21

PRESIDENTIALISM VERSUS
PARLIAMENTARISM

JOSEPH W. ROBBINS
Shepherd University

W hether a country employs a presidential or

parliamentary regime is an incredibly mean-
ingful distinction. Numerous studies have
shown that presidential systems result in more open trade
policies and greater particularistic spending (i.e., trans-
one another, and how government formation occurs. Once
we can clearly distinguish among alternative government
types, we can better identify the relevance for under-
standing topics such as policy making, representation,
and democratic survival.
portation funding, agricultural subsidies, etc.) and are bet- After this chapter describes the key attributes of pres-
ter suited to represent the entire electorate (Cheibub, idential and parliamentary systems, it discusses the pos-
2006; Evans, 2004; Keech & Pak, 1995; Shugart & Carey, itive attributes of each system. Furthermore, it addresses
1992). In addition, and perhaps more important, the recent proliferation of mixed or hybrid regimes—
researchers have argued that presidential regimes were which contain elements of both presidential and parlia-
prone to conflict and, in some cases, democratic collapse mentary systems. Political scientists have long debated
(Linz, 1990a, 1994). More recent work has gone even fur- the potential dangers or “perils of presidentialism”
ther to help us understand the nuances of regime type. (Linz, 1990a), and a recapitulation of this discussion
Margit Tavits’s (2009) book considers whether directly represents the final section of this chapter. Finally, the
elected presidents in parliamentary governments produce chapter briefly delineates the policy impacts of each
greater political divisiveness, pervasive apathy among the regime type.
electorate, and more frequent intergovernmental conflict.
Likewise, much has been written on the benefits of par-
liamentary governments because they are perceived to be Theory: Identifying the Main
fundamentally different from presidential systems.
Specifically, parliamentary governments are thought to
Components of Presidential Regimes
engender greater public goods spending (e.g., education, When one thinks of presidential systems, the United
health care, and pensions) and be more efficient and more States and Latin America typically come to mind because
durable than alternative regime types are. Therefore, it is they house a vast majority of all presidential regimes cur-
necessary to highlight the differences between these rently in operation. But what exactly is included in a pres-
regimes by focusing on how the chief executive and leg- idential state? Fundamentally, presidential regimes are
islature are elected, how these two branches interact with those in which there is a singularly elected politician who

177
178 • COMPARATIVE POLITICS

represents an entire country and whose tenure is not pred- Beyond this demarcation, Shugart and Carey (1992)
icated on legislative support. There are also states such as reason that there are other certain essential attributes found
Germany, Hungary, and India that have presidents but in all presidential systems. First, they claim that a separa-
whose leaders are comparatively minor players in policy tion of powers among branches of government is neces-
making. Accordingly, the mere existence of a president sary. For students of American politics, this concept is
does not necessarily indicate a presidential state; indeed, well-known. A separation of powers refers to a clear divi-
the German, Hungarian, and Indian regimes are seldom sion of responsibility, in which most often the executive
considered true presidential regimes. Clearly, then, there branch administers the law, the legislature writes the laws,
can be substantial variation among presidential regimes and the judiciary interprets or reviews the constitutionality
since the aforementioned powers are not possessed by all of the laws. In parliamentary governments, however, such
presidents. In fact, presidents may possess any combina- a division of authority is often lacking, as the legislative
tion of the following tools: appointment powers, cabinet and executive branches are essentially fused together.
meeting control, veto power, line-item veto power, emer- Second, Shugart and Carey (1992) note that presidents
gency powers, foreign policy control, authority over gov- are directly elected through some type of nationwide vote.
ernment formation, and the power to dissolve the Their ascension into office is not contingent on parliamen-
legislature. Aside from this litany of presidential powers, tary support, but rather they are elected by an entire coun-
there is another way to discuss or categorize these sys- try. Of course, this too can take place through various
tems. That said, perhaps it is more useful to focus on four mechanisms. Some states use a simple-majority voting
key characteristics of presidential regimes that can be system, in which the winner secures most (or a plurality)
used to differentiate among executive types. of the popular vote. Meanwhile, countries such as France
In Matthew Shugart and John Carey’s (1992) impres- use a slightly modified format, where the winner must pos-
sive book, Presidents and Assemblies, the authors discuss sess more than 50% of the nationwide vote. In those elec-
the relationship between regime type and electoral sys- tions in which there is no clear-cut majority winner, the top
tem and the subsequent implications for how the two two vote getters will compete against each other in a sec-
concepts interact. Aside from this discussion, Shugart ond, runoff election. Another approach uses an indirect
and Carey focus on a number of key characteristics that mechanism, best illustrated by some type of electoral col
can help students classify governments as presidential, lege, to elect the president. Although it is not the only
parliamentary, or mixed. In particular, they argue that country to use this tool, the United States is perhaps the
there is an inherent trade-off between presidential and most well-known country to use this complex mechanism.
