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The Maritime
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The Maritime Future of the Indian Ocean
The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS)
FuTurE IssuE N
o
13 | 09 | 10
IsBN/EAN: 978-94-91040-18-4
Authors Tim Sweijs, Willem Cleven, Mira Levi, Joelle Tabak, Zinzi Speear, Jeroen de Jonge
Editing Aurlie Basha i Novosejt, HCSS & Taalcentrum Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Graphs Richard Podkolinski, Nanna Spakler & Willem Cleven
2010 The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies. All rights reserved. No part of this report
may be reproduced and/or published in any form by print, photo print, microfilm or any
other means without previous written permission from the HCSS. All images are subject
to the licenses of their respective owners.
Graphic Design: Studio Maartje de Sonnaville, The Hague
Print: Koninklijke De Swart, The Hague
This publication is part of the Security Foresight Programme. The Security Foresight
Programme is made possible by:
The Maritime Future
of the Indian Ocean
Putting the G back into
Great Power Politics
FuTurE IssuE N
o
13 | 09 | 10
4 Future Issue: The Maritime Future of the Indian Ocean
The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) seeks to advance
international security in an era defined by geopolitical, technological
and doctrinal transformation and new security risks. HCSS provides
strategic analysis and offers concrete policy solutions to decision
makers. HCSS serves as a strategic planning partner to governments,
international organisations and the business community.
HCss report 5
Table of Contents
1 Executive summary 7
2 Introduction 9
2.1 setting the stage 9
2.2 Methodological Approach 11
2.3 Trends in the Debate 13
3 The Maritime Future of the Indian Ocean 15
3.1 Parameters 15
3.2 Drivers 30
3.3 security Implications 36
4 HCss Assessment of the Indian Ocean Debate 41
5 Conclusions and Policy recommendations 45
Addendum Implications for the
National security of the Netherlands 47
Appendices 51
5.1 Appendix A Blue-Green-Brown Water Navy Capabilities 51
5.2 Appendix B Maritime Expenditures Projections 53
5.3 Appendix C strategic Categories of Maritime Power 57
5.4 Appendix D Maritime Build-up 59
5.5 Appendix E (Military) Maritime Facilities in the Indian Ocean 65
5.6 Appendix F Current and Future Maritime Capabilities of France,
the uK, Australia and Japan in the Indian Ocean 73
5.7 Appendix G Emerging Maritime Technologies 76
5.8 Appendix H Definitions and scaling of Parameters 81
5.9 Appendix I Definitions and scaling of Drivers 85
5.10 Appendix J relationships 88
5.11 Appendix K List of Foresights in sample 90
5.12 Appendix L Endnotes 99
HCss report 7
ExECuTI VE suMMAry
Executive summary 1
The Indian Ocean is fast becoming the new center of economic gravity, as it ties
together the economic fortunes of emerging Asia, the US, and Europe. Maritime
rivalries in the Indian Ocean are an early indicator of the return of great-power
politics to the limelight of the international arena. This Future Issue reveals the
considerable amount of disagreement existing among experts with regard to
the future trajectory of events in the Indian Ocean. There is little disagreement,
however, that the economic and strategic importance of the Oceans major Sea
Lines of Communication (SLOCs) particularly its choke points will continue
to grow amidst an accelerating maritime build-up, the continued presence of
significant pockets of regional instability, maritime piracy, and terrorism. These
current and future key developments in the Indian Ocean will have important
implications for security and business continuity. The analysis in this Future Issue
warrants the following conclusions:
The safety of the Indian Oceans SLOCs is of vital importance to the growth of
the emerging economies in South and East Asia, as well as the world economy
at large. The strategically located choke points are extremely vulnerable to
disruptive attacks both from state and non-state actors, including pirates and
terrorists. Contingencies at sea have the potential not only to affect already
volatile oil prices, but also to have dramatic effects on companies that rely on
principle of just-in-time production and delivery within the context of global
production networks.
The Indian Ocean is a major testing ground for great-power relations between
the US and the potential emerging contenders China and India. Even as China
and India harbor ambitions to expand their forward naval presence in the
Indian Ocean, historically embedded mistrust is encouraging mutual
suspicion concerning each partys intentions. Both China and India are
starting to consider the Indian Ocean in terms of prerogatives and
responsibilities. This could trouble the Oceans waters considerably and pose a
potential source of future conflict. It could also indicate that these emerging
8
ExECuTI VE suMMAry
Future Issue: The Maritime Future of the Indian Ocean
powers are starting to shoulder some of the responsibility for maintaining the
safety of the Oceans SLOCs.
A significant maritime build-up is taking place across five strategic categories:
SLOC protection, maritime dominance (sea control and sea denial), power
projection, submarine-launched nuclear second-strike capability, and space
dominance. The US remains far ahead of China in terms of maritime
capabilities and even farther ahead of India across all five categories of
maritime capability. Its lead is likely to shrink in the years to come, however,
with China leveling the playing field in such areas as sea denial and power
projection capabilities. This could change the balance of power at least enough
to foster ambitions for regional hegemony on the part of at least one of the two
contenders.
HCSS offers the following policy recommendations:
The Indian Ocean requires close attention by decision makers at the highest
strategic levels. Foreign ministries should recognize the Indian Ocean as a
region that deserves attention in its own right.
Given that the Indian Ocean is a test zone for the rules of the game in a nascent
multi-polar world order, it is of the utmost importance to establish governance
frameworks that will facilitate the integration of rising powers in regulating
this order and upholding the principles of an open world economy.
In the light of the tremendous importance of the safety of SLOCs for sea-based
trade and world economic growth, policymakers should attach high priority to
the safeguarding of SLOCs and vulnerable choke points.
Because global production chains are vulnerable to supply disruption
originating from the Indian Ocean, business executives should re-assess their
policies regarding supply-chain risk management.
HCss report 9
I NTrODuCTI ON
Introduction 2
2.1 Setting the Stage
The Indian Ocean (one of the worlds three oceans) runs from the eastern shores
of Africa and the Middle East to the western shores of Australia and the Malay
Peninsula, framing the entire southern shoreline of Asia. It is a key transit region
for inter-continental trade in energy and commercial goods. Current estimates
suggest that the annual value of two-way international trade passing through
the Indian Ocean sea lanes is almost USD 1 trillion.
1
While its importance as a
transportation hub is expected to increase further over the next two decades,
it is also increasingly becoming a trade destination in its own right.
Emerging and established great powers most notably the US, China, and India
are bolstering or establishing strategic footholds in the Indian Ocean region
along the Oceans sea lines of communication (SLOCs), as well as in the narrow
passages that connect these SLOCs with Europe (e.g., Bab-el-Mandeb), the Middle
East (e.g., the Strait of Hormuz), and East Asia (e.g., the Strait of Malacca), as
illustrated in Figure 1.
The strategic maneuvering of these powers marks the return of great-power
politics to the limelight of the international arena, and it may form the prelude to
an era of renewed maritime rivalry. In its 2007 maritime strategy entitled Freedom
to Use the Seas, India recognizes that SLOCs are critical to its future economic
prosperity, noting that nations that depend on the waters of the Indian Ocean for
their trade and energy supplies have come to expect that the Indian Navy will
ensure a measure of stability and tranquility in the waters around our shores.
2

For its part, the US speaks of the need to posture credible combat power in the
Indian Ocean in order to protect its vital interests.
3
China, meanwhile, remains
largely silent over its objectives in the Indian Ocean. Like India and the US,
however, it is engaging in a build-up of its maritime capabilities, and these
actions may be a harbinger of a future maritime arms race with implications
that will reach far beyond the boundaries of the Indian Ocean region.
I NTrODuCTI ON
FIGurE 1: sEA LINEs OF COMMuNICATION AND CHOKE POINTs IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
The future is admittedly not singular (i.e., one cannot credibly and confidently
predict the future; the future, ex ante, is therefore always plural), the Indian
Ocean and its Rim are very likely to become a sample stage for some of the most
important global challenges in the 21
st
century. Persistent conflicts in the Middle
East and the Horn of Africa will be a continuing source of instability in the
Oceans northwestern region, and they will pose a major security challenge to the
international community in general. In addition, many violent, non-state actors
have established strongholds in such areas as the Arabic Peninsula, East Africa,
and the Hindu Kush, which are plagued with weak or failing governance
structures. These actors will continue to use the Indian Ocean in support of their
operations. Climate change may become a security challenge as well, as the rising
sea level threatens to displace the inhabitants of low-lying coastal regions in
Bangladesh and the Maldives islands. Competition for control over deposits of
scarce resources found in the Indian Ocean Rim countries will likely ensue in the
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coming decades. Moreover, the Indian Ocean will be one of the key stages on
which established and emerging powers will meet and match forces in the next
two decades.
As a result, developments and possible tensions or threats in the Indian Ocean
may become the first litmus test for the US with regard to its strategy for
addressing the rise of China and India. Whichever equilibrium is achieved in the
region, it will likely reflect the underlying nature of a world characterized by
multi-polarity: it will either be an inclusive and open system, upholding a
principle of Mare Liberum (or free and open seas), or a system characterized by
regionalism and therefore Mare Clausum (closed seas).
2.2 Methodological Approach
This Future Issue examines how these developments will shape the security
environment in the Indian Ocean over the next two decades. To address the
substantial uncertainty that exists about the future course of history and to
incorporate it into the debate, we have mapped the full spectrum of (and thus
the divergence in) global expert opinion about the future of the Indian Ocean.
We accomplished this by analyzing approximately 100 foresight studies that
have been published on the topic in the last ten years.
We followed a two-tier search protocol in our review of the discourse on the
Indian Ocean. To begin, we conducted an extensive search of the World Wide
Web using a search algorithm containing thirty search terms across three
categories, comprising future, security, and the geographical indicator Indian
Ocean. In a second search, we concentrated on 200 well-known foresight
institutes and academic institutions, and we tapped into the in-house Metafore
database of HCSS. From our search results, we selected a sample of 96 relevant
foresight studies published since 2000 (see Appendix K).
We subsequently analyzed these studies using our standard Metafore protocol of
parameters, drivers, and security implications. Parameters are defined as the key
attributes of the maritime situation in the Indian Ocean that are likely to change
in the future. The primary question in this regard involves the identification of
characteristics of the maritime situation in the Indian Ocean that are likely to
change in the future. Drivers are defined as the forces that are likely to trigger
changes in the parameters. The primary question in this regard involves the
identification of mechanisms that are likely to drive change in the future maritime
12
I NTrODuCTI ON
situation in the Indian Ocean. Implications are the consequences resulting from
changes in the parameters (see Table 1).
PArAMeterS DriverS iMPlicAtionS
Civilian Use of SLOCs Asian Economic Growth Changes in the Balance
of Power
Strategic Importance of SLOCs Energy Dependency (Risk of) Violent Conflict
Vulnerability of SLOCs Economic Interdependency Insecurity of SLOCs
Activity of Violent Non-State
Actors
Maritime Ambitions of
Emerging Powers
Rerouting of (Energy)
Supply Lines
Maritime Power Distribution Maritime Ambitions of
the United States
Economic Disruption
Nature of the Maritime
Build-up
External Sources of
Interstate Friction
Maritime Relations Cooperation on
Non-Maritime Issues
Instability of the
Indian Ocean Littoral
TABLE 1: OVErVIEW OF PArAMETErs, DrIVErs AND IMPLICATIONs PrEVALENT IN
FOrEsIGHT sTuDIEs
Taking into account the divergence in perspectives on the maritime future of the
Indian Ocean, we distilled the key parameters and drivers prevalent in expert
opinion and divided them along a three-point graduated scale (e.g., decrease-
constant-increase or low-medium-high). We also coded the nature of the
relationship (positive or negative) between drivers, parameters, and security
implications. For example, some experts predict that the Indian Oceans SLOCs
are likely to become more vulnerable, due to conflicts between the maritime
ambitions of emerging and established powers. According to other experts,
increasing economic interdependency is likely to make the Indian Oceans SLOCs
less vulnerable. Appendices H and I provide definitions of the parameters and
HCss report 13
I NTrODuCTI ON
drivers, and they explain the operationalization of these scales. Appendix J offers
an overview of the coded relations. The following sections present the key
parameters in the debate on the future of the Indian Ocean, the key forces that
drive these parameters, and their likely implications, as predicted by the expert
discourse.
2.3 trends in the Debate
As shown in Chart 1, the Indian Ocean has been receiving an increasing amount
of attention: more of the foresights in our sample were published after 2008 than
were published in the seven-year period prior to that. In fact, all publications
from government and industry parties that directly make and implement
policy were published after 2005, with the largest share after 2009. This
suggests that the strategic importance of this topic is increasing.
CHArT 1: PuBLICATION TrEND: NuMBEr OF FOrEsIGHTs By yEAr OF PuBLICATION
The majority of the studies were authored by think tanks and research institutes
(see Chart 2). Our results may be skewed, however, due to the open-source nature
of our search. In other words, government and industry publications may be
under-represented simply because they are not openly and/or freely available.
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This limitation may partly explain the relative absence of the European Union
(EU) and major European powers (e.g., Great Britain, Italy, France) from our
analysis. It is worth noting that our sample includes views from both sides of the
Pacific, even though it may seem to focus primarily on the West (particularly the
US), with Chinese views seemingly less represented (see Chart 3). While this bias
can be explained in part by the inherent language barrier we encounter in
analyzing Chinese documents, two points are worth making. First, despite the
language barrier, more than one third of the foresights in our sample are from
Asia, including Singapore and Japan. Second, a number of the US publications
were actually authored by Asian academics employed by overseas research
departments.
CHArT 2: TyPE OF sOurCE: NuMBEr OF FOrEsIGHTs By TyPE OF ExECuTOr
CHArT 3: COuNTry PErsPECTIVE: NuMBEr OF FOrEsIGHTs By COuNTry OF PuBLICATION
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HCss report 15
THE MArI TI ME FuTurE OF THE I NDI AN OCEAN
3 The Maritime Future
of the Indian Ocean
3.1 Parameters
Seven key parameters emerge from the debate on the future of the Indian Ocean
(see Chart 4). The first two parameters describe the economic usage of the Indian
Oceans SLOCs and their relative importance to key stakeholders. The second pair
of parameters refers to the level of vulnerability of the SLOCs and the threat that
various types of violent non-state actors pose to commercial shipping. The third
group of parameters concerns the geopolitical future of the Indian Ocean,
focusing on the maritime presence of key stakeholders, the nature of the
relationships between them, and the maritime balance of power in the region.
CHArT 4: MAPPING THE DEBATE: NuMBEr OF FOrEsIGHT PrEDICTIONs OF THE
PArAMETErs
This limitation may partly explain the relative absence of the European Union
(EU) and major European powers (e.g., Great Britain, Italy, France) from our
analysis. It is worth noting that our sample includes views from both sides of the
Pacific, even though it may seem to focus primarily on the West (particularly the
US), with Chinese views seemingly less represented (see Chart 3). While this bias
can be explained in part by the inherent language barrier we encounter in
analyzing Chinese documents, two points are worth making. First, despite the
language barrier, more than one third of the foresights in our sample are from
Asia, including Singapore and Japan. Second, a number of the US publications
were actually authored by Asian academics employed by overseas research
departments.
CHArT 2: TyPE OF sOurCE: NuMBEr OF FOrEsIGHTs By TyPE OF ExECuTOr
CHArT 3: COuNTry PErsPECTIVE: NuMBEr OF FOrEsIGHTs By COuNTry OF PuBLICATION
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The first four parameters show a clear and remarkably similar pattern: expert
opinion predicts future increases in the civilian use, strategic importance, and
vulnerability of SLOCs, as well as in the activity of violent non-state actors. The
latter three parameters feature much more prominently in the debate concerning
the Indian Ocean, and they clearly illustrate the level of disagreement among
experts and thus the greater degree of uncertainty regarding the future
development of these parameters.
In other words, the geopolitical landscape of the Indian Ocean may unfold in
different ways over the next two decades. The direction that they take will depend
upon the level and nature of the maritime build-up, the level of cooperative or
confrontational relations between the powers, and the polarity of the maritime
system (uni-polar, bi-polar, or multi-polar). The following sections discuss these
pairings in more detail.
sea Lines of Communication: Civilian use and strategic
Importance
The Indian Ocean is, and will probably continue to be, a major transit route for
inter-continental and regional trade in commercial goods and fossil fuels. The
foresight studies unanimously predict that commercial shipping along the
Indian Ocean SLOCs will expand in the coming decades. If the Chinese and
Indian economies continue on their path of economic growth and increasing
dependence on international trade in order to meet key resource needs and access
export markets, new port facilities will continue to be developed in order to
strengthen the Oceans routes from Africa and the Gulf Region towards India
and East-Asia, including Australia. These shifts are increasingly transforming
the Indian Ocean into a maritime center of gravity, or the strategic heart of the
maritime world.
4

