FYROM Irredentism and Pοlicy

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Ιakovos D.

Μichailidis 

Irredentism and Pοlicy:


FYROM Official State Papers, 1944-2006
On 2 August 1944, to mark the 41st anniversary of the Ilinden Uprising,
the Anti-Fascist Council of Makedonija [AFCM] met at the Monastery of
Prohor Ptchinski, near Kumanovo. It was this Meeting that paved the way
for the founding of the People’s Republic of Makedonija and the Republic’s
inclusion in the Jugoslav Federation. The Meeting acknowledged the
right of the ‘Macedonian People’ to self-determination, and declared the
anniversary of the Ilinden Uprising a national festival. From that day to this,
the PRM, or SRM [Socialist Republic of Makedonija], as it was renamed a
few years later, or FYROM as it became at the start of the 1990s after the
break-up of Jugoslavia as a unit, has faithfully stuck to certain ideological
principles, most of which have had to do with Greece.
The present work proposes to highlight FYROM’s irredentist policy towards
Greece from 1944 to the present, a policy that is in flagrant breach of the
Interim Agreement signed by the two parties in 1995 expressly calling on
them to put an end to any mutual expressions of irredentism.  There is one
basic premise that has been consistently ignored both by the international
community in general and by most of the interested parties. What FYROM
mainly relies on, not just for its prolongation or its development, but for its
very existence, is its irredentist ambitions at Greece’s expense. Should these
ambitions collapse, FYROM would be hard pressed to even survive. We shall
examine the issues involved under three main headings, which put in a
nutshell our neighbouring country’s political and ideological principles over
the years:
1) Renaming Greek Macedonia ‘Aegean Macedonia’, and representing
it as terra irredenta, as an integral part of FYROM.
2) Claiming the existence of an oppressed ‘Macedonian minority’ within
Greece.
3) Appropriating emblems and symbols, and the Greek cultural legacy in
general (with Ancient Macedonia as the focal point).
The Society of Macedonian Studies has set up a research project, under
the supervision of Professor John Koliopoulos, who teaches history at the

. Iakovos D. Michailidis is Assistant Professor of Modern and Contemporary History in the History & Ar-
chaeology Department of the Philosophy Faculty of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki.
. AFCM was the political wing of the Communist armed resistance movement active in Jugoslav
Makedonija during the German-Bulgarian Occupation.
. [Irredentism (the correct form): a collective policy of seeking, by word or action, to achieve that
one’s country of origin shall have restored to it territory which it has meantime lost to a neighbouring
country. An individual pursuing this policy is an irredentist. The lost territory itself is termed irredenta,
‘unredeemed’. The origin of this series of terms was in Italy during the late 1870s, when it was hoped
to annex to the new Italian state territories that had formerly been Italian. Translator’s Note].

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Ì a c e d o n i a n i s m

University of Thessaloniki, in order to document these three lines of argument.


A group of scholars, as Research Fellows of the Society, have studied a
whole series of official documents of state, including parliamentary minutes,
official speeches by government officials, and party political charters and
manifestoes, school textbooks, writings by historians, and Internet sites,
spanning from 1944 to the present day. Auxiliary unofficial documents used
are those of non-governmental bodies and organizations (particularly of an
irredentist kind), but only insofar as they relate to official state policy discourse.
We have not for the time being concerned ourselves with independent action
by private organizations: the project has confined itself to investigating how
FYROM’s apparatus of state jumped on the irredentist bandwagon.
With regard to things as they stand today, careful scrutiny of the sources
mentioned above is enough to show that although aggressive phrasing has
been ironed out of FYROM’s Constitution, although the Sun of Vergina has
been dropped from the official national flag, in consequence of the Interim
Agreement, and although the phrasing used in the international forum is now
studiously diplomatic, irredentist language is still widespread throughout the
political fabric of the country. A contributory factor is the way young people
are taught, particularly at primary and secondary school. No historian can
hope to offer a solution, a ‘magic bullet’, that will deal with both sides’
problems; and in any case, even were there such a solution, it is beyond the
ambit of the academic community. Political problems – such as the Athens-
Skopje dispute – call for purely political solutions. All that need be said is
that when details, data, and arguments from history are employed and
frequently appealed to by all the parties involved, we, as specialists in this
field, have an obligation to supply Greeks and the international community
at large with the essential information that will (we hope) enable them to
understand the individual parameters of a complex situation and aid the
dialogue by putting forward their own productive views.

Irredentist ‘Aegean Macedonia’

This claim is a common one found in many of the sources. Impressively


resistant to time, it is the most serious proposition in FYROM’s irredentist
propaganda. Note that it could not have been put forward before 1940,
since this use of the term ‘Macedonia’ had not yet been invented: the term
in use, Vardarska Banovina [Vardar Province], denoted the South Serbian
districts.
The first occurrence of the term is in the founding manifesto of AFCM
(already cited). Here the unification of ‘Macedonia’, based on the right of
self-determination, was a primary goal: ‘It is essential that we unite the whole
Macedonian people of the three parts of Macedonia into one Macedonian
state… Macedonians from Greek and Bulgarian Macedonia must follow the
example of Macedonians in Jugoslav Macedonia’.

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IR R EDENTISM AND POLICY: F Y ROM OF FICIA L STATE PA PERS

▲ Jugoslav stamp, 1939, with the legend ‘Vardarska’ [Banovina]


for the southern part of Serbia.

This goal was not just praiseworthy ambition on the part of the local
leadership of the SRM [the Socialist Republic of Makedonija] it reflected,
every so often, the party line of the Federal Jugoslav Government. In the
period from immediately after the Allies’ liberation of the Balkans from the
Axis Powers in the last months of 1944 to the end of the Greek Civil War
in 1949, there was a spate of official Jugoslav irredentist pronunciamenti
against Greece. Significantly, only a month or two after the AFCM Manifesto,
during the first session of AVNOJ [the Anti-Fascist Council for the Liberation
of Jugoslavia] in Belgrade [9-12 November 1944], General Vukmanović,
known as Tempo, representing PRM [the People’s Republic of Makedonija],
claimed that ‘Macedonians’ living in Greek and Bulgarian Macedonia
were eagerly awaiting union with the mother republic. Timed to coincide
with the session, a letter of protest (published in the newspaper Politika for
13 November) from ANVOJ’s Vice-President Dimitar Vlahov to the Greek
Prime Minister accused Greece of ‘imperialist’ policy against her northern
neighbour, and of oppression of the ‘Macedonian Anti-Fascists of Aegean
Macedonia’. 
The oneness of the ‘Macedonians’ was clearly marked on wall maps
in various buildings in PRM; Thessaloniki appeared as the Macedonian

. Public Record Office, War Office [henceforward PRO/WO] 204/9677, Classified Report from British
Military Mission to Belgrade, 14 Νovember 1944, Call No.CB-2694.

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Ì a c e d o n i a n i s m

capital.  Interviewed for the New York Times early in April 1945, Josip Broz
Tito, president of the Federal Republic of Jugoslavia, said that though his
country had no territorial claims on Greece, there was nothing to prevent
the possible wish of Macedonians to unite.  On 22 July 1945, Belgrade also
sent a protest note to Athens, accusing Greece of the ‘persecution’ of ‘our
Macedonian compatriots’ in ‘Aegean Macedonia’ by parastatal groups and
by state authorities as well. Belgrade called for these people to be granted
human rights and for unimpeded return of the refugees to their homes.  On
11 October 1945, in a speech at Skopje during celebrations of the fourth
anniversary of the Jugoslav resistance against the Fascist Occupation, and
in front of thousands of people including refugees from Greece, Tito himself
said that Jugoslavia would never renounce ‘the right of the Macedonian
people to unite’. There were (he said) ‘our brethren in Aegean Macedonia,
to whose fate we are not indifferent. Our thoughts are with them, and we
care about them’. He ended: ‘I promise you that all Macedonians will one
day be united in their own community, Macedonia’.
But this was not to be the end of the Jugoslavian crescendo of protest
against Greece. In a speech to the Constituent Assembly of Jugoslavia, on
26 January 1946, Bane Andrejev spent a good deal of time talking about
Greek ‘terrorizing’ of Slav speakers within Greece, emphasizing that the
latter should ‘go on with their fight for freedom’.10 At the same time, Andrejev
insisted that for Greek and Bulgarian Macedonia to unite with PRM was no
act of hegemony but the consummation of the Macedonian legitimate
demand for union.11 Similar was the tenor of a speech by the veteran
Communist activist Dimitar Vlahov, leader between the two World Wars of
the United VMRO. He referred at great length to areas not yet incorporated
into the Jugoslavian Federation. He also had something to say about the
situation in Greek Macedonia, where (according to him) there were 129
‘terrorist groups’ working to annihilate Slav speakers. Vlahov ended by
advocating the formation of a united Macedonia within the Federation.12

. Historical Archive of the Greek Foreign Ministry [henceforward ΙΑΥΕ] 1945, File 59/2, Commander
Superior, Special Security Office of the Supreme Command of the West Macedonia Gendarmerie,
Col. P. Anastasopoulos, ‘Information Bulletin’. Kozani. 29 May 1945. Call No. 12/1/6.
. Records of the U.S. Department of State [henceforward DS]. Greece 1945-1949, 868.00/4-3045,
Reel No.2, Office. To Greek Foreign Ministry. Athens, 30 Αpril 1945, Call No. Εmb. 1154. See also Νέα
Αλήθεια, 24 April 1945.
. DS Greece 1945-1949, 868.00/7-2445, Reel No. 3, Telegram from Kirk to the State Department, Caz-
erta, 24 July 1945, Call No. Εmp. 3046 The contents of this Note were published in the Greek newspa-
pers at the beginning of September: see Μακεδονία, 2 September 1945.
. Public Record Office, Foreign Office [henceforward PRO/FO] 371/48389, The Jugoslav Note to
Greece is attached to Caccia’s reply to the Foreign Office, Athens, 24 July 1945, Call No. 373.
. Halkias Archive, ‘Parts of Tito’s speech at Skopje on 11 October 1945’. See also Μακεδονία, 14 Oc-
tober 1945, See also Ελληνικόν Θάρρος, 25 Νovember 1945, Ελληνικός Βορράς, 25 Νovember 1945,
with photo of the final paragraph of Tito’s speech. See also A. Kyrou, Η συνωμοσία εναντίον της
Μακεδονίας [The conspiracy against Macedonia] 1940-1949 (Αthens, 1950, in Greek), p. 143.
10. PRO/FO 371/58615, Stevenson to the Foreign Office, Belgrade, 22 January 1946, Call No. 125.
11. Andrejev’s speech was published in the 20 February 1946 issue of Bilten (Билтен). See G.Modis, Σχέδια
και Ορέξεις γειτόνων [Neighbours’ Plans and Appetites], Thessaloniki, 1947, pp. 17-18.
12. PRO/FO 371/58615, Stevenson to Foreign Office, Belgrade, 22 January 1946, Call No. 124.

