IV.

Byzantine Macedonia (324-1025)

by Theodoros Korres

1. Macedonia from the 4th to the 6th century

Although the majority of modern historians date the monocracy of Constantine the
Great from 324, the beginning of the history of the Eastern Roman Empire, which was
later to be called Byzantium, must take us back to the period of the Tetrarchy, when
there occurred many significant events which were to prove decisive for the future of
Macedonia.
During that time, Galerius Caesar transferred his administrative seat from Sirmio
in Pannonia to Thessaloniki, which he effectively established as the capital of the East-
ern Roman Empire, and built the Rotunda, a luxurious, palatial complex, and the
triumphant arch which bears his name. This brief return to the time of Galerius is im-
perative for another, perhaps even more important reason. This is because at that time,
there occurred the notorious persecution of Christians, among whom the Roman officer,
Demetrios, was martyred in 305. And it is widely known how closely connected with
the history of the city and especially with the attempts to defend it against the various
enemies which threatened it, is the name and worship of the martyr Demetrios, who
from the 6th century has been recognized as the patron saint of Thessaloniki.1
The administrative reforms of Diocletian were continued by Constantine the Great
and the diocese of Moesia was divided, probably before 327, into the administrative ar-
eas of Dacia and Macedonia, as stated in Notitia dignitatum, a source from the 5th
century. In the new administrative form, the province of Macedonia was further divided
into Macedonia prima and Macedonia secunda.
As a result, the boundaries of Macedonia in the 4th century extended as far east as
the River Nestos , as far north as present-day Velesa (Titov-Veles), as far west as Epirus
Vetus, and as far south as Thessaly. It is worth noting that the boundaries of Macedonia
change continuously in the centuries that follow.2
The importance of Thessaloniki as an administrative center was realized by
Constantine the Great, who made it the base of his military campaigns during the period
322-23. According to the 5th century historian, Zosimus, Constantine constructed a
square artificial harbour in the north western corner of the city, where the ships belong-
ing to the fleet he had gathered to transport his army to Asia Minor for his confrontation
with Licinius could moor3. The ‘dug’ harbour of Constantine the Great was to play an
important role in the commercial activity and economic growth of Thessaloniki in Byz-
antine times, as referred to in sources from the 10th and 12th centuries. Let it be noted
that, following his defeat, Licinius was conveyed to the prison in Thessaloniki, where
he remained until his execution in 325.
In 379, half a century later, Theodosios the Great (379-395) also chose Thessalo-
niki as the base of his military campaigns against the enemies of the empire, the Goths,
who, after their victory at Adrianople in 378, where they slaughtered the Roman army
and Emperor Valens himself, invaded the western sector of the Balkans and the Greek
mainland looting and wreaking destruction. Although the evidence from the sources is
scant and vague, it would appear that Theodosios ordered a general mobilization of the
army in the area and, with the help of Goth mercenaries, managed in the summer of 379
to defeat the Goths and their allies, the Alans and Huns, who were pillaging Thrace, and
finally repulsed them to regions beyond Mt Haimos. The emperor returned to Thessa-
90 BYZANTINE MACEDONIA (324-1025)
loniki, where he remained until the summer of 380 reorganizing his army. During this
time he strengthened the city’s fortifications, as evidenced by an inscription on a tower
along the eastern walls which reads “Ormisdas built walls around the city that could not
be captured”4.
During his stay, Theodosios was baptized a Christian by the Metropolitan of
Thessaloniki. With the zeal of the neophyte, Theodosios issued from Thessaloniki an
edict which recognized the doctrine of the First Ecumenical Council of Nicaea as the
only authoritative one and followed this a year later by decreeing Orthodox Christianity
as the official religion of the Empire and implementing strict measures against idolaters
as well as non-orthodox Christians.
Despite the military successes of Theodosios, the Goths continued to cause trou-
ble in the provinces in the north Balkans and the emperor attempted to solve the
problem by signing a peace treaty in 382, under which he sanctioned the settlement of
Goths in the areas of Dacia and Thrace and their induction into the Roman (Byzantine)
army as foederati, or allies. This policy of his met with opposition, which reached a
climax in Thessaloniki in 390, when citizens, in reaction to the arrest of a well-known
charioteer by Vouterih, the commander of the Goth garrison, instigated disturbances
which resulted in the murder of the commander. The emperor’s reaction was swift and
severe. The citizens of Thessaloniki were summoned to the hippodrome, where seven
thousand of them were trapped and slaughtered by the Goth mercenaries. Later, in re-
sponse to pressure from Ambrosios, bishop of Mediolanum (Milan), Theodosios was
forced to ask publicly for forgiveness for his actions. It is worthwhile noting that the
hippodrome was never again used and with the passing of time fell into a state of ruin5.
A few years later in 395, the Visigoths led by Alaric turned towards eastern Ma-
cedonia, which they pillaged, failing, however, to overrun the walls of Thessaloniki.
During the period 473-483, Macedonia was attacked by the Ostrogoths. Philippi
and Thessaloniki were endangered and were saved through the intervention of emperor
Zeno (476-491) himself. Other Macedonian towns such as Pella, Edessa and Heraclea
near Monastir, which was completely destroyed, were less fortunate. Macedonia was
finally relieved of the Goths when, in 488, Zeno deflected their attentions towards Italy.
However, this period of relative peace for Macedonia was short lived.

