FYROM Irredentism and Pοlicy
FYROM Irredentism and Pοlicy
FYROM Irredentism and Pοlicy
Μichailidis
. Iakovos D. Michailidis is Assistant Professor of Modern and Contemporary History in the History & Ar-
chaeology Department of the Philosophy Faculty of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki.
. AFCM was the political wing of the Communist armed resistance movement active in Jugoslav
Makedonija during the German-Bulgarian Occupation.
. [Irredentism (the correct form): a collective policy of seeking, by word or action, to achieve that
one’s country of origin shall have restored to it territory which it has meantime lost to a neighbouring
country. An individual pursuing this policy is an irredentist. The lost territory itself is termed irredenta,
‘unredeemed’. The origin of this series of terms was in Italy during the late 1870s, when it was hoped
to annex to the new Italian state territories that had formerly been Italian. Translator’s Note].
[17]
Ì a c e d o n i a n i s m
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IR R EDENTISM AND POLICY: F Y ROM OF FICIA L STATE PA PERS
This goal was not just praiseworthy ambition on the part of the local
leadership of the SRM [the Socialist Republic of Makedonija] it reflected,
every so often, the party line of the Federal Jugoslav Government. In the
period from immediately after the Allies’ liberation of the Balkans from the
Axis Powers in the last months of 1944 to the end of the Greek Civil War
in 1949, there was a spate of official Jugoslav irredentist pronunciamenti
against Greece. Significantly, only a month or two after the AFCM Manifesto,
during the first session of AVNOJ [the Anti-Fascist Council for the Liberation
of Jugoslavia] in Belgrade [9-12 November 1944], General Vukmanović,
known as Tempo, representing PRM [the People’s Republic of Makedonija],
claimed that ‘Macedonians’ living in Greek and Bulgarian Macedonia
were eagerly awaiting union with the mother republic. Timed to coincide
with the session, a letter of protest (published in the newspaper Politika for
13 November) from ANVOJ’s Vice-President Dimitar Vlahov to the Greek
Prime Minister accused Greece of ‘imperialist’ policy against her northern
neighbour, and of oppression of the ‘Macedonian Anti-Fascists of Aegean
Macedonia’.
The oneness of the ‘Macedonians’ was clearly marked on wall maps
in various buildings in PRM; Thessaloniki appeared as the Macedonian
. Public Record Office, War Office [henceforward PRO/WO] 204/9677, Classified Report from British
Military Mission to Belgrade, 14 Νovember 1944, Call No.CB-2694.
[19]
Ì a c e d o n i a n i s m
capital. Interviewed for the New York Times early in April 1945, Josip Broz
Tito, president of the Federal Republic of Jugoslavia, said that though his
country had no territorial claims on Greece, there was nothing to prevent
the possible wish of Macedonians to unite. On 22 July 1945, Belgrade also
sent a protest note to Athens, accusing Greece of the ‘persecution’ of ‘our
Macedonian compatriots’ in ‘Aegean Macedonia’ by parastatal groups and
by state authorities as well. Belgrade called for these people to be granted
human rights and for unimpeded return of the refugees to their homes. On
11 October 1945, in a speech at Skopje during celebrations of the fourth
anniversary of the Jugoslav resistance against the Fascist Occupation, and
in front of thousands of people including refugees from Greece, Tito himself
said that Jugoslavia would never renounce ‘the right of the Macedonian
people to unite’. There were (he said) ‘our brethren in Aegean Macedonia,
to whose fate we are not indifferent. Our thoughts are with them, and we
care about them’. He ended: ‘I promise you that all Macedonians will one
day be united in their own community, Macedonia’.
But this was not to be the end of the Jugoslavian crescendo of protest
against Greece. In a speech to the Constituent Assembly of Jugoslavia, on
26 January 1946, Bane Andrejev spent a good deal of time talking about
Greek ‘terrorizing’ of Slav speakers within Greece, emphasizing that the
latter should ‘go on with their fight for freedom’.10 At the same time, Andrejev
insisted that for Greek and Bulgarian Macedonia to unite with PRM was no
act of hegemony but the consummation of the Macedonian legitimate
demand for union.11 Similar was the tenor of a speech by the veteran
Communist activist Dimitar Vlahov, leader between the two World Wars of
the United VMRO. He referred at great length to areas not yet incorporated
into the Jugoslavian Federation. He also had something to say about the
situation in Greek Macedonia, where (according to him) there were 129
‘terrorist groups’ working to annihilate Slav speakers. Vlahov ended by
advocating the formation of a united Macedonia within the Federation.12
. Historical Archive of the Greek Foreign Ministry [henceforward ΙΑΥΕ] 1945, File 59/2, Commander
Superior, Special Security Office of the Supreme Command of the West Macedonia Gendarmerie,
Col. P. Anastasopoulos, ‘Information Bulletin’. Kozani. 29 May 1945. Call No. 12/1/6.
. Records of the U.S. Department of State [henceforward DS]. Greece 1945-1949, 868.00/4-3045,
Reel No.2, Office. To Greek Foreign Ministry. Athens, 30 Αpril 1945, Call No. Εmb. 1154. See also Νέα
Αλήθεια, 24 April 1945.
. DS Greece 1945-1949, 868.00/7-2445, Reel No. 3, Telegram from Kirk to the State Department, Caz-
erta, 24 July 1945, Call No. Εmp. 3046 The contents of this Note were published in the Greek newspa-
pers at the beginning of September: see Μακεδονία, 2 September 1945.
. Public Record Office, Foreign Office [henceforward PRO/FO] 371/48389, The Jugoslav Note to
Greece is attached to Caccia’s reply to the Foreign Office, Athens, 24 July 1945, Call No. 373.