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IR R EDENTISM AND POLICY: F Y ROM OF FICIA L STATE PA PERS

At the beginning of April 1946, Dimitar Vlahov made a speech at Monastir,


present day Bitola, about ‘Aegean Macedonia’, expressing the longings of
the ‘Macedonian’ people. His local audience was swelled by a thousand
or so refugee Slavophones [speakers of any Slavonic language] from Greek
Macedonia.13 The Parliamentary Vice-President called on them to continue
devoting their labour to the work of renewing and rebuilding Jugoslavia.14
On 26 April 1946, Col. Pečo Trajkov, Skopje’s army commander, gave an
interview to a Toronto newspaper in which he said that PRM had indeed
been incorporated into the Jugoslav Federation, but that this was not
the end of the matter. Goče Delčev’s slogans of ‘a complete and united
republic’ still rang in their ears (he said); and this would be achieved by
uniting ‘Pirin Macedonia’ and ‘Aegean Macedonia’ (regarded by Trajkov
as ‘occupied territory’) with PRM itself.15
On 2 July 1946 the Congress of the ‘Union of Macedonian Women’ was
held in Skopje. Ourania Perovski, as representative of refugee women from
Greece, made a reference to the peoples of ‘Aegean Macedonia’ who (she
said) still languished under ‘monarchist-fascist terrorism’.16 The celebrations
of Ilinden began on this very same day in Skopje, as did the 1st Congress
of the Macedonian Popular Front. Among the VIPs taking part were Lazar
Količevski, the President of the People’s Republic of Makedonija; M. Nesković,
the President of the Republic of Serbia; and the Federal Minister of Justice,
Frane Frol. There were also delegations from Pirin Macedonia, headed by
the Bulgarian parliamentary deputy Hristo Stoichev; and delegates from
Greek Macedonia and from Trieste.17 In the city’s Stadium, named for Tito,
was a banner with the words ‘We have never denied the Macedonian
People’s right to unite. We will not deny our principles because of personal
sympathies’, then, quoting Tito’s speech of 11 October the previous year, ‘We
have brethren in Aegean Macedonia, to whose fate we are not indifferent.
Our thoughts are with them, and we care about them’.18 This was the cue
for fiery oratory in favour of the union of the ‘Macedonian People’. The key
speech was Frol’s. To the plaudits of the assembled crowd, he gave his pledge
that Jugoslavia would strive to this end.19 PRM’s president, Količevski, invoked
the example of the unification of Italy in the 19th century. He referred to the
People’s Republic of Makedonija as ‘our own Piedmont, for the liberation
and union of all Macedonia’. He expressed his belief that the struggle for
‘Aegean Macedonia’ would wipe out the ‘monarchist-fascist’ [Greek]
regime and would give the people back their freedom. Similar in tone was

13. ΙΑΥΕ 1946, File 67/2, Dalietos’ telegram in code to Greek Foreign Ministry, Belgrade, 16 April 1946, Call
No. 296.
14. ΙΑΥΕ 1946, File 67/2,Dalietos’ report to Greek Foreign Ministry, Belgrade, 25 April 1946, Call No. 650.
The Greek Ambassador got his information from the issue of Borba for 17 April 1946.
15. Halkias Archive.
16. ΙΑΥΕ 1946, File 67/2, Dalietos’ report to Greek Foreign Ministry, Belgrade, 2 July 1946, Call No. 1206.
17. PRO/FO 371/58615, Clutton to Bevin, Belgrade, 22 August 1946, Call No. 310.
18. Halkias Archive.
19. Halkias Archive.

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Ì a c e d o n i a n i s m

Vlahov’s speech. He underlined the need for unremitting struggle so that


the other two parts of Macedonia, the Greek and the Bulgarian, be joined
to PRM. As representative of the refugees from Greek Macedonia, Mihail
Keramičiev spoke of his fellow-combatants’ distress. ‘We Macedonians of the
Aegean’ (he said) ‘are more uncertain than ever today which road to go if
we are to gain our freedom and enter the People’s Republic of Makedonija’.
The Congress then resolved to send a memorandum to the Paris Peace
Conference including the words: ‘…in another Part of the country, Aegean
Macedonia, there is raging terrorism… Our people ask that the principles of
the Atlantic Charter be applied in Aegean Macedonia’.20 Simultaneously the
following declaration was published in the newspapers: ‘Women and men
of Macedonia! Taking part in the 1st Congress of the Macedonian Popular
Front were dear friends and delegates from Pirin [i.e. Bulgarian] and Aegean
[i.e. Greek] Macedonia. This turned the Congress into a demonstration of the
unshakeable determination of the Macedonian People, from all the Parts of
Macedonia, to be completely free and at unity with our own PRM, within the
Federal Jugoslav Republic. It has been a basic item on the agenda of the
Popular Front, from the very first day of its existence, that the Macedonian
People (in its entirety) must be united with its Republic’.21
A further step forward in Skopje’s irredentist actions was the publishing, in
the 26 August 1946 issue of the official State news organ Borba [The Struggle],
a map showing Jugoslavia’s borders, as in force and as determined by
‘ethnic group’. It is immediately obvious that the ‘ethnic’ boundaries take
in very nearly the whole of Greek Macedonia, Thessaloniki included.
Along with the map – which, it is important to note, was then published
in many Jugoslav newspapers and journals – was an extensive article
attacking ‘the terrorism practised in Greece against democratic citizens,22
especially Slavophones’. More than twenty thousand ‘fellow-nationals’ had,
according to Borba, been obliged to leave Greece and flee to Jugoslavia
and Bulgaria. The reader needs to be aware here that the original of this
map is to be found among Bulgarian nationalists of the period between the
two World Wars, when Sofia had a virtual monopoly on Slav irredentism in
the Macedonian Question. In 1933, for instance, the Macedonian Institute
in Sofia attempted to reinforce Bulgarian expansionist plans by circulating
a ‘Geographical Map of Macedonia’ (see illustration below). This same
map, showing the ‘Geographical and Ethnic Boundaries of Macedonia’,
was subsequently reproduced at Skopje, as an illustration for a History of the
Macedonian People published in 1969 and reissued by the State Publishing

20. ΙΑΥΕ 1946, File 67/2, Telegram from Dalietos to Greek Foreign Ministry, Belgrade, 7 August 1946, Call
No. 1461. See also Halkias Archive. See also Μόδης, op.cit, pp. 40-41.
21. ΙΑΥΕ 1946, File 1/4, Letter from Dalietos to Greek Foreign Ministry, Belgrade, 10 August 1946, Call No.
1513 See also και Halkias Archive, ΙΑΥΕ 1946, File 1/10, Letter from Lieut.Col. of Artillery K. Iatros to
Greek Foreign Ministry, ΒΣΤ 902, 23 September 1946, Call No. Classified ΓΕΣ/3392203/Α2/ΙΙ. See also FO
371/58615, Clutton to Bevin, Belgrade, 22 August 1946, Call No. 310.
22. [This carefully-chosen expression would also have been capable of the meanings ‘republican citi-
zens’ and ‘citizens of the Republic’ (i.e. PRM). Translator’s Note].

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▲ Map published in Borba, the Jugoslav Communist Party’s official newspaper,


on 26 August 1946.

▲ Map of Greater Macedonia, published in 1933


by the Macedonian Institute in Sofia.

House Нова Македонија in 1992. It was published in tandem with a book


entitled Macedonia: a Natural and Economic Unity (Sofia 1945), reissued by
FYROM’s Institute of National History (Skopje 1978).
From the beginning of September 1946, the war of words between
diplomats in Athens and Belgrade heates up. The opening shot was fired
in Skopje on 12 September 1946, at the ceremony for the transfer of Goče
Delčev’s remains. Vlahov delivered an inflammatory oration in which he
denounced the policy of the ‘Greek fascists’. It was aimed (he said) at
annihilating the ‘Macedonian People’ and at driving them out. Greece
had ‘no ethnic, political, or economic rights’ over ‘Aegean Macedonia’.23

23. Halkias Archive.

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Ì a c e d o n i a n i s m

▲ Covers (in photocopy) of the book Macedonia as a natural and economic unit
(Sofia 1945, in Bulgarian, republished Skopje 1978, in Slavmacedonian).

