vehicle(s): FMEA Date ( Orig): (Rev)
Core Team:
Action Results
Item Potential Potential S C Potential O Current D R Responsibility & S O D R
Failure Effect(s) e l Cause(s)/ c Design e P Recommended Target Actions e c e P
Mode of Failure v a Mechanisms c Controls t N Action(s) Completion Date Taken v c t N
Function s Failure u e
s r c
Failure
Mode 1
Function
1
Failure
Mode n

Potential Effects of Failure Modes:

Function
2 • Operator Safety
• Next user
• Downstream User
Function
n
• Vehicle operation
• Customer (Internal and End User)
• Government Regulations
 Potential Effects of Failure
Purpose: Secure 2 screws to specified torque (1.2Nm)

Operator Next Downstream Vehicle Ultimate Government

Safety Operation Operations Operation Customer Regulations
Op30.1 Op30.2 Op40 Car Driver XYZ

One or None None Repair / Headlamp Visibility Non-

More Rework may not impaired compliance
Screws be able at night
Not Fully to be and in fog
Secured adjusted or
maintain
adjustment
 Process FMEA -- Severity
Potential
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
___ System FMEA Number:
Design Responsibility:
___ Subsystem Page 1 of 1
Key Date:
___ Component Prepared by:
Model Year / Vehicle(s): FMEA Date ( Orig): (Rev)
Core Team:
Process Action Results
Function Potential Potential S C Potential O Current D R Responsibility & S O D R
Failure Effect(s) e l Cause(s)/ c Design e P Recommended Target Actions e c e P
Mode of Failure v a Mechanisms c Controls t N Action(s) Completion Date Taken v c t N
s Failure u e
Requirements s r c
Suggested Severity Evaluation Criteria
 PFMEA Path 1-- Actions
Potential
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
___ System FMEA Number:
Design Responsibility:
___ Subsystem Page 1 of 1
Key Date:
___ Component Prepared by:
Model Year / Vehicle(s): FMEA Date ( Orig): (Rev)
Core Team:
Process Action Results
Function Potential Potential S C Potential O Current D R Responsibility & S O D R
Failure Effect(s) e l Cause(s)/ c Design e P Recommended Target Actions e c e P
Mode of Failure v a Mechanisms c Controls t N Action(s) Completion Date Taken v c t N
s Failure u e
Requirements s r c
 Select and Manage Actions

To Reduce: Consider This Action: To Accomplish This:

Severity Change the design … or Eliminate failure

the process if operator mode(s) ...
safety is involved ...
 Process FMEA Path 2
Potential
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
___ System FMEA Number:
Design Responsibility:
___ Subsystem Page 1 of 1
Key Date:
___ Component Prepared by:
Model Year / Vehicle(s): FMEA Date ( Orig): (Rev)
Core Team:
Process Action Results
Function Potential Potential S C Potential O Current D R Responsibility & S O D R
Failure Effect(s) e l Cause(s)/ c Design e P Recommended Target Actions e c e P
Mode of Failure v a Mechanisms c Controls t N Action(s) Completion Date Taken v c t N
s Failure u e
Requirements s r c
 Assumptions for Cause
• Assume that in-coming parts are correct.
• What would cause the operation to fail in
this manner?

• Consider sources of in-coming variation.

• What would cause the operation to fail in
this manner?
 Process FMEA -- Causes
Potential
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
___ System FMEA Number:
Design Responsibility:
___ Subsystem Page 1 of 1
Key Date:
___ Component Prepared by:
Model Year / Vehicle(s): FMEA Date ( Orig): (Rev)
Core Team:
Action Results
Item Potential Potential S C Potential O Current D R Responsibility & S O D R
Failure Effect(s) e l Cause(s)/ c Design e P Recommended Target Actions e c e P
Mode of Failure v a Mechanisms c Controls t N Action(s) Completion Date Taken v c t N
Function s Failure u e
s r c

Failure
Mode 1
Function
1
Failure
Mode n

Function
2
WHY?
Function
n
 Sentencing Technique
Consequence of the failures
Outcome of the Failures happening  Folding Not work
 Less Gap  Intended function fail
 Inoperative  Customer annoyance
 Noise

Could result in Effect

Failure
Mode Due to

Cause

Reason for the failure

 Base step height less / improper Assy
 Wiring interchange / intermittent failure
 Improper Assy / less gap / part Problem
 Process FMEA -- Occurrence
Potential
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
___ System FMEA Number:
Design Responsibility:
___ Subsystem Page 1 of 1
Key Date:
___ Component Prepared by:
Model Year / Vehicle(s): FMEA Date ( Orig): (Rev)
Core Team:
Process Action Results
Function Potential Potential S C Potential O Current D R Responsibility & S O D R
Failure Effect(s) e l Cause(s)/ c Design e P Recommended Target Actions e c e P
Mode of Failure v a Mechanisms c Controls t N Action(s) Completion Date Taken v c t N
s Failure u e
Requirements s r c
Suggested Occurrence Evaluation Criteria
 Recommended Actions
Potential
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
___ System FMEA Number:
Design Responsibility:
___ Subsystem Page 1 of 1
Key Date:
___ Component Prepared by:
Model Year / Vehicle(s): FMEA Date ( Orig): (Rev)
Core Team:
Process Action Results
Function Potential Potential S C Potential O Current D R Responsibility & S O D R
Failure Effect(s) e l Cause(s)/ c Design e P Recommended Target Actions e c e P
Mode of Failure v a Mechanisms c Controls t N Action(s) Completion Date Taken v c t N
s Failure u e
Requirements s r c
 Select and Manage Actions

To Reduce: Consider This Action: To Accomplish This:

Severity Change the design ... or Eliminate failure

the process if operator mode(s) ...
safety is involved ...

