EN BANC

[G.R. No. 147780. May 10, 2001.]

PANFILO LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO and CESAR O.

MANCAO, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ,
P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO MENDOZA, and P/SR. SUPT.
REYNALDO BERROYA, respondents.

[G.R. No. 147781. May 10, 2001.]

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. ANGELO REYES,

SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, ET AL., respondents.

[G.R. No. 147799. May 10, 2001.]

RONALDO A. LUMBAO, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY HERNANDO

PEREZ, GENERAL DIOMEDIO VILLANUEVA, P/DIR. LEANDRO
MENDOZA and P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO BERROYA ,
respondents.

[G.R. No. 147810. May 10, 2001.]

THE LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO, petitioner, vs.

THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SECRETARY HERNANDO
PEREZ, THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENERAL
DIOMEDIO VILLANUEVA, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE,
and DIRECTOR GENERAL LEANDRO MENDOZA, respondents.

RESOLUTION

MELO, J : p

On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an "angry and

violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones
and other deadly weapons" assaulting and attempting to break into
Malacañang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of
rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issued General Order
No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police to suppress the rebellion in the National Capital Region.
Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the
"rebellion" were thereafter effected. TaEIcS

Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a "state of

rebellion," which allegedly gave a semblance of legality to the arrests, the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2023 cdasiaonline.com
 following four related petitions were filed before the Court —
(1) G.R. No. 147780 for prohibition, injunction, mandamus, and habeas
corpus (with an urgent application for the issuance of temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction) filed by Panfilo M. Lacson,
Michael Ray B. Aquino, and Cezar O. Mancao; (2) G.R. No. 147781 for
mandamus and/or review of the factual basis for the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, with prayer for a temporary
restraining order filed by Miriam Defensor-Santiago; (3) G.R. No. 147799 for
prohibition and injunction with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or restraining order filed by Ronaldo A. Lumbao; and (4) G.R. No. 147810
for certiorari and prohibition filed by the political party Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino.
All the foregoing petitions assail the declaration of a state of rebellion
by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the warrantless arrests allegedly
effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact and in law.
Significantly, on May 6, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting
of the declaration of a "state of rebellion" in Metro Manila. Accordingly, the
instant petitions have been rendered moot and academic. As to petitioners'
claim that the proclamation of a "state of rebellion" is being used by the
authorities to justify warrantless arrests, the Secretary of Justice denies that
it has issued a particular order to arrest specific persons in connection with
the "rebellion." He states that what is extant are general instructions to law
enforcement officers and military agencies to implement Proclamation No.
38. Indeed, as stated in respondents' Joint Comments:
[I]t is already the declared intention of the Justice Department
and police authorities to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the
courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001 which
means that preliminary investigations will henceforth be conducted.
(Comment, G.R. No. 147780, p. 28; G.R. No. 147781, p. 18; G.R.
No. 147799, p. 16; G.R. No. 147810, p. 24)

With this declaration, petitioners' apprehensions as to warrantless arrests

should be laid to rest.
In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort
to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the circumstances so warrant.
The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the
declaration of a "state of rebellion."
Moreover, petitioners' contention in G.R. No. 147780 (Lacson Petition ),
147781 (Defensor-Santiago Petition ), and 147799 (Lumbao Petition ) that
they are under imminent danger of being arrested without warrant do not
justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies of mandamus and
prohibition, since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest is not without
adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. Such an individual may ask
for a preliminary investigation under Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, where
he may adduce evidence in his defense, or he may submit himself to inquest
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2023 cdasiaonline.com
 proceedings to determine whether or not he should remain under custody
and correspondingly be charged in court. Further, a person subject of a
warrantless arrest must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities within
the periods provided in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, otherwise the
arresting officer could be held liable for delay in the delivery of detained
persons. Should the detention be without legal ground, the person arrested
can charge the arresting officer with arbitrary detention. All this is without
prejudice to his filing an action for damages against the arresting officer
under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Verily, petitioners have a surfeit of other
remedies which they can avail themselves of, thereby making the prayer for
prohibition and mandamus improper at this time (Sections 2 and 3, Rule 65,
Rules of Court).
Aside from the foregoing reasons, several considerations likewise
inevitably call for the dismissal of the petitions at bar.
CAScIH

G.R. No. 147780

In connection with their alleged impending warrantless arrest,
petitioners Lacson, Aquino, and Mancao pray that the "appropriate court
before whom the informations against petitioners are filed be directed to
desist from arraigning and proceeding with the trial of the case, until the
instant petition is finally resolved." This relief is clearly premature
considering that as of this date, no complaints or charges have been filed
against any of the petitioners for any crime. And in the event that the same
are later filed, this Court cannot enjoin criminal prosecution conducted in
accordance with the Rules of Court, for by that time any arrest would have
been in pursuance of a duly issued warrant.
As regards petitioners' prayer that the hold departure orders issued
against them be declared null and void ab initio, it is to be noted that
petitioners are not directly assailing the validity of the subject hold departure
orders in their petition. They are not even expressing intention to leave the
country in the near future. The prayer to set aside the same must be made
in proper proceedings initiated for that purpose.
Anent petitioners' allegations ex abundante ad cautelam in support of
their application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, it is manifest
that the writ is not called for since its purpose is to relieve petitioners from
unlawful restraint (Ngaya-an v. Balweg, 200 SCRA 149 [1991]), a matter
which remains speculative up to this very day.
G.R. No. 147781
The petition herein is denominated by petitioner Defensor-Santiago as
one for mandamus. It is basic in matters relating to petitions for mandamus
that the legal right of the petitioner to the performance of a particular act
which is sought to be compelled must be clear and complete. Mandamus will
not issue unless the right to relief is clear at the time of the award (Palileo v.
Ruiz Castro , 85 Phil. 272). Up to the present time, petitioner Defensor-
Santiago has not shown that she is in imminent danger of being arrested
without a warrant. In point of fact, the authorities have categorically stated
that petitioner will not be arrested without a warrant.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2023 cdasiaonline.com
 G.R. No. 147799
Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the People's Movement against Poverty
(PMAP), for his part, argues that the declaration of a "state of rebellion" is
violative of the doctrine of separation of powers, being an encroachment on
the domain of the judiciary which has the constitutional prerogative to
"determine or interpret" what took place on May 1, 2001, and that the
declaration of a state of rebellion cannot be an exception to the general rule
on the allocation of the governmental powers.
We disagree. To be sure, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution
expressly provides that "[t]he President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of
all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he
may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion . . ." Thus, we held in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v.
Hon. Zamora, (G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000):
. . . The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not
easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters
considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors
which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of
textual standards that the court may use to judge necessity,
information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove
unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be
difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many
instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that
there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not
constituting technical proof.
On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a
vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be
classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In
the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be
imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of
human lives and mass destruction of property. . . .
(at pp. 22-23)

