Threats and Countermeasures
Threats and Countermeasures
Threats and Countermeasures
Microsoft Corporation Published: May 2011 Authors: Starr Andersen, Greg Marshall, Eric Mitchell, Roland Winkler
Abstract
The purpose of this guide is to provide you with a reference to security settings that provide countermeasures for specific threats against current versions of the Windows operating systems.
This document is provided as-is. Information and views expressed in this document, including URL and other Internet Web site references, may change without notice. You bear the risk of using it. This document does not provide you with any legal rights to any intellectual property in any Microsoft product. You may copy and use this document for your internal, reference purposes. 2011 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Microsoft, Active Directory, ActiveX, Aero, AppLocker, BitLocker, BranchCache, Internet Explorer, MS-DOS, Outlook, ReadyBoost, SQL Server, Win32, Windows, Windows Live, Windows Media, Windows NT, Windows, Windows Server, and Windows Vista are trademarks of the Microsoft group of companies. All other trademarks are property of their respective owners.
Contents
Threats and Countermeasures Guide: Security Settings in Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7 ................................................................................................................................... 4 Threats and Countermeasures Guide: Account Policies ................................................................. 7 Threats and Countermeasures Guide: Advanced Security Audit Policy........................................ 29 Threats and Countermeasures Guide: User Rights ....................................................................... 63 Threats and Countermeasures Guide: Security Options ............................................................. 107 Threats and Countermeasures Guide: Event Log ........................................................................ 206 Threats and Countermeasures Guide: System Services .............................................................. 215 Threats and Countermeasures Guide: Software Restriction Policies.......................................... 361 Threats and Countermeasures Guide: Application Control Policies ........................................... 364 Threats and Countermeasures Guide: External Storage Devices ................................................ 366 Threats and Countermeasures Guide: Additional Resources ..................................................... 387
Threats and Countermeasures Guide: Security Settings in Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7
This guide is a reference to the security settings in Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7 that provide countermeasures for specific threats against the current versions of the operating systems. Note For a web version of this document, see Threats and Countermeasures Guide in the Windows Server Technical Library. Many of the countermeasures that are described in this guide are not intended for specific computer roles in the companion guides, or in some cases, for any roles at all. These countermeasures help ensure compatibility, usability, manageability, availability, or performance. Generally, as security increases, functionality decreases, and vice versa. However, there are exceptions, and some security countermeasures actually help improve functionality. Each section begins with a brief explanation of what is in the section, followed by a list of subsection headings, each of which corresponds to a setting or group of settings. Each subsection includes a brief explanation of what the countermeasure does and the following subsections: Vulnerability Explains how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configuration. Countermeasure Explains how to implement the countermeasure. Potential impact Explains the possible negative consequences of countermeasure implementation. For example, the section Domain Level Account Policies begins with the following subsections: Account Policies Enforce password history Vulnerability Countermeasure Potential impact
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Maximum password age Vulnerability Countermeasure Potential impact This pattern is repeated throughout this guide. Settings that are closely related are presented in a single subsection. For example, in the Security Options section, four related settings are placed into the same subsection as follows: Microsoft network client and server: Digitally sign communications Microsoft network client: Digitally sign communications (always) Microsoft network server: Digitally sign communications (always) Microsoft network client: Digitally sign communications (if server agrees) Microsoft network server: Digitally sign communications (if client agrees) This guide focuses on Group Policy settings that are considered security settings, and those that are intended to help organizations manage their environments are not documented. This guide examines only the settings and features in Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7 that can help organizations secure their enterprises against specific threats. Settings and features that were added in service packs after the release of Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2, or functionalities that may have been added by software released after those service packs, may not be discussed in this guide. Also, management features and those security features that are not configurable by administrators are not described in this guide. The information that is provided within this guide should help you and members of your organization understand the countermeasures that are available in the current versions of the operating systems.
Section overviews
This guide consists of the following sections, which provide a reference to the settings that you should consider when planning the security policy for your organization.
This section discusses the Group Policy settings that are applied at the domain level: password policies, account lockout policies, and Kerberos
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This section discusses the use of advanced audit policy settings, which are now integrated with Group Policy to monitor and enforce your security measures. It describes the various settings, and it provides examples of how audit information is modified when the settings are changed. This section discusses the various logon rights and privileges that are provided by the Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2 operating systems, and it provides guidance about which accounts should be assigned these rights. This section provides guidance about security settings for digital data signatures, Administrator and Guest account names, drive access, driver installation behavior, and logon prompts. This section provides guidance about how to configure the settings that relate to the various event logs on computers running Windows Server 2008 R2 or Windows 7. Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7 include a variety of system services. Many of these services are configured to run by default, but others are not present unless you install specific components. This section describes the various services included with the operating systems so that you can best decide which ones to leave enabled and which ones can be safely disabled. This section provides a brief overview of the
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Restriction Policies
Software Restriction Policy feature that is available in Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7. It provides links to additional resources about how to design and use policy settings to control which applications can be used in your organization. This section provides a brief overview of the AppLocker feature that is available in Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7. It provides links to additional resources about how to design and use policy settings to control which applications can be used in your organization. This section describes Group Policy settings that can be used to limit, prevent, or allow the use of external storage devices in networked computers. This section provides links to additional information sources about Windows security topics from Microsoft that you may find useful.
Account Lockout Policy Kerberos Policy A single Windows Server 2008 R2 domain can have one of each of these policies. If these policies are set at any level below the domain level in Active Directory Domain Services, they affect only local accounts on member servers. The Account Policies settings in Group Policy are applied at the domain level. Default values are present in the built-in Default Domain Controllers Policy GPO for Password Policy settings, Account Lockout Policy settings, and Kerberos Policy settings. The domain Account Policies settings become the default local Account Policies settings of any computer that is running the Windows operating system and that is a member of the domain. Note Each domain can have only one Account Policies setting. The Default Domain Policy is the policy that is enforced by the domain controllers in the domain by default. The Account Policies setting must be defined in the Default Domain Policy or in a new policy that is linked to the root of the domain and given precedence over the Default Domain Policy. These domain-wide Account Policies settings (Password Policy, Account Lockout Policy, and Kerberos Policy) are enforced by the domain controllers in the domain. Therefore, domain controllers always retrieve the values of these Account Policies settings from the Default Domain Policy GPO. The only exception to this rule is when another Account Policies setting is defined for an organizational unit (OU). The Account Policies settings for the OU affect the local policy on any computers that are contained in the OU. For example, if an OU policy defines a maximum password age that differs from the domain-level Account Policies settings, the OU policy is applied and enforced only when users log on to the local computer. The default local computer policies apply only to computers that are in a workgroup or in a domain where neither an OU Account Policies setting nor a domain policy applies. The following sections discuss the settings for each of the policies that is in the Account Policies folder.
manual methods or automated tools to guess weak passwords. Strong passwords that are changed regularly reduce the likelihood of a successful password attack. Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows Server 2008 support fine-grained password policies. This feature provides organizations with a way to define different password and account lockout policies for different sets of users in a domain. In the Active Directory domains in Windows 2000 and Windows Server 2003, only one password policy and account lockout policy could be applied to all users in the domain. Fine-grained password policies apply only to user objects (or inetOrgPerson objects if they are used instead of user objects) and global security groups. Fine-grained password policies include attributes for all the settings that can be defined in the Default Domain Policy (except Kerberos protocol settings) as well as account lockout settings. When you specify a fine-grained password policy, you must specify all of these settings. By default, only members of the Domain Admins group can set fine-grained password policies. However, you can also delegate the ability to set these policies to other users. The domain functional level must be Windows Server 2008 or Windows Server 2008 R2 to use fine-grained password policies. Fine-grained password policies cannot be applied to an organizational unit (OU) directly. To apply a fine-grained password policy to users of an OU, you can use a shadow group. A shadow group is a global security group that is logically mapped to an OU to enforce a finegrained password policy. You add users of the OU as members of the newly created shadow group and then apply the fine-grained password policy to this shadow group. You can create additional shadow groups for other OUs as needed. If you move a user from one OU to another, you must update the membership of the corresponding shadow groups. Fine-grained password policies do not interfere with custom password filters that you might use in the same domain. Organizations that have deployed custom password filters to domain controllers running Windows 2000 or Windows Server 2003 can continue to use those password filters to enforce additional restrictions for passwords. For more information about fine-grained password policies, see AD DS: Fine-Grained Password Policies. You can enforce the use of strong passwords through an appropriate password policy. There are password policy settings that control the complexity and lifetime of passwords, such as the Passwords must meet complexity requirements policy setting. You can configure the password policy settings in the following location by using the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) on your domain controller: Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Account Policies\Password Policy
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If individual groups require distinct password policies, these groups should be separated into another domain or forest based on any additional requirements.
The longer a user uses the same password, the greater the chance that an attacker can determine the password through brute force attacks. Also, any accounts that may have been compromised remain exploitable for as long as the password is left unchanged. If password changes are required but password reuse is not prevented, or if users continually reuse a small number of passwords, the effectiveness of a good password policy is greatly reduced. If you specify a low number for this policy setting, users can use the same small number of passwords repeatedly. If you do not also configure the Minimum password age policy setting, users might repeatedly change their passwords until they can reuse their original password. Note After an account has been compromised, a simple password reset might not be enough to restrict a malicious user because the malicious user might have modified the user's environment so that the password is changed back to a known value automatically at a certain time. If an account has been compromised, it is best to delete the account and assign the user a new account after all affected systems have been restored to normal operations and verified that they are no longer compromised.
Countermeasure
Configure the Enforce password history policy setting to 24, the maximum setting, to help minimize the number of vulnerabilities that are caused by password reuse. For this policy setting to be effective, you should also configure effective values for the Minimum password age and Maximum password age policy settings.
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Potential impact
The major impact of configuring the Enforce password history policy setting to 24 is that users must create a new password every time they are required to change their old one. If users are required to change their passwords to new unique values, there is an increased risk of users who write their passwords somewhere so that they do not forget them. Another risk is that users may create passwords that change incrementally (for example, password01, password02, and so on) to facilitate memorization, but this makes them easier to guess. Also, an excessively low value for the Maximum password age policy setting is likely to increase administrative overhead because users who forget their passwords might ask the help desk to reset them frequently.
The longer a password exists, the higher the likelihood that it will be compromised by a brute force attack, by an attacker gaining general knowledge about the user, or by the user sharing the password. Configuring the Maximum password age policy setting to 0 so that users are never required to change their passwords is a major security risk because that allows a compromised password to be used by a malicious user for as long as the valid user is authorized access.
Countermeasure
Configure the Maximum password age policy setting to a value that is suitable for your organization's business requirements.
Potential impact
If the Maximum password age policy setting is too low, users are required to change their passwords very often. Such a configuration can reduce security in the organization because users might write their passwords in an unsecured location or lose them. If the value for this policy setting is too high, the level of security within an organization is reduced because it allows
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potential attackers more time in which to discover user passwords or to use compromised accounts.
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Possible values: User-specified number of days between 0 and 998 Not Defined The default value for this policy setting is 1 on domain controllers and 0 on stand-alone servers.
Vulnerability
Users may have favorite passwords that they like to use because they are easy to remember and they believe that their password choice is secure from compromise. Unfortunately passwords are compromised, and if an attacker is targeting a specific individual user account with foreknowledge of data about that user, reuse of old passwords can cause a security breach. To address password reuse, you must use a combination of security settings. Using this policy setting with the Enforce password history policy setting prevents the easy reuse of old passwords. For example, if you configure the Enforce password history policy setting to ensure that users cannot reuse any of their last 12 passwords, but you do not configure the Minimum password age policy setting to a number that is greater than 0, they could change their password 13 times in a few minutes and reuse the password they started with. You must configure this policy setting to a number that is greater than 0 for the Enforce password history policy setting to be effective.
Countermeasure
Configure the Minimum password age policy setting to a value of at least 2 days. Users should know about this limitation and contact the help desk if they need to change their password during that 2-day period. If you configure the number of days to 0, immediate password changes would be allowed, which we do not recommend.
Potential impact
If an administrator sets a password for a user but wants that user to change the password when the user first logs on, the administrator must select the User must change password at next logon check box, or the user cannot change the password until the next day.
The longer a password is, the better security it provides, especially if it includes a character combination of uppercase and lowercase letters, digits, symbols, and punctuation. The following table shows the amount of time that it would take a computer that is performing a brute force attack (at 10 million character combinations per second) to discover a password for a user account. Alphanumeric case-sensitive (62 characters) Alphanumeric case-sensitive including symbols (96 characters) Instant Instant 8.5 seconds 13.5 minutes 22 hours 87 days 23 years
Password length
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Instant Instant Less than 2 seconds 1.5 minutes 1.5 hours 4 days 253 days
Note A computer that could perform a brute force attack at a rate of 1 billion character combinations per second would take 83.5 days to discover an eight-symbol password that includes a combination of uppercase and lowercase letters, digits, symbols, and punctuation. Possible values: User-specified number between 0 and 14 Not Defined The default value for this policy setting is 7 on domain controllers and 0 on stand-alone servers.
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Vulnerability
Types of password attacks include dictionary attacks (which attempt to use common words and phrases) and brute force attacks (which try every possible combination of characters). Also, attackers sometimes try to obtain the account database so they can use tools to discover the accounts and passwords.
Countermeasure
Configure the Minimum password length policy setting to a value of 8 or more. If the number of characters is set to 0, no password will be required. In most environments, we recommend an 8-character password because it is long enough to provide adequate security but not too difficult for users to easily remember. This configuration provides adequate defense against a brute force attack. Using the Passwords must meet complexity requirements policy setting in addition to the Minimum password length policy setting helps reduce the possibility of a dictionary attack.
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Note Some jurisdictions have established legal requirements for password length as part of establishing computer security regulations.
Potential impact
Requirements for extremely long passwords can actually decrease the security of an organization because users might leave the information in an unsecured location or lose it. If very long passwords are required, mistyped passwords could cause account lockouts and increase the volume of Help Desk calls. If your organization has issues with forgotten passwords due to password length requirements, consider teaching your users about passphrases. They are often easier to remember, and due to the larger number of character combinations, they are much harder to discover. Note Older versions of Windows such as Windows 98 and Windows NT 4.0 do not support passwords that are longer than 14 characters. Computers that run these older operating systems are unable to authenticate with computers or domains that use accounts that require long passwords.
too high. When a check is performed against the user's full name, several characters separate the name into individual tokens: commas, periods, dashes/hyphens, underscores, spaces, number signs, and tabs. A token that is three or more characters long is searched for in the password and if it is present, the password change is rejected. For example, the name Erin M. Hagens would be split into three tokens: Erin, M, and Hagens. Because the second token is only one character long, it would be ignored. Therefore, this user could not have a password that included either "erin" or "hagens" as a substring anywhere in the password. All of these checks are case-insensitive. These complexity requirements are enforced when a password is changed or a new password is created. For specific instructions about how to configure password policy settings, see Apply or modify password policy. For more information, see: Strong passwords Password best practices Apply or modify password policy Security Configuration Manager tools The rules that are included in the Windows Server 2008 R2 policy cannot be directly modified. However, you can create a new version of the Passfilt.dll file to apply a different set of rules. For more information about how to create your own password filter, see Password Filters. Possible values: Enabled Disabled Not Defined By default, this policy setting is enabled on domain controllers and disabled on stand-alone servers.
Vulnerability
Passwords that contain only alphanumeric characters are extremely easy to discover with several publicly available tools.
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Countermeasure
Configure the Passwords must meet complexity requirements policy setting to Enabled and advise users to use a variety of characters in their passwords. When combined with a Minimum password length of 8, this policy setting ensures that the number of different possibilities for a single password is so great that it is difficult (but not impossible) for a brute force attack to succeed. (If the Minimum password length policy setting is increased, the average amount of time necessary for a successful attack also increases.)
Potential impact
If the default password complexity configuration is retained, additional help desk calls for locked-out accounts could occur because users might not be accustomed to passwords that contain non-alphabetical characters or might have problems entering passwords that contain accented characters or symbols on keyboards with different layouts. However, all users should be able to comply with the complexity requirement with minimal difficulty. If your organization has more stringent security requirements, you can create a custom version of the Passfilt.dll file that allows the use of arbitrarily complex password strength rules. For example, a custom password filter might require the use of non-upper row symbols. (Upper row symbols are those that require you to press and hold the SHIFT key and then press any of the digits between 1 and 0.) A custom password filter might also perform a dictionary check to verify that the proposed password does not contain common dictionary words or fragments. The use of ALT key character combinations can greatly enhance the complexity of a password. However, such stringent password requirements can result in increased Help Desk requests. Alternatively, your organization could consider a requirement for all administrator passwords to use ALT characters in the 01280159 range. (ALT characters outside of this range can represent standard alphanumeric characters that would not add additional complexity to the password.)
Store password using reversible encryption for all users in the domain
This policy setting determines whether the following Windows operating systems use reversible encryption when they store passwords: Windows Server 2008 R2 Windows Server 2008 Windows Server 2003 Windows 2000 Server Windows 7 Professional
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Windows 7 Ultimate Windows 7 Enterprise Windows Vista Business N Windows Vista Ultimate Windows Vista Enterprise Windows XP Professional Windows 2000 Professional The Store password using reversible encryption for all users in the domain policy setting provides support for application protocols that require knowledge of the user's password for authentication purposes. However, encrypted passwords that are stored in a way that is reversible can potentially be decrypted by an attack that obtains the encrypted version and is able to find the encryption key. Also, a successful brute force attack could obtain not only a usable password (one that is able to perform authentications to the domain), but one that is identical to the actual user's password (which could give insight into the user's password selection criteria, or be usable in other systems that are sharing the same password). A knowledgeable attacker who was able to break this encryption could then log on to network resources with the compromised account. Caution Do not enable this policy setting unless business requirements outweigh the need to protect password information. Use of Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP) through remote access or Internet Authentication Service (IAS) services requires that this policy setting be enabled. CHAP is an authentication protocol that can be used by Microsoft Remote Access and Network Connections. It is also required when using Digest authentication in Internet Information Services (IIS). Both IAS and IIS support more secure methods of authentication that do not require reversible encryption. If possible, move those services to a different authentication protocol instead of enabling this policy setting. Possible values: Enabled Disabled Not Defined
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Enabling this policy setting allows the operating system to store passwords in a format that can weaken your overall security.
Countermeasure
Disable the Store password using reversible encryption for all users in the domain policy setting.
Potential impact
If your organization uses either the CHAP authentication protocol through remote access or IAS services or Digest authentication in IIS, you must configure this policy setting to Enabled. Application of this policy through Group Policy on a user-by-user basis increases security risks because it requires the appropriate user account object to be opened in Active Directory Users and Computers.
Not Defined This policy setting is dependent on the Account lockout threshold policy setting that is being defined, and it must be greater than or equal to the value specified for the Reset lockout counter after policy setting.
Vulnerability
A denial-of-service (DoS) condition can be created if an attacker abuses the Account lockout threshold and repeatedly attempts to log on with a specific account. After you configure the Account lockout threshold policy setting, the account will be locked after the specified number of failed attempts. If you configure the Account lockout duration policy setting to 0, the account remains locked until an administrator unlocks it manually.
Countermeasure
Configure the Account lockout duration policy setting to an appropriate value for your environment. To specify that the account will remain locked until an administrator manually unlocks it, configure the value to 0. When the Account lockout duration policy setting is configured to a non-zero value, automated attempts to guess account passwords are delayed for this interval before resuming attempts against a specific account. Using this policy setting in combination with the Account lockout threshold policy setting makes automated password guessing attempts more difficult.
Potential impact
Although it may seem like a good idea to configure the Account lockout duration policy setting to 0 so that accounts cannot be automatically unlocked, such a configuration can increase the number of requests that your organization's Help Desk receives to unlock accounts that were locked by mistake.
repeated failed password attempts to unlock the workstation count against the account lockout threshold. Possible values: User-defined value between 0 and 999 Not Defined The default value for this policy setting is 0.
Vulnerability
Online brute force password attacks can use automated methods to try millions of password combinations for any user account. The effectiveness of such attacks can be almost eliminated if you limit the number of failed logons that can be performed. However, a DoS attack could be performed on a domain that has an account lockout threshold configured. An attacker could programmatically attempt a series of password attacks against all users in the organization. If the number of attempts is greater than the account lockout threshold, the attacker might be able to lock out every account without needing any special privileges or being authenticated in the network. Note Offline password attacks are not countered by this policy setting.
Countermeasure
Because vulnerabilities can exist when this value is configured as well as when it is not configured, two distinct countermeasures are defined. Any organization should weigh the choice between the two, based on their identified threats and the risks that they want to mitigate. The two countermeasure options are: Configure the Account lockout threshold policy setting to 0. This configuration ensures that accounts will not be locked out, and it prevents a DoS attack that intentionally attempts to lock out accounts. This configuration also helps reduce Help Desk calls because users cannot accidentally lock themselves out of their accounts. Because it does not prevent a brute force attack, this configuration should be chosen only if both of the following criteria are explicitly met: The password policy requires all users to have complex passwords of 8 or more characters. A robust audit mechanism is in place to alert administrators when a series of failed logons occur in the environment.
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Configure the Account Lockout Threshold policy setting to a sufficiently high value to provide users with the ability to accidentally mistype their password several times before the account is locked, but ensure that a brute force password attack still locks the account. A good recommendation for such a configuration is 50 invalid logon attempts, which prevents accidental account lockouts and reduces the number of Help Desk calls, but does not prevent a DoS attack. We recommend this option if your organization cannot implement complex password requirements and an audit policy that alerts administrators to a series of failed logon attempts. Using this type of policy must be accompanied by a good, fast process that can be implemented to unlock locked accounts when needed on weekends, at night, or during holidays to help mitigate massive lockouts caused by an attack on your systems.
Potential impact
If this policy setting is enabled, a locked-out account is not usable until it is reset by an administrator or until the account lockout duration expires. This policy setting will likely generate a number of additional Help Desk calls. In fact, locked accounts cause the greatest number of calls to the Help Desk in many organizations. If you configure the Account lockout threshold policy to 0, there is a possibility that an attacker's attempt to discover passwords with a brute force password attack might go undetected if a robust audit mechanism is not in place. If you configure this policy setting to a number greater than zero, an attacker can easily lock out any accounts for which the account name is known. This is especially dangerous considering that no privileges other than access to the network are necessary to lock the accounts.
Users can accidentally lock themselves out of their accounts if they mistype their password multiple times.
Countermeasure
Configure the Reset account lockout counter after policy setting to 30.
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Potential impact
If you do not configure this policy setting or if the value is configured to an interval that is too long, an attacker could attempt to log on to each user's account numerous times and lock out their accounts, a DoS attack might succeed, or administrators might have to manually unlock all locked-out accounts. If you configure this policy setting to a reasonable value, users can perform new attempts to log on after a failed logon within a reasonable time, without making brute force attacks feasible at high speeds. Be sure that you notify users of the values that are used for this policy setting so that they wait for the lockout timer to expire before they call the Help Desk.
Enabled Disabled Not Defined The default value for this policy setting is Enabled.
Vulnerability
If you disable this policy setting, users could receive session tickets for services that they no longer have the right to use because the right was removed after they logged on.
Countermeasure
If you configure the value for the Maximum lifetime for service ticket policy setting too high, users might be able to access network resources outside of their logon hours. Also, users whose
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accounts were disabled might continue to have access to network services with valid service tickets that were issued before their accounts were disabled.
Countermeasure
Configure the Maximum lifetime for service ticket policy setting to 600 minutes.
Potential impact
If you configure the value for the Maximum lifetime for user ticket policy setting too high, users might be able to access network resources outside of their logon hours. Also, users whose accounts were disabled might continue to have access to network services with valid user tickets that were issued before their accounts were disabled. If you configure this value too low, ticket requests to the KDC may affect the performance of your KDC and present an opportunity for a DoS attack.
Countermeasure
Configure the Maximum lifetime for user ticket policy setting with a value between 4 and 10 hours.
Potential impact
Reducing this policy setting from the default value reduces the likelihood that the TGT will be used to access resources that the user does not have rights to. However, it requires more frequent requests to the KDC for TGTs on behalf of users. Most KDCs can support a value of 4 hours without too much additional burden.
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If the value for the Maximum lifetime for user ticket renewal policy setting is too high, users might be able to renew very old user tickets.
Countermeasure
Configure the Maximum lifetime for user ticket renewal policy setting to 7 days.
Potential impact
To prevent "replay attacks," which are attacks in which an authentication credential is resubmitted by a malicious user or program to gain access to a protected resource, the Kerberos
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authentication protocol uses time stamps as part of its protocol definition. For time stamps to work properly, the clocks of the client computer and the domain controller need to be closely synchronized. Because the clocks of two computers are often not synchronized, administrators can use this policy to establish the maximum acceptable difference for the Kerberos protocol between the clocks on the client computer and a domain controller. If the difference between the clocks is less than the maximum time difference that is specified in this policy setting, any time stamp that is used in a session between the two computers is considered to be authentic.
Countermeasure
Configure the Maximum tolerance for computer clock synchronization policy setting to 5 minutes.
Potential impact
Additional references
The following links provide additional information about topics that relate to securing domain controllers that run Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, and Windows Server 2008 R2: Modify Security Policies in Default Domain Controllers Policy Best Practice Guide for Securing Windows Server Active Directory Installations
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Note For instructions on how to use Auditpol.exe to create detailed audit policies for computers running Windows Vista and how to distribute those setting by using a script, see article 921469 in the Microsoft Knowledge Base. The nine local audit policy settings under Security Settings\Local Policies\Audit Policy can still be used if client computers do not support advanced audit policy settings. However, where possible it is recommended that you use the more precise auditing capabilities that are provided by the advanced audit policy settings. Important Using both the basic audit policy settings under Security Settings\Local Policies\Audit Policy and the advanced settings under Advanced Audit Policy Configuration can cause unexpected results. Therefore, the two sets of audit policy settings should not be combined. If you use the Advanced Audit Policy Configuration settings, you should enable the Audit: Force audit policy subcategory settings (Windows Vista or later) policy setting under Security Settings\Local Policies\Security Options. This setting will override audit policy settings under Security Settings\Local Policies\Audit Policy and prevent conflicts between similar settings by forcing basic security auditing to be ignored. For more information about using the basic security audit policy, see the Audit Policy section of Threats and Countermeasures Guide: Security Settings in Windows Server 2008 and Windows Vista . When you implement advanced audit policy settings: Specify the categories and subcategories of the events that you want to audit. The event categories and subcategories that you select constitute your audit policy. Set the size and behavior of the Security log. You can view the Security log with Event Viewer. Determine which objects you want to audit access of and what type of access you want to audit, if you want to audit directory service access or object access. For example, if you want to audit all attempts by users to open a particular file, you can configure audit policy settings in the object access event category so that both successful and failed attempts to read a file are recorded. The Security log records an audit event whenever users perform certain specified actions. For example, the modification of a file or a policy can trigger an event that shows the action that was performed, the associated user account, and the date and time of the action. These events can be both successful and failed attempts to perform actions.
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Regular security analyses enable administrators to track and determine whether adequate security measures are in effect for each computer as part of an enterprise risk management program. Such analyses focus on highly specific information about all aspects of a computer that relate to security, which administrators can use to adjust the security levels. More important, this information can help detect any security oversights that may occur in the computer over time. For example, security levels may be temporarily changed to enable immediate resolution of an administration or network issue. However, such changes are often forgotten and never undone. If security levels are not properly reset, a computer may no longer meet the requirements for enterprise security. Establishing and enabling audit policy settings that record deviations from your enterprise security policy are extremely important for any enterprise network. Audit logs may provide the only indication that a security breach has occurred by recording changes on file permissions, installation of programs, and escalation of privileges. Even if the breach is discovered by means other than auditing, proper audit settings can generate an audit log that may contain important information about the breach, how it occurred, and which systems were affected. In many cases, failure events are much more informative than success events because failures typically indicate errors. For example, successful logon to a computer by a user would typically be considered normal. However, if someone unsuccessfully tries to log on to a computer multiple times, it may indicate an attacker's attempt to break into the computer with someone else's account credentials. The Event Log in Group Policy is used to define attributes that relate to the Application, Security, and System logs, such as maximum log size, access rights for each log, and retention settings and methods. Auditing events are stored in the Security event log. For more information about the Event Log, see the Threats and Countermeasures Guide: Event Log section in this guide. Before any audit processes are implemented, an organization should determine how to collect, organize, and analyze the data. There is little value in large volumes of audit data if there is no underlying plan to use it. Also consider that audit settings can affect computer performance. The effect of a given combination of settings may be negligible on an end-user computer but quite noticeable on a busy server. Therefore, you should perform some performance tests before you deploy new audit settings in your production environment. A final consideration is the amount of storage space that you can allocate to store the data that is collected during auditing. Depending on the setting you choose, auditing data can accumulate quickly and can fill up available disk space. The following sections describe the options and issues for configuring advanced security audit policy settings for better system management and security.
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Vulnerability
If audit policy settings are not configured, it can be difficult or impossible to determine what occurred during a security incident. However, if security audit policy settings are configured so that events are generated for all activities, the Security log will be filled with data and difficult to use. Also, you can use a large amount of data storage as well as adversely affect overall computer performance if you configure audit policy settings for a large number of objects. If failure auditing is used and the Audit: Shut down system immediately if unable to log security audits policy setting in the Security Options section of Group Policy is enabled, an attacker could generate millions of failure events such as logon failures to fill the Security log and force the computer to shut down, creating a denial-of-service (DoS). If security logs are allowed to be overwritten, an attacker can overwrite part or all of their activity by generating large numbers of events so that the evidence of their intrusion is overwritten.
Countermeasure
Enable advanced security audit policy settings that support the organizational security policy for all the computers in your organization. Identify the components that you need to monitor to enable your organization to hold users accountable for their actions while they use organizational resources. These components should allow IT departments to detect unauthorized activity efficiently and track events in log files. For more information about identifying security auditing priorities, and selecting and implementing security auditing settings to address those needs, see Planning and Deploying Advanced Security Auditing Policies.
Potential impact
If no audit policy settings are configured or if audit settings are too lax on the computers in your organization, security incidents might not be detected or not enough evidence will be available for network forensic analysis after security incidents occur. However, if audit settings are too detailed, critically important entries in the Security log may be obscured by the large number of log entries created by routine activities and computer performance, and the available amount of
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data storage may be seriously affected. Companies that operate in certain regulated industries may have legal obligations to log certain events or activities. Important Applying advanced audit policy settings replaces any comparable basic or local security audit policy settings. If you subsequently change the advanced audit policy setting to Not configured, you will need to complete the following steps to restore the original basic security audit policy settings: 1. Confirm that all Advanced Audit Policy settings are set to Not configured. 2. Delete all audit.csv files from the %SYSVOL% folder on the domain controller. 3. Reconfigure and apply local security audit policy settings.
Description
Default setting
This security policy setting Not configured determines whether the operating system generates audit events on credentials that are submitted for a user
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Name
Description account logon request. These events occur on the computer that is authoritative for the credentials. For domain accounts, the domain controller is authoritative. For local accounts, the local computer is authoritative. Because domain accounts are used much more frequently than local accounts in enterprise environments, most of the Account Logon events in a domain environment occur on the domain controllers that are authoritative for the domain accounts. However, these events can occur on any computer, and they may occur in conjunction with Logon/Logoff events, or on separate computers.
Default setting
This security policy setting Not configured allows you to generate audit events for Kerberos authentication ticket-granting ticket (TGT) requests. If you configure this policy setting, an audit event is generated after a Kerberos protocol authentication TGT request. Success audits record successful attempts and Failure audits record unsuccessful attempts.
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Description
Default setting
This security policy setting Not configured determines whether the operating system generates security audit events for Kerberos protocol service ticket requests. Events are generated every time Kerberos is used to authenticate a user who attempts to access a protected network resource. Kerberos protocol service ticket operation audit events can be used to track user activity. This security policy setting Not configured allows you to audit events that are generated by responses to credential requests submitted for a user account logon that are not credential validation or Kerberos protocol tickets. Examples include new Remote Desktop sessions and Remote Desktop disconnections, locking and unlocking a workstation, invoking or dismissing a screen saver, detection of a Kerberos protocol replay attack, in which a Kerberos protocol request with identical information was received twice, access to a wireless network that is granted to a user or computer account, or access to a wired 802.1x network that is granted
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Name
Default setting
Description This security policy setting determines whether the operating system generates audit events when application group management tasks are performed, such as when an application group is created, changed, or deleted; or a member is added to or removed from an application group. This security policy setting determines whether the operating system generates audit events when a computer account is created, changed, or deleted. This policy setting is useful for tracking account-related changes to computers that are members of a
Not configured
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Name
Description domain.
Default setting
This security policy setting determines whether the operating system generates audit events when a distribution group is created, changed, or deleted; or a member is added to or removed from a distribution group. These audit events are only logged on domain controllers. This security policy setting determines whether the operating system generates user account management audit events when: The password hash of an account is accessed. This typically happens when the Active Directory Migration Tool (ADMT) is moving password data. The Password Policy Checking application programming interface (API) is called. Calls to this function could be part of an attack from a malicious application that is testing whether password complexity policy settings are being applied. Changes are made to domain policy under Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Account Policies\Password Policy or Computer Configuration\Windows
Not configured
Not configured
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Name
Default setting
This security policy setting determines whether the operating system generates audit events when a security group is created, changed, or deleted; a member is added to or removed from a security group; or a group's type is changed. Security groups can be used for access control permissions and also as distribution lists.
Success
This security policy setting Success determines whether the operating system generates audit events when a user account is created, changed, deleted, renamed, disabled, enabled, locked out, or unlocked; a user account password is set or changed; a security identifier (SID) history is added to a user account; the Directory Services Restore Mode password is set; permissions on accounts that are members of administrators groups are changed; or Credential Manager credentials are backed up or restored. This policy setting is essential for tracking events that involve provisioning and managing user
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Name
Description accounts.
Default setting
Description This security policy setting determines whether the operating system generates audit events when encryption or decryption calls are made into the data protection application interface (DPAPI), which is used to protect secret information such as stored passwords and key information. For more information about DPAPI, see Windows Data Protection. This security policy setting determines whether the operating system generates audit events when a process is
Not configured
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Name
Description created (starts), and the name of the program or user that created it.
Default setting
This security policy setting allows you to generate audit events when an attempt is made to end a process. Success audits record successful attempts and Failure audits record unsuccessful attempts. If you do not configure this policy setting, no audit event is generated when a process ends. This security policy setting determines whether the operating system generates audit events when inbound remote procedure call (RPC) connections are made.
Not configured
Not configured
and configure SACLs on directory objects, a large volume of entries can be generated in the Security logs on domain controllers. You should enable these settings only if you actually intend to use the information that is created. Note You can configure a SACL on an Active Directory object through the Security tab in that object's Properties dialog box. This method is analogous to Audit object access, except that it applies only to Active Directory objects and not to file system and registry objects. The following table describes the settings that are included in this category and their default settings. For more information about the events that are generated by these settings, see the Security Audit Policy Reference.
Description
Default setting
This security policy setting can be Not configured used to generate security audit events with detailed tracking information about the data that is replicated between domain controllers. This audit subcategory can be useful to diagnose replication issues, but it can create a very high volume of event data. This security policy setting determines whether the operating system generates events when an Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS) object is accessed. Important Audit events will only be generated on objects with configured SACLs, and only when they are
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Not configured
Name
Default setting
This security policy setting determines whether the operating system generates audit events when objects in AD DS are created, deleted, modified, moved, or undeleted. Changes to Active Directory objects are important events to track to understand the state of the network policy. Directory Service Changes auditing, where appropriate, indicates the old and new values of the changed properties of the objects that were changed. Important Audit events will only be generated on objects with configured SACLs, and only when they are accessed in a manner that matches the SACL settings.
Not configured
This security policy setting determines whether the operating system generates audit events when replication between two domain controllers begins and ends.
Not configured
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Description
Default setting
This security policy setting Success allows you to audit security events that are generated by a failed attempt to log on to an account that is locked out. Account lockout events are essential for understanding user activity and detecting potential attacks. This security policy setting determines whether the operating system generates audit events for the results of the Internet Key Exchange Not configured
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Name
Description (IKE) protocol and Authenticated Internet Protocol (AuthIP) during Extended Mode negotiations.