parliamentary governments: Presidential governments In the case of the United States, both the Republican and
tend to be more efficient than parliamentary regimes, but the Democratic Party select a slate of electors for each
the former may not be as representative as the latter. state equal to the number of House of Representatives
Efficiency, in this case, refers to voters’ ability to identify members and senators from that state. The presidential
the final government composition in advance. That is, a candidate who wins a plurality of a state’s popular vote
presidential system is efficient in that voters can identify receives the Electoral College votes of that same state.
who will serve as president, or lead the government, prior Each candidate’s electoral votes are then summed, and the
to the casting of the final vote. In the 2008 presidential candidate with a majority of the Electoral College votes
election, voters knew that either Senator John McCain or (i.e., 270) is declared the victor.
Barack Obama would become the 44th president of the Third, presidents serve fixed terms that are not depen-
United States. In contrast, parliamentary systems are not dent on the support or confidence of the legislature.
as efficient since the final government composition is Presidents, in most cases, serve 4- or 5-year terms, and at
contingent on the final electoral results and the subse- the end of a term, the president must either step down from
quent political wrangling over the formation of a govern- the office or run for reelection. Put differently, presidents
ing coalition. On the other hand, representation or are not permitted to remain in office indefinitely, whereas
representativeness refers to how much of the population (theoretically) prime ministers in some parliamentary gov-
is represented by the ruling government. Although presi- ernments are. It is worth noting, however, that certain pro-
dents can theoretically represent the entire populace, this visions are in place in the event an official commits an
is certainly not a given. The oft-cited example of egregious offense. For example, following the Bill
Salvador Allende’s 1970 electoral victory in Chile, with Clinton–Monica Lewinsky scandal during the 1990s, the
just over 30% of the popular vote, serves as a reminder U.S. Congress impeached the president, although it did not
that presidents seldom represent the entire populace. In remove him from office. Similarly, during the First
parliamentary systems, moreover, representation of the Russian Republic, the Russian legislature sought to
entire electorate is more easily attained through coali- impeach Boris Yeltsin for his disastrous economic policies,
tional governments than under a single leader in a presi- the First Chechen War, and a host of other calamities.
dential system. Thus, parliamentary regimes offer greater Thus, in most cases, there are mechanisms in place to
representation but are typically less efficient than their remove from office a much maligned president, but in
presidential counterparts. ordinary circumstances the president’s term will conclude
 Presidentialism Versus Parliamentarism • 179

after 4 or 5 years in most cases. And, unlike in parliamen- types have emphasized three primary aspects of presiden-
tary systems, the president’s term is not susceptible to leg- tial states that help us understand their appeal to politicians
islative approval. In parliamentary governments, a prime throughout the world. The three appeals include efficiency
minister may be asked, or forced, to step down if he or she in political results and governance, the representativeness
loses the confidence or support of his or her legislative of the entire populace, and the checks and balances typi-
counterparts. In contrast, a president can be eternally at cally found in these governments.
odds with legislators and not jeopardize his or her political As discussed earlier, efficiency is an attractive aspect of
survival. Therefore, a presidential regime is also character- most presidential systems because of the information con-
ized by fixed terms, which are not contingent on legislative veyed to voters. In particular, efficiency means that voters
approval. This design is popular for numerous reasons, but know, prior to casting a ballot, what the new government
it is not without its critics. These topics, though, will be will look like. That is not to say that the outcomes are pre-
elucidated later in this chapter. ordained but rather that the most likely scenarios are
That presidents retain the power to form their own cab- widely known. This efficiency provides voters with a
inet is the fourth component of presidential structures. wealth of information as they decide which candidate to
Having the authority to appoint cabinet members is a cru- support. They also know that, if elected, their candidate
cial tool at the president’s disposal, and this can help the should pursue with few obstacles or restrictions the poli-
president pursue, and, it is hoped, fulfill, his or her cam- cies supported by his or her electorate. Parliamentary sys-
paign promises. Without this power, a president may have tems, however, differ considerably. In some instances, the
to resort to political negotiating with rivals to fill these described scenario can, and does, unfold in parliamentary
positions. In such a scenario, a president’s appointments regimes. More common, however, is the formation of a
may be delayed as a result of political wrangling between coalition government. In such a situation, two or more par-
parties or candidates. Such occurrences may hinder a ties join together in a coalition. Consequently, each party’s
president’s ability to carry out his or her mandate, and demands or expectations are tempered as a result of the
such a failure could have economic, social, or political coalition formation exercise. Therefore, if a voter sup-
repercussions. After all, if a president struggles to appoint ported a conservative party, then the voter’s preferred poli-
defense, education, or economic ministers, then these cies may not come to fruition because parties must
agencies’ ability to carry out changes in defense, educa- compromise their positions in order to join the governing
tion, or economic policies could be undermined. This coalition. Furthermore, a singularly elected official (e.g., a
authority is significantly different under parliamentary president) may make it easier for voters to hold govern-
regimes, in which cabinet appointments are typically ment officials accountable. At times, the president may be
more of a cooperative endeavor. assigned too much blame if economic problems arise, but
The final primary attribute in presidential systems it is generally easier to punish one official than an entire
involves the executive’s lawmaking authority. In some legislature for lackluster economic policies. Therefore,
states, presidents have virtually no lawmaking authority. efficiency is more apparent in presidential systems in com-
The U.S. president, for example, has some tools available parison with parliamentary ones.