The Court, in a proper case, may look into the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the exercise of this power. However, this is no longer feasible at this
time, Proclamation No. 38 having been lifted.
G.R. No. 147810
Petitioner Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino is not a real party-in-
interest. The rule requires that a party must show a personal stake in the
outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a
favorable decision so as to warrant an invocation of the court's jurisdiction
and to justify the exercise of the court's remedial powers in his behalf ( KMU
Labor Center v. Garcia, Jr ., 239 SCRA 386 [1994]). Here, petitioner has not
demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify resort to the Court.
Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to
be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders,
members, and supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2023 cdasiaonline.com
 detention for the crime of rebellion. Every action must be brought in the
name of the party whose legal right has been invaded or infringed, or whose
legal right is under imminent threat of invasion or infringement. HITAEC

At best, the instant petition may be considered as an action for

declaratory relief, petitioner claiming that its right to freedom of expression
and freedom of assembly is affected by the declaration of a "state of
rebellion" and that said proclamation is invalid for being contrary to the
Constitution.
However, to consider the petition as one for declaratory relief affords
little comfort to petitioner, this Court not having jurisdiction in the first
instance over such a petition. Section 5[1], Article VIII of the Constitution
limits the original jurisdiction of the Court to cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are hereby
DISMISSED. However, in G.R. No. 147780, 147781, and 147799,
respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlier
adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons
acting for and in their behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting petitioners
therein without the required judicial warrant for all acts committed in relation
to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacañang.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Mendoza, Panganiban and Gonzaga-
Reyes, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, Buena, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., are on leave.
Vitug, J., please see separate opinion.
Kapunan and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., see dissenting opinion.
Panganiban, J., join the dissent of J. Kapunan.

Separate Opinions
VITUG, J.:

I concur insofar as the resolution enjoins any continued warrantless

arrests for acts related to, or connected with, the May 1st incident but
respectfully dissent from the order of dismissal of the petitions for being said
to be moot and academic. The petitions have raised important constitutional
issues that, in my view, must likewise be fully addressed.

KAPUNAN, J., dissenting:

The right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been

characterized as belonging "in the catalog of indispensable freedoms."
Among deprivation of rights, none is so effective in cowing a
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2023 cdasiaonline.com
 population, crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in
every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and
most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government.
And one need only briefly to have dwelt and worked among a people
possessed of many admirable qualities but deprived of these rights to
know that the human personality deteriorates and dignity and self-
reliance disappear where homes, persons and possessions are subject
at any hour to unheralded search and seizure by the police. 1

Invoking the right against unreasonable searches and seizures,

petitioners Panfilo Lacson, Michael Ray Aquino and Cezar O. Mancao II now
seek a temporary restraining order and/or injunction from the Court against
their impending warrantless arrests upon the order of the Secretary of
Justice. 2 Petitioner Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), likewise, seeks to
enjoin the arrests of its senatorial candidates, namely, Senator Juan Ponce-
Enrile, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Senator Gregorio B. Honasan and
General Panfilo Lacson. 3 Separate petitioners were also filed by Senator
Juan Ponce Enrile, 4 Former Ambassador Ernesto M. Maceda, 5 Senator
Miriam Defensor-Santiago, 6 Senator Gregorio B. Honasan, 7 and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). 8
Briefly, the order for the arrests of these political opposition leaders
and police officers stems from the following facts:
On April 25, 2001, former President Joseph Estrada was arrested upon
the warrant issued by the Sandiganbayan in connection with the criminal
case for plunder filed against him. Several hundreds of policemen were
deployed to effect his arrest. At the time, a number of Mr. Estrada's
supporters, who were then holding camp outside his residence in Greenhills
Subdivision, sought to prevent his arrest. A skirmish ensued between them
and the police. The police had to employ batons and water hoses to control
the rock-throwing pro-Estrada rallyists and allow the sheriffs to serve the
warrant. Mr. Estrada and his son and co-accused, Mayor Jinggoy Estrada,
were then brought to Camp Crame where, with full media coverage, their
fingerprints were obtained and their mug shots taken.
Later that day, and on the succeeding days, a huge gathered at the
EDSA Shrine to show its support for the deposed President. Senators Enrile,
Santiago, Honasan, opposition senatorial candidates including petitioner
Lacson, as well as other political personalities, spoke before the crowd
during these rallies.
In the meantime, on April 28, 2001, Mr. Estrada and his son were
brought to the Veterans Memorial Medical Center for a medical check-up. It
was announced that from there, they would be transferred to Fort Sto.
Domingo in Sta. Rosa, Laguna.
In the early morning of May 1, 2001, the crowd at EDSA decided to
march to Malacañang Palace. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) was
called to reinforce the Philippine National Police (PNP) to guard the premises
of the presidential residence. The marchers were able to penetrate the
barricades put up by the police at various points leading to Mendiola and
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2023 cdasiaonline.com
 were able to reach Gate 7 of Malacañang. As they were being dispersed with
warning shots, tear gas and water canons, the rallyists hurled stones at the
police authorities. A melee erupted. Scores of people, including some
policemen, were hurt.
At noon of the same day, after the crowd in Mendiola had been
dispersed, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 38
declaring a "state of rebellion" in Metro Manila:
Presidential Proclamation No. 38
DECLARING STATE OF REBELLION IN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL
REGION
WHEREAS, the angry and violent mob, armed with explosives,
firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons, in
great part coming from the mass gathering at the EDSA Shrine, and
other armed groups, having been agitated and incited and, acting upon
the instigation and under the command and direction of known and
unknown leaders, have and continue to assault and attempt to break
into Malacañang with the avowed purpose of overthrowing the duly
constituted Government and forcibly seize power, and have and
continue to rise publicly, shown open hostility, and take up arms
against the duly constituted Government for the purpose of removing
from the allegiance to the Government certain bodies of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, and to
deprive the President of the Republic of the Philippines, wholly and
partially, of her powers and prerogatives which constitute the
continuing crime of rebellion punishable under Article 134 of the
Revised Penal Code; cIADaC

WHEREAS, armed groups recruited by known and unknown

leaders, conspirators, and plotters have continue (sic) to rise publicly
by the use of arms to overthrow the duly constituted Government and
seize political power;
WHEREAS, under Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution,
whenever necessary, the President as the Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces of the Philippines, may call out such armed forces to
suppress the rebellion;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of

the powers vested in me by law hereby recognize and confirm the
existence of an actual and on-going rebellion compelling me to declare
a state of rebellion;
In view of the foregoing, I am issuing General Order No. 1 in
accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution calling upon
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National police
to suppress and quell the rebellion.
City of Manila, May 1, 2001.