Default setting
This security policy setting Not configured determines whether the operating system generates events for the results of the IKE protocol and AuthIP during Main Mode negotiations. This security policy setting determines whether the operating system generates audit events for the results of the IKE protocol and AuthIP during Quick Mode negotiations. Not configured
Audit Logoff
This security policy setting Success determines whether the operating system generates Note audit events when logon There is no failure event sessions are terminated. These in this subcategory events occur on the computer because failed logoffs that was accessed. In the case (such as when a system of an interactive logon, these abruptly shuts down) do would be generated on the not generate an audit computer that was logged on record. to. Logon events are essential to understanding user activity and detecting potential attacks. Logoff events are not 100 percent reliable. For example, the computer can be
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Name
Description turned off without a proper logoff and shutdown taking place; in this case, a logoff event will not be generated.
Default setting
Audit Logon
This security policy setting Success for client computers determines whether the Success and Failure for servers operating system generates audit events when a user attempts to log on to a computer. For an interactive logon, events are generated on the computer that was logged on to. For network logon, such as accessing a share, events are generated on the computer hosting the resource that was accessed. Logon events are essential to tracking user activity and detecting potential attacks.
This security policy setting determines whether the operating system generates audit events for RADIUS (IAS) and Network Access Protection (NAP) activity on user access requests (Grant, Deny, Discard, Quarantine, Lock, and Unlock). NAP events can be used to understand the overall health of the network.
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Description
Default setting
This security policy setting Not configured determines whether the operating system generates audit events for other logon or logoff events, such as when a Remote Desktop session disconnects or connects, a workstation is locked or unlocked, a screen saver is invoked or dismissed, a user is granted access to a wireless network, a user is granted access to a wired 802.1x network, or a replay attack is detected. The latter indicates that a Kerberos protocol request was received twice with identical information. This condition could also be caused by network misconfiguration. This security policy setting Success determines whether the operating system generates audit events when a special logon is used or a member of a special group logs on. A special logon is a logon that has administrator-equivalent privileges, and it can be used to elevate a process to a higher level. Special Groups is a Windows feature that enables the administrator to find out when
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Name
Description a member of a certain group has logged on. The administrator can set a list of group security identifiers (SIDs) in the registry. If any of these SIDs is added to a token during logon and this auditing subcategory is enabled, a security event is logged. For more information about this feature, see article 947223 in the Microsoft Knowledge Base. Users who hold special privileges can potentially make changes to the system. It is recommended to track their activity.
Default setting
on the target computer, and then you must set SACLs on the specific metabase objects that you want to monitor. If you do not configure the policy settings in this category selectively, a large volume of entries can be generated in the Security logs on computers in your organization. Therefore, you should only enable these settings if you actually intend to use the information that is logged. Note You must perform a two-step process to enable auditing an object, such as a file, folder, printer, or registry key. After you enable the Audit object access policy, you must modify the SACLs of the objects that you want to monitor. For example, to audit any attempts by users to open a particular file, you can configure a Success or Failure audit attribute directly on the file that you want to monitor for that particular event by using Windows Explorer or Group Policy. The following table describes the settings that are included in this category and their default settings. For more information about the events that are generated by these settings, see the Security Audit Policy Reference.
Description
Default setting
This security policy setting Not configured determines whether the operating system generates audit events when applications attempt to use the Windows Auditing application programming interfaces (APIs) to create, delete, or initialize an application client context, or for application operations. The level, volume, relevance, and importance of these audit events depend on the application that is generating them. The operating system logs the events as they are generated by the application. This security policy setting Not configured
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Name
Description generates events when a wide variety of Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) operations are performed, such as when AD CS starts, shuts down, is backed up, or is restored; certificates are requested, issued, or revoked; and security permissions for AD CS role services are modified.
Default setting
This security policy setting allows you to audit attempts to access files and folders on a shared folder. Detailed File Share audit events include detailed information about the permissions or other criteria that are used to grant or deny access. Note The Detailed File Share setting logs an event every time a file or folder is accessed, whereas the File Share setting only records one event for any connection that is established between a client computer and file share.
Not configured
This security policy setting determines whether the operating system generates audit events when a shared folder is accessed. Audit events are not
Not configured
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Name
Description generated when shared folders are created, deleted, or when share folder permissions change. Combined with File System auditing, File Share auditing allows you to track what content was accessed, the source (IP address and port) of the request, and the user account that was used for access.
Default setting
This security policy setting Not configured determines whether the operating system audits user attempts to access file system objects. These events are essential for tracking activity for file objects that are sensitive or valuable, and these events require extra monitoring. Note Audit events are only generated for objects that have configured SACLs, and only if the type of access requested (such as Write, Read, or Modify) and the account that makes the request match the settings in the SACL.
This security policy setting determines whether the operating system generates audit events when connections are allowed or blocked by the
Not configured
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Name
Description Windows Filtering Platform, such as when an application is blocked from accepting incoming connections, a connection is allowed or blocked, a binding to a local port is allowed or blocked, or an application or service is allowed or blocked from listening on a port for incoming connections.
Default setting
This security policy setting allows Not configured you to audit packets that are dropped by the Windows Filtering Platform. A high rate of dropped packets may indicate attempts to gain unauthorized access to computers on your network. This security policy setting Not configured determines whether the operating system generates audit events when a handle to an object is opened or closed. Enabling Audit Handle Manipulation also enables the logging of "reason for access" data within generated events. Only objects with configured SACLs generate these events, and only if the attempted handle operation matches the SACL. Note Handle Manipulation events are only generated for object types where
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Name
Description the corresponding File System or Registry Object Access subcategory is enabled. For more information, see Audit File System or Audit Registry.
Default setting
This security policy setting allows you to audit attempts to access the system kernel, which include mutexes and semaphores. Only kernel objects with a matching SACL generate security audit events. Note The audits generated are usually only useful to developers.
Not configured
This security policy setting determines whether the operating system generates audit events for the management of Task Scheduler jobs or COM+ objects. This security policy setting determines whether the operating system audits user attempts to access registry objects. Audit events are only generated for objects that have configured SACLs specified, and only if the type of access requested (such as Write, Read, or Modify) and the account that
Not configured
Audit Registry
Not configured
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Name
Default setting
Audit SAM
This security policy setting allows Not configured you to audit events that are generated by attempts to access Security Accounts Manager (SAM) objects including SAM_ALIAS (a local group), SAM_GROUP (a group that is not a local group), SAM_USER (a user account), SAM_DOMAIN (a domain), and SAM_SERVER (a computer account).
Description This security policy setting determines whether the operating system generates audit events when changes are made to the
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Name
Description audit policy, including permissions and audit settings on the audit policy object, changing the system audit policy, registration and deregistration of security event sources, changing per-user audit settings, changing the value of CrashOnAuditFail, and changing audit settings on an object.
Default setting
This security policy setting Success determines whether the operating system generates audit events when changes are made to authentication policy, including creation, modification, and removal of forest and domain trusts; changes to the Kerberos protocol policy under Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Account Policies\Kerberos Policy, or namespace collision, such as when an added trust collides with an existing namespace name. In addition, audit events are logged when any of the following user rights are granted to a user or group: Access this computer from the network, Allow logon locally, Allow logon through Remote Desktop, Logon as a batch job, or Logon as a service. Note This setting is useful for
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Name
Description tracking changes in domain and forest level trust and for privileges that are granted to user accounts or groups.
Default setting
This security policy setting Not configured determines whether the operating system generates audit events when user rights are assigned or removed, and when the Encrypting File System (EFS) policy is changed. Not configured
Audit Filtering Platform Policy This security policy setting determines whether the operating Change system generates audit events for IPsec services status changes, changes to IPsec settings, changes to the Windows Filtering Platform engine and providers, and IPsec Policy Agent service activities. Audit MPSSVC Rule-Level Policy Change
This security policy setting Not configured determines whether the operating system generates audit events when changes are made to policy rules for the Microsoft Protection Service (MPSSVC.exe), which is used by Windows Firewall. The tracked activities include active policies when the Windows Firewall service starts; changes to the Windows Firewall settings, Group Policy settings, rules, and exception list; and rules ignored or not applied by the Windows Firewall service.
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Name
Description Note Changes to firewall rules are important to understand the security state of the computer and how well it is protected against network attacks.
Default setting
This security policy setting Not configured determines whether the operating system generates events for security policy changes that are not otherwise audited in the Policy Change category, such as Trusted Platform Module (TPM) configuration changes, kernelmode cryptographic self-tests, and cryptographic provider operations.
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Description
Default setting
This security policy setting Not configured allows you to audit events that are generated when a privileged service is called or when sensitive user rights such as the following are used: Act as part of the operating system Back up files and directories Create a token object Debug programs Impersonate a client after authentication Manage auditing and security log Take ownership of files or other objects
This security policy setting allows you to audit events that are generated by the use of non-sensitive user rights, such as: Access Credential Manager as a trusted caller Access this computer from the network Add workstations to the domain Allow log on locally
Not configured
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Name
Description Change the system time Force shutdown from a remote system Perform volume maintenance tasks
Default setting
This security policy setting is not Not configured used in this version of Windows.
System
This category of audit policy settings enables auditing the restart or shutdown of users' computers, or events that affect either computer security or the Security log. For example, if malicious software tried to change a setting on your computer without your permission, System event auditing would record it. Note Because few additional events are recorded if both failure and success audits are enabled for system events, and because all such events are very significant, you should enable these policy settings on all computers in your organization. The following table describes the settings that are included in this category and their default settings. For more information about the events that are generated by these settings, see the Security Audit Policy Reference.
Description This security policy setting determines whether the operating system audits the activities of the IPsec driver, and it reports any of the following events: Startup and shutdown of IPsec services
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Name
Description Packets that are dropped due to integrity check failure Packets that are dropped due to replay check failure Packets that are dropped due to being in plaintext Packets that are received with an incorrect Security Parameter Index (SPI). (This can indicate malfunctioning hardware or interoperability problems.) Failure to process IPsec filters Security A high rate of packet drops by the IPsec filter driver may indicate attempts to gain access to the network by unauthorized systems.
Default setting
This security policy setting determines whether the operating system audits the startup and shutdown of the Windows Firewall service and driver, security policy processing by the Windows Firewall service, and cryptography key file and migration operations.
Audit Security State Change This security policy setting determines whether the operating system audits changes in the security state of a system, and it reports system startup and
Success
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Name
Description shutdown, changes of system time, and system recovery from CrashOnAuditFail. Important Some auditable activity may not be recorded when a system reboots due to CrashOnAuditFail.
Default setting
This security policy setting determines whether the operating system audits events that are related to security system extensions. This can include when a security extension code is loaded (such as an authentication, notification, or security package). It also includes when a service is installed. An audit log is generated when a service is registered with the Service Control Manager. The audit log contains information about the service name, binary, type, start type, and service account. Important Attempts to install or load security system extensions or services that are critical system events that could indicate a security breach. These events are expected to appear more often on a domain controller than on client computers
Not configured
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Name
Default setting
This security policy setting Success and Failure determines whether the operating system audits events that violate the integrity of the security subsystem, which can include any of the following events: Audited events are lost due to a failure of the auditing system. A process uses an invalid local procedure call (LPC) port in an attempt to impersonate a client computer, reply to a client computers address space, read to a client computers address space, or write from a client computers address space. A remote procedure call (RPC) integrity violation is detected. A code integrity violation with an invalid hash value of an executable file is detected. Cryptographic tasks are performed. Important Violations of security subsystem integrity are critical and could indicate a potential security attack.
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Description This security policy setting allows you to configure a global SACL on the file system for an entire computer. Note This policy setting must be used in combination with the File System security policy setting
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Name
Default setting
Registry
This security policy setting allows you to configure a global SACL on the registry for a computer. Note This policy setting must be used in combination with the Registry security policy setting under Object Access.
Not configured
Additional references
The following links provide additional information about security audit policy settings: For more security audit policy information, see Security Auditingin the Windows Server 2008 and Windows Server 2008 R2 Technical Library. For an overview of Windows Server 2008 auditing and compliance issues, see the TechNet magazine article Auditing and Compliance in Windows Server 2008. Security Audit Events for Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2 is a downloadable reference spreadsheet that lists all events that appear in the Security log and are logged with a source of Security-Auditing. Article 947223 in the Microsoft Knowledge Base describes how to audit when members of identified special groups log on to the computer.
and can override permissions that have been set on specific objects. Privileges are managed in Group Policy under User Rights Assignment. An example of a logon right is the ability to log on to a computer locally. An example of a privilege is the ability to shut down the computer. Both types of user rights are assigned by administrators to individual users or groups as part of the security settings for the computer.
Access this computer from the network Act as part of the operating system Add workstations to domain Adjust memory quotas for a process Allow log on locally Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services Back up files and directories Bypass traverse checking
SeBackupPrivilege SeChangeNotifyPrivilege
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Group Policy Setting Change the system time Change the time zone Create a pagefile Create a token object Create global objects Create permanent shared objects Create symbolic links Debug programs Deny access to this computer from the network
Deny log on as a batch job
Constant Name SeSystemtimePrivilege SeTimeZonePrivilege SeCreatePagefilePrivilege SeCreateTokenPrivilege SeCreateGlobalPrivilege SeCreatePermanentPrivilege SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeDenyNetworkLogonRight
Deny log on as a service Deny log on locally Deny log on through Remote Desktop Services Enable computer and user accounts to be trusted for delegation Force shutdown from a remote system Generate security audits Impersonate a client after authentication Increase a process working set
SeEnableDelegationPrivilege
Group Policy Setting Increase scheduling priority Load and unload device drivers Lock pages in memory Log on as a batch job Log on as a service Manage auditing and security log Modify an object label Modify firmware environment values Perform volume maintenance tasks Profile single process Profile system performance Remove computer from docking station Replace a process level token Restore files and directories Shut down the system Synchronize directory service data Take ownership of files or other objects
Constant Name SeIncreaseBasePriorityPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeLockMemoryPrivilege SeBatchLogonRight SeServiceLogonRight SeSecurityPrivilege SeRelabelPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeManageVolumePrivilege SeProfileSingleProcessPrivilege SeSystemProfilePrivilege SeUndockPrivilege SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeShutdownPrivilege SeSyncAgentPrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege
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Vulnerability
If an account is given this right, the user of the account can create an application that calls into Credential Manager and is then provided the credentials for another user.
Countermeasure
Do not define the Access Credential Manager as a trusted caller policy setting for any accounts besides Credential Manager.
Potential impact
None. Not Defined is the default configuration.
Users By default, the members of the following groups have this right on domain controllers: Administrators Authenticated Users Enterprise Domain Controllers Everyone Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access
Vulnerability
Users who can connect from their computer to the network can access resources on target computers for which they have permission. For example, the Access this computer from the network user right is required for users to connect to shared printers and folders. If this user right is assigned to the Everyone group, anyone in the group can read the files in those shared folders. This situation is unlikely because the groups that are created by a default installation of Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7 do not include the Everyone group. However, if a computer is upgraded to Windows Server 2008 R2 or Windows 7 and the original computer includes the Everyone group as part of its defined users and groups, that group is transitioned as part of the upgrade process, and it is present on the system.
Countermeasure
Restrict the Access this computer from the network user right to only those users and groups who require access to the computer. For example, if you configure this policy setting for the Administrators and Users groups, users who log on to the domain can access resources that are shared from servers in the domain if members of the Domain Users group are included in the local Users group.
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Note If you are using IPsec to help secure network communications in your organization, ensure that a group that includes computer accounts is given this right. This right is required for successful computer authentication. Assigning this right to Authenticated Users or Domain Computers meets this requirement.
Potential impact
If you remove the Access this computer from the network user right on domain controllers for all users, no one can log on to the domain or use network resources. If you remove this user right on member servers, users cannot connect to those servers through the network. If you have installed optional components such as ASP.NET or Internet Information Services (IIS), you may need to assign this user right to additional accounts that are required by those components. It is important to verify that authorized users are assigned this user right for the computers that they need to access the network.
Vulnerability
Users with the Act as part of the operating system user right can take complete control of the computer and erase evidence of their activities.
Countermeasure
Restrict the Act as part of the operating system user right to as few accounts as possible, and it should not be assigned to the Administrators group under typical circumstances. When a service
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requires this user right, configure the service to log on with the Local System account, which has this privilege inherently. Do not create a separate account and assign this user right to it.
Potential impact
There should be little or no impact because the Act as part of the operating system user right is rarely needed by any accounts other than the Local System account.
Vulnerability
The Add workstations to domain user right presents a moderate vulnerability. Users with this right could add a computer to the domain that is configured in a way that violates organizational security policies. For example, if your organization does not want its users to have administrative privileges on their computers, a user could install Windows on his or her computer and then add the computer to the domain. The user would know the password for the local administrator account, could log on with that account, and then add his or her domain account to the local Administrators group.
Countermeasure
Configure this setting so that only authorized members of the IT team are allowed to add computers to the domain.
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Potential impact
For organizations that have never allowed users to set up their own computers and add them to the domain, this countermeasure has no impact. For those that have allowed some or all users to configure their own computers, this countermeasure forces the organization to establish a formal process for these procedures going forward. It does not affect existing computers unless they are removed from and re-added to the domain.
Vulnerability
A user with the Adjust memory quotas for a process user right can reduce the amount of memory that is available to any process, which could cause business-critical network applications to become slow or to fail. This privilege could be used to start a denial-of-service (DoS) attack.
Countermeasure
Restrict the Adjust memory quotas for a process user right to users who require it to perform their jobs, such as application administrators who maintain database management systems or domain administrators who manage the organization's directory and its supporting infrastructure.
Potential impact
Organizations that have not restricted users to roles with limited privileges may find it difficult to impose this countermeasure. Also, if you have installed optional components such as ASP.NET
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or IIS, you may need to assign the Adjust memory quotas for a process user right to additional accounts that are required by those components. IIS requires that this privilege be explicitly assigned to the IWAM_<ComputerName>, Network Service, and Service accounts. Otherwise, this countermeasure should have no impact on most computers. Additionally, some applications might require a service account with this user right to run. If this user right is necessary for a user account, it can be assigned to a local computer account instead of to a domain account. Before you remove a user account from the list of accounts with this right, ensure that those user accounts are not being used as service accounts.
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Possible values: User-defined list of accounts Not Defined By default, the members of the following groups have this right on workstations and servers: Administrators Backup Operators Users By default, the members of the following groups have this right on domain controllers: Account Operators Administrators Backup Operators Print Operators Server Operators
Vulnerability
Any account with the Allow log on locally user right can log on to the console of the computer. If you do not restrict this user right to legitimate users who must log on to the console of the computer, unauthorized users could download and run malicious software to elevate their privileges.
Countermeasure
For domain controllers, assign the Allow log on locally user right only to the Administrators group. For other server roles, you may choose to add Backup Operators as well as Administrators. For end-user computers, you should also assign this right to the Users group. Alternatively, you can assign groups such as Account Operators, Server Operators, and Guests to the Deny log on locally user right.
Potential impact
If you remove these default groups, you could limit the abilities of users who are assigned to specific administrative roles in your environment. If you have installed optional components such as ASP.NET or IIS, you may need to assign the Allow log on locally user right to additional
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accounts that are required by those components. IIS requires that this user right be assigned to the IUSR_<ComputerName> account. You should confirm that delegated activities are not adversely affected by any changes that you make to the Allow log on locally user rights assignments.
Vulnerability
Any account with the Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services user right can log on to the remote console of the computer. If you do not restrict this user right to legitimate users who must log on to the console of the computer, unauthorized users could download and run malicious software to elevate their privileges.
Countermeasure
For domain controllers, assign the Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services user right only to the Administrators group. For other server roles and end-user computers, add the Remote Desktop Users group. For servers that have the Remote Desktop (RD) Session Host role service enabled and do not run in Application Server mode, ensure that only authorized IT personnel who must manage the computers remotely belong to either of these groups. Caution For RD Session Host servers that run in Application Server mode, ensure that only users who require access to the server have accounts that belong to the Remote Desktop Users group because this built-in group has this logon right by default.
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Alternatively, you can assign the Deny log on through Remote Desktop Services user right to groups such as Account Operators, Server Operators, and Guests. However, be careful when you use this method because you could block access to legitimate administrators who also belong to a group that has the Deny log on through Remote Desktop Services user right.
Potential impact
Removal of the Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services user right from other groups or membership changes in these default groups could limit the abilities of users who perform specific administrative roles in your environment. You should confirm that delegated activities are not adversely affected.
Vulnerability
Users who can back up data from a computer could take the backup media to a non-domain computer on which they have administrative privileges and restore the data. They could take ownership of the files and view any unencrypted data that is contained within the backup set.
Countermeasure
Restrict the Back up files and directories user right to members of the IT team who must back up organizational data as part of their day-to-day job responsibilities. If you are using backup software that runs under specific service accounts, only these accounts (and not the IT staff) should have the Back up files and directories user right.
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Potential impact
Changes in the membership of the groups that have the Back up files and directories user right could limit the abilities of users who are assigned to specific administrative roles in your environment. You should confirm that authorized backup administrators can still perform backup operations.
Vulnerability
The default configuration for the Bypass traverse checking setting is to allow all users, including the Everyone group, to bypass traverse checking. Permissions to files and folders are controlled though the appropriate configuration of file system access control lists (ACLs) because the ability to traverse the folder does not provide any Read or Write permissions to the user. The only scenario in which the default configuration could lead to a mishap would be if the administrator who configures permissions does not understand how this policy setting works. For example, the administrator might expect that users who are unable to access a folder are unable to access the contents of any child folders. Such a situation is unlikely, and, therefore, this vulnerability presents little risk.
Countermeasure
Organizations that are extremely concerned about security may want to remove the Everyone group, and perhaps the Users group, from the list of groups that have the Bypass traverse checking user right. Taking explicit control over traversal assignments can be an effective way to limit access to sensitive information. Accessbased enumeration can also be used. If you use accessbased enumeration, users cannot see any folder or file to which they do not have access. For more information about this feature, see Access-based Enumeration.
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Potential impact
The Windows operating systems, as well as many applications, were designed with the expectation that anyone who can legitimately access the computer will have this user right. Therefore, we recommend that you thoroughly test any changes to assignments of the Bypass traverse checking user right before you make such changes to production systems. In particular, IIS requires this user right to be assigned to the Network Service, Local Service, IIS_WPG, IUSR_<ComputerName>, and IWAM_<ComputerName> accounts. (It must also be assigned to the ASPNET account through its membership in the Users group.) We recommend that you leave this policy setting at its default configuration.
Vulnerability
Users who can change the time on a computer could cause several problems. For example, time stamps on event log entries could be made inaccurate, time stamps on files and folders that are created or modified could be incorrect, and computers that belong to a domain may not be able to authenticate themselves or users who try to log on to the domain from them. Also, because the Kerberos authentication protocol requires that the requester and authenticator have their clocks synchronized within an administrator-defined skew period, an attacker who changes a computer's time may cause that computer to be unable to obtain or grant Kerberos protocol tickets. The risk from these types of events is mitigated on most domain controllers, member servers, and end-user computers because the Windows Time Service automatically synchronizes time with domain controllers in the following ways: All desktop client computers and member servers use the authenticating domain controller as their inbound time partner.
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All domain controllers in a domain nominate the primary domain controller (PDC) emulator operations master as their inbound time partner. All PDC emulator operations masters follow the hierarchy of domains in the selection of their inbound time partner. The PDC emulator operations master at the root of the domain is authoritative for the organization. Therefore, we recommend that you configure this computer to synchronize with a reliable external time server. This vulnerability becomes much more serious if an attacker is able to change the system time and then stop the Windows Time Service or reconfigure it to synchronize with a time server that is not accurate.
Countermeasure
Restrict the Change the system time user right to users with a legitimate need to change the system time, such as members of the IT team.
Potential impact
There should be no impact because time synchronization for most organizations should be fully automated for all computers that belong to the domain. Computers that do not belong to the domain should be configured to synchronize with an external source.
Vulnerability
Changing the time zone represents little vulnerability because the system time is not affected. This setting merely enables users to display their preferred time zone while being synchronized with domain controllers in different time zones.
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Countermeasure
Countermeasures are not required because system time is not affected by this setting.
Potential impact
None. Not Defined is the default configuration.
Vulnerability
Users who can change the page file size could make it extremely small or move the file to a highly fragmented storage volume, which could cause reduced computer performance.
Countermeasure
Restrict the Create a page file user right to members of the Administrators group.
Potential impact
None. Restricting this right to members of the Administrators group is the default configuration.
This user right is used internally by the operating system; by default, it is not assigned to any user groups.
Vulnerability
Caution A user account that is given this user right has complete control over the system, and it can lead to the system being compromised. We highly recommend that you do not assign any user accounts this right. The operating system examines a user's access token to determine the level of the user's privileges. Access tokens are built when users log on to the local computer or connect to a remote computer over a network. When you revoke a privilege, the change is immediately recorded, but the change is not reflected in the user's access token until the next time the user logs on or connects. Users with the ability to create or modify tokens can change the level of access for any currently logged on account. They could escalate their privileges or create a DoS condition.
Countermeasure
Do not assign the Create a token object user right to any users. Processes that require this user right should use the Local System account, which already includes it, instead of a separate user account that has this user right assigned.
Potential impact
None. Not Defined is the default configuration.
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Vulnerability
Users who can create global objects could affect processes that run under other users' sessions. This capability could lead to a variety of problems, such as application failure or data corruption.
Countermeasure
Restrict the Create global objects user right to members of the local Administrators and Service groups.
Potential impact
None. Restricting the Create global objects user right to members of the local Administrators and Service groups is the default configuration.
Vulnerability
Users who have the Create permanent shared objects user right could create new shared objects and expose sensitive data to the network.
Countermeasure
Do not assign the Create permanent shared objects user right to any users. Processes that require this user right should use the System account, which already includes this user right, instead of a separate user account.
Potential impact
None. Not Defined is the default configuration.
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Vulnerability
Users who have the Create symbolic links user right could inadvertently or maliciously expose your system to symbolic link attacks. Symbolic link attacks can be used to change the permissions on a file, to corrupt data, to destroy data, or as a DoS attack.
Countermeasure
Do not assign the Create symbolic links user right to standard users. Restrict this right to trusted administrators. You can use the fsutil command to establish a symlink file system setting that controls the kind of symbolic links that can be created on a computer. For more information about fsutil and symbolic links, type fsutil behavior set symlinkevaluation /? at an elevated command prompt.
Potential impact
None. Not defined is the default configuration.
Debug programs
This policy setting determines which users can attach to or open any process, even those they do not own. This user right provides access to sensitive and critical operating-system components. Possible values: User-defined list of accounts Not Defined
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Vulnerability
The Debug programs user right can be exploited to capture sensitive computer information from system memory or to access and modify kernel or application structures. Some attack tools exploit this user right to extract hashed passwords and other private security information or to insert rootkit code. By default, the Debug programs user right is assigned only to administrators, which helps mitigate risk from this vulnerability.
Countermeasure
Remove the accounts of all users and groups that do not require the Debug programs user right.
Potential impact
If you revoke this user right, no one can debug programs. However, typical circumstances rarely require this capability on production computers. If a problem arises that requires an application to be debugged on a production server, you can move the server to a different OU temporarily and assign the Debug programs user right to a separate Group Policy for that OU.
Vulnerability
Users who can log on to the computer over the network can enumerate lists of account names, group names, and shared resources. Users with permission to access shared folders and files can connect over the network and possibly view or modify data.
Countermeasure
Assign the Deny access to this computer from the network user right to the following accounts: ANONYMOUS LOGON Built-in local Administrator account Local Guest account All service accounts
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An important exception to this list is any service accounts that are used to start services that must connect to the computer over the network. For example, if you have configured a shared folder for Web servers to access and present content within that folder through a Web site, you may need to allow the account that runs IIS to log on to the server with the shared folder from the network. This user right is particularly effective when you must configure servers and workstations on which sensitive information is handled because of regulatory compliance concerns.
Potential impact
If you configure the Deny access to this computer from the network user right for other groups, you could limit the abilities of users who are assigned to specific administrative roles in your environment. You should verify that delegated tasks are not negatively affected.
Vulnerability
Accounts that have the Deny log on as a batch job user right could be used to schedule jobs that could consume excessive computer resources and cause a DoS condition.
Countermeasure
Assign the Deny log on as a batch job user right to the local Guest account.
Potential impact
If you assign the Deny log on as a batch job user right to other accounts, you could deny users who are assigned to specific administrative roles the ability to perform their required job activities. You should confirm that delegated tasks are not affected adversely.
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Vulnerability
Accounts that can log on as a service could be used to configure and start new unauthorized services, such as a keylogger or other malicious software. The benefit of the specified countermeasure is somewhat reduced by the fact that only users with administrative privileges can install and configure services, and an attacker who has already attained that level of access could configure the service to run with the System account.
Countermeasure
We recommend that you not assign the Deny log on as a service user right to any accounts, which is the default configuration. Organizations that are extremely concerned about security may want to assign this user right to groups and accounts that they are certain will never need to log on as a service.
Potential impact
If you assign the Deny log on as a service user right to specific accounts, services may not start and a DoS condition could result.
Vulnerability
Any account with the ability to log on locally could be used to log on at the console of the computer. If this user right is not restricted to legitimate users who must log on to the console
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of the computer, unauthorized users might download and run malicious software that elevates their privileges.
Countermeasure
Assign the Deny log on locally user right to the local guest account. If you have installed optional components such as ASP.NET, you may want to assign this user right to additional accounts that are required by those components.
Potential impact
If you assign the Deny log on locally user right to additional accounts, you could limit the abilities of users who are assigned to specific roles in your environment. However, this user right should explicitly be assigned to the ASPNET account on computers that are configured with the Web Server role. You should confirm that delegated activities are not adversely affected.
Vulnerability
Any account with the right to log on through Remote Desktop Services could be used to log on to the remote console of the computer. If this user right is not restricted to legitimate users who need to log on to the console of the computer, malicious users might download and run software that elevates their privileges.
Countermeasure
Assign the Deny log on through Remote Desktop Services user right to the built-in local guest account and all service accounts. If you have installed optional components such as ASP.NET, you may want to assign this user right to additional accounts that are required by those components.
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Potential impact
If you assign the Deny log on through Remote Desktop Services user right to other groups, you could limit the abilities of users who are assigned to specific administrative roles in your environment. Accounts that have this user right cannot connect to the computer through Remote Desktop Services or Remote Assistance. You should confirm that delegated tasks are not negatively affected.
Vulnerability
Misuse of the Enable computer and user accounts to be trusted for delegation user right could allow unauthorized users to impersonate other users on the network. An attacker could exploit this privilege to gain access to network resources and make it difficult to determine what has happened after a security incident.
Countermeasure
The Enable computer and user accounts to be trusted for delegation user right should be assigned only if there is a clear need for its functionality. When you assign this right, you should investigate the use of constrained delegation to control what the delegated accounts can do. On domain controllers, this right is assigned to the Administrators group by default. Note
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There is no reason to assign this user right to anyone on member servers and workstations that belong to a domain because it has no meaning in those contexts. It is only relevant on domain controllers and stand-alone computers.
Potential impact
None. Not Defined is the default configuration.
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Vulnerability
Any user who can shut down a computer could cause a DoS condition to occur. Therefore, this user right should be tightly restricted.
Countermeasure
Restrict the Force shutdown from a remote system user right to members of the Administrators group or other specifically assigned roles that require this capability, such as non-administrative operations center staff.
Potential impact
If, on a domain controller, you remove the Force shutdown from a remote system user right from the Server Operator group, you could limit the abilities of users who are assigned to specific administrative roles in your environment. You should confirm that delegated activities are not adversely affected.
Vulnerability
Accounts that can write to the Security log could be used by an attacker to fill that log with meaningless events. If the computer is configured to overwrite events as needed, attackers could use this method to remove evidence of their unauthorized activities. If the computer is configured to shut down when it is unable to write to the Security log and it is not configured to automatically back up the log files, this method could be used to create a DoS condition.
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Countermeasure
Ensure that only the Local Service and Network Service accounts have the Generate security audits user right assigned to them.
Potential impact
None. Restricting the Generate security audits user right to the Local Service and Network Service accounts is the default configuration.
Vulnerability
An attacker with the Impersonate a client after authentication user right could create a service, trick a client computer into connecting to the service, and then impersonate that computer to elevate the attacker's level of access to that of the computer.
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Countermeasure
On member servers, ensure that only the Administrators and Service groups (SERVICE, Local Service, and Network Service) have the Impersonate a client after authentication user right assigned to them.
Potential impact
In most cases, this configuration has no impact. If you have installed optional components such as ASP.NET or IIS, you may need to assign the Impersonate a client after authentication user right to additional accounts that are required by those components, such as IUSR_<ComputerName>, IIS_WPG, ASP.NET, or IWAM_<ComputerName>.
Vulnerability
Increasing the working set size for a process decreases the amount of physical memory that is available to the rest of the system.
Countermeasure
Increase user awareness of the impact of increasing a process working set and how to recognize when their system is adversely affected by changing this setting.
Potential impact
None. Allowing standard users to increase the process working set is the default configuration.
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Vulnerability
A user who is assigned this user right could increase the scheduling priority of a process to RealTime, which would leave little processing time for all other processes and could lead to a DoS condition.
Countermeasure
Verify that only Administrators have the Increase scheduling priority user right assigned to them.
Potential impact
None. Restricting the Increase scheduling priority user right to members of the Administrators group is the default configuration.
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Vulnerability
Device drivers run as highly privileged code. A user who has the Load and unload device drivers user right could unintentionally install malicious software that masquerades as a device driver. Administrators should exercise greater care and install only drivers with verified digital signatures. Note You must have this user right or be a member of the local Administrators group to install a new driver for a local printer or to manage a local printer and configure defaults for options such as duplex printing.
Countermeasure
Do not assign the Load and unload device drivers user right to any user or group other than Administrators on member servers. On domain controllers, do not assign this user right to any user or group other than Domain Admins.
Potential impact
If you remove the Load and unload device drivers user right from the Print Operators group or other accounts, you could limit the abilities of users who are assigned to specific administrative roles in your environment. You should ensure that delegated tasks are not negatively affected.
Vulnerability
Users with the Lock pages in memory user right could assign physical memory to several processes, which could leave little or no RAM for other processes and result in a DoS condition.
Countermeasure
Do not assign the Lock pages in memory user right to any accounts.
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Potential impact
None. Not Defined is the default configuration.
Vulnerability
The Log on as a batch job user right presents a low-risk vulnerability. For most organizations, the default setting of Not Defined is sufficient. Members of the local Administrators group have this right by default.
Countermeasure
You should allow the computer to manage this logon right automatically if you want to allow scheduled tasks to run for specific user accounts. If you do not want to use the Task Scheduler in this manner, configure the Log on as a batch job user right for only the Local Service account. For IIS servers, you should configure this policy locally instead of through domainbased Group Policy settings so that you can ensure that the local IUSR_<ComputerName> and IWAM_<ComputerName> accounts have this logon right.
Potential impact
If you configure the Log on as a batch job setting by using domain-based Group Policy settings, the computer cannot assign the user right to accounts that are used for scheduled jobs in the Task Scheduler. If you install optional components such as ASP.NET or IIS, you may need to assign this user right to additional accounts that are required by those components. For example, IIS requires assignment of this user right to the IIS_WPG group and the IUSR_<ComputerName>, ASPNET, and IWAM_<ComputerName> accounts. If this user right is
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not assigned to this group and these accounts, IIS cannot run some COM objects that are necessary for proper functionality.
Log on as a service
This policy setting determines which service accounts can register a process as a service. In Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7, only the Network Service account has this right by default. Any service that runs under a separate user account must be assigned this user right. Possible values: User-defined list of accounts Not Defined
Vulnerability
Log on as a service allows accounts to start network services or services that run continuously on a computer, even when no one is logged on to the console. The risk is reduced by the fact that only users with administrative privileges can install and configure services. An attacker who has already attained that level of access could configure the service to run with the Local System account.
Countermeasure
By definition, the Network Service account has the Log on as a service user right. This right is not granted through the Group Policy setting. You should minimize the number of other accounts that are granted this user right.
Potential impact
On most computers, restricting the Log on as a service user right to the Local System, Local Service, and Network Service built-in accounts is the default configuration, and there is no negative impact. However, if you have installed optional components such as ASP.NET or IIS, you may need to assign the Log on as a service user right to additional accounts that are required by those components. IIS requires that this user right be explicitly granted to the ASPNET user account.
Viewer. For more information about audit policy, see the Threats and Countermeasures Guide: Advanced Security Audit Policy section of this guide. Possible values: User-defined list of accounts Not Defined
Vulnerability
Anyone with the Manage auditing and security log user right can clear the Security log to erase important evidence of unauthorized activity.
Countermeasure
Ensure that only the local Administrators group has the Manage auditing and security log user right.
Potential impact
Restricting the Manage auditing and security log user right to the local Administrators group is the default configuration. Warning If groups other than the local Administrators group have been assigned this user right, removing this user right might cause performance issues with other applications. Before removing this right from such a group, investigate whether any applications are dependent on this right.