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IR R EDENTISM AND POLICY: F Y ROM OF FICIA L STATE PA PERS

He virtually repeated these assertions a few days later at Monastir, when


addressing a large gathering of some ten thousand people. ‘Greece has
no right to Aegean Macedonia’ he said ‘which has always been made
up of Slavs’. He went on: ‘The Macedonian People has, according to the
Atlantic Charter, every right to unite.
A United Macedonia exhibits [sic]
full and perfect ethnic, racial and
economic unity. Each part of it seeks
nothing other than union within the
context and borders of Jugoslavia’.24
At the end of September, Andrejev
returned to the theme of acts of
terrorism against the Slavophone
population. He declared his firm
intention of fighting to save them
from imminent extinction.25 At
the Paris Peace Conference, the
Jugoslav delegate to the Political &
Territorial Committee on Bulgaria,
Moša Pijade, declared in committee
session that ‘Aegean Macedonia’
was going through ‘the most tragic
era of its history due to brutal
violence’,26 and asked the Great
Powers to intervene immediately
‘to put a stop to this regime’ so that
the ‘oppressed Macedonian people could be freed from the Greek yoke
and form a state within the Jugoslav Federation’.
Throughout the 1940s, the verbal pronunciamenti about the oneness of
the Macedonian area and about irredenta ‘Aegean Macedonia’ were
translated into action. It is now accepted that Jugoslavia was actively
involved in the Greek Civil War, and that it openly incited, not so much
the resistance fighters of Markos’ Democratic Army, as those Slavophone
organizations vowed to the secession of Greek Macedonia. One such
was the secessionist movement led by Ilias Dimakis known as ‘Goče’. In
November 1944 he made Monastir his headquarters and worked hard at
reorganizing his band, recruiting widely from refugees in Greece. Before
very long he had a body of about a thousand men, which he named
the ‘First Aegean Strike Brigade’. Dimakis himself became the Brigade’s

24. Nova Makedonija, 22 September 1946.


25. Halkias Archive.
26. ΙΑΥΕ 1946, File 43/4, Session Minutes of the Political & Territorial Committee on Bulgaria, 6 September
1946, ΙΑΥΕ 1946, File 1/4, Telegram from Dragoumis to Greek Foreign Ministry, Paris, 6 September
1946, Call No. 1426. See also Καθημερινή, 7 September 1946, το Βήμα, 7 September 1946, το Φως, 7
September 1946.

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Ì a c e d o n i a n i s m

commander. As his second-in-command he chose Naum Pejov, a veteran


of the SNOF [Slavomacedonian People’s Liberation Front] and a native of
the village of Gavros, near Kastoria: Pejov had fled to the PRM in June 1944.
Dimakis’ Political Commissar was Mihail Keramičiev, from the same village as
Pejov, with Vangel Ajanovski-Oche from the Edessa region as Keramičiev’s
deputy.27
There is also today evidence for the view that NOF [People’s Liberation
Front]28 was organized at the instance of PRM, the Communist Party of
Makedonija, and its overt aim was the union of Greek Macedonia with the
Jugoslav Federation. Very revealing indeed is the content of a conversation

▲ The ‘First Aegean Strike Brigade’ marching through Monastir.

between Količevski and NOF leaders in Skopje, at the very end of the year
1946. Količevski gives them orders to go down into Greece and fight alongside
the Greek Communists. ‘You will now go down there… The KKE [Communist
Party of Greece] will direct your struggle… The [party] line of the KKE has

27. A few days later, the Aridaia & Edessa Battalion went the same road, under the leadership of an-
other SNOF veteran, the schoolmaster Pavle Rakovski, See the article by Sp. Sfetas, «Αυτονομιστικές
κινήσεις των Σλαβοφώνων κατά το 1944, η στάση του ΚΚΕ και η διαφύλαξη των ελληνογιουγκοσλαβικών
συνόρων» [Slavophones’ separatist moves in 1994, the Greek Communist Party’s position, and the
maintenance of the Greek and Jugoslav borders], pp. 105-124 (in Greek) in: Πρακτικά του Διεθνούς
Συνεδρίου Μακεδονία και Θράκη, 1941-1944. Κατοχή – Αντίσταση – Απελευθέρωση [Proceedings of
the International Conference ‘Macedonia & Thrace’: Occupation, Resistance, Liberation]. Thessa-
loniki, 1998.
28. NOF [Popular (or ‘People’s’) Liberation Front] = НОФ [Народно Осбодителнют Фронт]. Activist or-
ganization of Slavophones in Greece. Founded at the instance of the Jugoslav Communists. Active
throughout the Greek Civil War, its aim being the secession of Greek Macedonia.

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IR R EDENTISM AND POLICY: F Y ROM OF FICIA L STATE PA PERS

been put right… you can trust them… any problems you have, you can sort
them out with the KKE leadership… fight whole-heartedly along with the
Greek People… against chauvinism, separatism, and local trends’.29
It is clear that these pro-Jugoslav elements in NOF had a single professed
aim: the secession of Greek Macedonia and its union with the Jugoslav
Federation. Supporting evidence of this is an article published by the
organization in its periodical Bilten [The Bulletin] on 15 March 1946, in which
NOF denies accusations of collaboration with the Bulgarians. ‘We are not
Ohranites [‘Guards’]’ it reads, ‘still less are we separatists. This is proved by the
line we take. Our struggle is against separatism, for two reasons: it leads the
Macedonian People to the precipice, to new slavery, and separatism is the
line taken by the forces of international reaction, which want to break up the
unity of the Jugoslav peoples’. This disclaimer was however accompanied
by an affirmation of the policy of secession for Greek Macedonia and enosis
with PRM: ‘The Macedonian People have the right to unite and this right they
have won with the gun. The Macedonian People of Aegean Macedonia
have, by joining the ranks of ELAS [the National Popular Liberation Army] and
by fighting Fascism, at the same time been fighting for national freedom…
The Macedonian People of Aegean Macedonia has every right to ask to
be united with its pillar and prop, progressive Vardar Macedonia… We wish
to live with our free brethren of Vardar Macedonia, to be able to enjoy the
fruits that the greater part of our people has won’. 30
The PRM’s and Jugoslavia’s irredentist claims continued unabated for the
duration of the Greek Civil War. Elections for the Popular Front of Macedonia
were held in Skopje, on 7 March 1948. As president of, respectively, the
Presidium of the People’s Parliament of Jugoslavia, and the Council of the
Popular Front of Macedonia, Dimitar Vlahov condemned ‘monarchist-
fascist’ Greece and referred to ‘our Macedonian brethren in Aegean
Macedonia, alongside the Democratic Army, fighting for its overthrow’. 31 In
a speech to the 2nd Congress of the Macedonian Popular Front, Količevski
criticized Bulgaria’s ‘Patriotic Front’ for ideas of aggrandisement, and
in the same breath proclaimed the right of the ‘Macedonian’ people to
unite within the Jugoslav Federation. 32 Commenting on his statements,
and on the dissonance between Belgrade and Sofia, the Greek daily
newspaper Kathimerini observed that Serbia and Bulgaria were bickering
not just amongst themselves, but like the proverbial ‘two cocks fighting over
someone else’s barn’ – the ‘barn’ being, Greek Macedonia. 33 Vlahov then
went on to make new speeches in which he insisted that Greece had no

29. Tashko Mamurovski, Паскал Митревски и неговото време (1912-1978) [Paskal Miitrevski (i.e. Paskh-
alis Miitropoulos) and his times (1912-1978)], Skopje, 1992, pp. 73-74 (in Slavmacedonian). For NOF
actions, the author cites a note from Fotev: this is now in his family archives.
30. Modis, op.cit, pp. 12-13.
31. ΙΑΥΕ 1948, File 52, Sub-File 3, Report by P. Gerolymatos, 1st Secretary, directing the Greek Consulate
at Skopje, to Greek Foreign Ministry, Skopje, 8 March 1948.
32. Καθημερινή, 15 June 1948.
33. Καθημερινή, 16 June 1948.

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Ì a c e d o n i a n i s m

▲ Front page of Билтен [Bilten], issued by NOF during the Civil War.

sovereign rights over ‘Aegean Macedonia’, which, he said belonged from


the ethnological point of view to the Slavomacedonians. 34
The year 1949 came in, and the drama of events in Greece reached its
high point. Since the autumn of 1948 it had gradually emerged that relations
between the KKE, the Greek Communist Party, and its Jugoslav counterpart
were becoming increasingly strained. This very soon became clear for all to
see; and it was the direct consequence of the rupture between Stalin and
Tito, and Tito’s expulsion from the Cominform in the summer of ’48. At the
very beginning of 1949, a close associate (Petros Roussos) of the senior Greek
communist Nikos Zahariadis was summing up the work done outside Greece
by the Party in 1948. He referred to ‘Tito’s treachery’, and called it ‘a stab in
the back’ for Greeks. 35 There was a double sequel: firstly, a split within the
ranks of the NOF, 36 with a cleavage between pro-Jugoslavs and others who
remained loyal to the Greek Communist Party, and secondly, a resolution by
the Party at its 5th Plenary Session (30-31 January 1949), adding fuel to the
flames. The Party’s Secretary-General, Zahariadis, gave his audience a taste

34. Αλήθεια, 15 June 1948.


35. Anna Matthaiou & Popi Polemi. «‘Οι διεθνείς σχέσεις της Δημοκρατικής Ελλάδας μέσα στο 1948’: μία
έκθεση του Πέτρου Ρούσου» [Petros Roussos’ report, ‘The foreign relations of the Republic of Greece
in 1948’], Αρχειοτάξιο, 2 (June 2000, in Greek), 8.
36. On the founding and activities of NOF the classic work on the Slavomacedonian side is still the study
by Risto Kirjazovski [Ристо Кирјазовски], Народно Ослободителниот Фронт иДругите Организации
на Македонците од Егејска Македонија (1945-1949)» [The People’s Liberation Front and other orga-
nizations of Macedonians from Aegean Macedonia (1945-1949)], Skopje, 1985, in Slavmacedonian.