Because of the extraordinary growth rates recorded by the economies of China,
India, and other countries in southern and eastern Asia, experts are predicting
that the worlds economic center of gravity will gradually shift to the East. This
is largely the result of the particular economic policies of these countries, which
are premised on export-led growth. At the same time, these countries are also
heavily dependent on imports (especially the Chinese and Indian economies) in
order to meet the rapidly expanding energy needs of their burgeoning industries
and expanding populations. In the coming decades, as the energy demands of
China and Indias economies translate into a growing dependency on Middle
HCss report 17
Eastern and African imports for their energy and resource needs, the strategic
importance of the Indian Oceans SLOCs will increase accordingly. Even Chinas
efforts to diversify energy imports away from the Middle East (and most probably
towards Africa) are likely to intensify Chinas use of the SLOCs in the Indian
Ocean.
5
The fact that vast mineral deposits worth at least USD one trillion have
been discovered in Afghanistan is likely to contribute to the strategic importance
of the SLOCs as well.
In addition, thirteen of the worlds busiest ports are currently located in Asia
(with Singapore heading the list, having processed almost 30 million containers
in 2008) and are directly dependent on the safety of the Indian Oceans SLOCs for
their business.
6
More than 90% of the worlds trade is currently transported by
sea, and the total volume of seaborne trade increased by more than 35% between
1998 and 2008.
7
As the total volume of seaborne trade continues to expand, most
of this growth is likely to originate from or be destined for Chinese and Indian
ports. For example, energy transports from the Middle East have little alternative
but to pass first through the Strait of Hormuz and then cross the ocean to pass
through the Strait of Malacca on their way to China or, if their aim is to reach
Europe, to navigate through the Bab-el-Mandeb in the western part of the Indian
Ocean.
8
In conclusion, the increased use of the Indian Oceans SLOCs will place
further pressure on key maritime choke points in the region, thereby providing
these states with further motivation to control these SLOCs.
Vulnerability of sLOCs and the Threat of Non-state Actors
The increased use of the Indian Oceans SLOCs makes them vulnerable to
regional instability, spillover violence from regional conflicts, and the actions
of pirates, terrorists, and criminal organizations. Furthermore, most of the
strategically important SLOCs and maritime choke points are adjacent to failed
states and areas with weak governance systems. As such, they are particularly
vulnerable to disruption, with no viable alternative shipping routes available.
Despite the economic and political rise of India and a number of countries within
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), many of the Indian Oceans
littoral states have a poor record in governance and stability. The transit to Bab-
el-Mandeb, the only maritime passage from the Gulf of Aden to European waters
(with the exception of the much longer route around the African continent), is
situated between Somalia, which is the leading case study of a failed state, and
Yemen, which could soon follow suit.
9
At the other end of the Ocean, the Strait of
Malacca is the major connecting point between the Indian Ocean and the South
18
China Sea, as well as the Pacific Ocean. It is bordered by the historically unstable
Aceh region of Indonesia.
In addition to these two choke points, the Strait of Hormuz is the only waterway
connecting the Ocean to the energy resources of the Persian Gulf. The Strait of
Hormuz will continue to be vulnerable to potential instability in Iran. Twenty
percent of the worlds oil supply passes through the Strait, amounting to about
seventeen million barrels a day. Considering the strategic importance of this
choke point, it is obvious that a disruption in maritime security would have a
severe impact.
10
Finally, in addition to these choke points, several of the oceans
littoral states (e.g., Pakistan, Myanmar, and until recently Sri Lanka) are
struggling with internal conflicts that may also weaken the Oceans security in
the future.
Indeed, the lack of state control along the Oceans shores may increasingly create
a breeding ground for three types of violent non-state actors: pirates, terrorists,
and international criminal organizations. Pirates figure most prominently in the
contemporary security discourse on the Indian Ocean, and foresights suggest an
increase in piracy in the Indian Ocean during the coming decades.
Approximately a quarter of all maritime piracy is targeted at shipments of fossil
fuels. This happens primarily in the Strait of Malacca (see Figure 2).
11
The
foresights devote more attention to the actions of Somali pirates in the Gulf of
Aden, however, predicting that they will continue to attract new recruits, due to
the profitability of the enterprise. Some scenarios suggest that these pirates may
be joined by Yemeni counterparts in the future. In addition, pirates whose
activities are currently concentrated around the maritime choke points at each
end of the Indian Ocean are also expected to venture progressively further into
the Indian Ocean proper.

The growing strategic importance and economic significance of the SLOCs,
combined with their vulnerable position adjacent to failed states, make them an
attractive target for terrorist groups looking to disrupt global trade. Indeed, the
sinking of only a few ships could seriously affect traffic through the narrow
straits of Hormuz and Malacca, making them particularly vulnerable to potential
actions undertaken by such groups as Al Qaeda (in the Strait of Hormuz) and the
Jemaah Islamiyah (in the Strait of Malacca). Maritime infrastructures (e.g.,
Indias offshore oil facilities) may be targeted as well, as has happened in other
HCss report 19
areas (e.g., attacks on facilities off the shores of the Niger Delta in the Gulf of
Guinea). Moreover, since the 2008 attacks in Mumbai, India, seaborne access to
onshore targets has emerged as another dimension of maritime security that
policymakers must consider.
Finally, in addition to their importance for the transport of oil and manufactured
products, the Indian Oceans trade routes are also used for the trafficking of
drugs, people, and small arms by international criminal organizations. The
Indian Ocean has emerged as an important transit route for the narcotic trade
from the Golden Triangle (Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand) and the Golden
Crescent (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran) to the West and Far East. In the near
future, criminal organizations will probably continue to use the Indian Ocean
waterways for their activities. In addition, terrorist organizations are known to
participate in the illegal drug trade to finance their operations, thereby blurring
the lines between the activities of terrorists and organized crime. Foresights
FIGurE 2: PIrATE ACTIVITy IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
20
suggest that a similar synergy might occur between international terrorism and
piracy, an ominous phenomenon that could potentially cause serious disruptions
to maritime traffic and global commerce. To date, however, there has been little
or no evidence of even initial steps towards developing such synergy.
12
Maritime Balance of Power
Geopolitical developments in the Indian Ocean region will have a considerable
impact on the regional balance of power, amidst ongoing and broader shifts in
the global power distribution. At present, no regional power in the Indian Ocean
area can be considered the single most dominant maritime power (given that
the US is an extra-regional power). Within the foresights, there is considerable
debate (and thus disagreement) regarding the future shape and composition
of the Indian Ocean as a political and maritime system. Nonetheless, two
observations are worthy of note. First, the majority of the foresights
(representing more than twenty studies) that touch upon the future maritime
balance of power, suggest that the US will no longer be the single, dominant
maritime player in the Indian Ocean, due to the emergence of India and China
and the resulting diffusion of power in the region. At the same time, however,
none of the sources predict that the US will completely leave the Indian Ocean
(which remains a stage for great-power politics), and a sizeable number of
studies (more than ten) suggest that the US is likely to retain its position as
the most advanced global naval power.
The second notable observation is that the economic rise of China is expected to
run parallel to its rise as a maritime power in the Indian Ocean. Even if Chinas
actual maritime presence remains largely restricted to the Strait of Malacca and
the Bay of Bengal, experts argue that its investments in Pakistan, its stake in the
development of the Pakistani port of Gwadar, and the availability of forward
bases in Myanmar and other locations will enable it to sustain deployments
across the Ocean and secure its place as a regional maritime power. Although
China has been investing heavily in the comprehensive modernization of its
maritime capacity (see the discussion below and Appendices B, C, D, and E),
the expeditionary capability that these programs are intended to generate is
emerging only slowly.
13
One notable achievement in this respect is the permanent
deployment of a three-ship Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) Navy task force to
the Gulf of Aden since 2008 with the goal of protecting SLOCs in these pirate-
infested waters.
14
In November 2009, China expressed interest in playing a
leading role in the fight against Somali pirates. They offered to co-chair SHADE
HCss report 21
(Shared Awareness and Deconfliction) along with the EU and US-led Combined
Maritime Force, which is headquartered in Bahrain.
The rise of India is more contentious, and fewer foresights (less than ten) predict
the emergence of a bi-polar or tri-polar maritime system with India as a key
player. Although India has been modernizing and improving its naval
capabilities since the late 1990s, it currently lacks the expeditionary capability to
deploy forces on a permanent basis beyond the reach of its bases. Nevertheless,
Indias geographical position provides it with considerable strategic leverage, as
it is located along the major transit route and it possesses several smaller islands
across the ocean. This could enhance Indias potential to become a maritime
power in the medium-term.
The maritime balance of power ultimately depends on the number and the nature
of the naval assets (i.e., the type of capabilities) deployed in the region by the
different states listed above. In the next ten to twenty years, the presence of naval
assets in the Indian Ocean is likely to increase significantly. An overwhelming
majority of the foresight studies predict that one or more of the major powers in
the region will expand its naval capabilities, both in terms of vessels and in terms
of naval bases and port infrastructure, which are crucial to supporting and
sustaining a states maritime presence and expeditionary capabilities. Given that
the Chinese and American expeditionary fleets are not always based in the Indian
Ocean region proper, one important indicator of their focus or commitment to
the region will be the development of strategic maritime infrastructure to
support naval deployment in that region (see Figure 3).
Nature of the Maritime Build-up
Chinas grand maritime strategy which some have dubbed the String of Pearls
strategy involves securing access to the Indian Ocean, expanding its maritime
presence, and strengthening diplomatic relations with countries from the
Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca, essentially extending across the entire
Indian Ocean. As part of this strategy, China is building naval bases on the
islands of the Maldives and Seychelles, and it is investing in military port
infrastructure in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar.
15
Although it
is unclear whether these investments necessarily entitle China to make use of
the infrastructure as well, sources do indicate that ships from the PLA Navy are
allowed to berth in Pakistan and, most likely, in Myanmar.
16
In addition to the
military rationale behind these investments, Chinas efforts to create closer ties
22
with Myanmar are motivated by its desire to secure direct access for Chinas
Yunnan province to the Bay of Bengal. Such access would allow it to bypass the
Strait of Malacca, thereby greatly enhancing the security of its energy supply,
assuming that these pipelines are not subject to attack. If they are able to be
translated into usage rights, these infrastructure projects, along with the
planned creation of a number of island bases, would provide China with the
capacity to deploy a permanent expeditionary naval force in the Indian Ocean
basin and challenge the regional dominance of the US (as well as the presence
of India) over the next decade.
India perceives these steps as an incursion into its sphere of influence. It is
responding by building a naval base in the Maldives, and it has expanded its
monitoring facilities in the southern Indian Ocean. It is also building a naval
patrol base on the Lakshadweep Islands, thereby acquiring oversight and control
of the adjacent Nine Degree Channel choke point. In addition, India is developing
a naval base in Sri Lankas northern peninsula, which is the area that suffered the
brunt of fighting between the Sri Lankan government forces and the separatist
Tamil Tigers. A few foresights contain mention the Indian Look East policy as a
counterweight to the Chinese String of Pearls strategy. Nonetheless, India has
yet to take any steps to establish a naval presence east of the Strait of Malacca in
support of such a policy (for an overview of the various types of maritime
facilities in the Indian Ocean, see Figure 3 and Appendix E).
17
Due to its well-developed blue-water capabilities (which are elaborated further
in Appendix A), the US has been able to build its forward presence in the Indian
Ocean with few actual territorial possessions in the region. The US naval base at
Diego Garcia in the British Indian Ocean Territory acts merely as a staging area
for navy ships and long-range bombers. Several potential problems are
associated with the continued use of the base. First, although it is unlikely to do
so, the UK may decide to terminate its lease of the island to the US in 2016, in
response to increasing international pressure for the native populations right to
return. Second, because most of the atoll is less than two meters high, rising sea
levels will pose a significant threat to the islands infrastructure. In anticipation
of these developments, the US Navy announced in 2009 that it plans a major
expansion of its presence in Bahrain, which currently houses the Fifth Fleet and
the Coalition Maritime Forces anti-piracy missions Combined Task Forces 150
and 151 (which have been undertaken in coalition with a number of other
countries). Some sources suggest that the US is also planning to establish a
missile base in Sri Lanka.
18

HCss report 23
The US is by far the highest spender on overall defense and on maritime
capabilities. Comprising about 28% of its overall defense budget, US maritime
expenditures amount to a staggering USD 156 billion. In comparison, China
dedicates 15% of its overall defense budget to its naval forces (amounting to USD
10.5 billion).
19
With a modest 7% of its overall defense expenditures earmarked for
maritime power, India spends only a meager USD 2 billion. Over the next decade,
however, the defense budgets of China and India in particular are projected to
grow considerably as these countries continue on their paths of economic
growth. Growth-projection rates of the maritime budgets of the three powers
are provided in Appendix B.
Maritime Capabilities
Beyond ports, maritime bases, naval expenditures, and the number of ships
deployed in the region, an in-depth analysis of the maritime capabilities that
these countries are developing sheds light on the future security environment
of the Indian Ocean. The polarity of the maritime system and the nature of the
relationships of the Indian Oceans maritime powers will invariably determine
FIGurE 3: MArITIME INFrAsTruCTurE OF INDIA, CHINA, AND THE us

24
and depend upon whether they invest in offensive or defensive capabilities.
Offensive and defensive intentions of nations can be distinguished by looking
more closely at the key characteristics of the capabilities that are part of the
build-up and that determine maritime strength.
Our analysis focuses on strategic capabilities in five key categories: SLOC
protection, maritime dominance (sea control and sea denial), power projection,
submarine-launched nuclear second-strike capability, and space dominance. The
assessment of maritime strengths is based on an assessment of all capabilities
within a certain category, as well as a selected capability that is considered most
relevant:
SLOC protection refers to the ability to protect the uninterrupted flow of
resources and trade, using primarily surface ships and diesel-electric driven
submarines, augmented by aerial reconnaissance vehicles (manned or
unmanned). Principal surface combatants are the selected capability for SLOC
protection, due to their endurance, presence, helicopter-carrying capability,
and ability to interrogate small and large surface craft.
Maritime dominance refers to the ability to achieve sea control and, more
precisely, the ability to control specific sea areas or maritime choke points for a
limited period. Sea control is most effectively maintained by principle surface
combatants (the selected capability) based on surveillance by maritime aircraft
(manned or unmanned). Maritime dominance also includes sea denial, which
is the ability to deny an opponent the unrestricted use of specific sea areas or
maritime choke points. Submarines (conventional or nuclear) constitute the
selected capability for sea denial.
Power projection refers to the ability to influence or manage any situation on
land or in coastal areas using expeditionary forces, either sea-based (e.g.,
amphibious forces) or airborne (e.g., maritime air). Aircraft-carrier battle
groups with extensive kinetic weaponry (e.g., cruise missiles or bombers)
constitute the selected capability for power projection.
Submarine-launched nuclear second-strike capability refers to the ability to
survive a nuclear strike and retaliate in kind using a submarine-launched
nuclear weapon. The selected capability is therefore a nuclear-powered attack
submarine that launches ballistic or cruise missiles.
Space dominance refers to the ability to use space for surveillance,
intelligence, and communications purposes by using satellites. The selected
capability therefore involves satellites designed for surveillance, intelligence,
and communications. These categories and their related maritime capabilities
are described in further detail in Appendix C.
HCss report 25
The possession or building up of strategic capabilities within one or more of
these strategic categories partially determines (and reflects) the future nature
of the relationship between the key powers. Chart 5 provides an overview of
the overall and selected capabilities within these strategic categories for China,
India, and the US. This overview serves as the starting point for our examination
of potential future developments in our analysis below.
20
Appendices C and D
provide an overview and an explanation of the choices that we have made in
assigning capabilities to certain categories and in selecting a prime capability
for each category. As with every selection, our choices may (and are intended to)
invite debate, but they are certainly not arbitrary, having been informed by
subject-matter expertise and supported by a transparent line of reasoning.
CHArT 5: COMPArIsON OF NATIONAL MArITIME CAPABILITIEs By NuMBEr OF AssETs
ACrOss FIVE sTrATEGIC CATEGOrIEs
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26
It is important to note that sheer numbers do not reflect the overall balance of
power for two reasons. First, simply adding up numbers does not adequately
capture overall maritime strength, due to incommensurable differences in
capabilities, and other factors that determine strength (e.g., skill and morale).
21

Second, these numbers refer to the entire set of maritime capabilities of a state,
rather than the capabilities that are deployed in the Indian Ocean region.
Nonetheless, not all states deploy their capabilities in the Indian Ocean region.
For example, while nearly the entire maritime capability of India is deployed in
the Indian Ocean Region, the US Navy maintains a global presence across the
three world oceans in order to uphold the Pax Americana, and the Chinese Navy is
able to employ only a very limited number of assets in the region for prolonged
periods. In case of conflict, the US Navy would have to redeploy one of its fleets
to the Indian Ocean in order to enhance its regular naval presence (the 5
th
Fleet).
It would probably redeploy its 7
th
Fleet, which is normally based in the Pacific
Ocean, a process that could take weeks. This would provide other powers with a
floating window of opportunity in which they could gain a temporary military
advantage. It would also create a capability gap in the Pacific Ocean. Despite
these cautions, the comparison of capabilities does give an indication of the
maritime capabilities possessed by these three powers. The analysis below
focuses on a big-picture comparison. Appendix D provides precise figures to
support this analysis.
Taking the above-mentioned caveats into account, the comparison reveals that
the US is currently dominant in sea denial, power projection, nuclear second-
strike capability, and space control. It also plays a dominant role in the protection
of SLOCs and in sea control, albeit to a lesser extent. In relative terms, the US
has a smaller lead in mine warfare and frigate capabilities (particularly in
comparison to China), although it largely compensates for this difference
through maritime air and space dominance.
India trails the US and China across most of the strategic categories. It currently
has no guided missile destroyers and cruisers, and it has few missile frigates and
almost no amphibious vessels. In addition, its mine warfare capability is quite
small relative to China. Although the expected launch of two new aircraft carriers
in the period 2013-2015 (bringing the total to three) would theoretically
strengthen Indias maritime capabilities, its overall maritime power-projection
capability (especially with regard to sea control) is undermined by its small
HCss report 27
arsenal of older submarines. Its sea-control capability is expected to increase as
the Indian government realizes its plans to engage in substantial modernization
and to increase the number of principal surface combatants. This capability will
be further enhanced once the first new range of destroyers and frigates is taken
into service (expected by 2015).
22
As part of its new strategy of minimum nuclear
deterrence, India is also investing in expanding its currently limited maritime
nuclear second-strike capability. To this end, it launched two nuclear powered
ballistic-missile submarines in 2009, and it is in the process of developing two
more.
23
Taken as a whole, Indias power-projection capabilities are very limited,
despite its hydrographic and oceanographic capability (i.e., the ability to map
coastal and ocean waters independently). It is currently trying to expand these
capabilities by investing in principal surface and submarine forces (due in
2020).
24
With regard to its space capabilities, India launched its first dedicated
military surveillance satellite in 2009. This satellite is now complemented by a
ground-based, military-satellite reconnaissance system, and there are plans to
develop an Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS) with a system
of seven satellites by 2014. This system would ensure autonomy in regional
navigation (and independence from the US Global Positioning Satellite (GPS)
system. India is also developing a secure system of communications satellites,
which would enable cruise-missile control in conjunction with the IRNSS,
among other purposes.
25
China is capable of SLOC protection and sea denial with its arsenal of principal
surface combatants and conventional submarines, as well as its substantial
mine-warfare capability (comprising 64 minesweepers and minelayers). The fact
that China does not yet operate an aircraft carrier precludes any real maritime
dominance, although it has a long-standing ambition to build one. The
realization of this ambition, together with the expansion of its fleet of nuclear
submarines, its arsenal of amphibious vessels (which it aims to increase to 50 by
2030),
26
and its investment in oceanographic research/survey vessels could allow
China to gain dominance in force projection (at sea and from sea to land) and in
the protection of SLOCs in the Indian Ocean region. Such dominance would be
only for a limited time, however, until the US redeploys its assets. Taken together,
these capabilities suggest a shift from Chinas traditional exclusive reliance on its
area-denial strategy towards a forward power-projection posture. According to
many American experts (for example, see the reports from both the Pentagon and
the Congressional Research Service listed in the bibliography), China continues
to pursue an anti-access strategy. This view is encouraged by aforementioned
28
developments in the structure of its naval force and the acquisition of such
equipment as anti-ship ballistic missiles, nuclear attack submarines, and C4ISR
(command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance) systems.
27
Chinas nuclear second-strike capability is
relatively weak, as it has only three nuclear-powered ballistic submarines, the
operational readiness of which is unclear.
28
In terms of space control, China is
building an independent navigation network with an additional 30 satellites,
which are expected to be launched into orbit before 2015 and which are presumed
to be available for military purposes as well.
29