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The following list describes the integrity levels from lowest to highest integrity: Untrusted Default assignment for processes that are logged on anonymously. Low Default assignment for processes that interact with the Internet. Medium Default assignment for standard user accounts and any object not explicitly designated with a lower or higher integrity level. High Default assignment for administrator accounts and processes that request to run using administrative rights. System Default assignment for Windows kernel and core services. Installer Used by setup programs to install software. It is important that only trusted software is installed on computers because objects that are assigned the Installer integrity level can install, modify, and uninstall all other objects. Possible values: User-defined list of accounts Not Defined By default, no user accounts are given this right.
Vulnerability
Anyone with the Modify an object label user right can change the integrity level of a file or process so that it becomes elevated or decreased to a point where it can be deleted by lowerlevel processes. Either of these states effectively circumvents the protection offered by Windows Integrity Controls and makes your system vulnerable to attacks by malicious software. If malicious software is set with an elevated integrity level such as Trusted Installer or System, administrator accounts do not have sufficient integrity levels to delete the program from the system. In that case, use of the Modify an object label right is mandated so that the object can be relabeled. However, the relabeling must occur by using a process that is at the same or a higher level of integrity than the object that you are attempting to relabel.
Countermeasure
Do not give any group this right. If necessary, implement it for a constrained period of time to a trusted individual to respond to a specific organizational need.
Potential impact
None. Not Defined is the default configuration.
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Vulnerability
Anyone who is assigned the Modify firmware environment values user right could configure the settings of a hardware component to cause it to fail, which could lead to data corruption or a DoS condition.
Countermeasure
Ensure that only the local Administrators group is assigned the Modify firmware environment values user right.
Potential impact
None. Restricting the Modify firmware environment values user right to the members of the local Administrators group is the default configuration.
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Vulnerability
A user who is assigned the Perform volume maintenance tasks user right could delete a volume, which could result in the loss of data or a DoS condition. Also, disk maintenance tasks can be used to modify data on the disk such as user rights assignments that might lead to escalation of privileges.
Countermeasure
Ensure that only the local Administrators group is assigned the Perform volume maintenance tasks user right.
Potential impact
None. Restricting the Perform volume maintenance tasks user right to the local Administrators group is the default configuration.
Vulnerability
The Profile single process user right presents a moderate vulnerability. Attackers with this user right could monitor a computer's performance to help identify critical processes that they might
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want to attack directly. Attackers may be able to determine what processes run on the computer so that they could identify countermeasures that they may need to avoid, such as antivirus software or an intrusion-detection system. They could also identify other users who are logged on to a computer.
Countermeasure
Ensure that only the local Administrators group is assigned the Profile single process user right.
Potential impact
If you remove the Profile single process user right from the Power Users group or other accounts, you could limit the abilities of users who are assigned to specific administrative roles in your environment. You should ensure that delegated tasks are not negatively affected.
Vulnerability
The Profile system performance user right poses a moderate vulnerability. Attackers with this user right could monitor a computer's performance to help identify critical processes that they might want to attack directly. Attackers may also be able to determine what processes are active on the computer so that they could identify countermeasures to avoid, such as antivirus software or an intrusion detection system.
Countermeasure
Ensure that only the local Administrators group is assigned the Profile system performance user right.
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Potential impact
None. Restricting the Profile system performance user right to the local Administrators group is the default configuration.
Vulnerability
Anyone who has the Remove computer from docking station user right can log on and then remove a portable computer from its docking station. If this setting is not defined, it has the same effect as if everyone were granted this right.
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However, the value of implementing this countermeasure is reduced by the following factors: If attackers can restart the computer, they could remove it from the docking station after the BIOS starts but before the operating system starts. This setting does not affect servers because they typically are not installed in docking stations. An attacker could steal the computer and the docking station together. Computers that can be mechanically undocked can be physically removed by the user whether or not they use the Windows undocking functionality.
Countermeasure
Ensure that only the local Administrators group and the user account to which the computer is allocated are assigned the Remove computer from docking station user right.
Potential impact
By default, only members of the local Administrators group are granted this right. Other user accounts must be explicitly granted the right as necessary. If your organization's users are not members of the local Administrators groups on their portable computers, they cannot remove their own portable computers from their docking stations without shutting them down first. Therefore, you may want to assign the Remove computer from docking station privilege to the local Users group for portable computers.
Vulnerability
Users with the Replace a process level token user right can start processes as other users whose credentials they know.
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Countermeasure
For member servers, ensure that only the Local Service and Network Service accounts have the Replace a process level token user right.
Potential impact
On most computers, restricting the Replace a process level token user right to the Local Service and Network Service built-in accounts is the default configuration, and there is no negative impact. However, if you have installed optional components such as ASP.NET or IIS, you may need to assign the Replace a process level token user right to additional accounts. For example, IIS requires that the Service, Network Service, and IWAM_<ComputerName> accounts be explicitly granted this user right.
Vulnerability
An attacker with the Restore files and directories user right could restore sensitive data to a computer and overwrite data that is more recent, which could lead to loss of important data,
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data corruption, or a DoS condition. Attackers could overwrite executable files that are used by legitimate administrators or system services with versions that include malicious software to grant themselves elevated privileges, compromise data, or install programs that provide for continued access to the computer. Note Even if the following countermeasure is configured, an attacker could still restore data to a computer in a domain that is controlled by the attacker. Therefore, it is critical that organizations carefully protect the media that are used to back up data.
Countermeasure
Ensure that only the local Administrators group is assigned the Restore files and directories user right unless your organization has clearly defined roles for backup and for restore personnel.
Potential impact
If you remove the Restore files and directories user right from the Backup Operators group and other accounts, users who are not members of the local Administrators group cannot load data backups. If your organization delegates the restoration of backups to a subset of your IT staff, you should verify that this change does not negatively affect the ability of your organization's personnel to do their jobs.
Vulnerability
The ability to shut down domain controllers should be limited to a very small number of trusted administrators. Although the Shut down the system user right requires the ability to log on to the server, you should be very careful about which accounts and groups that you allow to shut down a domain controller. When a domain controller is shut down, it is no longer available to process logons, process Group Policy settings, and answer Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) queries. If you shut down domain controllers that possess Flexible SingleMaster Operations (FSMO) roles, you
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can disable key domain functionality, such as processing logons for new passwordsthe primary domain controller (PDC) emulator role. For other server roles, especially those where non-administrators have rights to log on to the server (such as RD Session Host servers), it is critical that this privilege be removed from users that do not have a legitimate reason to restart the servers.
Countermeasure
Ensure that only the Administrators and Backup Operators groups are assigned the Shut down the system user right on member servers, and ensure that only the Administrators group is assigned the user right on domain controllers.
Potential impact
The impact of removing these default groups from the Shut down the system user right could limit the delegated abilities of assigned roles in your environment. You should confirm that delegated activities are not adversely affected.
Vulnerability
The Synchronize directory service data user right affects domain controllers; only domain controllers should be able to synchronize directory service data. Domain controllers have this user right inherently because the synchronization process runs in the context of the System account on domain controllers. Attackers who have this user right can view all information that is stored within the directory. They could then use some of that information to facilitate additional attacks or expose sensitive data, such as direct telephone numbers or physical addresses.
Countermeasure
Ensure that no accounts are assigned the Synchronize directory service data user right.
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Potential impact
None. Not Defined is the default configuration.
Vulnerability
Any users with the Take ownership of files or other objects user right can take control of any object, regardless of the permissions on that object, and then make any changes that they want to make that object. Such changes could result in exposure of data, corruption of data, or a DoS condition.
Countermeasure
Ensure that only the local Administrators group has the Take ownership of files or other objects user right.
Potential impact
None. Restricting the Take ownership of files or other objects user right to the local Administrators group is the default configuration.
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Audit: Shut down system immediately if unable to log security audits DCOM: Machine Access Restrictions in Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) DCOM: Machine Launch Restrictions in Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) Devices: Allow undock without having to log on Devices: Allowed to format and eject removable media Devices: Prevent users from installing printer drivers
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Devices: Restrict CD-ROM access to locally logged-on user only Devices: Restrict floppy access to locally logged-on user only Domain controller: Allow server operators to schedule tasks Domain controller: LDAP server signing requirements Domain controller: Refuse machine account password changes Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (multiple related settings) Domain member: Disable machine account password changes Domain member: Maximum machine account password age Domain member: Require strong (Windows 2000 or later) session key Interactive logon: Display user information when the session is locked Interactive logon: Do not display last user name Interactive logon: Do not require CTRL+ALT+DEL Interactive logon: Message text for users attempting to log on and Message title for users attempting
to log on
Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache (in case domain controller is not available) Interactive logon: Prompt user to change password before expiration Interactive logon: Require Domain Controller authentication to unlock workstation Interactive logon: Require smart card Interactive logon: Smart card removal behavior Microsoft network client and server: Digitally sign communications (four related settings) Microsoft network client: Send unencrypted password to third-party SMB servers Microsoft network server: Amount of idle time required before suspending session Microsoft network server: Disconnect clients when logon hours expire Microsoft network server: Server SPN target name validation level Network access: Allow anonymous SID/Name translation Network access: Do not allow anonymous enumeration of SAM accounts Network access: Do not allow anonymous enumeration of SAM accounts and shares
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Network access: Do not allow storage of passwords or credentials for network authentication Network access: Let Everyone permissions apply to anonymous users Network access: Named Pipes that can be accessed anonymously Network access: Remotely accessible registry paths Network access: Remotely accessible registry paths and sub-paths Network access: Restrict anonymous access to Named Pipes and Shares Network access: Shares that can be accessed anonymously Network access: Sharing and security model for local accounts Network security: Allow Local System to use computer identity for NTLM Network security: Allow Local System NULL session fallback Network Security: Allow PKU2U authentication requests to this computer to use online identities Network security: Configure encryption types allowed for Kerberos Network security: Do not store LAN Manager hash value on next password change Network security: Force logoff when logon hours expire Network security: LAN Manager authentication level Network security: LDAP client signing requirements Network security: Minimum session security for NTLM SSP based (including secure RPC) clients Network security: Minimum session security for NTLM SSP based (including secure RPC) servers Network security: Restrict NTLM: Add remote server exceptions for NTLM authentication Network security: Restrict NTLM: Add server exceptions in this domain Network Security: Restrict NTLM: Audit Incoming NTLM Traffic Network Security: Restrict NTLM: Audit NTLM authentication in this domain Network Security: Restrict NTLM: Incoming NTLM traffic Network Security: Restrict NTLM: NTLM authentication in this domain Network Security: Restrict NTLM: Outgoing NTLM traffic to remote servers Recovery console: Allow automatic administrative logon
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Recovery console: Allow floppy copy and access to all drives and all folders Shutdown: Allow system to be shut down without having to log on Shutdown: Clear virtual memory pagefile System cryptography: Force strong key protection for user keys stored on the computer System cryptography: Use FIPS compliant algorithms for encryption, hashing, and signing System objects: Default owner for objects created by members of the Administrators group System objects: Require case insensitivity for non-Windows subsystems System objects: Strengthen default permissions of internal system objects (e.g. Symbolic Links) System settings: Optional subsystems System settings: Use Certificate Rules on Windows Executables for Software Restriction Policies User Account Control: Admin Approval Mode for the Built-in Administrator account User Account Control: Allow UIAccess applications to prompt for elevation without using the secure
desktop
User Account Control: Behavior of the elevation prompt for administrators in Admin Approval Mode User Account Control: Behavior of the elevation prompt for standard users User Account Control: Detect application installations and prompt for elevation User Account Control: Only elevate executables that are signed and validated User Account Control: Only elevate UIAccess applications that are installed in secure locations User Account Control: Run all administrators, in Admin Approval Mode User Account Control: Switch to the secure desktop when prompting for elevation User Account Control: Virtualize file and registry write failures to per-user locations
The built-in Administrator account cannot be locked out no matter how many failed logons it accrues, which makes it a prime target for brute force attacks that attempt to guess passwords. This account has a well-known security identifier (SID), and there are non-Microsoft tools that allow authentication by using the SID rather than the account name. Therefore, even if you rename the Administrator account, an attacker could launch a brute force attack by using the SID to log on. All other accounts that are members of the Administrator's group have the safeguard of locking out the account if the number of failed logons exceeds its configured maximum.
Countermeasure
Disable the Accounts: Administrator account status policy setting so that the built-in Administrator account cannot be used in a normal system startup. If it is very difficult to maintain a regular schedule for periodic password changes for local accounts, you can disable the built-in Administrator account instead of relying on regular password changes to protect it from attack.
Potential impact
Maintenance issues can arise under certain circumstances if you disable the Administrator account. For example, if the secure channel between a member computer and the domain controller fails in a domain environment for any reason and there is no other local Administrator account, you must restart in Safe Mode to fix the problem that caused the secure channel to fail. If the current Administrator password does not meet the password requirements, you cannot enable the Administrator account after it is disabled. If this situation occurs, another member of the Administrators group must set the password on the Administrator account with the Local Users and Groups tool.
Not Defined
Vulnerability
The default Guest account allows unauthenticated network users to log on as Guest with no password. These unauthorized users could access any resources that are accessible to the Guest account over the network. This capability means that any shared folders with permissions that allow access to the Guest account, the Guests group, or the Everyone group are accessible over the network, which could lead to the exposure or corruption of data.
Countermeasure
Disable the Accounts: Guest account status policy setting so that the built-in Guest account cannot be used.
Potential impact
All network users must be authenticated before they can access shared resources. If you disable the Guest account and the Network Access: Sharing and Security Model option is set to Guest Only, network logons fail, such as those performed by the Microsoft Network Server (SMB Service). This policy setting should have little impact on most organizations because Disabled is the default setting.
Accounts: Limit local account use of blank passwords to console logon only
This policy setting enables or disables remote interactive logons by network services such as Terminal Services or Remote Desktop Services, Telnet, and File Transfer Protocol (FTP) for local accounts that have blank passwords. If you enable this policy setting, a local account must have a non-blank password to perform an interactive or network logon from a remote client. Possible values: Enabled Disabled Not Defined Caution This policy setting does not affect interactive logons that are performed physically at the console or logons that use domain accounts. It is possible for non-Microsoft applications that use remote interactive logons to bypass this policy setting.
Vulnerability
Blank passwords are a serious threat to computer security, and they should be forbidden through both organizational policy and suitable technical measures. In fact, the default settings
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for Active Directory domains require complex passwords of at least seven characters. However, if users with the ability to create new accounts bypass your domain-based password policies, they could create accounts with blank passwords. For example, a user could build a stand-alone computer, create one or more accounts with blank passwords, and then join the computer to the domain. The local accounts with blank passwords would still function. Anyone who knows the name of one of these unprotected accounts could then use it to log on.
Countermeasure
Enable the Accounts: Limit local account use of blank passwords to console logon only policy setting.
Potential impact
If you rename the Administrator account, it is slightly more difficult for unauthorized persons to guess this privileged user name and password combination. The user who installs the operating system specifies an account that is the first member of the Administrator group and has full rights to configure the computer. The account may not have the name Administrator, so this countermeasure is applied by default on new Windows 7 installations. If a computer is upgraded from a previous version of Windows to Windows 7, the account with the name Administrator is retained with all the rights and privileges that were defined for the account in the previous installation. The built-in Administrator account cannot be locked; regardless of how many times an attacker might use an incorrect password. This capability makes the Administrator account a popular target for brute force attacks that attempt to guess passwords. The value of this countermeasure is lessened because this account has a well-known SID, and there are nonMicrosoft tools that allow authentication by using the SID rather than the account name. Therefore, even if you rename the Administrator account, an attacker could launch a brute force attack by using the SID to log on.
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Countermeasure
Specify a new name in the Accounts: Rename administrator account policy setting to rename the Administrator account.
Potential impact
You must provide users who are authorized to use this account with the new account name. (The guidance for this policy setting assumes that the Administrator account was not disabled.)
Because the Guest account name is well known, it provides a vector for a malicious user to access network resources and attempt to elevate privileges or install software that could be used for a later attack on your system.
Countermeasure
Specify a new name in the Accounts: Rename guest account policy setting to rename the Guest account. If you rename this account, it is slightly more difficult for unauthorized persons to guess this privileged user name and password combination.
Potential impact
There should be little impact because the Guest account is disabled by default.
are global in scope, and therefore, they are visible to all processes on the computer. These objects all have a security descriptor, but typically they have a NULL SACL. If you enable this policy setting at startup, the kernel assigns a SACL to these objects when they are created. Possible values: Enabled Disabled Not Defined
Vulnerability
A globally visible named object, if incorrectly secured, could be acted upon by malicious software by using the name of the object. For instance, if a synchronization object such as a mutex had a poorly chosen discretionary access control list (DACL), malicious software could access that mutex by name and cause the program that created it to malfunction. However, the risk of such an occurrence is very low.
Countermeasure
Enable the Audit: Audit the access of global system objects policy setting.
Potential impact
If you enable the Audit: Audit the access of global system objects policy setting, a large number of security events could be generated, especially on busy domain controllers and application servers. Such an occurrence could cause servers to respond slowly and force the Security log to record numerous events of little significance. This policy setting can only be enabled or disabled, and there is no way to choose which events are recorded. Even organizations that have the resources to analyze events that are generated by this policy setting are not likely to have the source code or a description of what each named object is used for. Therefore, it is unlikely that most organizations would benefit by enabling this policy setting.
When the Backup and Restore function is used, it creates a copy of the file system that is identical to the target of the backup. Making regular Backup and Restore volumes is an important part of your incident response plan. However, a malicious user could use a legitimate backup copy to gain access to information or to impersonate a legitimate network resource to compromise your enterprise.
Countermeasure
Enable the Audit: Audit the use of Backup and Restore privilege policy setting. Alternatively, implement automatic log backup by configuring the AutoBackupLogFiles registry key. If you enable this option when the Audit privilege use policy setting is also enabled, an audit event is generated for every file that is backed up or restored. This information could help you to identify an account that was used to accidentally or maliciously restore data in an unauthorized manner. For more information about configuring this key, see article 100879 in the Microsoft Knowledge Base.
Potential impact
If you enable this policy setting, a large number of security events could be generated, which could cause servers to respond slowly and force the Security event log to record numerous events of little significance. If you increase the Security log size to reduce the chances of a system shutdown, an excessively large log file may affect system performance.
Audit: Force audit policy subcategory settings (Windows Vista or later) to override audit policy category settings
In Windows Vista, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008, and Windows Server 2008 R2, audit policies can be managed in a more precise way by using the audit policy subcategories. Setting audit policies at the category level overrides the subcategory audit policy feature. The registry value SCENoApplyLegacyAuditPolicy, allows audit policies to be managed by using subcategories without requiring a change to Group Policy settings. This registry value can be set to prevent the application of category-level audit policies from Group Policy and from the Local Security Policy administrative tool.
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There are 40 auditing subcategories that provide more precise details about activities on a computer. The following table lists these subcategories.
Description Reports the loading of extension code such as authentication packages by the security subsystem. Reports on violations of integrity of the security subsystem. Reports on the activities of the Internet Protocol security (IPsec) driver. Reports on other system events. Reports changes in security state of the system, such as when the security subsystem starts and stops. Reports when a user attempts to log on to the system.
SystemSystem Integrity
SystemIPsec Driver
No Auditing
Logon/LogoffLogon
Success
Logon/LogoffLogoff
Reports when a user logs off from Success the system. Reserved for future use. No Auditing
Reports the results of Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol and Authenticated Internet Protocol (AuthIP) during Main Mode negotiations.
No Auditing
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Description Reports the results of IKE protocol and AuthIP during Quick Mode negotiations. Reports the results of AuthIP during Extended Mode negotiations.
No Auditing
Logon/LogoffSpecial Logon
Reports when a special logon is Success used. A special logon is a logon that has administrator-equivalent privileges and can be used to elevate a process to a higher level. Reports events that are generated by RADIUS and Network Access Protection (NAP) user access requests. These requests can be Grant, Deny, Discard, Quarantine, Lock, and Unlock. Auditing this setting results in a medium or high volume of records on servers running Network Policy Server. Reports other logon/logoffrelated events, such as disconnecting and reconnecting to Remote Desktop Services or Terminal Services sessions, using RunAs to run processes under a different account, and locking and unlocking a workstation. Reports when file system objects are accessed. Only file system No Auditing
No Auditing
No Auditing
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CategorySubcategory
Description objects with SACLs cause audit records to be generated, and only when they are accessed in a manner that matches their SACL.
Default Setting
Object AccessRegistry
Reports when registry objects are No Auditing accessed. Only registry objects with SACLs cause audit records to be generated, and only when they are accessed in a manner that matches their SACL. Reports when kernel objects such No Auditing as processes and mutexes are accessed. Only kernel objects with SACLs cause audit records to be generated, and only when they are accessed in a manner that matches their SACL. Typically kernel objects are only given SACLs if the AuditBaseObjects or AuditBaseDirectories auditing options are enabled. Reports when SAM objects are accessed. Reports when Certification Services operations are performed. Reports when applications attempt to generate audit events by using the Windows auditing application programming interfaces (APIs). No Auditing
Object AccessSAM
No Auditing
No Auditing
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Description Reports when a handle to an object is opened or closed. Only objects with SACLs cause these events to be generated and only if the attempted handle operation matches the SACL. Handle Manipulation events are only generated for object types where the corresponding Object Access subcategory is enabled; for example, File System or Registry. Reports when a file share is accessed.
No Auditing
Reports when packets are No Auditing dropped by the Windows Filtering Platform (WFP). These are highvolume events, so log file size should be monitored closely when auditing these events. Reports when connections are allowed or blocked by WFP. These are high-volume events, so log file size should be monitored closely when auditing these events. Reports other object accessrelated events such as Task Scheduler jobs and COM+ objects. Reports when a process terminates. No Auditing
No Auditing
No Auditing
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Description Reports encrypted or decrypted calls into the data protections application programming interface (DPAPI). DPAPI protects secret information such as stored password and key information. Reports remote procedure call (RPC) connection events. Reports the creation of a process and the name of the program or user that created it. Reports changes in the audit policy including SACL changes. Reports changes in the authentication policy. Reports changes in the authorization policy including permissions (DACL) changes. Reports changes in policy rules that are used by the Microsoft Protection Service (MPSSVC.exe). This service is used by Windows Firewall.
No Auditing
No Auditing
Policy ChangeAudit Policy Change Policy ChangeAuthentication Policy Change Policy ChangeAuthorization Policy Change
Success
Success
No Auditing
No Auditing
Reports the addition and removal No Auditing of objects from WFP, including startup filters. These are highvolume events, so log file size should be monitored closely when auditing these events.
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Description Reports other types of security policy changes, such as configuration of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) or cryptographic providers. Reports each event of user account management, such as when a user account is created, changed, deleted, renamed, disabled, or enabled, or when a password is set or changed. Reports each event of computer account management, such as when a computer account is created, changed, deleted, renamed, disabled, or enabled. Reports each event of security group management, such as when a security group is created, changed, or deleted, or when a member is added to or removed from a security group.
Success
No Auditing
Success
Reports each event of No Auditing distribution group management, such as when a distribution group is created, changed, or deleted, or when a member is added to or removed from a distribution group. Reports each event of application No Auditing group management on a computer, such as when an
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CategorySubcategory
Description application group is created, changed, or deleted, or when a member is added to or removed from an application group.
Default Setting
User Account Management Other Account Management Events DS AccessDirectory Service Changes
No Auditing
Reports changes to objects in No Auditing Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS). Directory Service Changes auditing, where appropriate, indicates the old and new values of the changed properties of the objects that were changed. Only objects with SACLs cause an audit to be generated, and only when they are accessed in a manner that matches their SACL. Some objects and properties do not cause an audit to be generated due to settings to the object class in the schema. Reports when replication between two domain controllers begins and ends. Reports details about the information that is replicating between domain controllers. These are high-volume events, so log file size should be monitored closely when auditing these events. No Auditing
No Auditing
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Description
Default Setting
Reports when an AD DS object is No Auditing accessed. Only objects with SACLs cause audit events to be generated, and only when they are accessed in a manner that matches their SACL. Reports the results of validation No Auditing tests on Kerberos protocol tickets that are submitted for a user account logon request.
Account LogonOther Account Reports the events that occur in No Auditing response to credentials that are Logon Events submitted for a user account logon request. These events do not relate to credential validation or Kerberos protocol tickets, because those events have separate subcategories that can be audited). Account LogonCredential Validation Reports the results of validation tests on credentials that are submitted for a user account logon request. Reports when a user account or service uses a sensitive privilege. A sensitive privilege includes the following user rights: Act as part of the operating system Back up files and directories Create a token object
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No Auditing
No Auditing
CategorySubcategory
Description Debug programs Enable computer and user accounts to be trusted for delegation Generate security audits Impersonate a client after authentication Load and unload device drivers Manage auditing and security log Modify firmware environment values Replace a process-level token Restore files and directories Take ownership of files or other objects Auditing this subcategory creates a high volume of events, so log file size should be monitored closely when auditing these events.
Default Setting
Reports when a user account or service uses a nonsensitive privilege. The following list identifies the user rights that are considered nonsensitive privileges: Access Credential Manager as a trusted caller Access this computer from
No Auditing
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CategorySubcategory
Description the network Add workstations to domain Adjust memory quotas for a process Allow log on locally Allow log on through Terminal Services or Remote Desktop Services Bypass traverse checking Change the system time Create a pagefile Create global objects Create permanent shared objects Create symbolic links Deny access this computer from the network Deny log on as a batch job Deny log on as a service Deny log on locally Deny log on through Terminal Services or Remote Desktop Services Force shutdown from a remote system Increase a process working set Increase scheduling priority
Default Setting
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CategorySubcategory
Description Lock pages in memory Log on as a batch job Log on as a service Modify an object label Perform volume maintenance tasks Profile single process Profile system performance Remove computer from docking station Shut down the system Synchronize directory service data Auditing this subcategory creates a high volume of events, so log file size should be monitored closely when auditing these events.
Default Setting
This category is reserved for future use. No events are currently mapped to this subcategory.
No Auditing
Vulnerability
Prior to the introduction of auditing subcategories in Windows Vista, it was difficult to track events at a per-system or per-user level. The larger event categories created too many events, and the key information that needed to be audited was difficult to find.
Countermeasure
Potential impacts
The individual audit policy subcategories are now exposed in the Group Policy tools interface. Administrators can deploy a custom audit policy that applies detailed security auditing settings. If you attempt to modify an auditing setting by using Group Policy after you enable this setting, the Group Policy auditing setting is ignored in favor of the custom policy setting. To modify auditing settings by using Group Policy, you must first disable the SCENoApplyLegacyAuditPolicy key. Important Be very cautious about audit settings that can generate a large volume of traffic. For example, if you enable Success or Failure auditing for all of the Privilege Use subcategories, the high volume of audit events that are generated can make it difficult to find other types of entries in the Security log. Such a configuration could also have a significant impact on system performance.
Not Defined
Vulnerability
If the computer is unable to record events to the Security log, critical evidence or important troubleshooting information may not be available for review after a security incident. Also, an attacker could potentially generate a large volume of Security log events to purposely force a computer shutdown.
Countermeasure
Enable the Audit: Shut down system immediately if unable to log security audits policy setting to ensure that security auditing information is captured for review.
Potential impact
If you enable this policy setting, the administrative burden can be significant, especially if you also configure the Retention method for the Security log to Do not overwrite events (clear log manually). This configuration causes a repudiation threat (for example, a backup operator could deny that they backed up or restored data) to become a denial-of-service (DoS) vulnerability because a server could be forced to shut down if it is overwhelmed with logon events and other security events that are written to the Security log. Also, because the shutdown is abrupt, it is possible that irreparable damage to the operating system, applications, or data could result. Although the NTFS file system maintains its integrity when this type of computer shutdown occurs, there is no guarantee that every data file for every application will still be in a usable form when the computer restarts.
These ACLs also provide a centralized location for an administrator to set a general authorization policy that applies to all COM servers on the computer. This policy setting allows you to specify an ACL in two ways. You can type the security descriptor in SDDL, or you can choose users and groups and grant or deny them Local Access and Remote Access permissions. We recommend that you use the built-in user interface to specify the ACL content that you want to apply with this setting. The default ACL settings vary, depending on the version of the Windows operating system you are running.
Vulnerability
Many COM applications include some security-specific code (for example, to call CoInitializeSecurity), but they use weak settings that often allow unauthenticated access to the process. In earlier versions of Windows, administrators could not override these settings to force stronger security without modifying the application. An attacker could attempt to exploit weak security in an individual application by attacking it through COM calls. Also, COM infrastructure includes the Remote Procedure Call System Service (RPCSS), a system service that runs during and after computer startup. This service manages activation of COM objects and the running object table, and it provides helper services to DCOM remoting. It exposes RPC interfaces that can be called remotely. Because some COM servers allow unauthenticated remote access, these interfaces can be called by anyone, including unauthenticated users. As a result, RPCSS can be attacked by malicious users who use remote, unauthenticated computers.
Countermeasure
To protect individual COM-based applications or services, set the DCOM: Machine Access Restrictions in Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) policy setting to an appropriate computer-wide ACL.
Potential impact
Windows operating systems implement default COM ACLs when they are installed. Modifying these ACLs from the default may cause some applications or components that communicate by using DCOM to fail. If you implement a COM server and you override the default security settings, confirm that the application-specific call permissions that ACL assigns correct permissions to appropriate users. If the permissions are incorrect, you must change your application-specific permission ACL to provide appropriate users with activation rights so that applications and Windows components that use DCOM do not fail.
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Many COM applications include some security-specific code (for example, to call CoInitializeSecurity), but they use weak settings that often allow unauthenticated access to the process. In earlier versions of Windows, administrators could not override these settings to force stronger security without modifying the application. An attacker could attempt to exploit weak security in an individual application by attacking it through COM calls. COM infrastructure includes the RPCSS, a system service that runs during computer startup and always runs after that. This service manages activation of COM objects and the running object table, and it provides helper services to DCOM remoting. It exposes RPC interfaces that can be called remotely. Because some COM servers allow unauthenticated remote component
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activation, these interfaces can be called by anyone, including unauthenticated users. As a result, RPCSS can be attacked by malicious users by using remote, unauthenticated computers.
Countermeasure
To protect individual COM-based applications or services, set this policy setting to an appropriate computer-wide ACL.
Potential impact
Windows operating systems implement default COM ACLs when they are installed. Modifying these ACLs from the default may cause some applications or components that communicate by using DCOM to fail. If you implement a COM server and you override the default security settings, confirm that the application-specific launch permissions ACL assigns activation permission to appropriate users. If it does not, you must change your application-specific launch permission ACL to provide appropriate users with activation rights so that applications and Windows components that use DCOM do not fail.
If this policy setting is enabled, anyone with physical access to portable computers in docking stations could remove them and possibly tamper with them.
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Countermeasure
Disable the Devices: Allow undock without having to log on policy setting.
Potential impact
Users who have docked their computers must log on to the local console before they can undock their computers. For computers that do not have docking stations, this policy setting has no impact.
Users could move data on removable disks to a different computer where they have administrative privileges. The user could then take ownership of any file, grant themselves full control, and view or modify any file. The fact that most removable storage devices eject media when a mechanical button is pressed diminishes the advantage of this policy setting.
Countermeasure
Configure the Devices: Allowed to format and eject removable media policy setting to Administrators.
Potential impact
Only administrators can format and eject removable media. If users are in the habit of using removable media for file transfers and storage, they must be informed of the change in policy.
drivers when they add a network printer. This policy setting prevents typical users from downloading and installing untrusted printer drivers. Note This policy setting has no impact if an administrator has configured a trusted path to download drivers. If you use trusted paths, the print subsystem attempts to use the trusted path to download the driver. If the trusted path download succeeds, the driver is installed on behalf of any user. If the trusted path download fails, the driver is not installed and the network printer is not added. Possible values: Enabled Disabled Not Defined
Vulnerability
It may be appropriate in some organizations to allow users to install printer drivers on their own workstations. However, you should allow only administrators, not users, to do so on servers because printer driver installation on a server may unintentionally cause the computer to become less stable. A malicious user could install inappropriate printer drivers in a deliberate attempt to damage the computer, or a user might accidentally install malicious software that masquerades as a printer driver.
Countermeasure
Enable the Devices: Prevent users from installing printer drivers policy setting.
Potential impact
Only members of the Administrators, Power Users, or Server Operators groups can install printers on the servers. If this policy setting is enabled but the driver for a network printer already exists on the local computer, users can still add the network printer.
A remote user could potentially access a mounted CD that contains sensitive information. This risk is small because CD drives are not automatically made available as shared drives; administrators must deliberately choose to share the drive. However, administrators can deny network users the ability to view data or run applications from removable media on the server.
Countermeasure
Enable the Devices: Restrict CD-ROM drive access to locally logged-on user only policy setting.
Potential impact
Users who connect to the server over the network cannot use any CD drives that are installed on the server when someone is logged on to the local console of the server. System tools that require access to the CD drive will fail. For example, the Volume Shadow Copy service attempts to access all CD and floppy disk drives that are present on the computer when it initializes, and if the service cannot access one of these drives, it fails. This condition causes the Windows Backup tool to fail if volume shadow copies were specified for the backup job. Any non-Microsoft backup products that use volume shadow copies also fail. This policy setting would not be suitable for a computer that serves as a CD media player for network users.
A remote user could potentially access a mounted floppy disk that contains sensitive information. This risk is small because floppy disk drives are not automatically shared;
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administrators must deliberately choose to share the drive. However, administrators can deny network users the ability to view data or run applications from removable media on the server.
Countermeasure
Enable the Devices: Restrict floppy access to locally logged-on user only policy setting.
Potential impact
Users who connect to the server over the network cannot use any floppy disk drives that are installed on the server when someone is logged on to the local console of the server. System tools that require access to floppy disk drives fail. For example, the Volume Shadow Copy service attempts to access all CD-ROM and floppy disk drives that are present on the computer when it initializes, and if the service cannot access one of these drives, it fails. This condition causes the Windows Backup tool to fail if volume shadow copies were specified for the backup job. Any non-Microsoft backup products that use volume shadow copies also fail.
Tasks that run under the context of the Local System account can affect resources that are at a higher privilege level than the user account that scheduled the task.
Countermeasure
Disable the Domain controller: Allow server operators to schedule tasks policy setting.
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Potential impact
The impact should be small for most organizations. Users (including those in the Server Operators group) can still create jobs by means of the Task Scheduler snap-in. However, those jobs run in the context of the account with which the user authenticates when setting up the job.
Unsigned network traffic is susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks. In such attacks, an intruder captures packets between the server and the client, modifies them, and then forwards them to the client. Where LDAP servers are concerned, an attacker could cause a client to make decisions that are based on false records from the LDAP directory. To lower the risk of such an intrusion in an organization's network, you can implement strong physical security measures to protect the network infrastructure. You could also implement Internet Protocol security (IPsec) authentication header mode (AH tunnel mode), which performs mutual authentication and packet integrity for IP traffic to make all types of man-in-the-middle attacks extremely difficult.
Countermeasure
Configure the Domain controller: LDAP server signing requirements policy setting to Require signature.
Potential impact
Clients that do not support LDAP signing cannot run LDAP queries against the domain controllers.
If you enable this policy setting on all domain controllers in a domain, domain members cannot change their computer account passwords, and those passwords are more susceptible to attack.
Countermeasure
Disable the Domain controller: Refuse machine account password changes policy setting.
Potential impact
Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (multiple related settings)
The following policy settings determine whether a secure channel can be established with a domain controller that cannot sign or encrypt secure channel traffic: Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always) Domain member: Digitally encrypt secure channel data (when possible) Domain member: Digitally sign secure channel data (when possible) If you enable the Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always) policy setting, a secure channel cannot be established with any domain controller that cannot sign or encrypt all secure channel data. To protect authentication traffic from man-in-the-middle, replay, and other types of network attacks, computers that are running the Windows operating system create a communication channel through NetLogon called "secure channels." These channels authenticate computer accounts, and they also authenticate user accounts when a remote user connects to a network resource and the user account exists in a trusted domain. This authentication is called "passthrough authentication," and it allows a computer that has joined a domain to have access to the user account database in its domain and in any trusted domains. Note To enable the Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always) policy setting on a member workstation or server, all domain controllers in the domain that the member belongs to must sign or encrypt all secure channel data. This
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requirement means that all such domain controllers cannot run an operating system earlier than Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 with Service Pack 6a (SP6a). If you enable the Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always) policy setting, the Domain member: Digitally sign secure channel data (when possible) policy setting is automatically enabled. Possible values: Enabled Disabled Not Defined
Vulnerability
When a computer joins a domain, a computer account is created. After it joins the domain, the computer uses the password for that account to create a secure channel with the domain controller for its domain every time it restarts. Requests that are sent on the secure channel are authenticated and sensitive information such as passwords are encrypted, but the channel is not integrity-checked, and not all information is encrypted. If a computer is configured to always encrypt or sign secure channel data but the domain controller cannot sign or encrypt any portion of the secure channel data, the computer and domain controller cannot establish a secure channel. If the computer is configured to encrypt or sign secure channel data when possible, a secure channel can be established, but the level of encryption and signing is negotiated.