The President likewise issued General Order No. 1 which reads:

GENERAL ORDER NO. 1
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2023 cdasiaonline.com
 DIRECTING THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE TO SUPPRESS THE REBELLION IN THE
NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION
WHEREAS, the angry and violent mob, armed with explosives,
firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons, in
great part coming from the mass gathering at the EDSA Shrine, and
other armed groups, having been agitated and incited and, acting upon
the instigation and under the command and direction of known and
unknown leaders, have and continue to assault and attempt to break
into Malacañang with the avowed purpose of overthrowing the duly
constituted Government and forcibly seize political power, and have
and continue to rise publicly, show open hostility, and take up arms
against the duly constituted Government certain bodies of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, and to
deprive the President of the Republic of the Philippines, wholly and
partially, of her powers and prerogatives which constitute the
continuing crime of rebellion punishable under Article 134 of the
Revised Penal Code;
WHEREAS, armed groups recruited by known and unknown
leaders, conspirators, and plotters have continue (sic ) to rise publicly
by the use of arms to overthrow the duly constituted Government and
seize political power;

WHEREAS, under Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution,

whenever necessary, the President as the Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces of the Philippines, may call out such armed forces to
suppress the rebellion; DHIaTS

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of

the powers vested in me under the Constitution as President of the
Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces
of the Philippines and pursuant to Proclamation No. 38, dated May 1,
2001, do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine national police to suppress and quell the rebellion.

I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the

Philippines and the Chief of the Philippine National Police and the
officers and men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police to immediately carry out the necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and quell the rebellion
with due regard to constitutional rights.

City of Manila, May 1, 2001.

Pursuant to the proclamation, several key leaders of the opposition

were ordered arrested. Senator Enrile was arrested without warrant in his
residence at around 4:00 in the afternoon. Likewise arrested without warrant
the following day was former Ambassador Ernesto Maceda. Senator Honasan
and Gen. Lacson were also ordered arrested but the authorities have so far
failed to apprehend them. Ambassador Maceda was temporarily released
upon recognizance while Senator Ponce Enrile was ordered released by the
Court on cash bond.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2023 cdasiaonline.com

 The basic issue raised by the consolidated petitions is whether the
arrest or impending arrest without warrant, pursuant to a declaration of
"state of rebellion" by the President of the above-mentioned persons and
unnamed other persons similarly situated suspected of having committed
rebellion is illegal, being unquestionably a deprivation of liberty and violative
of the Bill of Rights under the Constitution.
The declaration of a "state of rebellion" is supposedly based on Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution which reads:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may
call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public
safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days,
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight
hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or
in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at
least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may
revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be
set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress if the
invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours
following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with
its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon
within thirty days from its filing.
ECaSIT

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the

Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on
military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to
function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to
persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or
directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person

thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days,
otherwise he shall be released.

Section 18 grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, the power to

call out the armed forces in cases of (1) lawless violence, (2) rebellion and
(3) invasion. 9 In the latter two cases, i.e., rebellion or invasion, the President
may, when public safety requires, also (a) suspend the privilege of the writ
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2023 cdasiaonline.com
 o f habeas corpus, or (b) place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law. However, in the exercise of this calling out power as
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, the Constitution does not require
the President to make a declaration of a "state of rebellion" (or, for that
matter, of lawless violence or invasion). The term "state of rebellion" has no
legal significance. It is vague and amorphous and does not give the President
more power than what the Constitution says, i. e, whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. As Justice Mendoza observed during the
hearing of this case, such a declaration is "legal surplusage." But whatever
the term means, it cannot diminish or violate constitutionally-protected
rights, such as the right to due process, 10 the rights to free speech and
peaceful assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances, 11
and the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, 12 among others.
In Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, et al., 13 the Court held
that:
. . . [T]he distinction (between the calling out power, on one
hand, and the power to suspend the privilege of the write of habeas
corpus and to declare martial law, on the other hand) places the calling
out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law
and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped
together the three powers and provided for their revocation and review
without any qualification. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

xxx xxx xxx

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the
aforementioned powers highlights the intent to grant the President the
widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the "calling out" power
because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power
compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the
curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual
freedoms, and thus necessitating affirmation by Congress and, in
appropriate cases, review by this Court.

On the other hand, if the motive behind the declaration of a "state of

rebellion" is to arrest persons without warrant and detain them without bail
and, thus, skirt the Constitutional safeguards for the citizens' civil liberties,
the so called "state of rebellion" partakes the nature of martial law without
declaring it as such. It is a truism that a law or rule may itself be fair or
innocuous on its face, yet, if it is applied and administered by public
authority with an evil eye so as to practically make it unjust and oppressive,
it is within the prohibition of the Constitution. 14 In an ironic sense, a "state
of rebellion" declared as a subterfuge to effect warrantless arrest and
detention for an unbailable offense places a heavier burden on the people's
civil liberties than the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and the declaration of martial law because in the latter case, built-in
safeguards are automatically set on motion: (1) The period for martial law or
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2023 cdasiaonline.com
 suspension is limited to a period not exceeding sixty day; (2) The President is
mandated to submit a report to Congress within forty-eight hours from the
proclamation or suspension; (3) The proclamation or suspension is subject to
review by Congress, which may revoke such proclamation or suspension. If
Congress is not in session, it shall convene in 24 hours without need for call;
and (4) The sufficiency of the factual basis thereof or its extension is subject
to review by the Supreme Court in an appropriate proceeding. 15
No right is more fundamental than the right to life and liberty. Without
these rights, all other individual rights may not exist. Thus, the very first
section in our Constitution's Bill of Rights, Article III, reads:
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws.

And to assure the fullest protection of the right, more especially

against government impairment, Section 2 thereof provides:
SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. TIEHSA

Indeed, there is nothing in Section 18 which authorizes the President or

any person acting under her direction to make unwarranted arrests. The
existence of "lawless violence, invasion or rebellion" only authorizes the
President to call out the "armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion."
Not even the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
or the declaration of martial law authorizes the President to order the arrest
of any person. The only significant consequence of the suspension of the writ
o f habeas corpus is to divest the courts of the power to issue the writ
whereby the detention of the person is put in issue. It does not by itself
authorize the President to order the arrest of a person. And even then, the
Constitution in Section 18, Article VII makes the following qualifications:
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to
persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or
directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person
thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days,
otherwise he shall be released.

In the instant case, the President did not suspend the writ ofhabeas
corpus. Nor did she declare martial law. A declaration of a "state of
rebellion," at most, only gives notice to the nation that it exists, and that the
armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it, as in fact she did.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2023 cdasiaonline.com
 Such declaration does not justify any deviation from the Constitutional
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.
As a general rule, an arrest may be made only upon a warrant issued
by a court. In very circumscribed instances, however, the Rules of Court
allow warrantless arrests. Section 5, Rule 113 provides:
SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful . — A police
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has

committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

xxx xxx xxx

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest
police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with
section 7 of Rule 112.