Across the board, the US possesses the most advanced navy. In maritime
dominance, especially with regard to sea denial and power projection, the US is
far ahead of its potential competitors, with eleven aircraft carriers (ten of which
are nuclear powered), fourteen nuclear-powered ballistic missile, 66 nuclear
submarines, and a large arsenal of submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The US
also deploys nuclear submarines equipped with a substantial number of nuclear
tipped cruise missiles. It has a wide array of anti-submarine capabilities, and it
possesses a very advanced and extensive satellite capability. Although all three
countries have indigenous satellite-launching capability, the US has eleven
launch sites (considerably more than Indias single site and Chinas three sites).
The long-term outlook for the US Navy shows that, although it will invest in the
modernization of its arsenal of ships, the overall size of this arsenal will remain
roughly constant.
30
Most sources agree, however, that the US Navy will remain
the single most powerful navy in the world despite the growth of the maritime
capabilities of China and India and that it will probably maintain a considerable
naval presence in the region as well.
31

The three states are investing in maritime capabilities across the five strategic
categories, although the maritime build-up in the Indian Ocean is not limited
to the three major powers alone. Another important element of the US naval
strategy involves encouraging cooperation with the smaller nations in the region
in order to enable a joint response to common challenges. Australia is investing
heavily in strengthening its maritime forces (according to Australias White
Paper on defense, which is applicable through 2030). This initiative was
undertaken in response to the growing challenges to its long and vulnerable
maritime supply lines.
32
France, the UK, and Japan are also maritime players
in the Indian Ocean Region, maintaining substantial maritime presence and
infrastructure in the region (e.g., France in Djibouti). Nonetheless, these states
HCss report 29
did not feature significantly in the foresight discourse. Pakistan and Indonesia
are also looking to expand or upgrade their existing maritime assets.
33
(Appendix
F provides additional background information about current and future
capabilities of France, the UK, Australia, and Japan).
Maritime relations: Confrontation or Cooperation?
Whether these maritime capabilities across the five strategic categories will be
used in military action obviously also depends on the nature of the relationships
between the key powers. Nearly all foresight studies (more than 90) contain
some form of prediction on whether the nature of these relationships will be
confrontational (high rivalry) or peaceful and cooperative (low rivalry). As is
often the case in predicting the future, most of these predictions are highly
subjective and speculative. A closer look at the debate concerning the specific
bilateral relationships (instead of the overall balance) does provide clearer insight
into the possible future of inter-state relations in the region in the future. As
Chart 6 clearly shows, the relationships of both the US and India with China are
largely expected to become confrontational rather than cooperative. This trend,
however, figures more prominently in foresights from US origin.
CHArT 6: NuMBEr OF FOrEsIGHT PrEDICTIONs OF FuTurE NATurE OF MArITIME
rELATIONs: COOPErATIVE Or CONFrONTATIONAL
30
Indias relationships are expected to become cooperative across the board. In
particular, relations between the US and India are expected to remain peaceful.
Nonetheless, although bilateral trade and strategic military cooperation between
the US and India has increased (with some fluctuation) since the end of the Cold
War, Indian officials have also repeatedly stated that they do not aspire to create
a full-fledged alliance, despite their preference for maintaining friendly ties with
the US.
34
The Asia Times Online, the New Yorker, and other sources indicate that
India is creating a partnership with Myanmar and speculate on a future
partnership with Pakistan, in an effort to further its economic and geopolitical
interests.
35
The latter is particularly striking given the historical legacy of
animosity and a number of very important unresolved issues between the
countries. One example involves their continued conflict over Kashmir and the
alleged ties between the Pakistan Intelligence Services and the perpetrators of
the 2008 Mumbai attacks. A small number (twelve) of foresight studies also argue
the possible emergence of a tri-polar system, which could be either cooperative
or confrontational.
3.2 Drivers
The outlook for the Indian Oceans security environment is driven by a range of
factors (drivers) arising from both within and outside the region. As shown in
Chart 7, the foresight literature evaluates these eight drivers, paying particular
attention to the extent to which each driver is expected to affect the economic
and geopolitical situation of the Indian Ocean in the coming decades.

The first three drivers are concerned with the economic configuration in South
and East Asia, which is expected to continue to be characterized by rapid growth,
regional integration, and an increasing demand for energy. The second pairing
of drivers reflects the future strategic ambitions of the three major players in the
Indian Ocean. This includes the ambitions of the emerging powers (China and
India), which may or may not be translated into actual capabilities, as well as
the ambitions of the established power (the US), which may re-evaluate its
hegemonic stance in the years to come. The third combination of drivers is
concerned with external sources of cooperation or confrontation, thus
illustrating how maritime relations are an element within a larger framework
shaped by issues that go beyond the Indian Ocean. The last driver, which is
concerned with the stability of the Indian Ocean littoral states, reflects the fact
that, despite the increasing economic significance of the Indian Ocean and the
rise of India and China to global prominence, the region is also home to a
number of weak states that may affect the regional security environment.
HCss report 31
Economic Drivers: Growth, Energy, and Interdependency
The eastward shift of the worlds economic center of gravity will have direct
effects on economic activity in the Indian Ocean, particularly as its SLOCs
expand in response to growth in trade flows and vital energy imports. If China
and India continue to record such high growth rates, China is expected to
become the second largest economy in the world by 2025, with India not far
behind.
36
While economists largely agree on this growth scenario, other experts
have expressed doubts. According to their arguments, the economic growth of
China and India could be hampered by a number of structural domestic problems
relating to socio-political stability, the nature of the existing political regimes,
and demographic challenges, which may delay the advent of a Pacific Era.
37

If economic and demographic growth in these countries does continue unabated,
it will have direct consequences for their industrial and commercial demand for
fossil fuels. Chinas energy demand is expected to exceed that of the US by 2015,
continuing to expand rapidly through 2030 at a rate exceeded only by India.
Furthermore, both China and India depend heavily on oil imports, which are
expected to rise to 75% and 95%, respectively, of their total oil consumption by
2030. Natural gas imports are expected to increase to 40% and 50% of total gas
consumption for China and India, respectively. By 2030, India is projected to
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CHArT 7: MAPPING THE DEBATE: NuMBEr OF FOrEsIGHT PrEDICTIONs OF THE DrIVErs
32
overtake the US as the worlds second-largest coal consumer behind China. As a
result, both countries will become increasingly dependent on energy imports
over land and by sea, especially from the Middle East, thus increasing the
importance of the Indian Ocean as a transit region.
38
Analysts agree that this will
have important consequences for energy security, as the bulk of traffic will have
to pass through the strategic choke points at each end of the ocean: the Strait of
Hormuz and Bal-el-Mandeb (to Europe) in the West and the Strait of Malacca (to
China) in the East.
In addition to its effects on the volume of traffic through the Indian Oceans
SLOCs and their strategic importance, increases in Asian energy dependency
may lead to competition over resources if demand for energy exceeds supply.
With states increasing their naval presence around the maritime choke points in
order to protect valuable cargo from violent non-state actors, foresights suggest
that energy security may be a driver for confrontation between the major players
in the region.
Alternatively, competition over scarce energy resources in the Indian Ocean
region may be mitigated by a shared interest in guaranteeing the regions
stability for continued economic growth. Over the last two decades, China and
India have become increasingly economically interdependent. This is reflected
in trade statistics showing that bilateral trade has grown from USD 260 million
in 1990 to approximately USD 60 billion in 2010, and it is expected to continue
to increase in the coming decades. However, foreign direct investment (FDI),
which arguably requires a greater degree of mutual trust than trade does,
continues to lag.
39

Chinese and Indian FDI in the wider region, the growing presence of Asian
multinational corporations across the region, and the resulting specialization
in manufacturing production may increasingly tie the fate of the countries of
South and East Asia (including China and India) to each other. This economic
interdependency may serve as a deterrent to open competition over energy and
other scarce resources, while strengthening regional stability.
Maritime Ambitions
The maritime strategies of the major players form an important starting point
for predicting the future presence of maritime assets in the Indian Ocean, as
they explicitly state each countrys ambitions and intentions with regard to its
HCss report 33
maritime capabilities. Of the three major players, India is the most vocal in its
ambitions. In its maritime strategy, India states explicitly that it will strive to
ensure the safety of the Oceans SLOCs:
Our strategy recognizes that the sea lines of communication passing through our
region are critical for our economic growth and to the global community. Smaller
nations in our neighbourhood as well as nations that depend on the waters of the
Indian Ocean for their trade and energy supplies have come to expect that the Indian
Navy will ensure a measure of stability and tranquility in the waters around our
shores.
40

The US demonstrates a similar commitment to the protection of SLOCs and
strategic interests. The US maritime strategy A Cooperative Strategy for 21st
Century Seapower of 2007 emphasizes naval cooperation with regional partners.
It describes the US Navy as a force for good, protecting this Nations vital
interests even as it joins with others to promote security and prosperity across
the globe.
41
It also plans to maintain a forward force, however, specifically
designed to dissuade potential challengers to the US and its allies:
Credible combat power will be continuously postured in the Western Pacific and the
Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean to protect our vital interests, assure our friends and allies
of our continuing commitment to regional security, and deter and dissuade potential
adversaries and peer competitors.
42
As an emerging extra-regional power with considerable strategic interests in
the Indian Ocean, China is somewhat more ambiguous or indirect in stating its
maritime ambitions west of the Strait of Malacca. According to its strategy
Chinas National Defense in 2008, China is primarily concerned with territorial
defense, and it does not explicitly discuss its maritime interests beyond its
territorial waters:
The Navy is a strategic service of the PLA, and the main force for maritime
operations. It is responsible for such tasks as safeguarding Chinas maritime security
and maintaining the sovereignty of its territorial waters, along with its maritime
rights and interests.
43
Mutual perceptions of the opponents naval strategies play a significant role in
determining a countrys perception of the regional security environment.
34
Historically embedded mistrust between China and India is encouraging mutual
suspicion regarding each others maritime intentions, particularly given the
tendency of both countries to think in terms of rights and responsibilities within
their own naval backyards (the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean,
respectively).
44
As mentioned earlier, the US is particularly worried about Chinas
maritime build-up, and its analysis of Chinas naval capacity focuses on that
latters capabilities for sea denial and power projection rather than on its stated
commitment to the defense of territorial waters.
45
Whereas the US has maintained a forward naval presence in the Indian Ocean for
decades, India and China appear to have started to harbor such ambitions only
recently. Throughout the foresights, it is widely agreed that both countries are
committed to attaining a military and naval status that they view as befitting
their economic power.
External sources of Conflict and Cooperation
As a component of broader diplomatic relations, maritime relations between
the major players in the Indian Ocean are a function of the confrontational or
cooperative nature of these relations. The current bilateral or multilateral
cooperation to address such shared challenges as nuclear proliferation or
international terrorism may facilitate the establishment of working
relationships. It may also have a trust-building dimension with potential
spillover effects into the maritime realm. Old disputes (many of which are
ongoing) may have an opposite effect, however, leading instead to greater
maritime rivalry.
Although a European model of economic integration and interdependence
between states is not likely to emerge in the Indian Ocean context in the
foreseeable future, a more modest degree of economic interdependence may
also provide fertile soil for further cooperation. In this light, bilateral and
multilateral trade agreements, together with the expanding memberships of
such regional organizations as the ASEAN, the South Asia Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and the Indian Ocean Rim Association for
Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) could have a positive effect on regional ties,
particularly with regard to Sino-Indian relations. Although it is often difficult
to achieve in practice, the process of addressing common security challenges in
the Indian Ocean (e.g., piracy and maritime terrorism) may also create a positive
momentum on which to build a working relationship. A good example is the
HCss report 35
earlier mentioned Horn of Africa maritime security consultation mechanism
on SHADE, in which the EU, the US, and China are participating.
Ancient grudges may break to new mutiny, however, as historic rivalries and
territorial disputes could hamper warming relations, possibly even igniting into
fresh violence. China and India have several ongoing territorial disputes and
political disagreements, including over the Aksai Chin area of Kashmir and the
Arunachal Pradesh in Eastern India, and over Indias support for the Dalai Lamas
Tibetan government-in-exile. The Indian government recognizes these hurdles,
and it has stated that, although most of these disputes are dormant and not large
enough to feed national hostility, in the medium to long term, some can turn
ugly rapidly, and are clearly of strategic concern.
46
Moreover, the Pakistan-
India-China nexus is often cited as a possible trigger for conflict as well. The
relationship between Pakistan and India has been one of continuous rivalry and
distrust, which has escalated into several short wars and is most noticeable in the
contested region of Kashmir. Chinas involvement as a prominent sponsor of
Pakistan (through arms sales and financial support) is a permanent source of
irritation for its main regional rival, India. Although it is difficult to predict
specifically whether and how these disputes could heat up or be resolved in the
coming decades, they are all potential sources of conflict and rivalry between
the major powers in the Indian Ocean.
Although the US has no territorial presence in the region, its historical
involvement in regional affairs has left seeds of potential conflict with the
regional powers. As part of its ongoing military operations in Afghanistan, US
support for the Pakistani government will continue to cast a shadow over Indo-
American relations, as will Indias ties to the Taliban forces. The relationship
between the US and China is even more tense, however, primarily with regard
to the US political and military support for Taiwan. In addition, US military
involvement in southern and eastern Asia during the Cold War was a historical
source of friction, although it was defused after their rapprochement under
President Nixon. Since the 1990s, tensions have surfaced regularly with regard to
Chinas human rights record, US-Taiwan relations, and increasingly, trade and
financial issues. The total trade between these two states, which are the largest
economies in the world, more than doubled in the 2003-2008 period, with about
USD 365 billion in trade in 2009 alone.
47
Finally, in early 2010, it was also
estimated that China held over USD 877 billion of US public debt, making it the
largest foreign owner of US Treasury securities.
48
36
Instability of the Indian Ocean Littoral
The stability of the Indian Ocean littoral states will certainly affect the security
environment of the Indian Ocean, particularly in the areas surrounding the
strategic maritime choke points. Six of the top twenty countries on the Foreign
Policy Failed State Index of 2010 are located on the Oceans shores, with three
others located near the western maritime choke points. The weak governance
structures in these areas and the virtual absence of the rule of law makes them
ideal breeding grounds for piracy and international terrorism. A number of these
states may remain or become black holes over the next two decades (with Somalia
and Yemen as cases in point, as mentioned earlier). Terrorist black holes in these
areas, as well as in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and on several Indonesian islands in
the Strait of Malacca, are another concern for the safety of traffic through the
Indian Ocean. Continued instability in the Middle East and in East Africa could
also exacerbate the issue of energy security, as may potential political instability
in Iran.
3.3 Security implications
The developments that have been sketched above will have implications that
reach far beyond the Indian Ocean alone. Policymakers in Beijing, Delhi, and
Washington are beginning to consider the idea that, in the words of American
strategist Robert Kaplan, the Indian Ocean and its adjacent waters will be a
central theatre of global conflict and competition this century.
49
The ways in
which the key powers will address mutual (and sometimes conflicting) maritime
interests will directly affect the global balance of power and play a large role in
determining the geopolitical landscape of the decades to come. The foresight
discourse presents a variety of security implications (see Figure 4) of these
developments. The most significant developments involve 1) changes in the
balance of power and the risk of violent conflict and 2) insecurity along the
SLOCs resulting in large-scale economic disruption and the rerouting of energy
supply.
Changes in the Balance of Power and the risk of Violent Conflict
Within the context of slowly but inexorably evolving regional power dynamics,
there is an increased risk of an outbreak of violent conflict. While the US
economy is slowing down and its international military position is weakened,
China and India are rising rapidly. Similarly, the current maritime build-up of
these three states in the Indian Ocean will probably continue over the next two
decades. They will combine to produce shifts in the regional power distribution,
HCss report 37
thereby forcing regional and global alliances to adapt. Such periods of change are
often accompanied by increased instability and possibly even by rivalries that
could escalate into a full-blown maritime arms race. This could increase the
chance of armed conflict between the states within the Indian Ocean region.
50