. Halkias Archive, ‘Parts of Tito’s speech at Skopje on 11 October 1945’. See also Μακεδονία, 14 Oc-
tober 1945, See also Ελληνικόν Θάρρος, 25 Νovember 1945, Ελληνικός Βορράς, 25 Νovember 1945,
with photo of the final paragraph of Tito’s speech. See also A. Kyrou, Η συνωμοσία εναντίον της
Μακεδονίας [The conspiracy against Macedonia] 1940-1949 (Αthens, 1950, in Greek), p. 143.
10. PRO/FO 371/58615, Stevenson to the Foreign Office, Belgrade, 22 January 1946, Call No. 125.
11. Andrejev’s speech was published in the 20 February 1946 issue of Bilten (Билтен). See G.Modis, Σχέδια
και Ορέξεις γειτόνων [Neighbours’ Plans and Appetites], Thessaloniki, 1947, pp. 17-18.
12. PRO/FO 371/58615, Stevenson to Foreign Office, Belgrade, 22 January 1946, Call No. 124.
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IR R EDENTISM AND POLICY: F Y ROM OF FICIA L STATE PA PERS
13. ΙΑΥΕ 1946, File 67/2, Dalietos’ telegram in code to Greek Foreign Ministry, Belgrade, 16 April 1946, Call
No. 296.
14. ΙΑΥΕ 1946, File 67/2,Dalietos’ report to Greek Foreign Ministry, Belgrade, 25 April 1946, Call No. 650.
The Greek Ambassador got his information from the issue of Borba for 17 April 1946.
15. Halkias Archive.
16. ΙΑΥΕ 1946, File 67/2, Dalietos’ report to Greek Foreign Ministry, Belgrade, 2 July 1946, Call No. 1206.
17. PRO/FO 371/58615, Clutton to Bevin, Belgrade, 22 August 1946, Call No. 310.
18. Halkias Archive.
19. Halkias Archive.
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Ì a c e d o n i a n i s m
20. ΙΑΥΕ 1946, File 67/2, Telegram from Dalietos to Greek Foreign Ministry, Belgrade, 7 August 1946, Call
No. 1461. See also Halkias Archive. See also Μόδης, op.cit, pp. 40-41.
21. ΙΑΥΕ 1946, File 1/4, Letter from Dalietos to Greek Foreign Ministry, Belgrade, 10 August 1946, Call No.
1513 See also και Halkias Archive, ΙΑΥΕ 1946, File 1/10, Letter from Lieut.Col. of Artillery K. Iatros to
Greek Foreign Ministry, ΒΣΤ 902, 23 September 1946, Call No. Classified ΓΕΣ/3392203/Α2/ΙΙ. See also FO
371/58615, Clutton to Bevin, Belgrade, 22 August 1946, Call No. 310.
22. [This carefully-chosen expression would also have been capable of the meanings ‘republican citi-
zens’ and ‘citizens of the Republic’ (i.e. PRM). Translator’s Note].
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IR R EDENTISM AND POLICY: F Y ROM OF FICIA L STATE PA PERS
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Ì a c e d o n i a n i s m
▲ Covers (in photocopy) of the book Macedonia as a natural and economic unit
(Sofia 1945, in Bulgarian, republished Skopje 1978, in Slavmacedonian).
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Ì a c e d o n i a n i s m
between Količevski and NOF leaders in Skopje, at the very end of the year
1946. Količevski gives them orders to go down into Greece and fight alongside
the Greek Communists. ‘You will now go down there… The KKE [Communist
Party of Greece] will direct your struggle… The [party] line of the KKE has
27. A few days later, the Aridaia & Edessa Battalion went the same road, under the leadership of an-
other SNOF veteran, the schoolmaster Pavle Rakovski, See the article by Sp. Sfetas, «Αυτονομιστικές
κινήσεις των Σλαβοφώνων κατά το 1944, η στάση του ΚΚΕ και η διαφύλαξη των ελληνογιουγκοσλαβικών
συνόρων» [Slavophones’ separatist moves in 1994, the Greek Communist Party’s position, and the
maintenance of the Greek and Jugoslav borders], pp. 105-124 (in Greek) in: Πρακτικά του Διεθνούς
Συνεδρίου Μακεδονία και Θράκη, 1941-1944. Κατοχή – Αντίσταση – Απελευθέρωση [Proceedings of
the International Conference ‘Macedonia & Thrace’: Occupation, Resistance, Liberation]. Thessa-
loniki, 1998.
28. NOF [Popular (or ‘People’s’) Liberation Front] = НОФ [Народно Осбодителнют Фронт]. Activist or-
ganization of Slavophones in Greece. Founded at the instance of the Jugoslav Communists. Active
throughout the Greek Civil War, its aim being the secession of Greek Macedonia.
