Crim2 Casedigests Titles1-2
Crim2 Casedigests Titles1-2
Crim2 Casedigests Titles1-2
During the Japanese occupation, the accused joined the paramilitary force of the Japanese and acted as an undercover agent for them. He assisted in several executions of suspected guerillas. He was charged of 7 counts of treason. He admitted to counts 1, 2, 3, and 7, but didnt admit to counts 4, 5, and 6. The special prosecutor was only able to present evidence to support count 4. HELD/RATIO: The accused was found guilty of treason for counts 1,2,3, and 7; but, he was acquitted for count 4. For counts 1, 2, 3, and 7, the accused was guilty since he admitted. However, he cannot be held liable for count 4 since the two-witness rule wasnt met. The two witnesses testified to two different incidents. In a different light, common crimes are absorbed in treason. People vs. Siyoh L- 57292 FACTS > Julaide Siyoh and Omarkyam Kiram, together with Namli Indanan and Andaw Jamahali were accused of qualified piracy with triple murder and frustrated murder > On July 10, 1979, Antonio de Guzman together with his friends who were also travelling merchants like him (Danilo Hiolen. Rodolfo de Castro and Anastacio de Guzman) were on their way to Pilas Island, Province of Basilan, to sell goods they received from Alberto Aurea. > They left for Pilas Island at 2:00 p.m. of July 10, 1979 on a pumpboat. They took their dinner and slept that night in the house of Omar-kayam Kiram at Pilas Island. Who also helped them from selling their goods to different Islands near Pilas. > Before the incident happened, Antonio, the lone survivor saw that Kiram was talking with another two persons that he can only recognize in their faces somewhere near the house where they were selling the goods > On July 14, 1979, When they were heading back to Pilas Island from Baluk-Baluk Island through riding a pumpboat where Siyoh positioned himself at the front while Kiram operated the engine. > On the way to Pilas Island, Antonio de Guzman saw another pumpboat painted red and green about 200 meters away from their pumpboat Shortly after" Kiram turned off the engine of their pumpboat. Thereafter two shots were fired from the other pumpboat as it moved towards them > There were two persons on the other pumpboat who were armed with armantes. De Guzman recognized them to be the same persons he saw Kiram conversing with in a house at Baluk-Baluk Island. > When the boat came close to them, Kiram threw a rope to the other pumpboat which towed de Guzman's pumpboat towards Mataja Island. > On the way to Mataja Island, Antonio de Guzman and his companions were divested of their money and their goods by Kiram. Thereafter Kiram and his companions ordered the group of de Guzman to undress. Taking fancy on the pants of Antonio de Guzman, Kiram put it on. > With everybody undressed, Kiram said 'It was good to kill all of you'. After that remark, Siyoh hacked Danilo Hiolen while Kiram hacked Rodolfo de Castro. Antonio de Guzman jumped into the water. As he was swimming away from the pumpboat, the two companions of Kiram fired at him, injuring his back. But he was able to reach a mangrove where he stayed till nightfall. When he left the mangrove, he saw the dead bodies of Anastacio de Guzman, Danilo Hiolen and Rodolfo de Castro. He was picked up by a fishing boat and brought to the Philippine Army station at Maluso where he received first aid treatment. Later he was brought to the J.S. Alano Memorial Hospital at Isabela, Basilan province. > On July 15, 1979, while waiting for the dead bodies of his companions at the wharf, de Guzman saw Siyoh and Kiram. He pointed them out to the PC and the two were arrested before they could run. When arrested, Kiram was wearing the pants he took from de Guzman and de Guzman had to ask Pat. Bayabas at the Provincial Jail to get back his pants from Kiram ISSUE: WoN the respondent-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt? CONTENTIONS OF APPELLANTS 2. 3.
Since it was contested by appellants that there guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt since the prosecution did not present evidence that the accused were also the one who killed Anastacio de Guzman because his remains are never recovered. The Credibility of the Witnesssince only 1 witness was presented Appellants claim (Siyoh and Kiram) that they were not the assailants but also the victim
HELD: They were said to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified piracy with triple murder and frustrated homicide RATIONALE 1. Number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy, not material; Piracy, a special complex crime punishable by deathbut the number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy is not material. PD 532 considers qualified piracy as a special complex crime punishable by death. Therefore, the guilt of respondent were proven beyond reasonable doubt. 2. There was no other evidence presented on why should the lone survivor tell lies and fabricate story as to apprehend the accused. 3. Appellants claim that they were not the assailants but also the victim and that the two persons they have identified (Namli Indanan and Andaw Jamahali) is baseless as view in the proven conspiracy among the accused. The Conspiracy was established through the testimony of the lone witness and survivor- De Guzman UMIL VS. RAMOS [187 SCRA 311; G.R. NO. 81567; 3 OCT 1991] Facts: On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the saidhospital with a gunshot wound. That the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. The wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Bian, Laguna however it was disclosed later that the true name of the wounded man was Rolando Dural. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Servicesof the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, he was positively identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols. Issue: Whether or Not Rolando was lawfully arrested. Held: Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing as offense when arrested. The crimes rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance therefore in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the state and are in the nature of continuing crimes. People vs Burgos Facts: One Cesar Masamlok surrendered to the authorities at the Davao del Sur Constabulary HQ. He testified that Ruben Burgos forcibly recruited him as member of NPA. Burgos threatened him with the use of a firearm. Masamlok attended the seminar where Burgos spoke about his membership with the NPA and the organizations desire to overthrow the government. Pursuant to this information, PC-INP members went to house of accused. Accused was plowing the field when they arrived.