1. Avaro-Slavic invasions of the 6th and 7th centuries

th
The 6 century is known to have been particularly difficult for the Byzantine empire
and especially for its Balkan provinces. This is so because, while the Byzantines were
fighting the Persians in the east and attempting to achieve the reconquista in the west, it
was necessary simultaneously to check the intense aggressive activities of the Huns and
Slavic tribes, who, with their predatory forays, were plaguing Macedonia as well. The
situation in the Balkans deteriorated at the end of the reign of Justinian (527-565) with
the appearance of seasoned Avar soldiers. An Asian people, they moved towards
Europe creating a powerful state which spread from the Danube to the Dneiper and
Baltic and began to plunder the northern provinces of the empire with the help of Slavic
tribes which they had subjugated.
At this time, emperor Maurice (582-602), who was being kept busy by the Per-
sians on the eastern front, did not have a sufficiently large military force to repulse the
Avaro-Slavic invaders and was compelled to pay an annual tribute in order to secure
peace in the region. However, when in 591 the Byzantines signed a pact with the Per-
sians, Maurice transferred his forces to the Balkans, and having crossed the Danube,
surprised the Slavs and won “a victory the Romans were proud of”. Unfortunately for
THEODOROS KORRES 91
the empire and the inhabitants of the area, however, the fall of Maurice and the rise of
Phocas (602-610) upset the balance. The Byzantine-Persian war was resumed, the
Avaro-Slavic forces invaded unobstructed and, having occupied cities and areas of pre-
sent-day Bulgaria and Serbia, arrived in 597 at the walls of Thessaloniki6.
In connection with the attempts of the Thessalonians to defend themselves against
their enemies at that time, there has been created a rich tradition which has as its central
hero the “mirovlitis (the myrrh-exuding one), kallinikos (the glorious victor), philopatris
(lover of the homeland) Demetrios” who intervenes and saves the city from the invad-
ers. This tradition is preserved until today in the hagiologic texts of the “Miracles of St
Demetrios”, a collection of celebratory speeches which were delivered by the metro-
politans of Thessaloniki on the occasion of the feast of St Demetrios and constitute the
only source which refers to the sieges laid to Thessaloniki by Avaro-Slavic forces. It is
worth noting that the purpose of reciting the “Miracles of St Demetrios” was not to re-
cord the events. They aimed only to stress “that it is only from God and nowhere else
that salvation came to the city”. It is in any case acknowledged how difficult it is to
search for historical truth in hagiologic texts. The text of the “Miracles” presents addi-
tional difficulties because it describes events of the 6th and 7th centuries which are not
referred to in any of the scant sources from the period.7
During the 6th and mainly the 7th centuries, the Avars and the Slavs attempted on
five occasions to occupy the city of St Demetrios. The first attack took place in Septem-
ber of 597 and, according to what is mentioned in the “Miracles”, it was the first time
that the Thessalonians had seen the Avaro-Slavic forces at close quarters, testimony
which refutes the assumption that the Slavs had settled in the area from the end of the
6th century. Despite the exaggerated number of 100,000 which is referred to in the
source, the city was successfully defended after the miraculous intervention of the
myrrh-scented patron saint of the city, who appears “in the shape of a warrior who
struck with his lance the first of the barbarians who climbed the ladder” and forces the
khagan of the Avars, Vaino, to lift the seven day siege and return to his base beyond
the Danube.
The second attempt took place in 604, during the reign of Phocas (602-610) on the
eve of the feast of St Demetrios. This time, the small number of Avaro-Slavic forces,
which totalled 5,000, arrived unnoticed and would have succeeded in surprising the
Thessalonikians, who were gathered in celebration in the church of the patron saint.
However, the “city-saving” Demetrios persuaded a Byzantine officer to dispatch the
armed citizens to the walls and in this way the surprise attack was foiled. The following
day, as soon as it was confirmed how few attackers there were, the citizens successfully
attempted a break out and pursued them.
The third attempt in 615, during the reign of Heraklius, was better organized and
more dangerous. Bands of Slavs who had settled in Macedonia and Thessaly laid siege
to Thessaloniki from the sea using innumerable dugouts, while their families waited for
them on the neighbouring plain with all their belongings in order to settle in the city af-
ter its capture. At dawn on the fourth day after their arrival, the Slavs attempted to
assault the city and take it over. However, while the battles were raging along the sea-
wall, St Demetrios appeared “wearing a white chlamys (cloak)” walking along the walls
and on the surface of the sea evoking “a wind which had a divine aura”, which began to
blow in the gulf and destroyed the dugouts of the besiegers, staining “the whole sea with
the blood of the barbarians”. Owing to the heroism of its citizens and the southwesterly
winds which blew at the crucial moment, Thessaloniki avoided capture and destruction
yet again8.
92 BYZANTINE MACEDONIA (324-1025)
In the summer of 618, the Avaro-Salvic forces attempted once again to capture the
bride of the Thermaic Gulf. Armed with siege engines they tried for thirty-three days to
destroy the walls. The city was finally spared because of the heroism of its residents and
the inexperience of the Avaro-Slavic forces in the use of the siege engines. They re-
peated the attempt two years later, at a time when Thessaloniki had suffered heavy
damage from a strong earthquake. Not even this time did they manage to take the city.
This in fact was the last time that the Avars and the Slavs joined forces to lay siege to
Thessaloniki because the Avars, after their failure to capture Constantinople in 626,
ceased to be a threat to Byzantium.
The final and perhaps most dangerous attempt against Thessaloniki took place in
676-678, when bands of Slavs who had settled in the surrounding area tried to take the
city. The Thessalonians stoutly defended themselves strengthened by their faith in the
myrrh-exuding Demetrios who "in the shape of a warrior" intervened to save the city in
the crucial hours. And it is this faith which I believe led them to put up a strong defence
instead of panicking, which, otherwise, would have driven them to defeat and destruc-
tion. Emperor Constantine IV (668-685) was not able to help the co-capital because at
that time Constantinople itself was under siege by the Arabs. However, immediately
after the Arab forces were crushed, the siege of Thessaloniki was lifted because the em-
peror turned his attention and his forces towards undertaking a powerful confrontation
with the “rebellious” Slavs9.
However, it is acknowledged that Byzantium was a multi-national political entity
and resorted to the use of arms in confronting foreigners only when they came as ag-
gressors. In fact, they tolerated and often assisted the settlement of foreigners on their
soil when they asked to be granted permission by the emperor. From the vague informa-
tion provided by sources from that time it would appear that we have two categories of
Slavic settlers:
I. On the northern borders of the empire beyond the Danube, there was a relatively
dense settlement of Slavs, whose smaller units were independent and autonomous
and did not have any obligations towards the emperor.
II. On the other hand, other bands of Slavs exploiting the general upheaval which
they created with their raids in the Balkans, ventured further south and formed en-
claves of permanent settlements, known as ‘sklaveniai’, on Byzantine soil paying
“pakta” in other words tribute10 .
Let it not be concluded that the emperors of Constantinople remained indifferent and
abandoned Macedonia and its capital to its own fortunes. On the contrary, there were
Byzantine garrisons in all the towns of Macedonia and especially in Thessaloniki, and
campaigns against the Slavs were carried out. In 658, Constans II “marched against the
sklaveniai and subdued many”, in 688, Justinian II defeated the Slavs and resettled
many of them in the Asia Minor theme of Opsikion, and finally, in 783, during the time
of Irene, the “Logothetes”, Staurakios, having defeated the Bulgars and the Slavs in
Thrace, “advanced in the direction of Thessaloniki and Greece, subjugated the enemy
and made them pay tribute to the empire.” 11
As referred to above, bands of Slavs had already arrived in Macedonia and Thrace
at the beginning of the 7th century and established settlements in marshy or semi-
highland regions, which the Byzantines called sklaveniai. Such bands or tribes were the
Drougouvitai and Sagoudatai, who lived between Veria and Monastir, the Velegezitai in
the area of Dimitriada in Thessaly, the Strymonitai in the higher lands around the River
Strymon close to Rentina and the Smoleanoi in the higher lands of Rhodope. Although
these bands had their own princes or reges, they were obliged to pay taxes to the Byzan-
THEODOROS KORRES 93
tine empire, which is the reason why they often revolted. On such occasions, the Byzan-
tine army intervened and restored peace12.
As time passed, the interaction with Slavs who had settled on lands within the
Byzantine empire became friendly. The newcomers began to develop commercial rela-
tions and gradually adopted and followed the Byzantine way of life. One such case is
that of the “prince” of the Rynchionoi Perboundos, who dressed like the Byzantines,
spoke Greek, associated with wealthy Thessalonians and, most importantly, preferred to
live in the city on the Thermaic Gulf instead of with his subjects. In this way we can
observe that with time, the superior Byzantine culture attracted the Slavs, who were fi-
nally christianized “having accepted baptism from God” and made a part of Byzantine
society.13
The Avaro-Slavic raids and the successful defence put up by the Macedonian
capital are certainly the most significant events in the history of the region during the 6th
and 7th centuries. There is, however, something of equal importance that needs to be
specially stressed. That is the fact that with the sparing of the city, a cultural tradition
which spanned centuries and which would have been broken if the Slavs had taken the
city of St Demetrios, was saved and maintained. It is of course natural that the city’s
continual struggles for survival did not offer the most suitable conditions for spiritual
and cultural activities. However, the store of knowledge and culture which had been
amassed over the centuries was sufficient to allow the city to radiate its light and play a
leading role, especially during the 9th century, in the culturalizing and christianizing of
the Slavs who settled beyond the boundaries of the empire. This subject, however, will
be addressed later.

2. The “theme” system in the Balkans

In the 7th century it appears that the administrative map of the region changes once
more. The Byzantine empire is divided into new military administrative units called
“themes”, as referred to in sources from the period. This new administrative system as-
signed to the same officer, the general, both the political and military administration of
the “theme” and replaced the mercenary forces with native soldiers, who received in
return for their services an allocation of land which they were able to cultivate. The plot
of land allocated was subdivided and transferred to their male offspring together with
the obligation to serve in the army.
The new institution of “themes” was also applied in the Balkans. Between 680
and 681, the theme of Thrace was established and at the end of the 8th century, that of
Macedonia, with its capital in Adrianople, possibly in the years of the monocracy of
Irene of Athens (792 – 802). At the start of the 9th century, the themes of Strymon and
Thessaloniki were established. Thessaloniki, the former capital of Illyricum, becomes
from this point on “the capital of the western themes”14.