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IR R EDENTISM AND POLICY: F Y ROM OF FICIA L STATE PA PERS

of what was to come in his opening remarks. ‘In our People’s new rising’, he
said, ‘the Macedonian people have given their all. With their blood they
have won the right to free and independent life and development. There
can be no doubt that as a result of the victory of the popular revolution in
Greece the Macedonian people will win the right to free and independent
life and development’. This was a frank confession of a change of direction
on the minorities’ issue, and it was certainly due to the tight corner in which
the KKE found itself at the start of 1949. Therefore, despite the objections of
many leading Party members, the 5th Plenary resolved to finally recognize
the right of the ‘Macedonian People’ to national reconstruction and self-
determination:
‘…In northern Greece the Macedonian People have given their all for the
struggle and are fighting on with admirable and total heroism and self-sacrifice.
It cannot be doubted that as o result of victory by the DSE [Democratic Army
of Greece] and the People’s Revolution, the Macedonian People will have full
national restitution, as they themselves want it, winning it tomorrow by giving
their life-blood today. Macedonian Communists will always be at the head
of their people’s struggle. At the same time Macedonian Communists must
beware of the divisive and disruptive activities fostered by alien elements in
order to disrupt the unity between the Macedonian and the Greek People,
a disruption that can only assist their common enemy, monarchism and
fascism, and American and English imperialism. At the same time, the KKE
must root out all obstacles and must strike at all chauvinist demonstrations
of Greek expansionism, that are causing resentment and discomfort among
the Macedonian People, thus helping the disrupters with their treacherous
activity and stiffening the forces of resistance. The Slavomacedonian and the
Greek People can only win if united. If divided, all they can do is lose. So the
two peoples’ unity in the struggle must be jealously guarded, as the apple of
their eye, and strengthened little by little, day by day’.
The resolutions of the 5th Plenary Session were followed by a whole series
of Party initiatives in pursuit of the new policy. The 2nd Plenary Session of
the Central Committee of NOF was held on 3 February 1949. In his speech,
Zahariadis set out what the Slavophones were being offered in exchange:
essentially a reshuffle of the Republic’s Provisional Government to promote
a Slavophone to a ministerial post; NOF representation on the DSE’s General
Staff; the renaming of the DSE’s 11th Division as the ‘Macedonian Division’;
and the founding of a ‘Macedonian’ Communist organization. In the hope
particularly of pushing the group round the pro-Tito Keramičiev further to
the sidelines, Zahariadis promoted to the NOF Secretariat two of his old
buddies among the Slavomacedonian activists, Paskal Mitrevski and Pavel
Rakovski. The KKE leadership was indisputably breaking new ground with
these decisions, as was noted by the bourgeois Press, which spoke of the
Party’s ‘irrevocable split…from the body of the Nation’. 37

37. Ελευθερία, 4 March 1949.

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Ì a c e d o n i a n i s m

It was not many weeks later, on 25-26 March 1949, that the 2nd Congress
of the NOF was held, at Psarades on the Prespa Lakes district of Florina. To
an audience of seven hundred delegates, Zahariadis acknowledged the
part played by the ‘Macedonian’ people, and then harped on the need for
unity with the Greek People if victory was to be achieved. At the end of its
deliberations, the Congress condemned Keramičiev’s pro-Yugoslav group,
and declared the ‘Macedonian’ people’s right to self-determination. ‘In the
present critical moments of the 2nd NOF Congress’ an the Declaration, ‘the
enemies of our people are trying on all sides to disrupt the unity between
the Macedonian People and the militant unity between the Macedonian
People and the Greek People, a unity essential for the victory of both Peoples.
Enemies of our People, of every sort, are exploiting military difficulties and
the other difficulties stemming from them, and are exploiting the situation
in Jugoslavia, uttering various different slogans that make headway with
certain craven and drooping elements, inciting them to break ranks. We,
the seven hundred delegates to the 2nd Congress of the People’s Liberation
Front, do brand these conspirators who are sowing disruption and desertion
in our lines, treading on the blood of our thousands of heroes, as common
traitors and miserable deserters from our People’s struggle. All who have
been led astray by the preaching of the enemy and the disrupters’ subversive
manoeuvres, and who have taken the easy road of flight and desertion,
have done a hellish deed of counter-popular treachery that will help none
but the enemy, the monarchist-fascists, and the imperialist camp’. 38
On the very next day, 27 March, Zahariadis’ pledge to the 2nd NOF
Congress was put into effect, with the founding of KOEM [the Communist
Organization of Aegean Macedonia]. A week later, on 3 April, Mitrevski
became Minister of Supplies in the Provisional Government, Vangel Kojchev
became a member of the DSE’s Supreme War Council and Kochev became
president of Directorate of National Minorities.
Throughout the spring of 1949 there were various different contacts, of a
desperate kind, between the KKE and NOF, and Slavomacedonians who had
taken refuge in Skopje. The purpose was to persuade these latter to change
their minds and join the DSE, even were it only at the eleventh hour. 39 In May

38. For the resolutions taken at the 5th KKE Congress and the actions of NOF, the standard works are still
Evangelos Kofos’ book The Impact of the Macedonian Question on Civil Conflict in Greece (1943-
1949), (Athens, 1989, in English), and Spyridon Sfetas’ article «Ανεπιθύμητοι σύμμαχοι και ανεξέλεγκτοι
αντίπαλοι: Οι σχέσεις ΚΚΕ και NOF στη διάρκεια του εμφυλίου (1946-1949)» [Undesirable allies and
uncontrollable opponents: the relations between the KKE and the NOF during the Civil War (1946-
1949)], in: Spyridon Sfetas [ed], Όψεις του Μακεδονικού Ζητήματος στον 20ό αιώνα [Aspects of the
Macedonian Question in the 20th century] (Thessaloniki, 2001, in Greek), 157-203. See also Spyridon
Sfetas. Η διαμόρφωση της σλαβομακεδονικής ταυτότητας. Μια επώδυνη διαδικασία [The forming of
the Slavomacedonian identity], Thessaloniki, 2003 (in Greek), pp. 257-268.
39. An exhaustive account of the negotiations between the Greek and Jugoslav Communists and
the part played by the Slavomacedonians is to be found in a study by Risto Kirjazovski [Ристо
Кирјазовски], Македонците и односите на КПЈ и КПГ 1945-1949 [The Macedonians and relations
between the Jugoslav and Greek and Communist Parties, 1945-1949], Skopje, 1995, in Slavmacedo-
nian.

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▲ The newspaper Μακεδονικός Φρουρός [Makedonikos Frouros], 24 July 1949.

1949 the Keramičiev-Dimakis group sent the KKE a letter that put an end to
all attempts to play the go-between. 40 It made a blanket criticism of KKE
policy on the Macedonian Question as ‘in error’ and ‘biassed’ against the
‘Macedonian’ People. Per contra, the letter lauded the Communist Parties
of Jugoslavia and Makedonija, and Tito himself, to the skies for their policy.
The Slavomacedonian ‘guerrillas’ naturally included among the conditions
of their assistance to the KKE that they should receive ‘an apology in writing’
for the ‘injustices’ done to NOF; that independent ‘Macedonian’ units should
be created, with a ‘Macedonian’ cadre at the head of each; that anti-
Tito propaganda should be discontinued; and that free communication
between Greek and Jugoslav Macedonia should be restored. These were
demands to which the KKE obviously had no choice but to assent. 41
On 28 July 1949, a month or so before the end of the Greek Civil War, an
end which was already in sight, Τίτο addressed a convention of pro-Jugoslav
NOF cadres in Skopje. 42 The majority of them were refugees from Greece. 43
Tito launched a fierce attack on the KKE. He accused it of never having
been remotely interested in the rights of Slavomacedonians in Greece. 44 He

40. There is a blow-by-blow account in the Memoirs of two leading Slavomacedonian activists, Naum
Peyov, Македонците и граѓанската војна во Грција [The Macedonians and the Civil war in
Greece], Skopje, 1968, in Slavmacedonian. Vangel Ajanovski-Oche, Егејски Бури [Storms in the Ae-
gean], Skopje, 1975, in Slavmacedonian.
41. The complete correspondence, and the contacts between pro-Jugoslav elements and loyal KKE
cadres of the NOF, are to be found in: Архив на Македонија, Егејска Македонија во НОБ 1949,
Vol. 6, Skopje, 1983, in Slavmacedonian.
42. ΙΑΥΕ 1949, File 34, Sub-File 2, Telegram from Baizos to Greek Foreign Ministry, Skopje, 28 July 1949, Call
No. 571.
43. Evangelos Kofos, Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia, Thessaloniki, 1964, p. 185, Ελευθερία,
30 July 1949.
44. Kofos, op.cit., p. 185.

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Ì a c e d o n i a n i s m

▲ The newspaper Μακεδονικός Φρουρός [Makedonikos Frouros], 15 May 1949 and 5 June 1949.

▲ ‘The NOF and the Cominform greatly wanted to detach Greek Macedonia.
‘Over my dead body!’, says the Evzone. Nobody knew this better than Tito’.
From the newspaper Μακεδονία [Makedonia], 24 April 1949.

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called on refugees from Greece to work for their peaceful integration into
Jugoslavia – which was interpreted in Greek circles as meaning that he had
given up his territorial claims on Greek Macedonia. Tito also met deputations
of refugees from Greece and wounded guerrillas, a meeting which was
given an official atmosphere by the presence of numerous high-ranking
members of the Federal and local Party officials. The refugees apparently
thanked Tito for his help, while condemning the revanchist language of KKE
broadcasts against Jugoslavia. 45 Tito allowed a day or two to pass, then on
2 August 1949, on the occasion of the 5th anniversary of the proclamation
of the PRM, and in front of a very large audience – of perhaps as many as
35,000 people, according to foreign diplomats46 – he delivered his bombshell.
He accused the KKE of not behaving properly towards the ‘Macedonians of
the Aegean’. It had not placed them in senior Party positions; and it had not
permitted ‘Macedonian schools’ to function in free Greece. Immediately
afterwards, Makedonija’s president, Količevski, described his Republic as
‘the Piedmont of a future United Macedonia’. 47 The above phraseology was
a mirror of the revaluation of Jugoslav policy towards Greece. While the
goal remained the same, to wit the secession of Greek Macedonia and
the shielding of the ‘Macedonian minority’ in Greece, the means were now
different, since virtually all the Slavomacedonian activists had by now fled
to the PRM.
Once the Greek Civil War came to its close, PRM propaganda on
behalf of ‘Macedonia irredenta’ increased. Now it was spearheaded by
Slavophone ex-guerrillas who had taken refuge en masse in Jugoslavia
after the War ended. Their efforts were aided and abetted by various
different academic bodies in the PRM, giving them the necessary touch of
authority and impetus to keep going. At the start of 1950, for instance, with
the encouragement and economic assistance of the local Party leadership,
the ‘Union of Refugees from Aegean Macedonia’ [UR] was set up in Skopje.
Its aim was to pull into its ranks all the refugees from Greece who had made
their way to the PRM. Membership of UR was open to any refugee living in
Jugoslavia. Run by a General Council, it had branches, each with its own
local council, in various parts of the country. The Union’s interest was by no
means confined exclusively to refugees in PRM, however; it extended to
the Slavophone residue in Greece. In his summary to the general assembly
one year after the inception, the Union’s Secretary General stated that UR
had a duty to keep a close eye on developments in Greek Macedonia,
and to denounce the ‘monarchist-fascist’ Greek government’s policy of
discrimination against Slav-speakers. 48

45. ΙΑΥΕ 1949, File 34, Sub-File 2, Report from Baizos to Greek Foreign Ministry, Skopje, 7 August 1949, Call
No. 602/Δ/1.
46. ΙΑΥΕ 1949, File 34, Sub-File 2, Report from Baizos to Greek Foreign Ministry, Skopje, 7 August 1949, Call
No. 589/Δ/1.
47. Elizabeth Barker, Macedonia: its place in Balkan Power Politics (1950), pp. 209-210.
48. Архив на Македонија, фонд 996: «Организациони Извештај» [Organizational Report].