Countermeasure
Select one of the following settings as appropriate for your environment to configure the computers in your domain to encrypt or sign secure channel data: Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always) Domain member: Digitally encrypt secure channel data (when possible) Domain member: Digitally sign secure channel data (when possible)
Potential impact
Using digital encryption and signing the secure channel is a good idea where they are supported. The secure channel protects domain credentials as they are sent to the domain controller. However, operating systems earlier than Windows NT 4.0 with SP6a do not support digital encryption and signing the secure channel. Microsoft Windows 98 Second Edition client computers do not support it unless they have the Active Directory Client Extension installed. Therefore, you cannot enable the Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel
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data (always) policy setting on domain controllers that support Windows 98 client computers as members of the domain. Potential impacts can include the following: The ability to create or delete trust relationships is disabled with clients running versions of Windows earlier than Windows NT 4.0 with SP6a. Logons are disabled from client computers running versions of Windows earlier than Windows NT 4.0 with SP6a. The ability to authenticate other domains' users is disabled from a domain controller running a version of Windows earlier than Windows NT 4.0 with SP6a in a trusted domain. You can enable this policy setting after you eliminate all client computers running Windows 98 or Windows 95 from the domain and upgrade all Windows NT 4.0 servers and domain controllers from trusted/trusting domains to Windows NT 4.0 with SP6a. You can enable the policy settings, Domain member: Digitally encrypt secure channel data (when possible) and Domain member: Digitally encrypt sign channel data (when possible), on all computers in the domain that support the above settings and client computers running versions of Windows earlier than Windows NT 4.0 with SP6a. Applications that run on these versions of Windows are not affected.
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This policy setting was added to Windows to make it easier for organizations that store prebuilt computers that are put into production months later. It eliminates the need for those computers to rejoin the domain. This policy setting is also sometimes used with imaged computers or those with hardware- or software-level change prevention. Correct imaging procedures make the use of this policy unnecessary for imaged computers. Possible values: Enabled Disabled Not Defined
Vulnerability
The default requirement for domain accounts is to change the password every 30 days. If you disable this policy setting, computers retain the same passwords as their computer accounts. Computers that cannot automatically change their account password are at risk from an attacker who could determine the password for the computer's domain account.
Countermeasure
Verify that the Domain member: Disable machine account password changes policy setting is configured to Disabled.
Potential impact
In Active Directory domains, each computer and every user has an account and password. By default, the domain members automatically change their domain password every 30 days. If you increase this interval significantly, or set it to 0 so that the computers no longer change their passwords, an attacker has more time to undertake a brute force attack to guess the password of one or more computer accounts.
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Countermeasure
Configure the Domain member: Maximum machine account password age policy setting to 30 days.
Potential impact
Whenever possible, you should take advantage of these stronger session keys to help protect secure channel communications from attacks that attempt to hijack network sessions and eavesdrop. (Eavesdropping is a form of hacking in which network data is read or altered in transit. The data can be modified to hide or change the sender, or it can be redirected.)
Countermeasure
Enable the Domain member: Require strong (Windows 2000 or later) session key policy setting. If you enable this policy setting, all outgoing secure channel traffic requires a strong encryption key. If you disable this policy setting, the key strength is negotiated. You should enable this policy setting only if the domain controllers in all trusted domains support strong keys. By default, this policy setting is disabled.
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Potential impact
Computers that have this policy setting enabled cannot join Windows NT 4.0 domains, and trusts between Active Directory domains and Windows NT domains may not work properly. Computers that do not support this policy setting cannot join domains in which the domain controllers have this policy setting enabled.
When a computer displays the secure desktop in an unsecured area, certain user information can be readily available to anyone looking at the monitor, either physically or through a remote connection. The displayed user information could include the domain user account name or the full name of the user who locked the session or who had logged on last.
Countermeasure
Enabling this policy setting allows the operating system to hide certain user information from being displayed on the secure desktop (after the computer has been started or when the session has been locked by using CTRL+ALT+DEL). However, user information is displayed if the Switch User feature is used so that the logon tiles are displayed for each logged on user. You might consider enabling the Interactive logon: Do not display last user name policy setting, which will prevent Windows from displaying the logon name and logon tile of the last user to log on.
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Potential impact
If you do not enable this policy setting, the effect will be the same as enabling the policy setting and selecting the User display name, domain and user names option. If the policy setting is enabled and set to Do not display user information, the user name of the user who is currently logged on is not displayed on the secure desktop when the computer is locked. However, if the Interactive logon: Do not display last user name policy setting is not enabled, the user name of the last user who logged on is still displayed. Depending on how the logon tiles are configured, they could provide visual clues as to who is logged on. In addition, if the Interactive logon: Do not display last user name policy setting is not enabled, then the Switch user feature will show user information.
An attacker with access to the console (for example, someone with physical access or someone who can connect to the server through Remote Desktop Services or Terminal Services) could view the name of the last user who logged on to the server. The attacker could then try to guess the password, use a dictionary, or use a brute force attack to try to log on.
Countermeasure
Enable the Interactive logon: Do not display last user name policy setting.
Potential impact
Users must always type their user names when they log on to the servers.
required to use this key combination to log on to the network. However, this configuration poses a security risk because it provides an opportunity for users to log on with weaker logon credentials. When this policy is disabled, users must press CTRL+ALT+DEL before they log on to Windows, or they must use a smart card, a tamper-proof device that stores security information, to log on.
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This policy setting makes it easier for users with certain types of physical impairments to log on to computers that run the Windows operating system. However, if users are not required to press CTRL+ALT+DEL, they are susceptible to attacks that attempt to intercept their passwords. If CTRL+ALT+DEL is required before logon, user passwords are communicated by means of a trusted path. If this policy setting is enabled, an attacker could install a Trojan horse program that looks like the standard Windows logon dialog box and capture the user's password. The attacker would then be able to log on to the compromised account with whatever level of privilege that user has.
Countermeasure
Unless they use a smart card to log on, users must simultaneously press CTRL+ALT+DEL before the logon dialog box is displayed.
Interactive logon: Message text for users attempting to log on and Message title for users attempting to log on
There are two separate policy settings that relate to logon displays: Interactive logon: Message text for users attempting to log on Interactive logon: Message title for users attempting to log on The first policy setting specifies a text message that displays to users when they log on, and the second policy setting specifies a title for the title bar of the text message window. Many organizations use this text for legal purposes; for example, to warn users about the ramifications of misuse of company information, or to warn them that their actions may be audited. Possible values: User-defined text
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Not Defined
Vulnerability
Users often do not understand the importance of security practices. However, the display of a warning message before logon may help prevent an attack by warning malicious or uninformed users about the consequences of their misconduct before it happens. It may also help to reinforce corporate policy by notifying employees of the appropriate policy during the logon process.
Countermeasure
Configure the Interactive logon: Message text for users attempting to log on and Interactive logon: Message title for users attempting to log on policy settings to an appropriate value for your organization. Note Any warning message that displays should be approved by your organization's legal and human resources representatives.
Potential impact
Users see a message in a dialog box before they can log on to the server console. Note Client computers running Windows 2000 cannot interpret and display messages that exceed 512 characters in length and contain carriage-return, line-feed sequences. You must use a computer that is running Windows 2000 to create a logon message policy that applies to other computers running Windows 2000. If you create a logon message policy on a computer that is running Windows 2000, and you discover that it does not display properly on other computers running Windows 2000, you must first change the policy setting to Not Defined, and then reconfigure the setting by using a computer running Windows 2000. If you do not do this, the changes do not take effect properly.
Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache (in case domain controller is not available)
This policy setting determines the number of individual users who can log on to a Windows domain by using cached account information. Logon information for domain accounts can be cached locally so that if a domain controller cannot be contacted on subsequent logons, a user can still log on. This policy setting determines the number of individual users whose logon information is cached locally.
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If a domain controller is unavailable and a user's logon information is cached, the user is prompted with the following message: A domain controller for your domain could not be contacted. You have been logged on using cached account information. Changes to your profile since you last logged on may not be available. If a domain controller is unavailable and a user's logon information is not cached, the user is prompted with this message: The system cannot log you on now because the domain <DOMAIN_NAME> is not available. Possible values: User-defined number between 0 and 50 Not Defined
Vulnerability
The number that is assigned to this policy setting indicates the number of users whose logon information is cached locally by the servers. If the number is set to 10, the server caches logon information for 10 users. When an eleventh user logs on to the computer, the server overwrites the oldest cached logon session. Users who access the server console have their logon credentials cached on that server. An attacker who is able to access the file system of the server could locate this cached information and use a brute force attack to attempt to determine user passwords. To mitigate this type of attack, Windows encrypts the information and obscures its physical location.
Countermeasure
Configure the Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache (in case domain controller is not available) policy setting to 0, which disables the local caching of logon information. Additional countermeasures include enforcement of strong password policies and physically secure locations for the computers.
Potential impact
Users cannot log on to any computers if there is no domain controller available to authenticate them. Organizations can configure this value to 2 for end-user computers, especially for mobile users. A configuration value of 2 means that the user's logon information is still in the cache, even if a member of the IT department has recently logged on to the computer to perform
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system maintenance. This method allows users to log on to their computers when they are not connected to the organization's network.
If user passwords are configured to expire periodically in your organization, users need to be warned when this is about to happen, or they may be locked out of the computer inadvertently when their passwords expire. This condition could lead to confusion for users who access the network locally, or it could make it impossible for users to access your organization's network through dial-up or virtual private network (VPN) connections.
Countermeasure
Configure the Interactive logon: Prompt user to change password before expiration policy setting to 14 days.
Potential impact
Users see a dialog-box prompt to change their password each time that they log on to the domain when their password is configured to expire in 14 or fewer days.
By default, the computer caches (in memory) the credentials of any users who are authenticated locally. The computer uses these cached credentials to authenticate anyone who attempts to unlock the console. When cached credentials are used, any changes that have recently been made to the accountsuch as user rights assignments, account lockout, or the account being disabledare not considered or applied after the account is authenticated. User privileges are not updated, and (more important) disabled accounts are still able to unlock the console of the computer.
Countermeasure
Configure the Interactive logon: Require Domain Controller authentication to unlock workstation policy setting to Enabled and configure the Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache (in case domain controller is not available) policy setting to 0.
Potential impact
When the console on a computer is locked by a user or automatically by a screen-saver timeout, the console can be unlocked only if the user can authenticate to the domain controller. If no domain controller is available, users cannot unlock their workstations. If you configure the Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache (in case domain controller is not available) policy setting to 0, users whose domain controllers are unavailable (such as mobile or remote users) cannot log on.
It can be difficult to make users choose strong passwords, and even strong passwords are vulnerable to brute force attacks if an attacker has sufficient time and computing resources.
Countermeasure
For users with access to computers that contain sensitive data, issue smart cards and configure the Interactive logon: Require smart card policy setting to Enabled.
Potential impact
All users of a computer with this policy setting enabled must use smart cards to log on to the local computer, which means that the organization must have a reliable public key infrastructure (PKI) in addition to smart cards and smart card readers for these users. These requirements are significant challenges because expertise and resources are required to plan for and deploy these technologies. For more information about deploying smart cards, see Windows Vista Smart Card Infrastructure.
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Possible values: No Action Lock Workstation Force Logoff Disconnect if a remote Terminal Services session Not Defined By default, this policy setting is Not Defined, which is equivalent to the No Action setting. Note The Smart Card Removal Policy service must be started for this policy setting to work.
Vulnerability
Users sometimes forget to lock their workstations when they are away from them, allowing the possibility for malicious users to access their computers. If smart cards are used for authentication, the computer should automatically lock itself when the card is removed to ensure that only the user with the smart card is accessing resources by using those credentials.
Countermeasure
Configure the Interactive logon: Smart card removal behavior policy setting to Lock Workstation. If you select Lock Workstation for this policy setting, the workstation locks when the smart card is removed. Users can leave the area, take their smart card with them, and still maintain a protected session. This behavior is similar to the setting that requires users to log on when resuming work on the computer after the screen saver has started. If you select Force Logoff for this policy setting, the user is automatically logged off when the smart card is removed. This policy setting is useful when a computer is deployed as a public access point, such as a kiosk or other type of shared computer.
Potential impact
If you select Force Logoff, users must reinsert their smart cards and reenter their PINs when they return to their workstations.
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Microsoft network client and server: Digitally sign communications (four related settings)
There are four separate policy settings that relate to packet-signing requirements for Server Message Block (SMB) communications: Microsoft Network Client: Digitally Sign Communications (Always) Microsoft Network Server: Digitally Sign Communications (Always) Microsoft Network Client: Digitally Sign Communications (If Server Agrees) Microsoft Network Server: Digitally Sign Communications (If Client Agrees) Implementation of digital signatures in high-security networks helps prevent the impersonation of clients and servers, known as "session hijacking." Possible values for each of these policy settings are: Enabled Disabled Not Defined
Vulnerability
Session hijacking uses tools that allow attackers who have access to the same network as the client computer or server to interrupt, end, or steal a session in progress. Attackers can potentially intercept and modify unsigned Server Message Block (SMB) packets and then modify the traffic and forward it so that the server might perform objectionable actions. Alternatively, the attacker could pose as the server or client after legitimate authentication and gain unauthorized access to data. SMB is the resource-sharing protocol that is supported by many Windows operating systems. It is the basis of NetBIOS and many other protocols. SMB signatures authenticate both users and the servers that host the data. If either side fails the authentication process, data transmission does not take place.
Countermeasure
Configure the policy settings as follows: Disable Microsoft Network Client: Digitally Sign Communications (Always). Disable Microsoft Network Server: Digitally Sign Communications (Always). Enable Microsoft Network Client: Digitally Sign Communications (If Server Agrees).
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Enable Microsoft Network Server: Digitally Sign Communications (If Client Agrees). In highly secure environments, we recommend that you configure all of these policy settings to Enabled. However, that configuration may cause slower performance on client computers and prevent communications with earlier SMB applications and operating systems. Note An alternative countermeasure that could protect all network traffic is to implement digital signatures with IPsec. There are hardware-based accelerators for IPsec encryption and signing that could be used to minimize the performance impact on the servers' CPUs. No such accelerators are available for SMB signing.
Potential impact
The Windows implementation of the SMB file and print-sharing protocol support mutual authentication, which prevents session hijacking attacks and supports message authentication to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. SMB signing provides this authentication by placing a digital signature into each SMB, which is then verified by both the client computer and the server. Implementing SMB signing may negatively affect performance because each packet must be signed and verified. If these policy settings are enabled on a server that is performing multiple roles, such as a small business server that is serving as a domain controller, file server, print server, and application server, performance may be substantially slowed. Additionally, if you configure computers to ignore all unsigned SMB communications, older applications and operating systems cannot connect. However, if you completely disable all SMB signing, computers are vulnerable to session-hijacking attacks.
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Vulnerability
If you enable this policy setting, the server can transmit plaintext passwords across the network to other computers that offer SMB services. These other computers might not use any of the SMB security mechanisms.
Countermeasure
Disable the Microsoft network client: Send unencrypted password to connect to third-party SMB servers policy setting.
Potential impact
Some very old applications and operating systems such as MS-DOS, Windows for Workgroups 3.11, and Microsoft Windows 95 may not be able to communicate with the servers in your organization by means of the SMB protocol.
Microsoft network server: Amount of idle time required before suspending session
This policy setting determines the amount of continuous idle time that must pass in an SMB session before the session is suspended because of inactivity. Administrators can use this policy setting to control when a computer suspends an inactive SMB session. The session automatically reestablishes when activity in client computer resumes. A value of 0 disconnects an idle session as quickly as possible. The maximum value is 99999, which is 208 days which in effect disables the policy setting. Possible values: User-defined period of time in minutes Not Defined By default, this policy is not defined, which means that the system allows 15 minutes of idle time for servers and an undefined time for workstations.
Vulnerability
Each SMB session consumes server resources, and numerous null sessions slow the server or possibly cause it to fail. An attacker could repeatedly establish SMB sessions until the server's SMB services become slow or unresponsive.
Countermeasure
There is little impact because SMB sessions are reestablished automatically if the client resumes activity.
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If your organization configures logon hours for users, it makes sense to enable this policy setting. Otherwise, users who should not have access to network resources outside of their logon hours may actually continue to use those resources with sessions that were established during allowed hours.
Countermeasure
Enable the Microsoft network server: Disconnect clients when logon hours expire policy setting.
Potential impact
If logon hours are not used in your organization, this policy setting has no impact. If logon hours are used, existing user sessions are forcibly terminated when their logon hours expire.
This policy setting controls the level of validation that a computer with shared folders or printers (the server) performs on the SPN that is provided by the client computer when it establishes a session by using the SMB protocol. The level of validation can help prevent a class of attacks against SMB servers (referred to as SMB relay attacks). This policy setting will affect SMB1 and SMB2.
Countermeasure
If you set Accept if provided by client, the SMB server will accept and validate the SPN that is provided by the SMB client and allow a session to be established if it matches the SMB server's list of SPNs. If the SPN does not match, the session request for that SMB client computer will be denied. If you set Required from client, the SMB client computer must send an SPN name in session setup, and the SPN name that is provided must match the SMB server that is being requested to establish a connection. If no SPN is provided by the client computer, or the SPN that is provided does not match, the session is denied.
Potential impact
All Windows operating systems support a client SMB component and a server SMB component. This policy setting affects the server SMB behavior, and its implementation should be carefully evaluated and tested to prevent disruptions to file and print serving capabilities. Because the SMB protocol is widely deployed, setting the options to Accept if provided by client or Required from client will prevent some clients from successfully authenticating to some servers in your environment.
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Possible values: Enabled Disabled Not Defined By default, this policy setting is enabled on domain controllers, and it is disabled on workstations and member servers.
Vulnerability
If this policy setting is enabled, a user with local access could use the well-known Administrator's SID to learn the real name of the built-in Administrator account, even if it has been renamed. That person could then use the account name to initiate a password-guessing attack.
Countermeasure
Disable the Network access: Allow anonymous SID/Name translation policy setting.
Potential impact
Disabled is the default configuration for this policy setting on member computers; therefore, it has no impact on them. The default configuration for domain controllers is Enabled. If you disable this policy setting on domain controllers, computers running versions of Windows earlier than Windows Server 2003 may not communicate with domains that have computers running Windows Server 2003. For example, the following computers may not work: Remote Access Service servers running Windows NT 4.0
Servers that host Microsoft SQL Server and run on computers that are running Windows NT 3.x or Windows NT 4.0 Servers that host Remote Access Service or Microsoft SQL Server and run on computers that are running Windows 2000 and are located in Windows NT domains
resources that have permissions that explicitly include the special built-in group ANONYMOUS LOGON. In Windows 2000, a similar policy setting called Additional Restrictions for Anonymous Connections managed a registry value called RestrictAnonymous, which was located in the HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\LSA registry key. In Windows Server 2003, the policy settings Network access: Do not allow anonymous enumeration of SAM accounts and Network access: Do not allow anonymous enumeration of SAM accounts and shares replaced the Windows 2000 policy setting. They manage the registry values RestrictAnonymousSAM and RestrictAnonymous, respectively, which are located in the HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa registry key. Possible values: Enabled Disabled Not Defined
Vulnerability
An unauthorized user could anonymously list account names and use the information to perform social engineering attacks or attempt to guess passwords. Social engineering attackers try to deceive users in some way to obtain passwords or some form of security information.
Countermeasure
Enable the Network access: Do not allow anonymous enumeration of SAM accounts policy setting.
Potential impact
It is impossible to establish trust with domains that are running Windows NT 4.0. Also, client computers that run earlier versions of the Windows operating system such as Windows NT 3.51 and Windows 95 experience problems when they try to use resources on the server.
Network access: Do not allow anonymous enumeration of SAM accounts and shares
This policy setting determines whether anonymous enumeration of Security Accounts Manager (SAM) accounts and shared folders is allowed. This capability is convenient, for example, when an administrator wants to grant access to users in a trusted domain that does not maintain a reciprocal trust. You can enable this policy setting if you do not want to allow anonymous enumeration of SAM accounts and shared folders. However, even if it is enabled, anonymous users still have access to any resources that have permissions that explicitly include the special built-in group ANONYMOUS LOGON.
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In Windows 2000, a similar policy setting called Additional Restrictions for Anonymous Connections managed a registry value called RestrictAnonymous, which was located in the HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\LSA registry key. In Windows Server 2003, the policy settings Network access: Do not allow anonymous enumeration of SAM accounts and Network access: Do not allow anonymous enumeration of SAM accounts and shares replaced the Windows 2000 policy setting. They manage the registry values RestrictAnonymousSAM and RestrictAnonymous, respectively, which are located in the HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa registry key. Possible values: Enabled Disabled Not Defined
Vulnerability
An unauthorized user could anonymously list account names and shared resources and use the information to attempt to guess passwords or perform social-engineering attacks.
Countermeasure
Enable the Network access: Do not allow anonymous enumeration of SAM accounts and shares policy setting.
Potential impact
It is impossible to grant access to users of another domain across a one-way trust because administrators in the trusting domain are unable to enumerate lists of accounts in the other domain. Users who access file and print servers anonymously are unable to list the shared network resources on those servers. The users must be authenticated before they can view the lists of shared folders and printers.
Network access: Do not allow storage of passwords or credentials for network authentication
This policy setting determines whether the Stored User Names and Passwords feature can save passwords or credentials for later use when it gains domain authentication. If you enable this policy setting, the Stored User Names and Passwords feature in Windows does not store passwords and credentials. Possible values: Enabled
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Passwords that are cached can be accessed by users when they are logged on to their computer. Although this information may sound obvious, a problem can arise if the user unknowingly runs malicious software that reads the passwords and forwards them to an unauthorized user. Note The chances of success for this exploit and others that involve malicious software are reduced significantly for organizations that effectively implement and manage an enterprise antivirus solution combined with sensible software restriction policies. For more information about software restriction policies, see the section Software Restriction Policies.
Countermeasure
Enable the Network access: Do not allow storage of passwords or credentials for network authentication policy setting.
Potential impact
Users are forced to type passwords whenever they log on to network resources that are not accessible to their domain account. This policy setting should have no impact on users who access network resources that are configured to allow access with their Active Directorybased domain account.
An unauthorized user could anonymously list account names and shared resources, and then use the information to attempt to guess passwords, perform social engineering attacks, or launch DoS attacks.
Countermeasure
Disable the Network access: Let Everyone permissions apply to anonymous users policy setting.
Potential impact
You can restrict access over named pipes such as COMNAP and LOCATOR to help prevent unauthorized access to the network. The following list describes available named pipes and their purpose. These named pipes were granted anonymous access in earlier versions of Windows and some legacy applications may still use them.
Purpose SNABase named pipe (Systems Network Architecture (SNA) is a collection of network protocols that were originally developed for
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Named pipe
SNA Server named pipe Default named pipe for SQL Server Named pipe for the Print Spooler service End Point Mapper named pipe. Remote Procedure Call Locator service named pipe Distributed Link Tracking Client named pipe Distributed Link Tracking Server named pipe
TrlWks TrkSvr
Countermeasure
Configure the Network access: Named Pipes that can be accessed anonymously policy setting to a null value (enable the policy setting but do not specify named pipes in the text box).
Potential impact
This configuration disables null-session access over named pipes, and applications that rely on this feature or on unauthenticated access to named pipes no longer function. This may break trust between domains in a mixed-mode environment.
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Vulnerability
An attacker could use information in the registry to facilitate unauthorized activities. To reduce the risk of such an attack, suitable ACLs are assigned throughout the registry to help protect it from access by unauthorized users.
Countermeasure
Configure the Network access: Remotely accessible registry paths policy setting to a null value (enable the policy setting but do not enter any paths in the text box).
Potential impact
Remote management tools require remote access to the registry to properly monitor and manage those computers. If you remove the default registry paths from the list of accessible ones, such remote management tools could fail. Note If you want to allow remote access, you must also enable the Remote Registry service.
The registry contains sensitive computer configuration information that could be used by an attacker to facilitate unauthorized activities. The fact that the default ACLs that are assigned throughout the registry are fairly restrictive and help protect the registry from access by unauthorized users reduces the risk of such an attack.
Countermeasure
Configure the Network access: Remotely accessible registry paths and sub-paths policy setting to a null value (enable the policy setting but do not enter any paths in the text box).
Potential impact
Remote management tools require remote access to the registry to properly monitor and manage those computers. If you remove the default registry paths from the list of accessible ones, such remote management tools could fail.
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Note If you want to allow remote access, you must also enable the Remote Registry service.
Null sessions are a weakness that can be exploited through shared folders (including the default shared folders) on computers in your environment.
Countermeasure
Enable the Network access: Restrict anonymous access to Named Pipes and Shares policy setting.
Potential impact
You can enable this policy setting to restrict null-session access for unauthenticated users to all server pipes and shared folders except those that are listed in the NullSessionPipes and NullSessionShares entries. If you choose to enable this policy setting and are supporting Windows NT 4.0 domains, determine whether any of the named pipes in the following list are required to maintain trust relationships between the domains, and then add the pipe to the Network access: Named pipes that can be accessed anonymously: COMNAPSNA session access
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COMNODESNA session access SQL\QUERYSQL instance access SPOOLSSSpooler service LLSRPCLicense Logging service NetlogonNet Logon service LsarpcLSA access SamrRemote access to SAM objects browserComputer Browser service In operating systems earlier than Windows Server 2003 with Service Pack 1 (SP1), these named pipes were allowed anonymous access by default. In later operating systems, these pipes must be explicitly added if needed.
Any shared folders that are listed can be accessed by any network user, which could lead to the exposure or corruption of sensitive data.
Countermeasure
Configure the Network access: Shares that can be accessed anonymously policy setting to a null value.
Potential impact
There should be little impact because this is the default configuration. Only authenticated users have access to shared resources on the server.
logons that use local accounts are automatically mapped to the Guest account. The Classic model provides precise control over access to resources and enables you to grant different types of access to different users for the same resource. Conversely, the Guest only model treats all users equally as the Guest user account, and they all receive the same level of access to a given resource, which can be either Read Only or Modify. The default configuration for a stand-alone computer is Guest only. The default configuration for domain members is Classic. Notes This policy setting does not affect network logons that use domain accounts. Nor does this policy setting affect interactive logons that are performed remotely through services such as Telnet, Terminal Services or Remote Desktop Services. This setting also has no effect on computers running Windows 2000. When the computer is not joined to a domain, this policy setting also tailors the Sharing and Security tabs in Windows Explorer to correspond to the sharing and security model that is being used. Possible values: Classic: Local users authenticate as themselves Guest only: Local users authenticate as Guest Not Defined
Vulnerability
With the Guest only model, any user who can authenticate to your computer over the network does so with guest privileges, which probably means that they do not have Write access to shared resources on that computer. Although this restriction does increase security, it makes it more difficult for authorized users to access shared resources on those computers because ACLs on those resources must include access control entries (ACEs) for the Guest account. With the Classic model, local accounts should be password protected. Otherwise, if Guest access is enabled, anyone can use those user accounts to access shared system resources.
Countermeasure
For network servers, configure the Network access: Sharing and security model for local accounts policy setting to Classic local users authenticate as themselves. On end-user computers, configure this policy setting to Guest only local users authenticate as guest.
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Potential impact
Network security: Allow Local System to use computer identity for NTLM
This policy setting allows Local System services that use SPNEGO (Negotiate) to use the computer identity when reverting to NTLM authentication. If you enable this policy setting, services running as Local System that use Negotiate will use the computer identity. This might cause some authentication requests between Windows operating systems to fail and log an error. If you do not configure this policy setting, services running as Local System that use Negotiate when reverting to NTLM authentication will authenticate anonymously. This was the behavior in previous versions of Windows. Possible values: Enabled Disabled Not Defined
Vulnerability
When connecting to computers running versions of Windows earlier than Windows Vista or Windows Server 2008, services running as Local System and using SPNEGO (Negotiate) that revert to NTLM use the computer identity. In Windows Server 2008 R2 or Windows 7, if you are connecting to a computer running Windows Server 2008 or Windows Vista, then a system service uses either the computer identity or a NULL session. When connecting with a NULL session, a system-generated session key is created, which provides no protection but allows applications to sign and encrypt data without errors. When connecting with the computer identity, signing and encryption are supported to provide data protection.
Countermeasure
You can configure the Network security: Allow Local System to use computer identity for NTLM security policy setting to allow Local System services that use Negotiate to use the computer identity when reverting to NTLM authentication.
Potential impact
If you do not configure this policy setting, services running as Local System that use the default credentials and a NULL session revert to NTLM authentication for Windows operating systems
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earlier than Windows Vista or Windows Server 2008. This might cause some authentication requests between Windows operating systems to fail and display an error.
If this setting is enabled, then a system-generated session key is created when connecting with a NULL session, which provides no protection but allows applications to sign and encrypt data without errors. Data intended to be protected may be exposed.
Countermeasure
You can configure the computer to use the machine identity for Local System with the policy Network security: Allow Local System to use computer identity for NTLM. If that is not possible, then this policy can be used to prevent data from being exposed in transit that was protected with a well-known key.
Potential impact
If you enable this policy, services that use NULL session with Local System could fail to authenticate because they will be prohibited from using signing and encryption. This policy applies to Windows Server 2008 and Windows Vista (SP1 and later). When your environment no longer requires support for NT 4, this policy should be disabled. By default it is disabled on Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2.
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Network Security: Allow PKU2U authentication requests to this computer to use online identities
This policy setting determines whether the PKU2U authentication protocol requests will be allowed between computers running Windows 7. If you enable this policy setting, this will allow authentication to successfully complete between the two (or more) computers that have established a peer relationship through the use on online IDs. The PKU2U SSP obtains a local certificate and exchanges the policy between the peer computers. When validated on the peer computer, the certificate within the metadata is sent to the logon peer for validation, and it associates the user's certificate to a security token and the logon process completes. Possible values: Enabled Disabled Not Defined
Vulnerability
Enabling this policy setting allows a user account on one computer to be associated with an online identity, such as Windows Live ID, so that the account can log on to a peer computer (if the peer computer is likewise configured) without the use of a Windows logon account (domain or local). Although this can be beneficial for workgroups or home groups, using this feature in a domain might circumvent your established security policies.
Countermeasure
Set this policy to Disabled or do not configure this security policy for all domain-joined computers.
Potential impact
If you disable or do not enable this policy setting, the PKU2U protocol will not be used to authenticate between peer computers, which forces users to follow domain-defined access control policies. If you enable this policy setting, you will allow your users to use PKU2U to authenticate by using local certificates between computers that are not part of a domain. This allows users to share resources between computers.
Possible values: DES_CBC_CRC DES_CBC_MD5 RC4_HMAC_MD5 AES128_HMAC_SHA1 AES256_HMAC_SHA1 Future encryption types The following table describes these values.
Value DES_CBC_CRC
Description Supported in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, and Windows Server 2008. Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2 systems do not support DES by default.
DES_CBC_MD5
Supported in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, and Windows Server 2008. Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2 systems do not support DES by default.
RC4_HMAC_MD5
Supported in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2. Not supported in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, or Windows Server 2003. Supported in Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.
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AES128_HMAC_SHA1
Value AES256_HMAC_SHA1
Description Not supported in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, or Windows Server 2003. Supported in Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.
As of the release of Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7, this is reserved by Microsoft for additional encryption types that might be implemented.
Vulnerability
Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7 do not support the DES cryptographic suites by default because stronger cryptographic suites are available. However, to enable Kerberos protocol interoperability with non-Windows versions of Kerberos, these suites can be enabled. Doing so might open attack vectors on computers running Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7.
Countermeasure
Do not configure this policy setting. This will force computers running Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7 to use the AES or RC4 cryptographic suites. You can also disable DES for your computers running Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008.
Potential impact
If you do not select any of the encryption types, computers running Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7 might have Kerberos protocol authentication failures when connecting with computers running non-Windows versions of Kerberos. If you do select any encryption type, you will lower the effectiveness of encryption for Kerberos authentication. Contemporary non-Windows implementations of Kerberos support RC4 and AES 128-bit and AES 256-bit encryption. Most implementations, including MIT Kerberos and Windows Kerberos, are deprecating DES encryption.
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Network security: Do not store LAN Manager hash value on next password change
This policy setting determines whether LAN Manager is prevented from storing hash values for the new password the next time the password is changed. Hash values are representation of the password after the encryption algorithm is applied that corresponds to the format specified by the algorithm. To decrypt the hash value, the encryption algorithm must be determined and then reversed. The LAN Manager hash is relatively weak and prone to attack compared to the cryptographically stronger NTLM hash. Possible values: Enabled Disabled Not Defined
Vulnerability
The SAM file can be targeted by attackers who seek access to user name and password hashes. Such attacks use special tools to discover passwords, which can then be used to impersonate users and gain access to resources on your network. These types of attacks are not prevented by enabling this policy setting because LAN Manager hashes are much weaker than NTLM hashes, but it is much more difficult for these attacks to succeed.
Countermeasure
Enable the Network security: Do not store LAN Manager hash value on next password change policy setting. Require that all users set new passwords the next time they log on to the domain so that LAN Manager hashes are removed.
Potential impact
Earlier operating systems such as Windows 95, Windows 98, and Windows Millennium Edition, in addition to some non-Microsoft applications, cannot connect to the system.
If you disable this policy setting, users can remain connected to the computer outside of their allotted logon hours.
Countermeasure
Enable the Network security: Force logoff when logon hours expire policy setting. This policy setting does not apply to administrator accounts.
Potential impact
When a user's logon time expires, SMB sessions terminate. The user cannot log on to the computer until the next scheduled access time commences.
Send NTLM responses only Send NTLMv2 responses only Send NTLMv2 responses only. Refuse LM Send NTLMv2 responses only. Refuse LM & NTLM Not Defined The Network security: LAN Manager authentication level policy setting determines which challenge/response authentication protocol is used for network logons. This choice affects the authentication protocol level that client computers use, the session security level that the computers negotiate, and the authentication level that servers accept. The following table identifies the policy settings, describes the setting, and identifies the security level that is used in the corresponding registry setting if you choose to use the registry to control this setting instead of the policy setting.
Description Client computers use LM and NTLM authentication, and they never use NTLMv2 session security. Domain controllers accept LM, NTLM, and NTLMv2 authentication. Client computers use LM and NTLM authentication, and they use NTLMv2 session security if the server supports it. Domain controllers accept LM, NTLM, and NTLMv2 authentication. Client computers use NTLM authentication only, and they use NTLMv2 session security if the server supports it. Domain controllers accept LM, NTLM, and NTLMv2 authentication.
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Description Client computers use NTLMv2 authentication only, and they use NTLMv2 session security if the server supports it. Domain controllers accept LM, NTLM, and NTLMv2 authentication. Client computers use NTLMv2 authentication only, and they use NTLMv2 session security if the server supports it. Domain controllers refuse to accept LM authentication, and they will accept only NTLM and NTLMv2 authentication. Client computers use NTLMv2 authentication only, and they use NTLMv2 session security if the server supports it. Domain controllers refuse to accept LM and NTLM authentication, and they will accept only NTLMv2 authentication.
Vulnerability
Beginning with Windows Vista, this policy setting is undefined. Beginning with Windows Server 2008, this policy setting is configured to Send NTLMv2 responses only. In Windows 2000, Windows Server 2003, and Windows XP, client computers are configured by default to send LM and NTLM authentication responses (client computers running Windows 95 and Windows 98 send only LM). The default setting on servers allows all client computers to authenticate with servers and use their resources. However, this means that LM responsesthe weakest form of authentication responseare sent over the network, and it is potentially possible for attackers to intercept that traffic to reproduce the user's password more easily.
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The Windows 95, Windows 98, and Windows NT operating systems cannot use the Kerberos version 5 protocol for authentication. For this reason, in a Windows Server 2003 domain, these computers authenticate by default with the LM and NTLM protocols for network authentication. You can enforce a more secure authentication protocol for Windows 95, Windows 98, and Windows NT by using NTLMv2. For the logon process, NTLMv2 uses a secure channel to protect the authentication process. Even if you use NTLMv2 for client computers and servers running these earlier versions of Windows, client computers and servers that are members of the domain use the Kerberos authentication protocol to authenticate with Windows Server 2003 domain controllers.
