10

State and Local

Government Expenditures

10.1 Fiscal Federalism in the United States

and Abroad
10.2 Optimal Fiscal Federalism
10.3 Redistribution across Communities
10.4 Conclusion

10

Fiscal Federalism

The United States has a federal system,

dividing activity between a national
government and state and local
governments.
Education, for example, is often provided by
state governments.
Optimal fiscal federalism: The question
of which activities should take place at
which level of government.

10.1

Fiscal Federalism in the United States and Abroad

The distribution of government spending

has changed dramatically over time in the
United States.
Local state and spending have declined
considerably.
Much state and local spending now
supported by intergovernmental grants.
o Intergovernmental grants: Payments
from one level of government to another.

10.1

State and Local Spending in the United States,

19022010

10.1

Spending and Revenue of State and Local

Governments
State and local governments rely on multiple
sources of revenues.
State governments use sales and income
taxes primarily.
Local governments use property taxes
heavily.
o Property tax: The tax on land and any
buildings on it, such as commercial
businesses or residential homes.

10.1

Spending and Revenue of State and Local

Governments
Spending
Stat $/PC
e

Revenue
Stat $/PC
e

Educatio AK
n
MA
spending
TN

3,010
2,643
1,50

Incom NY
2,311
e taxes MT
854
Man 0
y

Health
DC
care
spending LA
UT

10,34
9

Sales
taxes

6,759
5,031

DC

1,847

Iowa 698
Man 0
y

10.1

Fiscal Federalism Abroad

Spendi Reven
ng
ue (%
(% of
of all)
all)
Greece
Portugal
France

0.0
13.7
20.3

0.8
5.5
12.1

Norway
United
States

33.5
50.0

11.9
35.7

Denmark
OECD

63.3
24.8

24.7
26.5

Many countries
engage in fiscal
equalization.
Fiscal
equalization:
Policies by which
the national
government
distributes grants
to subnational
governments in an
effort to equalize
differences in
wealth.

10.2

The Tiebout Model

What determines how much and how

efficiently public goods local governments
provide?
The market provides the optimal amount of
private goods.
Why does the market do so well for private
goods but not public goods?
Tiebouts insight: shopping and
competition.

10.2

The Tiebout Model: Shopping and Competition

There is neither shopping nor competition

for national government.
But when public goods are provided at the
local level by cities and towns, competition
arises
o Individuals can vote with their feet.
This threat of exit can induce efficiency in
local public goods production.

10.2

The Formal Model

Competition across towns can lead to the

optimal provision of public goods.
Towns determine public good levels and tax
rates.
People move freely across towns, picking
their preferred locality.
People with similar tastes end up together,
paying the same amount in taxes and
receiving the same public goods.
There is no free riding because everyone
pays the same amount in each town.

10.2

Problems with Tiebout Competition

The Tiebout model requires a number of

assumptions that may not hold in reality:
People are actually be able to move.
People have full information on taxes and
benefits.
People must be able to choose among a
range of towns that might match my taste
for public goods.
The provision of some public goods
requires sufficient scale or size.
There must be enough towns so that
individuals can sort themselves into groups
with similar preferences for public goods.

10.2

Problems with Tiebout Competition: Financing

The Tiebout model requires equal financing of

the public good among all residents.
Lump-sum tax: A fixed taxation amount
independent of a persons income,
consumption of goods and services, or
wealth.
Lump sum taxes are often infeasible/unfair,
so taxes are income or wealth based.
But then the rich pay more than the poor,
so the poor chase the rich.

10.2

Problems with Tiebout Competition: Financing

To keep poor people from chasing rich people,

towns enact zoning.
Zoning: Restrictions that towns place on
the use of real estate.
Zoning regulation establishes, for example,
minimum lot sizes.
Zoning regulations protect the tax base of
wealthy towns by pricing lower-income
people out of the housing market.

10.2

No Externalities/Spillovers

The Tiebout model assumes that public

goods have effects only in a given town and
that the effects do not spill over to
neighboring towns.
Many local public goods have similar
externality or spillover features: police,
public works, education.
If there are spillovers, then low-tax, lowbenefit municipalities can free-ride off of
high-tax, high-benefit ones.

10.2

Resident Similarity Across Areas

Tiebout competition works through sorting.

A testable implication: When people have
more choice of local community, the tastes
for public goods will be more similar among
town residents than when people do not
have many choices.
Comparing larger and smaller metropolitan
areas (with more and less choice), this
seems to be true.

10.2

Capitalization of Fiscal Differences into House

Prices
People not only vote with their feet, they also
vote with their pocketbook, in the form of
house prices.
House price capitalization: Incorporation
into the price of a house the costs
(including local property taxes) and benefits
(including local public goods) of living in the
house.
Areas with relatively generous public goods
(given taxes) should have higher house
prices.