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Ì a c e d o n i a n i s m

In June 1951, it was put on record in a resolution of UR’s Assembly that it was
the Union’s duty not to be indifferent to the terrible sufferings of their People
in Greece. 49 A codicil to the same resolution read: ‘We must regularly keep
the [Jugoslav] Government informed of the Athens Govenrment’s policy of
genocide, and encourage it to take initiatives in international forums’.
These observations placed the irredentist issue on the agenda of the
SRM’s – and hence Jugoslavia’s - relations with neighbouring countries
from the very first. The same purpose was also served by the use of the
term ‘Aegeans’ [Егејците] to describe refugees from Greece, in place
of the non-specific ‘Macedonians’. It was clear, in other words, that the
use of the term in question promoted the concept of the unity of the
Macedonian People, while also pointing to the existence of ‘enslaved,
unredeemed brethren’ and keeping alive the prospect of their future

▲ The newspaper Voice of the Aegeans [Глас на Егејците].

union under the leadership of the Jugoslav Communists. The same


September, UR issued its own monthly newspaper, Voice of the Aegeans
[Глас на Егејците].
This newspaper was one of several activities by which the UR hatched,
and then gradually systematized and codified an irredentist campaign
to the detriment of Greece. Dozens of articles were published by Voice of
the Aegeans before its demise in 1954, a sacrifice on the altar of the triple
rapprochement between Greece, Jugoslavia, and Turkey. All attempted
to construct and bring to the fore a history of ‘Aegean Macedonia’, linking
it with the broader historical superstructure of the SRM. The story of the
closure of this activist organ is some indication of how organically it was
connected with the official local political establishment. The stake of PRM’s
government in UR is also attested by the fact that in the summer of 1951
Dimči Mire, president of the local parliament, was a member not only of UR’s
Council General but also of the committee responsible for the newspaper.
The reason why UR’s activities were being encouraged by the Federal
Government was, according to an evaluation by the British Embassy at
Athens, that Belgrade wanted ‘to keep Macedonian consciousness alive,
since it might prove useful in the future’. This might, the evaluation added,

49. Глас на Егејсите, No. 11, 17 June 1951.

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be a way of discouraging refugees who were not eager to stay in Jugoslavia


and wanted to return to Greece. 50
From the very first moment, the UR’s Slavomacedonian activists regarded it
as of the greatest urgency to write their own history, which (they insisted) had
been deliberately passed over in silence by Balkan historians; and they also
laid great weight on the political education of the young. Construction of a
Slavomacedonian myth: this was their ultimate goal. The Slav Macedonian
way of thinking had by now cottoned on to the unique advantage, for this
purpose, of actually living in PRM, friendly mother and homeland. What
was needed for success was to mobilize all the available forces of the
political nomenklatura among the Slavomacedonian political refugees.
Their writing of a ‘constructed’ history proceeded along three main lines.
First they recorded the military events of the past ten years, the German
Occupation, and the Greek Civil War, and set them in a connected chain
of Slavomacedonian history. Second, they linked this whole period with the
remoter past, and above all with the Ilinden Uprising of 1903. Third, they
singled out Slavomacedonian heroes from the more recent historical past
and set them among the pantheon of other Slavomacedonian heroes of
the Federal Republic.
The method of achieving the first of these aims preoccupied the editorial
staff of Voice of the Aegeans throughout the paper’s existence. At the UR’s
annual General Assembly in June 1951, there was lengthy discussion among
the organization’s leading cadres about what goals were advisable. Naum
Pejov made a keynote speech in which he said:
‘Out of our young people must be created a vigorous
national intelligentsia that will defend the interests of our
People. We have never yet had the chance to develop
an intelligentsia, because it has been doing its studies in
neighbouring countries and has been shaped in a mould
hostile to our national liberation struggle… We do not have any
official confirmation for the lives laid down and the material
destruction suffered by our People, and this is one part of our
national history that our young ones must be indoctrinated
with. It is one way of showing our friends and our enemies
that we mean to live free. So memoirs must be compiled, the
lives laid down must be recorded, and brochures and books
must be written with professional skill’. 51
Another delegate, Basil (not to be confused with Naum) Pejov, observed
that the Union of Macedonian Writers ought to take steps to publish material
about the life and struggles of the ‘Macedonian People’ of ‘Aegean
Macedonia’. The need to raise the refugees’ cultural and academic level

50. FO 371/95163: Confidential Report from the British Embassy at Athens to the British Embassy at Bel-
grade, Athens, 7 August 1951, Call No. Emb.1041/43/51.
51. Глас на Егејсите, No. 11, 17 June 1951.

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Ì a c e d o n i a n i s m

was pointed out by Risto Andonovski and the UMW’s secretary Micho
Terpovski singled out children’s education as the central focus of this need.
At the start of 1952, Voice of the Aegeans acted on Naum Pejov’s prompt,
putting out a request to any ‘Aegeans’ with photographs of different parts of
Makedonija, and in particular with photographs of dead bodies, to send them
to the editorial team for publication in a planned album. 52 The Union’s Council
General was simultaneously collecting details about lives lost. The intention
was to put out a kind of White Book about Aegean Macedonia. A collateral
manoeuvre was a move to erect a War Memorial to Slavomacedonian
‘Aegean’ heroes killed in the 1940s.53 In July 1953 the editorial board was
compelled to admit, to its evident discomfiture, that the results had not
come up to its expectations, and that the only publication so far had been a
brochure on Greek Macedonia. 54
It was also at this time that leading Slavomacedonian cadres shouldered
the task of recording the bloody details of recent history, to be made public in
the columns of the refugee newspaper. There were a great many contributors,
but the main names were those of (Naum) Pejov, Andonovski, Andreas Tsipas,
and Keramičiev. As can be seen from the articles, Pejov, the ex-separatist,
had not only contrived to heal the scars of the wound to his authority in 1944,
but had outgunned, in the ideological sense, all others who thought like him.
His various speeches at different refugee assemblies, his stream of articles on
events during the Occupation and the Civil War: these were patiently hosted
in Voices of the Aegean, even when, as often happened, they made up one
half of its reading matter. It was on the Occupation and the Civil War that
Pejov concentrated, for the most part or on what the SNOF55 and the NOF
were up to, their relations with the Greek Communist Party, and the doldrums
of the ‘Slavomacedonian’ minority that obstinately stayed in Greece. 56 Tsipas57
and Keramičiev58 covered much the same ground as Pejov. Andonovski 59

52. Глас на Егејситe, No. 22, May 1952.


53. Глас на Егејсите, No. 11, 17 June 1951.
54. Глас на Егејсите, No. 36, July 1953.
55. SNOF [Slavomacedonian People’s Liberation Front] = СНОФ [Славомакедонско Народно
Осбодителнют Фронт]. Activist organization of Slavomacedonians in Greece. Active throughout
the Occupation of Greece, its aim being the secession of Greek Macedonia.
56. See, for a sample, five of Pejov’s articles in Глас на Егејситe (in Slavmacedonian): ‘Put a stop to the
violent terrorizing of our brethren in Aegean Macedonia’, No. 3, Νov. 1950, ’SNOF’s work in the ranks
of ELAS [the Greek National Liberation Army] in Aegean Macedonia’, No. 4, Dec. 1950, ’The situation
of our People in Aegean Macedonia’, No. 11, 17 June 1951, ’A contribution to the truth – stemming
from the 1st Congress of the NOF in Aegean Macedonia’, No. 18, Jan. 1952, ‘Hundreds of thousands
of Macedonians demand their minority rights, No. 40, Νov. 1953.
57. Tsipas’s articles in Глас на Егејситe (in Slavmacedonian): ‘On my own’, No. 19, March 1952, ‘The KKE
and the Macedonian ethnic question’, No. 29, Dec. 1952, No. 30, Jan. 1953, No. 31, Feb. 1953.
58. See Keramičiev’s articles in Глас на Егејситe (in Slavmacedonian): ‘We are fighting for the minority
rights of our People’ No. 4, Dec. 1950. See also his first editorial leader for August 1951; he remained
editor until June 1953.
59. See Risto Andonovski’s articles in Глас на Егејситe (in Slavmacedonian): ‘Vodena and its inhabit-
ants’, No. 9, Μay 1951, ‘Irina Gionova-Mrka’, No. 12, July 1951, ‘In the hills of Aegean Macedonia’,
No. 18, Jan. 1952, No. 19, Feb. 1952, No. 22, May 1952, ‘Is there or is there not a Macedonian Ques-
tion for Greece in Aegean Macedonia?’, No. 39, Oct. 1953, No. 40, Νov. 1953, No. 42, Jan. 1954, No.
43, Feb. 1954, No. 44, March 1954, ‘Well-loved folksongs of Aegean Macedonia’, No. 45, Αpr. 1954.

