by Dr. Douglas L.

Bland

PARLIAMENTS DUTY TO DEFEND CANADA

Defence policy cannot be made in private and the results simply announced Canadians will not accept that, nor should they.... In any process of consultative policy development at the federal level, Parliament has a critical role to play. Special Joint Committee On Canadas Defence Policy, 1994 1 Canadian Forces and, more generally, the broader defence establishment. The Canadian Forces under the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) is the instrument for national defence. Although the CDS plays a vital role as adviser to governments and is vested with the control and administration of the Canadian Forces, neither he nor any other officer is responsible or accountable for the national defence or defence policy. In any liberal democracy and, therefore, in Canada, there must be an unbroken line or a system of accountability from officers commanding Canadian Forces units in the field to the CDS, to Parliament and, finally, to the people, who will judge the actions and decisions of individual leaders. Whenever this system of accountability breaks down, then the people are disadvantaged and democracy is threatened. Some might dismiss this conclusion, asserting for instance, that the defence of Canada is really in the hands of Americans or allies, or that our armed forces are so small and out-of-sight, lost
Dr. Douglas L. Bland (Lieutenant-Colonel, retd) holds the Chair of Defence Management Studies in the School of Policy Studies at Queens University at Kingston.

he defence of Canada is not a public good or service delivered to Canadians by some faceless government agent. In a liberal democracy like Canada, national defence is an activity shared by three principal assemblies: the people, the Parliament and the Canadian Forces. The defence of Canada is the responsibility of all Canadians, they will determine through their votes how Canada will be defended, how many dollars will be spent on defence, and what risks will be taken and what vulnerabilities will be accepted. They expect their representatives, senators and Members of Parliament (MPs), to inform them of defence needs, to provide resources for necessary roles and missions, and to continuously supervise the

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in the political landscape, so neglected by politicians that what happens in the field, in Somalia for example, can have no effect on our democracy or the national defence. Such people belong to the little Canada club. They imply that Canada is not a real country nor a real democracy like the United States, that the purpose of the Canadian Forces is not to win the nations wars, and, because the Canadian Forces are small in peacetime, one need not waste time overseeing their activities. Perhaps they take their cue from Sir Wilfred Laurier who wrote almost a hundred years ago, You must not take the militia seriously, for though it is useful for suppressing internal disturbances, it will not be required for the defence of the country, as the Monroe Doctrine protects us from enemy aggression. 2 This attitude carried forward to modern times. In 1963, the brilliant Canadian defence scientist, Robert Sutherland, advised Paul Hellyer that while it would be highly advantageous to discover a strategic rationale which would impart to Canadas defence programmes a wholly Canadian character, such a rationale does not

Even if Canada were in all cases a mindless strategic follower, the need for accountability would increase, not decrease. Though some officers, officials and commentators might believe that Canadian Forces units and formations will always be deployed under the command of foreign officers, this situation does not absolve anyone from their duty to account for the actions of Canadian commanders in the field, nor for the consequences to members of the Canadian Forces that follow from the decisions of foreign commanders. Think what might happen if a deployed unit of the Canadian Forces were to suffer significant casualties while under a United Nations command. Canadians would never be satisfied with some explanation that said well, they were under a UN commander, and the CDS cannot be held to account for the plan that caused the disaster. Such reasoning may have worked at Hong Kong and Dieppe, but it will not work in this century. Lending troops to foreign commands and foreign strategies demands more, not less, accountability.