Countermeasure
Configure the Network security: LAN Manager Authentication Level policy setting to Send NTLMv2 responses only. We and a number of independent organizations strongly recommend this level of authentication when all client computers support NTLMv2. For more information about how to enable NTLMv2 on earlier versions of Windows, see article 239869 in the Microsoft Knowledge Base. Windows NT 4.0 requires Service Pack 4 (SP4) to support NTLMv2, and the Windows 95 and Windows 98 operating systems need the directory service client installed to support NTLMv2.
Potential impact
Clients that do not support NTLMv2 authentication cannot authenticate in the domain and access domain resources by using LM and NTLM.
This policy setting does not have any impact on ldap_simple_bind or ldap_simple_bind_s. Microsoft LDAP clients do not use ldap_simple_bind or ldap_simple_bind_s to communicate with a domain controller. Possible values: None Negotiate signing Require signature Not Defined
Vulnerability
Unsigned network traffic is susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks in which an intruder captures the packets between the client and server, modifies them, and then forwards them to the server. For an LDAP server, this susceptibility means that an attacker could cause a server to make decisions that are based on false or altered data from the LDAP queries. To lower this risk in your network, you can implement strong physical security measures to protect the network infrastructure. Also, you can make all types of man-in-the-middle attacks extremely difficult if you require digital signatures on all network packets by means of IPsec authentication headers.
Countermeasure
Configure the Network security: LDAP server signing requirements policy setting to Require signature.
Potential impact
If you configure the server to require LDAP signatures, you must also configure the client computer. If you do not configure the client computer, it cannot communicate with the server, which could cause many features to fail, including user authentication, Group Policy, and logon scripts.
Network security: Minimum session security for NTLM SSP based (including secure RPC) clients
This policy setting allows a client computer to require the negotiation of 128-bit encryption, or NTLMv2 session security. These values are dependent on the Network security: LAN Manager Authentication Level policy setting value. Possible values: Require 128-bit encryption
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Network traffic that uses the NTLM Security Support Provider (NTLM SSP) could be exposed such that an attacker who has gained access to the network can create man-in-the-middle attacks.
Countermeasure
Enable all options that are available for the Network security: Minimum session security for NTLM SSP based (including secure RPC) clients policy setting.
Potential impact
If this policy setting is configured, client computers that are enforcing these settings cannot communicate with older servers that do not support these settings.
Network security: Minimum session security for NTLM SSP based (including secure RPC) servers
This policy setting allows a server to require the negotiation of message confidentiality (encryption), message integrity, 128-bit encryption, or NTLMv2 session security. These values are dependent on the LAN Manager Authentication Level security setting value. Possible values: Require message integrity Require message confidentiality Require NTLMv2 session security Require 128-bit encryption Not Defined
Vulnerability
Network traffic that uses the NTLM Security Support Provider (NTLM SSP) could be exposed such that an attacker who has gained access to the network can create man-in-the-middle attacks.
Countermeasure
Enable all four options that are available for the Network security: Minimum session security for NTLM SSP based (including secure RPC) servers policy setting.
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Potential impact
If this policy setting is configured, older client computers that do not support these security settings cannot communicate with this computer.
Network security: Restrict NTLM: Add remote server exceptions for NTLM authentication
This policy setting allows you to create an exception list of remote servers to which client computers are allowed to use NTLM authentication if any of the deny options are set in the Network Security: Restrict NTLM: Outgoing NTLM traffic to remote servers policy setting. When you can enter a list of remote servers to which client computers are allowed to use NTLM authentication, the policy is defined and enabled.
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When it has been determined that the NTLM authentication protocol should not be used from a client to any remote servers because you are required to use a more secure protocol, such as Kerberos protocol, there might be some applications on the client computer that still use NTLM. If so, and you set Network Security: Restrict NTLM: Outgoing NTLM traffic to remote servers to any of the Deny options, those applications will fail because the outbound NTLM authentication traffic from the client computer will be blocked. If you define an exception list of servers to which client computers are allowed to use NTLM authentication, then NTLM authentication traffic will continue to flow between the servers and those applications on the client computers. The servers then are vulnerable to any malicious attack that takes advantage of security weaknesses in NTLM.
Countermeasure
When you use Network Security: Restrict NTLM: Outgoing NTLM traffic to remote servers in audit-only mode, you can determine by reviewing which applications on the client computers are making NTLM authentication requests to the remote servers in your environment. When assessed, you will have to determine on a case-by-case basis if NTLM authentication still minimally meets your security requirements. If not, then the application has to be upgraded to use something other than NTLM authentication.
Potential impact
Defining a list of servers for this policy setting will enable NTLM authentication traffic from the application on the client computer that uses those servers, and this might result in a security vulnerability. If this list is not defined and Network Security: Restrict NTLM: Outgoing NTLM traffic to remote servers is enabled, then applications on client computers that use NTLM will fail to authenticate to those servers that they have used in the past.
When you enter a list of remote servers to which clients are allowed to use NTLM authentication, the policy is defined and enabled. Possible values: User-defined list of servers to which clients are allowed to use NTLM authentication Not Defined
Vulnerability
When it has been determined that the NTLM authentication protocol should not be used within a domain because you are required to use a more secure protocol, such as Kerberos protocol, there might be some client applications that still use NTLM. If so, and you set Network Security: Restrict NTLM: NTLM authentication in this domain to any of the Deny options, those applications will fail because the outbound NTLM authentication traffic from the client will be blocked. If you define an exception list of servers in this domain to which client computers are allowed to use NTLM pass-through authentication, then NTLM authentication traffic will continue to flow between the servers and those applications on the client computers. The servers then are vulnerable to any malicious attack that takes advantage of security weaknesses in NTLM.
Countermeasure
When you use Network Security: Restrict NTLM: NTLM authentication in this domain in auditonly mode, you can determine by reviewing which applications on the client computers are making NTLM authentication requests to the pass-through authentication servers. When assessed, you will have to determine on a case-by-case basis if NTLM authentication still minimally meets your security requirements. If not, then the application has to be upgraded to use something other than NTLM authentication.
Potential impact
Defining a list of servers for this policy setting will enable NTLM authentication traffic between those servers and any application on the client computer that uses those servers and might result in asecurity vulnerability. If this list is not defined and Network Security: Restrict NTLM: Outgoing NTLM traffic to remote servers is enabled, then applications on the client computers that use NTLM will fail to authenticate to those servers that they have used in the past.
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Enabling this policy setting will reveal through logging which servers and client computers within your network or domain handle NTLM traffic. The identity of these computers can be used in malicious ways if NTLM authentication traffic is compromised. The policy setting does not prevent or mitigate any vulnerability because it is for audit purposes only.
Countermeasure
Restrict access to the log files when this policy setting is enabled in your production environment.
Potential impact
If you do not enable or configure this policy setting, no NTLM authentication traffic information will be logged. If you do enable this policy setting, only auditing functions will occur; no security enhancements will be implemented.
Not Defined
Vulnerability
Enabling this policy setting will reveal through logging which servers and client computers within your network or domain handle NTLM traffic. The identity of these computers can be used in malicious ways if NTLM authentication traffic is compromised. The policy setting does not prevent or mitigate any vulnerability because it is for audit purposes only.
Countermeasure
Restrict access to the log files when this policy setting is enabled in your production environment.
Potential impact
If you do not enable or configure this policy setting, no NTLM authentication traffic information will be logged. If you enable this policy setting, only auditing functions will occur; no security enhancements will be implemented.
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Possible values: Allow all Deny all domain accounts Deny all accounts Not Defined
Vulnerability
Malicious attacks on NTLM authentication traffic resulting in a compromised server can occur only if the server handles NTLM requests. If those requests are denied, this attack vector is eliminated.
Countermeasure
When it has been determined that the NTLM authentication protocol should not be used within a network because you are required to use a more secure protocol, such as Kerberos protocol, you can select from several options based on your security goals to restrict NTLM usage.
Potential impact
If you configure this policy setting, numerous NTLM authentication requests could fail within your network, which could degrade productivity. Before implementing this change through this policy setting, set Network security: Restrict NTLM: Audit Incoming NTLM Traffic to the same option so that you can review the log for the potential impact, perform an analysis of servers, and create an exception list of servers to exclude from the Network security: Restrict NTLM: Add server exceptions in this domain policy setting.
Vulnerability
Malicious attacks on NTLM authentication traffic resulting in a compromised server or domain controller can occur only if the server or domain controller handles NTLM requests. If those requests are denied, this attack vector is eliminated.
Countermeasure
When it has been determined that the NTLM authentication protocol should not be used within a network because you are required to use a more secure protocol, such as the Kerberos protocol, then you can select from several options based on your security goals to restrict NTLM usage within the domain.
Potential impact
If you configure this policy setting, numerous NTLM authentication requests could fail within the domain, which could decrease productivity. Before implementing this change through this policy setting, set Network security: Restrict NTLM: Audit NTLM authentication in this domain to the same option so that you can review the log for the potential impact, perform an analysis of servers, and create an exception list of servers to exclude from this policy setting by using Network security: Restrict NTLM: Add server exceptions in this domain. Audited and blocked events are recorded on this computer in the Operational log located in Applications and Services Log\Microsoft\Windows\NTLM.
Malicious attacks on NTLM authentication traffic resulting in a compromised server or domain controller can occur only if the server or domain controller handles NTLM requests. If those requests are denied, this attack vector is eliminated.
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Countermeasure
When it has been determined that the NTLM authentication protocol should not be used within a network because you are required to use a more secure protocol, such as Kerberos protocol, you can select from several options, based on your security goals, to restrict NTLM usage to servers.
Potential impact
If you configure this policy setting to deny all requests, numerous NTLM authentication requests to remote servers could fail, which could decrease productivity. Before implementing this restriction through this policy setting, select Audit all so that you can review the log for the potential impact, perform an analysis of servers, and create an exception list of servers to exclude from this policy by using Network security: Restrict NTLM: Add remote server exceptions for NTLM authentication. Audited and blocked events are recorded on this computer in the Operational log located in Applications and Services Log\Microsoft\Windows\NTLM.
The Recovery Console can be very useful when you must troubleshoot and repair computers that do not start. However, allowing automatic logon to the Recovery Console can make it possible for someone to assume full control of the server.
Countermeasure
Disable the Recovery console: Allow automatic administrative logon policy setting.
Potential impact
Users must enter a user name and password to access the Recovery Console.
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Recovery console: Allow floppy copy and access to all drives and all folders
This policy setting enables or disables the Recovery Console SET command, which allows you to set the following Recovery Console environment variables: AllowWildCards. Enables wildcard support for some commands, such as the DEL command. AllowAllPaths. Allows access to all files and folders on the computer. AllowRemovableMedia. Allows files to be copied to removable media, such as a floppy disk. NoCopyPrompt. Suppresses the prompt that typically displays before an existing file is overwritten. Possible values: Enabled Disabled Not Defined
Vulnerability
An attacker who can cause the system to restart into the Recovery Console could steal sensitive data and leave no audit or access trail.
Countermeasure
Disable the Recovery console: Allow floppy copy and access to drives and folders policy setting.
Potential impact
Users who have started a server through the Recovery Console and logged on with the built-in Administrator account cannot copy files and folders to a floppy disk.
Not Defined
Vulnerability
Users who can access the console locally could shut down the computer. Attackers who have access to the local console could restart the server, which would cause a temporary DoS condition. Attackers could also shut down the server and leave all of its applications and services unavailable.
Countermeasure
Disable the Shutdown: Allow system to be shut down without having to log on policy setting.
Potential impact
Important information that is kept in real memory may be written periodically to the paging file to help the operating system handle multitasking functions. An attacker who has physical access to a server that has been shut down could view the contents of the paging file. The attacker could move the system volume into a different computer and then analyze the contents of the
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paging file. Although this process is time consuming, it could expose data that is cached from random access memory (RAM) to the paging file. Caution An attacker who has physical access to the computer could bypass this countermeasure by unplugging the computer from its power source.
Countermeasure
Enable the Shutdown: Clear virtual memory pagefile when system shuts down policy setting. This configuration causes the operating system to clear the pagefile when the computer is shut down. The amount of time that is required to complete this process depends on the size of the pagefile. Because the process overwrites the storage area used by the pagefile several times, it could be several minutes before the computer completely shuts down.
Potential impact
It takes longer to shut down and restart the computer, especially on computers with large paging files. For a computer with 2 gigabytes (GB) of RAM and a 2-GB paging file, this policy setting could increase the shutdown process by 20 to 30 minutes, or more. For some organizations this downtime violates their internal service level agreements. Therefore, use caution before you implement this countermeasure in your environment.
System cryptography: Force strong key protection for user keys stored on the computer
This policy setting determines whether users can use private keys, such as their Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) key, without a password. Possible values: User input is not required when new keys are stored and used User is prompted when the key is first used User must enter a password each time they use a key Not Defined
Vulnerability
If a user's account is compromised or the user's computer is inadvertently left unsecured, the malicious user can use the keys that are stored for the user to access protected resources.
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Countermeasure
Configure the System cryptography: Force strong key protection for user keys stored on the computer policy setting to User must enter a password each time they use a key so that users must provide a password that is distinct from their domain password every time they use a key. This configuration makes it more difficult for an attacker to access locally stored user keys, even if the attacker takes control of the user's computer and determines the logon password.
Potential impact
Users must type their password every time they access a key that is stored on their computer. For example, if users use an S/MIME certificate to digitally sign their email, they are forced to type the password for that certificate every time they send a signed email message. For some organizations, the overhead that is involved by using this configuration may be too high. At a minimum, this policy setting should be set to User is prompted when the key is first used.
System cryptography: Use FIPS compliant algorithms for encryption, hashing, and signing
This policy setting determines whether the TLS/SSL Security Support Provider supports only the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS)-compliant strong cipher suite known as TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, which means that the provider only supports the TLS protocol as a client and as a server, if applicable. It uses only the Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES) encryption algorithm for the TLS traffic encryption, only the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) public key algorithm for the TLS key exchange and authentication, and only the Secure Hash Algorithm version 1 (SHA-1) hashing algorithm for the TLS hashing requirements. When this policy setting is enabled, the Encrypting File System (EFS) service supports only the 3DES encryption algorithm for encrypting file data. By default, the implementation of EFS beginning with Windows Server 2003 uses the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with a 256bit key. Possible values: Enabled Disabled Not Defined
Vulnerability
You can enable this policy setting to ensure that the computer uses the most powerful algorithms that are available for digital encryption, hashing, and signing. Use of these algorithms minimizes the risk of compromise of digitally encrypted or signed data by an unauthorized user.
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Countermeasure
Enable the System cryptography: Use FIPS compliant algorithms for encryption, hashing, and signing policy setting.
Potential impact
Client computers that have this policy setting enabled cannot communicate by means of digitally encrypted or signed protocols with servers that do not support these algorithms. Network clients that do not support these algorithms cannot use servers that require the algorithms for network communications. For example, many Apache-based Web servers are not configured to support TLS. If you enable this policy setting, you must also configure your Web browser to use TLS. This policy setting also affects the encryption level that is used for the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The Remote Desktop Connection tool uses the RDP to communicate with servers that run Remote Desktop Services or Terminal Services and client computers that are configured for remote control. RDP connections fail if both computers are not configured to use the same encryption algorithms.
System objects: Default owner for objects created by members of the Administrators group
This policy setting determines whether the Administrators group or an object creator is the default owner of any system objects that are created. Possible values: Administrators group Object creator Not Defined
Vulnerability
If you configure this policy setting to the Administrators group, it is impossible to hold individuals accountable for the creation of new system objects.
Countermeasure
Configure the System objects: Default owner for objects created by members of the Administrators group policy setting to Object creator.
Potential impact
When system objects are created, the ownership reflects which account created the object instead of the more generic Administrators group. A consequence of this policy setting is that
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objects become orphaned when user accounts are deleted. For example, when a member of the information technology group leaves, any objects that they created anywhere in the domain have no owner. This situation could become an administrative burden because administrators must manually take ownership of orphaned objects to update their permissions. This potential burden can be minimized if you can ensure that Full Control is always assigned to new objects for a domain group such as Domain Admins.
Because Windows is case insensitive but the POSIX subsystem supports case sensitivity, failure to enable this policy setting makes it possible for a user of that subsystem to create a file with the same name as another file but with a different mix of uppercase and lowercase letters. Such a situation could potentially confuse users when they try to access such files from normal Win32 tools because only one of the files is available.
Countermeasure
Enable the System objects: Require case insensitivity for non-Windows subsystems policy setting.
Potential impact
All subsystems are forced to observe case insensitivity. This configuration may confuse users who are familiar with any UNIX-based operating systems that are case sensitive.
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System objects: Strengthen default permissions of internal system objects (e.g., Symbolic Links)
This policy setting determines the strength of the default DACL for objects. The Windows operating system maintains a global list of shared computer resources (such as MS-DOS device names, mutexes, and semaphores) so that objects can be located and shared among processes. Each type of object is created with a default DACL that specifies who can access the objects and with what permissions. If you enable this policy setting, the default DACL is strengthened because non-administrator users are allowed to read shared objects but not modify shared objects that they did not create. Possible values: Enabled Disabled Not Defined
Vulnerability
This policy setting is enabled by default to protect against a known vulnerability that can be used with hard links or symbolic links. Hard links are actual directory entries in the file system. With hard links, the same data in a file system can be referred to by different file names. Symbolic links are text files that provide a pointer to the file that is interpreted and followed by the operating system as a path to another file or directory. Because symbolic links are a separate file, they can exist independently of the target location. If a symbolic link is deleted, its target location remains unaffected. When this policy setting is disabled, it is possible for a malicious user to destroy a data file by creating a link that looks like a temporary file that the system automatically creates, such as a sequentially named log file, but points to the data file that the malicious user wants to eradicate. When the system writes the files with that name, the data is overwritten. Enabling System objects: Strengthen default permissions of internal system objects (e.g., Symbolic Links) prevents an attacker from exploiting programs that create files with predictable names by not allowing them to write to objects that they did not create.
Countermeasure
Enable the System objects: Strengthen default permissions of global system objects (e.g., Symbolic Links) policy setting.
Potential impact
The POSIX subsystem is an Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) standard that defines a set of operating system services. The POSIX subsystem is required if the server supports applications that use that subsystem. The POSIX subsystem introduces a security risk that relates to processes that can potentially persist across logons. If a user starts a process and then logs out, there is a potential that the next user who logs on to the computer could access the previous user's process. This would allow the second user to take actions on the process by using the privileges of the first user.
Countermeasure
Configure the System settings: Optional subsystems setting to a null value. The default value is POSIX.
Potential impact
Applications that rely on the POSIX subsystem no longer operate. For example, Microsoft Services for Unix (SFU) installs an updated version of the POSIX subsystem that is required, so you must reconfigure this setting in Group Policy for any servers that use SFU.
System settings: Use Certificate Rules on Windows Executables for Software Restriction Policies
This policy setting determines whether digital certificates are processed when software restriction policies are enabled and a user or process attempts to run software with an .exe file name extension. This security setting enables or disables certificate rules (a type of software restriction policies rule). With software restriction policies, you can create a certificate rule that allows or disallows Microsoft Authenticode-signed software to run, based on the digital certificate that is associated with the software. For certificate rules to work in software restriction policies, you must enable this security setting. Possible values: Enabled
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Without the use of software restriction policies, users and computers might be exposed to the running of unauthorized software that could include malicious software such as viruses and Trojan horses.
Countermeasure
Enable the System settings: Use Certificate Rules on Windows Executables for Software Restriction Policies policy setting.
Potential impact
If you enable certificate rules, software restriction policies check a certificate revocation list (CRL) to verify that the software's certificate and signature are valid. This checking process may negatively affect performance when signed programs start. To disable this feature, you can edit the software restriction policies in the appropriate GPO. On the Trusted Publishers Properties dialog box, clear the Publisher and Timestamp check boxes.
User Account Control: Admin Approval Mode for the Built-in Administrator account
This policy setting determines the behavior of Admin Approval mode for the built-in Administrator account. Possible values: Enabled Disabled When this policy setting is enabled, the built-in Administrator account logs on in Admin Approval Mode. In this mode, the local Administrator account functions like a standard user account, but it has the ability to elevate privileges without logging on by using a different account. In this mode, any operation that requires elevation of privilege displays a prompt that allows the administrator to permit or deny the elevation of privilege. When this policy setting is disabled, the built-in Administrator account logs on in XP-compatible mode, and it runs all applications by default with full administrative privileges. By default, this policy setting is set to Disabled. However, if a computer is upgraded from a previous version of Windows to Windows 7 and the Administrator account is the only account on the computer, the built-in Administrator account remains enabled, and this policy setting is also enabled.
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Vulnerability
One of the risks that User Account Control (UAC) is intended to mitigate is that of malicious software running under elevated credentials without the user or administrator being aware of its activity. An attack vector for malicious programs is to discover the password of the Administrator account because that user account was created for all installations of the Windows operating system. To address this risk, the built-in Administrator account is disabled in Windows 7. In Windows Server 2008 R2, the Administrator account is enabled, and the password must be changed the first time the administrator logs on. In a default installation of Windows 7, accounts with administrative control over the computer are initially set up in one of two ways: If the computer is not joined to a domain, the first user account you create has the equivalent permissions as a local administrator. If the computer is joined to a domain, no local administrator accounts are created. The enterprise or domain administrator must log on to the computer and create a local administrator account if one is warranted. After Windows 7 is installed, the built-in Administrator account can be enabled, but we strongly recommend that this account remain disabled.
Countermeasure
Enable the User Account Control: Admin Approval Mode for the Built-in Administrator account policy setting if you have the built-in Administrator account enabled.
Potential impact
Users who log on by using the local Administrator account are prompted for consent whenever a program requests an elevation in privilege.
User Account Control: Allow UIAccess applications to prompt for elevation without using the secure desktop
This security setting controls whether User Interface Accessibility (UIAccess or UIA) programs can automatically disable the secure desktop for elevation prompts that are being used by a standard user. Note This policy setting does not change the behavior of the UAC elevation prompt for administrators. Possible values: Enabled
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Disabled or Not Configured When this policy setting is enabled, UIA programs including Windows Remote Assistance can automatically disable the secure desktop for elevation prompts. Unless you have also disabled elevation prompts, the prompts appear on the interactive user's desktop instead of the secure desktop, and they appear on the remote administrator's view of the desktop during a Windows Remote Assistance session, and the remote administrator can provide the appropriate credentials for elevation. If you plan to enable this policy setting, you should also review the effect of the User Account Control: Behavior of the elevation prompt for standard users policy setting. If it is configured as Automatically deny elevation requests, elevation requests are not presented to the user. If you disable this policy setting, the secure desktop can only be disabled by the user of the interactive desktop or by disabling the User Account Control: Switch to the secure desktop when prompting for elevation policy setting. By default, this policy setting is set to Enabled.
Vulnerability
UIA programs are designed to interact with the Windows operating system and with application programs on behalf of a user. This policy setting allows UIA programs to bypass the secure desktop to increase usability in certain cases, but allowing elevation requests to appear on the regular interactive desktop instead of the secure desktop increases the risk that a malicious program could intercept data that is being transferred between the UI and the application. Because UIA programs must be able to respond to prompts regarding security issues, such as the UAC elevation prompt, UIA programs must be highly trusted. To be considered trusted, a UIA program must be digitally signed. By default, UIA programs can be run only from the following protected paths: Program Files, including subfolders Program Files (x86), including subfolders, in 64-bit versions of Windows only Windows\System32 The requirement to be in a protected path can be disabled by the User Account Control: Only elevate UIAccess applications that are installed in secure locations policy setting. Although this policy setting applies to any UIA program, it is used primarily in certain Windows Remote Assistance scenarios. The Windows Remote Assistance program is a UIA program.
Countermeasure
Disable the User Account Control: Allow UIAccess applications to prompt for elevation without using the secure desktop policy setting.
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Potential impact
If a user requests remote assistance from an administrator and the remote assistance session is established, any elevation prompts appear on the interactive user's secure desktop and the administrator's remote session is paused. To avoid pausing the remote administrator's session during elevation requests, the user can select the Allow IT Expert to respond to User Account Control prompts check box when setting up the remote assistance session. However, selecting this check box requires that the interactive user respond to an elevation prompt on the secure desktop. If the interactive user is a standard user, the user does not have the required credentials to allow elevation.
User Account Control: Behavior of the elevation prompt for administrators in Admin Approval Mode
This policy setting determines the behavior of the elevation prompt for accounts that have administrative credentials. Possible values: Elevate without prompting Prompt for credentials Prompt for consent The default value for this policy setting is Prompt for consent.
Vulnerability
One of the risks that the UAC feature tries to mitigate is that of malicious software running under elevated credentials without the user or administrator being aware of its activity. This policy setting notifies the administrator of elevated privilege operations and permits the administrator to prevent a malicious program from elevating its privilege when the program attempts to do so.
Countermeasure
Configure the User Account Control: Behavior of the elevation prompt for administrators in Admin Approval Mode policy setting to Prompt for consent.
Potential impact
This is the default behavior. Administrators should be made aware that they will be prompted for consent.
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User Account Control: Behavior of the elevation prompt for standard users
This policy setting determines the behavior of the elevation prompt for standard users.
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Possible values: Automatically deny elevation requests Prompt for credentials The default configuration for this policy setting is Prompt for credentials.
Vulnerability
One of the risks that UAC tries to mitigate is that of malicious programs running under elevated credentials without the user or administrator being aware of their activity. This policy setting notifies the user that a program requires the use of elevated privilege operations, and it requires that the user be able to supply administrative credentials for the program to run.
Countermeasure
Configure the User Account Control: Behavior of the elevation prompt for standard users to Automatically deny elevation requests. This policy setting requires the user to log on with an administrative account to run programs that require elevation of privilege. As a security best practice, standard users should not have knowledge of administrative passwords. However, if your users have both standard and administrator-level accounts, we recommend setting Prompt for credentials so that the users do not choose to always log on with their administrator accounts, and they use the standard user account instead.
Potential impact
Users must provide administrative passwords to run programs with elevated privileges. This could cause an increased load on IT staff while the programs that are affected are identified and standard operating procedures are modified to support least privilege operations.
User Account Control: Detect application installations and prompt for elevation
This policy setting determines the behavior of application installation detection for the entire system. If this policy setting is enabled, application installation packages that require an elevation of privilege to install are detected and the user is prompted for administrative credentials. Enterprises that are running standard user desktops that capitalize on delegated installation technologies (such as Group Policy Software Install (GPSI) or SMS) can disable this feature. In this case, installer detection is unnecessary and it is not required. Possible values: Enabled
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Some malicious software may attempt to install itself after being given permission to run, for example, malicious software with a trusted application shell. The user may give permission for the program to run because the program is trusted and is then prompted for installation of an unknown component. This provides another way to trap the software before it can do damage.
Countermeasure
Enable the User Account Control: Detect application installations and prompt for elevation policy setting.
Potential impact
User Account Control: Only elevate executables that are signed and validated
This policy setting enforces public key infrastructure (PKI) signature checks on any interactive application that requests elevation of privilege. Enterprise administrators can control the applications that are allowed to run through the population of certificates in the local computer's Trusted Publishers store. If this policy setting is enabled, the PKI certificate chain validation of a given executable file is enforced before it is permitted to run. Possible values: Enabled Disabled The default configuration for this policy setting is Disabled.
Vulnerability
Intellectual property, personally identifiable information, and other confidential data is normally manipulated by applications on the computer, and elevated credentials are required to get access to the information. Users and administrators inherently trust applications that are used with these information sources and provide their credentials. If one of these applications is replaced by a rogue application that appears identical to the trusted application, the confidential data and the user's administrative credentials could be compromised.
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Countermeasure
Enable the User Account Control: Only elevate executables that are signed and validated policy setting.
Potential impact
Enabling this policy setting requires that you have a PKI and that your enterprise administrators have populated the Trusted Publishers store with the certificates for the allowed applications. Some older applications are not signed, and they cannot be used in an environment that is hardened with this policy setting. You should carefully test your applications in a preproduction environment before implementing this policy setting. For information about the steps that are required to test application compatibility, make application compatibility fixes, and sign installer packages to prepare your organization for UAC deployment, see Understanding and Configuring User Account Control in Windows Vista. Control over the applications that are installed on the desktop and the hardware that joins your domain should provide similar protection from the vulnerability that is addressed by this policy setting. Additionally, the level of protection that is provided by this policy setting is not an assurance that all rogue applications will be found.
User Account Control: Only elevate UIAccess applications that are installed in secure locations
This policy setting enforces the requirement that applications that request running with a UIAccess integrity level (by means of a marking of UIAccess=true in their application manifest), must reside in a secure location on the file system. Relatively secure locations are limited to the following directories: Program Files, including subdirectories Windows\system32 Program Files (x86), including subdirectories for 64-bit versions of Windows Note The Windows operating system enforces a PKI signature check on any interactive application that requests running with a UIAccess integrity level regardless of the state of this security setting. Possible values: Enabled
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UIAccess integrity allows an application to bypass User Interface Privilege Isolation (UIPI) restrictions when an application is elevated in privilege from a standard user to an administrator. When this policy setting is enabled, an application that has the UIAccess flag set to true in its manifest can interchange information with applications that are running at a higher privilege level, such as logon prompts and privilege elevation prompts. This ability is required to support accessibility features (such as screen readers) that are transmitting user interfaces to alternative forms, but it is not required by most applications. A process that is started with UIAccess rights has the following capabilities: To set the foreground window. To drive any application window by using the SendInput function. To use read input for all integrity levels by using low-level hooks, raw input, GetKeyState, GetAsyncKeyState, and GetKeyboardInput. To set journal hooks. To use AttachThreadInput to attach a thread to a higher integrity input queue.
Countermeasure
Enable the User Account Control: Only elevate UIAccess applications that are installed in secure locations policy setting.
Potential impact
If the application that requests UIAccess meets the UIAccess policy setting requirements, the application can bypass most of the UIPI restrictions. If the application does not meet the security restrictions, the application is started without UIAccess rights, and it can interact only with applications at the same or lower privilege level.
Disabled Note If this security setting is configured to Disabled, the Security Center notifies the user that the overall security of the operating system has been reduced. The default configuration for this policy setting is Enabled.
Vulnerability
This policy setting turns UAC on or off. If this setting is disabled, UAC is not used, and any security benefits and risk mitigations that are dependent on UAC are not present on the system.
Countermeasure
Enable the User Account Control: Run all users, including administrators, as standard users policy setting.
Potential impact
Users and administrators must learn to work with UAC prompts and adjust their work habits to use least privilege operations.
User Account Control: Switch to the secure desktop when prompting for elevation
This policy setting determines whether the elevation request prompts appears on the interactive user desktop or the secure desktop. Possible values: Enabled Disabled The default configuration for this policy setting is Enabled.
Vulnerability
Elevation prompt dialog boxes can be spoofed, causing users to disclose their passwords to malicious software.
Countermeasure
Enable the User Account Control: Switch to the secure desktop when prompting for elevation policy setting. The secure desktop helps protect against input and output spoofing by presenting the credentials dialog box in a protected section of memory that is accessible only by trusted system processes.
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Potential impact
User Account Control: Virtualize file and registry write failures to per-user locations
This policy setting enables or disables redirecting the Write failures of earlier applications to defined locations in the registry and file system. This feature mitigates those applications that historically ran as administrator and wrote runtime application data back to either %ProgramFiles%, %Windir%, %Windir%\system32, or HKLM\Software\. Virtualization facilitates the running of applications that cannot run with standard user privileges. An administrator who runs only standard user applications may choose to disable this feature because it is unnecessary. Possible values: Enabled Disabled The default configuration for this policy setting is Enabled.
Vulnerability
Enable the User Account Control: Virtualize file and registry write failures to per-user locations policy setting.
Potential impact
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Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2 have event systems that save event log files as XML files that can be reported on and managed as part of a collective reporting schema. There are several additional log providers and categories that you can monitor. Event Viewer in Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2 tracks information in a number of logs, including: Windows Logs This provider contains the following event logs from the operating system: Application Events in this Windows log are classified as error, warning, or information, depending on the severity of the event. An error is a significant problem, such as loss of data. A warning is an event that is not necessarily significant, but it might indicate a possible future problem. An information event describes the successful operation of a program, driver, or service. Security This Windows log contains security-related events, called "audit events," which are described as successful or failed, depending on the event, such as whether a user's attempt to log on to the Windows operating system was successful. Setup This Windows log records events that are related to installing programs and services on a computer. Computers that are configured as domain controllers display additional logs in this category. System This Windows log records system events that are sent by the Windows operating system and Windows system services. They are classified as error, warning, or information. Forwarded Events This Windows log records events that are forwarded to this log by other computers. Applications and Services Logs The Applications and Services Log is a new category of event log provider. Each application or service that is installed on the computer can have an individual log. These logs store events from a single application or service rather than events that might have system-wide impact. This category of logs includes four subtypes for which the application or service can provide events: Administrative, Operational, Analytic, and Debug logs. Administrative Events in the Administrative channel indicate a problem and a welldefined solution that an administrator can act on. An example of an administrative event is an event that occurs when an application fails to connect to a printer. These events are well documented or they include a message that gives the reader direct instructions about what must be done to rectify the problem.
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Operational Events found in the Operational channel are used for analyzing and diagnosing a problem or occurrence. They can be used to trigger tools or tasks based on the problem or occurrence. An example of an operational event is an event that occurs when a printer is added or removed from a system. Analytic Events found in the Analytic channel aid in performance evaluations and troubleshooting. These events are published in high volume, so they should only be enabled and logged for limited amounts of time as part of a diagnostic process. They describe program operation and they may indicate problems that cannot be handled by user intervention. Debug Events found in the Debug channel can be used by developers to troubleshoot issues with their programs. Note Analytic and Debug logs are hidden and disabled by default. To use these logs, first start Event Viewer, click the View menu, and then select Show Analytic and Debug Logs. Then select the Analytic or Debug log that you want to enable, and on the Action menu, click Properties. In the Properties dialog box, select Enable logging, and click OK. Each of these logs has attributes, such as maximum log size, access rights, and retention settings and methods, which can be defined in the appropriate Event Log section in Group Policy.
Note The event log Group Policy settings in Windows Server 2003 are still supported on Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2. However, if the new Group Policy settings for the Event Log Service are also specified, they take precedence.
Vulnerability
If you significantly increase the number of objects to audit in your organization and if you enabled the Audit: Shut down system immediately if unable to log security audits policy setting, there is a risk that the Security log will reach its capacity and force the computer to shut down. If such a shutdown occurs, the computer is unusable until an administrator clears the Security log. To prevent such a shutdown, you can disable the Audit: Shut down system immediately if unable to log security audits policy setting that is described in Threats and Countermeasures Guide: Security Options and increase the Security log size.
Countermeasure
Enable sensible log-size policies for all computers in your organization so that legitimate users can be held accountable for their actions, unauthorized activity can be detected and tracked, and computer problems can be detected and diagnosed. Article 957662 in the Microsoft Knowledge Base provides guidance for the maximum size of event logs that you should configure on your server.
Potential impact
When event logs fill to capacity, by default the computer overwrites the oldest entries with the most recent ones. To mitigate the risk of loss of older data, you can configure the computer to automatically back up the log when it becomes full. Ideally, all specifically monitored events should be sent to a server that uses System Center Operations Manager 2007 or a similar automated monitoring tool. Such a configuration is particularly important because an attacker who successfully compromises a server could clear the Security log. If all events are sent to a monitoring server, you can gather forensic information about the attacker's activities.
Log access
This policy setting determines which user accounts have access to log files and what usage rights are granted. Individual access rights can be specified for each of the Application, Security, Setup, and System event log channels. Possible values: Enabled Disabled Not Configured
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Enabling this setting allows you to enter a security descriptor for the log file. The security descriptor controls who can read, write, or clear the event log. You enter the security descriptor by using Security Definition Description Language (SDDL). The following example shows the default SDDL string for the Application log:
O:BAG:SYD:(D;; 0xf0007;;;AN)(D;; 0xf0007;;;BG)(A;; 0xf0007;;;SY)(A;; 0x5;;;BA)(A;; 0x7;;;SO)(A;; 0x3;;;IU)(A;; 0x2;;;BA)(A;; 0x2;;;LS)(A;; 0x2;;;NS)
In this example, the first ACE denies Anonymous Users read, write, and clear access to the log. The sixth ACE permits Interactive Users to read and write to the log. For more information about SDDL syntax and about how to construct an SDDL string, see the MSDN topic Security Descriptor String Format. If this policy setting is disabled or not configured for the Application or Setup logs, all authenticated users can write, read, and clear the log. If this policy setting is disabled or not configured for the Security log, only system software and administrators can read or clear the log.