to circumvent Congress’s policy-making authority. He can The second positive contribution of presidential
issue executive decrees and executive treaties that can, but regimes is the representativeness of one elected official. In
do not always, carry the same weight as congressional leg- parliamentary systems, with multiple political parties, it is
islation. In other countries, however, presidential lawmak- likely that each party will represent only its supporters. For
ing authority rivals that of the legislature. As a result, some conservative voters, this means that their needs will be
legislative authority and/or autonomy may be usurped by ignored if the majority winner is a liberal party that seeks
an overly ambitious executive. One such case is the to represent (or reward) its supporters. Such a possibility
Russian and Ukrainian presidencies, in which presidents becomes even more complex if we consider a country with
have wielded considerable power (Protsyk, 2004). In con- several political parties. Supporters of presidential govern-
trast, the French executive is considerably different because ments, however, contend that this scenario is less likely to
of the accepted practice of cohabitation. During cohabita- occur in a presidential state. They argue that presidents
tion, in which the legislature and executive are controlled represent the entire country and, therefore, are beholden to
by different political parties, the president often allows the the entire electorate rather than just a subset of the popula-
prime minister to lead the government. This scenario can tion. In 2000, when George W. Bush was declared presi-
also include a president’s veto power, whereby the execu- dent of the United States, he stated that he would represent
tive can prevent a bill from becoming a law. the entire country rather than just his supporters, despite
his narrow margin of victory. And 8 years later, Barack
Appeals and Implications of Presidentialism Obama made a similar pledge as president. Accordingly, a
single elected official can, at least theoretically, be better
Before turning to the potential dangers of presidential positioned to represent an entire country than may be
governance, it is necessary to identify the positive attributes likely under parliamentary governments. Whether this
of these systems. To this extent, those who study regime happens is certainly debatable.
180 • COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Presidential systems may also be preferred to parliamen- legislative branch, but they are also charged with structur-
tary regimes because a presidential system balances repre- ing the executive branch. Legislative officials determine
sentation with another branch of government. That is, most who will serve as the head of the government (or who will
presidential regimes distribute powers among the branches serve as the prime minister or premier), which politicians
of government. This arrangement provides multiple points will fill the various cabinet positions, and who will head
for citizens to influence their government. If lobbying the the various legislative committees. If there is a clear
president proves fruitless, then a concerned citizen can turn majority winner in the initial elections, then government
his or her attention to the legislature. Thus, states with pop- formation is fairly straightforward, and typically no coali-
ularly elected presidents can balance or distribute power tion is formed. In other instances, however, where there is
over multiple branches of government. This institutional no majority party, the party with the most seats (often
fragmentation can also prevent one branch from becoming referred to as the formateur party) is responsible for con-
too powerful and thus running roughshod over minority structing the governing coalition. This party will seek a
interests. Therefore, people from all ideological back- coalition partner—or sometimes multiple partners—and,
grounds should have some say in policy making as long as after cobbling together enough support to give the coali-
there are multiple political actors or institutions with some tion a majority of seats, the parties involved will then
semblance of power. Because the electorate is represented jointly determine the prime minister, cabinet positions,
by at least two different institutions (i.e., the legislature and and other leadership posts. Although this is the norm, there
the executive in this case), presidential systems can foment are cases when a coalition government is not formed, even
democratic stability by offering voters more opportunities to in the absence of a majority winner. Currently, the
influence the policy-making process. Canadian government has a minority government led by
the Conservative Party. In the Canadian case, there is no
majority party, and coalition formation efforts have
Theory: Identifying the Main proved futile. Consequently, the Conservative Party, by
Components of Parliamentary Regimes default, is the de facto governing party even though it
lacks a clear majority of seats.