It must be noted that the above are exceptions to the constitutional

norm enshrined in the Bill of Rights that a person may only be arrested on
the strength of a warrant of arrest issued by a "judge" after determining
"personally" the existence of "probable cause" after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Its
requirements should, therefore, be scrupulously met:
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable
seizure of his body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic
and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions to
the requirement of warrants of arrests is strictly construed. Any
exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a
warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by
the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without
warrant or extend its application beyond the cases specifically
provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set
back a basic right so often violated and so deserving of full protection.
16

A warrantless arrest may be justified only if the police officer had facts
and circumstances before him which, had they been before a judge, would
constitute adequate basis for a finding of probable cause of the commission
of an offense and that the person arrested is probably guilty of committing
the offense. That is why the Rules of Criminal Procedure require that when
arrested, the person "arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense" in the presence of the arresting officer. Or
if it be a case of an offense which had "just been committed," that the police
officer making the arrest "has personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it."
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2023 cdasiaonline.com
 Petitioners were arrested or sought to be arrested without warrant for
acts of rebellion ostensibly under Section 5 of Rule 113. Respondents' theory
is based on Umil vs. Ramos, 17 where this Court held:
The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance
thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assault against the
State and are in the nature of continuing crimes. 18

Following this theory, it is argued that under Section 5(a), a person

who "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit"
rebellion and may be arrested without a warrant at any time so long as the
rebellion persists.
Reliance on Umil is misplaced. The warrantless arrests therein,
although effected a day or days after the commission of the violent acts of
petitioners therein, were upheld by the Court because at the time of their
respective arrests, they were members of organizations such as the
Communist Party of the Philippines, the New Peoples Army and the National
United Front Commission, then outlawed groups under the Anti-Subversion
Act. Their mere membership in said illegal organizations amounted to
committing the offense of subversion 19 which justified their arrests without
warrants.
In contrast, it has not been alleged that the persons to be arrested for
their alleged participation in the "rebellion" on May 1, 2001 are members of
an outlawed organization intending to overthrow the government. Therefore,
to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5(a), there must be a showing
that the persons arrested or to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing or is attempting to commit the offense of rebellion. 20 In other
words, there must be an overt act constitutive of rebellion taking place in
the presence of the arresting officer. In United States vs. Samonte, 21 the
term" in his [the arresting officer's] presence" was defined thus:
An offense is said to be committed in the presence or within the
view of an arresting officer or private citizen when such officer or
person sees the offense, even though at a distance, or hears the
disturbance created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene
thereof; or the offense is continuing, or has not been consummated, at
the time the arrest is made. 22

This requirement was not complied with particularly in the arrest of

Senator Enrile. In the Court's Resolution of May 5, 2001 in the petition for
habeas corpus filed by Senator Enrile, the Court noted that the sworn
statements of the policemen who purportedly arrested him were hearsay. 23
Senator Enrile was arrested two (2) days after he delivered allegedly
seditious speeches. Consequently, his arrest without warrant cannot be
justified under Section 5(b) which states that an arrest without a warrant is
lawful when made after an offense has just been committed and the
arresting officer or private person has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person arrested has
committed the offense.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2023 cdasiaonline.com
 At this point, it must be stressed that apart from being inapplicable to
the cases at bar, Umil is not without any strong dissents. It merely re-
affirmed Garcia-Padilla vs . Enrile, 24 a case decided during the Marcos
martial law regime. 25 It cannot apply when the country is supposed to be
under the regime of freedom and democracy. The separate opinions of the
following Justices in the motion for reconsideration of said case 26 are
apropos:
FERNAN, C.J., concurring and dissenting:
Secondly, warrantless arrests may not be allowed if the arresting
officers are not sure what particular provision of law had been violated
by the person arrested. True it is that law enforcement agents and
even prosecutors are not all adept at the law. However, erroneous
perception, not to mention ineptitude among their ranks, especially if it
would result in the violation of any right of a person, may not be
tolerated. That the arrested person has the "right to insist during the
pre-trial or trial on the merits" (Resolution, p. 18) that he was
exercising a right which the arresting officer considered as contrary to
law, is beside the point. No person should be subjected to the ordeal of
a trial just because the law enforcers wrongly perceived his action. 27
(Emphasis supplied)

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring and dissenting opinion

Insofar as G.R. No. 81567 is concerned, I join the other dissenting
Justices in their observations regarding "continuing offenses." To base
warrantless arrests on the doctrine of continuing offense is to give a
license for the illegal detention of persons on pure suspicion. Rebellion,
insurrection, or sedition are political offenses where the line between
overt acts and simple advocacy or adherence to a belief is extremely
thin. If a court has convicted an accused of rebellion and he is found
roaming around, he may be arrested. But until a person is proved
guilty, I fail to see how anybody can jump to a personal conclusion that
the suspect is indeed a rebel and must be picked up on sight whenever
seen. The grant of authority in the majority opinion is too broad. If
warrantless searches are to be validated, it should be Congress and not
this Court which should draw strict and narrow standards. Otherwise,
the non-rebels who are critical, noisy, or obnoxious will be
indiscriminately lumped up with those actually taking up arms against
the Government.

The belief of law enforcement authorities, no matter how well-

grounded on past events, that the petitioner would probably shoot
other policemen whom he may meet does not validate warrantless
arrests. I cannot understand why the authorities preferred to bide their
time. await the petitioner's surfacing from underground, and ounce on
him with no legal authority instead of securing warrants of arrest for
his apprehension. 28 (Underscoring supplied)

CRUZ, J., concurring and dissenting:

I submit that the affirmation by this Court of the Garcia-Padilla
decision to justify the illegal arrests made in the cases before us is a
step back to that shameful past when individual rights were wantonly
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2023 cdasiaonline.com
 and systematically violated by the Marcos dictatorship. It seems some
of us have short memories of that repressive regime, but I for one am
not one to forget so soon. As the ultimate defender of the Constitution,
this Court should not gloss over the abuses of those who, out of
mistaken zeal, would violate individual liberty in the dubious name of
national security. Whatever their ideology and even if it be hostile to
ours, the petitioners are entitled to the protection of the Bill of Rights,
no more and no less than any other person in this country. That is what
democracy is all about. 29 (Underscoring supplied)

FELICIANO, J., concurring and dissenting:

12. My final submission, is that, the doctrine of "continuing
crimes," which has its own legitimate function to serve in our criminal
law jurisprudence, cannot be invoked for weakening and dissolving the
constitutional guarantee against warrantless arrest. Where no overt
acts comprising all or some of the elements of the offense charged are
shown to have been committed by the person arrested without
warrant, the "continuing crime" doctrine should not be used to dress up
the pretense that a crime, begun or committed elsewhere, continued
to be committed by the person arrested in the presence of the
arresting officer. The capacity for mischief of such a utilization of the
"continuing crimes" doctrine, is infinitely increased where the crime
charged does not consist of unambiguous criminal acts with a definite
beginning and end in time and space (such as the killing or wounding
of a person or kidnapping and illegal detention or arson) but rather of
such problematic offenses as membership in or affiliation with or
becoming a member of, a subversive association or organization. For
in such cases, the overt constitutive acts may be morally neutral in
themselves, and the unlawfulness of the acts a function of the aims or
objectives of the organization involved. Note, for instance, the following
acts which constitute prima facie evidence of "membership in any
subversive association:" ESDcIA

a) Allowing himself to be listed as a member in any book or any

of the lists, records, correspondence, or any other document of the
organization;

b) Subjecting himself to the discipline of such or association or

organization in any form whatsoever;
c) Giving financial contribution to such association or
organization in dues, assessments, loans or in any other forms;
xxx xxx xxx
f) Conferring with officers or other members of such association
or organization in furtherance of any plan or enterprise thereof ;
xxx xxx xxx
g) Preparing documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, or any other
type of publication to promote the objectives and purposes of such
association or organization;
xxx xxx xxx
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2023 cdasiaonline.com
 k) Participating in any way in the activities, planning action,
objectives, or purposes of such association or organization.
It may well be, as the majority implies, that the constitutional
rule against warrantless arrests and seizures makes the law
enforcement work of police agencies more difficult to carry out. It is not
our Court's function, however, and the Bill of Rights was not designed,
to make life easy for police forces but rather to protect the liberties of
private individuals. Our police forces must simply learn to live with the
requirements of the Bill of Rights, to enforce the law by modalities
which themselves comply with the fundamental law. Otherwise they
are very likely to destroy, whether through sheer ineptness or excess
of zeal, the very freedoms which make our policy worth protecting and
saving. 30 (Underscoring supplied)

It is observed that a sufficient period has lapsed between the fateful

day of May 1, 2001 up to the present. If respondents have ample evidence
against petitioners, then they should forthwith file the necessary criminal
complaints in order that the regular procedure can be followed and the
warrants of arrest issued by the courts in the normal course. When
practicable, resort to the warrant process is always to be preferred because
"it interposes an orderly procedure involving 'judicial impartiality' whereby a
neutral and detached magistrate can make informed and deliberate
determination on the issue of probable cause." 31
The neutrality, detachment and independence that judges are
supposed to possess is precisely the reason the framers of the 1987
Constitution have reposed upon them alone the power to issue warrants of
arrest. To vest the same to a branch of government, which is also charged
with prosecutorial powers, would make such branch the accused's adversary
and accuser, his judge and jury. 32
A declaration of a state of rebellion does not relieve the State of its
burden of proving probable cause. The declaration does not constitute a
substitute for proof. It does not in any way bind the courts, which must still
judge for itself the existence of probable cause. Under Section 18, Article VII,
the determination of the existence of a state of rebellion for purposes of
proclaiming martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus rests for which the President is granted ample, though not
absolute, discretion. Under Section 2, Article III, the determination of
probable cause is a purely legal question of which courts are the final
arbiters.
Justice Secretary Hernando Perez is reported to have announced that
the lifting of the "state of rebellion" on May 7, 2001 does not stop the police
from making warrantless arrests. 33 If this is so, the pernicious effects of the
declaration on the people's civil liberties have not abated despite the lifting
thereof. No one exactly knows who are in the list or who prepared the list of
those to be arrested for alleged complicity in the "continuing" crime of
"rebellion" defined as such by executive fiat. The list of the perceived
leaders, financiers and supporters of the "rebellion" to be arrested and
incarcerated could expand depending on the appreciation of the police. The
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2023 cdasiaonline.com
 coverage and duration of effectivity of the orders of arrest are thus so open-
ended and limitless as to place in constant and continuing peril the people's
Bill of Rights. It is of no small significance that four of the petitioners are
opposition candidates for the Senate. Their campaign activities have been to
a large extent immobilized. If the arrests and orders of arrest against them
are illegal, then their Constitutional right to seek public office, as well as the
right of the people to choose their officials, is violated.
In view of the transcendental importance and urgency of the issues
raised in these cases affecting as they do the basic liberties of the citizens
enshrined in our Constitution, it behooves us to rule thereon now, instead of
relegating the cases to trial courts which unavoidably may come up with
conflicting dispositions, the same to reach this Court inevitably for final
ruling. As we aptly pronounced in Salonga vs. Cruz Paño: 34
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the
symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of
protection given by constitutional guarantees.

Petitioners look up in urgent supplication to the Court, considered the

last bulwark of democracy, for relief. If we do not act promptly, justly and
fearlessly, to whom will they turn to?
WHEREFORE, I vote as follows:

(1) Give DUE COURSE to and GRANT the petitions;

(2) Declare as NULL and VOID the orders of arrest issued against
petitioners;
(3) Issue a WRIT OF INJUNCTION enjoining respondents, their
agents and all other persons acting for and in their behalf
from effecting warrantless arrests against petitioners and all
other persons similarly situated on the basis of Proclamation
No. 38 and General Order No. 1 of the President.
SO ORDERED.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., dissenting:

The exercise of certain powers by the President in an atmosphere of

civil unrest may sometimes raise constitutional issues. If such powers are
used arbitrarily and capriciously, they may degenerate into the worst form of
despotism.
It is on this premise that I express my dissent.
The chain of events which led to the present constitutional crisis are as
follows:
On March 2, 2001, the Supreme Court rendered the landmark decision
that would bar further questions on the legitimacy of Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo's presidency. 1 In a unanimous decision, the Court declared that
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2023 cdasiaonline.com
 Joseph Ejercito Estrada had effectively resigned his post and that Macapagal-
Arroyo is the legitimate President of the Philippines. Estrada was stripped of
all his powers and presidential immunity from suit.
Knowing that a warrant of arrest may at any time be issued against
Estrada, his loyalists rushed to his residence in Polk Street, North Greenhills
Subdivision, San Juan, Metro Manila. They conducted vigil in the vicinity
swearing that no one can take away their "president."
Then the dreadful day for the Estrada loyalists came.
On April 25, 2001, the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan issued
warrants of arrest against Estrada, his son Jinggoy, Charlie "Atong" Ang,
Edward Serapio, Yolanda Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, Eleuterio Tan and Delia
Rajas. 2 Emotions ran high as an estimated 10,000 Estrada loyalists, ranging
from tattooed teenagers of Tondo to well-heeled Chinese, gathered in
Estrada's neighborhood. 3 Supporters turned hysterical. Newspapers
captured pictures of raging men and wailing women. 4 When policemen
came, riots erupted. Police had to use their batons as well as water hoses to
control the rock-throwing Estrada loyalists. 5
It took the authorities about four hours to implement the warrant of
arrest. At about 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, Philippine
National Police (PNP) Chief, Director General Leandro R. Mendoza, with the
aid of PNP's Special Action Force and reinforcements from the Philippine
Army and Marines, implemented the warrant of arrest against Estrada. 6
Like a common criminal, Estrada was fingerprinted and had his mug
shots taken at the detention center of the former Presidential Anti-Organized
Task Force at Camp Crame. The shabby treatment, caught on live TV
cameras nationwide, had sparked off a wave of protest all over the country.
Even international news agencies like CNN and BBC were appalled over the
manner of Estrada's arrest calling it "overkill." In a taped message aired over
radio and television, Estrada defended himself and said, "I followed the rule
of law to the letter. I asked our people now to tell the powers to respect our
constitution and the rule of law."
Being loyal to the end, the supporters of Estrada followed him to Camp
Crame. About 3,000 of them massed up in front of the camp. They were
shouting "Edsa Three! Edsa Three! They vowed not to leave the place until
Estrada is released. When asked how long they planned to stay, the
protesters said, "Kahit isang buwan, kahit isang taon." 7
At about 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon, also of the same day, the PNP's
anti-riot squads dispersed them. Thus, they proceeded to the Edsa Shrine in
Mandaluyong City where they joined forces with hundreds more who came
from North Greenhills. 8 Hordes of Estrada loyalists began gathering at the
historic shrine.
On April 27, 2001, the crowd at Edsa begun to swell in great
magnitude. Estrada loyalists from various sectors, most of them obviously
belonging to the "masses," brought with them placards and streamers
denouncing the manner of arrest done to the former president. 9 In the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2023 cdasiaonline.com
 afternoon, buses loaded with loyalists from the nearby provinces arrived at
the Edsa Shrine. One of their leaders said that the Estrada supporters will
stay at Edsa Shrine until the former president gets justice from the present
administration. 10
An estimated 1,500 PNP personnel from the different parts of the
metropolis were deployed to secure the area. 11 On April 28, 2001, the PNP
and the Armed Forces declared a "nationwide red alert." 12 Counter-
intelligence agents checked on possible defectors from the military top
officials. Several senators were linked to an alleged junta plot.
During the rally, several Puwersa Ng Masa candidates delivered
speeches before the crowd. Among those who showed up at the rally were
Senators Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Gregorio Honasan, Juan Ponce Enrile,
Edgardo Angara, Vicente Sotto and former PNP Director General Panfilo
Lacson and former Ambassador Ernesto Maceda. 13
On April 30, 2001, the government started to prepare its forces. A
2,000-strong military force backed up by helicopter gunships, Scorpion tanks
and armored combat vehicles stood ready to counter any attempt by
Estrada loyalists to mount a coup. And to show that it meant business, the
task force parked two MG-520 attack helicopters armed to the teeth with
rockets on the parade ground at Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City. Also
deployed were two armored personnel carriers and troops in camouflage
uniforms. 14 Over 2,500 soldiers from the army, navy, and air force were
formed into Task Force Libra to quell the indignant Estrada loyalists. 15
On May 1, 2001, at about 1:30 o'clock in the morning, the huge crowd
at Edsa started their march to Malacañang. 16 Along the way, they overran
the barricades set up by the members of the PNP Crowd Dispersal Control
Management. 17
Shortly past 5:00 o'clock in the morning of the same day, the marchers
were at the gates of Malacañang chanting, dancing, singing and waving
flags. 18
At around 10:00 o'clock in the morning, the police, with the assistance
of combat-ready soldiers, conducted dispersal operations. Some members of
the dispersal team were unceasingly firing their high-powered firearms in the
air, while the police, armed with truncheons and shields, were slowly pushing
the protesters away from the gates of Malacañang. Television footages
showed protesters hurling stones and rocks on the advancing policemen,
shouting invectives against them and attacking them with clubs. They
burned police cars, a motorcycle, three pick-ups owned by a television
station, construction equipment and a traffic police outpost along Mendiola
Street. 19 They also attacked Red Cross vans, destroyed traffic lights, and
vandalized standing structures. Policemen were seen clubbing protesters,
hurling back stones, throwing teargas under the fierce midday sun, and firing
guns towards the sky. National Security Adviser Roilo Golez said the Street
had to be cleared of rioters at all costs because " this is like an arrow, a
dagger going all the way to (Malacañang) Gate 7." 20
Before noontime of that same day, the Estrada loyalists were driven
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2023 cdasiaonline.com
 away.
The violent street clashes prompted President Macapagal-Arroyo to
place Metro Manila under a "state of rebellion." Presidential Spokesperson
Rigoberto Tiglao told reporters, " We are in a state of rebellion. This is not an
ordinary demonstration. " 21 After the declaration, there were threats of
arrests against those suspected of instigating the march to Malacañang.
At about 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was
arrested in his house in Dasmariñas Village, Makati City by a group led by
Reynaldo Berroya, Chief of the Philippine National Police Intelligence Group.
22 Thereafter, Berroya and his men proceeded to hunt re-electionist Senator
Gregorio Honasan, former PNP Chief Panfilo Lacson, former Ambassador
Ernesto Maceda, Brig. Gen. Jake Malajakan, Senior Superintendents Michael
Ray Aquino and Cesar Mancao II, Ronald Lumbao and Cesar Tanega of the
People's Movement Against Poverty (PMAP).] 23 Justice Secretary Hernando
Perez said that he was "studying" the possibility of placing Senator Miriam
Defensor — Santiago "under the Witness protection program."
Director Victor Batac, former Chief of the PNP Directorate for Police
Community Relations, and Senior Superintendent Diosdado Valeroso, of the
Philippine Center for Transnational Crime, surrendered to Berroya. Both
denied having plotted the siege.
On May 2, 2001, former Ambassador Ernesto Maceda was arrested.
The above scenario presents three crucial queries: First, is President
Macapagal-Arroyo's declaration of a "state of rebellion" constitutional?
Second , was the implementation of the warrantless arrests on the basis of
the declaration of a "state of rebellion" constitutional? And third, did the
rallyists commit rebellion at the vicinity of Malacañang Palace on May 1,
2001?
The first and second queries involve constitutional issues, hence, the
basic yardstick is the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines. The third query
requires a factual analysis of the events which culminated in the declaration
of a state of rebellion; hence, an examination of Article 134 of the
Revised Penal Code is in order.
On May 7, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No.
39, "DECLARING THAT THE STATE OF REBELLION IN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL
REGION HAS CEASED TO EXIST", which in effect has lifted the previous
Proclamation No. 38.
I beg to disagree with the majority opinion in ruling that the instant
petitions have been rendered moot and academic with the lifting by the
President of the declaration of a "state of rebellion".
I believe that such lifting should not render moot and academic the
very serious and unprecedented constitutional issues at hand, considering
their grave implications involving the basic human rights and civil liberties of
our people. A resolution of these issues becomes all the more necessary
since, as reported in the papers, there are saturation drives (sonas) being
conducted by the police wherein individuals in Metro Manila are picked up
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2023 cdasiaonline.com
 without warrants of arrest.
Moreover, the acts sought to be declared illegal and unconstitutional
are capable of being repeated by the respondents. In Salva v. Makalintal
(G.R. No. 132603, Sept. 18, 2000), this Court held that "courts will decide a
question otherwise moot and academic if it is 'capable of repetition, yet
evading review' . . ."
I & II — President Macapagal-Arroyo's
declaration of a "state of rebellion" and the
implementation of the warrantless arrests
premised on the said declaration are
unconstitutional.
Nowhere in the Constitution can be found a provision which grants
upon the executive the power to declare a "state of rebellion," much more,
to exercise on the basis of such declaration the prerogatives which a
president may validly do under a state of martial law. President Macapagal-
Arroyo committed a constitutional short cut. She disregarded the clear
provisions of the Constitution which provide:
"SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of
all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary,
he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when
the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight
hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a
report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting
jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or
special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of
the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety
requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours

following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with
its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding

filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual bases of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon
within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the

Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on
military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to
function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2023 cdasiaonline.com
 The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to
persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or
directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person
thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days,
otherwise he shall be released." 24

Obviously, the power of the President in cases when she assumed the
existence of rebellion is properly laid down by the Constitution. I see no
reason or justification for the President's deviation from the concise and
plain provisions. To accept the theory that the President could disregard the
applicable statutes, particularly that which concerns arrests, searches and
seizures, on the mere declaration of a "state of rebellion" is in effect to place
the Philippines under martial law without a declaration of the executive to
that effect and without observing the proper procedure. This should not be
countenanced. In a society which adheres to the rule of law, resort to extra-
constitutional measures is unnecessary where the law has provided
everything for any emergency or contingency. For even if it may be proven
beneficial for a time, the precedent it sets is pernicious as the law may, in a
little while, be disregarded again on the same pretext but for evil purposes.
Even in time of emergency, government action may vary in breath and
intensity from more normal times, yet it need not be less constitutional. 25
My fear is rooted in history. Our nation had seen the rise of a dictator
into power. As a matter of fact, the changes made by the 1986
Constitutional Commission on the martial law text of the Constitution were to
a large extent a reaction against the direction which the Supreme Court took
during the regime of President Marcos. 26 Now, if this Court would take a
liberal view, and consider that the declaration of a "state of rebellion" carries
with it the prerogatives given to the President during a "state of martial law,"
then, I say, the Court is traversing a very dangerous path. It will open the
way to those who, in the end, would turn our democracy into a totalitarian
rule. History must not be allowed to repeat itself. Any act which gears
towards possible dictatorship must be severed at its inception.
The implementation of warrantless arrests premised on the declaration
of a "state of rebellion" is unconstitutional and contrary to existing laws. The
Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizure of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized." 27 If a state of martial law "does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative
assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts
and agencies over civilians, where civil courts are able to function, nor
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ, " 28(a) then it is with more
reason, that a mere declaration of a state of rebellion could not bring about
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2023 cdasiaonline.com
 the suspension of the operation of the Constitution or of the writ of habeas
corpus.
Neither can we find the implementation of the warrantless arrests
justified under the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Pertinent is Section
5, Rule 113, thus:
"SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

xxx xxx xxx."

Petitioners cannot be considered "to have committed, is actually

committing, or is attempting to commit an offense" at the time they were
hunted by Berroya for the implementation of the warrantless arrests. None
of them participated in the riot which took place in the vicinity of the
Malacañang Palace. Some of them were on their respective houses
performing innocent acts such as watching television, resting etc. The sure
fact however is that they were not in the presence of Berroya. Clearly, he did
not see whether they had committed, were committing or were attempting
to commit the crime of rebellion. But of course, I cannot lose sight of the
legal implication of President Macapagal-Arroyo's declaration of a "state of
rebellion." Rebellion is a continuing offense and a suspected insurgent or
rebel may be arrested anytime as he is considered to be committing the
crime. Nevertheless, assuming ex gratia argumenti that the declaration of a
state of rebellion is constitutional, it is imperative that the said declaration
be reconsidered. In view of the changing times, the dissenting opinion of the
noted jurist, Justice Isagani Cruz, in Umil v. Ramos, 28 quoted below must be
given a second look.
"I dissent insofar as the ponencia affirms the ruling in Garcia-
Padilla vs. Enrile that subversion is a continuing offense, to justify the
arrest without warrant of any person at any time as long as the
authorities say he has been placed under surveillance on suspicion of
the offense. That is a dangerous doctrine. A person may be arrested
when he is doing the most innocent acts, as when he is only washing
his hands, or taking his supper, or even when he is sleeping, on the
ground that he is committing the 'continuing' offense of subversion.
Libertarians were appalled when that doctrine was imposed during the
Marcos regime. I am alarmed that even now this new Court is willing to
sustain it. I strongly urge my colleagues to discard it altogether as one
of the disgraceful vestiges of the past dictatorship and uphold the rule
guaranteeing the right of the people against unreasonable searches
and seizures. We can do no less if we are really to reject the past
oppression and commit ourselves to the true freedom. Even if it be
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2023 cdasiaonline.com
 argued that the military should be given every support in our fight
against subversion, I maintain that that fight must be waged
honorably, in accordance with the Bill of Rights. I do not believe that in
fighting the enemy we must adopt the ways of the enemy, which are
precisely what we are fighting against. I submit that our more
important motivation should be what are we fighting for."

I need not belabor that at the time some of the suspected instigators
were arrested, (the others are still at-large), a long interval of time already
passed and hence, it cannot be legally said that they had just committed an
offense. Neither can it be said that Berroya or any of his men had "personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the persons to be arrested have
committed a crime." That would be far from reality.
III — The acts of the rallyists at the vicinity of
Malacañang Palace on May 1, 2001 do not
constitute rebellion.
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
"ARTICLE 134. Rebellion or insurrection — How committed. —
The crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly
and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing
from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the
Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land,
naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the
Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives."
(As amended by RA No. 6968, O.G. 52, p. 9864, 1990)