Canadian experience emphasizes this point. Senior Canadian officers have known since the first days of UN peacekeeping missions that the UN has no reliable system for controlling and supporting units in the field. Yet Canadian governments, evidently on the advice of these officers, have repeatedly deployed forces in these circumstances, almost without complaint, and in some cases in seeming disregard of the obvious dangers of doing so. When Canadians are killed or wounded on UN operations because the UN system fails, as it did in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, can anyone believe that Canadian officers and officials were surprised? The questions Canadians and Parliament might ask indeed, must ask before any international deployment of the Canadian Forces are, what are the Canadian arrangements for the command and safety of members of the Canadian Forces overseas, and who are the Canadian officers answerable for these The Hon. Brooke Claxton, Minister of National Defence, inspecting a guard of honour at factors, irrespective of any Allied, coaliCentralia, May 1951. tion or UN promise? exist and one cannot be invented. 3 Hellyer rejected Besides the dangers inherent in all military operathis idea and tried, but failed mainly because of the little Canada club to develop a national strategy in tions overseas, there are numerous other reasons why 1964. But even if it were true that one cannot discover politicians have to account to Canadians for the actions a strategic rationale for Canadas national defence, and decisions of military leaders, public servants and would this fact upset or negate the need for a chain of the government of the day in matters of national accountability from the armed forces to parliament and defence. Domestic operations, whether in aid of the civil power or assistance to the civil authority, can be to the people?

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significant and important to the health and welfare of Canadians. The government spends billions of dollars each year on defence-related programmes: someone must account for the efficiency, effectiveness and honesty of these programmes. Service in the Canadian Forces restricts by law the rights of citizens in uniform and imposes on them a code of service discipline that is unique and potentially severe. Someone must account to Canadians for these laws and how they are administered. More than two hundred years ago, the great British parliamentarian, Edmund Burke, observed that an armed disciplined body is, in its essence, dangerous to liberty; undisciplined, it is ruinous to society. Not much has changed over time and someone has to account for the state of good order and discipline in the Canadian Forces. Someone also has to oversee the government of the day that controls the armed forces. But most important of all, someone also must account to Canadians for the state of national defence in all its aspects and for what officers, officials and politicians responsible for national defence are asked to do, what they say they will do and for what they do in fact. In the language of the Somalia Inquiry, the quintessential condition for the civil control of the military and all aspects of national defence is a vigilant Parliament. Thus, Parliament is the someone finally accountable to Canadians for every aspect of national defence. But is Parliament attentive to its duty?

PARLIAMENTS DUTY

ome might think that the government of the day is responsible and accountable for national defence and that the remainder of Parliament is merely opposition or sideshow. This popular modern image of Parliament a house divided is unfortunate, especially for defence policy and the Canadian Forces. There is no space here to recount the history of Parliament, but traditionally, it was always Parliament and not the government that was meant to direct the nation. In fact, the earliest parliaments were devised to oversee the Crown and the Crowns agents, the public service. Former parliaments wrestled control of the armed forces from the Crown by controlling expenditures for defence. Defending the nation was often considered above politics, and this was particularly so in times of great crisis, as during the world wars. But when crises abate, some politicians when in opposition seem unable to resist the temptation to use national defence policy as a whip against the government, and governments seem unable to see national defence as more than a liability against which they must

protect themselves. In Canada over the years it appears that the politics of defence matter more than national defence itself. However, it is always the members of the Canadian Forces who suffer collateral damage during partisan battles over national defence. But by what measure can we make an assessment of Parliaments record as overseer and the peoples representative? There is surprisingly little modern literature on the issue. Some of the best work was done by the late Rod Byers in the early 1970s, but until recently there has been very little new research. There are, however, many opinions and they cannot be dismissed, especially when they come from respected persons of experience. The late General Gerard Theriault, who was not given to impulsive or rash criticism, once wrote the military requires [from politicians] a great deal more than the kind of weak, inconsistent, reactive, and insufficiently informed leadership that nearly inevitably results from the structural shortcomings of the political control machinery we have in Canada. 4 One can also look at the debates on national defence in the House of Commons. However, even when the Commons debates critical issues, such as the deployment of the forces overseas, the absence of members is