Although presidential systems are common in the Western Cabinet dominance is another important feature of par-
hemisphere, they are not the only option available to gov- liamentary democracies (Lijphart, 1999). On forming the
ernments. In fact, presidential systems are in the minority ruling coalition, those in power make a number of key
when it comes to regime types found throughout the world. appointments, although none more powerful than that of
Parliamentary systems actually outnumber presidential the prime minister. The prime minister is enlisted to serve
states when we take stock of the entire global community. at the behest of the governing majority and will do so until
To many students of U.S. politics, parliamentary systems he or she loses the support of the legislature. When the
remain a foreign concept, and the inner workings of these prime minister loses support of the legislature, as evi-
regimes are equally befuddling. Accordingly, it is neces- denced through a vote of no confidence, then new elections
sary to discuss the defining characteristics and operation of must be held. An alternative practice is the vote of confi
parliamentary governments before presenting the appeals dence, which is an act initiated by the government. Here,
of parliamentary systems and discussing an emerging type if the ruling government is incapable of securing a major-
of government, generally referred to as hybrid regimes. ity of the votes in the legislature, then the government
Often referred to as the Westminster model, after the must step down (Clark, Golder, & Golder, 2009). Some
United Kingdom’s government, parliamentary systems states use a slightly different version of the confidence
differ from presidential states in several ways. One of the vote, referred to as a constructive vote of confidence. In
key defining characteristics of parliamentary systems is Germany and Hungary, two countries where such a tool is
the fusion of the executive and legislative branches. in use, the legislature must agree on a replacement gov-
Whereas the heads of state and government are often ernment prior to dissolving the extant body.
embodied in the same person in a presidential regime, par- Predictably, cooperation among politicians is very
liamentary systems often separate the two roles. In addi- important in parliamentary systems, for without it, all
tion, presidential systems generally have a separation of elected officials must run for reelection and thus risk los-
powers among the various branches of government, but ing their positions. Lacking party discipline or coopera-
such a clear allocation of responsibility is not found in tion, the government is likely to collapse. This is exactly
most parliamentary regimes. Instead, parliamentary gov- what has happened recently in the Czech Republic. Like so
ernments often combine the responsibilities of both the many other countries in the past few years, the Czech
legislative and the executive branches. Republic was plagued by the recent global economic
After an initial election, in which voters decide how downturn, and when economic troubles combined with
many seats are allocated to the various political parties, internal political strife, it was hardly surprising that the
the elected representatives in a parliamentary system are governing coalition lost its grasp on power.
then given the task of establishing or forming the govern- Although coalitional survival is predicated on party dis-
ment. Not only do these individuals have to organize the cipline and cooperation, the most prominent or powerful
 Presidentialism Versus Parliamentarism • 181

actor in most parliamentary governments is the prime min- two-party systems like those seen in the United States and,
ister. Prime ministers are elected by their governing coali- to a similar degree, the United Kingdom.
tion; but not all prime ministers are equally powerful. Multiple-party systems are often found in parliamen-
Indeed, Giovanni Sartori (1994) explains that there are at tary governments that use PR electoral systems. This can
least three scenarios common to most parliamentary be especially attractive to highly fragmented societies. In
governments: A prime minister may be first above fact, given the deep sectarian divides in Iraq, it should not
unequals, first among unequals, or first among equals. The be surprising that the architects of this young democracy
power of the prime minister is greatest in the first case opted for a parliamentary style of governance with a PR
(i.e., first above unequals), examples of which can be electoral system. This structure enables Iraqi leaders to
found in places such as Germany, Greece, and the United represent a multitude of diverse interests—including polit-
Kingdom (Lijphart, 1999). In contrast, among the weakest ical, ethnic, religious, and geographic. The choice of gov-
prime ministers (i.e., first among equals) are the heads of ernment type and electoral system is a significant decision;
government in Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway indeed, this setup should allow multiple parties to partici-
(Lijphart, 1999). How does one discern between powerful pate in the policy-making process, which should, at least in
and weak prime ministers? Typically, researchers have theory, temper Iraqi tensions. That parliamentary govern-
relied on the prime minister’s authority vis-à-vis fellow ments with PR electoral systems are better able to repre-
members of the executive branch (e.g., the Exchequer in sent multiple interests is one of the more attractive features
the United Kingdom compared with the prime minister), of this regime type.
the prime minister’s ability to navigate through the policy- Another distinguishing feature of parliamentary gov-
making process, and his or her ability to remove and ernments is the absence of fixed terms. The confidence
appoint members of the executive branch. These are but a votes used to sustain a coalition government suggest that a
few examples of how we can measure prime ministerial government can fail at any time. Although most parlia-
strength; many more examples can be found in other mentary states have provisions that require elections to be
sources (see King, 1994; Lijphart, 1999). held every 4 or 5 years, virtually all parliamentary terms
Beyond these features, what other defining characteris- can be cut short. Elections that may be held at any time are
tics do we see in parliamentary governments? Other than also referred to as endogenously timed elections. Recent
the aforementioned lack of separation between the legisla- political science research has found that politicians may
ture and executive, a few additional attributes are worth use this feature to extend their political careers: When a
stressing. In particular, parliamentary governments are government is viewed in a positive manner, elections may
often more conducive to cooperation. Because their politi- be called earlier to capitalize on this success, but when
cal survival depends on cooperation, members of the leg- public approval ratings are low or decreasing, then the
islature are more willing to work with the executive branch governing coalition will often postpone elections. Others,
than are legislatures in presidential regimes. In addition, however, have found that since political leaders possess
although established and fully functioning judiciaries are more accurate information than voters, early elections will
common in many democracies, the separation of powers or be held if elected officials anticipate political strife or eco-
checks and balances between the legislative and executive nomic turmoil (Smith, 2003). As a corollary, other works
branches found in many presidential governments is often have found that voters are cognizant of this practice and, in
missing from parliamentary governments. some cases, may punish coalition members for holding
In most parliamentary governments, we also see the use elections too early. Nevertheless, this is an attractive fea-
of a proportional representation (PR) electoral system to ture of the Westminster model as it gives the electorate
translate votes into legislative seats. There are some excep- more tools to keep tabs on elected officials.