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IR R EDENTISM AND POLICY: F Y ROM OF FICIA L STATE PA PERS
been put right… you can trust them… any problems you have, you can sort
them out with the KKE leadership… fight whole-heartedly along with the
Greek People… against chauvinism, separatism, and local trends’.29
It is clear that these pro-Jugoslav elements in NOF had a single professed
aim: the secession of Greek Macedonia and its union with the Jugoslav
Federation. Supporting evidence of this is an article published by the
organization in its periodical Bilten [The Bulletin] on 15 March 1946, in which
NOF denies accusations of collaboration with the Bulgarians. ‘We are not
Ohranites [‘Guards’]’ it reads, ‘still less are we separatists. This is proved by the
line we take. Our struggle is against separatism, for two reasons: it leads the
Macedonian People to the precipice, to new slavery, and separatism is the
line taken by the forces of international reaction, which want to break up the
unity of the Jugoslav peoples’. This disclaimer was however accompanied
by an affirmation of the policy of secession for Greek Macedonia and enosis
with PRM: ‘The Macedonian People have the right to unite and this right they
have won with the gun. The Macedonian People of Aegean Macedonia
have, by joining the ranks of ELAS [the National Popular Liberation Army] and
by fighting Fascism, at the same time been fighting for national freedom…
The Macedonian People of Aegean Macedonia has every right to ask to
be united with its pillar and prop, progressive Vardar Macedonia… We wish
to live with our free brethren of Vardar Macedonia, to be able to enjoy the
fruits that the greater part of our people has won’. 30
The PRM’s and Jugoslavia’s irredentist claims continued unabated for the
duration of the Greek Civil War. Elections for the Popular Front of Macedonia
were held in Skopje, on 7 March 1948. As president of, respectively, the
Presidium of the People’s Parliament of Jugoslavia, and the Council of the
Popular Front of Macedonia, Dimitar Vlahov condemned ‘monarchist-
fascist’ Greece and referred to ‘our Macedonian brethren in Aegean
Macedonia, alongside the Democratic Army, fighting for its overthrow’. 31 In
a speech to the 2nd Congress of the Macedonian Popular Front, Količevski
criticized Bulgaria’s ‘Patriotic Front’ for ideas of aggrandisement, and
in the same breath proclaimed the right of the ‘Macedonian’ people to
unite within the Jugoslav Federation. 32 Commenting on his statements,
and on the dissonance between Belgrade and Sofia, the Greek daily
newspaper Kathimerini observed that Serbia and Bulgaria were bickering
not just amongst themselves, but like the proverbial ‘two cocks fighting over
someone else’s barn’ – the ‘barn’ being, Greek Macedonia. 33 Vlahov then
went on to make new speeches in which he insisted that Greece had no
29. Tashko Mamurovski, Паскал Митревски и неговото време (1912-1978) [Paskal Miitrevski (i.e. Paskh-
alis Miitropoulos) and his times (1912-1978)], Skopje, 1992, pp. 73-74 (in Slavmacedonian). For NOF
actions, the author cites a note from Fotev: this is now in his family archives.
30. Modis, op.cit, pp. 12-13.
31. ΙΑΥΕ 1948, File 52, Sub-File 3, Report by P. Gerolymatos, 1st Secretary, directing the Greek Consulate
at Skopje, to Greek Foreign Ministry, Skopje, 8 March 1948.
32. Καθημερινή, 15 June 1948.
33. Καθημερινή, 16 June 1948.
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Ì a c e d o n i a n i s m
▲ Front page of Билтен [Bilten], issued by NOF during the Civil War.
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IR R EDENTISM AND POLICY: F Y ROM OF FICIA L STATE PA PERS
of what was to come in his opening remarks. ‘In our People’s new rising’, he
said, ‘the Macedonian people have given their all. With their blood they
have won the right to free and independent life and development. There
can be no doubt that as a result of the victory of the popular revolution in
Greece the Macedonian people will win the right to free and independent
life and development’. This was a frank confession of a change of direction
on the minorities’ issue, and it was certainly due to the tight corner in which
the KKE found itself at the start of 1949. Therefore, despite the objections of
many leading Party members, the 5th Plenary resolved to finally recognize
the right of the ‘Macedonian People’ to national reconstruction and self-
determination:
‘…In northern Greece the Macedonian People have given their all for the
struggle and are fighting on with admirable and total heroism and self-sacrifice.
It cannot be doubted that as o result of victory by the DSE [Democratic Army
of Greece] and the People’s Revolution, the Macedonian People will have full
national restitution, as they themselves want it, winning it tomorrow by giving
their life-blood today. Macedonian Communists will always be at the head
of their people’s struggle. At the same time Macedonian Communists must
beware of the divisive and disruptive activities fostered by alien elements in
order to disrupt the unity between the Macedonian and the Greek People,
a disruption that can only assist their common enemy, monarchism and
fascism, and American and English imperialism. At the same time, the KKE
must root out all obstacles and must strike at all chauvinist demonstrations
of Greek expansionism, that are causing resentment and discomfort among
the Macedonian People, thus helping the disrupters with their treacherous
activity and stiffening the forces of resistance. The Slavomacedonian and the
Greek People can only win if united. If divided, all they can do is lose. So the
two peoples’ unity in the struggle must be jealously guarded, as the apple of
their eye, and strengthened little by little, day by day’.
The resolutions of the 5th Plenary Session were followed by a whole series
of Party initiatives in pursuit of the new policy. The 2nd Plenary Session of
the Central Committee of NOF was held on 3 February 1949. In his speech,
Zahariadis set out what the Slavophones were being offered in exchange:
essentially a reshuffle of the Republic’s Provisional Government to promote
a Slavophone to a ministerial post; NOF representation on the DSE’s General
Staff; the renaming of the DSE’s 11th Division as the ‘Macedonian Division’;
and the founding of a ‘Macedonian’ Communist organization. In the hope
particularly of pushing the group round the pro-Tito Keramičiev further to
the sidelines, Zahariadis promoted to the NOF Secretariat two of his old
buddies among the Slavomacedonian activists, Paskal Mitrevski and Pavel
Rakovski. The KKE leadership was indisputably breaking new ground with
these decisions, as was noted by the bourgeois Press, which spoke of the
Party’s ‘irrevocable split…from the body of the Nation’. 37
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Ì a c e d o n i a n i s m
It was not many weeks later, on 25-26 March 1949, that the 2nd Congress
of the NOF was held, at Psarades on the Prespa Lakes district of Florina. To
an audience of seven hundred delegates, Zahariadis acknowledged the
part played by the ‘Macedonian’ people, and then harped on the need for
unity with the Greek People if victory was to be achieved. At the end of its
deliberations, the Congress condemned Keramičiev’s pro-Yugoslav group,
and declared the ‘Macedonian’ people’s right to self-determination. ‘In the
present critical moments of the 2nd NOF Congress’ an the Declaration, ‘the
enemies of our people are trying on all sides to disrupt the unity between
the Macedonian People and the militant unity between the Macedonian
People and the Greek People, a unity essential for the victory of both Peoples.