Occurrence Change the design or Prevent cause(s), or

process ... reduce their rate of
occurrence
 Process FMEA -- Path 3
Potential
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
___ System FMEA Number:
Design Responsibility:
___ Subsystem Page 1 of 1
Key Date:
___ Component Prepared by:
Model Year / Vehicle(s): FMEA Date ( Orig): (Rev)
Core Team:
Process Action Results
Function Potential Potential S C Potential O Current D R Responsibility & S O D R
Failure Effect(s) e l Cause(s)/ c Design e P Recommended Target Actions e c e P
Mode of Failure v a Mechanisms c Controls t N Action(s) Completion Date Taken v c t N
s Failure u e
Requirements s r c
 Process Controls - in order of merit -
should seek to ...
• 1. Prevent cause from occurring, or reduce
rate of occurrence (Type A)
• 2. Detect cause and lead to corrective actions
(Type B)
• 3. Detect failure mode. (Type C)
 Process FMEA -- Detection
Potential
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
___ System FMEA Number:
Design Responsibility:
___ Subsystem Page 1 of 1
Key Date:
___ Component Prepared by:
Model Year / Vehicle(s): FMEA Date ( Orig): (Rev)
Core Team:
Process Action Results
Function Potential Potential S C Potential O Current D R Responsibility & S O D R
Failure Effect(s) e l Cause(s)/ c Design e P Recommended Target Actions e c e P
Mode of Failure v a Mechanisms c Controls t N Action(s) Completion Date Taken v c t N
s Failure u e
Requirements s r c
Suggested Detection Evaluation Criteria
Suggested Detection Evaluation Criteria
 Assessing Risk
• Severity (S)
• Severity x Occurrence (S x O)
• Severity x Occurrence x Detection
(S x O x D) = Risk Priority Number (RPN)
 Recommended Actions
Potential
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
___ System FMEA Number:
Design Responsibility:
___ Subsystem Page 1 of 1
Key Date:
___ Component Prepared by:
Model Year / Vehicle(s): FMEA Date ( Orig): (Rev)
Core Team:
Process Action Results
Function Potential Potential S C Potential O Current D R Responsibility & S O D R
Failure Effect(s) e l Cause(s)/ c Design e P Recommended Target Actions e c e P
Mode of Failure v a Mechanisms c Controls t N Action(s) Completion Date Taken v c t N
s Failure u e
Requirements s r c
 Select and Manage Actions

To Reduce: Consider This Action: To Accomplish This:

Severity Change the design ... or Eliminate failure

the process if operator mode(s) ...
safety is involved ...

Occurrence Change the design or Prevent cause(s), or

process ... reduce their rate of
occurrence

Detection Add or improve the Improve ability to

control methods ... detect a failure
mode ...
 Future Actions
Potential
___ System
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
FMEA Number:
___ Subsystem Page 1 of 1
___ Component Design Responsibility:
Key Date: Prepared by:
Model Year / Vehicle(s): / FMEA Date ( Orig): (Rev)
Core Team:

Process
Action Results
Function Potential Potential S C Potential O Current D R Responsibility & S O DR
Failure Effect(s) e l Cause(s)/ c Process e P Recommended Target Actions e c e P
Mode of Failure v a Mechanisms c Controls t N Action(s) Completion Date Taken v c t N
s Failure u e
Requirements s r c

Action Results
Actions S O D R
Taken e c e P
v c t N
 What is Different in 4th Edition
• Controls: In Current Process Controls, Prevention
and Detection have been introduced.
– Prevention: Prevent the cause/mechanism of failure
or the Failure mode from occurring or reduce their
rate of occurrence.
• e.g: In Plastic moulding of ABS, pre-heating is required to get
streak free product, so pre-heating @ 80 deg for 2 hrs will
prevent streaks. This needs to be displayed in WI & Control
Plan
– Detection: Detect the cause/mechanism of failure or
the failure mode, and lead to corrective action(s).
• e.g: For Streaks, a visual first off inspection is required and a
process sampling check needs to be done.
What is Different in 4th Edition
 Potential Failure Mode And Effects
Analysis
• Assessment of Risk, Occurrence & Detection:
• Severity, Occurrence & Detection can be rated based on the
guidelines given in PFMEA manual
• These 3 are not dependent to each other
• Severity rating:
– Extent of the effect of the Failure Mode
– Can’t be changed unless there’s an improvement in Design
• Occurrence rating:
– Extent of the occurrence of the failure mode / causes
– Can be reduced by Process improvements
• Detection rating:
– Extent of the possibility of detecting the Failure mode / Cause
– Can be reduced by doing MSA, Increasing frequency of inspection
etc...
PFMEA – Key Things to be Considered
• Process Characteristics mentioned in PFD are the
Causes of the Failure mode
• Identification of Effects of Failure mode at Next
Process, Assy., Customer, End User & Environment
• Updation of PFMEA whenever an 8D report is raised
• Shall have a PERFECT link with PFD.
• Opposite of failure mode shall be a Product
Characteristics in PFD.
• Identification of 3 Types of controls
» Type A – Detection of Failure Mode
» Type B – Detection of Cause
» Type C – Prevention of Cause
 Lesson:

Attack Cause instead of Detection of

Failure Modes. Don’t just wait for the
problems to Occur.
Thank You