tions to this. Great Britain and India each employ a single
member district (SMD) plurality electoral system to fill Appeals and Implications
legislative seats. The use of the SMD electoral system in of Parliamentary Governments
Great Britain has largely favored the two major parties—
the Conservatives and the Labour Party—at the expense of Parliamentary systems offer several remedies to the
the Liberal Democrats. Although there are other examples majoritarian tendencies common to most presidential gov-
of parliamentary systems that use SMD electoral systems, ernments. For starters, many suggest that accountability is
more often than not parliamentary systems employ a PR in fact greater in parliamentary—not presidential—sys-
system. Under these electoral systems, we typically see the tems. While ineffective presidents could scapegoat their
emergence of multiple-party systems because more seats rivals in the legislature, this argument is unconvincing for
per electoral district are up for grabs. Maurice Duverger leaders in parliamentary systems. Because there is no other
(1954), a noted French political scientist, observed many actor who can thwart policy making, coalition members
years ago that PR systems typically produce multiparty are more accountable for the results of their policies. As
systems while SMD systems typically have a constraining one can imagine, this is a double-edged sword. On one
effect on the number of political parties. More specifically, hand, if the government’s policies are utterly disastrous,
he explained that most SMD systems should produce then everyone knows whom to blame. Thus, it is easy to
182 • COMPARATIVE POLITICS

remove from power those responsible for the ineffective or information, and rewarding loyal rank-and-file members.
harmful policies. On the other hand, if a government’s By providing these benefits, individual legislators will
policies prove to be a rousing success, then this can cer- succumb to the party in hopes of furthering their careers.
tainly work to the coalition members’ advantage. Because And, in exchange for this loyalty, parties are better able to
it was the coalition’s steady hand alone that implemented legislate given this increased party discipline. Without
the policies responsible for economic growth, political sta- political parties, parliamentary systems could become
bility, and so forth, its members are poised to be the lone immobilized due to the rampant chaos stemming from the
beneficiaries of the policies in question. As such, advo- lack of organization and structure. Likewise, we can point
cates of the parliamentary model would suggest that this to the Weimar Republic in Germany and the French Fourth
style of governance is better able to reward or punish the Republic as two examples of what happens when party
politicians at the helm of the state apparatus. organizations are incipient or unable to coerce discipline
Similarly, the presence of endogenously timed elections from their rank-and-file members. In both cases, the weak
is also seen as a boon for accountability and, by extension, parties populating the political landscape undermined
democratic stability. This mechanism rewards popular or policy-making efforts.
highly regarded politicians for their policies by granting
them an extended tenure. One of the arguments against
presidentialism is that if a president has done an excellent Perils of Presidentialism: Do Presidential
job, he or she still must run for reelection at the end of a Systems Produce Democratic Instability?
term. But in parliamentary systems, if those in power are
highly regarded, then there is no need to hold elections The decision of whether to implement a parliamentary
(again, there are exceptions to this). Equally telling, or a presidential system has engendered a healthy
though, is the constant threat of dissolving the govern- debate among scholars. Much of this discussion was
ment. If a country’s political or economic climate has suf- fueled in part by the experience of Latin America,
fered at the hands of a coalition government, then that where many countries implemented presidential sys-
government can be removed from office at any time. This tems that would collapse years later. Because of this tur-
enables voters to oust unpopular politicians at any time, bulent regional experience, a number of scholars were
which is an improvement over presidential structures. quick to write off presidential regimes because, they
Barring any significant scandal or an attempted coup argued, these systems would undermine democracy and
d’état, most presidents cannot be removed from office lead to political unrest. The reasons for this skepticism
until the expiration of their term. Consequently, a nefari- rest on four primary criticisms. Ostensibly, the argu-
ous or incompetent president cannot be removed prema- ment contends that presidentialism hinders democratic
turely (unless impeachment proceedings are initiated), survival due to the prevalence of minority governments,
thus enabling the president to wreak further havoc on a frequent legislative impasses, the lack of durable coali-
country’s livelihood. tions, and the propensity of the executives to exploit
Finally, parliamentary systems are thought to be more constitutional authority for their own benefit.