Enemies of our People, of every sort, are exploiting military difficulties and
the other difficulties stemming from them, and are exploiting the situation
in Jugoslavia, uttering various different slogans that make headway with
certain craven and drooping elements, inciting them to break ranks. We,
the seven hundred delegates to the 2nd Congress of the People’s Liberation
Front, do brand these conspirators who are sowing disruption and desertion
in our lines, treading on the blood of our thousands of heroes, as common
traitors and miserable deserters from our People’s struggle. All who have
been led astray by the preaching of the enemy and the disrupters’ subversive
manoeuvres, and who have taken the easy road of flight and desertion,
have done a hellish deed of counter-popular treachery that will help none
but the enemy, the monarchist-fascists, and the imperialist camp’. 38
On the very next day, 27 March, Zahariadis’ pledge to the 2nd NOF
Congress was put into effect, with the founding of KOEM [the Communist
Organization of Aegean Macedonia]. A week later, on 3 April, Mitrevski
became Minister of Supplies in the Provisional Government, Vangel Kojchev
became a member of the DSE’s Supreme War Council and Kochev became
president of Directorate of National Minorities.
Throughout the spring of 1949 there were various different contacts, of a
desperate kind, between the KKE and NOF, and Slavomacedonians who had
taken refuge in Skopje. The purpose was to persuade these latter to change
their minds and join the DSE, even were it only at the eleventh hour. 39 In May
38. For the resolutions taken at the 5th KKE Congress and the actions of NOF, the standard works are still
Evangelos Kofos’ book The Impact of the Macedonian Question on Civil Conflict in Greece (1943-
1949), (Athens, 1989, in English), and Spyridon Sfetas’ article «Ανεπιθύμητοι σύμμαχοι και ανεξέλεγκτοι
αντίπαλοι: Οι σχέσεις ΚΚΕ και NOF στη διάρκεια του εμφυλίου (1946-1949)» [Undesirable allies and
uncontrollable opponents: the relations between the KKE and the NOF during the Civil War (1946-
1949)], in: Spyridon Sfetas [ed], Όψεις του Μακεδονικού Ζητήματος στον 20ό αιώνα [Aspects of the
Macedonian Question in the 20th century] (Thessaloniki, 2001, in Greek), 157-203. See also Spyridon
Sfetas. Η διαμόρφωση της σλαβομακεδονικής ταυτότητας. Μια επώδυνη διαδικασία [The forming of
the Slavomacedonian identity], Thessaloniki, 2003 (in Greek), pp. 257-268.
39. An exhaustive account of the negotiations between the Greek and Jugoslav Communists and
the part played by the Slavomacedonians is to be found in a study by Risto Kirjazovski [Ристо
Кирјазовски], Македонците и односите на КПЈ и КПГ 1945-1949 [The Macedonians and relations
between the Jugoslav and Greek and Communist Parties, 1945-1949], Skopje, 1995, in Slavmacedo-
nian.
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IR R EDENTISM AND POLICY: F Y ROM OF FICIA L STATE PA PERS
1949 the Keramičiev-Dimakis group sent the KKE a letter that put an end to
all attempts to play the go-between. 40 It made a blanket criticism of KKE
policy on the Macedonian Question as ‘in error’ and ‘biassed’ against the
‘Macedonian’ People. Per contra, the letter lauded the Communist Parties
of Jugoslavia and Makedonija, and Tito himself, to the skies for their policy.
The Slavomacedonian ‘guerrillas’ naturally included among the conditions
of their assistance to the KKE that they should receive ‘an apology in writing’
for the ‘injustices’ done to NOF; that independent ‘Macedonian’ units should
be created, with a ‘Macedonian’ cadre at the head of each; that anti-
Tito propaganda should be discontinued; and that free communication
between Greek and Jugoslav Macedonia should be restored. These were
demands to which the KKE obviously had no choice but to assent. 41
On 28 July 1949, a month or so before the end of the Greek Civil War, an
end which was already in sight, Τίτο addressed a convention of pro-Jugoslav
NOF cadres in Skopje. 42 The majority of them were refugees from Greece. 43
Tito launched a fierce attack on the KKE. He accused it of never having
been remotely interested in the rights of Slavomacedonians in Greece. 44 He
40. There is a blow-by-blow account in the Memoirs of two leading Slavomacedonian activists, Naum
Peyov, Македонците и граѓанската војна во Грција [The Macedonians and the Civil war in
Greece], Skopje, 1968, in Slavmacedonian. Vangel Ajanovski-Oche, Егејски Бури [Storms in the Ae-
gean], Skopje, 1975, in Slavmacedonian.
41. The complete correspondence, and the contacts between pro-Jugoslav elements and loyal KKE
cadres of the NOF, are to be found in: Архив на Македонија, Егејска Македонија во НОБ 1949,
Vol. 6, Skopje, 1983, in Slavmacedonian.
42. ΙΑΥΕ 1949, File 34, Sub-File 2, Telegram from Baizos to Greek Foreign Ministry, Skopje, 28 July 1949, Call
No. 571.
43. Evangelos Kofos, Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia, Thessaloniki, 1964, p. 185, Ελευθερία,
30 July 1949.
44. Kofos, op.cit., p. 185.
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Ì a c e d o n i a n i s m
▲ The newspaper Μακεδονικός Φρουρός [Makedonikos Frouros], 15 May 1949 and 5 June 1949.
▲ ‘The NOF and the Cominform greatly wanted to detach Greek Macedonia.
‘Over my dead body!’, says the Evzone. Nobody knew this better than Tito’.