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◄ The co-authored book


Aegean Macedonia in our
national history.

and Šimovski60 were chiefly interested in folklore and are valuable in that
they preserve much information about life in Greek Macedonia in the years
between the two World Wars.
Articles from the newspaper were cannibalized for a book entitled Егејска
Македонија [Aegean Macedonia], published by the Union of Refugees Press
in 1951, under Andonovksi’s name. Also in 1951, Keramičiev contributed an
article to the collective work Егејска Македонија во нашата национална
историја [Aegean Macedonia in our national history]. The newspaper’s
directorate undertook the placing of his book and its distribution to refugee
organizations. In August 1952, the UR’s Secretariat decided to set up an ad
hoc committee to opine on whether or not it was worth publishing two new
books about the Occupation and the Greek Civil War, one by Andonovski
and one by Pejov.
It was as the ‘Aegeans’ were compiling their own history that the first
young students entered the University of Skopje, newly founded in 1949. In
January 1952, the newspaper was able to report, with evident satisfaction,

60. See Todor Šimovski’s articles in Глас на Егејситe (in Slavmacedonian): ‘On the occasion of the forti-
eth anniversary of the death of Risto Batančiev, teacher and revolutionary’, No. 36, July 1953, ‘In our
birthplace of Dibeni’, No. 39, Οct. 1953, No. 40, Νov. 1953, ‘Goče Delčev at Goumenissa’, No. 46,
May 1954.

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Ì a c e d o n i a n i s m

that there were now a total of five students in the University’s Faculty of
Philosophy. These were Gjorgji Sevriev, Dimitar Velikov, Krste Bitovski, Spiro
Stojanski, and Kuzma Gjorgjevski. In 1952, Todor Šimovski became the first
‘Aegean’ from the Faculty to take his degree, and at the start of the year
the student roll included 47 ‘Aegeans’, with scholarships from PRM each
worth 4200 dinars a month.
The basic thing to note is that production of an ideological armoury of texts
about the Greek Civil War and the Ilinden Uprising lasted until 1954. These
texts were mainly for internal consumption by ‘Aegean’ refugees. After 1954
there followed a period in which the older stock of historical commentaries
was being legitimated and incorporated into PRM’s collective national
ideology. It was also the year 1954 which saw the definitive settlement, even
if not quite the actual finish, of the issue about whether refugees should
remain in the country. Not that the production of history books specially for
‘Aegeans’ came to a halt. Матица на Иселениците од Македонија, the
‘Centre for Macedonians in Exile’, founded in 1951, continued the work of
the UR, particularly in the political domain. And if Voice of the Aegeans did
fall silent in 1954, it was at once replaced by a monthly called Makedonija
[Македонија], whose first editor was none other than Andonovski, and an
annual called The Exile’s Calendar
[Иселеницки Календар].
It was not only ex-guerrillas from
Greece who were looking into the
history of ‘Aegean Macedonia’
with interest. Before very long
this subject was introduced,
as a separate category of
reference and research, into the
repertoire of the SRM’s official
organ for such studies, IEE, the
Institute of National History.
Τhe ΙΕΕ had been founded by
SRM’s government in 1948, with
one clear aim – ‘to write and
publicize the official history of
the Macedonian People’, and
to incorporate it into Jugoslav
history as a whole. 61 On 1 July
1956, delivering a speech for
the IEE’s first anniversary, in
front of Party officials and
academic VIPs, Šimovski – a
▲ Cover of the magazine Македонија,
with the waterfalls at Edessa.

61. Vlado Ivanovski [Bладо Ивановски] (ed.), 30 години Институт за Национална Историја, [30 Years
of the Institute of National History], [n.pl.], 1978.

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refugee from the Kilkis district who had been the first ‘Aegean’ to join the
Institute, in 1952 – said that one of the IEE’s basic obligations ought to be
to collect historical material, not just about the distant past, but about the
recent struggle of the ‘Macedonians from Aegean Macedonia’. Here (he
said) events of great importance had taken place – struggles worthy of
inclusion in the official history, lest they be forgotten. 62 Šimovski’s prompting
seems to have had its effect, for over the coming years a series of ‘Aegean’
historians were to join the Institute, their one and only task being to compile a
history of ‘Aegean Macedonia’. In 1964, a post was found for Risto Poplazarov,
from Kalohori near Kastoria, who four years earlier had graduated from the
Philosophical Faculty of the University of Prague in Czechoslovakia. In 1967,
it was the turn of Krste Bitoshki, from the village of Gavros, also near Kastoria,
who had completed his studies in the Philosophical Faculty of the University
of Skopje in 1956. They were joined in 1970 by Risto Iliovski, a child of the
Paidomazoma, 63 who had studied in Budapest; in 1972 by Stojan Kiselinovski,
another child of the Paidomazoma, who had studied in Romania; in 1974
by a Democratic Army veteran, Risto Kirjazovski; in 1976 by Vasil Gotevski
from Idroussa, a history graduate of the University of Warsaw; and in 1977 by
Eleftheria Bambakovska, from Kardia near Kozani, a history graduate of the
University of Skopje. 64 Significantly, by the end of the 1980s a quarter of all
the Institute’s research fellows were of Greek extraction; and it was they who
monopolized the discussion of research on subjects of Greek interest. The
Balkanology Section was well known to be packed with ‘Aegean’ staff. It was
headed by Rastislav Terzjovski from Perlepe [Prilep], and all its researchers
without exception were of ‘Aegean Macedonian’ origin: Šimovski, Kirjazovski,
Kiselinovski, and Theodoros Papanagiotou. 65 In 1976 Šimovski was drafted to
the editorial team of the Institute’s review Гласник [The Messenger], to be
followed in 1979 by Iliovski and in 1983 by Bitoshki. (It is a striking fact that
even in today’s FYROM, no historian hailing from any other region has written
about historical developments in Greek Macedonia). Thus their texts are
fatally loaded with sentimental effusion, hyperbole, and hostile innuendo
towards Greece. It is further interesting to note how the ‘Aegean lobby’, as
they call themselves, has imposed itself, with regard to Party legitimacy and
political approach, even on history as written in the Jugoslav Federation.
The rise of the ‘Aegeans’ as academics in the 1960s and 70s went hand in
glove with the war of words between the diplomats of Athens and Belgrade
during these two decades. The battle over the Macedonian Question, a

62. «Годишно Собрание на Институтот за Национална Иcторија», [‘The Annual Assembly of the Insti-
tute of National History], Гласник, 1/1 (1957), 339.
63. [Paidomazoma: the ‘collecting up of minors’. A term current during Seljuk and Ottoman occupation
of Greece to denote the occupying power’s seizure and reculturing of (male) children, some des-
tined for high military or civilian office. Now more usually applied, by transference, to Greek Com-
munist guerrillas’ abduction by of children from Greek territory to neighbouring Communist countries
(contested by revisionist historians). Translator’s Note].
64. Ivanovski, op.cit., pp. 46, 93, 101, 104, 112-113, 118.
65. ibid, p. 30.

[39]
Ì a c e d o n i a n i s m

▲ The newspaper Μακεδονία [Makedonia], Thessaloniki, 30 August 1953.

battle as often as not fomented by the Jugoslavs, could now be based on


a rich fund of reserves supplied by the ‘Aegeans’ – persevering though in
the wrong, and now with the legal blessing of the State. 66 A three-volume
work, Историја на македонскиот народ [The History of the Macedonian
People], was published to great applause by the Institute of National History
in 1969. It included extensive references to ‘Aegean’ Macedonia, the texts
having been written by the troika Andonovski, Šimovski, and Bitoshki.
The same period saw the publication by the Institute of a whole series
of books by other ‘Aegeans’. The great majority of them were by veteran
guerrillas who had, rather late in the day, discovered that writing history
could be a road to rehabilitation. 67 ‘Aegean’ historians were also now coming
into closer touch with the public in the rest of the Jugoslav Republics, as a
result of the printing of their own works in Belgrade, their appearances in
Jugoslav books of multiple authorship, and publication of their articles in
Jugoslav journals. 68 ‘Aegean’ Slavomacedonian guerrillas could well afford

66. The passage of words between Konstantinos Karamanlis, then Greek Prime Minister, and Ðuranović,
Federal Prime Minister of Jugoslavia, at Spilt in March 1979, afford a typical instance. The discussions
turned to the subject of cultural exchanges, whereupon Ðuranović remarked: ‘In the domain of bi-
lateral cooperation there is the matter of the Macedonian ethnic minority’. Karamanlis immediately
replied that that was ‘a regrettable issue’ in bilateral relations. He asked what the point was of the
Macedonians digging up the Macedonian Question forty years on. Ðuranović answer was: ‘There
are no differences between Belgrade and Skopje on matters of foreign policy’. The atmosphere was
dangerously charged. Karamanlis refused to discuss the subject any further, and the two leaders
turned their attention to other matters. It was however plain that this skirmish about the Macedonian
Question had overshadowed the summit talks. See Konstantinos Svolopoulos (ed.), Κωνσταντίνος
Καραμανλής. Αρχείο. Γεγονότα και κείμενα [The Karamanlis Archives], Vol. 11 Η Ελλάδα στην Ευρώπη
1977-1980 [Greece in Europe 1977-1980]. Περίοδος Β΄ 1η Ιανουαρίου 1979 - 15 Μαΐου 1980 [Period II :
1.1.1979-15.5.1980], Αthens, 1997, in Greek, pp. 64-68.
67. Good examples are Naum Pejov’s Македонците и граѓанската војна во Грција, [The Macedo-
nians and the Civil War in Greece], Skopje, 1968, in Slavmacedonian; Ajanovski-Oche’s Егејски
бури, [Storms in the Aegean], Skopje, 1975, in Slavmacedonian; and Šimovski’s Населените места
во Егејска Македонија, [The inhabited regions of Aegean Macedonia], Vol. 1, Skopje, 1978, in Slav-
macedonian.
68. Krste Vitoshki [Крсте Битоски], ‘Отпорот на Македонците против асимилаторските стремежи
на грчката вооружена пропаганда (1878-1908)’, [The Resistance of the Macedonians to attempts
by the armed Greek propaganda to assimilate them], Југословенски историски часопис, 4 (Bel-
grade, 1969, in Slavmacedonian), 125-128; Risto Poplazarov [Ристо Поплазаров], ‘Некои моменти
од борбата на Македонците против грчката и бугарската црковно-просветна доминација
во втората половина на ХIХ век (до 1888)’ [Some key moments in the Macedonians’ struggle
against Greek and Bulgarian religious and educational domination in the later 19th century, up to