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remarkable. Perhaps the most telling opinion on Parliament and national defence came from Parliament itself. In its 1994 report, the Special Joint Committee (SJC) of the Senate and the House of Commons on Canadas defence policy remarked, whatever our individual views on particular issues of defence policy or operations, there was one matter on which we agreed almost from the beginning that there is a need to strengthen the role of Parliament in the scrutiny and development of defence policy. 5 In contrast to their peers in the United States Congress, few senators or Members of Parliament (MPs) in Canada are expert in international affairs or national defence. For example, on Canadian news talk shows, who speaks to the issues? More often we see a retired corporal and a retired disgruntled logistics colonel rather than an informed senator or MP. Though some may blame a national media for seeking sensation and not facts, usually the media cannot find a well-informed political person to join debates, and those who do, seem always to use the opportunity to make political points or to evade critics rather than expose the issues for nonpartisan debate. The results of a 1999 Queens University survey of senators and MPs intended to test their interests, attitudes and knowledge in matters of national defence was revealing. 6 The survey was prompted by the basic question, How do we know what senators and members of parliament know if we never ask them? The results, in outline, suggest the following general conclusions:
q

basis for a nonpartisan defence policy. They also agree that they are not well served by the NDHQ and the executive part of government who tend to keep them in the dark. Most members favour the office of the CDS, some form of unification, a clearly identifiable CFHQ, a non-military role for the Deputy Minister of DND, and a distinct role for the military in defence policy making. Finally, most senators and MPs agree that Parliament is not playing an effective role in controlling the defence establishment and defence policy generally.

Members of Parliament are not negligent nor uninterested in national defence; to the contrary, interviews and personal contacts suggest a reasonable degree of interest and concern for defence policy and the Canadian Forces in both the Senate and the Commons. What then accounts for Parliaments disheartening record as the civil authority and overseer in matters of national defence? Arguably, Parliament is inhibited partly by habit, by weak parliamentary structures, by the overly partisan nature of modern parliaments, and especially by the great distance between the Hill and the Ottawa bureaucracy. Political habits, such as using Question Period in the House as target practice where everything is cast in partisan terms, and continuing the same attitudes in committees, defeat any possible hope for the sensible development of a truly nonpartisan national policy. Ministers are reluctant to admit to weaknesses in policy for fear of being skewered by the Opposition. Ministers, officers and officials treat the Opposition as though it were an opponent to national defence, and shackle information because they expect the Opposition will use forthright information to distort debates in the House. Opposition members of the defence committee most often wish to hear complaints against the government from witnesses. Government members in committee, on the other hand, often appear interested only in defending their record. Only recently have the Financial Accounts Committee and the Defence Committee made a genuine nonpartisan effort to address declining capabilities in the armed forces, and this consensus was reported by the media because it was remarkable. Committees of the Commons are generally hostage to ministers agendas. They have little freedom to develop strong nonpartisan policy positions and less likelihood of seeing their work transformed into effective policies. Committees across Parliament lack the

There is a small cadre of senators and MPs interested in defence policy and the Canadian Forces who may be willing to lead the way in Parliament. These individuals are interested in the wellbeing of the Canadian Forces and they are willing to forgo partisan interests to advance the cause of national defence. There are few senators and fewer MPs who have had any significant experience with the Canadian Forces or defence matters generally. Few senators or MPs have a sound grasp of the details of defence administration they know little and have no opinion on what defence budget is adequate, how many people should be in the armed forces, how the defence budget should be distributed in terms of people, capital, O&M, or between the service elements or between the Regular Force and the Reserves. They agree on certain fundamental policies, like women in the Canadian Forces (more than 70 percent for), and some opinions could form the