From the newspaper Μακεδονία [Makedonia], 24 April 1949.
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IR R EDENTISM AND POLICY: F Y ROM OF FICIA L STATE PA PERS
called on refugees from Greece to work for their peaceful integration into
Jugoslavia – which was interpreted in Greek circles as meaning that he had
given up his territorial claims on Greek Macedonia. Tito also met deputations
of refugees from Greece and wounded guerrillas, a meeting which was
given an official atmosphere by the presence of numerous high-ranking
members of the Federal and local Party officials. The refugees apparently
thanked Tito for his help, while condemning the revanchist language of KKE
broadcasts against Jugoslavia. 45 Tito allowed a day or two to pass, then on
2 August 1949, on the occasion of the 5th anniversary of the proclamation
of the PRM, and in front of a very large audience – of perhaps as many as
35,000 people, according to foreign diplomats46 – he delivered his bombshell.
He accused the KKE of not behaving properly towards the ‘Macedonians of
the Aegean’. It had not placed them in senior Party positions; and it had not
permitted ‘Macedonian schools’ to function in free Greece. Immediately
afterwards, Makedonija’s president, Količevski, described his Republic as
‘the Piedmont of a future United Macedonia’. 47 The above phraseology was
a mirror of the revaluation of Jugoslav policy towards Greece. While the
goal remained the same, to wit the secession of Greek Macedonia and
the shielding of the ‘Macedonian minority’ in Greece, the means were now
different, since virtually all the Slavomacedonian activists had by now fled
to the PRM.
Once the Greek Civil War came to its close, PRM propaganda on
behalf of ‘Macedonia irredenta’ increased. Now it was spearheaded by
Slavophone ex-guerrillas who had taken refuge en masse in Jugoslavia
after the War ended. Their efforts were aided and abetted by various
different academic bodies in the PRM, giving them the necessary touch of
authority and impetus to keep going. At the start of 1950, for instance, with
the encouragement and economic assistance of the local Party leadership,
the ‘Union of Refugees from Aegean Macedonia’ [UR] was set up in Skopje.
Its aim was to pull into its ranks all the refugees from Greece who had made
their way to the PRM. Membership of UR was open to any refugee living in
Jugoslavia. Run by a General Council, it had branches, each with its own
local council, in various parts of the country. The Union’s interest was by no
means confined exclusively to refugees in PRM, however; it extended to
the Slavophone residue in Greece. In his summary to the general assembly
one year after the inception, the Union’s Secretary General stated that UR
had a duty to keep a close eye on developments in Greek Macedonia,
and to denounce the ‘monarchist-fascist’ Greek government’s policy of
discrimination against Slav-speakers. 48
45. ΙΑΥΕ 1949, File 34, Sub-File 2, Report from Baizos to Greek Foreign Ministry, Skopje, 7 August 1949, Call
No. 602/Δ/1.
46. ΙΑΥΕ 1949, File 34, Sub-File 2, Report from Baizos to Greek Foreign Ministry, Skopje, 7 August 1949, Call
No. 589/Δ/1.
47. Elizabeth Barker, Macedonia: its place in Balkan Power Politics (1950), pp. 209-210.
48. Архив на Македонија, фонд 996: «Организациони Извештај» [Organizational Report].
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Ì a c e d o n i a n i s m
In June 1951, it was put on record in a resolution of UR’s Assembly that it was
the Union’s duty not to be indifferent to the terrible sufferings of their People
in Greece. 49 A codicil to the same resolution read: ‘We must regularly keep
the [Jugoslav] Government informed of the Athens Govenrment’s policy of
genocide, and encourage it to take initiatives in international forums’.
These observations placed the irredentist issue on the agenda of the
SRM’s – and hence Jugoslavia’s - relations with neighbouring countries
from the very first. The same purpose was also served by the use of the
term ‘Aegeans’ [Егејците] to describe refugees from Greece, in place
of the non-specific ‘Macedonians’. It was clear, in other words, that the
use of the term in question promoted the concept of the unity of the
Macedonian People, while also pointing to the existence of ‘enslaved,
unredeemed brethren’ and keeping alive the prospect of their future
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IR R EDENTISM AND POLICY: F Y ROM OF FICIA L STATE PA PERS
50. FO 371/95163: Confidential Report from the British Embassy at Athens to the British Embassy at Bel-
grade, Athens, 7 August 1951, Call No. Emb.1041/43/51.
51. Глас на Егејсите, No. 11, 17 June 1951.
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Ì a c e d o n i a n i s m
was pointed out by Risto Andonovski and the UMW’s secretary Micho
Terpovski singled out children’s education as the central focus of this need.
At the start of 1952, Voice of the Aegeans acted on Naum Pejov’s prompt,
putting out a request to any ‘Aegeans’ with photographs of different parts of
Makedonija, and in particular with photographs of dead bodies, to send them
to the editorial team for publication in a planned album. 52 The Union’s Council
General was simultaneously collecting details about lives lost. The intention
was to put out a kind of White Book about Aegean Macedonia. A collateral
manoeuvre was a move to erect a War Memorial to Slavomacedonian
‘Aegean’ heroes killed in the 1940s.53 In July 1953 the editorial board was
compelled to admit, to its evident discomfiture, that the results had not
come up to its expectations, and that the only publication so far had been a
brochure on Greek Macedonia. 54
It was also at this time that leading Slavomacedonian cadres shouldered
the task of recording the bloody details of recent history, to be made public in
the columns of the refugee newspaper. There were a great many contributors,
but the main names were those of (Naum) Pejov, Andonovski, Andreas Tsipas,
and Keramičiev. As can be seen from the articles, Pejov, the ex-separatist,
had not only contrived to heal the scars of the wound to his authority in 1944,
but had outgunned, in the ideological sense, all others who thought like him.