[40]
IR R EDENTISM AND POLICY: F Y ROM OF FICIA L STATE PA PERS

◄ The three-volume History


of the Macedonian People.

to speak with pride of their part


in the Resistance, their work
alongside Tito’s Partizani, and
the rectitude with which they
toed the Jugoslav Party line.
These were very considerable
virtues when taken in relation
to the building of the Jugoslav
Federal State.
In the decades to come,
the slogan of an irredenta
‘Aegean Macedonia’ would
be PRM’s flagship, used
whenever the international
situation warranted it, a serviceable
bludgeon at official discussions between Greece and Jugoslavia. This
was the era of ‘the non-existent Macedonian Question’, the long haul of
the Cold War. The allies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization found it
expedient to give preferential treatment to a Jugoslavia that did not ‘toe
the Soviet line’. At the same time they put pressure on the powers that be in
Greece not to rock the boat but to keep their mouths shut, since that was
what the interests of the Western world dictated. The then Prime Minister of
Greece, Constantine Karamanlis, and his Foreign Minister, Averof, tasted the
fruits of this Realpolitik early in the 1960s, when their Jugoslav counterparts
precipitously withdrew the issue of ‘unredeemed Macedonian regions’ from
the conference agenda.
In the summer of 1960 one Slavomacedonian newspaper after another
published articles attacking an alleged Greek policy against Slavophones
in Greek Macedonia. The lead was taken by the official Government press
organ, Нова Македонија [New Makedonija]. The campaign was reinforced
by speeches from Tito’s Foreign Minister, Drago Kunč. Diplomatic reflexes
were immediately triggered by these developments. On 2 June 1960,

1888], Југословенски историски часопис, 4 (Belgrade, 1969, in Slavmacedonian), 103-110; Idem,


‘Македонска историографија за историјата на македонскиот народ во XIX и почетокот на XX
век’, [The writings of Macedonian historians on the history of the Macedonian people in the 19th and
early 20th century]; The Historiography of Jugoslavia 1965-1975 (Belgrade, 1975, in Slavmacedonian),
298-323; Idem, ‘Македонски доброволци во Српско-турската војна во 1876 год.’, Југословенски
историски часопис,[Macedonian volunteers in the Serbo-Turkish War of 1876], 1-2 (Belgrade, 1976,
in Slavmacedonian).

[41]
Ì a c e d o n i a n i s m

◄ The newspaper
Μακεδονία [Makedonia],
Thessaloniki, 20 June
1950.

◄ The newspaper
Μακεδονία [Makedonia],
Thessaloniki, 20 June
1950.

► The newspaper
Μακεδονία [Make-
donia], Thessaloniki,
9 September 1950.

[42]
IR R EDENTISM AND POLICY: F Y ROM OF FICIA L STATE PA PERS

Dimitrios Nikolareizis, the Greek Ambassador to Belgrade, had a meeting


with the then Jugoslav Foreign Minister, Kosta Popović, their agenda being
the recent speeches by Kunč, and the resuscitation of the Macedonian
Question by Jugoslav circles more generally. The meeting was revealing as
to the Jugoslavs’ approach to the question and the arguments advanced
by them. Popović told his Greek guest quite frankly that in Jugoslavia’s
view there did exist a ‘Macedonian’ minority in Greece. Taken aback,
the Greek Ambassador replied that this was ‘a serious thing to say’. He
went on: ‘We have always been under the impression that it was only
circles in Skopje that brought up any question of a Macedonian minority;
and that the Government in Belgrade never encouraged them to bring
such a question up’. He assured Popović that his Government would react
‘violently’ when it heard this piece of news; and that Premier Karamanlis
would be enraged, especially since he was just about to pay an official
visit to Belgrade. 69 Popović rejoined drily, no doubt hoping to play down the
unfortunate impression he had made, that his government could hardly
overlook the existence of a ‘Macedonian’ minority in Greece, since this
would be a departure from their principles. At the same time, (he said), he
quite understood the Greek position.
One month later, in July, the Foreign Ministers of the two countries,
Averof and Popović, met at Tito’s bower, the Brijuni Islands. At the top
of their agenda was the Macedonian Question. Popović repeated the
familiar position of Jugoslavia: it was impossible for Belgrade to ignore the
existence of a ‘kindred’,’Macedonian’ minority in Greece, without saying
a word, when Greece was involved in acts of provokatsia to this minority’s
detriment. This was a position rooted (he said) in firm Jugoslav convictions.
The Federal Government could not exercise control of statements by local
governments, or of ‘what the papers said’. He did however accept that
this would not have occurred to the same degree by comparison with
Greece. Averof, visibly annoyed by what his counterpart had just said,
replied with emphasis that the minority question ‘might well blow Greek-
Jugoslav relations sky-high’. He advised Popović to be more prudent. There
were, after all, SRM documents which referred to Greek Macedonia as
‘Aegean Macedonia’. ‘What is Skopje implying here?’ (he enquired). ‘That
Greek Macedonia does not exist? Or that it ought not to exist? This would
mean war’. But despite this verbal sparring, the two Ministers’ meeting
appears to have ended in a gentleman’s agreement to avoid any action
that might poison bilateral relations.
At the beginning of October 1960, in a speech to the People’s Parliament
of Makedonija, with the Jugoslav Federal Vice-President Kardelj in
attendance, Prime Minister Količevski insisted that the presence of a
‘Macedonian’ minority in Greece was an incontrovertible historical fact.

69. Kofos Archives. Talks between Nikolareizis and Popović, 2 June 1960.

[43]
Ì a c e d o n i a n i s m

No one (he said) could prevent his People taking an interest in their fate. 70
These irredentist speeches in SRM were not without their consequences.
This time the fuse was an answer that the new Prime Minister, Aleksandar
Grilčo, gave an American journalist at a reception for members of the Press,
on 14 November 1961. Greece was (he said) taking ‘certain disquieting
measures’ to the detriment of the ‘Macedonian’ minority. Grilčo also told
the journalist that Athens’ ultimate policy aim was to efface the minority’s
ethnic consciousness.71 Finally, he repeated his country’s fixed position that
the only way bilateral relations between Makedonija and Greece could be
improved was by Greece’s recognizing minority rights. Two days later, the
Jugoslav Ambassador at Athens was summoned by Averof for a friendly
rap over the knuckles for Grilčo’s indiscreet remarks. The ambassador made
light of them, and, in the hope of showing that they were not espoused by
Belgrade, he assured the Greek Foreign Minister that they had not been
published in Borba [the official Party paper] or transmitted by Tanjug [the
State News Agency].72
Now that there was a bush war of speeches, Averof himself entered the
fray, on 7 December 1961. In an address to the Greek Parliament, the Foreign
Minister described the Grilčo speech as ‘unacceptable’, and repeated the
fixed Greek position, that no ‘Macedonian’ minority existed in the country. A
week later, on 15 December, a spokesman for the Jugoslav Foreign Minister,
Kunč, made use of Averof’s address for a whitewash of Makedonija’s Prime
Minister, repeating his country’s firm position that there was indeed a
‘Macedonian’ minority in Greece and adding that nothing but giving this
minority their ‘rights’ would normalize bilateral relations.
Generous measures were taken by the local SRM government at this
time for the benefit of their refugees from Greece. A law was passed
in 1961 recognizing service in the ranks of NOF or SNOF as a ‘period of
employment’. (This measure had been in force earlier, but only for service in
the DSE: it had been discontinued in 1956 in deference to ‘Greek-Jugoslav
friendship’). Many refugees had also been given awards for services
rendered to their country; and a fair number of others had got a pension.
Three leading ‘Aegean’ cadres had been elected People’s Deputies. Two
of them went on to hold a ministerial post: Pejov, as Minister of Farming
and Forests, and Mitrevski, as Deputy Minister of People’s Legislation.
Keramičiev became a Deputy and, like Ajanovski-Oche, a senior official
in the Ministry of the Interior. Taško Hadjijanev became a senior official in
the Ministry of Farming and Forests. Minas Fotev became a senior official
in the local SRM Government Office.
And so things stood until the end of the 1980s and the start of the ‘90s, when

70. Nova Makedonija, 6 October 1960.


71. Καθημερινή, 15 November 1961.
72. PRO/FO 371/160434, Letter from the British Embassy in Athens to the Foreign Office, Αthens, 17 No-
vember 1961, Call No. 1033/25/61.