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resources to research deeply the many issues they consider. Though they do call witnesses from outside the bureaucracy to testify, very often committees are overly dependent on government experts. Moreover, because most public service and military witnesses are more or less obliged to follow their ministers line, their expertise may be lost to the committees. The Senate, which does not have a committee on national defence, is somewhat freer to pursue its own agenda and has provided valuable service to Canadians and the Canadian Forces in the past. This criticism is not aimed at members of various parliamentary committees; rather, the remarks simply highlight the difficulty senators and MPs face when they try or expect to move policy forward by way of the committee rooms. Partisanship is so common on the Hill that some might think that Parliament is meant to be ruled by parties and party whips. Traditionally, however, parliaments were gatherings of representatives of the people sent to London and later to Ottawa to oversee the bureaucracy the Crowns servants and to represent their constituents. Today, some might say that MPs and senators to a lesser degree are in Ottawa merely to represent their party. This assessment may be unfair to some individual members, but the power of party politics cannot be ignored by those advocates who hope to influence government policies in any field. Given the strong play of partisanship on the Hill, is it inevitable that defence policy and the control of the Canadian Forces must be carried away by this unfortunate fact of national political life? According to the Queens University survey, senators and MPs considered bureaucratic secrecy and executive control as the main impediment to parliamentary surveillance of the defence establishment and defence issues. More than 60 percent of members including a majority of Liberal members felt they did not have access to the information they required to make informed decisions on national defence. Nearly 60 percent declared that Parliament does not play an effective role in controlling the defence establishment or supervising military operations. For instance, during hearings of the SJC, a committee member declared that officials from NDHQ failed to provide certain documents and information to the committee either because they could not be found, or, as some speculate, because officials simply refused to respond to requests from Parliament. Senators and MPs do try to find the information they need to fulfil their responsibilities, but they receive little help from officials or officers. Thus, 70 percent of respondents agreed that the Commons Defence Committee should have a permanent research staff to help them overcome this problem.

Senators and MPs were asked about their contacts with the Canadian Forces and the defence establishment in Ottawa. Their answers are not encouraging. Although many politicians have spoken to members of the Canadian Forces, only about 20 percent of respondents reported that they had spoken often with a general officer, 60 percent had never met any CDS, and an astonishing 70 percent had never made it across the street and down the hill to NDHQ. But whose fault is this? Officials at NDHQ have for years maintained a system of parliamentary liaison, but it has been mostly reactive, a type of clearing house for inquiries. Very few members of committees visit Canadian Forces units in the field and at sea. There has never been an active programme in NDHQ to inform senators and MPs and not much effort to keep those interested in national defence aware of the Departments concerns or the conditions of the Canadian Forces. Although the Minister of National Defence apparently ordered officials in mid-1999 to organize a parliamentary outreach programme to keep members abreast of defence affairs, there is no evidence that this programme is effectively in place. No MP or senator to whom the author spoke in early 2000 had yet to be reached by the programme. Senators or MPs who might wish to become informed on defence matters are still very much on their own, especially if they are in opposition. Worse, there is no human face of defence or the Canadian Forces on the Hill and no ready way for politicians to talk with members of the Canadian Forces about their duties and concerns. There are a few notable exceptions to this longstanding break in relationships. During emergencies and war, for instance, Parliament does take notice, and offi-

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cers and officials are often on the Hill explaining policy and plans. The Minister, too, is usually on his feet on these occasions answering members questions. But, unfortunately, because politicians are not routinely well informed, debates on deployments and questions and answers in a crisis usually miss critical points. The civil authority cannot control the military nor supervise the defence establishment unless senators and

team, nor how to steer a ship, nor the landing procedures of a Hercules, nor the forward-backward action of any weapons system as some officers seem to think is necessary. Where they must be expert to a degree is in matters of defence budgeting and expenditures, in defence law, in critical factors that influence the use of force and deployments of the Canadian Forces. Politicians need to know details of major contracting and how they influence the capabilities of the armed forces. They must understand civilmilitary relations in a Canadian context and must understand with some precision what Canada is committed to do and what such commitments demand in budgetary and organizational terms for the Canadian Forces. Without doubt, the most critical function of parliamentary oversight requires senators and MPs to recognize the actions and decisions of ministers, senior officers and officials that must be rewarded or sanctioned. In other words, Parliament must have a credible capacity to assess individual responsibility and to hold people accountable for what they are asked to do and what they do.

