REPUBLIC VS. HON.

EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL
G.R. No. 84645 March 19, 1993
220 SCRA 124
REPUBLIC VS. HON. EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL

FACTS:

The heirs of the deceased of the January 22, 1987 Mendiola massacre together
with those injured (Caylao group), instituted the petition, seeking the reversal and
setting aside of the orders of respondent Judge Sandoval (May 31 and Aug 8, 1988) in
"Erlinda Caylao, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, et al." which dismissed the case
against the Republic of the Philippines.
The massacre was the culmination of eight days and seven nights of
encampment by members of the militant Kilusang Magbubukid sa Pilipinas (KMP) at the
then Ministry (now Department) of Agrarian Reform (MAR) at the Philippine Tobacco
Administration Building along Elliptical Road in Diliman, Quezon City.
The farmers and their sympathizers presented their demands for what they
called "genuine agrarian reform". The KMP, led by its national president, Jaime Tadeo,
presented their problems and demands, among which were: (a) giving lands for free to
farmers; (b) zero retention of lands by landlords; and (c) stop amortizations of land
payments.
 Task Force Nazareno under the command of Col. Cesar Nazareno was
deployed at the vicinity of Malacaang. The civil disturbance control units of the
Western Police District under Police Brigadier General Alfredo S. Lim were also
activated. The government anti-riot forces were assembled at Mendiola in a
formation of three phalanges.
The marchers, at around 4:30 p.m., numbered about 10,000 to 15,000.
From C.M. Recto Avenue, they proceeded toward the police lines. No dialogue
took place between the marchers and the anti-riot squad. It was at this moment
that a clash occurred and, borrowing the words of the Commission
"pandemonium broke loose".
After the clash, twelve (12) marchers were officially confirmed dead,
although according to Tadeo, there were thirteen (13) dead, but he was not able
to give the name and address of said victim. Thirty-nine (39) were wounded by
gunshots and twelve (12) sustained minor injuries, all belonging to the group of
the marchers.
 REPUBLIC VS. HON. EDILBERTO G.
SANDOVAL (CONT.)
President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 11 on January 22, 1987, which created the
Citizens' Mendiola Commission. for the "purpose of conducting an investigation of the disorder, deaths, and
casualties that took place in the vicinity of Mendiola Bridge and Mendiola Street and Claro M. Recto
Avenue, Manila, in the afternoon of January 22, 1987".
From the results of the probe, the Commission recommended:
1. the criminal prosecution of four unidentified, uniformed individuals, shown either on tape or in pictures, firing
at the direction of the marchers.
2. that the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) be tasked to undertake investigations regarding the identities of
those who actually fired their guns that resulted in the death of or injury to the victims of the incident.
3. The Commission also suggested that all the commissioned officers of both the Western Police District and the
INP Field Force, who were armed during the incident, be prosecuted for violation of paragraph 4(g) of Section
13, Batas Pambansa Blg. 880, the Public Assembly Act of 1985. The Commission's recommendation also
included the prosecution of the marchers, for carrying deadly or offensive weapons, but whose identities have
yet to be established.
4. The last and the most significant recommendation of the Commission was for the deceased and wounded
victims of the Mendiola incident to be compensated by the government. It was this portion that
petitioners (Caylao group) invoke in their claim for damages from the government.
 REPUBLIC VS. HON. EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL
(CONT.)
Notwithstanding such recommendation, no concrete form of
compensation was received by the victims. Petitioners (Caylao group) were
constrained to institute an action for damages against the Republic of the
Philippines, together with the military officers, and personnel involved in the
Mendiola incident, before the trial court. The complaint was docketed as
Civil Case No. 88-43351 (Erlinda Caylao, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines,
et al.)
The SG filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the State cannot
be sued without its consent. Petitioners opposed maintaining that the State
has waived its immunity from suit and that the dismissal of the instant action
is contrary to both the Constitution and the International Law on Human
Rights.
Respondent Judge Sandoval dismissed the complaint as against the
Republic of the Philippines on the ground that there was no waiver by the
 REPUBLIC VS. HON. EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL
(CONT.)

Issue:
Whether or not the State has waived its
immunity from suit?
 REPUBLIC VS. HON. EDILBERTO G.
SANDOVAL (CONT.)
Ruling:
This is not a suit against the State with its consent.
First, the recommendation made by the Commission to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased and the victims does not in any way mean that liability
attaches to the State. AO 11 merely states the purpose of the creation of the
Commission and, therefore, whatever is the finding of the Commission only
serves as the basis for a cause of action in the event any party decides to
litigate the same. This is precisely the essence of it being a fact-finding body.
Thus, the recommendation of the Commission does not in any way bind the
State.
Second, whatever acts or utterances that then President Aquino may
have done or said, the same are not tantamount to the State having waived its
immunity from suit. The President's act of joining the marchers, days after the
incident, does not mean that there was an admission by the State of any
 REPUBLIC VS. HON. EDILBERTO G.
SANDOVAL (CONT.)