3. Establishment of the Bulgarian state.

Byzantine-Bulgarian wars (680 – 820)
The reforms to the existing administrative system in Byzantine Macedonia appear to
have dictated the conditions which prevailed after the arrival and settlement in north-
eastern Thrace of a new people, the Bulgars, who proved to be the greatest enemy of the
Byzantines. Around the middle of the 7th century, Bulgar tribes led by Asparuch settled
in the northern part of the Danube delta and began to plague the neighbouring Byzan-
tine provinces with their pillaging raids. Constantine IV (668 – 685) crossed the Danube
94 BYZANTINE MACEDONIA (324-1025)
with a powerful military force in 680 in an attempt to engage the Bulgars. However, the
marshy region hindered Byzantine efforts to deploy their forces and achieve a swift vic-
tory. The emperor fell ill and his withdrawal was followed by the disorderly retreat of
his entire army. The Bulgars crossed the Danube in pursuit of them and, whereas the
Byzantines fled in panic “without being pursued by anyone”, they settled in the area of
Varna, having subjugated the Slavic tribes who lived there. From their new base, the
Bulgars began raiding towns and forts in the region. The emperor tried in vain to repel
these new enemies and was finally compelled to buy the peace which he had been un-
able to enforce with the use of arms15.
In 685, Justinian II (685 – 695), son of Constantine IV, ascended the Byzantine
throne on the death of his father. Justinian, young, inexperienced and ambitious, was
unable to tolerate having to pay an annual tribute to the Bulgars. Consequently, he
marched against the Bulgars and Slavs in Thrace, north of Haimos, and defeated them
before turning his attention northwestwards in the direction of Thessaloniki and subju-
gating all the Slavs who had revolted. However, when he began his return journey to the
capital he was ambushed by the Bulgars, probably in the gorge of Philippopolis or Rou-
pel and “with the slaughter of many of his soldiers in the gorge of Kleisoura and the
injuring of many more, he was able to proceed with great difficulty”. The next cam-
paign undertaken against the Bulgars near Anchialos in 708 by Justinian , during his
second reign (705 – 711), was equally unsuccessful16.
Implacable enemies of the Byzantines, the Bulgars attempted in every possible
way to undermine the empire. As a result, when in 719 and during the reign of Leo III
(717-741) a movement headed by former emperor Artemius- Anastasius II, who had
been exiled to Thessaloniki, was started, the Bulgars joined forces with the usurper. Of
course their expectations to be able to precipitate a civil war among the Byzantines
never materialized because Leo crushed the movement from the very start.
The Byzantine-Bulgarian conflict continued during the reign of Leo’s successor,
Constantine V (741-775). In 719 a terrible pestilence, originating in Sicily, broke out
and quickly spread over the mainland of Greece, to the islands and finally reached Con-
stantinople in 747. Areas in Thrace and the capital were badly affected by the pestilence
and were deserted. That is why the emperor was forced some time later to re-populate
them by bringing people from Syria, Armenia as well as “from the islands and mainland
Greece”, in anticipation of any moves that might result from the expansive intentions of
the Bulgars. The Bulgars, however, reacted by invading Thrace and reaching the sub-
urbs of Constantinople17. Before turning towards the Bulgars, the emperor conducted a
campaign in the theme of Macedonia and subjugated all the rebellious sklaveniai in the
region. In 759, after campaigns which wavered between victory and defeat, Constantine
V managed to vanquish the Bulgars in a battle near the Marcellae fortress and force
them to sue for peace, which, however, did not last long.
Three years later in 762, Telez, the new leader of the Bulgars, resumed the raids
against the empire and Constantine V once more began a campaign against them. The
two armies met near Anchialos in the summer of 763 and the Bulgars suffered a crush-
ing defeat, an event which Constantine V celebrated with great triumph in the
hippodrome of Constantinople. Despite the defeats which they had suffered, the Bulgars
remained the most significant enemy of the empire in the Balkans and especially Mace-
donia, as we shall see later, since they continued to be a threat to the long-suffering
northern Byzantine provinces until the 11th century 18.
The next round of the Byzantine-Bulgarian war begins in 809 in the region north
of the Strymon River, when the Bulgars ambushed Byzantine forces during the time
they were being paid and, having slain the officers and soldiers, escaped taking with
THEODOROS KORRES 95
them the chest which contained 1,100 litres of gold. In the same year, the Bulgars led by
Krum used cunning to take Sardica (Sofia), forcing emperor Nikephoros I (802-811) to
turn his attention towards them as soon as conditions permitted. Indeed in the summer
of 811, at the head of the military forces of the theme, the emperor crossed the Haimos
and invaded Bulgaria. Despite their initial successes, the Byzantines were finally
trapped by Krum and suffered a crushing defeat with a large number of casualties.
Among the dead was emperor Nikephoros I himself. The war continued on the plains of
eastern Thrace during the reigns of Nikephoros’ successors with raids on and pillaging
of towns in the theme of Macedonia until the autumn of 813, when Leo V (813-820)
managed to surprise and destroy the Bulgar army near Mesembria. A few months later,
the capable Bulgar leader Krum died and Byzantine was able to feel relief for a short
time from its dangerous northern neighbours19.

4. The towns of Macedonia (6th-9th century)

During the period from the 6th until the 9th century, the Macedonian countryside suf-
fered in every possible way from the Avaro-Slavic and Bulgar raids and the oppressed
populations sought refuge within the walls surrounding the towns in the vicinity. The
Macedonian towns managed to survive and remain centers of commerce and culture.
When in fact they were coastal towns which had ports, as in the case of Thessaloniki,
their importance grew.
Thessaloniki was the worthy capital of Macedonia and the second largest city in
terms of size and importance (the first after the first) after Constantinople. Built in an
advantageous position, a military and commercial center, it played an important role
during this time because it was before its land and sea walls that the attacks of the ene-
mies of Macedonia broke out and eventually died down. In any case, their persistence in
attempting to capture Thessaloniki confirms what is provided by the sources, which re-
cord that the city was the wealthiest and most important one in the region.
The information which we have on the other towns of Macedonia is scant and de-
rives mainly from the registers of the bishoprics and the minutes of Councils. The most
important are Stoboi, Kaisareia, (northwest of Kozani), Vargala, walled Veria, a center
of important cultural tradition, Servia, also fortressed and next to the River Aliakmon,
Edessa, Serres, which is referred to in the 9th century as the capital of the theme of
Strymon and a bishopric seat, Christoupolis (Kavala), a powerful military base with the
second largest harbour in Macedonia after Thessaloniki, Amphipolis and Philippi20 .

5. Christianizing of the Slavs

Thessaloniki earned its fame as the foremost city of Macedonia not only because over
the centuries in question it managed to remain an impregnable fortress and bulwark of
Macedonia, but because in this way it saved the cultural heritage of centuries and was
able in the 9th century, as mentioned, to radiate its light upon the Slavic world beyond
the frontiers of the empire.
It was in Thessaloniki that the brothers Methodius and Constantine-Cyril, who
preached Christianity in Moravia, translated liturgical tracts into the Slavic language
and developed an alphabet capable of rendering the sounds found in the language, were
born and first schooled. They were the sons of a droungarios, a low-ranking military
officer, in the Theme of Thessaloniki. Methodius, who was born around 815, studied in
Thessaloniki and was later appointed administrator of the sklaveniai of Strymon. The
younger Constantine was born in either 825 or 827 and after his comprehensive studies
96 BYZANTINE MACEDONIA (324-1025)
went in 843 to Constantinople, where he studied under the patriarch Photios, and Leo
the Mathematician. His progress was rapid. He became secretary to Photios and teacher
of rhetoric at the Magnaura school. In 863, when Prince Ratislav of Greater Moravia
asked Michael III (842-867) to dispatch preachers to teach Christianity to his subjects,
the patriarch Photios and Bardas, the regent of Michael III, assigned the brothers Meth-
odius and Constantine to carry out the mission because they had diplomatic experience
and knew the Slavic language as well. Their mission most certainly offered opportuni-
ties for furthering political interests because, apart from christianizing, they had the
opportunity to establish Byzantine culture as well and extend the influence of the em-
pire in central Europe. The brothers from Thessaloniki accomplished their mission with
great success. They did not only provide the neophytes with the alphabet they had de-
vised but also a translation of the Bible and other liturgical texts into old Slavonic, and,
most important of all, they produced the first works of Slavic literature. Justifiably,
therefore, Methodius and Constantine-Cyril are honoured as apostles of the Slavs, and
Thessaloniki very rightly takes pride in the fact that the two Byzantine apostles of the
Greek-Christian cultural heritage that was passed on to the Slavic world, were born and
nurtured in its cultural milieu.21
As a result of the peace that reigned after the christianizing of the Slavs who lived
within the bounds of the empire, Macedonia and especially Thessaloniki experienced
remarkable economic growth. A cosmopolitan centre of international commerce, cross-
roads of the road network that connected Constantinople with Italy and the route which
led to the shores of the Aegean and the regions of the Danube, Thessaloniki rapidly
reached its enviable position.
John Kameniates, who was later to describe some of the most tragic hours of the
bride of the Thermaic Gulf, speaks of the “abundance of agriculture” and the “offerings
of commerce”, about “silk fabrics” and “treasures full of precious stones” which the
residents of the city possessed and flooded its market place with, a market place full of a
“mingling of local and foreign people who were to be found there”. However, these
very riches and the city’s fame appear to have been the reasons behind its unexpected
misfortunes22.