No one should expect politicians, and new MPs especially, to be expert in, or even familiar with, any of these areas when they first enter Parliament. Given time and well-organized information, and the honest nonpartisan assistance of the CDS and the Deputy The Hon. David Collenette, Minister of National Defence, during Battle of the Atlantic ceremonies Minister of DND, politicians can begin in Ottawa, May 1994. to fulfill their constitutional responsiMPs understand the complexities of national defence bilities. In the past, however, this type of assistance has and develop expert opinions of their own. The leaders of been neither effective nor even forthcoming. the Canadian Forces, on the other hand, cannot expect informed support for the armed forces when they make A NEW TRADITION? little effort to cultivate senators and MPs who are interested and willing to carry the militarys case to party nyone bent on improving the relationship between caucuses and to the public. Whenever public servants Parliament and the armed forces must contend with and military officers restrict ordinary members by hin- three facts of national life. First, it is unrealistic to dering their fact-finding efforts, the sad irony is that expect that every senator and MP would place national they turn interested members into the opposition and defence on top of their list of interests, but every officer disarm willing supporters. should recognize that some senators and MPs are very interested in defence policy and the well-being of the However, it is fair to ask, What is it that parlia- Canadian Forces. mentarians need to know if they are to do their duty? First, what they do not need to know in any detail are Second, although ordinary members of Parliament military technical facts. For instance, politicians do not have little power, they cannot be dismissed for they do need to know the organization of an infantry combat have influence and can build support for the Canadian

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Forces in ways no officer or official could hope to match. Third, officers make a mistake when they begin their discussions as though politicians know nothing and reject their ideas merely because they do not coincide with officers preferences. Therefore, if the civil-military relations in Canada are going to mature, officers need to rethink their attitude towards politicians and begin to build strong apolitical links to their political supporters.

Clear away the partisan rhetoric and the theatre, and the basic defence policies of any of the parties that might form a national government are the same. This fact of national life is evident during crisis and debates about overseas deployments. It was especially evident during the deliberations of the SJC in 1993 and 1994. What might follow from an all-party consensus on national defence policy? Parliamentary committees might spend much more time productively managing the steady development of an agreed national defence strategy aimed at joining policy ends to appropriate means. Defence planners would be assured of a predictable future on which to build the defence programme they would know for instance

The second path towards a better relationship leads from NDHQ to Parliament. The CDS and the Deputy Minster must build on the initiatives now in place, such as the CDSs annual report to Parliament and enthusiastically embrace the Ministers idea of a parliamentary outreach programme. The programme should flood the offices on the Hill with paper and electronically delivered information. Every senator and MP should continue to receive a copy of the Maple Leaf and the Canadian Military Journal. Every new senator and MP should be offered a defence/Canadian Forces briefing, or even a national security studies course, as an introduction to the Canadian Forces. The CDS should invite politicians to regular briefing sessions in NDHQ. Members of the Defence Committee and others should be invited regularly to visit Canadian Forces bases, units and staff colleges to speak with officers and members of the armed forces much as they did during the Quality of Life studies. Finally, perhaps, the CDS might consider establishing on the Hill an office of defence information staffed by military officers from operational units. Military officers have been sent to the Hill to assist and advise various The Hon. Allan McKinnon, Minister of National Defence, speaking with MajorGeneral Richard Rohmer, Chief of Reserves, November 1979. special parliamentary committees in the past indeed, General Baril was an adviser to the Senate in the that major capabilities programmes would have a life 1980s and there is no reason why they could not be after elections and changes of government. A politistationed there on a more or less permanent basis today. cal consensus on national defence might promote a civil consensus and replace the chief characteristic of What steps can senators and MPs take to enhance Canadian defence policy surprise with a set of their control of the armed forces and to strengthen their norms around which the expectations of the principal relationship with the Canadian Forces? Perhaps the sin- leaders could converge. An agreed national defence gle most important thing they could do would be to build strategy would for the first time in Canadian history, a nonpartisan consensus on the fundamentals of perhaps, provide Canada with a defence strategy Canadas national defence. That is to say, they could take made at home. partisanship out of defence policy. This suggestion may This suggestion says nothing about and need not seem wildly radical for the moment, but on reflection it is obviously possible. The Queens University survey detract from the Loyal Oppositions duty to oppose the and a review of defence history since 1947 illustrates government and to uncover scandals horses on the pay that a consensus of sort already exists. For instance, roll and so on. There is no reason why a consensus on there is agreement on the objectives of national defence, major policies and plans would cause the Opposition to on the structure of the law and the defence establish- fall silent; rather, to the contrary, the Opposition would ment, on the desired major capabilities of the Canadian have a sentinel responsibility to hold the government to the agreed national strategy. Forces, and even on the size of the defence budget.