His various speeches at different refugee assemblies, his stream of articles on
events during the Occupation and the Civil War: these were patiently hosted
in Voices of the Aegean, even when, as often happened, they made up one
half of its reading matter. It was on the Occupation and the Civil War that
Pejov concentrated, for the most part or on what the SNOF55 and the NOF
were up to, their relations with the Greek Communist Party, and the doldrums
of the ‘Slavomacedonian’ minority that obstinately stayed in Greece. 56 Tsipas57
and Keramičiev58 covered much the same ground as Pejov. Andonovski 59
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IR R EDENTISM AND POLICY: F Y ROM OF FICIA L STATE PA PERS
and Šimovski60 were chiefly interested in folklore and are valuable in that
they preserve much information about life in Greek Macedonia in the years
between the two World Wars.
Articles from the newspaper were cannibalized for a book entitled Егејска
Македонија [Aegean Macedonia], published by the Union of Refugees Press
in 1951, under Andonovksi’s name. Also in 1951, Keramičiev contributed an
article to the collective work Егејска Македонија во нашата национална
историја [Aegean Macedonia in our national history]. The newspaper’s
directorate undertook the placing of his book and its distribution to refugee
organizations. In August 1952, the UR’s Secretariat decided to set up an ad
hoc committee to opine on whether or not it was worth publishing two new
books about the Occupation and the Greek Civil War, one by Andonovski
and one by Pejov.
It was as the ‘Aegeans’ were compiling their own history that the first
young students entered the University of Skopje, newly founded in 1949. In
January 1952, the newspaper was able to report, with evident satisfaction,
60. See Todor Šimovski’s articles in Глас на Егејситe (in Slavmacedonian): ‘On the occasion of the forti-
eth anniversary of the death of Risto Batančiev, teacher and revolutionary’, No. 36, July 1953, ‘In our
birthplace of Dibeni’, No. 39, Οct. 1953, No. 40, Νov. 1953, ‘Goče Delčev at Goumenissa’, No. 46,
May 1954.
[37]
Ì a c e d o n i a n i s m
that there were now a total of five students in the University’s Faculty of
Philosophy. These were Gjorgji Sevriev, Dimitar Velikov, Krste Bitovski, Spiro
Stojanski, and Kuzma Gjorgjevski. In 1952, Todor Šimovski became the first
‘Aegean’ from the Faculty to take his degree, and at the start of the year
the student roll included 47 ‘Aegeans’, with scholarships from PRM each
worth 4200 dinars a month.
The basic thing to note is that production of an ideological armoury of texts
about the Greek Civil War and the Ilinden Uprising lasted until 1954. These
texts were mainly for internal consumption by ‘Aegean’ refugees. After 1954
there followed a period in which the older stock of historical commentaries
was being legitimated and incorporated into PRM’s collective national
ideology. It was also the year 1954 which saw the definitive settlement, even
if not quite the actual finish, of the issue about whether refugees should
remain in the country. Not that the production of history books specially for
‘Aegeans’ came to a halt. Матица на Иселениците од Македонија, the
‘Centre for Macedonians in Exile’, founded in 1951, continued the work of
the UR, particularly in the political domain. And if Voice of the Aegeans did
fall silent in 1954, it was at once replaced by a monthly called Makedonija
[Македонија], whose first editor was none other than Andonovski, and an
annual called The Exile’s Calendar
[Иселеницки Календар].
It was not only ex-guerrillas from
Greece who were looking into the
history of ‘Aegean Macedonia’
with interest. Before very long
this subject was introduced,
as a separate category of
reference and research, into the
repertoire of the SRM’s official
organ for such studies, IEE, the
Institute of National History.
Τhe ΙΕΕ had been founded by
SRM’s government in 1948, with
one clear aim – ‘to write and
publicize the official history of
the Macedonian People’, and
to incorporate it into Jugoslav
history as a whole. 61 On 1 July
1956, delivering a speech for
the IEE’s first anniversary, in
front of Party officials and
academic VIPs, Šimovski – a
▲ Cover of the magazine Македонија,
with the waterfalls at Edessa.
61. Vlado Ivanovski [Bладо Ивановски] (ed.), 30 години Институт за Национална Историја, [30 Years
of the Institute of National History], [n.pl.], 1978.
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IR R EDENTISM AND POLICY: F Y ROM OF FICIA L STATE PA PERS
refugee from the Kilkis district who had been the first ‘Aegean’ to join the
Institute, in 1952 – said that one of the IEE’s basic obligations ought to be
to collect historical material, not just about the distant past, but about the
recent struggle of the ‘Macedonians from Aegean Macedonia’. Here (he
said) events of great importance had taken place – struggles worthy of
inclusion in the official history, lest they be forgotten. 62 Šimovski’s prompting
seems to have had its effect, for over the coming years a series of ‘Aegean’
historians were to join the Institute, their one and only task being to compile a
history of ‘Aegean Macedonia’. In 1964, a post was found for Risto Poplazarov,
from Kalohori near Kastoria, who four years earlier had graduated from the
Philosophical Faculty of the University of Prague in Czechoslovakia. In 1967,
it was the turn of Krste Bitoshki, from the village of Gavros, also near Kastoria,
who had completed his studies in the Philosophical Faculty of the University
of Skopje in 1956. They were joined in 1970 by Risto Iliovski, a child of the
Paidomazoma, 63 who had studied in Budapest; in 1972 by Stojan Kiselinovski,
another child of the Paidomazoma, who had studied in Romania; in 1974
by a Democratic Army veteran, Risto Kirjazovski; in 1976 by Vasil Gotevski
from Idroussa, a history graduate of the University of Warsaw; and in 1977 by
Eleftheria Bambakovska, from Kardia near Kozani, a history graduate of the
University of Skopje. 64 Significantly, by the end of the 1980s a quarter of all
the Institute’s research fellows were of Greek extraction; and it was they who
monopolized the discussion of research on subjects of Greek interest. The
Balkanology Section was well known to be packed with ‘Aegean’ staff. It was
headed by Rastislav Terzjovski from Perlepe [Prilep], and all its researchers
without exception were of ‘Aegean Macedonian’ origin: Šimovski, Kirjazovski,
Kiselinovski, and Theodoros Papanagiotou. 65 In 1976 Šimovski was drafted to
the editorial team of the Institute’s review Гласник [The Messenger], to be
followed in 1979 by Iliovski and in 1983 by Bitoshki. (It is a striking fact that
even in today’s FYROM, no historian hailing from any other region has written
about historical developments in Greek Macedonia). Thus their texts are
fatally loaded with sentimental effusion, hyperbole, and hostile innuendo
towards Greece. It is further interesting to note how the ‘Aegean lobby’, as
they call themselves, has imposed itself, with regard to Party legitimacy and
political approach, even on history as written in the Jugoslav Federation.