[44]
IR R EDENTISM AND POLICY: F Y ROM OF FICIA L STATE PA PERS

the break-up of Jugoslavia resulted in the independence of its component


Republics, including Makedonija.
The establishment of FYROM in September 1991, this did not put an end
to claims about ‘unredeemed’, ‘Aegean’ Macedonia. Quite the contrary.
It is now generally accepted that forces were unleashed, rather than held
in check, by the new données. Gone were those formal inhibitions that
Belgrade entertained from time to time. The fledgling country was flooded
with maps showing a Greater Macedonia, unified as far as the foothills of
mount Olympus. These maps were reprinted in school textbooks, sent as
postcards, and were even used on stamps. Only then did the powers that
be in Greece look the problem squarely in the face. Initially they had been
stunned; then they were angry.
Today, twelve years after the signing of the Interim Accord, an agreement
more honoured in the breach than in the observance, the irredentist output
from FYROM, so far from withering away, is wider, and more intensive. As
was said earlier, the relevant references may have been deleted from the
Constitution, and the need for diplomatic equilibrium may have succeeding
in papering over the cracks so far as the international arena goes. But
these days FYROM’s irredentist propaganda lurks in official government
discourse and in a whole host of government decisions and acts, party
political manifestoes, and pronouncements by State foundations. To take
but one example, insistence on the use of the term ‘Aegean Macedonia’
is universal and permanent. That piece of irredentism occurs even on the
official website of FYROM’s Foreign Ministry, where the Minister is said, at the
end of December 2006, to have had a meeting with a delegation from ‘the
Union of Macedonians from Aegean Macedonia’.
This particular organization, and others like it of refugees from Greece,
receives annual funding from FYROM’s treasury (as can easily be seen by
reference to the official government bulletin). One effect of funding has
been, almost inevitably, the return from the dead of the newspaper Voices
of the Aegean, complete with a bevy of verbal aggression against Greece.
Another generous beneficiary of the state coffers is a newspaper called Ne
Zaborav [‘I do not forget!’].
FYROM also funded the 3rd Rally of ‘Child-Refugees from Aegean
Macedonia’ in Skopje in summer 2003. FYROM’s Parliament is not far behind
in irredentist measures: the parliamentary calendar of official holidays now
includes an ‘Aegean Brigade Day’. (This brigade was originally recruited
from Slavophone activists hard at work, as we have seen, to achieve
the secession of Greek Macedonia and its union with what was then the
Jugoslav Federation). A ‘unified unredeemed Macedonia’ also receives
much exposure on the official website of the Church in Skopje, Orthodox,
but schismatic. Of the same tenor are long print run publications by official
state bodies such as FYROM’s Institute of National History or her Academy
of Sciences, all intended to set in solid type the indissoluble links joining
Macedonian lands together.

[45]
Ì a c e d o n i a n i s m

◄ The announcement, on
the official website of FYROM’s
Foreign Ministry, of a meeting
between Foreign Minister Milošoski
and a delegation from the ‘Union
of Macedonians from Aegean
Macedonia’, at the end
of December 2006.

It is also interesting to see how, from 1998 onwards, the durable


concept of a Greater Macedonia, as a separate geographical entity,
has reappeared on the scene. Until 1998 its historicity went back only as
far as the nineteenth century, as is evident from one reprint after another
of the official Historical Map of Macedonia. On this map, issued at Skopje
in 1992, the only territory marked as ‘Macedonia in Prehistoric Times’ is
that occupied today by FYROM. But in the ‘revised editions’ of the atlas,
in 1998 and 2006, all of geographical Macedonia is now included. So too
for the classical period. In the 1992 edition there is no clear boundary
between classical Greece and Macedonia in classical times. But in

[46]
IR R EDENTISM AND POLICY: F Y ROM OF FICIA L STATE PA PERS

▲ Left: Front page of the magazine Voice of


the Aegeans [Глас на Егејците].

► Right: Front page of the newspaper


Незаборав [Nezaborav (‘I do not forget!’)].

the 1997 editions Greece and Macedonia are shown as two different
regions.
The same goes for the way Macedonia is represented in the remaining
historical periods. Whereas in the 1992 edition no ‘ethnic and geographical
boundaries of Macedonia’ are shown for the Medieval period, in the 1997
edition Medieval Macedonia is a visible entity with geographical as well as
ethnic borders.
Thus FYROM’s irredentist ideology underwent a certain radicalization from
1998 onwards, in defiance of the provisions of the recently signed Interim
Agreement. There is an ongoing attempt to construct a national myth
and the means used is the aggressive appropriation of the region’s history
– up to and including designs on the ancient Macedonian Greek heritage
and its legators in prehistory. The phrase that best describes this desperate

[47]
Ì a c e d o n i a n i s m

▲ Map of Macedonia in Prehistoric Times. Historical Atlas (Skopje 1992).

[48]
IR R EDENTISM AND POLICY: F Y ROM OF FICIA L STATE PA PERS

▲ Map of Macedonia in Prehistoric Times. Historical Atlas (Skopje 1998, 2006).

▲ The Greek colonies. Kosta Atsievski & team, Историја за V одделение [History Textbook, Grade V],
Skopje 2005, p.37.

[49]
Ì a c e d o n i a n i s m

▲ Map of Macedonia in Ancient Times. Historical Atlas (Skopje 1997).

attempt to construct a ‘Macedonian’ identity different from the Greek


identity is one from Roman law: prior tempore, fortior iure [‘earlier in time,
therefore stronger in law’]. But it is the Greek identity that is of uninterrupted
continuation since prehistoric times, and that has come down to its modern
legatees, the dwellers in FYROM.
The shift in ideology has also made its way into FYROM’s educational system.
The more recent school textbooks, in primary and secondary schools, refer
constantly to ‘Aegean Macedonia’ and to the unity of the Macedonian
area. In essence, the narration of the country’s historical past is entirely
based on a linear continuity the axis of which is the geographical area of
Macedonia. Everything – from the ancient Macedonians, the Roman and
Byzantine past, the Ottoman period, modern times, to the present – centres
on Macedonia and its inhabitants. Macedonia is described as a country
that has been enslaved and liberated, and today continues its glorious
history with FYROM as its vehicle.
Very revealing are the instructions to candidates for university places

[50]
IR R EDENTISM AND POLICY: F Y ROM OF FICIA L STATE PA PERS

▲ Map of Macedonia in the Middle Ages. Historical Atlas (Skopje 1992).

[51]
Ì a c e d o n i a n i s m

▲ Map of Macedonia in Ancient Times. Historical Atlas (Skopje 1997).

▲ Blaže Ristovski & team, Историја за VIII одделение


[History Textbook, Grade VIII] (Skopje 2005), p.120.

[52]
IR R EDENTISM AND POLICY: F Y ROM OF FICIA L STATE PA PERS

in, a directive from the country’s Ministry of Education. These instructions


require young students to answer questions about the enslavement of
‘Macedonians’ in neighbouring states, and about their struggle for freedom
and union with the mother-homeland. This indoctrination of today’s students
in FYROM with irredentist dreams lost in the mists of history and antiquity is
perhaps the gloomiest aspect of the present situation, for it offers no hope
for the future. The ideology of ‘Macedonian national identity’ is Slav to its
very foundations and for six decades the inhabitants of FYROM have been
saturated with it. Given that this ideology has caused so many tremors and
cracks in the Balkan superstructure, the present weaning of young people in
FYROM on a diet of descent from Alexander the Great is not merely quaint:
it is positively dangerous.

The ‘oppressed Macedonian minority’

The unity of the ‘unredeemed but integral Macedonian area’ is intimately


bound up with the existence of a ‘Macedonian minority’ - ‘oppressed’, of
course - in adjacent countries. This credo was included, as we have seen,
in AFCM’s founding meeting; and it has continued unchanged as a feature
of political discourse and state policy to saturation point ever since. On 21
December 2006 the President of FYROM was still telling Parliament about his
interest in the fate of the ‘Macedonian minority’ in neighbouring countries.
References to ‘Macedonian minorities’ and FYROM’s interest in them recur
in the Ministry of Culture’s plans for 2004-2008, reinforced by publications
on this subject, which is also a publicly stated platform of the ruling party,
IMRO [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization]. It should be noted
that the political leaders of the country attend any refugee organization’s
anniversary celebration without fail, and often deliver inflammatory
speeches. President Kiro Gligorov was to be seen at the 2nd Rally of ‘Child
Refugees from Aegean Macedonia’, in Skopje in 1998. Prime Minister Gruevski
took part in the 26th Rally of ‘Macedonians from Aegean Macedonia’, in
Trnovo in 1995. The then Foreign Minister, Kazule, was at the 22nd Rally of
‘Macedonians from Aegean Macedonia’, in Trnovo in 2002.

[53]
Ì a c e d o n i a n i s m

The emblems and the appropriation of the historical past

When the name of the city of Skopje’s airport was changed to ‘Alexander
the Great’, it was just one more straw in the wind. The country continues to
print stamps depicting Philip II and Alexander. And on the official Church
website emblems are appropriated openly. All this betrays FYROM’s need to
reposition itself historically and geographically.

◄ Stamp with the Sun of Vergina.


Issued by the State Post Office of
FYROM in 1992.

This is especially so in school textbooks, where the proposition that the


ancient Macedonians were somehow ‘different’ from the rest of the Greeks
is a rigid dogma.

► The Sun of Vergina. FYROM school


textbook (in photocopy).

[54]
IR R EDENTISM AND POLICY: F Y ROM OF FICIA L STATE PA PERS

Afterword

All that has been said here bears undeniable witness to an irredentist
attitude towards Greece among FYROM’s organs of state and official
foundations. Article 4 of the Interim Accord provided that neither of the
two signatories should ‘promote or support claims on any part whatever of
the dominion of the other, or claims to change the existing boundary’. The
interpretation of this clause is, I think, obvious; as obvious as is its violation.
It can be taken as proved, then, that only in the international forum, these
last few years, has FYROM troubled to tone down the impression that it is
casting envious eyes on Greek territory. But it is also true that, the international
shop-window apart, nothing has really changed – either in official political
discourse or among the bodies that shape state policy. The objectives on the
agenda of AFCM have been religiously observed for sixty years and more,
as if time had stood still. And to boot, the new developments in FYROM - the
radicalization of irredentist ideology through now wholesale appropriation of
the historical past, linking it to the educational process – leave little room for
optimism. At the same time, the possibility that FYROM may come up with a
wiser and more moderate policy has taken a severe dent from developments
over the past ten years, with more and more countries recognizing it as the
Republic of Macedonia in a knock-on effect. These developments do not
breed much hope or optimism for the future. The only thing that needs be
said in conclusion, is that irredentist attitudes and practices of this sort have
not even the makings of good-neighbourliness; nor are they founded on
international treaties; nor (and that is for certain) do they help find lasting
and constructive solutions to the problems endemic in the bilateral relations
of FYROM and Greece.

[55]

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