Vulnerability
Attackers who successfully log on to a computer can learn important information about the computer if they are able to view the event logs. They could then use this information to implement additional exploits.
Countermeasure
Identify which log files are valued in your organization. The Security event log has the most restrictive default settings, but events in the Application log or Setup log may also be useful for forensic investigation. Configure the SID to match the user account that is trusted to manage and monitor those logs.
Potential impact
Users may not be able to access event log data for troubleshooting information.
Enabled Disabled Not Configured Note Old events may or may not be retained according to the Backup log automatically when full policy setting. You should only configure this setting if you archive the log at scheduled intervals and you ensure that the maximum log size is large enough to accommodate the interval.
Vulnerability
Retaining old events introduces a greater risk of a denial-of-service attack by filling up the event log, and it prevents critical information about an attack from being logged due to lack of space.
Countermeasure
Configure the Retain old events policy setting for the policies of all four event logs to Not Configured. If you decide that you must retain old events logs, configure the Backup log automatically when full policy setting to mitigate the risk that is associated with this policy setting.
Potential impact
None. This is the default configuration.
Vulnerability
If you significantly increase the number of objects to audit in your organization, there is a risk that the Security log will reach its capacity and force the computer to shut down. If such a shutdown occurs, the computer is unusable until an administrator clears the Security log. To prevent such a shutdown, you can disable the Audit: Shut down system immediately if unable to log security audits policy setting that is described in Threats and Countermeasures Guide: Security Options, and then increase the Security log size.
Countermeasure
If you enable the Retain old events policy setting and enable and specify a Maximum log size policy setting, you should also enable the Backup log automatically when full policy setting to ensure that all valued events are recorded and retained and that there is no loss of service due to lack of storage for event logs. Ideally, all significant events are sent to a monitoring server that uses Operations Manager 2007 or other automated monitoring tool.
Potential impact
Computers must have enough local storage to create a backup file or access to a network storage location to create the backup file. If the events cannot be logged because the disk is full or unavailable, the events are lost. Security events are the exception to this rule if you have enabled the Audit: Shut down system immediately if unable to log security audits policy setting, in which case the affected computer shuts down.
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Additional references
The following links provide additional information about event logging in Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2: For more information about SDDL, see Security Descriptor String Format. For more information about events in Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2, see Event Viewer and Resulting Internet Communication in Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2 .
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are required for the workload of each server. Even with this reduction in default services, your server may not need all of the services that are installed by default. You should disable any unneeded services to enhance security in your environment.
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Description Replace a process-level token Adjust memory quotas for a process Generate security audits Bypass traverse checking (This privilege is inherited through membership in the Everyone group.)
SeNetworkLogonRight
Access this computer from the network (This privilege is inherited through membership in the Everyone group.)
SeBatchLogonRight
Network Service account. The Network Service account is also a built-in account that is similar to an authenticated user account. Like the Local Service account, it has the same level of access to resources and objects as members of the Users group, which helps to protect the computer. Services that use the Network Service account access network resources with the credentials of the computer account. The name of the account is NT AUTHORITY\Network Service, and it does not have a user-accessible password. The Network Service account supports the following privileges by default.
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Description Replace a process-level token Adjust memory quotas for a process Generate security audits Bypass traverse checking (This privilege is inherited through membership in the Everyone group.)
SeNetworkLogonRight
Access this computer from the network (This privilege is inherited through membership in the Everyone group.)
SeInteractiveLogonRight SeImpersonatePrivilege
Services are attractive targets for creators of malicious software such as viruses because they usually run in the background and average users do not interact with them, they interact with the application that uses them. Ideally, service developers should limit the risk that is presented by misuse of a service by developing services that run using a lower-privilege account such as the Local Service account or the Network Service account. However, many services require some privileges that only the Local System account supports. If you are developing a service that requires a privilege provided by the Local System account, it should be developed to run with least privilege to reduce the potential attack surface presented by malicious use of the service. Running with least privilege means that services are not required to retain the default set of privileges that are supported by a standard account. Instead, service developers can select an account that has the privileges they require and then remove all other unnecessary privileges. Running with least privilege can be used for any type of service account (Local Service, Network Service, Local System, a domain, or a local account). When a service starts, the required privileges are registered with the Service Control Manager (SCM), which grants a set of privileges that is stored in the process token for the service.
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The privilege check uses one of the following methods: For stand-alone services, the SCM checks the list of required privileges against the process token. Any that were not specified as required are removed from the token. For shared-process services, such as services that are hosted in svchost, the list of privileges is a compilation of the required privileges for all services in the group. The only privileges that the SCM removes from the process token are those that no member of the group has specified as required. If a service does not specify a required set of privileges, by default the SCM assumes that the service requires all of the privileges that are associated with the account. This assures backward compatibility. However, if a service group contains a mixture of services with defined privileges and without defined privileges, the entire group uses the privileges that are associated with the account. If a service requires privileges that are not in the process token, the SCM does not start the service. For example, a process that is part of a service group running under the Network Service account could specify SeLoadDriverPrivilege as a required privilege. However, if other processes in the group did not specify required privileges, the process token for the group contains only those privileges that are defined for the Network Service account. SeLoadDriverPrivilege is not supported by a Network Service process token, so the start attempt for that process fails. Administrators must understand this issue when they make configuration changes such as changing the service image of a shared-process service while the target service process is running. The service can start only if the target service process supports the specified privileges.
Service isolation
Many services require access to objects that are available only to high-privilege accounts. For example, a service might have to write to a registry key that provides write access to administrators only. Services typically gained access to such objects by running in a highprivilege account such as the Local System account or by weakening the security on the objects to allow access by services that are running in a generic lower-privilege account. These approaches increased the risk that an attacker or malicious software could gain control of the system. The only way for an administrator to mitigate this risk was to create an account specifically for the service and allow access to the objects only for that account. However, this approach created manageability issues, most notably password management, because the administrator no longer had the advantages of using built-in operating system accounts. Service isolation mitigates this issue by providing services a way to access specific objects without having to run in a high-privilege account or weaken the objects' security protection. For example, service isolation allows an antivirus service to run in a lower-privilege account than the
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Local System account but still maintain complete access to its signature definition files or registry keys that would normally be accessible to administrators only. A service isolates an object for its exclusive use by securing the resourcesuch as file or registry key accesswith an access control entry that contains a service security ID (SID). This ID is referred to as a per-service SID. A per-service SID is derived from the service's name and it is unique to that service. After a SID has been assigned to a service, the service owner can modify the required objects' access control lists (ACLs) to allow access to the SID. For example, a registry key in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE would normally be accessible only to services with administrative privileges. By adding the per-service SID to the key's ACL, the service can run in a lower-privilege account but still have access to the key. If a per-service SID is enabled, it is added to the service's process token. To be added to the process token, a per-service SID must be enabled when the service's process is started. If a process hosts multiple services with enabled SIDs, all the SIDs are added to the process token. Per-service SIDs also allow a process token to be converted to a restricted token by adding one or more SIDs to the restricted token list.
Restricted SIDs
A per-service SID provides good isolation and allows the service to run in a lower-privilege account. However, because the process token also contains the SID for the account, a perservice SID does not prevent the service from accessing other resources that are accessible to the account. Consider the following scenario: Service X runs in the Local Service account and has a service SID enabled. In addition to having access to objects that have specifically granted this service access (by using the per-service SID), it also has access to all objects that grant access to the Local Service account. As a result, if this service was compromised, the attacker could cause damage by accessing the resources that are not related to the service. To mitigate this problem and reduce the damage potential of compromised services, the Windows operating system uses a hybrid approach that combines write-restricted tokens and per-service SIDs to provide restricted SIDs for services. When a service enables a restricted SID, the per-service SID of that service is added to both the normal and restricted SID lists of the write-restricted service process token. This ensures that the service can write only to objects that have explicitly granted write access to one of the SIDs in the restricted list. Returning to the preceding example, by enabling restricted SIDs, service X
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can no longer write to any objects that grant write access to the Local Service account because those objects do not explicitly grant write access to the per-service SID of service X. Important If you change the default service settings, key services may not run correctly. It is especially important to use caution if you change the Startup type and Log on as settings of services that are configured to start automatically.
Vulnerability
Any service or application is a potential point of attack. Important Additional services that you enable may depend on other services. Add all of the services that are needed for a specific server role to the policy for the server role that it performs in your organization.
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Countermeasure
Disable all unnecessary services. On your server, install only the server roles and features that are required to support the servers workload.
Potential impact
If some services (such as the Security Accounts Manager) are disabled, you cannot restart the computer. If other critical services are disabled, the computer may be unable to authenticate with domain controllers. If you want to disable some system services, you should test the changed settings on nonproduction computers before you change them in a production environment.
Application Management ASP.NET State Service Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) Base Filtering Engine BitLocker Drive Encryption Service Block Level Backup Engine Service Bluetooth Support Service BranchCache Certificate Propagation Client for NFS Certificate Services Cluster Service CNG Key Isolation COM+ Event System COM+ System Application Computer Browser Credential Manager Cryptographic Services DCOM Server Process Launcher Desktop Window Manager Session Manager DHCP Client DHCP Server Diagnostic Policy Service Diagnostic Service Host Diagnostic System Host Disk Defragmenter
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Distributed File System Distributed File System Replication Distributed Link Tracking Client Distributed Link Tracking Server Distributed Transaction Coordinator DNS Client DNS Server Encrypting File System Extensible Authentication Protocol Fax Service Function Discovery Provider Host Function Discovery Resource Publication Group Policy Client Group Policy Health Key and Certificate Management HomeGroup Listener HomeGroup Provider HTTP SSL Human Interface Device Access IIS Admin Service IKE and AuthIP IPsec Keying Modules Indexing Service Interactive Services Detection Internet Connection Sharing Intersite Messaging IP Helper
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IPsec Policy Agent KtmRm for Distributed Transaction Coordinator Link-Layer Topology Discovery Mapper LPD Service Media Center Extender Service Message Queuing Message Queuing Triggers Microsoft .NET Framework NGEN Microsoft FTP Service Microsoft Software Shadow Copy Provider Microsoft iSCSI Initiator Service Multimedia Class Scheduler Microsoft Fibre Channel Platform Registration Service Net.Msmq Listener Adapter Net.Pipe Listener Adapter Net.Tcp Listener Adapter Net.Tcp Port Sharing Service Netlogon Network Access Protection Agent Network Connections Network List Service Network Location Awareness Network Store Interface Service Offline Files Parental Controls Peer Name Resolution Protocol
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Peer Networking Grouping Peer Networking Identity Manager Performance Counter DLL Host Performance Logs & Alerts Plug and Play PnP-X IP Bus Enumerator PNRP Machine Name Publication Service Portable Device Enumerator Service Power Print Spooler Problem Reports and Solutions Control Panel Support Program Compatibility Assistant Service Protected Storage Quality Windows Audio Video Experience Remote Access Auto Connection Manager Remote Access Connection Manager Remote Desktop Configuration Remote Desktop Services Remote Desktop Services UserMode Port Redirector Remote Procedure Call (RPC) Remote Procedure Call (RPC) Locator Remote Registry RIP Listener Resultant Set of Policy Provider Routing and Remote Access RPC Endpoint Mapper
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SeaPort Secondary Logon Secure Socket Tunneling Protocol Service Security Accounts Manager Security Center Server Shell Hardware Detection Simple TCP/IP Services Smart Card Smart Card Removal Policy SNMP Service SNMP Trap Software Protection Special Administration Console Helper SPP Notification Service SSDP Discovery Storage Service Superfetch System Event Notification Service Tablet PC Input Service Task Scheduler TCP/IP NetBIOS Helper Telephony Themes Thread Ordering Server TPM Base Services
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UPnP Device Host User Profile Service Virtual Disk Service Volume Shadow Copy WLAN AutoConfig WMI Performance Adapter WWAN AutoConfig Web Management Service WebClient Windows Audio Windows Audio Endpoint Builder Windows Backup Windows Biometric Service Windows CardSpace Windows Color System Windows Connect Now - Config Registrar Windows Defender Windows Driver Foundation - User-mode Driver Framework Windows Error Reporting Service Windows Event Collector Windows Event Log Windows Firewall Windows Font Cache Service Windows Image Acquisition (WIA) Windows Installer Windows Internet Name Service (WINS)
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Windows Management Instrumentation Windows Media Center Receiver Service Windows Media Center Scheduler Service Windows Media Player Network Sharing Service Windows Modules Installer Windows Presentation Foundation Font Cache Windows Process Activation Service Windows Remote Management (WS-Management) Windows Search Windows Time Windows Update (Automatic Updates) Wired AutoConfig Workstation World Wide Web Publishing Service Note If a service is not started, other services that depend on that service also fail to start. Therefore, if you change the status of one service, you may affect other seemingly unrelated services. Applications and programs may also create dependencies on services that are different from the default configuration documented in the following service descriptions. To check the dependencies for a service, in the Services Control Panel or the MMC snap-in (services.msc), click Properties, and then click the Dependencies tab.
ActiveX Installer
The ActiveX Installer (AxInstSV) service provides User Account Control validation for the installation of ActiveX controls from the Internet, and it enables managing the ActiveX control installation that is based on Group Policy settings. This services startup type is Manual, so it will start when requested by an application. If this service is disabled, the installation of ActiveX controls will behave according to the default browser settings. When the ActiveX Installer service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account.
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This service is included in all versions of Windows 7, but it is not included in Windows Server 2008 R2. For more information about working with this service, see Administering the ActiveX Installer Service in Windows 7. The ActiveX Installer service is dependent on the following system components: Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper
Adaptive Brightness
The Adaptive Brightness (SensrSvc) service monitors ambient light sensors to detect changes in ambient light and adjust the display brightness. If this service is stopped or disabled, the display brightness will not adapt to lighting conditions. The default startup type for this service is Manual. When the Adaptive Brightness service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local Service account. This service is not dependent on any other system service, nor is any service dependent on it. This service is supported in all versions of Windows 7except Windows 7 Starter operating system. This service is not included in Windows Server 2008 R2. For more information about working with this service, see Windows 7 Brightness Control for Integrated Displays.
Application Experience
The Application Experience (AELookupSvc) service is a part of the Application Compatibility Administrator. It processes application compatibility lookup requests for applications as they start, provides support for computers that are running programs in compatibility mode, reports on compatibility issues, and automatically applies software updates to programs. The Application Experience service must be active for application compatibility software updates to be applied. You cannot customize this service; the operating system uses it internally. This service does not use any network, Internet, or Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS) resources. If you disable the Application Experience service, the service continues to run, but no calls are made to the service. You cannot stop the actual process.
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This service is installed by default and its startup type is Manual. When the Application Experience service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account. This service is not dependent on any other system service, nor is any service dependent on it.
Application Identity
The Application Identity (AppIDSvc) service determines and verifies the identity of an application. Disabling this service will prevent AppLocker from being enforced. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Manual. When the Application Identity service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local Service account. The Application Identity service is dependent on the following system components: AppID Driver Flt Mgr System Attribute Cache Cryptographic Services Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper
Application Information
The Application Information (Appinfo) service facilitates running interactive applications with additional administrative privileges. If this service is stopped, users cannot start applications
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with the additional administrative privileges that they may require to perform certain user tasks. For example, if this service is disabled, system tools like Services and Regedit cannot run. To enable this service after it has been disabled, you must start the computer in Safe Mode to get access to the Services snap-in console. The default startup type for this service is Manual and it is started by applications that request additional privileges. When the Application Information service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account by default. The Application Information service is dependent upon the following system components: Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper User Profile Service
Ports 21
Application Management
The Application Management (AppMgmt) service provides software installation services such as Assign, Publish, and Remove. It processes requests to enumerate, install, and remove
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applications that are deployed through an organization's network by using Group Policy. When you use Get Programs from the Windows Control Panel to install programs from the network on a domain-joined computer, Windows calls this service to retrieve the list of deployed applications on your network. The service is also called when you use Control Panel to remove an application, or when a component (such as the shell) makes an installation request for an application to handle a file name extension, Component Object Model (COM) class, or programmatic identifier (<ProgID> key) that is not present on the computer. The service is started by the first call, and it does not stop after it is started. If the Application Management service stops or if you disable it, users cannot install, remove, or enumerate applications that are deployed in AD DS. This service is installed by default, but it is not started unless an application requests it. When the Application Management service is started in its default configuration, it log on by using the Local System account. This service is available on Windows 7 Professional, Windows 7 Ultimate, and Windows 7 Enterprise in addition to all versions of Windows Server 2008 R2. It is not available on Windows 7 Starter, Windows 7 Home Basic, or Windows 7 Home Premium. This service is not dependent on any other system service, nor is any service dependent on it.
Ports 42424
COM+ Event System Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper
information to Active Directory Domain Services, if available. If necessary, it ensures that the most recent recovery certificates are used. Stopping or disabling the service prevents users from using these features of BitLocker. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Manual. When the BitLocker Drive Encryption Service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account. This service is not dependent on any other system service, nor is any service dependent on it.
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BranchCache
The BranchCache (PeerDistSvc) service caches network content from peer computers on the local subnet. This enables clients in a branch office to securely retrieve files that are cached locally. If this service is stopped or disabled, remote computers will need to connect directly to host servers to retrieve data. This service is installed by default on computers running Windows 7 Professional, Windows 7 Ultimate, and Windows 7 Enterprise, and its startup type is Manual. When the BranchCache service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Network Service account. The Branch Cache service is dependent upon the following system components: Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper BranchCache is a feature in Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2. For more information, see the BranchCache technology center.
Certificate Propagation
The Certificate Propagation (CertPropSvc) service propagates certificates from smart cards to resources that request them. The Certification Propagation service applies when a user is logged-on and inserts a smart card into a reader that is attached to the computer. The certificates are read from the smart card and added to the users personal store by the service. If the Group Policy setting "Turn on root certificate propagation from smart card" is enabled, Root Certificates are also propagated to the machine root trust store. Root certificate propagation is responsible for the following specific smart card deployment scenarios, where public key infrastructure (PKI) trust has not yet been established: Joining the domain Accessing a network remotely In both cases, the computer is not joined to a domain, and therefore, trust is not being managed by Group Policy. The objective is to authenticate to a remote server (the domain controller or the RADIUS server), and root certificate propagation provides the ability to use the smart card to include the missing trust chain.
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When a user inserts a smart card, the Certificate Propagation service copies any root certificates on the card to the Smart Card Trusted Roots certificate stores on the local computer. This process establishes a trust relationship with the organization. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Manual. However, if you have deployed smart cards as part of your authentication policy, we recommend that you configure this setting with the Automatic startup type. When started in the default configuration it will log on using the Local System account. The Certification Propagation service is dependent upon the following system components: Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper
Certificate Services
The Certificate Services service supports the Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) server role as part of Windows Server 2008 R2 to enable a business to act as its own certification authority (CA). It issues and manages digital certificates for smart card logon and for applications such as Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME), Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), Encrypting File System (EFS), IPsec. The AD CS server role is not installed by default. Administrators must install it through Server Manager, at which time the Certificate Services role service is also installed. If Certificate Services stops or if you disable it after installation, certificate requests are not accepted and
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certificate revocation lists (CRLs) and delta CRLs are not published. If the service stops long enough for CRLs to expire, existing certificates fail to validate. Certificate Services relies on RPC and on DCOM to communicate with clients by using random TCP ports that are higher than port 1024. Certificate Services is not supported on a Server Core installation of Windows Server 2008, but it is supported on a Server Core installation of Windows Server 2008 R2 in addition to the Standard, Enterprise, and Datacenter editions of Windows Server 2008 and Windows Server 2008 R2. The following table identifies the application protocol, network protocol, and ports used by Certificate Services:
Cluster Service
The Cluster Service (ClusSvc) supports the Failover Clustering feature in nextrefserver_7 that controls server cluster operations and manages the cluster database. A cluster is a collection of independent computers that work together to provide load-balancing and failover support. Applications that can run on a cluster, such as Microsoft Exchange Server and Microsoft SQL Server, use the cluster to present a single virtual computer to users. The cluster software spreads data and computation tasks among the nodes of the cluster. When a node fails, other nodes provide the services and data that were formerly provided by the missing node. When a node is added or repaired, the cluster software assigns some data and computation tasks to that node. There are two types of cluster solutions for the Windows operating systems that support different application styles: server clusters and Network Load Balancing (NLB) clusters. Server clusters provide a highly available environment for applications that must run reliably for long periods of time (such as databases or file servers), and they provide failover support with tightly integrated cluster management. NLB clusters provide a highly available and highly scalable
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environment for other types of applications such as public-facing Web servers, and balance the client requests among a set of identical servers. The Cluster Service is not installed or enabled by default. If the Cluster Service stops after it is installed, clusters are unavailable. The Cluster Service it an optional feature on a Server Core installation of Windows Server 2008 R2 in addition to the Standard, Enterprise, and Datacenter editions of Windows Server 2008 and Windows Server 2008 R2. The following table identifies the application protocol, network protocol, and ports that are used by the Cluster Service:
Application protocol Cluster Services RPC Cluster administrator Randomly allocated high UDP ports
Ports 3343 135 137 Random port number between 1024 and 65535
lived keys must be isolated so that they are never present in the application process. Cryptography Next Generation (CNG) currently supports storing asymmetric private keys by using the Microsoft software key storage provider (KSP) that is included in Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7, and installed by default. Key isolation is enabled by default in Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7. Also, nonMicrosoft KSPs are not loaded in the key isolation service (which is the Local Security Authority, or LSA, process). Only the Microsoft KSP is loaded in the key isolation service. The LSA process is used as the key isolation process to maximize performance. All access to private keys goes through the key storage router, which exposes a comprehensive set of functions for managing and using private keys. CNG stores the public portion of the stored key separately from the private portion. The public portion of a key pair is maintained in the key isolation service, and it is accessed by using lightweight remote procedure call (LRPC). The key storage router uses LRPC when calling into the key isolation process. All access to private keys goes through the private key router, and it is audited by CNG. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Manual. When the CNG Key Isolation service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account. The CNG Key Isolation service is dependent upon the following system components: Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper The following components are dependent upon the CNG Key Isolation service: Extensible Authentication Protocol Wired AutoConfig WLAN AutoConfig
system. The event system notifies event consumers as information becomes available, and it does not repeatedly poll the server. The COM+ Event System service handles most of the event semantics for the publisher and the subscriber. Publishers offer to publish event types, and subscribers request event types from specific publishers. Subscriptions are maintained outside the publisher and the subscriber, and they are retrieved when needed, which simplifies the programming model for both. The subscriber is not required to contain the logic to build subscriptionsit is possible to build a subscriber as easily as a COM component. The life cycle of the subscription is separate from that of the publisher or the subscriber. You can build subscriptions before the subscriber or publisher is activated. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Automatic. When started in its default configuration it logs on by using the Local Service account. When the COM+ Event System services stops, the System Event Notification service closes and cannot provide logon and logoff notifications. The Volume Shadow Copy Service, which is needed for Windows Backup and backup applications that rely on the Windows Backup API, also requires this service. The COM+ Event System service is dependent upon the following system components: Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper The following components are dependent upon the COM+ Event System service: Background Intelligent Transfer Service COM+ System Application SPP Notification Service System Event Notification Service
The COM+ System Application service is dependent upon the following system components: COM+ Event System Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper System Event Notification Service
Computer Browser
The Computer Browser (Browser) service maintains an up-to-date list of computers on your network, and it supplies the list to programs that request it. The Computer Browser service is used by Windows-based computers that must view network domains and resources. Computers that are designated as browsers maintain browse lists, which contain all shared resources that are used on the network. There are several roles that a computer might perform in a browsing environment. Under some conditions, such as failure or shutdown of a computer that is designated for a specific browser role, browsers or potential browsers may change to a different operational role. On Windows 7-based computers, the Computer Browser service is installed by default and its startup type is Manual. On computers running Windows Server 2008 R2, it is disabled. When the Computer Browser service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account. If it stops, the browser list is not updated or maintained. The Computer Browser service is dependent upon the following system components: Server Security Accounts Manager Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper Server SMB 1.xxx Driver Server SMB 2.xxx Driver srvnet Workstation
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Browser Support Driver Network Store Interface Service NSI proxy service driver SMB 1.x MiniRedirector SMB 2.0 MiniRedirector SMB MiniRedirector Wrapper and Engine Redirected Buffering Sub System Mup The following table identifies the application protocol, network protocols, and ports used by the Computer Browser service:
Application protocol NetBIOS Datagram Service NetBIOS Name Resolution NetBIOS Session Service
Credential Manager
The Credential Manager (VaultSvc) service provides secure storage and retrieval of credentials to users, applications, and security service packages. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Manual. When started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account. The Credential Manager service is dependent on the following system components: Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper The following system component is dependent upon the Credential Manager service.
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Cryptographic Services
The Cryptographic Services (CryptSvc) service provides key-management services for the computer. Cryptographic Services is composed of the following management services: Catalog Database Service. This service adds, removes, and looks up catalog files, which are used to sign all the files in the operating system. Windows File Protection (WFP), Driver Signing, and setup use this service to verify signed files. You cannot stop this service during setup. If the service stops after setup, it restarts when it is requested by an application. Protected Root Service. This service adds and removes Trusted Root Certification Authority certificates. The service displays a service message box with the certificate's name and thumbprint. If you click OK, the certificate is added or removed from your current list of trusted root authorities. Only Local System accounts have write access to the list. If this service stops, the current user cannot add or remove Trusted Root Certification Authority certificates. Automatic Root Certificate Update Service. This service retrieves root certificates as needed from Windows Update. This service can be used in support secure-sockets-layer (SSL) sessions to help ensure that server certificates are kept up-to-date. If this service stops, root certificates must be updated manually. Key Service. This service allows administrators to enroll for certificates on behalf of the local computer account. The service provides several functions that are required for enrollment, such as enumeration of available certification authorities, enumeration of available computer templates, and the ability to create and submit a certificate request in the local computer context. Only administrators can enroll on behalf of the local computer account. The Key Service also allows administrators to remotely install Personal Information Exchange (PFX) files on the computer. If this service stops, autoenrollment cannot automatically acquire the default set of computer certificates. The Cryptographic Services service is installed by default and its startup type is Automatic. When Cryptographic Services service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Network Service account. If it stops, the management services that are referenced in the preceding paragraphs do not function properly. The Cryptographic Services service is dependent on the following system components: Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper The following system component is dependent upon the Cryptographic Services service:
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DHCP Client
The DHCP Client (Dhcp) service manages network configuration. It registers and updates IP addresses and Domain Name System (DNS) names for the computer. You do not have to manually change the IP settings for a client computer, such as a portable computer, that connects from different locations throughout the network. The client computer is automatically given a new IP address, regardless of the subnet that it reconnects to (if a DHCP server is accessible from the subnets). There is no need to manually configure settings for DNS or WINS. The DHCP server can provide these settings to the client computer if the DHCP server is
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configured to issue such information. To enable this option on the client computer, click Obtain DNS Server Address Automatically. No conflicts are caused by duplicate IP addresses. If the DHCP Client service stops, the computer does not receive dynamic IP addresses and automatic DNS updates stop being registered on the DNS server. By default this service is installed by default and its startup type is Automatic. When the DHCP Client service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local Service account. The DHCP Client service is dependent upon the following system components: Ancillary Function Driver for Winsock Net I/O Legacy TDI Support Drive TCP/IP Protocol Driver Network Store Interface Service NSI proxy service driver The WinHTTP Web Proxy Auto-Discovery Service is dependent upon the DHCP Client Service.
DHCP Server
The DHCP Server (DHCPServer) service allocates IP addresses, and it enables advanced configuration of network settings (such as setting for DNS servers and WINS servers) to DHCP clients automatically. DHCP uses a client/server model. The network administrator establishes one or more DHCP servers that maintain TCP/IP configuration information and provide the information to client computers. The server database includes the following: Valid configuration parameters for all client computers on the network. Valid IP addresses that are maintained in a pool for assignment to client computers, plus reserved addresses for manual assignment. Duration of the lease that is offered by the server. The lease defines the length of time that the assigned IP address is valid. DHCP is an IP standard that is designed to reduce the complexity of address configuration administration. It uses a server computer to centrally manage IP addresses and other related configuration details for your network. DHCP includes the Multicast Address Dynamic Client Allocation Protocol (MADCAP), which is used to perform multicast address allocation. When registered client computers are dynamically
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assigned IP addresses through MADCAP, they can participate efficiently in the data stream process, such as for real-time video or audio network transmissions. With a DHCP server installed and configured on your network, DHCP-enabled client computers can obtain their IP addresses and related configuration parameters dynamically each time they start and join the network. DHCP servers provide this configuration in the form of an addresslease offer to the client computers. If the DHCP Server service stops, the server no longer issues IP addresses or other configuration parameters automatically. This service is only installed and activated if you install the DHCP server role. This service is available on a Server Core installation of Windows Server 2008 R2 in addition to the Standard, Enterprise, and Datacenter editions of Windows Server 2008 and Windows Server 2008 R2. The following table identifies the application protocols, network protocols, and ports that are used by the DHCP Server service:
Ports 67 2535
cannot function. The Diagnostic Service Host service is part of the Network Diagnostic Framework that is used to troubleshoot network connectivity issues. When a user selects Diagnose and Repair from the Network and Sharing Center or the Network Connection context menu, the Diagnostic Policy Service starts the Diagnostic Service Host service. The service continues to run until the computer is restarted. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Manual. When the Diagnostic Service Host service is started in its default configuration, it logs by on using the Local Service account. This service is not dependent on any other system service, nor is any service dependent on it.
Disk Defragmenter
The Disk Defragmenter (defragsvc) service is used to defragment disks on a schedule that is maintained by the Task Scheduler, which controls when it starts and stops. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Manual. When the Disk Defragmenter service is started in its default configuration, it logs by on using the Local System account. The Disk Defragmenter service is dependent upon the following system components: Remote Procedure Call (RPC) service DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper
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File System (DFS) is a distributed service that integrates disparate shared files into a single logical namespace. This namespace is a logical representation of the network storage resources that are available to users on the network. If the Distributed File System service stops, you are unable to access shared files or network data through the logical namespace. To access the data when the service is stopped, you must know the names of all the servers and all the shared files in the namespace, and you must access each of these targets independently. This service is installed as part of the File Services role. This service is available on a Server Core installation of Windows Server 2008 R2 in addition to the Standard, Enterprise, and Datacenter editions of Windows Server 2008 and Windows Server 2008 R2.
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The following table identifies the application protocols, network protocols, and ports that are used by the Distributed File System service:
Application protocol NetBIOS Datagram Service NetBIOS Session Service LDAP Server LDAP Server SMB RPC Randomly allocated high TCP ports
Ports 138 139 389 389 445 135 Random port number between 1024 and 65535
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TCP
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If the Distributed Link Tracking Client service stops links to content on that computer are not maintained or tracked. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Automatic. When the Distributed Link Tracking Client service is started in its default configuration, it logs by on using the Local System account. The Distributed Link Tracking Client service is dependent upon the following system components: Remote Procedure Call DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper
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Application protocol
Network protocol
Ports
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TCP TCP
DNS Client
The DNS Client (Dnscache) service resolves and caches Domain Name System (DNS) names for the computer. The DNS Client service must run on every computer that performs DNS name resolution. DNS name resolution is needed to locate domain controllers in AD DS domains. The DNS Client service is also needed to enable the location of the devices that are identified through DNS name resolution. Windows 7 includes both Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) and Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) protocol stacks that are installed and enabled by default. DNS name queries and registrations can involve IPv4 address records (A records) and IPv6 address records (AAAA records). If the DNS Client service stops, the computer cannot resolve DNS names or locate Active Directory domain controllers, and users cannot log on to the computer. Computers must perform both A and AAAA queries to determine the best method of connectivity to the endpoint that is wanted. By obtaining IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, there is an increased chance of access to the wanted endpoint if one of the addresses is unreachable. The DNS Client service minimizes the impact on DNS servers when performing DNS name queries through the following behavior: If the host has only link-local or Teredo IPv6 addresses assigned, the DNS Client service sends a single query for A records. For more information, see the Teredo Overview on Microsoft TechNet. If the host has at least one IPv6 address assigned that is not a link-local or Teredo address, the DNS Client service sends a DNS query for A records and then a separate DNS query to the same DNS server for AAAA records. If an A record query times out or has an error (other than name not found), the corresponding AAAA record query is not sent. This service is installed by default and it startup type is Automatic. When the DNS Service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Network Service account.
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The DNS Client service is dependent upon the following system components: NetIO Legacy TDI Support Driver TCP/IP Protocol Driver Network Store Interface Service NSI proxy service driver
DNS Server
The DNS Server (DNS) service enables DNS name resolution. It answers queries and update requests for DNS names. DNS servers locate devices that are identified by their DNS names and locate domain controllers in AD DS. If the DNS Server service stops or if you disable it, DNS updates do not occur. The DNS Server service is not required to run on every computer. However, if there is no authoritative DNS server for a particular portion of the DNS namespace, the location of the devices that use DNS names in that portion of the namespace fail. Absence of an authoritative DNS server for the DNS namespace that is used to name Active Directory domains results in an inability to locate domain controllers in that domain. The DNS Server service is only installed and activated if you install the DNS Server role. This service is available on a Server Core installation of Windows Server 2008 R2 in addition to the Standard, Enterprise, and Datacenter editions of Windows Server 2008 and Windows Server 2008 R2. The following table identifies the application protocols, network protocols, and ports used by the DNS Server service:
Ports 53 53
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The EFS service is dependent upon the following system components: Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper
Fax Service
The Fax Service is a Telephony API (TAPI)-compliant service, and it provides fax capabilities from users' computers. The Fax Service allows users to send and receive faxes from their desktop
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applications through a local fax device or a shared network fax device. The service offers the following features: Fax distribution and receipt Fax activity tracking and monitoring Inbound fax routing Server and device configuration management Archiving of sent faxes If you disable the print spooler or telephony service, the Fax Service does not start successfully. If this service stops, users cannot send or receive faxes. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Manual. It stops when there is no fax activity and restarts on an as-needed basis. On server operating systems, the Fax Service is installed with the Fax Server role. For more information, see Install the Fax Server Role. This service is available on a Server Core installation of Windows Server 2008 R2 in addition to the Standard, Enterprise, and Datacenter editions of Windows Server 2008 and Windows Server 2008 R2. The Fax Service is dependent upon the following system components: Plug and Play Print Spooler HTTP Remote Procedure Call DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper Telephony The following table identifies the application protocols, network protocols, and ports used by the Fax Service:
Ports 139
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Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper
Group Policy
The Group Policy service on domain controllers supports the application of Group Policy settings to client computers in the domain. To successfully apply Group Policy settings, a client must be able to contact a domain controller over the DCOM, ICMP, LDAP, SMB, and RPC protocols. If these protocols are unavailable or blocked between the client and a relevant domain controller, the Group Policy service will not apply or refresh. For a cross-domain logon, where a computer is in one domain and the user account is in another, these protocols may be required for the client, the resource domain, and the account domain to communicate. Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) is used for slow link detection. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Manual. When the Group Policy service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account. This service is available on a Server Core installation of Windows Server 2008 R2 in addition to the Standard, Enterprise, and Datacenter editions of Windows Server 2008 and Windows Server 2008 R2. The following table identifies the application protocols, network protocols, and ports used by the Group Policy service:
Ports Random ports between 1024 and 65535 Used for slow link detection 389 445 135 or a random port number between 1024 and 65535
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HomeGroup Listener
The HomeGroup Listener service makes local computer changes that are associated with configuring and maintaining computers that are joined to a homegroup. If this service is stopped or disabled, the computer will not work properly in a homegroup and the homegroup might not work properly. It is recommended that this service be running if the computer is part of a homegroup. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Manual. When the HomeGroup Listener service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account. The HomeGroup Listener service is dependent upon the following system components: Server Security Accounts Manager Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher
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RPC Endpoint Mapper Server SMB 1.xxx Driver Server SMB 2.xxx Driver srvnet
HomeGroup Provider
The HomeGroup Provider service performs networking tasks that are associated with configuring and maintaining homegroups. If this service is stopped or disabled, the computer will be unable to detect other homegroups, and the homegroup might not work properly. It is recommended that this service be running if the computer is part of a homegroup. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Manual. When the HomeGroup Provider service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local Service account. The HomeGroup Provider service is dependent on the following system components: Function Discovery Provider Host HTTP Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper Function Discovery Resource Publication Network List Service Network Location Awareness Network Store Interface Service NSI proxy service driver TCP/IP Protocol Driver
HTTP SSL
The HTTP SSL (HTTPFilter) service enables IIS to perform Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) functions. SSL is an open standard that establishes encrypted communications channels to help prevent the interception of critical information, such as credit card numbers. Primarily, it protects data
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that is transmitted for electronic financial transactions on the Internet, although it is designed to work on other Internet services as well. If the HTTP SSL service stops, IIS does not perform SSL functions. This service is installed when IIS is installed, and it is not present or active otherwise. You can configure this service through the Internet Information Services (IIS) snap-in. This service is available on a Server Core installation of Windows Server 2008 R2 in addition to the Web, Standard, Enterprise, and Datacenter editions of Windows Server 2008 and Windows Server 2008 R2. The following table identifies the application protocols, network protocols, and ports used by the HTTP SSL service:
Ports 443
The IIS Admin Service is not installed by default. It is installed when you install IIS an optional feature of the operating system. After this service is installed, its startup type is Automatic. When the IIS Admin Service is started, it logs on by using the Local System account by default. The IIS Admin Service is dependent upon the following system components: HTTP Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper Security Accounts Manager
Indexing Service
The Indexing Service (CISVC) indexes the contents and properties of files on local and remote computers and provides rapid access to files through a flexible querying language. The Indexing Service also enables quick document search capability on local and remote computers and a
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search index for content that is shared on the web. The service builds indexes of all textual information in files and documents. After the initial index build is complete, the Indexing Service maintains the indexes whenever a file is created, modified, or deleted. The Indexing Service has been replaced by Windows Search in Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2.The Indexing Service is still available; however, it must be explicitly installed. After it is installed, its default startup type is Automatic. When the Indexing Service is started it logs on by using the Local System account by default. The Indexing Service is dependent upon the following system components: Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper
has stopped responding because it has stopped progressing and the user has no way to resume it. Basically, any functionality in a service or a service-hosted driver that assumes the user is running in Session 0 does not work correctly in Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2. As a result of this issue, the option to enable the Interactive Service Detection service is available for customers who have services from earlier versions of Windows that send user interaction dialog boxes to Session 0 instead of to the corresponding user's session. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Manual. The service starts only when a visible dialog box that is not a command window is detected. If the service is started, users are notified when a dialog box or window (including a command window) appears in Session 0. Information about each of the last 10 dialog boxes appears in turn if more information is shown. This helps to ensure that when you test the deployment of the new operating you are aware of services from earlier operating systems in their environment, and they have the opportunity to contact the vendors for updated services. The service detects these visible dialog boxes or windows and sends a notification to the user. Users may choose to: Respond to the dialog box immediately by clicking a button to switch to Session 0, interact with the task dialog box, and then switch back to their session. Be reminded again in five minutes. The reminders continue until the dialog box closes. If this service is disabled, users do not receive notifications when the devices or services send dialog boxes to Session 0. When the Interactive Services Detection service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account, and it is allowed to interact with the desktop. This service is not dependent on any other system service, nor is any service dependent on it.