The rise of the ‘Aegeans’ as academics in the 1960s and 70s went hand in
glove with the war of words between the diplomats of Athens and Belgrade
during these two decades. The battle over the Macedonian Question, a
62. «Годишно Собрание на Институтот за Национална Иcторија», [‘The Annual Assembly of the Insti-
tute of National History], Гласник, 1/1 (1957), 339.
63. [Paidomazoma: the ‘collecting up of minors’. A term current during Seljuk and Ottoman occupation
of Greece to denote the occupying power’s seizure and reculturing of (male) children, some des-
tined for high military or civilian office. Now more usually applied, by transference, to Greek Com-
munist guerrillas’ abduction by of children from Greek territory to neighbouring Communist countries
(contested by revisionist historians). Translator’s Note].
64. Ivanovski, op.cit., pp. 46, 93, 101, 104, 112-113, 118.
65. ibid, p. 30.
[39]
Ì a c e d o n i a n i s m
66. The passage of words between Konstantinos Karamanlis, then Greek Prime Minister, and Ðuranović,
Federal Prime Minister of Jugoslavia, at Spilt in March 1979, afford a typical instance. The discussions
turned to the subject of cultural exchanges, whereupon Ðuranović remarked: ‘In the domain of bi-
lateral cooperation there is the matter of the Macedonian ethnic minority’. Karamanlis immediately
replied that that was ‘a regrettable issue’ in bilateral relations. He asked what the point was of the
Macedonians digging up the Macedonian Question forty years on. Ðuranović answer was: ‘There
are no differences between Belgrade and Skopje on matters of foreign policy’. The atmosphere was
dangerously charged. Karamanlis refused to discuss the subject any further, and the two leaders
turned their attention to other matters. It was however plain that this skirmish about the Macedonian
Question had overshadowed the summit talks. See Konstantinos Svolopoulos (ed.), Κωνσταντίνος
Καραμανλής. Αρχείο. Γεγονότα και κείμενα [The Karamanlis Archives], Vol. 11 Η Ελλάδα στην Ευρώπη
1977-1980 [Greece in Europe 1977-1980]. Περίοδος Β΄ 1η Ιανουαρίου 1979 - 15 Μαΐου 1980 [Period II :
1.1.1979-15.5.1980], Αthens, 1997, in Greek, pp. 64-68.
67. Good examples are Naum Pejov’s Македонците и граѓанската војна во Грција, [The Macedo-
nians and the Civil War in Greece], Skopje, 1968, in Slavmacedonian; Ajanovski-Oche’s Егејски
бури, [Storms in the Aegean], Skopje, 1975, in Slavmacedonian; and Šimovski’s Населените места
во Егејска Македонија, [The inhabited regions of Aegean Macedonia], Vol. 1, Skopje, 1978, in Slav-
macedonian.
68. Krste Vitoshki [Крсте Битоски], ‘Отпорот на Македонците против асимилаторските стремежи
на грчката вооружена пропаганда (1878-1908)’, [The Resistance of the Macedonians to attempts
by the armed Greek propaganda to assimilate them], Југословенски историски часопис, 4 (Bel-
grade, 1969, in Slavmacedonian), 125-128; Risto Poplazarov [Ристо Поплазаров], ‘Некои моменти
од борбата на Македонците против грчката и бугарската црковно-просветна доминација
во втората половина на ХIХ век (до 1888)’ [Some key moments in the Macedonians’ struggle
against Greek and Bulgarian religious and educational domination in the later 19th century, up to
[40]
IR R EDENTISM AND POLICY: F Y ROM OF FICIA L STATE PA PERS
[41]
Ì a c e d o n i a n i s m
◄ The newspaper
Μακεδονία [Makedonia],
Thessaloniki, 20 June
1950.
◄ The newspaper
Μακεδονία [Makedonia],
Thessaloniki, 20 June
1950.
► The newspaper
Μακεδονία [Make-
donia], Thessaloniki,
9 September 1950.
[42]
IR R EDENTISM AND POLICY: F Y ROM OF FICIA L STATE PA PERS
69. Kofos Archives. Talks between Nikolareizis and Popović, 2 June 1960.
[43]
Ì a c e d o n i a n i s m
No one (he said) could prevent his People taking an interest in their fate. 70
These irredentist speeches in SRM were not without their consequences.