Chinas grand strategy may produce a security imbalance in the region that could
put it on a collision course with the US and India.
51
It should be noted that some
experts hold the view that China is pursuing a natural path, contending that,
as a great continental nations economy grows, it begins to trade more with the
outside world and develops interests it did not have previously.
52
Other observers
see the potential advantages of greater Chinese involvement in safeguarding and
upholding the international liberal trade order.
53

The efforts of India and China to expand their regional spheres of influence in
each others backyards may result in regional skirmishes, as is already occurring
regularly between the US and China in the South China Sea.
54
The danger is that
conflicts at sea could spill over to other regional fault lines. For example, a war at
sea between India and China would likely re-ignite the unresolved Sino-Indian
border conflict as well.
FIGurE 4: sECurITy IMPLICATIONs

38
In the event of armed maritime conflict, the US and Indian aircraft carriers in the
Indian Ocean would be capable of projecting power against an opponent, both at
sea and from sea to land. With a coastline of more than 5,000 kilometers that
includes several megacities, India would be particularly vulnerable to sea-to-land
attacks. In the absence of aircraft carriers, China could still protect its shoreline
and inflict considerable damage with its maneuverable ballistic missiles and
nuclear submarines in case of possible attacks by US and Indian seaborne
capabilities. The possession of capabilities that enable a state to shift seamlessly
from sea control to sea denial would provide a strategic advantage to any first
mover. This fact injects an escalatory element into the regional maritime system.
Insecurity of sLOCs: rerouting of Energy supply Lines and
Disruption of the Economy
Regional instability, non-state violence, and potentially armed maritime conflict
will affect the safety of commercial shipping across the Indian Ocean. SLOCs are
particularly vulnerable at narrow choke points, as it is relatively easy (in physical
terms) to use land-based assets on adjacent coasts to disrupt shipping in those
spots. Even though most littoral states have no real incentive to close down
SLOCs, a state with malign intentions would certainly be able to deny the use
of choke points relatively easily through such actions as stationing a hostile
nuclear submarine in the area.
Maritime attacks, or the threat thereof, would cause a relocation of the affected
trade flows. In other words, it could reroute sea trade. For example, in the event
that the Bab-el-Mandeb or even the Suez Canal were to be closed down, seaborne
trade between Europe and Asia would have to go around the Cape of Good Hope,
resulting in significant increases in transportation costs and thus in consumer
prices. Furthermore, in the short term, the longer shipping times could throw
off a range of industries that work with time-sensitive deliveries, possibly
destroying them altogether in the long-term. Business models relying on just-in-
time delivery would probably have to be reassessed.
55

Should the rerouting of transportation lines prove to be prohibitively expensive,
oil tankers could still be forced to use high-risk SLOCs, which would result in
skyrocketing insurance premiums.
56
Ships passing choke points that are
designated as enhanced-risk areas by insurance companies are currently levied
an additional surcharge of up to 0.10% of the total value of their cargo, while the
HCss report 39
baseline premium imposed on seaborne freight is 0.05%.
57
In exceptional
circumstances, this surcharge may even reach 2.0%.
Indian and Chinese economic growth largely hinges on the continuing supply of
cheap carbon fuels, for which they are almost entirely dependent on the Indian
Ocean SLOCs. Any supply disruption in the Indian Ocean (e.g., through maritime
conflicts, piracy, or sea-based terrorism) could thus wreak tremendous havoc on
Asian economies by depriving them of the resources that function as the arteries
of their economies. The intensifying activity of pirates and their expansion of
activity from territorial waters to the high seas and the potential emergence of
new forms of maritime terrorism in the future represent a threat to the physical
safety of shipping, as well as to ports and oilrigs.
58
China uses the worst-case
scenario for large-scale economic disruption brought on by instability along the
SLOCs as a key argument for increasing its maritime presence in the eastern
Indian Ocean, as more than 80% of its energy imports pass through the Strait
of Malacca.
59
In such a narrow waterway (with a width of only 40 miles or 65
kilometers, but with a navigable width of only a mile at some locations), even a
low-intensity terrorist attack on an oil tanker has the potential to shut down the
entire Strait. A further danger is that a hostile blockade of the Strait could easily
cut China off from its economic lifeline.
60

HCss report 41
HCss AssEssMENT OF THE I NDI AN OCEAN DEBATE
4 HCss Assessment of
the Indian Ocean Debate
The contemporary discourse on the Indian Ocean revolves around a range of
parameters, drivers, and implications, some of which are sharply contested by
experts in the strategic and foresight communities in both hemispheres, as our
analysis has shown.
It is obvious, however, that the Indian Oceans security environment is heating
up. Current and emerging powers are making across-the-board investments in
expeditionary maritime power-projection capabilities (including infrastructure)
and in sea-denial capabilities that serve a variety of peaceful as well as potentially
confrontational purposes. Remarkably, India and China are investing heavily in
nuclear-attack submarines. In terms of military capabilities, these submarines
have not been a capability of choice since the end of the Cold War. It is fair to say
that this indicates a return to great-power politics in the more traditional sense.
It is also remarkable that the foresights contain hardly any mention of Europe
and the EU, despite the fact that EUs unified market constitutes the largest
economy in the world and has a major stake in the security of the Oceans SLOCs.
Between the British, Dutch, French, Portuguese, and Spanish navies, European
states have long-standing experience in that region, which could be applied to
more benign purposes in the post-colonial era, as has been done in other regions
around the world. In particular, British and French overseas territories provide
strong platforms from which these countries can play a role in the regions
security environment, possibly preventing it from turning into a tense, bi-polar
situation or a highly unstable tri-polar system.
61
Furthermore, the significant
financial investments that are made for these maritime build-ups provide
considerable business opportunities for European companies. Indeed, the
strategic rapprochement between France and India illustrates how some
European states do recognize the increasing importance of India.
62
One observer
therefore calls for the development of a European maritime grand strategy to
safeguard European interests around the globe.
63

42
Russia is also rarely mentioned in the Indian Ocean debate, although its absence
is perhaps less surprising. Russia is located in the northern hemisphere, and its
maritime power has been severely declining since the collapse of the Soviet
Union. If needed, however, its existing maritime assets could still be brought to
bear.
The role of regional maritime frameworks as a way of facilitating cooperative
relationships between the key powers is another largely unexplored issue in the
foresight literature. Nonetheless, shared interests in keeping the Oceans SLOCs
open may provide strong incentives to create such regional cooperative
frameworks, which may have the added benefit of creating additional positive
spillover effects into other areas. The South Asia Regional Port Security
Cooperative (SARPSCO), which was established to increase port and maritime
security in the Indian Ocean, may be a good example of this.
The importance of piracy seems to be highly exaggerated in the literature.
Although it features prominently in the debate on the future of the Indian Ocean,
its actual role as a driver of the maritime build-up across the five strategic
categories identified in this paper (SLOC protection, maritime dominance,
power projection, sea-based nuclear second-strike capability, and space
dominance) is negligible. While piracy (both on land and at sea) most certainly
needs to be addressed, current maritime anti-piracy operations, however
effective, also serve political purposes, including as a pretext to disguise actions
that for all intents and purposes amount to a maritime build-up.
Another notable point is that commentary on the nature and size of the future
maritime defense expenditures often conveniently overlook the fact that national
defense spending is a function of an overall security and threat assessment and
of the objectives that an individual state wants to achieve. In other words, land
powers traditionally allocate less of their overall defense spending to maritime
expenditures, given that they face greater land-based threats. With this in mind,
both India and China have very long land borders, which pose a range of land-
based threats that are not necessarily deterred by maritime power. Given that
they are more threatened by conventional, territorial threats than is the US, they
will face difficult trade-offs in their defense-spending allocations, which may
reduce further maritime spending.
64

HCss report 43
The literature contains little discussion about how technological developments
may shape the future maritime landscape. The transition from the industrial
era to the information age (which is taking place in large parts of the world),
combined with revolutionary research developments in energy production, may
drastically decrease the usage of SLOCs. Similarly, the world economy may shift
away from its current high levels of globalization (as measured in terms of trade
and FDI flows) toward a model of regionalization that will drastically decrease
global trade volumes and the use of SLOCs. This will spark radical changes
in the incentive structures of states, shifting them away from investing in
maritime capabilities in the Indian Ocean. Alternatively, land-based forms
of transportation may once again come to play a more important role in
international commerce. The significant investments in new silk roads,
railways, and pipelines may reduce the reliance on the Indian Oceans SLOCs.
65

This would significantly affect the role of ports worldwide as major
transportation hubs, thereby causing considerable changes in the world
economic and geopolitical landscape (e.g., with Turkey replacing the
Netherlands as the major entry point for commodities originating from Asia).
Climate change is another topic that does not figure prominently in the Indian
Ocean discourse, although it is expected to have particularly profound
implications for the Indian Ocean region in terms of the safety of maritime
infrastructure. It is also associated with the potential for mass immigration
flows resulting from flooding coastal areas or disappearing island countries
(e.g., the Maldives).
66
The literature also does not even touch upon the
implications of a potential Arctic passage for the civilian use of the Indian
Oceans SLOCs. The potential feasibility of the Arctic passage in the decades
to come is part of an ongoing debate, and it could alter international trading
routes significantly.
67

Similarly, only scant attention is paid to the actual form of future maritime
conflict and the ways in which these potential future conflicts might play out
within the context of the Indian Ocean region. It is uncertain whether we will
go back to the future and see the return of classic naval battles, or whether we
are already seeing the advent of a post-naval era, as asserted by some, in light of
the very small number of real naval clashes occurring since the Second World
War.
68
Alternatively, the trend towards asymmetric warfare might extend to
the maritime domain. We must also consider the role of unmanned submersed
vehicles whose aerial counterparts (i.e., drones) are currently having a real
44
impact on the conduct of contemporary warfare on land. More generally,
revolutionary breakthroughs in maritime capabilities might emerge as game
changers and cancel out rival forces, as occurred with the Dreadnought and
the submarine during the 20
th
century. These very relevant issues are seldom
addressed by experts in discussions concerning the future of the Indian Ocean,
even though they may actually be crucial to determining that future. Appendix G
provides an overview of emerging technologies, briefly touching upon some of
their security implications.

HCss report 45
CONCLusI ONs AND POLI Cy rECOMMENDATI ONs
5 Conclusions and Policy
recommendations
The Indian Ocean is fast becoming a new global center of political and economic
gravity, as it ties together the economic fortunes of emerging Asia, the US, and
Europe. This Future Issue has analyzed key current and future developments in
the Indian Ocean that will have important implications for security and business
continuity. The analysis in this Future Issue warrants the following conclusions:
The safety of the Indian Oceans SLOCs is of vital importance to the growth of
the emerging economies in South and East Asia and the world economy at
large. The strategically located choke points are extremely vulnerable to
disruptive attacks from state actors, as well as from non-state actors, including
pirates and terrorists. In addition to their potential to affect the already volatile
oil prices, contingencies at sea could dramatically affect companies that rely
on principles of just-in-time production and delivery within the context of
global production networks.
The Indian Ocean is a major testing ground for great-power relations between
the US and the potential emerging contenders China and India. Even as China
and India harbor ambitions to expand their forward naval presence in the
Indian Ocean, historically embedded mistrust is encouraging suspicion
concerning each partys intentions. Both China and India are starting to
consider the Indian Ocean in terms of prerogatives and responsibilities.
This could trouble the Oceans waters considerably and pose a potential source
of future conflict, but it could also indicate that these emerging powers are
starting to shoulder some of the responsibility of maintaining the safety of
the Oceans SLOCs.
A significant maritime build-up is taking place across five strategic categories:
SLOC protection, maritime dominance (sea control and sea denial), power
projection, submarine-launched nuclear second-strike capability, and space
dominance. The US remains far ahead of China in terms of maritime
capabilities in comparison to China and even farther ahead of India across all
five categories. Its lead is likely to shrink in the years to come, however, with
China leveling the playing field in such areas as sea denial and power-
46
CONCLusI ONs AND POLI Cy rECOMMENDATI ONs
projection capabilities. This could change the balance of power at least enough
to foster ambitions for regional hegemony on the part of at least one of the two
contenders.
HCSS offers the following policy recommendations:
The Indian Ocean requires close attention by decision makers at the highest
strategic levels. Foreign ministries should recognize the Indian Ocean as a
region that deserves attention in its own right.
Given that the Indian Ocean is a test zone for the rules of the game in a nascent
multi-polar world order, it is of the utmost importance to establish governance
frameworks that will facilitate the integration of rising powers in regulating
this order and upholding the principles of an open world economy.
In the light of the tremendous importance of the safety of SLOCs for sea-based
trade and world economic growth, policymakers should attach high priority to
the safeguarding of SLOCs and vulnerable choke points.
Because global production chains are vulnerable to supply disruption
originating from the Indian Ocean, business executives should re-assess their
policies regarding supply-chain risk management.
In conclusion, the maritime future of the Indian Ocean will be an important
factor in shaping the security environment of the 21st century. For now, one can
only hope that the relevant parties will adhere to the famous geo-strategist Alfred
Mahans adage that force is never more operative than when it is known to exist,
but is not brandished.
69
HCss report 47
ADDENDuM I MPLI CATI ONs FOr THE NATI ONAL sECurI Ty OF THE NETHErLANDs
Addendum Implications
for the National security
of the Netherlands
The contents of this report were discussed in various expert meetings with
representatives of the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, the
Advisory Council on International Affairs, and the Port of Rotterdam, and its
relevance for the Netherlands was frequently debated, particularly with regard
to the implications of the sea changes in the Indian Ocean for Dutch national
security.
The existence and reality of these implications were obvious to all insiders. As
the sixteenth largest economy in the world and the ninth largest export nation,
the Netherlands relies on water transportation for 90% of its trade and 88% of its
energy imports, with the port of Rotterdam contributing about ten percent of
the Dutch Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
70
Numerous implications of these
developments and ways in which to examine and evaluate these implications
were discussed. The most important implications included:
The consequences of unsafe SLOCs for the Netherlands in general and the port
of Rotterdam in particular
The impact of an attack on oil tankers (e.g., in the Strait of Hormuz) on oil
prices and, indirectly, on economic growth in general, and on the Dutch
industrial base, which relies on fossil fuels for the fabrication of its
manufactured goods in particular
The impact of piracy on insurance rates and the choice of SLOC (e.g., through
the Suez Channel or around the Cape of Good Hope)
The impact of unsafe SLOCs on companies whose production processes
operate on the principle of just-in-time delivery
Given the fact that the Dutch economy is highly dependent upon an open liberal
world economy, the importance of safe SLOCs is beyond doubt. The
consequences of unsafe SLOCs are nonetheless difficult to gauge in quantitative
terms at this point. A simple model simulating the impact of unsafe SLOCs (at
48
both the global and regional levels) on the size and substance of world trade
volumes would allow for a balanced estimate of the consequences for the Dutch
economy and the port of Rotterdam. While the development of such a model
unfortunately exceeds the scope of this study, the preliminary data that are
presented do offer an initial glimpse of the potential consequences, in addition
to providing some leads for further research.
The Netherlands has a 94.4% import dependency on crude oil.
71
It is also an
important energy distribution hub for Western Europe. Crude oil makes up one
third of its total imports of goods,
72
making the Netherlands the second largest
importer of oil in the world (after the US). The Netherlands is also the second
largest oil exporter in the world (after Russia). An estimated twelve percent of
oil imported into the Netherlands originates from the Indian Ocean.
73
Supply
disruption will have a profound effect on the Dutch economy. First, the oil
prices will undoubtedly increase in response to the global integration of oil
markets.
74
According to one estimate, an oil price increase of USD 15 a barrel
would have a negative effect of 0.6% on the growth of the gross domestic
product of the Netherlands.
75
While higher oil prices will also lead to inflation,
Dutch inflation rates will probably be lower than average, as oil consumption
forms a smaller part of Dutch gross national product (GNP).
76
On the positive
side, concomitant increases in gas prices will be beneficial to the Netherlands,
as a net gas exporter. For example, oil prices rose to USD 150 per barrel in 2008.
Combined with the growth in output volume, this resulted in a 35% increase in
profits for Dutch gas extraction.
77
Second, Dutch industries would suffer if oil
derivatives (e.g., Naphtha, which is used as a basis for making plastic, rubber,
paint, certain fibers for textile, and car parts) were to become more expensive.
Significant increases in oil prices would undoubtedly affect the transport
sector, the chemical sector, and the automotive industry.
78
With respect to shipping routes, until early 2009, approximately five to ten
Dutch vessels passed through the Gulf of Aden each week, amounting to 500
vessels per year. The numerous piracy attacks in the area have decreased that
number to 250-300 per year, with some vessels sailing around the Cape of Good
Hope.
79
The fact no other SLOCs can serve as an alternative to the Strait of
Hormuz highlights the need for stability in the Persian Gulf.
80
Insurance
premiums for vessels passing through the region will increase considerably in
case of contingencies. As indicated earlier, vessels passing choke points that are
HCss report 49
designated as enhanced-risk areas by insurance companies are levied an
additional surcharge of up to 0.10% of the total value of their cargo (while the
baseline premium imposed on seaborne freight is 0.05%).
81
In exceptional
circumstances, this surcharge may even reach 2.0%. Even though such
additional premiums are expensive, their total contribution to the extra costs
of oil transportation is relatively small. For example, a relatively expensive
war-risk premium of 2.0% of the market value of the vessel for seven days of
coverage would require a tanker worth USD 100 million to pay USD two million
dollars in additional premium costs. When distributed over the two million
barrels of oil, a tanker can transport, this amounts to an increase of one dollar
in the price per barrel.
82
This means that the transportation of oil is likely to
continue despite these steep premiums, as long as there is no full-blown
maritime conflict that paralyzes all SLOCs.
83
Corporations that rely on the just-in-time principle for logistics are more
vulnerable to risks that affect the chain. Across the board, companies in the
Netherlands do not invest heavily in supply-chain risk management. The
machine industry and the electric appliances and components industry are
characterized by a high degree of vulnerability relative to other industries in
the Netherlands, and they are therefore vulnerable to supply disruption
originating from the Indian Ocean.
84
Taken together, these industries comprise
55% of the total gross added value that Dutch industries contribute to the GDP
(eight percent of the total contribution of fourteen percent that industries
make to the overall GDP),
85
highlighting the need to pay significantly more
attention to supply-chain risk management.
Overall, the emergence of China and India as major economic players and the
Indian Oceans emergence as a key transit region and an end destination for
world trade are likely to affect the size and nature of global trade volumes. In
addition to affecting the Dutch economy as a whole, this is likely to have major
implications for the type of goods that the port of Rotterdam will process, a
topic that merits further examination.
As a general recommendation, we propose examining the implications derived
from the rapidly changing situation in the Indian Ocean on the five vital
interests of the Netherlands (ecological security, economic security, territorial
security, physical security, and socio-political stability), as outlined in the
50
government-wide Dutch National Security Strategy.
86
This examination should
be followed by an assessment of the proper policy response of the Dutch
government as a whole within the seven strategic functions of the Dutch
Ministry of Defense (see Figure 5).