STONEHILL VS. DIOKNO [20 SCRA 383; L-19550; 19 JUN 1967] Pat. Bioco called accused and asked him about the firearm. Accused denied possession of said firearm but later, his wife pointed to a place below their house where a gun was buried in the ground. After the recovery of said firearm, accused pointed to a stock pile of cogon where the officers recovered: 14 marron notebook 15 pamphlets: Ang Byan, Pahayagan ng Paritdo Komunista ng Pilipinas ets Accused admitted that firearm was issued to him by Nestor Jimines, team leader of sparro unit. RTC: convicted Issue: WON warrantless arrest was valid Held: NO Ratio: Not under the conditions provided in rules 1. The officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. 2. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator 3. Under Section 6(b), it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that a person to be arrested has committed a crime; a crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. Issue: WON search was valid Held: NO Ratio: If an arrest without a warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made, generally nothing that happened or is discovered afterwards can make it lawful. 16 There was to waiver to search in case at bar. To constitute waiver, 3 requisites must concur: 1. that the right exists 2. that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right 3. that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right Others: 17 denied of right to counsel during custodial interrogation 18 counsel was only called when accused subscribed under oath his statement Masamloks testimony was uncorroborated. He was an interested witness. Wanted trade-off: membership with Civil Home Defense Force. Disposition. JUDGMENT REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. ACQUITTED. Facts: Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors several judges2 hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit: Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers). as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code." Petitioners contentions are: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law Respondents-prosecutors contentions (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures. The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein. Issues: (1) Whether or not those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations are obtained legally. (2) Whether or not those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein are obtained legally. Held: The petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court, thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence
against petitioners herein. Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," as alleged in the aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or __________________________ BURGOS, SR. V. CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP [133 SCRA 800; G.R. NO. 64261; 26 DEC 1984] Facts: Petitioners assail the validity of 2 search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Cruz-Pano of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued. Respondents contend that petitioners should have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them before impugning the validity of the same before this Court. Respondents also assail the petition on ground of laches (Failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it). Respondents further state that since petitioner had already used as evidence some of the documents seized in a prior criminal case, he is stopped from challenging the validity of the search warrants. Petitioners submit the following reasons to nullify the questioned warrants: 1. Respondent Judge failed to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional provision as well as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. 2. The search warrants pinpointed only one address which would be the former abovementioned address. 3. Articles belonging to his co-petitioners were also seized although the warrants were only directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. 4. Real properties were seized. 5. The application along with a joint affidavit, upon which the warrants were issued, from the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group could not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may be validly issued in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. Respondents justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that they have been
sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which authorizes sequestration of the property of any person engaged in subversive activities against the government in accordance with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of National Defense. Issue: Whether or Not the 2 search warrants were validly issued and executed. Held: In regard to the quashal of warrants that petitioners should have initially filed to the lower court, this Court takes cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional Issue raised, not to mention the public interest generated by the search of the "We Forum" offices which was televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies. The existence of this special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules. With the contention pertaining to laches, the petitioners gave an explanation evidencing that they have exhausted other extrajudicial efforts to remedy the situation, negating the presumption that they have abandoned their right to the possession of the seized property. On the enumerated reasons: 1. This objection may properly be considered moot and academic, as petitioners themselves conceded during the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses. 2. The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants were applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. It would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two warrants intended for one and the same place. 3. Section 2, Rule 126, of the Rules of Court, does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. 4. Petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground, remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant. 5. The broad statements in the application and joint affidavit are mere conclusions of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Deficient of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so. In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause." Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question are too general. With regard to the respondents invoking PD 885, there is an absence of any implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the Minister of National Defense. Furthermore, President Marcos himself denies the request of military authorities to sequester the property seized from petitioners. The closure of the premises subjected to search and seizure is contrary to the freedom of the press as guaranteed in our fundamental law. The search warrants are declared null and void.