conducive to political party formation, especially multi- At their core, presidential systems are essentially
party systems. While this likelihood is partly attributed to majoritarian, winner-takes-all contests. That is, the sec-
the frequent use of PR electoral systems in parliamentary ond-place finisher receives nothing in return for his or her
governments, party systems also thrive under parliamen- strong showing. When George W. Bush narrowly edged
tary governments because of the incentives to create and out Al Gore in the Electoral College in the 2000 U.S. pres-
sustain parties in this type of regime. As Duverger noted idential election, there was no consolation prize for then
long ago, PR contests foment multiparty systems. This Vice President Gore even though he had in fact won the
notwithstanding, it is also worth nothing that presidential popular vote. Given this, the winner of a presidential con-
systems tend to constrain party-building efforts. After all, test has considerable authority and can do as he or she
if a president is endowed with adequate constitutional pleases. Furthermore, if the losing candidate is or was
power with respect to the legislature, then he or she need serving in the legislature, then the victorious candidate has
not be overly concerned with working with the legislature. little incentive to work with his or her former opponent.
Furthermore, when presidents can circumvent the legisla- This situation can result in a political stalemate that could
ture, there is little incentive for legislators to build or main- prompt drastic measures that could have a devastating
tain political parties. Thus, political parties may be less effect on the overall political system.
instrumental in lawmaking under presidential regimes. Furthermore, because there is only one president, presi-
Conversely, in parliamentary governments, political par- dential systems also tend to produce minority governments.
ties are effective vehicles for overcoming collective One excellent example of such a scenario is Chile’s Allende,
action problems that often surface in legislative bodies who became president after winning only slightly more than
(Aldrich, 1995). Creating and maintaining parties, more- 30% of the popular vote. A similar case is the 2002 French
over, can help legislators overcome collective action prob- presidential elections. Due to pervasive frustration with their
lems through organizing members, delivering necessary government, much of the French electorate voted against
 Presidentialism Versus Parliamentarism • 183

familiar candidates, and nearly 20% of voters supported the components identified thus far. In the event that a president
right wing candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen—a caustic individ- seeks to rewrite, distort, or even ignore the constitution,
ual whose campaign has been described as xenophobic if the fate of democracy has been sealed, and it will be on the
not anti-Semitic in many instances. In France’s two-round brink of collapse.
presidential contest, Le Pen was one of two candidates to Although much has been written about the potential
make it to the second round, in which he was soundly perils of presidentialism, this debate remains ongoing.
defeated by Jacques Chirac. Nevertheless, these examples, Other scholars have questioned this contention and have
particularly Allende’s story, serve as subtle reminders that countered that presidential systems are not inherently dan-
presidentialism may result in minority governments. gerous. For example, Donald Horowitz (1990) takes
Furthermore, in the case of Le Pen, had he been elected, it umbrage with a number of Juan Linz’s conjectures. First,
is plausible that his policies would have contrasted sharply Horowitz points out that Linz’s evidence is predominantly
with the views of much of the French electorate, thus caus- based on the Latin American experience and neglects sta-
ing a potentially dangerous scenario. ble presidencies found in other regions. Second, Horowitz
Another reason presidents may hinder democratic sur- maintains that the perils of presidentialism are based pri-
vival stems from what is commonly referred to as dual marily on exaggerated interpretations of these systems that
democratic legitimacies. Because presidents and legisla- do not represent all presidential states. It is important to
tors are elected in separate contests—unlike in parliamen- note that Horowitz also points out several instances in
tary systems—it is possible, if not probable, that both the which parliamentary systems have prompted instability.
legislative and executive branches of government may Among others, Nigeria is mentioned as one case in which
claim separate political mandates. If there are rules or pro- parliamentarism has resulted in an unstable polity. Another
visions in place to guide the government through these point of contention stems from the confusion surrounding
potentially rough waters, then there is little cause for con- presidential systems and electoral systems. Those sub-
cern. However, in most cases, there is little clarity in dol- scribing to the perils-of-presidentialism school of thought
ing out responsibilities between these branches of have essentially confused presidential systems with elec-
government, in which case, any showdown between the toral systems, thus producing some misguided conclu-
legislature and the president could result in a political sions. For example, the single member plurality systems
stalemate and, possibly, democratic collapse. The latter is used to elect many presidents often result in dispropor-
certainly not a given, but at the very least, legislative grid- tional outcomes that potentially exacerbate underlying
lock is likely to ensue. If a political shutdown does not social, political, or geographic tensions. Finally, those
result, the separate mandates of each branch could result in questioning the dangers of presidentialism also point out
an impasse that could at least stall policy making, which that the potentially beneficial aspects of presidential sys-
could deprive government agencies, citizens, and politi- tems have been largely overlooked, which has provided a
cians of potentially valuable policies or funding that is rather biased view of these regimes.