FIGurE 5: sEVEN sTrATEGIC FuNCTIONs, As DEFINED By THE NETHErLANDs MINIsTry
OF DEFENsE
In general, it has become clear that events transpiring in the Indian Ocean affect
Dutch national security, well-being, and business continuity; the region
therefore merits further attention and closer scrutiny in the years to come.
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HCss report 51
APPENDI CEs
Appendices
5.1 Appendix A Blue, Green, and Brown-Water navy
capabilities
The literature contains no clear definitions of what is understood by the terms
blue, green and brown-water navies. The defining characteristic of a blue-water
navy is the capability to be an expeditionary navy. It is capable of running
missions worldwide without direct support from the homeland because its fleets
are relatively self-sufficient. A blue-water navy can protect itself from airborne,
surface, and sub-surface threats. The most important assets of a blue-water navy
are its own logistical support mechanisms and its unique ability to protect its
logistic chain from external threats. The core instruments of a blue-water navy
are aircraft carriers, destroyers, and amphibious landing platforms, which are
protected by submarines and frigates. It has its own supply ships (which are
larger than 12,000 tons), and it can use them to secure access to energy and
supply goods for extended periods. It is capable of projecting sea-control and
sea-denial capabilities by exploiting the full spectrum of maritime capabilities,
including the air domain. For power projection ashore, it also relies on
hydrographic systems and mine placing, in addition to mine detection and
countering capabilities. A blue-water navy depends heavily on the capability to
establish and exploit maritime situational awareness
87
by means of long-range
aircraft (manned and/or unmanned).
A green-water navy is largely a coastal or coast guard navy that operates within
the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 200 nautical miles (or 370 km). It is not
intended for operating long-distance operations, although it is capable of
conducting hit-and-run operations and exercising sea-denial capabilities within
coastal waters. It also has limited sea-control capabilities. Instruments deployed
by a green-water navy include frigates, corvettes, and submarines that can be
supported by land-based attack helicopters and by coastal defense artillery and
missiles. The US Navy further differentiates between a green-water navy and a
52
APPENDI CEs
brown-water navy, although most other countries do not use these distinctions.
A brown-water navy is a river-based navy that is capable of carrying out
patrolling operations in river and coastal environments. By its very nature, a
brown-water navy serves the purpose of defending and providing security on
indigenous estuaries (e.g., the Brazilian Navy Amazon river patrol). Navies that
are intended to project power on foreign river estuaries as part of expeditionary
operations are considered as part of an amphibious blue-water navy.
States with typical blue-water navies include the US, France, Britain, Russia, the
Netherlands, and Japan.
88
Indias maritime vision Freedom to use the Seas indicates
that this country also aims to achieve blue-water capabilities by 2013.
89
Similarly,
South Korea is expected to transform its green-water navy into a blue-water navy
by 2020 by adding a strategic mobile fleet consisting of destroyers, submarines,
and an anti-submarine aircraft.
90
China also aspires to gain blue-water
capabilities, and it is expected to have a fully capable blue-water navy by the mid-
21
st
century. It is working to achieve a green-water navy in the nearer future.
91

Interestingly, although recent Chinese acquisitions have enhanced its coastal
sea-denial capabilities, they do not yet have the sea-control capabilities
associated with a blue-water navy.
92
The PLA Navy is substantially contributing
to anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden, which is seen by most naval
strategists as a clear sign of its expeditionary sea-control aspirations.

HCss report 53
APPENDI CEs
5.2 Appendix B Maritime expenditures Projections

in BillionS oF DollArS 2009-2010 2010-2011 2011-2012 2012-2013 2013-2014
inDiA
GDP [1, 2] 1242,64 1339,49 1449,17 1583,43 1740,41
DEFENsE [3] 29,95 32,39 35,04 38,29 42,08
DEFENsE BuDGET % GDP 2,41% 2,42% 2,42% 2,42% 2,42%
NAVy [3] 2,047 2,051 - - -
NAVy - FuTurE TrEND - - 2,219 2,425 2,665
NAVy As % OF GDP 0,16% 0,15% 0,15% 0,15% 0,15%
NAVy As % OF DEFENsE BuDGET 6,83% 6,33% 6,33% 6,33% 6,33%
US
GDP [1,4] 14266,20 14704,21 15326,88 16008,51 16729,38
DEFENsE [5] 589 533 549,09 573,51 599,34
NAVy [6] 156,21 156,32 - - -
NAVy - FuTurE TrEND [6] - - 160,69 163,1 168,5
NAVy As % OF GDP 1,09% 1,06% 1,05% 1,02% 1,01%
cHinA
GDP [1, 7] 4757,74 5263,33 5843,57 6524,23 7287,76
DEFENsE [8] 70 77,95 86,54 96,62 107,93
NAVy 10,50 11,69 - - -
NAVy - FuTurE TrEND - - 12,98 14,49 16,19
NAVy As % OF GDP 0,22% 0,22% 0,22% 0,22% 0,22%
TABLE 2: CurrENT AND PrOJECTED MArITIME ExPENDITurEs OF INDIA, CHINA,
AND THE us
54
APPENDI CEs
in BillionS oF DollArS 2014-2015 2020-2021 2025-2026 2028-2029 2030-2031
inDiA
GDP [1, 2] 1908,3 2398,82 3210,16 3823,35 4295,92
DEFENsE [3] 46,1 58,01 77,62 165,57 103,88
DEFENsE BuDGET % GDP 2,42% 2,42% 2,42% - 2,42%
NAVy [3] - - - - -
NAVy - FuTurE TrEND 2,92 3,67 4,91 5,84 6,57
NAVy As % OF GDP 0,15% 0,15% 0,15% 0,15% 0,15%
NAVy As % OF DEFENsE BuDGET 6,33% 6,32% 6,32% - 6,32%
US
GDP [1,4] 17419,3 16392,71 17354,00 18507,00 19310,00
DEFENsE [5] 624,0 575,00 560,00 605,00 -
DEFENsE BuDGET % GDP 3,58% 3,51% 3,23% 3,27% -
NAVy [6] - - - - -
NAVy - FuTurE TrEND [6] 170 157,56 153,45 165,78 -
NAVy As % OF GDP 0,98% 0,96% 0,88% 0,90% -
NAVy As % OF DEFENsE BuDGET 27,40% 27,40% 27,40% 27,40% -
cHinA
GDP [1, 7] 8283,3 8252,34 8946,57 9948,00 10677,15
DEFENsE [8] 122,6 122,22 132,50 147,33 158,13
NAVy - - - - -
NAVy - FuTurE TrEND 18,4 18,33 19,87 22,09 23,71
NAVy As % OF GDP 0,22% 0,22% 0,22% 0,22% 0,22%
TABLE 2: CurrENT AND PrOJECTED MArITIME ExPENDITurEs OF INDIA, CHINA, AND THE us
continUeD
HCss report 55
APPENDI CEs
Long-term projections are often misguided, and they often prove completely off-
target. The above table should therefore be taken only as an illustration of how
the maritime expenditures of India, the US, and China may develop from current
levels, assuming that absolute defense budgets grow in accordance with
projected economic/GDP growth rates (unless otherwise indicated by the state in
question) and that naval expenditures (as a percentage of total defense spending)
are held constant.
Sources:
1. IMF Country database. GDP projections in current prices 2010-2014,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=2005&ey=2014&s
csm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=924%2C534%2C111&s=NGDP_rPCH%2CNGDPD
%2CNGDPDPC&grp=0&a=&pr1.x=36&pr1.y=18.
2. For India, beyond 2015 a growth rate of 6% per annum is assumed, based on a report from
Goldman sachs:
syed Amin Jafri, India to be 3rd largest economy by 2020: Pant, rediff India Abroad, January
7, 2004, http://www.rediff.com/money/2004/jan/07economy.htm.
3. Ministry of Finance, India expenditure budget 2010-2011. Total Expenditure of ministries and
Departments, http://indiabudget.nic.in/ub2010-11/eb/stat02.pdf; Ministry of Finance, India
expenditure budget 2010-2011. Notes on Demand for Grants. Defense services Navy, http://
indiabudget.nic.in/ub2010-11/eb/sbe23.pdf.
4. GDP growth projections beyond 2014 in 2000 dollars, based on background data from:
http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=10297; Congressional Budget Offce (CBO), The Long-term
Budget Outlook, June 2009, http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/102xx/doc10297/06-25-LTBO.pdf
(Original document).
5. Defense expenditure 2009-2011 based on:
Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Defense Budget for Fiscal year 2011. Financial
summary Tables, February 2010, http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2011/fy2011_
summary_tables_whole.pdf.
Defense expenditure in 2020 and 2028 based on:
us government. Congressional Budget Offce (CBO), Long term implications of the Fiscal year
2010 defense budget, January 2010, www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/108xx/doc10852/01-25-FyDP.pdf, p.
24.
Defense expenditure 2025 based on:
J. Michael Gilmore, The 2009 Future years Defense Program: Implications and Alternatives,
February 4, 2009, http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/99xx/doc9972/02-04-Long-Term_Defense_
Testimony.pdf, Table 1, p. 23.
6. Navy expenditure 2009-2014 based on:
56
APPENDI CEs
Offce of Budget Department of the Navy, Highlight of the Department of the Navy Fy2011
Budget, February 2010, http://www.fnance.hq.navy.mil/FMB/11pres/Highlights_book.pdf,
Table 1, p. 1-13.
7. GDP projections based on an annual growth rate of 4,6% in 2010-2020 and 3,6% in 2020-2030.
OECD, Chinese Economic Performance in the Long run: The Outlook for the Next Quarter
Century,
http://www.oecd.org/document/49/0,3343,en_2649_33731_40278961_1_1_1_1,00.html.
8. Defense expenditure 2009 based on:
Chinas defense budget to grow 14.9% in 2009. China Daily, March 4, 2009, http://www.
chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-03/04/content_7535244.htm.
Defense expenditure 2010 based on:
China says defense spending rise slows to 7.5 percent. reuters, March 4, 2010,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idusTrE6230A720100304.
HCss report 57
APPENDI CEs
5.3 Appendix c Strategic categories of Maritime Power
Protection of SLOCs refers to defensive capabilities aimed at protecting the
uninterrupted flow of resources and trade, using primarily surface ships and
smaller submarines augmented by aerial vehicles (manned or unmanned).
Ideally, the protection of SLOCs depends on effective cooperation with other
nations that share similar interests. A state that focuses on the protection of
SLOCs will thrive in multilateral, cooperative contexts. Principal surface
combatants are the capability of choice for SLOC protection, because of their
endurance, presence, helicopter-carrying capability, and the ability to
interrogate small and large surface craft.
Maritime dominance refers to the ability to achieve sea control and, more
precisely, the ability to control specific sea areas or maritime choke points
(e.g., the Strait of Hormuz) for limited periods. Sea control is most effectively
maintained by principle surface combatants, based on surveillance by maritime
aircraft (manned or unmanned). It also includes sea denial, which is the ability
to deny an opponent the unrestricted use of specific sea areas or maritime
choke points. Sea denial is most effectively executed by means of submarines
(conventional or nuclear), for the mere unconfirmed presence of a submarine
can force an opponent to adjust its behavior. Sea control and sea denial are
complementary strategic maritime functions. Maritime dominance is relevant
in a confrontational, multi-polar context in which a states interests must be
defended against other states or non-state actors.
Power projection refers to the ability to influence or manage any situation on
land or in coastal areas using sea-based or airborne expeditionary forces. It is
enforced either by carrier battle groups with extensive kinetic weaponry, (e.g.,
cruise missiles or bombers) or by amphibious forces, special forces, and landing
craft. Power-projection capabilities enable a state to conduct unilateral or
multilateral operations in conflict or disaster-stricken regions, and its position is
strengthened in confrontational multi-polar or fragmented geopolitical contexts.
Sea-based nuclear second-strike capability refers to the ability to survive a
nuclear strike and retaliate in kind using a sea-launched nuclear weapon. These
weapons are typically delivered by ballistic missiles launched from nuclear-
powered submarines, which are very difficult to trace, making it nearly
impossible for opponents to destroy them. The possession of a sea-based nuclear
58
APPENDI CEs
second-strike capability has a powerful deterrent effect in cooperative or
confrontational bi-polar and multi-polar contexts.
Space dominance refers to the ability to use space for purposes of surveillance,
intelligence, and communications using satellites. Space-faring capabilities
are indicative of a states level of technological advancement; they are also an
indispensable element in the ability to wage modern war (including maritime
war), war, and they provide states with long-range ballistic missile capability.
Hydrographic capability refers to the ability to map coastal and ocean waters
independently in order to guarantee maritime safety. It is especially important in
times of conflict in which adversaries are not willing to share their hydrographic
and oceanographic information or in which no reliable information on coastal
and river areas is available. Hydrographic capability is also indispensible in
establishing incontestable data on the limits of the Exclusive Economical Zone
in the context of the UN Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS).
HCss report 59
APPENDI CEs
5.4 Appendix D Maritime Build-up

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TABLE 3: COMPArIsON OF NATIONAL MArITIME CAPABILITIEs (COMBINED) ALONG FIVE
sTrATEGIC CATEGOrIEs.
60
APPENDI CEs
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sTrATEGIC CATEGOrIEs. continUeD
HCss report 61
APPENDI CEs
sTrATEGIC CATEGOrIEs. continUeD
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62
APPENDI CEs
ABBreviAtionS
SSBn Ballistic Missile Submarine Nuclear-powered
SSn Nuclear (-powered) Attack Submarine
SS (K) Patrol Submarine (with ASW capability)
SSG Diesel Submarine with non-ballistic missile
SSAi Air-Independent Propulsion Submarine
FF (G) Frigate (with guided missile)
cG Cruiser (with guided missile)
DD(G) Destroyer (with guided missile)
AK Cargo ship
Ao Tanker (all categories)
lPD Landing Platform Dock (landingships)
lc Landing Craft
lS Landing Ship
Ml Minelayer
MH Mine Countermeasures: Minehunter
MS Mine Countermeasures: Minesweeper
cvn Aircraft Carrier (nuclear propulsion)
SrBM Short Range Ballistic Missile
irBM Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
icBM Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile
lAcM Land Attack Cruise Missile
Armed Attack & Fighter Aircraft
ASW With anti-submarine capability
UAv Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
Slc Satellite Launch Capability
leo Low Earth Orbit
Meo Medium Earth Orbit
Geo Geostationary Orbit
eo Elliptical Orbit
AGor Oceanographic Research Vessel
AGHr Hydographic Survey Vessel
TABLE 4: ABBrEVIATIONs FOr (MArITIME) CAPABILITIEs. (sOurCE: MILITAry BALANCE
2009 AND uCs DATABAsE)
93
HCss report 63
APPENDI CEs
This table shows maritime strategic capabilities along five categories: SLOC
protection, maritime dominance (sea control and sea denial), power projection,
sea-based nuclear second-strike capability, and space dominance. In order to
determine which country currently has dominant capabilities along these
categories, we used in-house subject-matter expert judgment to define a list of
maritime assets for each category. (Note that, for the sake of space, the identified
list of assets has been kept limited, and it might not reflect the total range of
available assets.) Drawing on data provided by the Military Balance 2009 and the
UCS database, we calculated the number of maritime assets held by each country
according to the five strategic categories (listed in the column total). This
number provides a rough illustration of the current distribution of maritime
power for the different capabilities. The illustration is rough, as the table assigns
equal numerical values to maritime assets with different uses and utilities, and
these values do not always correspond to their weight in determining actual
maritime capabilities. The column printed in blue provides a number for the
selected capability that our in-house subject-matter experts considered most
relevant in that maritime domain.
Several caveats that have already been mentioned in the main text of this report
are worth repeating. In general, it is important to note that sheer numbers do not
reflect the overall balance of power for two reasons. First, simply adding up
numbers does not adequately capture overall maritime strength, due to
incommensurable differences in capabilities and other factors that determine
strength (e.g., skill, morale, and perhaps even luck).
94
Second, these numbers
refer to the entire set of maritime capabilities of a state, rather than the
capabilities that are deployed in the Indian Ocean region. Nonetheless, not all
states deploy their capabilities in the Indian Ocean region. For example, while
nearly the entire maritime capability of India is deployed in the Indian Ocean
Region, the US Navy maintains a global presence across the seven world oceans
in order to maintain the Pax Americana, and the Chinese Navy is able to employ
only a limited number of assets in the region for prolonged periods. In case of
conflict, the US Navy would have to redeploy one of its fleets to the Indian Ocean
in order to enhance its regular naval presence (the 5
th
Fleet). It would probably
redeploy its 7
th
Fleet, which is normally based in the Pacific Ocean. This process
would take days, if not weeks, thereby providing other powers with a floating
window of opportunity in which they could gain a temporary military advantage.
It would also create a capability gap in the Pacific Ocean. Despite these cautions,
64
APPENDI CEs
this comparison of capabilities does provide an indication of the maritime
capabilities possessed by these three powers.
Taking the above-mentioned caveats into account, the table compares relative
maritime strengths based on a comparison of all capabilities within a certain
category, as well as a selected capability that is considered most relevant. As with
every selection, our choices may invite debate (which they indeed intend to do),
but they are certainly not arbitrary. They are informed by subject-matter
expertise and supported by a transparent line of reasoning. With this important
caveat in mind, this annex is especially important, as it provides detailed
information on the specific maritime assets along the five strategic categories.
HCss report 65
APPENDI CEs
5.5 Appendix e (Military) Maritime Facilities in the indian
ocean