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The second major innovation concerns parliamentary committees on national defence. The present Defence Committee of the House of Commons, as so many reports and observers have said, needs a specialized, expert research staff to assist it in its important work. Such a staff might include a director, two or three researchers from the academic world and one or two senior officers well-qualified by experience and education. Although some officials might fear that this staff might intrude on their domain, there are procedural ways to prevent this from happening. Other nations have similar organizations to assist their parliamentarians and there is no reason why the House Committee in Canada cannot establish this most useful mechanism. The Senate of Canada has no Defence Committee. This fact seems remarkable given the importance of the subject, the interest many Senators have in national defence, and the history of the Senate in issues of national defence. From time to time, the Senate has established committees or sub-committees on national defence. Perhaps the most productive committees were those which sat in the early 1980s led by Senators Paul Lafond and Jack Marshall. (The present speaker of the Senate, Senator Molgat, was a member of these committees.) The reason why senators thought in 1980 that they ought to begin serious considerations on Canadas national defence is particular germane to current issues. The committee declared in its first report (1982) that several senators had developed the view that Parliament for quite some time had shown little interest in and support for the Canadian Armed Forces and that unfortunately this attitude was becoming prevalent in the Canadian public. 7 The Senate, therefore, took the responsible position that it was its duty to do something to redress these failings and trends. Between 1981 and 1986, Senate committees and sub-committees produced some of the best studies on national defence in that period, including reports on territorial air defence, maritime defence, air transportation and manpower (as it was then called). These studies provided a mostly nonpartisan way to expose issues, to allow officers and officials to speak freely, and to inform the public and Parliament on pressing matters of national defence. Few matters are as important to the relationship between Parliament and the armed forces than the re-establishment by Senate of its committee on national defence and the use of this committee to play a prominent role in the defence of Canada. The need is at least as urgent today as it was in 1980. However, the Senate should do much more than study distinct issues, for the Senate is almost ideally

suited to provide the permanent home for a defence consensus. Senators, more easily than MPs, can take a nonpartisan stance on important policy questions. They have the time to become experts in the defence field, and usually spend enough time in office to carry that expertise through successive governments. What then of the relationship between the Senate and the Commons? A Defence Committee of the Senate need not challenge the prerogatives of the Commons, but it could assist the Defence Committee of the House of Commons as expert advisers. Senators might, for instance, take on sensitive tasks and provide the political continuity needed if national defence strategy and the Canadian Forces are to be managed and directed in a consistent manner over the long term. The two committees, once established, might meet occasionally in joint sessions and together conducted detailed studies of issues much as the very successful SJC did in 1993-94. Indeed, if one were looking for a model for a new committee structure on national defence, then the SJC is it. A permanent joint committee of the Senate and the Commons on national defence is an idea that the minister and the CDS might champion. Many Canadians question the value of the Senate, but senators can more than earn their keep when they act collegially to guard the national interest and important national institutions. Helping Parliament to control the defence establishment while assisting the Canadian Forces fulfills both of these honourable objectives.