Third, the case does not qualify as a suit against the State.
Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are:
When the Republic is sued by name;
When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency;
When the, suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is
such that ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the
government.
The State cannot be made liable because the military/police officers
who allegedly were responsible for the death and injuries suffered by the
ROGELIO ABERCA, ET. AL.
VS. MAJ. GEN. FABIAN
VER, ET. AL.
G.R. No. L-69866 April 15, 1988
 ABERCA VS VER

FACTS:
Task Force Makabansa (TFM) was ordered by
General Fabian Ver to conduct pre-emptive strikes
against Communist-Terrorist underground houses. TFM raided
several houses, employing in most cases defectively judicial
search warrants, that during these raids:
certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of
purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs;
that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the
courts;
that for some period after their arrest, they were denied visits of
relatives and lawyers;
that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and
counsel;
that military men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and
other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory
information or confessions and in order to punish them;
that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a
concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and
incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and
punish them, said plans being previously known to and sanctioned by
defendants.
Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory, moral, and
exemplary damages; and attorney's fees.
A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, stating
that
1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry about
their detention because the writ of habeas corpus
was suspended;
2) 2) defendants are immune from liability for acts
done in their official duties;
3) there was no cause of action.
 On Nov 8, 1983, Judge Fortun granted the
motion to dismiss, which prompted plaintiffs to file a MR on
Nov 18, 1983. He later inhibited himself and was replaced
Judge Lising, who denied the MR for being filed out of
time. Another MR was filed, and was only modified to
include Maj. Aguinaldo and MSgt. Balaba for officers
accountable in the said complaint.
The motion to set aside and reconsider the Resolution
of dismissal was denied. Hence, petitioners filed the
instant petition for certiorari on seeking to annul and set
aside the respondent court's resolution.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not immunity from suit may be invoked?
(No)
2. Whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal
searches conducted by military personnel and other
violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution?(No)
3. Whether the superior officers who gave the orders are
liable? (Yes)
Ruling:
1. NO. The court find respondents' invocation of the
doctrine of state immunity from suit totally
misplaced. The cases invoked by respondents actually
involved acts done by officers in the performance of
official duties within the ambit of their powers.
It may be that the respondents, as members of AFP,
were merely responding to their duty, as they claim, "to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection,
rebellion and subversion" in accordance with Proclamation
No. 2054 of President Marcos.
But this cannot be construed as a blanket license or a
roving commission untrammeled by any constitutional
restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and
liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and
protected by the Constitution.
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private
individual who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be
liable to the latter for damages..
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public
officer or employee or any private individual liable in
damages for violating the Constitutional rights and
liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not
exempt the respondents from responsibility.
2. NO.
The court does not find merit in respondents'
suggestion that plaintiffs' cause of action is barred by
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
The court find merit in petitioners' contention that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for
damages for illegal arrest and detention and other
violations of their constitutional rights.
 The suspension does not render valid an
otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is
suspended is merely the right of the individual to
seek release from detention through the writ of
habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his
liberty.
3. YES.
Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person
'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of
the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus,
it is not the actor alone who must answer for damages
under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has
also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the
aggrieved party.
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE VS. MANALO
G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008
 SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE VS. MANALO

FACTS:
Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by
military men belonging to the CAFGU on the suspicion that they
were members and supporters of the NPA. The brothers were
repeatedly beaten and tortured and questioned about their
knowledge of the NPA. After 18 months of detention and torture, the
brothers escaped on August 13, 2007.
Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition,
Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order to stop the military
officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and
other basic rights.
While the said case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
took effect on October 24, 2007. The Manalos subsequently filed a
manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing petition as
amparo petition.
The CA granted the privilege of the writ of amparo. The CA
ordered the Sec. of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP
to furnish the Manalos and the court with all official and unofficial
investigation reports as to the Manalos custody, confirm the present
places of official assignment of two military officials involved, and
produce all medical reports and records of the Manalo brothers
while under military custody. The Sec. of National Defense and the
Chief of Staff of the AFP appealed to the SC seeking to reverse and
set aside the decision promulgated by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the privilege of the Writ of
Amparo was properly given? (Yes)
RULING:
Yes. The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition in
the recommendations that resulted from a two-day National Consultative
Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances sponsored
by the Court on July 16-17, 2007. First time that the Supreme Court exercised
its expanded power in the 1987 Constitution to promulgate rules to protect
the peoples constitutional rights.
Amparo literally means protection in Spanish. Coverage of which
is confined to: extralegal killings (killings committed without due process of
the law) and enforced disappearances (an arrest, detention or abduction by
the government; refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts
places him outside the protection of the law ). It Provides for swift relief
because of the summary nature of its proceedings. Only substantial
evidence is required.
 The writ of ampar is built into the guarantees of the right to life
and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the
right to security of person under Article III, Section 2. Protection
includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the
government apparatus to extend protection to victims of ELKs and
EDs as well as their families.
The continuing threat on the life of the Manalo brothers is
apparent. There is still a threat to the life, liberty, and a violation of their
right to security because their captors, whom they escaped from, still
remain at large. This threat vitiates their free will because they are
forced to limit their movements and activities. Threats to liberty,
security, and life are actionable through a petition for a writ of
amparo.
In sum, we conclude that respondents right to
security as freedom from threat is violated by
the apparent threat to their life, liberty and
security of person. Their right to security as a
guarantee of protection by the government is
likewise violated by the ineffective investigation
and protection on the part of the military.
THANK YOU!
Legine S. Ramayla
Reporter
LlB II