The figures below present an overview of strategic foothold bases in the Indian
Ocean that are linked to the US, India, and China. The military facilities in each
base are also described, if information was available. The facilities were divided
into five types, which are further explained in the text below.
Intelligence-Gathering Stations are land-based facilities that are used by
military intelligence services to increase situational awareness and gather
regional intelligence, drawing on surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities.
Intelligence gathering at sea relies on manned and unmanned platforms
(submarines and unmanned aerial vehicles) with sensors for signal intelligence
(SIGINT) and radar signals (ELINT).
Refueling Stations are the primary means of the strategic storage of oil stocks.
Refueling stations are vital to sustaining the expeditionary missions of blue-
water navies.
Rearmament Stations offer states the capacity to resupply vessels on
expeditionary missions. They enable navies to project power in the higher end
of the conflict spectrum.
Repair Facilities provide states with the capacity for maintenance, repairs, and
role change (e.g., from mine laying to mine sweeping). They enhance the ability
of naval vessels to conduct expeditionary operations, even in combat situations.
(Regional) Headquarters serve as the forward-deployed operational command
centers of expeditionary forces. In most cases, naval operational command is
exercised from large surface combatants (e.g., carriers or landing craft). Key
elements in the exercise of effective expeditionary command include satellite
bandwidth and secure lines of communication. Land-based coalition forces need
headquarters only in order to accommodate large-scale naval operations of
longer duration (e.g., CTF 150 and 151 in the Arabian Basin)
Given that Chinas intentions in the Indian Ocean are subject to fierce debate, an
overview of the ports and bases that are financed by the Chinese government is
shown in Table 7. This list has been compiled in order to present the maritime
presence of the three key states in the Indian Ocean maritime build-up. The data
are drawn primarily from two articles featured in Contemporary South Asia and
Strategic Analysis, complemented by information from a number of databases
and articles, which are listed below as well.
66
APPENDI CEs
TABLE 6: (MILITAry) MArITIME BAsEs IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
coUntrY locAtion StAtUS USe MilitArY
FAcilitieS*
UniteD
StAteS
Diego Garcia
(British IO Territory)
Operational Military A,B,C,D
Changi Naval Base,
(Singapore)
Operational Military B,D
Kochi (India) Operational Military D
Manama (Bahrain) Operational Military B,C,D,E
inDiA Kochi Operational Military A,B,C,D, & E
Goa Operational Military C & D
Karwar Operational Miltary B, C & D
Visakhapatnam Operational Military/civilian C & E
Mumbai Operational Military/civilian A,B,C,D, & E
Rambilli Mandal Expected Military
Lakshadweep Islands Operational Military C
Port Blair
(N&A Islands)
Operational Military/civilian A, C, E
Maldives Expected Military A
Jaffna Peninsula
(Sri Lanka)
Expected Military C
Trencomalee
(Sri Lanka)
Operational Civilian B,C,D
Madagascar
(Northern tip)
Operational Military A
Mauritius Operational Military A
Seychelles Operational Military A
cHinA Marao Island
(Maldives)
Operational Military A
Seychelles Expected Military A,B,C,D
Great Coco Island
(Myanmar)
Operational Military A,B,
*Types of military facilities:
A. Intelligence Gathering Station
B. Refueling Station
C. Rearmament Station
D. Repair Facility
E. Headquarters
HCss report 67
APPENDI CEs
TABLE 6: (MILITAry) MArITIME BAsEs IN THE INDIAN OCEAN continUeD
coUntrY locAtion DetAileD FAcilitieS
UniteD
StAteS
Diego Garcia
Naval base, submarine base, support facilities
space surveillance network, NASA Space
Shuttle landing site, possible US nuclear weap-
on hub
Changi Naval Base,
(Singapore)
Maintenance, logistic support facility and train-
ing refueling, repair facilities
Kochi (India) Base of mobile ship repair unit
Manama (Bahrain) HQ fleet, naval base, mine counter-measures,
facilities & medical, munition, fuel mobility,
support facilities, airbase
inDiA Kochi Monitoring station , naval base, repair dry dock,
naval aircraft yard, refueling station
Goa Naval base, repair dry dockyard, refit and mod-
ernization of ships and submarines
Karwar Naval base
Visakhapatnam Submarines HQ, naval hospital
Mumbai Monitoring station, naval base, missile boat HQ,
submarine base, naval hospital
Rambilli Mandal -
Lakshadweep Islands Patrol craft base
Port Blair
(N&A Islands)
Advance base, support facility, naval hospital
Maldives -
Jaffna Peninsula
(Sri Lanka)
-
Trencomalee
(Sri Lanka)
Container port
Madagascar
(Northern tip)
Monitoring station
Mauritius Monitoring station
Seychelles Monitoring station
cHinA Marao Island
(Maldives)
Monitoring station
Seychelles -
Great Coco Island
(Myanmar)
Monitoring station
D. Repair Facility
E. Headquarters
68
APPENDI CEs
coUntrY locAtion FUtUre cAPABilitY
UniteD
StAteS
Diego Garcia
Composite anti terrorism base, increased
availability of precision-strike weapons,
enhanced regional surveillance capabilities,
augmented operational flexibility to host
short- and long-range aircraft.
Changi Naval Base,
(Singapore)
Kochi (India)
Manama (Bahrain) 15 extra berths, cargo and container facilities
inDiA Kochi Base for UAVs, anti submarine capabilities
Goa
Karwar Naval air base
Visakhapatnam
Mumbai
Rambilli Mandal Naval base anti aircraft, anti submarines
Lakshadweep Islands Base for UAVs
Port Blair
(N&A Islands)
Base for UAVs Submarine base
Maldives Military reconnaissance center
Jaffna Peninsula
(Sri Lanka)
Naval airbase
Trencomalee
(Sri Lanka)
Naval base, refueling station, repair docks
Madagascar
(Northern tip)
Mauritius
Seychelles
cHinA Marao Island
(Maldives)
Naval base, submarine base, permanent
hydrographic survey infrastructure
Seychelles Naval base , monitoring station
Great Coco Island
(Myanmar)
HCss report 69
APPENDI CEs
coUntrY locAtion coMMent SoUrceS
UniteD
StAteS
Diego Garcia
1.11.
Changi Naval Base,
(Singapore)
Use of Singapore facilities allowed under
the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU, 1990)
5.6.
Kochi (India) 1.
Manama (Bahrain) Might be used for hosting of US troops in case of
Asia-US confrontation, as during Enduring
Freedom
7.8.9.10.
inDiA Kochi Southern Naval Command 1.4.
Goa 1.4.
Karwar 1.
Visakhapatnam Eastern Naval Command 4.
Mumbai Western Naval Command 4.
Rambilli Mandal 1.
Lakshadweep Islands 3.4.
Port Blair
(N&A Islands)
Far Eastern Naval Command Base, capable of
launching cruise missiles equipped with nuclear
warheads
1.3.4.
Maldives Using Terrestrial Experimental Satellite 1.
Jaffna Peninsula
(Sri Lanka)
Contract of cooperation between IND &
SL for maritime surveillance
1.
Trencomalee
(Sri Lanka)
Contract with IND and US for civil use
Might be used for US/IND warships in future
1.2.
Madagascar
(Northern tip)
1.
Mauritius 1.
Seychelles 1.
cHinA Marao Island
(Maldives)
3.4.
Seychelles Anti piracy monitoring station 3.
Great Coco Island
(Myanmar)
1.2.
70
APPENDI CEs
TABLE 6: CHINAs INVEsTMENTs ABrOAD (WITH THE POTENTIAL OF BEING usED By
CHINEsE NAVAL VEssELs)
coUntrY locAtion StAtUS USe MilitArY
FAcilitieS*
DetAileD
FAcilitieS
tYPeS oF
SHiPS
PAKiStAn Gwadar Operational Mostly
civilian but
also
military
A,B,C,D Deep water port,
Signals
Intelligence
(SIGINT) facility
No data
available
BAnGlADeSH Chittagong Operational Military/
civilian
B,D,C Container port,
largest navy base,
logistics
bunkering
facilities
Small and
medium
warships
MYAnMAr Ramree
Island
(kyaukpyu)
Operational Military A,B,C,D Naval base,
monitoring
station, refueling
station
No data
available
Hainggyi
Island
Operational Military A,B Naval base,
monitoring
station
No data
available
Thilawa Operational Civilian/
military
capabilities
A, D Monitoring
station, shipyard
Ships
>10.000 ton
deadweight
(Myanmar
has only few)
Zadetkyi
Kyun Island
Operational Military A, B Naval
base,maritime
surveillance radar
Sri lAnKA Hambantota Expected Civilian/
military
capabilities
B,C,D - Military
vessels,
possibly
nuclear
submarines
D. Repair Facility
E. Headquarters
HCss report 71
APPENDI CEs
TABLE 7: CHINAs INVEsTMENTs ABrOAD (WITH THE POTENTIAL OF BEING usED By
CHINEsE NAVAL VEssELs) continUeD
coUntrY locAtion FUtUre
cAPABilitY
FinAnceD
BY
SiZe
inveSt-
MentS
coMMent SoUrceS
PAKiStAn Gwadar Monitor and
basing
capabilities
for PLAN (repair
yards, weapon
equipment
stores), Refueling
station
China usd 1
billion
1.2.12.
BAnGlADeSH Chittagong Jetty for mooring
small warships
China
(military)/
South Korea
(civil)
usd 8
billion
Part of
Bangladesh-
China Defense
Cooperation
Agreement
2.
MYAnMAr Ramree
Island
(kyaukpyu)
China No data
available
1.
Hainggyi
Island
China No data
available
Capable of
accomodating
much larger
ships than
those in
Myanmars
Navy
1.
Thilawa China Has a shipyard
for more big
warships
1.
Zadetkyi
Kyun Island
China usd 11
million
2.
Sri lAnKA Hambantota Deep-water port,
rearmament and
bunkering
facilities,
refueling station,
repair yard, oil
tank farm
China usd 1
billion
2.12.
72
APPENDI CEs
Sources:
1. D. L. Berlin, The Great Base race in the Indian Ocean Littoral: Confict Prevention or
stimulation?, Contemporary south Asia 13, no. 3 (2004): 239-255.
2. G. s. Khurana, Chinas string of Pearls in the Indian Ocean and Its security Implications,
strategic Analysis 32, no. 1 (2008): 1-39.
3. J. Joseph, Navy to use uAVs to spy on sea-Lanes, rediff India Abroad, January 31, 2003,
http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/jan/31uav.htm.
4. Global security, Indian Naval Bases, Global security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/
world/india/ports.htm.
5. Ibid.
6. Bureau of East Asian and Pacifc Affairs, Background Note: singapore, u.s. Department of
state, April 1, 2010, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2798.htm.
7. Bureau of East Asian and Pacifc Affairs, Background Note: Bahrain, u.s. Department of
state, January 29, 2010, Bureau of East Asian and Pacifc Affairs.
8. Global security, Bahrain Facilities, Global security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/
facility/bahrain.htm.
9. M. singh, us to Expand Naval Bases, Gulf Daily News, June 8, 2009, http://www.gulf-daily-
news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=252716.
10. K. Jones, us Navy to Expand Military Presence at Mina salman, Meed: Middle East Business
Intelligence, June 5, 2009, http://www.meed.com/sectors/industry/us-navy-to-expand-
military-presence-at-mina-salman/2033168.article.
11. International Institute for strategic studies (2009). Maritime Balance 2009: The Annual
Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence.
12. B. raman, Hambantota & Gwadar - An update, south Asia Analysis Group Paper no 3248.
(2009).
HCss report 73
APPENDI CEs
5.6 Appendix F current and Future Maritime capabilities
of France, the UK, Australia, and Japan in the indian ocean
The United Nations Security Council asked member states to take action to
prevent acts of piracy near the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden by
dispatching naval ships and military aircraftz. Canada, Denmark, France, India,
Netherlands, Russia, Spain, the United Kingdom (UK), and the US, as well as
regional and international organizations responded, and they are engaged in
counter-piracy operations off the Somalia coast following resolutions 1814 (2008),
1816 (2008) and 1838 (2008).
95
France
France has a contingent in the Indian Ocean. This contingent contributes to
peacekeeping and stabilization efforts in the Indian Ocean, as well as to maritime
security, humanitarian operations, and defense diplomacy. The contingent
comprises 750 Army and 430 Navy personnel. The ALINDIEN (lAmiral
commandant les forces maritimes franaises de locan Indien) has three command
facilities: one based in Reunion Island, another in Djibouti, and a third that is
permanently based on a command ship. France also has a base on the Island of
Mayotte, between Madagascar and Mozambique.
The naval station in Reunion Island has two P400 patrol boats, an Austral patrol
boat, a maritime affairs patrol, one Batral ferry, a Gendarmerie maritime patrol,
and a detachment of fusiliers. ALINDIEN has a command and resupply boat
(with its own headquarters and a workforce of 35 people), two surveillance
frigates based in Reunion Island, a marine commando unit, and a maritime
surveillance plane in Djibouti.
In Mayotte, there is a marine detachment with a servitude high-speed motorboat,
a boat for transporting material, and a high-speed motorboat for coastal
maritime surveillance. There are 1,000 SMA and 1,150 Gendarmerie forces in
Reunion Island and Mayotte, with an Alouette III and a high-speed motorboat.
The Air Force includes 280 personnel in Reunion Island, including two Transall
and two Fennec units. In addition, France often deploys other means to the
Indian Ocean, including a carrier group or a force projection group around a
projection and command ship.
96
74
APPENDI CEs
France is planning to expand its presence in the Persian Gulf, as the region is
becoming more important to the European economy. France plans to intensify
its involvement in this region with the new base in Abu Dhabi.
97