needed to keep society running smoothly. Although useful, this theoretical discussion does not
Additionally, if the president and legislative majority provide much empirical evidence of the dangers of presi-
hold different or contrasting ideological backgrounds or dentialism. Fortunately, a number of political scientists
partisan affiliations, then any quasi coalition will likely be have used a variety of statistical techniques to evaluate the
short-lived. Admittedly, this is certainly not a given, but it perils-of-presidentialism argument. Alfred Stepan and
is a likely outcome when the president and legislature hold Cindy Skach (1993) have reviewed several constitutional
different views on the direction of a given country. And frameworks, along with a host of other data sources, and
since there are few incentives for these actors to work have discovered that presidentialism is indeed correlated
together, coalitional stability is likely to be tenuous at best. with weaker democracies. Not surprisingly, others have
This instability could slow the political process as these reached much different conclusions. In their study of more
institutions battle for influence, thus resulting in delayed or than 50 countries, Timothy Power and Mark Gasiorowski’s
nonexistent policy making. If policy making does not grind (1997) findings refute the dangers of presidentialism. In
to a halt, then an alternative scenario exists whereby presi- the most comprehensive work to date, Jose Antonio Cheibub
dents would simply eschew the traditional lawmaking (2007) has echoed Power and Gasiorowski’s conclusions.
process and opt for extralegal options. This too could precip- Cheibub (2007) asserts that it is not presidential systems
itate a political showdown that could trigger a democratic that are dangerous; rather, he demonstrates that it is the
crisis or, worse yet, collapse. underlying social conditions or background characteristics
Faced with this scenario, many presidents were quick to that jeopardize democratic stability. Specifically, he sug-
exploit the constitution for their own personal gains. This gests that whether or not a military regime had previously
potential consequence of presidentialism is based on existed is far more important than whether a presidential
numerous experiences in Latin America, where presidents system is in place. Because many Latin American coun-
attempted to cling to power even when faced with mount- tries have had experiences with military dictatorships,
ing opposition from the legislature and/or the polity. This Cheibub’s findings put Linz’s theoretical work in a new
consequence can be viewed as the culmination of the other perspective.
184 • COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Baldez, L., & Carey, J. (2001). Budget procedure and fiscal

restraint in posttransition Chile. In S. Haggard & M. D.
Future Directions
McCubbins (Eds.), Presidents, parliaments, and policy
Clearly, much has been written on the topic of regime
(pp. 105 148). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
choice. Convincing arguments have been made on both sides
Cheibub, J. A. (2002). Minority governments, deadlock situa
of the debates—those warning of the perils of presidentialism tions, and the survival of presidential democracies.
and those questioning this assertion. Cheibub’s work is a Comparative Political Studies, 35, 284 312.
compelling study of the presidentialism argument; here, Cheibub, J. A. (2006). Presidentialism, electoral identifiability,
the author disaggregates the various components of the and budget balances in democratic systems. American
presidentialism argument and finds that statistical evi- Political Science Review, 100, 353 368.
dence dispels many of the concerns espoused by the camp Cheibub, J. A. (2007). Presidentialism, parliamentarism, and
opposed to presidentialism. This work, however, does not democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
address every concern. In fact, Cheibub goes on to say that Clark, T. D., & Wittrock, J. N. (2005). Presidentialism and the
testing the relationship between political party discipline effect of electoral law in postcommunist systems: Regime
type matters. Comparative Political Studies, 38, 171 188.
and presidents is impaired by our inability to measure
Clark, W. R., Golder, M., & Golder, S. N. (2009). Principles of
party discipline cross-nationally. Aside from this empirical
comparative politics. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
problem, there are other concerns with how we measure Cox, G. W. (1987). The efficient secret: The cabinet and the
these regimes. Although scholars such as Alan Siaroff development of political parties in Victorian England.
(2003) include several considerations to measure presiden- Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
tial strength, our ability to clearly distinguish presidential Duverger, M. (1954). Political parties. New York: Wiley.
states from parliamentary ones is still a work in progress. Evans, D. (2004). Greasing the wheels: Using pork barrel proj
This issue is further complicated when we take into ects to build majority coalitions in Congress. New York:
account the large number of hybrid systems that are also Cambridge University Press.
particularly elusive in categorizing regime type. Frye, T. (1997). A politics of institutional choice: Post
Communist presidencies. Comparative Political Studies, 30,
523 552.
Hellman, J. S. (1996). Constitutions and economic reform in the
Conclusion postcommunist transitions. East European Constitutional
Review, 5, 46 56.