This time the fuse was an answer that the new Prime Minister, Aleksandar
Grilčo, gave an American journalist at a reception for members of the Press,
on 14 November 1961. Greece was (he said) taking ‘certain disquieting
measures’ to the detriment of the ‘Macedonian’ minority. Grilčo also told
the journalist that Athens’ ultimate policy aim was to efface the minority’s
ethnic consciousness.71 Finally, he repeated his country’s fixed position that
the only way bilateral relations between Makedonija and Greece could be
improved was by Greece’s recognizing minority rights. Two days later, the
Jugoslav Ambassador at Athens was summoned by Averof for a friendly
rap over the knuckles for Grilčo’s indiscreet remarks. The ambassador made
light of them, and, in the hope of showing that they were not espoused by
Belgrade, he assured the Greek Foreign Minister that they had not been
published in Borba [the official Party paper] or transmitted by Tanjug [the
State News Agency].72
Now that there was a bush war of speeches, Averof himself entered the
fray, on 7 December 1961. In an address to the Greek Parliament, the Foreign
Minister described the Grilčo speech as ‘unacceptable’, and repeated the
fixed Greek position, that no ‘Macedonian’ minority existed in the country. A
week later, on 15 December, a spokesman for the Jugoslav Foreign Minister,
Kunč, made use of Averof’s address for a whitewash of Makedonija’s Prime
Minister, repeating his country’s firm position that there was indeed a
‘Macedonian’ minority in Greece and adding that nothing but giving this
minority their ‘rights’ would normalize bilateral relations.
Generous measures were taken by the local SRM government at this
time for the benefit of their refugees from Greece. A law was passed
in 1961 recognizing service in the ranks of NOF or SNOF as a ‘period of
employment’. (This measure had been in force earlier, but only for service in
the DSE: it had been discontinued in 1956 in deference to ‘Greek-Jugoslav
friendship’). Many refugees had also been given awards for services
rendered to their country; and a fair number of others had got a pension.
Three leading ‘Aegean’ cadres had been elected People’s Deputies. Two
of them went on to hold a ministerial post: Pejov, as Minister of Farming
and Forests, and Mitrevski, as Deputy Minister of People’s Legislation.
Keramičiev became a Deputy and, like Ajanovski-Oche, a senior official
in the Ministry of the Interior. Taško Hadjijanev became a senior official in
the Ministry of Farming and Forests. Minas Fotev became a senior official
in the local SRM Government Office.
And so things stood until the end of the 1980s and the start of the ‘90s, when
[44]
IR R EDENTISM AND POLICY: F Y ROM OF FICIA L STATE PA PERS
[45]
Ì a c e d o n i a n i s m
◄ The announcement, on
the official website of FYROM’s
Foreign Ministry, of a meeting
between Foreign Minister Milošoski
and a delegation from the ‘Union
of Macedonians from Aegean
Macedonia’, at the end
of December 2006.
[46]
IR R EDENTISM AND POLICY: F Y ROM OF FICIA L STATE PA PERS
the 1997 editions Greece and Macedonia are shown as two different
regions.
The same goes for the way Macedonia is represented in the remaining
historical periods. Whereas in the 1992 edition no ‘ethnic and geographical
boundaries of Macedonia’ are shown for the Medieval period, in the 1997
edition Medieval Macedonia is a visible entity with geographical as well as
ethnic borders.
Thus FYROM’s irredentist ideology underwent a certain radicalization from
1998 onwards, in defiance of the provisions of the recently signed Interim
Agreement. There is an ongoing attempt to construct a national myth
and the means used is the aggressive appropriation of the region’s history
– up to and including designs on the ancient Macedonian Greek heritage
and its legators in prehistory. The phrase that best describes this desperate
[47]
Ì a c e d o n i a n i s m
[48]
IR R EDENTISM AND POLICY: F Y ROM OF FICIA L STATE PA PERS
▲ The Greek colonies. Kosta Atsievski & team, Историја за V одделение [History Textbook, Grade V],
Skopje 2005, p.37.
[49]
Ì a c e d o n i a n i s m
[50]
IR R EDENTISM AND POLICY: F Y ROM OF FICIA L STATE PA PERS
[51]
Ì a c e d o n i a n i s m
[52]
IR R EDENTISM AND POLICY: F Y ROM OF FICIA L STATE PA PERS
[53]
Ì a c e d o n i a n i s m
When the name of the city of Skopje’s airport was changed to ‘Alexander
the Great’, it was just one more straw in the wind. The country continues to
print stamps depicting Philip II and Alexander. And on the official Church
website emblems are appropriated openly. All this betrays FYROM’s need to
reposition itself historically and geographically.
[54]
IR R EDENTISM AND POLICY: F Y ROM OF FICIA L STATE PA PERS
Afterword
All that has been said here bears undeniable witness to an irredentist
attitude towards Greece among FYROM’s organs of state and official
foundations. Article 4 of the Interim Accord provided that neither of the
two signatories should ‘promote or support claims on any part whatever of
the dominion of the other, or claims to change the existing boundary’. The
interpretation of this clause is, I think, obvious; as obvious as is its violation.
It can be taken as proved, then, that only in the international forum, these
last few years, has FYROM troubled to tone down the impression that it is
casting envious eyes on Greek territory. But it is also true that, the international
shop-window apart, nothing has really changed – either in official political
discourse or among the bodies that shape state policy. The objectives on the
agenda of AFCM have been religiously observed for sixty years and more,
as if time had stood still. And to boot, the new developments in FYROM - the
radicalization of irredentist ideology through now wholesale appropriation of
the historical past, linking it to the educational process – leave little room for
optimism. At the same time, the possibility that FYROM may come up with a
wiser and more moderate policy has taken a severe dent from developments
over the past ten years, with more and more countries recognizing it as the
Republic of Macedonia in a knock-on effect. These developments do not
breed much hope or optimism for the future. The only thing that needs be
said in conclusion, is that irredentist attitudes and practices of this sort have
not even the makings of good-neighbourliness; nor are they founded on
international treaties; nor (and that is for certain) do they help find lasting
and constructive solutions to the problems endemic in the bilateral relations
of FYROM and Greece.
[55]