UK
The UK has a base on the island Diego Garcia within British Indian Ocean
Territory, in the middle of the Indian Ocean. In 1971, the US and the UK signed
a lease agreement that allows the US to use the island.
98
Most of the facilities on
the island are therefore operated by the US Air Force, while the UK continues
to have access to the naval and air facilities. The installation has approximately
40 permanently stationed personnel, but no permanently deployed British
military units.
99
In its White Paper, the UK explains that it wants to maintain a
presence in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf and to contribute to international
efforts to protect vital sea lanes and choke points against a range of threats,
from terrorism to piracy and potential state-sponsored disruption.
100
The UK naval forces are currently protecting only the UK waters and strategic
assets (e.g., ports). The UK is aware of the importance of the timely arrival of
goods from overseas trade and thus of the necessity of protecting SLOCs and
choke points beyond UK waters. The UK is therefore considering the possibility
of deploying the forces of the Royal Navy to protect and support British and
wider international trade infrastructure and interests (e.g., in the Indian Ocean
region).
101
Australia
Australia intends to develop its naval capabilities in order to meet the new
challenges of its strategic environment and to avert a deterioration of its naval
strength. Australias naval force currently consists of four Adelaide class-guided
missile frigates, eight ANZAC (Australian and New Zealand Army Corps)
frigates, and six Collins class patrol submarines. Australia plans to upgrade its
naval force. The six Collins class submarines will be replaced by twelve new
submarines within the next fifteen to twenty years. The new submarines will
be capable of anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare, as well as strategic strike.
The ANZAC frigates will also be replaced, and three Air Warfare Destroyers will
be acquired. These vessels will be equipped with Aegis air-defense systems,
which will extend the range of the navy and make it possible to assume long-
distance escort duties and air-defense tasks. Australia is also planning to acquire
24 new naval combat helicopters with advanced Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW)
HCss report 75
APPENDI CEs
abilities; 46 MRH-90 troop-carrying helicopters (which the Army can use as
well); twenty offshore combatant vessels, and a strategic sealift ship to move
stores, equipment, and personnel.
102
Despite these plans, Australia probably lacks the ability to reach its major
strategic objectives. To improve maritime security in the northern region,
Australia would need at least five Air Warfare Destroyers and vessels that are
larger and more capable than the smaller frigates are, thereby extending its
strategic reach farther into East Asia and the Indian Ocean. Critics have also
raised doubts concerning the feasibility of funding the entire program
adequately until 2030. Furthermore, recruitment problems prevent Australia
from utilizing its naval capabilities completely. In 2008, the resignation rate
among its force of 12,000 recruits was eleven percent. Because of personnel
shortages, Australia could only put three of its six Collins class submarines
to sea at any one time.
103
Japan
Japan has taken the initiative to adopt measures intended to protect public safety
and maintain order at sea. This is of great importance to Japan, a maritime nation
that relies heavily on maritime transport. Approximately 2,000 Japan-related
ships pass through the Gulf of Aden and the coast of Somalia each year. This area
is very important for Japan, as it constitutes a shipping route that connects
Europe and the Middle East to East Asia. Since March 2009, two Japanese escort
ships started escorting other ships. Japan has also two P-3C aircraft for
conducting surveillance activities and collecting information.
104
76
APPENDI CEs
5.7 Appendix G emerging Maritime technologies
Drawing on a Royal Netherlands Navy study on future technologies,
105
a list of
emerging technologies was selected for further analysis. These technologies are
listed in the table below, followed by a very brief analysis of some of the potential
security implications of these emerging technologies.
TABLE 8: EMErGING MArITIME TECHNOLOGIEs

relevAnt
SHort terM
relevAnt
lonG terM
EnErgy TEchnology
Nuclear Fusion X
Bio fuels
Hydrogen economy X
Nano wire battery X
Ultra capacitors X
Wireless energy transfer X
TransporTaTion TEchnology
Electric cars X
Personal rapid transit X
Personal aircraft X
Precooled jet engines X
Scramjets X
Non-rocket space launch X
informaTion TEchnology
Artificial Intelligence X
4G cellular communication X
Machine translation X
Machine vision X
Machine augmented cognition X
Semantic Web X
GP Computing on Graphic PU X
Solid state drive X
HCss report 77
APPENDI CEs
relevAnt
SHort terM
relevAnt
lonG terM
3D optical data storage X
Spintronics X
Photonic computing X
Quantum computing X
Quantum cryptography X
Wireless communication X
Screenless display X
3D Display X
Organic light emitting diode X
Interferometric modulator display X
Laser display X
Phased array optics X
Holography X
Memristor processors X
3D printing X
Thermal copper pillar bump X
Immersive virtual reality X
humanoid TEchnology
Genetic engineering X
Synthetic biology X
Artificial photosynthesis X
Anti-aging drugs X
Cryoprotectant X
Hibernation
Stem-cell treatments
Personalized medicine X
Body implants X
In vitro meat X
Regenerative medicine X
roboTics
Swarm robotics X
Nanorobotics X
Powered Exoskeleton x
TABLE 8: EMErGING MArITIME TECHNOLOGIEs continUeD
78
APPENDI CEs
relevAnt
SHort terM
relevAnt
lonG terM
Hi MEMS X
maTErial sciEncE
High temp superconductivity X
High temp superfluidity X
Carbon nanotubes X
Metamaterials X
Self-healing materials X
Programmable matter X
Quantum dots X
oThEr TEchnologiEs
Led lamp X
Force field X
TABLE 8: EMErGING MArITIME TECHNOLOGIEs continUeD
HCss report 79
APPENDI CEs
relevance to Maritime Power Balance
Implications
Nuclear fusion/nano-wire battery/wireless energy transfer: Expeditionary
maritime power will no longer be the prerogative of great powers that have
maritime facilities in the region at their disposal, as the seemingly unlimited
supply of energy drastically enhances the staying power of naval forces. This may
upset the maritime balance of power and open the entire Indian Ocean arena to
both great and small powers.
Non-rocket space launch: Situational awareness (SA) is indispensable in the
conduct of contemporary and future conflict. The opening of space to state and
non-state actors will provide each of these actors with unprecedented SA,
thereby changing the nature of conflict.
Genetic engineering/Synthetic biology/Programmable matter/Hi MEMS:
Gigantic sea-animals (e.g., octopuses) could be re-engineered, remotely
controlled, and used as agents of war (e.g., through blockades of ports) or for
underwater detection.
Electric cars, Personal rapid transit, and wireless energy transfer: This could
mark the end of the carbon-fuel era, thereby decreasing reliance on SLOCs and
possibly counterbalancing it with increased dependence on rare earth metals and
elements.
Phased array optics: If used in a laser-based kinetic-power application, phased
array optics would allow for the swift (real-time) disruptive application of
potentially irresistible force, thus rendering old (industrial era) military (kinetic)
technology immediately obsolete.
Nano-robotics, Swarm robotics: This would partly mark the end of the human
(f )actor in maritime combat operations while potentially leading to tremendous
decreases in the costs of deploying maritime power. Strategic doctrines will need
to be reconsidered in light of the robotic revolution.
Force field, Meta-materials: This category refers to invisible and, in some
cases, undetectable instruments that introduce new and currently non-existing
forms of maritime dominance (both in sea control and sea denial).
80
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Quantum Computing, Spintronics, Super-conductivity, Quantum dots:
Quantum leaps in computing power and target-motion analysis would provide
a boost to maritime defense systems while providing similar enhancements for
offensive systems.
HCss report 81
APPENDI CEs
5.8 Appendix H Definitions and Scaling of Parameters
1. Civilian Use of SLOCs
This parameter analyzes the extent to which vessels will use seaborne trade
routes (known as SLOCs) for civilian purposes in the future. Foresights that
predict a decrease in the civilian use of SLOCs are coded as (1); those that foresee
no change in use of SLOCs are coded as (2), and foresights that predict an
increase in the civilian use of SLOCs are coded as (3).
Civilian Use of SLOCs:
1 Decrease
2 Stable
3 Increase
2. Strategic Importance of SLOCs
This parameter analyzes the extent to which commercial transportation of goods
will become more dependent on SLOCs (including the strategic choke points) in
the Indian Ocean. Foresights that predict a decrease in the strategic importance
of the SLOCs are coded as (1); those that see no change in strategic importance are
coded as (2), and foresights projecting an increase in the strategic importance of
SLOCs are coded as (3).
Strategic Use of SLOCs:
1 Decrease
2 Stable
3 Increase
3. Vulnerability of SLOCs
This parameter analyzes the extent to which vessels will be susceptible to
external dangers as they navigate through the SLOCs. Foresights that predict a
decrease in the vulnerability of SLOCs are coded as (1); those that see no change
in the current situation are coded as (2), and foresights that predict an increase
in the vulnerability of the SLOCs are coded as (3).
Vulnerability of the SLOCs:
1 Decrease
2 Stable
3 Increase
82
APPENDI CEs
4. Activity of Violent Non-State Actors
This parameter analyzes the extent to which the Indian Ocean will be prone to
violent activity (e.g., piracy, maritime terrorism and other criminal behavior)
from non-state actors. Foresights that predict a decrease in the activity of violent
non-state actors are coded as (1); those projecting no change in the current
situation are coded as (2), and foresights that expect an increase of the activity
of violent non-state actors are coded as (3).
Activity of Violent Non-State Actors:
1 Decrease
2 Stable
3 Increase
5. Maritime Power Distribution
This parameter analyzes the future distribution of political and military power in
the Indian Ocean. Foresights that predict the continued US domination of the
seas are coded as (1); those that project a bipolar or tripolar power distribution
involving China and Indian in addition to the dominance of the US are coded as
(2), and foresights predicting that multiple actors will project their political and
military power in the Indian Ocean are coded as (3).
Diffusion of Maritime Power:
1 Decrease: Unipolar
2 Stable: Bipolar or Tripolar
2.1 US versus China
2.2 US versus India
2.3 China versus Indian
2.4 US, China, and India
3 Increase: Multipolar
6. Nature of Maritime Build-up
This parameter analyzes the probability of maritime build-up in the Indian
Ocean. Foresights that predict a decrease in maritime presence are coded as (1);
those that predict a continuation of the status quo are coded as (2), and foresights
that predict a maritime build-up in the Indian Ocean are coded as (3). The three
coding options are further specified into ships, ports and bases, and technology.

HCss report 83
APPENDI CEs
Nature of Maritime Build-up:
1 Decrease
Ships
Ports and Bases
Technology
2 Stable
2.1 Ships
2.2 Ports and Bases
2.3 Technology
3 Increase
3.1 Ships
3.2 Ports and Bases
3.3 Technology
7. Maritime Relations
This parameter analyzes the extent to which the foresight community predicts
the presence of international rivalry in the realm of maritime relations in the
Indian Ocean. Foresights that predict decreasing rivalry and increasing
cooperation are coded as (1); those that projecting a stable level of rivalry in the
future are coded as (2) and foresights that predict increasing rivalry in the Indian
Ocean are coded as (3). The three coding options were further subdivided into
the specific relations that are mentioned in the literature. For the sake of
presentation, the parameter has been subdivided into confrontation and peaceful
extremes in the text.
Maritime Rivalry:
1 Decrease
1.1 China and India
1.2 US and China
1.3 US and India
1.5 Indian Ocean Region
2 Stable
2.1 China and India
2.2 US and China
2.3 US and India
84
APPENDI CEs
3 Increase
3.1 China and India
3.2 US and China
3.3 US and India
HCss report 85
APPENDI CEs
5.9 Appendix i Definitions and Scaling of Drivers
1. Asian Economic Growth
This driver analyzes the extent to which South and East Asian economies are
expected to expand in the future. Foresights that predict low economic growth
for Asian countries are coded as (1); those that predict medium economic growth
are coded as (2), and foresights predict that Asian economies will become the
largest world economies in the future are coded as (3).
Asian Economic Growth:
1 Low
2 Medium
3 High
2. Energy Dependency
This driver analyzes the extent to which Asian economies will remain dependent
on the import of fossil fuels from the Middle East, the worlds major energy-
supplying region. Foresights that project less dependency on energy supply from
the Middle East are coded as (1); those that predict no change in the current
situation are coded as (2), and predicting that Asian countries will become even
more dependent on Middle Eastern imported fossil fuels are coded as (3).
Energy Dependency:
1 Low
2 Medium
3 High
3. Economic Interdependency
This driver analyzes the extent to which Asian states will become economically
interdependent for their growth and for the supply of essential goods and
services, on the regional and global level. Foresights predicting that Asian
countries will become less interdependent on each other are coded as (1); those
that see no change in interdependency are coded as (2), and foresights that
project increasing interdependency between Asian countries are coded as (3).

Economic Interdependency:
1 Low
2 Medium
3 High
86
APPENDI CEs
4. Maritime Ambitions of Emerging Powers
This driver analyzes the extent to which emerging powers (e.g., China and India)
aspire to become major providers of maritime security in the Indian Ocean.
Foresights that predict no (or very modest) ambitions among Asian states to
become maritime powers are coded as (1); those that see distinct ambitions on the
part of these states are coded as (2), and foresights that describe clear ambitions on
the part of these states coupled with concrete maritime power strategies are coded
as (3).
Maritime Ambitions Emerging Powers:
1 Low
2 Medium
3 High
5. Maritime Ambitions of the US
This driver analyzes the extent to which the US continues to have the ambition to
project power in the waters of the Indian Ocean. Foresights predicting that the US
will reduce its influence in the Indian Ocean hemisphere are coded with (1); those
predicting that the US will aspire to stay in the Indian Ocean while cooperating
with regional powers are coded as (2), and those predicting that the US will aspire
to remain the hegemonic power in the Indian Ocean are coded as (3).
Maritime Ambitions US:
1 Low
2 Medium
3 High

6. External Sources of Interstate Friction
This driver analyzes the extent to which disputes between littoral states that are not
directly related to the Indian Ocean will continue to exist in the future. Foresights
that predict a decrease in disputes between Indian Ocean littoral states are coded
as (1); those that see no change in the probability of disputes are coded as (2), and
foresights that project an increase in the external causes of interstate friction are
coded as (3).
External Sources of Interstate Friction:
1 Low
2 Medium
3 Stable
HCss report 87
APPENDI CEs
7. Cooperation on Non-Maritime Issues
This driver analyzes the extent to which Asian states will engage in international
cooperation on non-maritime issues (e.g., economic and security affairs).
Foresights that predict a decrease in matters of cooperation between states are
coded as (1); those that expect cooperation to remain at current levels are coded as
(2), and foresights predicting an increase in cooperative behavior between Asian
states are coded as (3).
Cooperation on Non-Maritime Issues:
1 Low
2 Medium
3 High
8. Instability of the Indian Ocean Littoral
This driver analyzes the extent to which the lack of good governance in Indian
Ocean littoral states will affect the political stability of these states. Foresights
predicting that instability in the Indian Ocean littoral will decrease are coded
as (1); those that see no change in the current situation are coded as (2), and
foresights that predict increasing instability in the Indian Ocean littoral states
are coded as (3).
Instability of the Indian Ocean Littoral:
1 Low
2 Medium
3 High

88
APPENDI CEs
5.10 Appendix J relationships
WHAt iS DirectlY AFFecteD BY...
PArAMeterS
Civil Use of
SLOCs
Strategic
Importance
of SLOCs
Vulnera-
bility of
SLOCs
Activity of
Violent
Non-State
Actors
Nature of
the
Maritime
Build-up
Maritime
Relations
Maritime
Power
Distribution
W
H
A
t

D
i
r
e
c
l
t
Y

D
e
t
e
r
M
i
n
e
S
P
A
r
A
M
e
t
e
r
S
Civil Use of SLOCs
2 1 1
Strategic Importance
of SLOCs
11 3 | 3 1
Vulnerability of SLOCs
9 3 | 3
Activity of Violent
Non-State Actors
12 8 9 1
Nature of the
Maritime Build-up
2 | 1 8 15 | 2 4
Maritime Relations
1 2 7 1
Maritime Power
Distribution
1
D
r
i
v
e
r
S
Asian Economic
Growth
1 2 1 5 | 2 3 | 1 2
Economic
Interdependency
1 7 5 3
Energy Dependency
6 16 1 23 | 2 9 | 4 1
Maritime Ambitions
Emerging Powers
7 10 | 3 1
Maritime Ambitions
United States
3 1 | 3 1 | 1
External Sources of
Interstate Friction
1 2 | 1 1 3 3 | 1 1
Cooperation on
Non-Maritime Issues
3 4 | 3 1 | 1
Instability of the
3 4 2 1

Blue = parameters
Yellow = implications
Numbers = number of times relationship addressed in foresight studies
Numbers in green = positive relationship between driver and parameters/implications
Numbers in red = negative relationship between driver and parameters/implications
TABLE 9: rELATIONsHIPs (POsITIVE AND NEGATIVE) BETWEEN PArAMETErs AND DrIVErs
HCss report 89
APPENDI CEs
WHAt iS DirectlY AFFecteD BY...
iMPlicAtionS
Growing
Strategic
Importance
of the IO
Changes
in the
Balance
of Power
(Risk of)
Violent
Conflict
Changing
Nature of
Warfare
Economic
Disruption
Insecurity
of SLOCs
Rerouting
of Supply
Lines
W
H
A
t

D
i
r
e
c
l
t
Y

D
e
t
e
r
M
i
n
e
S
P
A
r
A
M
e
t
e
r
S
Civil Use of SLOCs
1
Strategic Importance
of SLOCs
Vulnerability of SLOCs
1 2
Activity of Violent
Non-State Actors
4 3
Nature of the
Maritime Build-Up
3 4 | 2 1
Maritime Relations
2 6 2
Maritime Power
Distribution
3
D
r
i
v
e
r
S
Asian Economic
Growth
1 2
Economic
Interdependency
Energy Dependency
3 2 2
Maritime Ambitions
Emerging Powers
Maritime Ambitions
United States
External Sources of
Interstate Friction
2
Cooperation on
Non-Maritime Issues
Instability of the