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The Internet Connection Sharing service is dependent upon the following system components: Base Filtering Engine Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper Network Connections Network Store Interface Service NSI proxy service drive Remote Access Connection Manager Secure Socket Tunneling Protocol Service Telephony Plug and Play Windows Management Instrumentation
Intersite Messaging
The Intersite Messaging (IsmServ) service enables message exchanges between computers in an environment with servers that are running the Windows Server operating system. This service is used for mail-based replication between sites. AD DS includes support for replication between sites through SMTP over IP transport. SMTP support is provided by the SMTP service, which is a component of IIS. The set of transports that are used for communication between sites must be extensible. Therefore, each transport is defined in a separate add-in dynamic link library (DLL) file. These add-in DLL files are loaded into the Intersite Messaging service, which runs on all domain controllers that can perform communication between sites. The Intersite Messaging service directs send-and-receive requests to the appropriate transport add-in DLL files, which then route the messages to the Intersite Messaging service on the destination computer. If the Intersite Messaging service stops, messages are not exchanged, intersite messaging replication does not work, and site-routing information is not calculated for other services. This service is installed by default on computers running Windows Server 2008 R2, but it is disabled until the server is promoted to the domain controller role. When the Intersite
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Messaging service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account. The Intersite Messaging service is dependent on the following system components: DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper
IP Helper
The IP Helper (iphlpsvc) service offers IPv6 connectivity over an IPv4 network. IPv6 solves many IPv4 issues regarding address depletion, security, autoconfiguration, and extensibility. This service allows IPv6-enabled sites and hosts to communicate through IPv6 over an IPv4 infrastructurefor example, the Internet. This is often referred to as "6to4." IPv6 sites and hosts can use their 6to4 address prefix and the Internet to communicate. They do not need to obtain an IPv6 global address prefix from an Internet service provider (ISP) to connect to the IPv6enabled portion of the Internet. 6to4 is a tunneling technique that is described in RFC 3056. The 6to4 hosts do not require any manual configuration, and they use a standard autoconfiguration to create 6to4 addresses. The 6to4 technique uses the global address prefix of 2002:WWXX:YYZZ::/48, where WWXX:YYZZ is the colon-hexadecimal representation of a public IPv4 address (w.x.y.z) that is assigned to a site or host, also known as the Next Level Aggregator (NLA) portion of a 6to4 address. The IP Helper service also supports 6over4, also known as IPv4 multicast tunneling, a technique that is described in RFC 2529. The 6over4 technique allows IPv6 and IPv4 nodes to communicate through IPv6 over an IPv4 infrastructure. It uses the IPv4 infrastructure as a multicast-capable link. For 6over4 to work correctly, the IPv4 infrastructure must be IPv4 multicast-enabled. If the IP Helper service stops, the computer only has IPv6 connectivity if it is connected to a native IPv6 network. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Automatic. When the IP Helper service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account. The IP Helper service is dependent upon the following system components: NetIO Legacy TDI Support Driver TCP/IP Protocol Driver Network Store Interface Service NSI proxy service driver
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Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper Windows Management Instrumentation
The KTM implements Transactional NTFS (TxF) and Transactional Registry (TxR). TxF allows transacted file system operations within the NTFS file system. TxR allows transacted registry operations. KTM enables client applications to coordinate file system and registry operations with a transaction that results in better error recovery during data transfer and in the event of system failure. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Manual. When the KtmRm for Distributed Transaction Coordinator service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Network Service account. The KtmRm for Distributed Transaction Coordinator service is dependent upon the following system components: Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper Security Accounts Manager
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LPD Service
The LPD Service (LPDSVC) enables client computers to print to the Line Printer Daemon (LPD) service on this server by using TCP/IP and the Line Printer Remote (LPR) protocol. This service is part of the Print and Documents Services feature of the operating system. This service is not installed by default. It can be added by using the Turn Windows Features on or off option in the Control Panel. After this service is installed, its default startup type is Manual. When the LPD Service is started it logs on by using the Local System account by default. The LPD Service is dependent upon the following system components: Print Spooler HTTP Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper TCP/IP Protocol Driver
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The Media Center Extender Service is dependent upon the following system components: Function Discovery Provider Host HTTP Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper PnP-X IP Bus Enumerator Remote Desktop Services Terminal Device Driver SSDP Discovery
Message Queuing
The Message Queuing (MSMQ) service is a messaging infrastructure and development tool that creates distributed messaging applications for the Windows operating system. Such applications can communicate across heterogeneous networks and send messages between computers that may be temporarily unable to connect to each other. This service provides guaranteed message delivery, efficient routing, security, and priority-based messaging. For remote reading, Message Queuing 4.0 uses encrypted RPC by default. In situations where encrypted RPC cannot be used, (for example, where a workgroup computer is part of the remote read process), the message is passed to the remote computer as plaintext and message security is not guaranteed. A plaintext message that has reached its destination queue can be read only by users who have the necessary access rights to read messages from the queue. We recommend that servers enable Message Queuing 4.0 in secured remote reading mode. In secured remote reading mode, the computer only listens to the secure remote read interface. The effect of this is that only Message Queuing 4.0 and Message Queuing 3.0 on servers running Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, or Windows Server 2008 R2 can remotely receive messages from queues on the computer. Remote reads from MSMQ 1.0 client computers, MSMQ 2.0 client computers, and Message Queuing 3.0 client computers running Windows XP are not supported. For information about enabling your server to use only the secured mode, see Enable Secured Remote Read. If the Message Queuing service stops, distributed messages are unavailable. If you disable this service, any services that explicitly depend on it do not start. Also, the COM+ Queued
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Components service, some functionality of Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), and the Message Queuing Triggers service are affected. Message Queuing is an optional feature in Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2. It is not installed or enabled by default. It can be added through the Turn Windows Features on or off dialog box in the Programs area of Control Panel. When this service is installed, its default startup type is Automatic. When the Message Queuing service is started it logs on using the Network Service account by default.
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The Message Queuing service is dependent upon the following system components: Message Queuing Access Control Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper Windows Event Log The following services are dependent upon the Message Queuing service: Message Queuing Triggers Net.Msmq Listener Adapter
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This service is installed by default, and the service startup type is Manual. You might have several versions of this service installed by different .NET applications. This service has been renamed Native Image Service in .NET Framework 4.
The need to maintain a computer's availability during the shadow copy. Use of the same communications channels as snapshots to facilitate information transfer between application and backup tools. If the Microsoft Software Shadow Copy Provider service stops, software-based volume shadow copies cannot be managed, which could cause Windows Backup to fail. This service is installed by default, and its startup type is Manual. When the Microsoft Software Shadow Copy Provider service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account. The Microsoft Software Shadow Copy Provider service is dependent upon the following system components: Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper
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The task keys are: Audio Capture Distribution Games Playback Pro Audio Window Manager The task keys specify how much preference is given to each multimedia type for CPU and graphics processor resources. The Multimedia Class Scheduler service also ensures that other concurrently running threads get an adequate portion of CPU time so that the system and other applications remain responsive. Therefore, the Multimedia Class Scheduler service reserves 20 percent of CPU time for other activity. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Automatic. When the Multimedia Class Scheduler service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account. The following component is dependent upon the Multimedia Class Scheduler service: Windows Audio
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The Net.Msmq Listener Adapter service is dependent upon the following system components: Message Queuing Message Queuing Access Control Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper Windows Event Log Windows Process Activation Service
Net.Tcp Port Sharing Service Windows Process Activation Service Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper
Netlogon
The Netlogon service maintains an encrypted channel between the computer and the domain controller that it uses to authenticate users and services. It passes user credentials through the encrypted channel to a domain controller and returns the domain security identifiers and user rights (this is commonly referred to as pass-through authentication).
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If the Netlogon service stops, the computer cannot authenticate users and services, and the domain controller cannot register DNS records. If this happens, the domain controller may deny NTLM authentication requests, and client computers cannot discover domain controllers. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Manual. However, after the computer joins a domain, its startup type is Automatic. When the Netlogon service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account.
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The Netlogon service is dependent upon the following system components: Workstation Browser Support Driver Network Store Interface Service NSI proxy service driver SMB 1.x MiniRedirector SMB MiniRedirector Wrapper and Engine Redirected Buffering Sub System Mup SMB 2.0 MiniRedirector
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Network Connections
The Network Connections (Netman) service is installed by default on computers running Windows Server 2008 R2 or Windows 7. This service manages objects in the Network Connections folder, from which you can view both network and remote connections. This service is responsible for client network configuration, and it displays the connection status in the notification area of the taskbar. You can also view and configure network interface settings through this service. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Manual. The Network Connections interface is invoked at startup. If this service stops, configuration of LAN, dial-up, and VPN connections are unavailable to client computers. If you disable this service, the following issues might result: Network connection status indicator in the notification area will not display correctly. Connections do not display in the Network Connections folder, which prevents dial-out access and configuration of LAN settings. Other services that use Network Connections to check for Network Location-specific Group Policy settings do not function properly. Events that pertain to media connection and disconnection are not received. Internet connection sharing does not function correctly. The ability to configure incoming connections, wireless settings, or your home network is unavailable. New connections are not created. Any services that explicitly depend on this service do not start. The Network Connections service is dependent upon the following system components: Network Store Interface Service NSI proxy service driver Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper The following system component is dependent upon the Network Connections service: Internet Connection Sharing (ICS)
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The Network Location Awareness service is dependent upon the following system components: Network Store Interface Service NSI proxy service driver Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper TCP/IP Protocol Driver The following system components are dependent upon the Network Location Awareness service: Network List Service HomeGroup Provider WWAN AutoConfig
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The following system components are dependent upon the Network Store Interface service: DHCP Client WinHTTP Web Proxy Auto-Discovery Service DNS Client IP Helper Network Connections Internet Connection Sharing (ICS) Network Location Awareness Network List Service HomeGroup Provider WWAN Autoconfig Workstation Computer Browser Netlogon Remote Desktop Configuration
Offline Files
The Offline Files (CscService) service performs maintenance activities in the Offline Files cache, responds to user logon and logoff events, and dispatches events to accounts or logs that are configured to receive events related to Offline Files activities and changes in cache state. The Offline Files service enables the user to designate particular network folders (and their subfolders) to be available offline. When the user is connected to the network, the Offline Files service automatically synchronizes the folders to the local hard disk drive. When the computer disconnects from the network, the Offline Files service provides access to the content from the locally cached copy. When the computer reconnects to the network, the service automatically synchronizes any changes that have been made in an offline file with the online version, and it updates the offline versions with recent changes to online versions. We recommend that you use the Encrypting File System (EFS) to encrypt the Offline Files cache so that the files in the cache can only be accessed by the user on whose behalf it is cached.
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This service is installed by default and its startup type is Automatic on computers running Windows 7 Professional, Windows 7 Ultimate, or Windows 7 Enterprise operating systems. The Offline Files service is not available on computers running the Windows 7 Starter, Windows 7 Home Basic, or Windows 7 Home Premium operating systems. When the Offline Files service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account. The Offline Files service is dependent upon the following system components: Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper
Parental Controls
The Parental Controls (WPCSvc) service provides backwards compatibility for Windows Vista parental controls. If you did not use Windows Vista parental controls, this service can be disabled. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Manual. When the Parental Controls service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local Service account. The Parental Controls service is dependent upon the following system components: Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper
that is shared and the types of peer-to-peer networks that are compliant with your policy should be explicitly designed and communicated to your users. This helps users make decisions about which peer-to-peer networks they can trust. A trusted peer-to-peer network should meet the following industry standards for establishing trust: Uses a trusted authentication method to identify the network and its users. Your security policy should identify which form of authentication is the minimally acceptable method. Supports different authorization levels to allow for control over who shares information by using the network. Supports encrypted data transmission so that when users collaborate over this network, their information is not as susceptible to capture by unauthorized users. Provides some form of data-integrity checking, such as digital signatures, to ensure that the data was not modified in transit. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Manual. When the Peer Name Resolution Protocol service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local Service account. The Peer Name Resolution Protocol service is dependent upon the following system component: Peer Networking Identity Manager
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The following system components are dependent upon the Peer Name Resolution Protocol service: Peer Networking Grouping PNRP Machine Name Publication Service
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The following system components are dependent upon the Peer Networking Identity Manager service: Peer Name Resolution Protocol Peer Networking Grouping PNRP Machine Name Publication Service
When the Performance Logs & Alerts service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local Service account. The Performance Logs & Alerts service is dependent upon the following system components: Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper
Routing and Remote Access Virtual Disk Windows Audio Endpoint Builder Windows Audio Windows Driver FoundationUser-Mode Driver Framework Windows Biometric Service WWAN Autoconfig
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The PnP-X IP Bus Enumerator service is dependent upon the following system components: Function Discovery Provider Host HTTP Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper The following system component is dependent upon the PnP-X IP Bus Enumerator service: Media Center Extender Service
When the Portable Device Enumerator Service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account. The Portable Device Enumerator Service is dependent upon the following system components: Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper
Power
The Power service manages the power policy and power policy notification delivery. This service is installed by default, and its startup type is Automatic on Windows 7 and Manual on Windows Server 2008 R2. When the Power service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account. This service is not dependent on any other system service, nor is any service dependent on it.
Print Spooler
The Print Spooler (Spooler) service manages all local and network print queues and controls all print jobs. The print spooler communicates with printer drivers and input/output (I/O) components, such as the USB port and the TCP/IP protocol suite, and it is the center of the Windows printing subsystem. If the Print Spooler service stops, you cannot print or send faxes from your local computer. When the Print Spooler service stops on a server that runs Remote Desktop Services, the Easy Print feature will not work correctly. The Printer Pruner feature of AD DS relies on the Print Spooler service. For the Printer Pruner to operate across the organization and allow orphaned queues to be scavenged on an unmanaged basis, every site in the organization must have at least one domain controller that runs the Print Spooler service. This service is installed by default in Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7, and its startup type is Automatic. If you configure the service startup type to Disabled or Manual, it does not automatically start when print jobs are submitted.
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When the Print Spooler service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account, and it is allowed to interact with the desktop. The Print Spooler service is dependent upon the following system components: HTTP Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper The following system components are dependent upon the Print Spooler service: Fax LPD Service
The Program Compatibility Assistant Service is dependent upon the following system components: Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper
Protected Storage
The Protected Storage service protects sensitive information that is stored, such as private keys, and prevents access by unauthorized services, processes, or users. The service provides a set of software libraries that allow applications to retrieve security and other information from personal storage locations, and it hides the implementation and details about the storage. The storage location that is provided by this service is protected from modification. The Protected Storage service uses the Hash-Based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) and the Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA1) cryptographic hash function to encrypt the user's master key. This component requires no configuration. If the Protected Storage service stops, private keys are inaccessible, the Certificate Services service does not operate, Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) and SSL do not work, and smart card logon fails. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Manual. When the Protected Storage service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account.
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The Protected Storage service is dependent upon the following system components: Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper
connection. When a program fails in an attempt to reference a remote DNS or NetBIOS name or address or when network access is unavailable, the service displays a dialog box that allows you to make a dial-up or VPN connection to the remote computer. The Remote Access Auto Connection Manager service maintains a local database of connections that were previously used to reach named computers or shared folders. When the service detects an unsuccessful attempt to reach a remote computer or shared folder, it offers to dial the connection that was last used to reach this remote device. It is started automatically on an as-needed basis. If you disable the Remote Access Auto Connection Manager service, you must manually establish connections to remote computers when you want to access them. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Manual. When the Remote Access Auto Connection Manager service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account. The Remote Access Auto Connection Manager service is dependent on the following system components: Remote Access Auto Connection Driver Remote Access Connection Manager Secure Socket Tunneling Protocol Service Telephony Plug and Play Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper
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The Remote Access Connection Manager service is inactive when no requests are pending. The Network Connections folder calls this service to enumerate the set of connections and to display the status of each one. If the Remote Access Connection Manager service stops or if you disable it, the computer cannot make dial-up or VPN connections to a remote network or accept inbound connection requests. Also, the Network Connections folder does not display any VPN or dial-up connections, and the Internet Options Control Panel does not allow the user to configure any options that pertain to dial-up or VPN connections. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Manual. When he Remote Access Connection Manager service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account. The Remote Access Connection Manager service is dependent upon the following system components: Secure Socket Tunneling Protocol Service Telephony Plug and Play Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper The following system components are dependent upon the Remote Access Connection Manager service: Internet Connection Sharing (ICS) Remote Access Auto Connection Manager Routing and Remote Access
This service is installed by default and it startup type is Manual. When the Remote Desktop Configuration service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account. The Remote Desktop Configuration service is dependent upon the following system components: Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper Workstation Browser Support Driver Network Store Interface Service NSI proxy service driver SMB 1.x MiniRedirector SMB MiniRedirector Wrapper and Engine Redirected Buffering Sub System Mup SMB 2.0 MiniRedirector
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The Remote Desktop Services service is dependent upon the following system components: Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper Terminal Device Driver The following system components are dependent on the Remote Desktop Services service: Remote Desktop Remote Desktop Session Host Server Media Center Extender Service Remote Desktop Services UserMode Port Redirector
Mup
Distributed Transaction Coordinator Encrypting File System (EFS) Extensible Authentication Protocol Fax Function Discovery Provider Host Function Discovery Resource Publication Group Policy Client Health Key and Certificate Management HomeGroup Listener HomeGroup Provider IIS Admin Service IKE and AuthIP IPsec Keying Modules Indexing Service Internet Connection Sharing (ICS) IP Helper IPsec Policy Agent KtmRm for Distributed Transaction Coordinator Link-Layer Topology Discovery Mapper LPD Service Media Center Extender Service Message Queuing Message Queuing Triggers Microsoft FTP Service Microsoft Software Shadow Copy Provider Net.Msmq Listener Adapter Net.Pipe Listener Adapter
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Net.Tcp Listener Adapter Network Access Protection Agent Network Connections Network List Service Network Location Awareness Offline Files Parental Controls Performance Logs & Alerts PnP-X IP Bus Enumerator Portable Device Enumerator Service Print Spooler Program Compatibility Assistant Service Protected Storage Quality Windows Audio Video Experience Remote Access Auto Connection Manager Remote Access Connection Manager Remote Desktop Configuration Remote Desktop Services Remote Desktop Services UserMode Port Redirector Remote Registry RIP Listener Routing and Remote Access Security Accounts Manager Security Center Server Shell Hardware Detection
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Smart Card Removal Policy Software Protection SPP Notification Service Superfetch System Event Notification Service Tablet PC Input Service Task Scheduler Telephony Telnet User Profile Service Virtual Disk Volume Shadow Copy Windows Audio Windows Backup Windows Biometric Service Windows Color System Windows Connect NowConfig Registrar Windows Defender Windows Firewall Windows Image Acquisition (WIA) Windows Installer Windows Live Family Safety Windows Management Instrumentation Windows Media Center Scheduler Service Windows Process Activation Service Windows Remote Management (WS-Management)
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Windows Search Windows Update Wired AutoConfig WLAN AutoConfig World Wide Web Publishing Service WWAN AutoConfig
Remote Registry
The Remote Registry service enables remote users who have the appropriate permissions to modify registry settings on the domain controller. The service's default configuration allows only members of the Administrators and Backup Operators groups to access the registry remotely. This service is required for the Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer (MBSA) tool. MBSA enables you to verify which patches are installed on each of the servers in your organization. If the Remote Registry service stops, only the registry on the local computer can be modified. If you disable this service, any services that explicitly depend on the service cannot start, but
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registry operations on your local computer are not affected. However, other computers or devices cannot connect to your local computer's registry. This service is installed by default, and its startup type is Automatic. The Remote Registry service is dependent upon the following system components: When the Remote Registry service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local Service account. Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper
RIP Listener
The RIP Listener (iprip) service listens for route updates that are sent by routers that use the Routing Information Protocol (RIP). RIP Listener is an optional networking component that you can install through the Turn Windows features on or off item in Control Panel. When started, the RIP Listener service listens for RIP v1 and RIP v2 traffic, and it uses the received RIP messages to update its routing tables. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Automatic. When the RIP Listener service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local Service account. The RIP Listener service is dependent upon the following system components: Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper
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If this service stops on a domain controller, the RSoP Planning mode simulation is unavailable on that domain controller. RSoP must run only on domain controllers; member servers and workstations do not need to run this service to be included in the planning mode simulation. This service is installed by default in Windows Server 2008 R2 and its startup type is Manual. When the Resultant Set of Policy Provider service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account. The Resultant Set of Policy Provider service is dependent upon the following system components: Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper
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Function Discovery Provider Host Function Discovery Resource Publication Group Policy Client Health Key and Certificate Management HomeGroup Listener HomeGroup Provider IIS Admin Service IKE and AuthIP IPsec Keying Modules Indexing Service Internet Connection Sharing (ICS) IP Helper IPsec Policy Agent KtmRm for Distributed Transaction Coordinator Link-Layer Topology Discovery Mapper LPD Service Media Center Extender Service Message Queuing Message Queuing Triggers Microsoft FTP Service Microsoft Software Shadow Copy Provider Net.Msmq Listener Adapter Net.Pipe Listener Adapter Net.Tcp Listener Adapter Network Access Protection Agent Network Connections Network List Service
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Network Location Awareness Offline Files Parental Controls Performance Logs & Alerts PnP-X IP Bus Enumerator Portable Device Enumerator Service Print Spooler Program Compatibility Assistant Service Protected Storage Quality Windows Audio Video Experience Remote Access Auto Connection Manager Remote Access Connection Manager Remote Desktop Configuration Remote Desktop Services Remote Desktop Services UserMode Port Redirector Remote Procedure Call (RPC) Remote Registry RIP Listener Routing and Remote Access Security Accounts Manager Security Center Server Shell Hardware Detection Smart Card Removal Policy Software Protection SPP Notification Service
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Superfetch System Event Notification Service Tablet PC Input Service Task Scheduler Telephony Telnet User Profile Service Virtual Disk Volume Shadow Copy Windows Audio Windows Backup Windows Biometric Service Windows Color System Windows Connect NowConfig Registrar Windows Defender Windows Firewall Windows Image Acquisition (WIA) Windows Installer Windows Live Family Safety Windows Management Instrumentation Windows Media Center Scheduler Service Windows Process Activation Service Windows Remote Management (WS-Management) Windows Search Windows Update Wired AutoConfig
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SeaPort
The SeaPort service enables detecting, downloading, and installing up-to-date configuration files for Microsoft search enhancement applications. It also provides server communication for the Customer Experience Improvement Program. If this service is disabled, search enhancement features such as search history may not work correctly. This service is not installed by default. It is installed with Windows Live Essentials as an enhancement to the default Windows Search service. After it is installed, its startup type is Automatic. When the SeaPort service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account. This service is not dependent on any other system service, nor is any service dependent on it.
Secondary Logon
The Secondary Logon (seclogon) service enables processes to be started under alternate credentials. This allows a user to create processes in the context of different security principals. A common use of this service is by administrators who may log on as restricted users but must have administrative privileges to run a specific application. They can use a secondary logon to temporarily run such applications. If the service is disabled, this type of logon access is unavailable and calls to the CreateProcessWithLogonW API fail. This service starts when a program or application is started by using the Run as different user option in the extended context menu (which can be opened by holding down the shift key when you right-click an item). This service is installed by default and its startup type is Manual. When the Secondary Logon service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account. This service is not dependent on any other system service, nor is any service dependent on it.
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Distributed Transaction Coordinator KtmRm for Distributed Transaction Coordinator Server Computer Browser HomeGroup Listener
Security Center
The Security Center (wscsvc) service monitors and reports security health settings on the computer. The health settings include whether the firewall is turned on, the current status of the installed antivirus application, the current status of the installed antispyware application, the current Windows Update setting, whether User Account Control is turned on, and whether the recommended Internet settings are in use. The service provides COM APIs for independent software vendors to register and record the state of their products to the Security Center service. The Action Center uses the service to provide alerts in the notification area and a graphical view of the security health states in the Action Center Control Panel. Network Access Protection (NAP) uses this service to report the security health states of client computers to the NAP Network Policy Server to make network quarantine decisions. The service also has a public API that allows external consumers to programmatically retrieve the aggregated security health state of the system. If you disable the Security Center service, the protected components continue to function in accordance with their specific configuration settings. However, no centralized monitor service is provided. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Automatic (Delayed Start. When the Security Center service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local Service account.
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The Security Center service is dependent upon the following system components: Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper Windows Management Instrumentation
Server
The Server service provides RPC support, file printing, and named-pipe sharing over the network. It allows local resources, such as disks and printers, to be shared so that other users on the network can access them. It also allows named-pipe communication for applications that run between computers. Named-pipe communication reserves memory for the output of one process to be used as input for another process. The input-acceptance process does not need to be local to the computer. If the Server service stops or if you disable it, the computer cannot share local files and printers with other computers on the network, and it cannot satisfy remote RPC requests. The Server service is installed by default and its startup type is Automatic. When the Server service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account. The Server service is dependent upon the following system components: Security Accounts Manager Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper Server SMB 1.xxx Driver Server SMB 2.xxx Driver The following system components are dependent on the Server service: Computer Browser HomeGroup Listener
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RPC Endpoint Mapper The following system component is dependent upon the Shell Hardware Detection Service: Windows Image Acquisition (WIA)
Smart Card
The Smart Card (SCardSvr) service manages and controls access to a smart card that is inserted into a smart card reader that is connected to the computer. The smart card subsystem is based on Personal Computer/Smart Card (PC/SC) Workgroup consortium standards. For more information, see PC/SC Workgroup. The Resource Manager component manages the access to readers and smart cards. To manage these resources, the Resource Manager performs the following functions: Identifies and tracks resources
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Allocates readers and resources across multiple applications Supports transaction primitives to access services that are available on a given card If this service stops, the computer is unable to read smart cards. This service is installed by default in Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2, and its startup type is Manual. When the Smart Card service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local Service account. The Smart Card service is dependent upon the following system component: Plug and Play
Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper
SNMP Service
The SNMP Service allows inbound Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) requests to be serviced by the local computer. This service includes agents that monitor activity in network devices and report to the network console workstation. It also provides a way to manage network hosts such as workstation or server computers, routers, bridges, and hubs from a centrally located computer that runs network management software. SNMP performs management services through a distributed architecture of management computers and agents. The SNMP Service also includes an SNMP agent that allows remote, centralized management of computers and services. The SNMP Service is only installed on the computer if you manually install the optional SNMP feature. If the SNMP service stops or if you disable it, the computer no longer responds to SNMP requests. If the computer is being monitored by network management tools that rely on SNMP, they cannot collect data from the computer nor control its functionality through the service. When this service is installed, its startup type is Automatic. When the SNMP Service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account.
SNMP Trap
The SNMP Trap service receives trap messages, which contain information about specific events and are generated by local or remote SNMP agents. The service forwards the messages to SNMP management programs that run on the computer. When configured for an agent, the SNMP service generates trap messages if any specific events occur, and these messages are sent to a trap destination. For example, an agent can be configured to initiate an authentication trap if an unrecognized management computer sends a request for information. Trap destinations consist of the computer name, and the IP address of the management computer. The trap destination must be a network-enabled host that runs SNMP management software. Trap destinations can be configured by a user, but the events (such as restarting the computer) that generate trap messages are internally defined by the SNMP agent.
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If the service stops or if you disable it, SNMP-based programs on the computer do not receive SNMP trap messages from other computers. If this computer monitors network devices or server applications with SNMP traps, significant computer events are lost. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Manual. When the SNMP Trap service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local Service account.
Software Protection
The Software Protection (sppsvc) service enables downloading, installing, and enforcing digital licenses for the Windows operating system and applications. If the service is disabled, the operating system and licensed applications will run in a notification mode. It is strongly recommended that you not disable the Software Protection service. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Automatic. When the Software Protection service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Network Service account. The Software Protection service is dependent upon the following system components: Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper
The Special Administration Console Helper service allows you to create inbound communication channels through the Command Prompt window. If the Special Administration Console Helper service stops, SAC services are not available. This service is installed by default in Windows Server 2008 R2, and its startup type is Manual. When the Special Administration Console Helper service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account.
SSDP Discovery
The SSDP Discovery (SSDPSRV) service discovers networks devices and services that use the simple service discovery protocol (SSDP), such as Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) devices. For example, the UPnP Device Host service uses SSDP to locate and identify UPnP-certified network devices and service. The SSDP Discovery service also announces SSDP devices and services that are running on the local computer. The service is started only when the computer attempts to locate and configure UPnP-certified devices. If you disable this service, the computer is cannot find UPnP-certified devices on the network and the UPnP Device Host service cannot find and interact with UPnP-certified devices. This service is installed by default in Windows 7, and its startup type is Manual. The service is installed by default in Windows Server 2008 R2, and its startup type is Disabled.
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When the SSDP Discovery service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local Service account. The SSDP Discovery service is dependent on the following system component: HTTP The following system components are dependent on the SSDP Discovery service: Media Center Extender Service UPnP Device Host
Storage Service
The Storage Service (StorSvc) enforces Group Policy settings for storage devices. It is only available for computers running Windows 7 Professional or Windows 7 Enterprise. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Manual. When the Storage Service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account.
Superfetch
The Superfetch (Sysmain) service maintains and improves system performance. The Superfetch service is part of a collection of performance-enhancing features that address responsiveness issues related to demand paging. We do not recommend using the Superfetch service on servers unless the server is being used as a workstation. This service is installed by default in Windows 7, and its startup type is Automatic. The service is installed by default in Windows Server 2008 R2, and its startup type is Disabled. When the Superfetch service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account. The Superfetch service is dependent on the following system components: File Information FS MiniFilter FltMgr Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper
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If the computer does not have tablet functionality or an external pen and touch input device, you should consider disabling this service. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Manual. When the Tablet PC Input Service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local Service account. The Tablet PC Input Service is dependent upon the following system components: Plug and Play Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper
Task Scheduler
The Task Scheduler (Schedule) service enables you to configure and schedule automated tasks on the computer. The service monitors whatever criteria you choose, and it carries out the tasks when the criteria are met. The Task Scheduler service supports a security isolation model that runs tasks in separate sessions according to their security content. As part of this isolation mode, tasks performed for different users are started in separate sessions, completely isolated from one another and from tasks that are running in the SYSTEM context. If passwords are required, they are encrypted and stored in Credential Manager, and they are retrieved as necessary. If the Task Scheduler service stops, scheduled tasks do not run at their scheduled times or intervals. This service is installed by default in Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2, and its startup type is Automatic. When the Task Scheduler service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account. It cannot be configured to log on using another account. The Task Scheduler service is dependent upon the following system components: Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper
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Telephony
The Telephony (TapiSrv) service provides support for programs that control telephony devices on the local computer and on servers that are also running the service through the LAN. This service is required for dial-up modem connectivity. This service is installed by default, and its startup type is Manual. When the Telephony (TapiSrv) service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Network Service account. The Telephony service is dependent upon the following system components: Plug and Play Remote Procedure Call (RPC)
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DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper The following system components are dependent upon the Telephony service: Fax Remote Access Auto Connection Manager Remote Access Connection Manager Internet Connection Sharing (ICS)
Themes
The Themes service provides theme-management services for the graphic user interface. A desktop theme is a predefined set of icons, fonts, colors, sounds, and other elements that give the computer desktop a unified and distinctive look. In Windows 7, if the Themes service stops or if you disable it, the visual style (including the windows, buttons, scrollbars, Start button, and other controls) revert to the Windows Classic visual style. This service is installed by default in Windows 7, and its startup type is Automatic. The service is installed by default in Windows Server 2008 R2, and its startup type is Disabled. When the Themes service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account.
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The UPnP Device Host service is dependent upon the following system components: HTTP SSDP Discovery
When VDS is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account. VDS is dependent upon the following system components: Plug and Play Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper
WLAN AutoConfig
The WLAN AutoConfig (Wlansvc) service provides the logic that is required to configure, discover, connect to, and disconnect from a wireless local area network (WLAN) as defined by IEEE 802.11 standards. It also contains the logic to turn the computer into a software access point so that other devices or computers can wirelessly connect to the computer by using a
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WLAN adapter that can support this. Stopping or disabling the WLAN AutoConfig service will make all WLAN adapters on the computer inaccessible from the networking UI in the Windows operating system. It is strongly recommended that you have the WLAN AutoConfig service running if the computer has a WLAN adapter. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Manual. When the WLAN AutoConfig service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account. The WLAN AutoConfig service is dependent upon the following system components: Extensible Authentication Protocol CNG Key Isolation Native WiFi Filter NDIS Usermode I/O Protocol Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper
WWAN AutoConfig
The WWAN AutoConfig (WwanSvc) service manages mobile broadband (GSM and CDMA) data card and embedded module adapters and connections by automatically configuring the networks. It is strongly recommended that this service be kept running for the best user experience of mobile broadband devices. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Manual.
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When the WWAN AutoConfig service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local Service account The WWAN AutoConfig service is dependent upon the following system components: NDIS Usermode I/O Protocol Network Location Awareness Network Store Interface Service NSI proxy service driver Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper TCP/IP Protocol Driver Plug and Play
WebClient
The WebClient (WebClient) service enables Win32 applications to access documents on the Internet. The service extends the network capability of the Windows operating system by allowing standard Win32 applications to create, read, and write files on Internet file servers through the use of WebDAV (a file-access protocol that is described in XML and uses HTTP for
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communication). Because it uses standard HTTP, WebDAV communicates by using an existing Internet infrastructure, such as firewalls and routers. This service is installed by default in Windows 7, and its startup type is Manual. When the WebClient service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local Service account. The WebClient service is dependent upon the following system components: WebDav Client Redirector Driver Redirected Buffering Sub System Mup
Windows Audio
The Windows Audio (AudioSrv) service provides support for sound and related Windows Audio event functions. This service manages events that are compatible with Plug and Play for audio devices such as sound cards and global audio effects (GFX) for Windows audio application program interfaces. Examples of GFXs are equalization (EQ), bass enhancement, and speaker correction. The service loads, unloads, saves, and restores states for the GFXs on a per-session basis. Through the Multimedia Control Panel, users can accomplish the following: Enable or disable a GFX Select among several GFX filters if more than one GFX is available that is designed for the specific audio hardware (A GFX driver's .inf file specifies the target hardware for the GFX.) You cannot stop the Windows Audio service after it is started. If you disable this service, audio functionality may be affected, including the inability to hear sound or process GFXs. This service is installed by default in Windows 7, and its startup type is Automatic. The service is installed by default in Windows Server 2008 R2, and its startup type is Manual. When the Windows Audio service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local Service account. The Windows Audio service is dependent upon the following system components: Multimedia Class Scheduler Remote Procedure Call (RPC)
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DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper Windows Audio Endpoint Builder Plug and Play
Windows Backup
The Windows Backup (SDRSVC) service supports backup features provided in Windows 7 that allows data files and system images to be stored separately from the computer. This protects the files and images in case of system failure or data loss.