From the foregoing provisions, the elements of the crime of rebellion

may be deduced, thus: first, that there be (a) public uprising and (b) taking
arms against the government; second, that the purpose of the uprising or
movement is either (a) to remove from the allegiance to said government or
its laws (1) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or (2) any
body of land, naval or other armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief
Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or
prerogatives. 29
Looking at the events on a magnified scale, I am convinced that the
two elements of the crime of rebellion are lacking.
First, there was no "taking of arms" against the government. To my
mind, "taking arms" connotes the multitude's deliberate and conscious resort
to arms or weapons for the purpose of aiding them in accomplishing any of
the purposes of rebellion. Admittedly, the Estrada loyalists pelted the
policemen with rocks and stones and attacked them with sticks and clubs,
but such was merely a result of the heightening tension between opposite
camps during the period of dispersal. The stones, rocks, sticks, clubs and
other improvised weapons were not deliberately resorted to by the Estrada
loyalists to further any of the purposes of rebellion. They availed of them, at
the precise moment of dispersal (this explains why their weapons were
those which could be easily gathered on the street ) and only for the purpose
of stopping the policemen from dispersing them. In this age of modernity,
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2023 cdasiaonline.com
 one who intends to overthrow the government will not only settle for stones,
woods, rocks, sticks or clubs as means to disable the government. It will be
extremely pathetic and the result will only be in vain. Unlike a true rebellion
which is organized, what happened at the vicinity of Malacañang was merely
a riot, a mob violence, or a tumultuous uprising. At this juncture, it bears
stressing that the crime of rebellion is a vast movement of men and a
complex net of intrigues and plots . 30 It must be distinguished from riot and
offenses connected with mob violence. In rebellion/insurrection, there is an
organized and armed uprising against authority. 31
Second, the purpose of the Estrada loyalists was neither (a) to remove
from the allegiance to the government or its laws (1) the territory of the
Philippines or any part thereof; or (2) any part of land, naval or other armed
forces; nor (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially,
of any of their powers or prerogatives. I looked at the chronology of events,
and one thing surfaced — the Estrada loyalists mainly demanded that their
beloved "president" should not be incarcerated. The crowd at Edsa swelled
in great magnitude on April 25, 2001, the day Estrada was arrested. In fact,
when they followed Erap at Camp Crame, they were shouting "Edsa! Edsa!
and they vowed not to leave until Estrada is released." 32
One must not be swayed by the theory of respondents that the
purpose of those people who gathered in Edsa and marched to Malacañang
was to commit rebellion. For sure, there were a thousand and one reasons
why they proceeded to Edsa. In determining their purpose, one must trace
the roots, — what prompted them to go to Edsa? They were the Estrada
loyalists who wanted him to be freed. If indeed there were minorities who
advocated another cause, the same should not be considered as the
prevailing one in the determination of what crime was committed. Facts
should not be stretched just to build a case of rebellion. This runs counter to
the principle of due process.
As a final word, I subscribe to the principle that the rule of law implies
the precept that similar cases be treated similarly. Men can not regulate
their actions by means of rule if this precept is not followed. Edsa I, Edsa II
and Edsa III are all public uprisings. Statements urging people to overthrow
the government were uttered in all these occasions. Injuries were sustained,
policemen were attacked, standing structures were vandalized . . . in all
these scenarios, one cannot be said to be extremely away from the other.
The only difference is that the first two succeeded, while the last failed. This
should not result to an unbridled or unlimited exercise of power by the duly
constituted authorities. It is during these trying times that fealty to the
Constitution is strongly demanded from all, especially the authorities
concerned.
WHEREFORE, I vote to give DUE COURSE to the petitions and GRANT
the same and to enjoin the respondents from arresting the petitioners in G.R.
Nos. 147780, 147781, and 147799 without the corresponding warrants.
SO ORDERED.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2023 cdasiaonline.com

 Footnotes
KAPUNAN, J., dissenting:
1. Dissenting Opinion, J. Jackson, in Brinegar vs . United States , 338 U.S. 2084
(1949).

2. G.R. No. 147780, for Prohibition Injunction Mandamus and Habeas Corpus.
3. G.R. No. 147810, for Certiorari and Prohibition.
4. G.R. No. 147785, for Habeas Corpus.

5. G.R. No. 147787 for Habeas Corpus.

6. G.R. No. 147781, for Mandamus.
7. G.R. No. 147818, for Injunction.

8. G.R. No. 147819, for Certiorari and Mandamus.

9. Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, et al. G.R. No. 141284, August 15,
2000.
10. CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE III, SECTION 1.
11. CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE III, SECTION 4.

12. CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE III, SECTION 2.

13. G.R. NO. 141284, supra.
14. See Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356.

15. Id., at Article VII, SECTION 18.

16. People vs. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1, 14 (1986).
17. 187 SCRA 311 (1990).

18. Id., at 318.

19. 187 SCRA 311, 318, 321, 323-24 (1990).
20. Under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, these acts would involve rising
publicly and taking up arms against the Government: (1) to remove from the
allegiance of the Government or its laws, the entire, or a portion of Philippine
territory, or any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or (2) to deprive
the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their
powers or prerogatives.
21. 16 Phil 516 (1910).
22. Id., at 519.

23. G.R. No. 147785.

24. 121 SCRA 472 (1983).
25. See Note 396 in BERNAS, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY, p. 180.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2023 cdasiaonline.com
 26. Umil vs. Ramos, 202 SCRA 251 (1991).
27. Id., at 274.

28. Id., at 279.

29. Id., at 284.
30. Id., at 293-295.

31. LAFAVE, I SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

(1987), pp. 548-549. Citations omitted.
32. Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs. CA, 171 SCRA 348 (1989).
33. Manila Bulletin issue of May 8, 2001 under the heading "Warrantless arrest
continue" by Rey G. Panaligan:
Justice Secretary Hernando Perez said yesterday the lifting of the state of
rebellion in Metro Manila does not ban the police from making warrantless
arrest of suspected leaders of the failed May 1 Malacañang siege.

In a press briefing, Perez said, "we can make warrantless arrest because that is
provided for in the Rules of Court," citing Rule 113.

34. 134 SCRA 438 (1985).

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., dissenting:
1. G.R. Nos. 146710-15; G.R. No. 146738, Estrada v. Desierto et al.; Manila Bulletin,
March 3, 2001, Vol. 339, No. 3, p. 1, column 3.

2. Manila Bulletin, April 26, 2001, p. 13.

3. inq7.net, April 26, 2001, p. 1.
4. Manila Bulletin, April 26, 2001, p. 14.

5. inq7.net, April 25, 2001, p. 1.

6. Manila Bulletin, April 26, 2001, p. 1.
7. Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI), April 26, 2001, p. A15.
8. PDI, April 26, 2001, p. A15.

9. Manila Bulletin, April 27, 2001, p. 8.

10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.

12. Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 28, 2001, p. 1.

13. Ibid. , April 29, 2001, p. 1.
14. inq7.net, April 30, 2001, p. 1.

15. philstar.com, May 1, 2001, p. 2.

16. inq7.net, May 2, 2001, p. 1.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2023 cdasiaonline.com

 17. Ibid. , pp. 1-2.

18. Ibid. , p. 3.
19. inq7.net, May 2, 2001, p. 1.
20. inq7.net, May 2, 2001, p. 1.

21. inq7.net, May 2, 2001, p. 1.

22. inq7.net, May 1, 2001.
23. inq7.net, May 1, 2001, p. 1.
24. Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

25. Smith/Cotter, Powers of the President During Crises, 1972, p. 13.

26. Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996
Edition, p. 789.
27. Article III, Section 2, 1987 Constitution.

28(a) Article VII, Section 18 (par. 4), Id.

28. 187 SCRA 311 (1990).
29. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book II, Thirteenth Edition, 1993, p. 73.
30. Ibid. , p. 74.

31. 46 CJS, section 1, p. 1058.

32. Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 26, 2001, p. A15.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2023 cdasiaonline.com