6. The siege and capture of Thessaloniki

by Arab pirates in 904
We find ourselves at the beginning of the 10th century after Leo VI (886-912) had as-
cended the throne. The enemies who were threatening the empire during this period
were the Arabs on the Asia Minor front and the Bulgars in the Balkans. However, apart
from these, there existed for the coastal areas of the empire, a permanent threat from
Saracens pirates, who with their base of operations in the ports of Crete and Syria plun-
dered the islands of the Aegean. From 902-903, they plundered Attica and destroyed
Dimitriada and Limnos where “they took most of the people prisoner “. Crete was cap-
tured in 824 by the Arabs and despite the attempts of the Byzantines, it remained in
their hands at the time. The fleets from the Byzantine themes patrolled the Aegean, but
the pirates struck with such speed and daring that the Byzantine ships arrived after the
events and simply witnessed the extent of the destruction which had been wrought by
the pirates23.
This was the situation in the Aegean when, in the summer of 904, an enormous
naval force of Saracen pirates, comprising 54 warships, “on board which there was a
desperate rabble of all sorts of people, a bloodthirsty rabble with the characteristics of
animals”, set sail from the port of Tarsus. The renegade, Leo of Tripoli, known for his
THEODOROS KORRES 97
naval accomplishments and his terrifying harshness, was its commander. What was to
happen thereafter we learn from the work of John Kameniates, the cleric from Thessa-
loniki who, having lived through the siege and capture of Thessaloniki, was taken
prisoner and later returned to his city when the pirates exchanged him for Arabs that had
been captured by the Byzantine forces.
When news reached Costantinople that Leo of Tripoli’s fleet had put to sea, Leo
VI dispatched the imperial fleet to hunt down the pirates. However, the Byzantine force
was not strong enough and the fleet returned to its base empty-handed. The pirates, hav-
ing first sailed all the way to the Sea of Marmara in a show of strength, left the straits
and headed towards the city of St. Demetrios. The Thessalonians were informed of the
bad news and tried in every way possible to strengthen the city’s defences. However,
there was no time and, consequently, the only thing they managed to do was repair, in a
makeshift way, the half-destroyed sections of the seawall and construct several wooden
towers on top of it. They also closed the entrance to the big harbour built by Constantine
the Great using an iron chain. It should be noted that Thessaloniki did not possess a re-
markable garrison to defend it, and many of the residents did not have either weapons or
experience of war. Furthermore, there was not even a small force of warships in port at
that crucial hour for the city24.
At dawn on 29th July 904, the Saracen fleet appeared at the entrance to the Ther-
maic Gulf and anchored before the seawall in the small harbour called Kellarion. There
were 54 large vessels full of wild pirates, Arabs, Syrians, Egyptians, Ethiopians and
others, who totaled 10,000. On the first day of the siege, the pirates searched for vulner-
able points in the seawall and attempted to scale and breach them using wooden ladders
which they carried there. However, the defenders fought with courage and were rein-
forced by Sklavenoi bowmen who had come to help their Thessalonian neighbours
repulse the attackers.
The following day, the pirates turned their attention towards the southern section
of the eastern land wall and set up their stone-throwing siege machines, under the cover
of which they attempted to take the wall. However, once again, the Thessalonians re-
pulsed them. Then, enraged by their failure, the pirates tried to enter the city by setting
fire to the gates at Roma and Kassandreotiki, but failed yet again. Disappointed, Leo
turned his attention once more to the seawall. Consequently, the following night, the
Saracens used another ploy. They lashed their vessels together two at a time and fas-
tened wooden towers, which were higher than the seawall, between their masts.
As soon as dawn broke on the third and fateful day, the 31st of July, the pairs of
ships approached the seawall as far as the depth of the water would allow. Atop their
wooden towers, the pirates howled like demons and threatened the defenders who,
numbed into silence, gaped from the embrasures. At this juncture, a group of defenders
lost their courage and slowly began to desert their positions and take refuge in the
higher parts of the city. Soon after this, a pair of ships that had been lashed together ap-
proached the exact point in the seawall where this had happened. From the top of the
wooden tower, the pirates fired a shower of arrows and stones at the few remaining de-
fenders, who no sooner panicked and abandoned their positions.
They did not fire only arrows and stones. According to Kameniates, apart from
the large stones which they hurled at the besieged defenders, the Saracens “having pro-
pelled fire through tubes, and having hurled within the walls some other devices which
were full of liquid fire, they brought so much confusion and panic to those who were
guarding the ramparts that they deserted their positions fear-stricken and fled leaving
the ramparts unguarded”. However, it would appear from the description in the quote
that the defenders of the city were surprised by the fact that the pirates were using in-
98 BYZANTINE MACEDONIA (324-1025)
cendiary weapons similar to their own “liquid fire” and lost heart when they saw the
flames beginning to encircle them and completely consuming the wooden parts of the
seawall, which they had constructed in haste. The combination of surprise and the fear
of the fire brought panic with the result that they abandoned their positions on the ram-
parts25.
“At this point it is already 9 o’clock in the morning,” writes John Kameniates,
“the Saracens, half-naked as they were, began to flow like an violent stream through the
streets of the city with their spears in their hands in pursuit of their victims, who like
frightened sheep do not know where to go. Men, women with babes in arms, parents,
children, relatives, friends, fell into each others arms in a desperate attempt to protect
themselves and be saved. Others, who appeared to have completely lost their senses,
stood like lost souls and stared with the apathy of an onlooker at the horror which sur-
rounded and threatened them. Many ran and hid in their houses, some sought refuge in
churches, others made their way towards the gates. The upheaval and confusion was
such,” stresses Kameniates, “that words alone are unable to describe.Wherever they
went, death followed them”26.
The Saracens spread throughout the city and began a barbaric, ruthless and indis-
criminate slaughter. There were many casualties, mainly at the western gates, because
many gathered at these gates in an attempt to break out. Only a few managed to escape
and then only by leaping from the western seawall. Thousands were taken prisoner,
among them Kameniates and his family, who managed to save themselves by buying
their lives with money and jewellery, as well as generals Niketas and Chatzilakios, who
were conveyed in the worst possible way to the harbour together with the budding youth
of Thessaloniki. They were loaded into the holds of the ships, literally piled like animals
one on top of the other, where, apart from other things, they suffered the torment of
hunger and thirst.
The Saracens remained in the city for ten days plundering and scouring it for hid-
den treasures. They were on the point of setting fire to the city but were made to change
their minds by Symeon the imperial secretary, who prevented the burning of the city by
paying them many kentenarion (a kentenarion=100 litrai, with 1 litra equivalent to ap-
proximately 320 grammes) of gold, which was originally destined for the Bulgars.
However, another imperial envoy, Rhodophilis, who happened to be in Thessaloniki on
his way west carrying a large amount of gold to pay the Byzantine troops who were
fighting against the Arabs in Sicily, refused to surrender the gold to the Saracens and
paid for his loyalty to the emperor with his life.
Before beginning his return journey, Leo of Tripoli sold many prisoners back to
their relatives who had gathered outside the city, and returned to the imperial represen-
tative, the imperial secretary Symeon, two hundred prisoners after having first obtained
a written guarantee that the Byzantines would release 200 Arab prisoners.
On the tenth day, the ships hoisted their sails and set off. In their holds the condi-
tions the prisoners faced were abominable. Literally thrown on top of each other, they
could not even breathe. Characteristically, Kameniates reports that there were 800 pris-
oners and 200 pirates on the ship which was carrying him. Furthermore, the voyage was
endless with them calling in at Kassandra, Euboia, Andros and Naxos because fear of
the Byzantine navy forced the pirates to wander and hide among the countless barren
islands of the Aegean. Finally, after a voyage which lasted 16 days, they arrived in
Crete on the 26th of August.
The tragic conditions during this voyage resulted in the deaths of many prisoners.
Despite this, when they arrived in Crete, the number of prisoners, according to the in-
formation provided by Kameniates, totaled 22,000. A large number were sold in the
THEODOROS KORRES 99
slave market in Crete, while the majority were transported to Leo’s homeland, Tripoli in
Syria, from which they were dispersed throughout the Muslim world. Only a small
number of 1,200 Thessalonians, among whom was Kameniates, reached Tarsus in Cil-
icia, where they were exchanged for Saracen prisoners. The news of the capture of the
“first after the first” city of the empire caused a tremendous reaction in the capital. The
emperor himself wrote a piece on the capture of Thessaloniki, in which he accepted the
responsibility apportioned to the central authority for all that had happened in the city27.
The capture and looting of Thessaloniki also shocked the learned patriarch,
Nicholas Mystikos, who in a sermon from the pulpit of the Church of St. Sophia, la-
ments the tragedy which struck the city of St Demetrios and wonders, in rhetorically
addressing the mirovlitis (the myrrh-exuding one), “What happened, Demetrios, martyr,
to your unbeatable alliance with Thessaloniki ? How could you tolerate having to see
your own city being occupied? How could you, the patron saint of the city, tolerate hav-
ing to see Thessaloniki, which from the day the sun first laid eyes on it had remained
impregnable, being taken by the enemy who scorned your sacred protection. How could
you tolerate and endure all of this?” He concludes with the only explanation that the
mind and soul of the loyal Byzantine Christian could accept: “for our sins”28.
The blow to Thessaloniki was terrible but not fatal. This is because despite the
adverse repercussions which there were for a time on the economic life, it did not have
serious effects on the future development of the city. Already from the 10th century, the
bride of the Thermaic Gulf becomes “the capital of the western themes” and the seat of
“the sole commander of the west”. And this is so because, as H. Ahrweiler rightly ob-
serves, the destruction of Thessaloniki in 904 halted the growth of the city for a while
but perhaps expedited a decision from Constantinople to establish a serious military and
political centre in the area which had been captured by the Slavs, which the Bulgars had
been in contention for, and which the Arab pirates included within the range of their ac-
tivity29.