There are several different ways a country can set up its Horowitz, D. (1990). Comparing democratic systems. Journal of
own government. It can take the form of a presidential, Democracy, 1, 783 794.
parliamentary, or hybrid regime. To be sure, there are Ishiyama, J. T., & Kennedy, R. (2001). Superpresidentialism and
attractive aspects of each regime, but it should not be sur- political party development in Russia, Ukraine, Armenia
prising that many newer democracies have opted for a and Kyrgyzstan. Europe Asia Studies, 53, 1177 1191.
hybrid regime that seeks the best of both worlds. For Ishiyama, J. T., & Velten, M. (1998). Presidential power and
example, several former Communist states, such as democratic development in post Communist politics.
Communist and Post Communist Studies, 31, 217 233.
Croatia, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine, have opted for
Keech, W. R., & Pak, K. (1995). Partisanship, institutions and
semipresidential regimes, in part to mitigate the shortcom-
change in American trade politics. Journal of Politics, 57,
ings of either presidential or parliamentary systems (Clark, 1130 1142.
Golder, & Golder, 2009). Having said that, simply because King, A. (1994). “Chief executives” in western Europe. In I. Budge &
a country opts for a presidential regime does not necessar- D. McKay (Eds.), Developing democracy: Comparative research
ily precipitate democratic collapse. For some time, schol- in honor of J. F. P. Blondel (pp. 150 163). London: Sage.
ars had reasoned that presidential systems were anathema Laver, M., & Shepsle, K. A. (1996). Making and breaking gov
to democracy, but contemporary analysis has largely dis- ernments: Government formation in parliamentary democ
puted this finding. Thus, presidential systems may not be racies. New York: Cambridge University Press.
as perilous as Linz and others have forecast. This is not to Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of democracy: Government forms
suggest that regime type is insignificant. Rather, regime and performance in thirty six countries. New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press.
type remains an important distinction, and it is imperative
Linz, J. J. (1990a). The perils of presidentialism. Journal of
that we understand the costs and benefits of different
Democracy, 1, 51 69.
regime types in order to minimize the potential negative Linz, J. J. (1990b). Virtues of parliamentarism. Journal of
consequences for a given country. Democracy, 1, 83 91.
Linz, J. J. (1994). Presidential or parliamentary democracy: Does
it make a difference? In J. J. Linz & A. Valenzuela (Eds.),
References and Further Readings The failure of presidential democracy (pp. 3 87). Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press.
Aldrich, J. (1995). Why parties? The origin and transformation Lohmann, S., & O’Halloran, S. (1994). Divided government and
of party politics in America. Chicago: University of Chicago U.S. trade policy: Theory and evidence. International
Press. Organization, 48, 595 632.
 Presidentialism Versus Parliamentarism • 185

Mainwaring, S. (1993). Presidentialism, mulitpartism, and democ Protsyk, O. (2004). Ruling with decrees: Presidential decree
racy: The difficult combination. Comparative Political making in Russia and Ukraine. Europe Asia Studies, 56,
Studies, 26, 198 228. 637 660.
Marsteintredet, L., & Berntzen, E. (2008). Reducing the perils of Roper, S. D. (2002). Are all semipresidential regimes the same? A
presidentialism in Latin America through presidential inter comparison of premier presidential regimes. Comparative
ruptions. Comparative Politics, 41, 83 102. Politics, 34, 253 272.
McCarty, N. (2000). Presidential pork: Executive veto power and dis Sartori, G. (1994). Neither presidentialism nor parliamentarism.
tributive politics. American Political Science Review, 94, 117 129. In J. J. Linz & A. Valenzuela (Eds.), The failure of presi
McGregor, J. P. (1994). The presidency in east Central Europe. dential democracy (pp. 106 118). Baltimore: Johns
RFE/RL Research Report, 3, 23 31. Hopkins University Press.
McGregor, J. P. (1996). Constitutional factors in politics in post Shugart, M. S., & Carey, J. M. (1992). Presidents and assem
Communist central and eastern Europe. Communist and blies: Constitutional design and electoral dynamics.
Post Communist Studies, 29, 147 166. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Metcalf, L. K. (2000). Measuring presidential power. Comparative Siaroff, A. (2003). Comparative presidencies: The inadequacy
Political Studies, 33, 660 685. of the presidential, semipresidential and parliamentary
Persson, T., Roland, G., & Tabellini, G. (2000). Comparative politics and distinction. European Journal of Political Research, 42,
public finance. Journal of Political Economy, 106, 1121 1160. 287 312.
Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (1999). The size and scope of gov Smith, A. (2003). Election timing in majoritarian parliaments.
ernment: Comparative politics and rational politicians. British Journal of Political Science, 33, 397 418.
European Economic Review, 43, 699 735. Stepan, A., & Skach, C. (1993). Constitutional frameworks and
Power, T. J., & Gasiorowski, M. J. (1997). Institutional design democratic consolidation. World Politics, 46, 1 22.
and democratic consolidation in the third world. Tavits, M. (2009). Presidents with prime ministers: Do direct
Comparative Political Studies, 30, 123 155. elections matter? Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.