A VIGILANT PARLIAMENT

n their report, the Commissioners of the Inquiry Into the Deployment of the Canadian Forces to Somalia strongly emphasized their concern with the apparent absence of Parliament in matters of national defence. They wrote: Canada has begun a new relationship with its armed forces, one that arguably requires greater involvement by members of Parliament and Canadians generally in the direction, supervision and control of the Canadian Forces. Civil control of the military may be a defining characteristic of liberal democracies, but it does not occur invariably. Civil control of the military in Canada and abroad should come from attentive citizens acting through an informed, concerned, and vigilant parliament. 8

Consider for a moment what heartache and turmoil might have been avoided if Parliament had conducted a

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rigorous inquiry into the Somalia deployment before the force left Canada rather than after it came home. But civil control of the military is not merely, or even primarily, a sinister concept built on some notion that military officers will run amok unless they are closely supervised. Positive control aims to help the armed forces meet the objectives set for it by governments and society. Many people salute the Reserves as the military footprint in the community. Although the Reserves are valuable in this regard, a deeper and more significant footprint in todays society can only be made by politicians keenly interested in defence policy and the Canadian Forces. Without the support of political representatives, there is little hope for lasting and informed control or support for Canadas national defence or the Canadian Forces. Therefore, officers,
NOTES
1. Canada, Security In A Changing World, Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Canadas Defence Policy, p. 58. 2. As quoted in George Stanley, Canadas Soldiers: The Military History of an Unmilitary People, Toronto: MacMillan, p. 924. 3. As quoted in Douglas L. Bland, Chiefs of Defence: Government and The Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces, Toronto: CISS, p. 226.

and defence department officials must not recoil from appropriate political involvement in their business, but rather they should seek, embrace and encourage it through ever closer association. Soldiers and politicians share responsibility for the defence of Canada. But they cannot do so effectively unless they are strongly linked by common understandings, shared goals and appropriate knowledge. Todays links as well as those of the past have rusted from poor maintenance. There is, however, no reason why this lack of attention need continue when all that is required to strengthen this bond is a whiff of initiative and a hearty willingness to act in Canadas interest.

4. Gerry Theriault, Democratic Civil-Military Relations: A Canadian View, in The Military In Modern Democratic Society, Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, p. 10. 5. Canada, Security In A Changing World, p. 57. 6. Douglas L. Bland, Parliament, Defence Policy and The Canadian Armed Forces, The Claxton Papers, 1, Kingston: School of Policy Studies Queens University. 7. Senate of Canada, First Report of the SubCommittee on National Defence of the

Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Manpower In Canadas Armed Forces, p. 1. 8. As quoted in Commission of Inquiry Into the Deployment of the Canadian Forces to Somalia, Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of The Somalia Affair, p. 1453.

The 17th Annual Political Studies Students Conference University of Manitoba

Canadas Security and Defence Policy: Continentalism and Internationalism
q

The 17 th Annual Political Studies Students Conference will be held at the University of Manitoba, Winnipeg from 1 to 3 February 2001. The 2001 Conference will explore issues pertaining to future aspects of Canadas security and defence policy. In particular, it focuses upon the relationship between Canadas bilateral defence relationship with the United States (continentalism) and Canadas longstanding security commitments (formal and informal) outside of North America (internationalism), and how this relationship will affect considerations about the future of Canadian defence policy and defence investments. Panel topics include Continentalism and Internationalism in their Historical Context; Continentalism - the Implications of Homeland Defence; Internationalism - NATO and Beyond; Force Requirements - What does Canada need and what can it afford?; and Does Canada need a new White Paper? Invited and/or confirmed participants include Dr. Douglas Bland (Queens University), Mr. David Cooper (NATO), Dr. Frank Harvey (Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie), Colonel David Higgins (NORAD), Dr. Natalie Mychajlyszyn (Centre for Security and Defence Studies, Carlton), Dr. Hector MacKenzie (DFAIT), Major-General Ken Pennie (DND), Dr. Roger Sarty (Deputy Director Canadian War Museum), and Dr. Kori Schake (National Defence University). The Conference is open to the public at no charge and all are welcome. For further information, please contact either Robert Christie or Marina Rountree at (204) 275-0179 or by email at [email protected]

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