7. Christianizing of the Bulgars

At this point we shall return again to the second half of the 9th century to follow what
was happening in the Balkan region. The relationship between the christianized
Moravia and the emperor, as the Byzantines had expected, had had political extensions.
Just as the negotiations between the Franks and the Bulgars had forced Prince Ratislav
of Greater Moravia to turn towards Byzantine, so had the Bulgar leader, Boris, felt
threatened after the christianizing of Moravia. The insecurity that the Bulgars felt was
exacerbated by the movements of Byzantine army, which marched towards the Bulgar-
ian border, and those of the Byzantine fleet, which sailed along the Bulgarian coast and
up the Danube. Not having any other recourse, Boris was forced by the Byzantines to
accept his own conversion to Christianity along with his people. In 864, he was baptized
and took the name of the Byzantine emperor, Michael, at the same time making peace
with the Byzantines. Of course, the relationship of the neophyte Bulgars with Constan-
tinople were not entirely harmonious and, between 866 and 867, Boris-Michael tried to
involve the Franks in the hope of securing the independence of the Bulgarian church,
which Constantinople was not willing to agree to. Concessions were made by both sides
and, in this way, relations between the two nations were peaceful for the twenty years
that followed30.
100 BYZANTINE MACEDONIA (324-1025)
8. New Byzantine-Bulgarian war in Macedonia. Tsar Symeon
Things changed when Boris-Michael abdicated in 889 and his son, Symeon, ascended
the throne. Although he was educated in Constantinople, the new tsar did not have
friendly feelings towards the Byzantines. On the contrary, having been acquainted at
close quarters with the weaknesses of the Byzantine empire, he ceased to feel awe to-
wards it and did everything possible over the course of his life to destroy it.
According to Byzantine sources of the time, from the moment he ascended the
throne, Symeon sought a pretext to break the peace which had lasted since 864. This
pretext was provided when the Customs station which levied duties on Bulgarian goods
was relocated and moved in 894 from Constantinople to Thessaloniki and a higher tariff
(kommerkion) was imposed on Bulgarian merchants. In the opinion of A. Christo-
philopoulou, the purpose behind the relocation of the Customs station was to monitor
more closely the movement of personnel and goods from Bulgaria and to establish a
permanent transit centre in Thessaloniki, with the ulterior motive of consolidating the
role of Thessaloniki as the economic hub of the region. Symeon’s protests brought no
results and he declared war, which, in any case, is what he had been aiming at. In the
clash which followed on Macedonian soil, the Byzantines were routed and Symeon took
many prisoners, among whom were men of the imperial guard, whose noses he had cut
off before sending them back to the capital “which was a disgrace for the Romans”31.
Despite their defeat, the Byzantines could have deployed new troops from the
populous themes of Asia Minor to meet the Bulgarian threat. However, once more the
war against the Arabs did not permit the depletion of forces on the eastern front. The
emperor therefore resorted to the usual alternative, a combination of arms and diplo-
macy. Using gifts and promises, Byzantine ambassadors persuaded the Hungarians to
attack the Bulgarians from the north while the new commander-in-chief (domestikos)
Nikephoros Phocas attacked from the south. The combined attack was a success, and
Symeon was forced to sue for peace. Leo VI accepted his request; however, the Bulgar-
ian leader used the truce as a time to reconstruct his army and search for allies,
obviously applying all that he had been taught while at the Imperial court in Constan-
tinople. With the Pechenegs as allies, he defeated the Hungarians and then turned his
attention towards the Byzantines.
In order to confront him, the emperor mustered a large force by transferring Asi-
atic troops from the theme of Macedonia. It would appear that his subsequent choice of
a new military commander, Leo Katakalon, who was assigned to lead the campaign,
was a mistake. The confrontation took place at Bulgarophygon near Adrianople in 896,
and resulted in a crushing defeat for the Byzantine army.
After his victory, Symeon turned his attention towards the region occupied by the
themes of Thessaloniki and Dyrrachium and stormed many Byzantine forts. However,
he left his own country in a vulnerable position and the Byzantines, in a diversionary
move, invaded Bulgaria in 899-900 and forced him to accept peace. However once
again, despite the treaty, the Bulgarian leader continued to conduct a military campaign
against Macedonia and keep the Byzantine forces occupied, in this way preventing the
emperor from dispatching reinforcements to Thessaloniki, which was coveted, besieged
and finally captured by the Saracen pirates led by Leo of Tripoli. Finally, with the me-
diation of the experienced diplomat, Leo Choerosphactes, Symeon was forced to sign a
treaty with the Byzantines, which appears to have brought a peace that lasted until the
death of Leo VI in 91232.
The new emperor, Alexander (912-913), did not posses the prudence of his prede-
cessor and refused to pay the Bulgarians the annual tribute which had been agreed to
under the treaty of 896. It was, in any case, burdensome and insulting for the Byzantines
THEODOROS KORRES 101
to pay tax to the ‘barbarians” and was seen as a solution which had been reached as a
last resort. That is why as soon as they considered they could impose their will with the
might of weapons, they attempted to do so. Of course, the Bulgarians reacted and had
begun to muster their forces when the sudden death of Alexander resulted in Symeon’s
deferring the campaign while he awaited developments in Constantinople.
The developments were not positive for Byzantine. The internal conflicts, the in-
trigues and the upheaval which occurred in the interim before the faction which
supported the eight-year-old Constantine VII and headed by the patriarch, Nicholas
Mystikos prevailed, gave Symeon the chance he had been waiting for. He invaded
Thrace once more and went this time as far as Constantinople, which he encircled
closely with his army from Vlachernai to the Golden Gate, hoping he would capture the
city easily. However, when he found himself before the impregnable fortification sys-
tem of the walls of the capital, he changed his mind and sought negotiations, which the
Byzantines happily agreed to. The negotiations ended in agreement and Symeon with-
drew, taking valuable presents and spoils with him and after meeting outside the walls
with the patriarch, Nicholas Mystikos, who in fact blessed him by placing his own
vestment (epirrhiptarion) on Symeon’s head33.
However, Symeon once again violated the agreements and taking advantage of the
internal disagreements of the Byzantines in connection with the question of the tutelage
of the minor, Constantine VII, he invaded Thrace in September 914 and treacherously
took Adrianople. The Byzantines recaptured the town almost immediately and mustered
a strong force, led by the military commander, Leo Phocas, to march against Symeon. A
decisive battle took place in August of 917 with victory for the Bulgarians, who slaugh-
tered the Byzantine troops and owed their success to the strategic abilities of Symeon.
Symeon was undoubtedly the protagonist of the events during this period and it
would appear that he did not have only military abilities but also political ones. Of
course his successes were not unconnected with everything that was happening in the
capital. The political intrigues and conflicts, which appear to have been transferred to
the battlefield, did not cease because the new and inexperienced Constantine VI could
not control things and, consequently, Symeon met with a divided enemy which was
without strong and determined leadership. The civil conflicts did not cease even when
Romanos I Lekapenos (920-944) ascended the throne. Symeon continued his pillaging
raids and in 924 arrived on the outskirts of Constantinople having looted and destroyed
along the way. In the years that followed, he who had been the bad demon to the Byzan-
tines continued to plague the Byzantine provinces in Thrace and Macedonia and only
his death in 927 finally rid the empire of a capable and particularly dangerous enemy34.
The death of Symeon and the dynastic disputes that ensued weakened the Bulgari-
ans, who, having once more invaded Macedonia, rushed to negotiate with the
Byzantines. Peace was finally sealed with the marriage of the son of Symeon’s succes-
sor, Peter, to the Byzantine princess Maria, niece of the emperor. In this way, the
protracted Byzantine-Bulgarian war, which had brought so much suffering and destruc-
tion to the warring sides, came to an end for a time. Although the confrontations did not
always take place in Macedonia, it was considered expedient to comment briefly on
them, because they affected to a large extent the ability of the Byzantines to protect the
wider region from enemies who coveted her, like, for example, Thessaloniki was in 904
by Leon of Tripoli, and also because they foreshadow what the Bulgarians were to do in
Macedonia in the years to follow.
102 BYZANTINE MACEDONIA (324-1025)
9. Byzantine-Bulgarian conflicts during the time of Nikephoros
Phocas and Ioannis Tsimiski
The forty year period of peace between the Byzantines and Bulgarians which followed
was interrupted in the winter of 966-67, when Bulgarian envoys arrived in Constantin-
ople to collect the taxes which Byzantium had apparently been paying all those years.
Emperor Nikephoros Phocas (963-969), the brilliant general who recaptured Crete from
the Arabs and had succeeded Emperor Romanos II, was on the throne at the time. The
emperor, who had achieved so many victories against the Arabs, unaware of the diffi-
culties and complexities of a Byzantine-Bulgarian war, dismissed the envoys in the
worst possible way saying to them that “I, the respected emperor of the Romans, will
not forever pay tribute to a poverty-stricken and detestable nation.” Following this, he
marched against Bulgaria in 967, but, being the experienced general he was, did not
penetrate deep into enemy territory because he obviously remembered the defeat suf-
fered by Byzantine forces in 811. However, instead of becoming personally involved,
he persuaded the Russ prince, Svjatoslav, to invade Bulgaria in 968 in return for fifteen
kentenaria of gold. The Bulgarians were routed, large areas of the country were sacked
and destroyed, and the Russ forces withdrew with rich spoils. The catastrophe was so
great that Tsar Peter fell ill and died in 969. However, the danger posed by the Russ had
not passed. Six months later, they invaded Bulgaria once again, destroyed whatever re-
mained, took Tsar Boris, who had succeeded his father Peter, hostage and subjugated
the country. It was clear that the problems which the Byzantines had unwittingly created
for themselves would be solved only by resorting to arms.
Nikephoros Phocas, however, was not the one who would undertake the difficult
task of expelling the Russ from Bulgaria but Ioannis Tzimisces, who succeeded him on
the Byzantine throne in 969. The attempt of the new emperor to force the Russ to with-
draw peacefully met with a brash refusal and threats from Svjatoslav to march against
Constantinople. The Russ leader fulfilled his threats a few months later when he in-
vaded the themes of Macedonia and Thrace at the head of a powerful force of Russ,
Patzinaks, Hungarians and Bulgars, who had already joined forces with him. The Byz-
antines withdrew before the superior enemy forces and the army of Svjatoslav reached
as far as Arcadiopolis, which was being defended by the experienced general Bardas
Sclerus, pillaging and destroying on their way. Sclerus managed to draw the Russ into a
war in which his military abilities overcame the superior numbers and resulted in the
slaughter of the invaders, who were forced to withdraw from areas in the themes of Ma-
cedonia and Thrace36. The campaign which Tzimisces planned against the Russ and the
Bulgarians temporarily delayed the insurgency headed by Bardas Phocas in Asia Minor,
during which time the enemies plagued areas in the theme of Macedonia with pillaging
raids. Finally, in the spring of 971, Tzimisces reached Adrianople with a large military
force while Byzantine naval forces patrolled the estuary of the Danube in order to sur-
round the Russ forces. At the head of an elite military force, the emperor unexpectedly
passed through the unguarded passes of the Haimos and appeared at Greater Preslav.
The surprise attack was successful and after a brief but intense battle, Tzimisces cap-
tured the town and took the Bulgarian king, Boris, and his family prisoner. This success
turned the Bulgarians against the Russ, and Svjatoslav, who had taken refuge in Dor-
ostalon after fighting desperately, was forced to sign a peace treaty and withdraw from
Bulgarian soil.
The Byzantine victory resulted in many difficulties for the Bulgars. Tzimisces
forced Boris to give up his throne and designated him Magistros, a high-ranking posi-
tion. Bulgaria was absorbed into the empire and ceased to be an independent state,
which took the Byzantine frontier as far as the Danube. Finally, the Bulgarian patriar-
chate ceased to exist or be recognized. In this way, Tzimisces felt that he had solved the
THEODOROS KORRES 103
Bulgar problem and secured peace in the Balkan region. However, as I. Karagiannopou-
los has already observed, “weapons do not constitute permanent foundations and
healthy solutions” and that in the subjugating and breaking up of the Bulgarian state by
Tzimisces are to be found the reasons behind all that was to transpire in the Balkans
during the reign of Basil II37.