10.2

EVIDENCE: Evidence for Capitalization from

Californias Proposition 13
Californias Proposition 13 became law in
1978.
o Set the maximum amount of any tax on
property at 1% of the full cash value.
o Full cash value: Value as of 1976, with
annual increases of 2% at most.
Reduced property taxes immensely in some
areas, little change in others.

10.2

EVIDENCE: Evidence for Capitalization from

Californias Proposition 13
Each $1 of property tax reduction increased
house values by about $7, about equal to
the PDV of a permanent $1 tax cut.
In principle, the fall in property taxes would
result in a future reduction in public goods
and services, which would lower home
values.
The fact that house prices rose by almost
the present discounted value of the taxes
suggests that Californians did not think that
they would lose many valuable public
goods and services when taxes fell.

10.2

Optimal Fiscal Federalism

Tiebout model implies that three factors

determine local public good provision:
1. Tax-benefit linkages: The relationship
between the taxes people pay and the
government goods and services they
get in return.
2. Cross-municipality spillovers in public
goods.
3. Economy of scale in public good
provision.
If taxes and benefits are linked, and there
are no spillovers or economies of scale,
then local public good provision is close to

10.2

Optimal Fiscal Federalism

If taxes and benefits are linked, and there

are no spillovers or economies of scale,
then local public good provision is close to
optimal.
Otherwise, further intervention may be
called for.
Actual fiscal federalism does not necessarily
line up:
o Are there enormous
spillovers/externalities in education?

10.3

Redistribution across Communities

Enormous inequality in revenue across

municipalities:
Weston, MA raises $21,334/student while
Lakeville raises $11,800.
Should we care?
o If Tiebout is right, then this reflects
optimal sorting and financing.
o But if not, redistribution might be called
for.
o The main tool of redistribution is
intergovernmental grants, cash transfers
from one level of government to another.

10.3

Matching Grants

Grants come in multiple forms, with different

implications.
Block grant: A grant of some amount with
no mandate as to how it is spent.
Conditional block grant: A grant of
some amount with a mandate as to how it
is spent.
Matching grant: A grant, the amount of
which is tied to the amount of spending by
the local community.

10.3

Tools of Redistribution: Grants

10.3

Matching Grants

10.3

Block Grant

10.3

Conditional Block Grant

10.3

Implications of Different Grant Types

Different grant types affect incentives in

different ways.
Matching grants rotate out the budget
constraint, acting like a subsidy.
o Help with externalities, since they are
targeted.
Block grants shift out the entire budget
constraint, raising spending on all goods.
o Good for redistribution.
Conditional block grants only differ from
block grants if the amount of the grant is
greater than the initial educational
spending.

10.3

Redistribution in Action: School Finance Equalization

Main kind of local redistribution is school

finance equalization.
School finance equalization: Laws that
mandate redistribution of funds across
communities in a state to ensure more
equal financing of schools.
Finance equalization schemes differ across
states:
o California redistributes effectively all
revenues.
o New Jersey redistributes most revenue
from towns with revenue above the 85th
percentile.

10.3

Redistribution in Action: School Finance Equalization

Different structures result in different tax

prices.
Tax price: For school equalization schemes,
the amount of revenue a local district would
have to raise in order to gain $1 more of
spending.
If half of revenue is redistributed, tax price
is $2.
If all revenue is redistributed, tax price is
infinite.

10.3

EVIDENCE: The Flypaper Effect

The simple implies that conditional grants

crowd-out local spending one-for-one. Do
they?
Looking at how states spend grant money,
the flypaper effect seems to matter: The
money sticks where it hits.
But states that get grants are the ones that
like spending the most.
And highway grants from the federal
government to states are determined by
the strength of the states political
representatives.

10.3

EVIDENCE: The Flypaper Effect

Knight attempted to measure the importance

of the flypaper effect.
Looked at how spending changes as states
congressional delegations gain or lose
power.
Each additional $1 of federal grant money
increase due to rising congressional power
leads to a $0.90 reduction in the states
own spending.
Additional studies also find evidence
inconsistent with the flypaper effect.

10.3

APPLICATION: School Finance Equalization and

Property Tax Limitations in California
If residents perceived that property taxes
were too high in California, why did they
wait until 1978 to lower them?
Proposition 13 actually a response to school
finance equalization in California.
Taxes no longer financed local school
spending; just taxes, rather than prices.
Tax price became infinite.
Voters were happy to limit property taxes
once those taxes no longer brought them
any benefit.

10.4

Conclusion

Central governments collect only part of

total tax revenues and spend only part of
total public spending.
The Tiebout model suggests that the
spending should be done locally when:
o Spending is on goods for which local
preferences are relatively similar.
o Most residents can benefit from those
goods.

10.4

Conclusion

Higher levels of government may not

believe the conclusions of the idealized
Tiebout model.
o They will want to redistribute across
lower levels of government.
o If the higher-level government decides
that it wants to redistribute across lower
levels, it can do so through several
different types of grants.
o Appropriate choice of grants depends on
goal of government financing.