TABLE 9: rELATIONsHIPs (POsITIVE AND NEGATIVE) BETWEEN PArAMETErs AND DrIVErs
continUeD
90
APPENDI CEs
5.11 Appendix K list of Foresights in Sample
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Berlin, D. L. India in the Indian Ocean. Naval War College Review 59, no. 2 (2006):
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Blank, S. The Geostrategic Implications of the Indo-American Strategic
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Bordonaro, F. Indias Project Seabird and the Indian Oceans Balance of Power.
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Brooks, L., et al. Chinas Arrival: A Strategic Framework for a Global Relationship.
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Burgess, S. F. Indias Emerging Security Strategy, Missile Defense, and Arms Control.
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HCss report 91
APPENDI CEs
Buszynski, L. Emerging Naval Rivalry in East Asia and the Indian Ocean;
Implications for Australia. Security Challenges 5, no. 3 (2009): 73-93.
Cetron, M.J. The Dragon and the Tiger; Prospects for China and India in the 21st
Century. Washington DC: World Future Society, 2004.
Chambers, M. R., ed. South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances.
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Da Cunha, D. Southeast Asian Perceptions of Chinas Future Security Role in Its
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Dadwal, S. R. Chinas Search for Energy Security: Emerging Dilemmas. Strategic
Analysis 31, no. 6 (2007): 889-914.
Denoon, D,, and D.T. Steward. The Economic and Strategic Rise of China and
India. New York City, NY: Carnegie Council, 2008.
S. Dutta, Chinas Emerging Power and Military Role: Implications for South Asia,
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Development (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1998).
Erickson, A., and G. Collins. Beijings Energy Security Strategy: The Significance
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APPENDI CEs
International Studies, 2009. http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090201_
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Haillin, Y. Safety at Sea. Beijing Review (2009).
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Harlow, M.A., ed. Proceedings from the Indian Ocean Workshop. Washington
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Helvey, M. D. F. Chinas Energy Consumption and Opportunities for US-China
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HCss report 93
APPENDI CEs
Holslag, J. The Persistent Military Security Dilemma between China and India.
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94
APPENDI CEs
Khurana, G. S. Chinas String of Pearls in the Indian Ocean and Its Security
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HCss report 97
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HCss report 99
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5.12 Appendix l endnotes
1 Ministry of Defense, Freedom To use The seas: Indias Maritime Military strategy, (New Delhi,
Ministry of Defense, 2007), 44.
3 Department of Defense, A Cooperative strategy for 21st Century seapower (Washington DC:
Department of DC, 2007), 18.
4 L. Brooks et al., Chinas Arrival: A strategic Framework for a Global relationship (Washington:
Center for a New American security, 2009).
5 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook (Paris: International Energy Agency 2009),
3; M.A. Harlow, ed., Proceedings from the Indian Ocean Workshop, (presented at the Indian
Ocean Workshop, Washington DC: John Hopkins university, 2008), 16.
6 united Nations Conference on Trade and Development, review of Maritime Transport 2009
(Geneva, 2009), 112-113; American Association of Port Authorities, World Port rankings
2008, American Association of Port Authorities, 2008, http://aapa.fles.cms-plus.com/
statistics/WOrLD%20POrT%20rANKINGs%2020081.pdf.
7 Figures on the 2000-2008 period: Ibid., 8-10.
8 G. s. Khurana, securing Maritime Lifelines, Indian Defense review 20, no. 4 (2005): 4.
9 G. Hill, yemen: Fear of Failure, Briefng Paper (London: the royal Institute of International
Affairs, 2008), 11.
10 C. Talmadge, Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat to the strait of Hormuz,
International security 33, no. 1 (2008): 82-117.
11 The The Hague Centre for strategic studies, HCss Piracy Database (The Hague: The Hague
Centre for strategic studies, 2010); The Hague Centre for strategic studies, Maritime Piracy,
Future Issue (The Hague: The Hague Centre for strategic studies, 2008).
12 P. Chalk, The Maritime Dimension of International security Terrorism, Piracy, and
Challenges to the united states, Project Air Force (santa Monica, CA: rAND Corporation,
2008), 31.
13 The The Hague Centre for strategic studies, Territoriale Dreiging (The Hague: The Hague
Centre for strategic studies, 2008).
14 A.r. Erikson and J.D. Mikolay, Welcome China to the Fight Against Pirates, u.s. Naval
Institute Proceedings 135, no. 3 (2009): 34-41.
15 G. s. Khurana, Chinas string of Pearls in the Indian Ocean and Its security Implications,
strategic Analysis 32, no. 1 (2008): 1-39; D. L. Berlin, The Great Base race in the Indian Ocean
Littoral: Confict Prevention or stimulation?, Contemporary south Asia 13, no. 3 (2004): 239-
255.
16 Berlin, The Great Base race in the Indian Ocean Littoral: Confict Prevention or stimulation?;
Khurana, Chinas string of Pearls in the Indian Ocean and Its security Implications.
17 s.P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001),
100
APPENDI CEs
252-256.
18 V. Dashpur, us not for missile base in Trincomalee: sri Lanka, Thaindian News, January
21, 2009, http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/uncategorised/us-not-for-missile-base-in-
trincomalee-sri-lanka_100145143.html.
19 Chinas defense spending as percentage of GDP is lower than that of the united states and of
India, assuming that Chinas offcial fgures refect actual expenditures. Estimates of actual
Chinese defense expenditures range from 1.4 (stockholm International Peace research
Institute (sIPrI)) to 1.75-2.5 (the u.s. Department of Defense) times as high as offcial fgures.
M.s. Chase, The Dragons Dilemma: A Closer Look at Chinas Defense Budget and Priorities,
Policy Memo (Washington D.C.: Progressive Policy Institute, 2010), 3.
20 International Institute for strategic studies, The Military Balance 2009: The Annual
Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics (London: routledge, 2009);
union of Concerned scientists, Nuclear Weapons & Global security, uCsusA Database, 2010,
http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/space_weapons/technical_
issues/ucs-satellite-database.html.
21 There have nonetheless been many attempts to develop an indicator for military strength by
looking at military assets. For a recent attempt, see Bowns, steven & Gebicke scott, From
r&D Investment to Fighting Power, 25 years Later, McKinsey, March 2010.
Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics, London 2010.
23 Indian defense plans based on private intervieuws with anonymous high-level sources and
s. srivastava, Indias Nuclear submarine Plan surfaces, Asia Times Online, February 20,
2009, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/south_Asia/KB20Df02.html; P. Crail and E. Lindsey,
India Launches First Nuclear submarine, Arms Control Association, september 2009, http://
www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_09/Indiasub.
24 Ministry of Defence, Indias Maritime Capabilities Perspective Plan 2005-2022 (New Delhi:
Ministry of Defense, 2006).
25 Military satellite to Give Indian Eyes in space, The Financial Express, september 5, 2005,
http://www.fnancialexpress.com/news/military-satellite-to-give-india-eyes-in-space/51912/2;
s. Anandan, Launch of First satellite for Indian regional Navigation satellite system Next
year, The Hindu, April 10, 2010, http://beta.thehindu.com/sci-tech/article393892.ece.
26 Global security. Military yearbook 2010. China. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/
china/navy.htm
27 r. Orourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for u.s. Navy CapabilitiesBackground
and Issues for Congress, Crs report for Congress (Washington D.C.: Congressional research
service, 2009), 3.
HCss report 101
APPENDI CEs
28 A.s. Erickson and M.s. Chase, An undersea Deterrent?, u.s. Naval Institute Proceedings
Magazine 135, no. 6 (2009).
29 L. Qinghua, China Launches Third Orbiter for Indigenous Global satellite Navigation
system, xinhuanet, January 17, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2010-01/17/
content_12822615.htm; J. D Pollack, Chinese Military Power: What Vexes the united states
and Why?, Orbis 51, no. 4 (2007): 635650.
30 Offce of the Chief of Naval Operations, report to Congress on Annual Long-range Plan
for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fy 2009 (Washington D.C.: Offce of the Chief of Naval
Operations, 2008), 8.
31 r. D. Kaplan, Center stage for the Twenty-First Century-Power Plays in the Indian Ocean,
Foreign Affairs 88, no. 2 (2009): 2; Harlow, Proceedings from the Indian Ocean Workshop, 308.
32 Australian Government, Australias Defence White Paper. Defending Australia in the Asia
Pacifc Century: Force 2030. (Canberra: Australian Department of Defense, 2009), 64, http://
www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf.
34 D. singh, Indo-us relations, strategic Analysis 33, no. 6 (2009): 931-937.
35 B. McCartan, India, Myanmar: reluctant Brothers in Arms, Asia Times Online, February 19,
2010, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/south_Asia/LB19Df01.html.; steve Coll, A reporter at
Large, The Back Channel, The New yorker, March 2, 2009, p. 38 .
36 u.s. Government, Global Trends 2025: The National Intelligence Councils 2025 Project
(Washington DC: u.s. Government), 29.
37 W. Pei, Think Again: Asias rise, Foreign Policy, July 2009, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
articles/2009/06/22/think_again_asias_rise.
38 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook, 117-120.
39 According to the Indian Department for Industrial Policy & Policy, Chinese companies invested
a mere usD 10.85 million in India between April 2000 and January 2009. Data taken from:
Government of India, Fact sheet on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (New Delhi: Government of
India, 2009). The current authors believe that these estimates may be conservative.
40 Integrated Headquarters Ministry of Defence Navy (2007), Freedom To use The seas: Indias
Maritime Military strategy, p. IV.
41 Department of Defense, A Cooperative strategy for 21st Century seapower (Washington DC:
Department of DC, 2007), 8.
42 Ibid 9.
43 Information Offce of the state Council of the Peoples republic of China (2009), Chinas
National Defense.
44 J. r. Holmes and T. yoshihara, Indias Monroe Doctrine and Asias Maritime Future,
102
APPENDI CEs
45 Offce of Naval Intelligence, The Peoples Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese
Characteristics (Washington D.C.: Offce of Naval Intelligence, 2009), 1.
46 Ministry of Defense, Freedom to use the seas: Indias Maritime Military strategy (New Delhi:
Ministry of Defense, 2007), 34.
47 u.s. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade, u.s. Census Bureau, 2010, http://www.census.gov/
foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html#2010.
48 Federal reserve Board, Major Foreign Holders of Treasury security (Washington DC:
Department of Treasury, 2010).
49 r. Kaplan, Center stage for the Twenty-First Century-Power Plays in the Indian Ocean
Foreign Affairs. 88, no. 2 (2009): 16-26.
50 D.M. Gibler, T.J. rider, and M.L. Hutchinson, Taking Arms Against a sea of Troubles:
Conventional Arms races During Periods of rivalry, Journal of Peace research 42, no. 2
(2005): 131-147.
52 r. D. Kaplan, Dont panic about China, The Atlantic, Wednesday June 23rd, 2010.
53 T. sweijs, Verschuivende macht en de fnancile balance of terror: Vs-China (The Changing
Balance of Power and the Financial Balance of Terror: us-China) in de Nieuwe Wereld,
Christen Democratische Verkenningen, Boom Press, Zomer 2009.
54 T. reid, us Warships Head for south China sea After standoff, The Times, March 14, 2009,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article5898650.ece.
55 World Economic Forum, Global risk report 2010: A Global risk Network report (Geneva:
World Economic forum, 2009).
56 r.O. King, Ocean Piracy and Its Impact on Insurance (Washington DC: Congressional research
service, 2008).
2008), 31; The Hague Centre for strategic studies, HCss Piracy Database (The Hague: The
Hague Centre for strategic studies, 2010)
58 E. Lipson and A. Pandya, eds., The Indian Ocean; resources and Governance Challenges
(Washington DC: The Henry L. stimson Center, 2009).
59 Michael Green, ed., Bridging strategic Asia: The rise of India in East Asia and the Implications
for the u.s.-Japan Alliance (Washington DC: Center for strategic & International studies,
2009), http://csis.org/fles/media/csis/pubs/090201_complete_report.pdf.
60 One source even suggests that a blockade of the strait of Malacca that would cut of China
entirely from the supply of Middle Eastern oil, would result in a decrease of Chinas GDP
growth by 5.4 to 10.8 percent, see B. Blair, C. yali, and E. Hagt, The Oil Weapon: Myth of
Chinas Vulnerability, China security, summer (2009): 32-63.
HCss report 103
APPENDI CEs
61 J. rogers, To rule the Waves: Why a Maritime Geostrategy is Needed to sustain European
union, security Policy Brief (Brussels: Egmont royal Institute for International relations,
2010); on tripolarity, see schweller randall schweller, Tripolarity and the second World War,
International studies Quarterly 37:1 (March 1993).
62 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Inde, France Diplomatie, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/pays-
zones-geo_833/inde_538/index.html; Ministry of Defence, Indian Navy Excercises with French
Navy, Off Britain, During Indian Naval ships Deployment in Europe - Veruna 2009, Indian
Navy, June 15, 2009, http://indiannavy.nic.in/Press090615.htm; For an overview see V. sakhuja,
India, France strategic Partnership: Nuclear and Maritime Cooperation (New Delhi: society for
the study of Peace and Confict, 2009).
63 J. rogers, To rule the Waves: Why a Maritime Geostrategy is Needed to sustain European
union, security Briefng (Brussels: Egmont Institute, 2010).
64 r.s. ross argues that Chinas maritime expenditures are driven by what he calls naval
nationalism. see r.s. ross Chinas Naval Nationalism: sources, Prospects, and the u.s.
response, International security 34, no.2 (2009): 46-81. In March 2010, robert Kagan
argued that China has many opportunities to focus on maritime expansion, as its borders
are relatively secure. see r. D. Kaplan, Q&A With robert Kaplan on Geopolitics in the Indian
Ocean, Foreign Affairs, April 7, 2009, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/interviews/
qa-with-robert-kaplan-on-geopolitics-in-the-indian-ocean.
65 The Economist, New silk roads: roads, railways and Pipelines Are redefning What We Mean
by Asia, The Economist, April 8, 2010, http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.
cfm?story_id=15872888.
66 united Nations Conference on Trade and Development, review of Maritime Transport 2009,
112-113.
67 Berkouwer, C. & Kooroshy J., The Arctic Passage Promise and Peril in A Melting Ocean,
(The Hague: The Hague Centre for strategic studies, 2009)
68 B. Tillman, Fear and Loathing in the Post-Naval Era, u.s. Naval Institute Proceedings
(Annapolis, MA: u.s. Naval Institute, 2009).
69 A.T. Mahan, Armaments and Arbitration or the Place of force in the International relations of
states (New york City, Ny: Harper and Brothers, 1912), 105.
70 Jeroen de Jonge, Frank Bekkers en rob de Wijk, Pas op de Plaats voor Defensie, strategy
and Change Paper No.02 (The Hague: The Hague Centre for strategic studies, 2010)
71 International Energy Agency, Oil supply security Emergency response of IEA Countries 2007,
199
72 Port of rotterdam, Herkomst en bestemming goederen 2008, http://www.portofrotterdam.
com/nl/Over-de-haven/havenstatistieken/Documents/herkomst_en_bestemming_
goederen_2008.pdf
73 Ibid.
104
APPENDI CEs
74 The robert s. strauss Center for International security and Law, strait of Hormuz :
Assessing Threats to Energy security in the Persian Gulf, Commercial issues, http://hormuz.
robertstrausscenter.org/commercial_issues.
75 Menno Middeldorp, De gevaren van een hogere olieprijs, rabobank Kennis en Economisch
onderzoek, (June 2006), 10.
76 Balzs gert, real Convergence, Price Level Convergence and Infation Differentials in
Europe, William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 895, (October 2007), 30-31.
77 Centraal Bureau voor de statistiek, De Nederlandse Economie 2008, (Den Haag/Heerlen
2009), 51.
78 Vereniging Nederlandse Petroleum Industrie, Wat doet een raffnaderij?, http://www.vnpi.nl/
Files/fle/Wat%20doet%20een%20raffnaderij.pdf, 1-2
79 Koninklijke Vereniging van reders, Piraterij, http://www.kvnr.nl/CMs/showpage.aspx?id=433.
80 The robert s. strauss Center for International security and Law, strait of Hormuz:
2008), 31; The Hague Centre for strategic studies, HCss Piracy Database (The Hague: The
Hague Centre for strategic studies, 2010).
82 The robert s. strauss Center for International security and Law, strait of Hormuz :
83 Ibid.
84 TNO, Nationaal Onderzoek Kwetsbaarheid Logistieke Ketens 2010: Zicht op risicos,
daadwerkelijke verstoringen en kwetsbaarheid, 6.
85 Centraal Bureau voor de statistiek, statistisch Jaarboek 2010, (Den Haag/Heerlen 2010), 157.
86 Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties. Nationale Veiligheid: strategie.
Den Haag, 2007.
87 NATO, Maritime situational Awareness, NATO, http://www.nurc.nato.int/research/msa.htm.
88 J. Hope and J. rogers, The royal Navy: Britains Trident for a Global Agenda, Henry Jackson
society, september 4, 2006, http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/stories.asp?id=279; I.
Kramnik, Mistral: challenge for Navy and the country, russian Navy, september 2, 2009,
Mistral: challenge for Navy and the country; Asahi shinbun, Japans New Blue Water Navy:
A Four-year Indian Ocean mission recasts the Constitution and the us-Japan alliance, The
Asia-Pacifc Journal: Japan Focus (2005); Ministry of Foreign Affairs, A Portrait of the royal
Netherlands Navy, Netherlands Embassy, http://www.netherlands-embassy.org/tromp/
portrait.htm.
HCss report 105
APPENDI CEs
89 Ministry of Defense, Freedom to use the seas: Indias Maritime Military strategy, 9 (New Delhi:
Ministry of Defense, 2007); s. Anandan, Indian Navy recognised as a Blue Water Force, The
Hindu, January 28, 2009, http://www.thehindu.com/2009/06/16/stories/2009061655160700.
htm.
90 K. Hwang, Navigate Necesse Est! Maritimity and the Prospect of a Korean Blue Water Navy,
Geopolitics Quarterly, no. 3 (2008): 99-113.
91 B. Kaplan, Chinas Navy Today: storm Clouds on the Horizon... or Paper Tiger?, Navy League
of the united states, 2010 May 11.
92 r. s. ross, Assessing the China Threat, National Interest, no. Fall (2005): 4.
Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics; union of concerned
scientists, Nuclear Weapons & Global security.
94 There have nonetheless been many attempts to develop an indicator for military strength by
looking at military assets. For a recent attempt, see Bowns, steven & Gebicke scott, From
r&D Investment to Fighting Power, 25 years Later, McKinsey, March 2010.
95 security Council, resolution sC/9514, (2 December 2008).
96 James rogers and Luis simn, The status And Location Of The Military Installations Of The
Member states Of The European union And Their Potential role For The European security
And Defence Policy, Policy Department External Policies, February (2009), 12-13.
97 Ibid 15.
98 Ellen Laipson and Amit Pandya, The Indian Ocean resource and Governance Challenges,
The Henry L. stimson Center (2009), 43.
99 James rogers and Luis simn, The status And Location Of The Military Installations Of The
Member states Of The European union And Their Potential role For The European security
And Defence Policy, Policy Department External Policies, February (2009), 13-14.
100 united Kingdom Government, The National security strategy of the united Kingdom security
in an Interdependent World, (Cabinet Offce 2008), 53-54.
101 Dr Lee Willett, British Defence And security Policy: The Maritime Contribution, royal united
services Institute for Defence and security studies (2008) , 5.
102 Leszek Buszynski, Emerging Naval rivalry in East Asia and the Indian Ocean: Implications
for Australia, security Challenges, Vol. 5, No. 3 (spring 2009), 91-92.
103 Ibid 92.
104 Japanese Government, Defense of Japan 2009, (Japan Ministry of Defense 2009), 126-130.
105 Emerging Technologies in naval operations: Beyond the Maritime Vision 2030, royal
Netherlands Navy 2010, excerpt of the Naval serendipity Project, P.J. van Maurik.
The Maritime
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