10. First phase of the new Byzantine-Bulgarian war

Basil II - Samuel
The death of Ioannis Tzimisces in 976 marked the beginning of important developments
which were destined to plague Macedonia for the next forty years. As already referred
to, the invasion of Bulgaria by Tzimisces was directed mainly at the Russ invaders,
whom he managed to expel from the country. The Bulgar people, although they had
been dealt a powerful blow, did not bend but sought a new person to replace the leader
they had been deprived of by Tzimisces when he took Boris prisoner and ousted him
from power. The found the leader they were seeking in the person of the young and ac-
tive Samuel, the son of count Nicholas, who, immediately after the death of Tzimisces,
revolted after having been appointed head of western Bulgaria. The Byzantines tried to
control the situation which had been created by sending Boris back to Bulgaria. How-
ever, Boris was killed and the leadership of the rebels remained in the hands of Samuel,
who appears to have been planning the re-establishment of the Bulgarian state. His am-
bitions plans included the expansion of his state in the direction of Thessaloniki, and
both central and southern Greece. Therefore, taking advantage of the problems that the
new emperor Basil II (976-1025) was facing in Asia Minor, especially with the insur-
rection by Bardas Sclerus, during the first years of his reign, he began raids not only
against the themes of Thrace, Macedonia and Thessaloniki, but also against those of
Greece and the Peloponnese.
The consequences of the expansive policies of Samuel were felt by the garrisons
of Thessaly and finally Larisa, whose residents were relocated and resettled, after its
capture, in the Bulgarian hinterland, while those who were in fighting condition were
obliged to serve in his army. Finally, he transferred the remains of the patron saint of
Larisa, St Achilleos, to Prespa where he had established his palace. Thereafter, he pro-
ceeded in the direction of south Greece pillaging and destroying everything in his path,
while the generals of the themes of Thessaloniki and Greece struggled in desperation to
save the large urban centers. However, when everything appeared to indicate that the
Bulgars were preparing to invade the Peloponnese, they suddenly turned north and
withdrew for fear of a possible Byzantine counterattack38.
The first moves of the Bulgar leader revealed that unlike Symeon, who dreamed
of seizing the Byzantine imperial crown, Samuel aspired to reconstructing the Bulgar
state and incorporating within it all lands belonging to Greece.
Meanwhile, the young Basil II continued his struggle to remain on the throne fac-
ing opposition from within the palace. After he had managed to crush the insurrection of
Bardas Sclerus and exile his intimate, Basil, (985), he turned his attention to the Bulgar-
ian problem and began preparations for a campaign against the dangerous enemy. In the
summer of 986, he crossed into Bulgaria with a powerful force intending to capture
Sardica (Sofia). The siege of Sardica did not bring the desired result because the de-
fenders resisted strongly and the Byzantine generals of Basil’s army proved incapable.
Under these conditions, the emperor ordered a withdrawal. However, Samuel was bid-
ing time and when the Byzantines attempted to pass through the Pillars of Trajan, he
104 BYZANTINE MACEDONIA (324-1025)
attacked and managed to force them into a disorderly retreat with heavy losses in both
men and armaments39.
This new success of Samuel severely damaged the integrity of the emperor and
ignited a new cycle of opposition against him. In August 987, the military forces of
Anatolia proclaimed Bardas Phocas emperor, while at the same time the rebellious gen-
eral Bardas Sclerus, who had been exiled, escaped and was also proclaimed emperor.
Bardas Phocas, who proved to be the more capable of the two pretenders to the throne,
captured Sclerus before turning his attention towards Constantinople.

11. Christianizing of the Russ

In the battles which followed, Basil II managed with the assistance of Russ warriors to
defeat Phocas, who was killed in battle. A decisive role was played in Basil’s struggle
against Phocas by the assistance he received from the Russ, which he secured in ex-
change for marriage of the emperor’s sister, Anna, to Vladimir, the leader of the Russ.
The marriage took place on condition that Vladimir himself and his people would be
converted to Christianity. Vladimir, bedazzled by the Byzantine princess and the pros-
pect of becoming related to the Byzantine emperor kept his promise. Ann with a large
retinue of metropolitans, bishops and monks set out in October 989 for her new home-
land. The christianizing of the Russ not only placed them under the spiritual
guardianship of the patriarchate of Constantinople but also within the sphere of Byzan-
tine political and cultural influence. For those reasons, the christianizing of the Russ
was truly an historic event40.