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Having a regular backup policy is essential for disaster recovery scenarios, but backups are also a security risk. Your security policy must address how data backups are going to be protected so that they are not used to remove confidential information from your data center or your organization. Backup copies that are on removable media should be placed in a secure storage area that only trusted personnel have access to, and they should be encrypted. If possible, desktops and portable computers should be backed up on network servers, which are backed up in a secure storage area. If that is not feasible, your users should be informed about best practices for securely backing up data , and you should provide a secure location to store their backup copies. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Manual. When the Windows Backup service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account. The Windows Backup service is dependent upon the following system components: Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper
Windows CardSpace
The Windows CardSpace (idsvc) service enables the creation, management, and disclosure of digital identities. Windows CardSpace is client software that enables users to provide their digital identity to online services in a simple and secure way. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Manual. When the Windows CardSpace service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account. This service is not dependent on any other system service, nor is any service dependent on it.
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Windows Defender
The Windows Defender (WinDefend) service scans the computer and helps protect the computer against pop-ups, slow performance, and security threats that are caused by spyware and other unwanted software. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Automatic. When the Windows Defender service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account. The Windows Defender service is dependent upon the following system components: Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher
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a problem-solving tool to address customer issues in a timely manner and to improve the quality of Microsoft products. Windows Error Reporting has "consent levels" that an administrator can configure to control how Windows Error Reporting sends data to Microsoft. These settings are configured on the Problem Reporting settings page of the Action Center Control Panel. These settings can also be configured through Group Policy under Computer Configuration or User Configuration in Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Error Reporting\Consent. User Account Control affects how Windows Error Reporting works. A standard user does not have the same ability to report errors as an administrator. If a prompt appears when a user is logged on as an administrator, the user can choose to report application and operating system errors. If a prompt appears for a user who is not logged on as an administrator, the user can choose to report application errors plus errors for operating system software that does not require administrative credentials to run. The administrator also has the option to specify a list of programs for which error reports should never be sent. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Manual. When the Windows Error Reporting service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account. This service is not dependent on any other system service, nor is any service dependent on it.
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Event collection allows administrators to get events from remote computers and store them in a centralized place. The events are stored in the local event log of the collector computer and persisted in the local event log. The destination log path for the events is a property of the subscription. All data in the received event is saved in the collector computer event log. Additional information that is related to forwarding the event is also added to the event. This service is installed by default, and its startup type is Manual. When the Windows Event Collector service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Network Service account. The Windows Event Collector is dependent upon the following system components: HTTP Windows Event Log
UDP UDP
137 138
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The following system components are dependent upon the Windows Event Log Service: Operations Manager Audit Forwarding Service Task Scheduler Windows Event Collector
Windows Firewall
The Windows Firewall (MpsSvc) service helps to protect the computer by preventing unauthorized users from gaining access to the computer through the Internet or a network. For an overview of the changes in Windows Firewall in Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2, see Whats New in Windows Firewall with Advanced Security. This service is installed by default and the startup type is Automatic. When the Windows Firewall service is started in the default configuration, it logs on by using the Local Service account. The Windows Firewall service is dependent upon the following system components: Base Filtering Engine Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper Windows Firewall Authorization Driver
The Windows Image Acquisition (WIA) service supports Small Computer System Interface (SCSI), IEEE 1394, USB, and serial digital still-image devices. Image scanners and digital cameras are examples of still-image devices. Support for infrared, parallel, and serial still-image devices is provided by the existing infrared, parallel, and serial interfaces. If the service stops, events from imaging devices are not captured and processed. If there is a device that is supported by the Windows Image Acquisition service installed on the computer, the service starts automatically at startup. Also, it restarts any time that a Windows Image Acquisition-enabled application is started. This service is installed by default in Windows 7, and its startup type is Manual. When the Windows Image Acquisition service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local Service account. The Windows Image Acquisition service is dependent upon the following system components: Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper Shell Hardware Detection
Windows Installer
The Windows Installer (msiserver) service manages the installation and removal of applications. It applies a set of centrally defined setup rules during the installation process that specify how applications are installed and configured. You can also use this service to modify, repair, or remove existing applications. The Windows Installer technology consists of the Windows Installer service for the Windows operating system and the Windows Installer Package (a .msi file) that contains application setup and installation information. The Windows Installer service is also an extensible software management system. It manages the installation, addition, and deletion of software components, monitors file resiliency, and maintains basic disaster recovery by way of rollbacks. It supports the installation and operation of software from multiple sources, and developers who want to install custom applications can customize it. Applications that use the installer start the service. If this service stops, applications that use it cannot be installed, removed, repaired, or modified. Also, a number of applications use this service when they are active, and they may not run if the Windows Installer service stops.
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This service is installed by default in Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2, and its startup type is Manual. When the Windows Installer service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account. The Windows Installer service is dependent upon the following system components: Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper
running Windows 7 or Windows Server 2008 R2. If the service stops, most Windows-based software cannot function properly. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Automatic. When the Windows Management Instrumentation service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account. The Windows Management Instrumentation service is dependent on the following system components: Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper The following system components are dependent on the Windows Management Instrumentation service: Internet Connection Sharing (ICS) IP Helper Security Center
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When the Windows Modules Installer service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account. This service is not dependent on any other system service, nor is any service dependent on it.
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The Windows Process Activation Service is dependent upon on the following system components: Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper The following system components are dependent upon the Windows Process Activation Service: Net.Msmq Listener Adapter Net.Pipe Listener Adapter Net.Tcp Listener Adapter World Wide Web Publishing Service
The Windows Remote Management service exposes an application programming interface (API) for scripting. The scripting API communicates with WMI by using syntax that is different from standard WMI scripts. The syntax for the Windows Remote Management service is documented in the WinRM section of MSDN. Hardware management uses a plug-in to expose WMI classes to the Windows Remote Management service. To call these classes, the WMI namespace and class must be converted into a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI). As a security measure, you should configure the Windows Remote Management service to use the HTTPS protocol. This service is installed by default, and its startup type is Manual. When the Windows Remote Management service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Network Service account. The Windows Remote Management service is dependent on the following system components: HTTP Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper
Windows Search
The Windows Search (WSearch) service supports the Instant Search feature, and it provides content indexing and property caching for file, email, and other content (by means of extensibility APIs). If the service is stopped or disabled, Windows Explorer cannot display virtual folder views of items, and Windows Explorer reverts to an item-by-item search. The content that is indexed is based on the file and data types that are supported through addins included in the Windows Search service and the default inclusion and exclusion rules for folders in the file system. For example, the filters that are included in the Windows Search service support more than 200 common types of data, including support for Microsoft Office documents, Office Outlook email (in conjunction with the MAPI protocol handler), plaintext files, and HTML. The main component of Windows Search is the indexer process, which is implemented as a Windows service running in the Local System account. The process is always running for all users even if no user is logged on. This enables the Windows Search service to maintain one index that is shared among all users, with security restrictions on content access, and to process remote queries from client computers on the network.
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The Windows Search service includes a number of features to ensure that it protects the user experience and system performance when indexing. The following conditions cause the service to slow or pause indexing: High CPU usage by processes that are not search related High system I/O rate including file reads and writes, pagefile and file cache I/O, and mapped file I/O Low memory availability Low battery life Low disk space on the drive that is storing the index The Windows Search service is installed by default, and its startup type is Automatic. When started in the default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account.
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The Windows Search service is dependent on the following system components: Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper
Windows Time
The Windows Time (W32Time) service maintains date and time synchronization on networked computers that are running the Windows operating system. It uses the Network Time Protocol (NTP) to synchronize computer clocks so that an accurate clock value, or time stamp, can be assigned to network validation and resource access requests. The implementation of NTP and the integration of time providers make the Windows Time service reliable and scalable for administrators. For computers that are not joined to a domain, you can configure the Windows Time service to synchronize time with an external time source. If the Windows Time service stops or if you disable it, date and time synchronization is unavailable in the network or from an external NTP server. There are two possible scenarios: If you stop the Windows Time service on a workstation, the workstation cannot synchronize its time with another source, but no other external server is affected. If you stop the Windows Time service on a domain controller, the same effect as in the previous scenario applies, but domain members are also unable to synchronize time with it. This inability to synchronize may adversely affect time synchronization in the organization. This service is installed by default in Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2, and its startup type is Manual. When the Windows Time service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local Service account.
You can disable the Windows Update service through the Control Panel. You can also use the Local Group Policy Editor to configure an intranet server that is configured with Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) to host updates from the Microsoft Update sites. This setting lets you specify a server on your network to function as an internal update service. If the Windows Update service stops or if you disable it, updates are not automatically downloaded to the computer. You must manually search for, download, and install applicable updates. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Automatic. When the Windows Update service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account. The following system components are dependent upon the Windows Update service: Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper
TCP/IP Protocol Driver Network Store Interface Service NSI proxy service driver
Wired AutoConfig
The Wired AutoConfig (dot3svc) service performs IEEE 802.1X authentication on Ethernet interfaces. By using the Wired Network (IEEE 802.3) Policies, Group Policy settings, and clientside extensions in Windows Server 2008 R2, you can specify network settings for computers running Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2. (The computers must connect to an Ethernet network through an 802.1X-compatible switch in an Active Directory environment.) Note You cannot configure computers running Windows XP or Windows Server 2003 by using Wired Network (IEEE 802.3) Policies. If your current wired network deployment enforces 802.1x authentication, the Wired AutoConfig service should be configured to run to establish Layer 2 connectivity and provide access to network resources. Wired networks that do not enforce 802.1x authentication are unaffected by the Wired AutoConfig service. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Manual. When the Wired AutoConfig service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account. The Wired AutoConfig service is dependent upon the following system components: Extensible Authentication Protocol CNG Key Isolation Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper NDIS Usermode I/O Protocol
WLAN Autoconfig
The WLAN Autoconfig service enables automatic configuration of Wireless Network (IEEE 802.11) Policies. Microsoft has worked with wireless communications vendors to automate the
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network adapter configuration process, which associates the network adapter with an available network and improves the wireless roaming experience in the Windows operating system. The wireless network adapter and its Network Driver Interface Specification (NDIS) driver provide support for NDIS object identifiers (also known as OIDs) that query and set device and driver behavior. The network adapter scans for available networks and passes the information to the Windows operating system. The WLAN Autoconfig service configures the network adapter for an available network. When two networks cover the same area, the user can configure a preferred network order. The computer tries each network in order until it determines an active one. It is also possible to limit association to only the configured, preferred networks. In Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7, the WLAN AutoConfig service enumerates wireless adapters, and it manages wireless connections and the wireless profiles that contain the settings required to configure a wireless client to connect to wireless networks. The WLAN AutoConfig System Services Group Policy settings in Windows Server 2008 R2 enable administrators to specify the service startup type of the WLAN AutoConfig service for domain member computers running Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2 that have wireless network adapters and the associated Windows 7 adapter drivers installed. WLAN AutoConfig Group Policy settings enable administrators to prevent domain member users from altering the startup mode of the WLAN AutoConfig service. This service is installed by default and its startup type is Manual. When the WLAN AutoConfig service is started in its default configuration, it logs on by using the Local System account.
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The WLAN AutoConfig service is dependent upon the following system components: Extensible Authentication Protocol CNG Key Isolation Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper Native WiFi Filter NDIS Usermode I/O Protocol
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Workstation
The Workstation (LanmanWorkstation) service creates and maintains client network connections and communications. The Workstation service is a user-mode wrapper for the Microsoft Networks redirector. It loads and performs configuration functions for the redirector, supports network connections to remote servers, supports the WNet APIs, and provides redirector statistics. This service is installed by default, and its startup type is Automatic. If the Workstation service stops, clients cannot establish connections to remote servers or access files through named pipes. Clients and programs cannot access files and printers on other remote computers, but TCP/HTTP connectivity is not affected. Internet browsing and Web Client access still work. The Workstation service is dependent upon the following system components: Browser Support Driver Network Store Interface Service NSI proxy service driver SMB 1.x MiniRedirector SMB 2.0 MiniRedirector SMB MiniRedirector Wrapper and Engine Redirected Buffering Sub System Mup The following system components are dependent on the Workstation service: Computer Browser Netlogon Remote Desktop Configuration
applications and simple websites reside. The configuration manager reads the stored computer configuration and ensures that Windows is configured to route HTTP requests to the appropriate application pools or operating system processes. This service can monitor the processes that contain custom applications and provide recycling services for these applications. Recycling is a configuration property of an application pool, which can be based on memory limits, request limits, processing time, or time of day. The service queues HTTP requests if custom applications stop responding, and it attempts to restart custom applications. You can configure the ports that are used by this service through the Internet Information Services (IIS) Manager snap-in. If the administrative website is enabled, a virtual website is created that uses HTTP traffic on TCP port 8098. The following table identifies the application protocol, network protocol, and ports used by the World Wide Web Publishing Service:
Ports 80 443
This service is an optional component that can be installed on Windows Server 2008 R2 or Windows 7 as part of the IIS Web Server package. If the World Wide Web Publishing Service stops, the operating system cannot serve any form of web request. The World Wide Web Publishing Service is dependent upon the following system components: Windows Process Activation Service Remote Procedure Call (RPC) DCOM Server Process Launcher RPC Endpoint Mapper
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Overview
Software restriction policies provide a policy-driven system to specify which programs are allowed to run on the local computer and which are not. The policy settings were introduced in Windows Server 2003 and Windows XP. In Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, the default hash rule algorithm was upgraded from Message Digest version 5 (MD5) to the Secure Hash Algorithm-256 (SHA256). SHA-256 is a 256-bit (32-byte) message digest hash, and it is meant to provide 128 bits of security against collision attacks. It is considered much stronger than MD5, which has known vulnerabilities. MD5 is still supported for compatibility with Windows XP. In addition, certificate rules can be activated from within the Software Restriction Policies snap-in extension instead of from within the Local Security Policies snap-in. No improvements to Software Restriction Policies were made for Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7. However, AppLocker, which is an improved application control policy feature, was introduced.
Vulnerability
People use computer networks to collaborate in many ways; they use email, instant messaging, and peer-to-peer applications. As these collaboration opportunities increase, so does the risk from viruses, worms, and other forms of malicious software. Email and instant messaging can
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transport unsolicited malicious software, which can take many formsfrom native Windows executable (.exe) files, to macros in word processing (.doc) documents, to script (.vbs) files. Viruses and worms are often transmitted in email messages, and they frequently include social engineering techniques that trick users into performing an action that activates the malicious software. The amount and variety of forms that malicious software can take make it difficult for users to know what is safe to run and what is not. When activated, malicious software can damage content on a hard disk drive, flood a network with requests to cause a denial-of-service (DoS) attack, send confidential information to the Internet, or compromise the security of a computer. Note Software restriction policies do not prevent restricted processes that run under the System account. For example, if a malicious program has set up a malicious service that starts under the Local System account, it starts successfully even if there is a software restriction policy configured to restrict it.
Countermeasure
Create a sound design for software restriction policies on end-user computers in your organization, and then thoroughly test the policies in a lab environment before you deploy them in a production environment. A policy consists of a default rule that specifies whether programs are allowed to run and exceptions to that rule. The default rule can be set to Unrestricted (the program is allowed to run) or Disallowed (the program is not allowed to run). Setting the default rule to Unrestricted allows an administrator to define exceptions (programs that are not allowed to run). A more secure approach is to set the default rule to Disallowed, and specify only the programs that are known and trusted to run. There are two ways to use software restriction policies: 1. If an administrator knows all of the programs that should run, then a software restriction policy can be applied to allow only this list of trusted applications. 2. If all the applications that users might run are not known, then administrators can disallow undesired applications or file types as needed. Software Restriction Policies has four rules with which to identify software. The purpose of a rule is to identify one or more software applications, and specify whether or not they are allowed to run. Creating rules largely consists of identifying software that is an exception to the
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default rule. Each rule can include descriptive text to help communicate why the rule was created. A software restriction policy supports the following four ways to identify software: 1. Hash: A cryptographic fingerprint of the file. 2. Certificate: A software publisher certificate that is used to digitally sign a file. 3. Path: The local or universal naming convention (UNC) path of where the file is stored. 4. Zone: The Internet zone as specified through Internet Explorer.
Potential impact
A flawed software restriction policy implementation can disable necessary applications or allow malicious software to run. Therefore, it is important that organizations dedicate sufficient resources to manage and troubleshoot the implementation of such policies. Note Although software restriction policies are an important tool that can enhance the security of computers, they are not a replacement for other security measures such as antivirus programs, firewalls, and restrictive access control lists (ACLs).
Additional references
The following links provide additional information about designing and using software restriction policies: For information about implementing software restriction policies on computers running Windows Vista, see Using Software Restriction Policies to Protect Against Unauthorized Software . For information about methods, including software restriction policies, to defend your computer against malicious software, see Chapter 2 of the Windows Vista Security Guide.
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Vulnerability
Computer networks are used to collaborate in many different ways, such as email, instant messaging, and peer-to-peer applications. As these collaboration opportunities increase, so does the risk from viruses, worms, and other forms of malicious software. Email and instant messaging can transport unsolicited malicious software, which can take many forms such as Windows executable files, macros in word processing documents, and script files. Viruses and worms are often transmitted in email messages, and they frequently include social engineering techniques that trick users into performing an action that activates the malicious software. The amount and variety of forms that malicious software can take make it difficult for users to know what is safe to run and what is not. When activated, malicious software can damage content on a hard disk drive, flood a network with requests to cause a denial-of-service (DoS) attack, send confidential information to the Internet, or compromise the security of a computer.
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Countermeasure
Create a sound design for your application control policies on end-user computers in your organization, and then thoroughly test the policies in a lab environment before you deploy them in a production environment.
Potential impact
A flawed application control policy implementation can disable necessary applications or allow malicious or unintended software to run. Therefore, it is important that organizations dedicate sufficient resources to manage and troubleshoot the implementation of such policies.
Additional References
For a listing of documentation about application control policies in Windows Server 2008 R2, see AppLocker in the Windows Server Technical Library.
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Overview
A growing variety of external storage devices can be connected to personal computers and servers that are running the Windows operating system. Many users now expect to be able to install and use these devices in the office, at home, and in other locations. For administrators, these devices pose potential security and manageability challenges, such as: Protecting against data loss due to unauthorized copying of the organization's data. Restricting users' ability to copy or load unauthorized data and applications to the organization's servers and client computers. Preventing users from installing device drivers for unauthorized devices. Preventing users from installing device drivers from unauthorized locations. Help protect against potential malware programs, such as Conficker, which are capable of using external storage devices to install themselves in the system and spread throughout the network. The Group Policy settings discussed in this section can be used to limit, prevent, or enable these situations. The default value for these policy settings is Not configured. These policy settings are located in the following locations under Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\System: Device Installation\Device Installation Restrictions Device Redirection\Device Redirection Restrictions Driver Installation Enhanced Storage Access Removable Storage Access These policy settings are located in the following locations under Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\AutoPlay Policies:
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Turn off AutoPlay Dont set the always do this check box Turn off AutoPlay for non-volume devices Default behavior for AutoRun Additional Group Policy settings that can be used to manage the installation or use of external storage devices are covered in other sections of this guide. These policy settings include: Load and unload device drivers in Threats and Countermeasures Guide: User Rights Devices: Allowed to format and eject removable media in Threats and Countermeasures
Guide: Security Options
Devices: Restrict CD-ROM access to locally logged-on user only in Threats and
Countermeasures Guide: Security Options
Devices: Restrict floppy access to locally logged-on user only in Threats and Countermeasures
Guide: Security Options
Also in Threats and Countermeasures Guide: System Services, there is information about the following services that can be used to manage external storage devices: The SSDP Discovery service, which supports peer-to-peer Plug and Play functionality for network devices and services. The Portable Device Enumerator Service, which enforces Group Policy settings for removable mass-storage devices. The Windows Update service, which enables the download and installation of security updates for Windows and Office, in addition to device drivers and device driver updates. For more information that can assist you in managing external storage devices, see the following sections of Using Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2: Controlling Communication with the Internet: Device Manager, Hardware Wizards, and Resulting Internet Communication in Windows 7 and
Windows Server 2008 R2
Plug and Play and Resulting Internet Communication in Windows 7 and Windows Server 7 Windows Update and Resulting Internet Communication in Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2
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Vulnerability
Allowing users to manage and use external devices without restrictions can expose an organization to the following risks: Data theft. It is easier for users to make unauthorized copies of company data if they can install unapproved devices that support removable media. For example, if users can install a CD-R device, they can burn copies of company data onto a recordable CD. Increase support costs. Allowing users to install and use devices that your Help Desk is not prepared to support can increase user confusion and expose the network to unapproved software that is associated with those devices.
Countermeasure
To address these concerns, you can configure Device Installation Restrictions Group Policy settings to do the following: Prevent installation of all devices. In this scenario, the administrator wants to prevent standard users from installing any device but allow administrators to install or update devices. To implement this scenario, you must configure two computer policies: one that prevents all users from installing devices and a second policy to exempt administrators from the restrictions. Allow users to install only authorized devices. In this scenario, the administrator wants to allow users to install only the devices that are included on a list of authorized devices. To complete this scenario, you configure and apply a Group Policy setting that includes a list of authorized devices so that users can install only the devices that you specify. Prevent installation of only prohibited devices. In this scenario, the administrator wants to allow standard users to install most devices but prevent them from installing devices that are included on a list of prohibited devices. To complete this scenario, you must configure and apply a Group Policy setting that includes a list of prohibited devices so that users can install any device except those that you specify. Control the use of removable media storage devices. In this scenario, the administrator wants to prevent standard users from writing data to removable storage devices or devices with removable media, such as a USB memory drive or a CD or DVD burner. To complete this scenario, you configure and apply a computer policy
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to allow Read access but deny Write access to a specific device or to an external writable device on a computer.
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The following table provides a brief description of the device installation policy settings that are used to implement these scenarios.
Policy setting Prevent installation of devices not described by other policy settings
Description This policy setting controls the installation of devices that are not specifically described by any other policy setting. If you enable this policy setting, users cannot install or update the driver for devices unless they are described by either the Allow installation of devices that match these device IDs policy setting or the Allow installation of devices for these device classes policy setting. This policy setting allows members of the local Administrators group to install and update the drivers for any device, regardless of other policy settings. If you enable this policy setting, administrators can use the Add Hardware Wizard or the Update Driver Wizard to install and update the drivers for any device. This policy setting specifies a list of Plug and Play hardware IDs and compatible IDs for devices that users cannot install. If you enable this policy setting, users cannot install or update the driver for a device if any of its hardware IDs or compatible IDs match one in this list. Note This policy setting takes precedence over any other policy settings that allow users to install a device. This policy setting prevents users from installing a device even if it matches another policy setting that would allow
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Policy setting
This policy setting specifies a list of Plug and Play device setup class GUIDs for devices that users cannot install. If you enable this policy setting, users cannot install or update drivers for a device that belongs to any of the listed device setup classes. Note This policy setting takes precedence over any other policy settings that allow users to install a device. This policy setting prevents users from installing a device, even if it matches another policy setting that would allow installation of that device.
This policy setting specifies a list of Plug and Play hardware IDs and compatible IDs that describe devices that users can install. This policy setting is intended to be used only when the Prevent installation of devices not described by other policy settings policy setting is enabled, and it does not take precedence over any policy setting that would prevent users from installing a device. If you enable this policy setting, users can install and update any device with a hardware ID or compatible ID that matches an ID in this list if that installation has not been specifically prevented by the Prevent installation of devices that match these device IDs policy setting, the Prevent installation of devices for these device classes policy setting, or the Prevent installation of removable devices policy setting. If another policy setting
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Policy setting
Description prevents users from installing a device, users cannot install it even if the device is also described by a value in this policy setting.
This policy setting specifies a list of device setup class GUIDs that describe devices that users can install. This policy setting is intended to be used only when the Prevent installation of devices not described by other policy settings policy setting is enabled, and it does not take precedence over any policy setting that would prevent users from installing a device. If you enable this policy setting, users can install and update any device with a device setup class that matches one of the device setup class GUIDs in this list if that installation has not been specifically prevented by the Prevent installation of devices that match these device IDs policy setting, the Prevent installation of devices for these device classes policy setting, or the Prevent installation of removable devices policy setting. If another policy setting prevents users from installing a device, users cannot install it even if the device is also described by a value in this policy setting.
Note These policy settings affect all users who log on to the computer where the policy settings are applied. You cannot apply these policies to specific users or groups except for the Allow administrators to override device installation policy policy setting. This policy exempts members of the local Administrators group from any of the device installation restrictions that you apply to the computer by configuring other policy settings as described in this section.
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Potential Impact
Inform users about the external hardware that they can and cannot use so that device restrictions do not generate unnecessary Help Desk calls. In addition, because new devices and updated device drivers are being introduced all the time, it may be necessary to define, review, and update organization-wide device standards and update the device installation Group Policy settings on a regular basis.
Vulnerability
If approved locations are not available, users might install device drivers from unapproved locations.
Countermeasure
To address these concerns, you can configure the following Device Redirection Restrictions Group Policy settings to prevent users from obtaining device drivers from unapproved locations.
Policy setting Prevent redirection of devices that match any of these device Ids
Description This policy setting prevents the redirection of specific USB devices. If you enable this policy setting, an alternate driver for the USB device cannot be loaded. This policy setting prevents the redirection of USB devices. If you enable this policy setting, an alternate driver for USB devices cannot be
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Policy setting
Description loaded.
Potential Impact
If the primary location that you specify for the device driver that supports a particular device is not available, the user cannot obtain the device driver from an alternate location. The user will only be able to install and use the specified device if the primary location you define is available.
Driver Installation
You can configure a computer policy on your computer to allow specified users to install devices from specific device setup classes. In addition, you can manage whether a user or administrator receives the prompt to search Windows Update or Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) for device drivers when one is not found locally. When you enable this policy setting, Windows Update or WSUS is searched without asking the user for permission first. This policy setting only affects a computer on which searching Windows Update or WSUS is enabled. Possible values: Enabled Disabled Not configured
Vulnerability
In some networks, allowing non-administrators to allow some classes of device drivers is considered a vulnerability. In addition, the ability to control whether a prompt appears allowing a user or administrator to decide whether to search Windows Update for a device driver if none is available locally can give them better control of which device drivers are installed.
Countermeasure
The following Group Policy settings can help you control whether non-administrators can install drivers for specified classes of devices and whether users or administrators receive a prompt when a device driver is not found locally.
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Policy setting
Description
Allow non-administrators to install drivers for This policy setting allows administrators to specify a list of device setup class GUIDs that these device setup classes describe device drivers that non-administrator members of the built-in Users group can install on the system. If you enable this policy setting, members of the Users group can install new drivers for the specified device setup classes. The drivers must be signed according to the Windows Driver Signing Policy or be signed by publishers that are already in the TrustedPublisher store. Turn off Windows Update device driver search prompt This policy setting specifies whether the administrator will be prompted before using Windows Update to search for device drivers. Note This policy setting has an effect only if the Turn off Windows Update device driver searching policy setting in Administrative Templates\System\Internet Communication Management\Internet Communication settings is disabled or not configured. If you enable this policy setting, administrators will not be prompted to search Windows Update.
Potential Impact
Enabling non-administrators to install device drivers can reduce the number of help desk calls when users attempt to install hardware, but it increases the risk that non-approved devices are installed.
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Vulnerability
These devices can be very small, such as USB flash drives, to provide a convenient way to store and carry data. At the same time, the small size makes it very easy for the device to be lost, stolen, or misplaced. By supporting authentication at the device level, it becomes less likely that the data on the device will be compromised, even if the device is lost or stolen.
Countermeasure
The Enhanced Storage Access policy settings enable you to use Group Policy to administer policies for Enhanced Storage devices that support certificate and password authentication silos in your organization. For definitions of various storage devices, see Definitions for Storage Silo Drivers in the MSDN Library. The following Group Policy settings control the behavior of Enhanced Storage devices.
Description This policy setting allows users to provision certificates on devices that support the Certificate Authentication Silo. Note This policy setting is applicable only to Enhanced Storage devices that support the Certificate Authentication Silo.
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Policy setting Allow only USB root hub connected Enhanced Storage devices
Description This policy setting allows only Enhanced Storage devices that are connected to USB root hubs. This policy setting allows you to configure a list of devices by manufacturer and product ID that are allowed on the computer. Note Manufacturer ID is a six-character value. Product ID is up to 40 characters in length. To specify that all devices by a manufacturer are allowed, type the manufacturer ID. To specify that only specific devices by a manufacturer are allowed, type the manufacturer ID, a hyphen, and the product ID or IDs of the allowed devices; for example: <Manufacturer ID>-<Product ID>. The manufacturer ID and the product ID values are case-sensitive. Contact the device manufacturer to get the manufacturer and product ID values.
This policy setting allows you to create a list of approved silos that can be used on the computer. The Certificate Authentication Silo is always on the approved list.
Do not allow password authentication of Enhanced Storage devices Do not allow non-Enhanced Storage
This policy setting blocks the use of a password to unlock an Enhanced Storage device. This policy setting limits the use of removable devices to Enhanced Storage devices and
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This policy setting locks the device when the computer is locked.
Potential Impact
Enhanced Storage devices can enhance data protection, but they may require additional user education to use properly.
Vulnerability
Removable storage devices such as read-only and read-write CD and DVD drives, USB drives, and tape drives can pose security concerns such as the risk of introducing malware onto network computers, the installation of unapproved software, and data theft.
Countermeasure
An administrator can apply Group Policy settings to control whether users can read from or write to any device with removable media. These policy settings can be used to help prevent sensitive or confidential material from being written to removable media.
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You can apply these policy settings at the computer level so they affect every user who logs on to the computer. You can also apply them at the user level and limit enforcement to specific user accounts. Important These removable storage access policies do not affect software that runs in the System account context, such as the ReadyBoost technology in Windows. However, any software that runs under the security context of the current user might be affected by these restrictions. For example, if the Removable Disks: Deny write access policy setting is in effect for a user, even if that user is an administrator, then the BitLocker setup program cannot write its startup key to a USB drive. You might want to consider applying the restrictions to only users and groups other than the local Administrators group. The Removable Storage Access policy settings also include a setting to allow an administrator to force a restart. If a device is in use when a restricting policy is applied, the policy might not be enforced until the computer is restarted. Use the policy setting to force a restart if you do not want to wait until the next time the user restarts the computer. If the restricting policies can be enforced without restarting the computer, then the restart option is ignored. The policy settings can be found in two locations. The policy settings found in Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\System\Removable Storage Access affect a computer and every user who logs on to it. The policy settings found in User Configuration\Administrative Templates\System\Removable Storage Access affect only the users to whom the policy setting is applied, including groups if Group Policy is applied by using Active Directory Domain Services. The following Group Policy settings enable you to control Read or Write access to removable storage drives. Each device category supports two policies: one to deny Read access and one to deny Write access.
Description This policy setting sets the amount of time (in seconds) that the system will wait to restart to enforce a change in access rights to removable storage devices. The restart is only forced if the restricting policies cannot be applied without it.
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Policy settings
Description Note If the policy change affects multiple devices, the change is enforced immediately on all devices that are not currently in use. If any of the affected devices are in use so that the change cannot be immediately enforced, then this policy to restart the computer will be enforced, if it was enabled by the administrator.
This policy setting allows you to deny Read or Write access to devices in the CD and DVD removable storage class, including USB connected devices. Important Some non-Microsoft CD and DVD burner software interacts with the hardware in a way that is not prevented by this policy setting. If you want to prevent all writing to CD or DVD burners, you might want to consider applying Group Policy to prevent the installation of that software.
This policy setting allows you to deny Read access to devices in the CD and DVD removable storage class, including USB connected devices. This policy setting allows you to deny Write access to devices in the CD and DVD removable storage class, including USB connected devices. Important Some non-Microsoft CD and DVD
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Policy settings
Description burner software interacts with the hardware in a way that is not prevented by the policy. If you want to prevent all writing to CD or DVD burners, you might want to consider applying a Group Policy setting to prevent the installation of that software.
This policy setting allows you to deny Read access to any device with a Device Setup Class GUID that is found in the lists you provide. This policy setting denies Write access to custom removable storage classes that you specify. This policy setting allows you to deny Execute access to devices in the Floppy Drive class, including USB connected devices. This policy setting allows you to deny Read access to devices in the Floppy Drive class, including USB connected devices. This policy setting allows you to deny Write access to devices in the Floppy Drive class, including USB connected devices. This policy setting allows you to deny Execute access to removable devices that are emulate hard disks, such as USB memory drives or external USB hard disk drives. This policy setting allows you to deny Read access to removable devices that are emulate hard disks, such as USB memory drives or
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Policy settings
This policy setting allows you to deny Write access to removable devices that emulate hard disks, such as USB memory drives or external USB hard disk drives. This policy setting allows you to deny Execute access to tape drives, including USB connected devices. This policy setting allows you to deny Read access to tape drives, including USB connected devices. This policy setting allows you to deny Write access to tape drives, including USB connected devices. This policy setting allows you to deny Read access to devices in the Windows Portable Device class, such as media players, mobile phones, and Windows CE devices. This policy setting allows you to deny Write access to devices in the Windows Portable Device class, such as media players, mobile phones, and Windows CE devices.
All Removable Storage classes: Deny all access This policy setting takes precedence over any of the policy settings in this list, and if enabled, it denies Execute, Read, and Write access to any device that is identified as using a removable storage device. All Removable Storage: Allow direct access in remote sessions This policy setting grants users direct access to removable storage devices in remote sessions.
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Potential Impact
Removable storage devices such as CD and DVD drives, removable disks, mobile phones, and tape drives have proliferated in the last few years, and users have come to rely on them to copy and transfer data from location to location. Restricting a user's ability to use these devices to read or write data may prevent or make it more difficult for them to complete some legitimate organization tasks, such as viewing DVD-based training materials or backing up data. If you implement removable storage device restrictions, you may need to provide alternate means, such as providing training kiosks or providing network-based backup, for these tasks to be completed.
Vulernability
AutoPlay and AutoRun capabilities can pose potential risks when malware is present on these devices, and they are allowed to run without user intervention. The AutoPlay and AutoRun policy settings enable you to use Group Policy to administer policies for files that are stored on enhanced storage devices or that are downloaded to computers in your organization. The following Group Policy settings control the behavior of AutoPlay and AutoRun.
Description Turns off the AutoPlay feature. AutoPlay begins reading from a drive as soon as you insert media into the drive. As a result, the setup file of programs and the music on
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Policy setting
Description audio media start immediately. If you enable this setting, you can disable AutoPlay on CD-ROM and removable media drives, or disable AutoPlay on all drives. This setting disables AutoPlay on additional types of drives. You cannot use this setting to enable AutoPlay on drives when it is disabled by default. Note This setting appears in the Computer Configuration and the User Configuration folders. If the settings conflict, the setting in Computer Configuration takes precedence over the setting in User Configuration.
If this policy is enabled, the "Always do this..." check box in AutoPlay will not be set by default when the dialog is shown. If this policy is enabled, AutoPlay will not be enabled for non-volume devices like MTP devices. If you disable or not configure this policy, AutoPlay will continue to be enabled for non-volume devices. Sets the default behavior for AutoRun commands. AutoRun commands are generally stored in autorun.inf files. They often launch the installation program or other routines. The default behavior in Windows Vista and later is to prompt the user whether the AutoRun command is to be run. If you disable or do not configure this policy,
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Policy setting
Description Windows Vista will prompt the user whether the AutoRun command is to be run. If you enable this policy, an Administrator can change the default behavior in Windows for AutoRun to: 1. Completely disable AutoRun commands 2. Automatically execute the AutoRun command.
Potential Impact
Restricting or blocking AutoPlay and AutoRun capabilities can enhance system security, but they may require additional user education to determine when such files can be run safely.
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