12. Second phase of the war. Defeat of the Bulgars and break
up of the Bulgar state
Samuel and his army continued to bide time and Basil began a new campaign against
them in the summer of 990. He traversed Thrace and Macedonia with his army and
reached Thessaloniki, whose defence system he strengthened. The emperor remained in
the area for a long period of time taking care of the areas that were threatened by the
expansive policy of Samuel and campaigning against the enemy. However, once again,
urgent problems on the front in Anatolia forced the emperor to leave hurriedly for Syria
in 994. He left the magister of the theme of Macedonia, Gregory Taronites, in charge of
the armed forces in Macedonia and responsible for the safety and protection of the re-
gion.
The departure of the emperor and his protracted absence from Macedonia pro-
vided Samuel with an opportunity to invade Byzantine soil and move against
Thessaloniki. In the battle which followed, Gregory Taronites was killed and his son,
Asotios was taken prisoner. Despite his victory, Samuel did not dare to lay siege to
Thessaloniki because its strong walls discouraged such an undertaking and so, passing
through the Vale of Tempe, he invaded Thessaly, Boiotia and Attica, which he savagely
looted. Next, encouraged by the absence of the Byzantine army, he entered the Pe-
loponnese, where he continued the looting and destruction41.
The emperor sent Nicephorus Uranus to fight against Samuel. Ouranos passed
through Thessaloniki, which had become in those years the staff defence centre for the
region, reached the long-suffering Larisa, crossed the plain of Pharsalos and camped on
the banks of the Spercheios, which had been flooded after the rains. Camped on the op-
posite bank was the Bulgar army, which was returning to Bulgaria loaded with loot and
prisoners that they had gathered by pillaging the Byzantine countryside. The great vol-
THEODOROS KORRES 105
ume of water that had been brought down by the Spercheios convinced Samuel that the
Byzantines would not be able to cross and he eased the guarding of his camp. However,
on this occasion, the outcome of things was the result of the perseverance and daring of
general Nicephorus Uranus. Shown the way by locals, he managed to cross the river
with his army during the night and attacked the Bulgars who were sleeping and there-
fore caught unawares. The surprise attack was a complete success and Samuel’s troops
were slaughtered. The Bulgar leader himself just managed to escape wounded with his
son, Romanos, and travellling by night, managed to flee by way of the Pindos moun-
tains and reach Bulgaria. After his brilliant victory and having freed all the prisoners,
Nicephorus Uranus returned in 997 to Thessaloniki42.
The defeat at the River Spercheios was shocking and foiled Samuel’s plans for the
conquest and annexation of Greek lands to the Bulgar state. Not having sufficient mili-
tary forces to continue his aggressive policy against Byzntine, Samuel resorted to
political evasions and turned his attention and energies towards the northwest. In his
attempt to retain control of the area of Dyrrachium, he married the captive Byzantine,
Asotios Taronites, who he had taken prisoner in the battle for Thessaloniki, to his
daughter, and, believing he had ensured his devotion, appointed him head of the garri-
son at Dyrrachium. However, Asotios, who remained loyal to the emperor, defected
with his wife and persuaded the residents to surrender the town to the Byzantines.
Knowing that Samuel no longer had forces to threaten the Byzantine provinces,
Basil II began the gradual reoccupation of the forts in Macedonia which remained in the
possession of the Bulgars. The fort at Verroia was surrendered to the Byzantines by the
Bulgar commander and this was followed by the forts in Servia and Vodena (Edessa).
From Servia, the emperor went south to Thessaly, captured all the forts which still re-
mained in Bulgar hands and re-located their garrisons in Voleron, near the estuary of the
River Nestos. At the end of the campaign, Basil II returned to Thessaloniki in 1003 to
spend the winter43.
The following year, the emperor headed towards the north Balkan area and laid
siege to a town by the shores of the Danube called Vidin, which he captured after a pe-
riod of many months despite the diversionary attempt which Samuel carried out against
Adrianople on the 15th of August, 1004. On his return, Basil reached the River Axios
near Skopje, where he found Samuel and his army “camped nonchalantly”. The Axios
was flooded and Samuel once again made the fatal mistake of believing that the river
would safeguard his position. However, once more the Byzantines crossed the flooded
river and surprised the Bulgars. A massacre ensued and Samuel had a narrow escape.
Skopje was delivered to Basil by its commander, Romanos, and in 1005 the emperor
returned in triumph to the capital44.
Sources from the period make little reference to what happened on the Balkan
front over the next decade. From the brief reference in the chronicles of Ioannis Sky-
litzis it would appear that the Byzantines continued the war of attrition against the
Bulgars and that Basil “did not allow a year to pass without invading and pillaging Bul-
garia destroying everything in his path”45.
This tactics of the Byzantines must have been effective because they drove Sam-
uel to consider that there was a need to fortify the passes that led into Bulgaria with
walls in order to stop the annual incursions into his country. The most important of
these passes led through the valley of the Strymon river as far as its confluence with the
river Stroumitsa and across its valley in the heart of Samuel’s Bulgaria between Skopje
and Ochrid. At the narrowest point of the Stroumitsa valley, the Bulgarians fortified the
Kleidion pass with dams and moats waiting for the Byzantines to attempt a crossing. In
fact in the summer of 1014, Basil II arrived at the pass and attempted to break through
106 BYZANTINE MACEDONIA (324-1025)
the resistance posed by the Bulgarians. His efforts were futile, however, as the Bulgari-
ans fought with determination and, safe as they were within the forts, placed the
Byzantines in a difficult position. The daring maneuvers of the Byzantine general,
Nicephorus Xiphias of Philippopolis, who, by leading his men along difficult paths, was
able to encircle the enemy and “suddenly attacked the Bulgars from the rear, yelling and
making a frightening noise”, in this way, saving the Byzantine army from the defeat
which they appeared to be on the point of suffering. Taken by surprise, the Bulgarians
panicked and attempted to escape. A violent battle ensued which ended in the slaughter
of a large number of Bulgarians and the capture of many more. Samuel just managed to
flee and reach Prilep. After negotiations, the impregnable fortress of Melenikon was
also handed over to Basil46.
The brilliant victory of the Byzantines was, however, marred by an act of un-
precedented savagery, a single act which comes in blatant contrast with what all we
know about the general behaviour of the Byzantines, and that of Basil in particular, to-
wards enemies they had vanquished. It was an act which, according to what I.
Karagiannopoulos has already observed, did not express anything more “than the degree
of savagery which had been reached as a result of the protracted and ruthless war”. On
the orders of the emperor, the Byzantines blinded a large number of Bulgarian prisoners
leaving them with one single eyed man for every hundred blinded prisoners to lead
them back to Bulgaria. Aik. Christophilopoulou observes that on this occasion, the Bul-
garians were treated as insurrectionists and not foreign prisoners, and as such punished
according to what was dictated by Byzantine law47. When this pitiful phalanx of blind
soldiers reached Bulgaria, the grief it aroused was so great that Samuel, the steeled Bul-
garian leader, suffered a heart attack and died two days later on the 6th of October, 1014.
He was succeeded by his son, Gabriel who “surpassed his father in bodily strength but
lacked his wisdom and shrewdness”, as is characteristically referred to in Byzantine
sources.
After the death of Samuel, the Bulgarians continued to do battle, but the character
of their military campaigns changed. Large battles no longer take place, but the Byzan-
tines attempt to capture the forts occupied by the Bulgarians, while the Bulgarians
defend themselves desperately. It is by now clear that the war is nearing an end, but the
end was not going to come as quickly as the Byzantines would have wished.
In the spring of 1015, Vodena (Edessa) revolted and, setting out from Thessalo-
niki, the emperor captured the town, which capitulated as soon as the Byzantine forces
encircled it. The people of the town were resettled in Voleron. The next objective of
Basil was the fort of Moglena Almopia, which was captured and destroyed by the Byz-
antines after a hard battle.
These victories of Basil’s generated confusion among the Bulgarians and rekin-
dled dynastic differences which culminated in the murder of Gabriel by Samuel’s
nephew, John Vladislav, who on assuming power vowed to show “the due servitude and
respect towards the emperor”. Despite the promises and dynastic disputes, the war con-
tinued and Basil was forced to resume campaigning, later capturing Ochrid48.
The campaigns continued in the following years (1016-1018) with incursions by
the Byzantines, some of which successful and others not, aimed at capturing fortified
towns and forts. In the spring of 1018, the death of John Vladislav in a battle before
Dyrrachium meant an end to this terrible Byzantine-Bulgarian war, which had lasted
about forty years. This is because on hearing of his death, the Bulgarians realized they
had not only lost their leader but also every hope and desire to continue their struggle
against the empire. In this way, almost all at the same time, the Bulgarian nobles began
to declare obedience to the emperor, who had already reached Serres. The Bulgarian
THEODOROS KORRES 107
commanders of the more important forts which had surrendered, including Krakras, the
brave defender of the fortress of Pernik, had also reached the town. Basil proceeded as
far as Stromnitsa, where he met with David, the archbishop of Bulgaria, who had had
brought letters from Tsarina Maria in connection with the proposition and terms of her
submission. In continuation, he reached Ochrid, where he accepted the surrender of the
royal family and other Bulgarian nobles and distributed among his soldiers the treasure
he had found in the royal palace.
The war which had so tormented the two rival sides had ended and Basil, having
toured the battlegrounds of Macedonia and Sterea (central Greece), reached Athens,
where he conducted magnificent celebrations and doxologies in the Church of the Vir-
gin Mary, which was built on the Acropolis, expressing in this way his gratitude to the
Ypermacho Stratigo (name meaning “advocate general” used to refer to the Virgin
Mary). Following this, he returned to Constantinople, where he celebrated his rightfully
won and glorious triumph.
The effect of Bulgarian allegiance to Constantinople was catalytic. The enemies
of the empire in the region, including Croats, Bosnians and Serbs, began one after the
other to recognize Byzantine suzerainty. Only the commander of Sirmium tried to react,
but was beaten and killed by the Byzantine general of the region49.

13. Administrative organization of occupied Bulgaria

Basil proved to be equally capable in the stabilization and preservation of peace. With
political insight, he distributed political office to Bulgarian nobles and, in this way, se-
cured their tolerance of the administrative changes he was preparing to effect. The
occupied areas of Bulgaria were divided into two large administrative districts or
themes: the theme of Bulgaria and that of Paradounavio or Paristrio. The theme of Bul-
garia comprised the western areas of the former Bulgar state (Sardica, Naissus,
Eutzapolis) and had Skopje as its administrative seat. The theme of Paradounavio com-
prised the northeastern areas and had its administrative seat in Silistria (Dorostalon) The
Bulgarian areas which were to be found between Mt Haimos and Rhodope were divided
into the themes of Thrace, Macedonia, Strymon and Bulgaria50.
The emperor did not bring any changes to the internal administration of the subju-
gated Bulgarian people, and, especially, did not change the existing tax system which
allowed taxes to be paid in kind. In this way he succeeded in reducing the possibility of
meeting with dissatisfaction from the conquered Bulgarians.
The measures which Basil took to organize the Bulgarian Church on new lines
were equally successful. He limited its power and authority without, however, affecting
its independence in connection with the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Although we do
not know exact details of the relevant sigillion (an official document confirmed by a
seal), it would appear that the Bulgarian Patriarchate was abolished and replaced by an
independent Bulgarian archdiocese with its seat in Ochrid. The monk, John, was ap-
pointed the new Archbishop of Bulgaria. With a series of sigillions, Basil determined
the number of clerics in each bishopric of the new Bulgarian church and placed the
bishoprics which belonged to the old Bulgar state of Peter and Samuel together with
those of Servia, Verroia and Stagoi under the jurisdiction of the Archbishop of Ochrid.
It is worth mentioning that the archdiocese of Bulgaria was brightened by the presence
of eminent scholars such as Theophylact, Demetrios, Chomatinos and John Kamateris,
who formed a nucleus of Greek cultural brilliance in Ochrid 51.
In December of 1025, Basil II, one of the ablest emperors of the period between
565 and 1025, died and with his death, as I. Karagiannopoulos rightly observed, “there
108 BYZANTINE MACEDONIA (324-1025)
ended one of the most glorious reigns in Byzantium. His reign was indeed the peak,
both external and internal, which characterizes the years of the Macedonia dynasty.
However, the seeds of decline had already made their appearance and would show
themselves clearly and dangerously during the reigns of his successors.”52.
THEODOROS KORRES 109

Notes
1. !.". Bakalopoulos, History of Thessaloniki, p. 59 ff.
2. G. Theocharidis, History of Macedonia, p. 45 ff. – Aik. Christophilopoulou, Byzan-
tine Macedonia, pp. 224-225.
3. Zosimos ##.22 (p. 78.17 ff.). – Ch. Mparkirtzis, «Fortification of Thessaloniki», p.
289 ff.
4. Bakalopoulos, History, p. 75 ff.
5. #. Karagiannopoulos, History, vol. #., p. 184 ff. – ". Chrysos, «Slaughter of Thessa-
lonians», pp. 93-105.
6. Theophylaktos Simokatis 220.18 ff. - #. Karagiannopoulos, History, vol. ##, p. 47 ff.
7. P. Lemerle, !iracles, vol. #, p.133 ff.
8. Lemerle, Miracles, vol. #, p.177 ff. - Th. Korres, «Some remarks on the First Two
Major Attempts of the Avaroslavs to Capture Thessaloniki (597-614)», Vizantina,
19 (1998), p. 171 ff.
9. Lemerle, Miracles, vol. I., p. 211 ff. - Korres, «The Fifth Siege», p. 153 ff. – Theo-
charidis, History of Macedonia, p. 161 ff.
10. Aik. Christophilopoulou, «Byzantine Macedonia», p. 144 ff.
11. $. Grigoriou-Ioannidou, «The Campaign of Justinian», II p. 111 ff.
12. A. Stavridou-Zafraka, «Slav Invasions», p. 168 ff.
13. %. Papoulia, «Infiltration», p. 255 ff. – $. Nystazopoulou-Pelekidou, «Slavic Cam-
paigns», p. 28 ff. – Korres, «The Fifth Siege», p. 140 ff.
14. Christophilopoulou, «Byzantine Macedonia», p. 150 ff.. – Stavridou-Zaphraka,
«First City of Thessaly», p. 65 ff. – By the same author, «The Theme of Strymon»,
p. 307 ff.
15. Theophanis 357.27 ff.
16. Theophanis 364.15-18. – Karagiannopoulos, History, vol. ##., pp. 97-98 and 108. -
Grigoriou-Ioannidou, «The Campaign of Justinian», II, p. 111 ff.
17. Theophanis 429.23-24.
18. Karagiannopoulos, History, ##., p. 142 ff.
19. Th. Korres, «The Slaughter of Nikephoros», I, p. 167 ff. – By the same author, «Leo
V», p. 87 ff.
20. Christophilopoulou, «Byzantine Macedonia», p. 261.
21. Karagiannopoulos, Apostles of the Slavs, p. 141 ff.
22. #. Kameniates 10.9 ff.
23. Karagiannopoulos, History, ##, p. 326 ff.
24. For the events of the siege see #. Kameniates 16.35 ff. – G. Tsaras, The Capture of
Thessaloniki, p. 53 ff.
25. #. Kameniates 32.43 ff. – see Th. Korres, «Liquid Fire», p. 100 ff.
26. #. Kameniates 33.68 ff.
27. #. Kameniates 56.47 ff. – G. Tsaras, The Capture of Thessaloniki, p. 113 ff.
28. Nikolaos Mystikos 10 ff.
29. H. Ahrweiler, Byzantine Macedonia, p. 278.
30. Karagiannopoulos, History, ##., p. 279 ff.
31. Io. Skylitzis 176.83. – Aik. Christophilopoulou, History, %2, p. 60.
32. Karagiannopoulos, History, ##, p.317 ff.
33. !. Stavridou-Zaphraka, The Meeting between Symeon and Nikolaos Mystikos, p.
143 ff.
34. Karagiannopoulos, History, ##, p.348 ff.
35. Leo Diakonos 61.23 ff.
36. Karagiannopoulos, History, ##, p. 417 ff.
37. Karagiannopoulos, History, ##, pp. 423-425.
38. Christophilopoulou, History, %2, p. 160 ff.
39. Christophilopoulou, History, %2, pp. 162-163.
40. Karagiannopoulos, History, ##, pp. 440-443.
41. Christophilopoulou, History, %2, pp. 163-164.
42. Christophilopoulou, History, %2, pp. 165.
43. Karagiannopoulos, History, ##, p. 452 ff.
44. Christophilopoulou, History, %2, p. 167.
110 BYZANTINE MACEDONIA (324-1025)
45 . o. Skylitzis 348.9 ff.
46. Karagiannopoulos, History, !!, pp. 459-460.
47. Karagiannopoulos, History, !!, p. 460. – see Christophilopoulou, History, "2, p. 162.
48. Theocharides, History of Macedonia, pp. 268-269.
49. Christophilopoulou, History, "2, pp. 171-172.
50. Karagiannopoulos, History, !!, p. 469 ff.
51. Theocharides, History of Macedonia, pp. 275-276.
52. Karagiannopoulos, History, !!, pp. 460-463.