NAME: Jonas Rebecca Iyanuoluwa

MATRIC NO: 180341083

DEPARTMENT: History and international studies
COURSE TITLE: Introduction to Defence and Strategic Analysis
COURSE CODE: HIS211
CA: What factors and situations combine to trigger the following wars?
LECTURER IN CHARGE: Dr Jamiu Oluwatoki
VIETNAM WAR

The twentieth century is characterised by

rapid acceleration of technological

progress. This trend influenced the military

sector and warfare as well. Deployment of

new weapons, which emerged thanks to

technological advancement, changed the

character of war. Several authors have

already tried to systematize the evolution of

warfare, taking different aspects into

consideration. For example, T.

Winthringham divided historical eras of

warfare according to the most dominant

technical parameters, M. Howard with

regard to predominant social characteristics

and A. Toffler divides warfare development

into individual waves according to “mode

of production”
The article explores the evolution of

warfare on the basis of theory developed by

an American author William Lind

Generations of Warfare

Lind’s concept called „The Four

Generations of Modern War“ begins at

modern era, the era of wars between states.

After the Peace of Westphalia 1648, the

state established a monopoly on war.

The first generation is characterised by

development of linear tactics. The reforms

introduced during the Thirty Years’ War,

which were connected with large-scale

deployment of firearms, marked the end of

Spanish Tercios. Lines became a

progressive tactical element. In the 19th

century, a new element called column tactic

emerged in connection with the Napoleonic

Wars. The late 19th century saw the

appearance of rifled muskets, the

breechloader, barbed wire and machine

guns and line or column tactic became

suicidal The character of battle and

warfare began to change

The second generation of warfare emerged

on the battlefields of World War I. The

large-scale deployment of technological

advances such as rapid-fire guns, machine

guns, flamethrowers as well as armies

comprising millions of soldiers gave rise to

attrition warfare. The French summarized

the second generation war with phrase:

“The artillery conquers, the infantry

occupies” [4]. The deployment of aircraft

added the third dimension to combat. The

end of the second generation warfare saw

building of solid defensive lines (e. g. the

Maginot Line built by France or the

Czechoslovak border fortifications), the

purpose of which was to stop an enemy’s

offensive and inflict damage that would

prevent adversaries from advancing.

The third generation of warfare was a

logical attempt to find a way out of the

existing situation. As W. Lind states:

“Third Generation war, also a product of

World War I, is commonly known as

blitzkrieg or manoeuvre warfare. It is based

not on firepower and attrition but speed,

surprise, and mental as well as physical

dislocation [5].” This statement can be

made more precise by another Lind’s idea,

according to which “the driving force was

primarily Ideas” [6]. It was the new

thinking that enabled the German Panzer

commanders to adopt their blitzkrieg tactics

successfully and gave rise to airmobile

warfare used by American troops in

Vietnam.

The fourth generation warfare is characterised

by radical changes. Technologies and ideas

remain the same, but the character of conflicts

becomes different as non-state opponents

emerge. The state loses its monopoly on war

[7]. It is a guerrilla warfare, where non-state

actors involve civilians in their fight by

means of their ideology, terror and violence

directed against the state and civilians. One of

the basic characteristics of this generation is

decentralisation [8] which leads to blurring of

specific battle lines.

Fourth generation war at home poses an

existential threat. If the state’s armed services

cannot defeat that threat, the state will

disappear and its armed forces with it

Third and Fourth Generation Warfare

and the Vietnam War

American involvement in the Vietnam War

was characterised by several aspects that

were completely different. The first aspect

was the presence of US advisors that was

aimed at consolidation of the South

Vietnamese Army (the Army of the

Republic of Vietnam -ARVN) and making

it capable of facing the guerrilla warfare.

The second aspect was the US involvement

in the fight against the Viet Cong (VC) and

the North Vietnamese Army (NVA). The

third aspect concerned systematic aerial

assaults on North Vietnam.

The Vietnamese had some experience of

guerrilla warfare from their resistance

against the Japanese occupation and the

French post-war colonial administration.

Partisans started to oppose the regime

established by the South Vietnamese

President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1957 [10].by

means of minor assaults and assassinations

of South Vietnamese politicians. Many of

the Viet Cong’s core members were Viet

Minh veterans, who were joined by

approximately 2,000 soldiers infiltrated

from the North. In 1958 and 1958, the

number of non-state armed groups and

activities steadily increased. The Military

Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) was

tasked to assist the South Vietnamese Army

in its consolidation and its fight against

insurgents.

As far as the assistance to ARVN is

concerned, the US army was not ready for a

guerrilla war in the first phase of the

conflict due to its military experience from

the World War II and the Korean War

battles. South Vietnam was facing poverty,

corruption and the issues concerning ethnic

minorities. This situation created “a

breeding ground for the emergence and

spread of insurgency” e. i. the ideal

environment for the Viet Cong activities,

which were aimed at destabilisation of the Saigon regime and subsequent enforcement

of the Viet Cong political ideologies.

The Viet Cong used the terror tactics such

as abductions, murders and intimidation. It

was responsible for 250 assassinations of

the South Vietnamese politicians in 1959.

In 1960, the number of assassinations rose

to 1,400. Besides this, the Viet Cog, which

was becoming increasingly powerful,

attacked the ARVN troops as well [12]. The

VC was gradually taking control of several

provinces. For example, it seized the

provincial capital of Phuoc-Vinh situated

40 miles from Saigon in autumn 1961. The

South Vietnamese President Ngo DihnDiem started to realise that the combat

meant also a political fight. The Saigon

government wanted to separate population

from insurgents and adopt social reforms.

The year 1962 saw the introduction of the

Strategic Hamlet Programme, the aim of

which was to secure villages from the enemy

and eliminate indoctrination of population

with the communist ideology [13].

The South Vietnamese Army responded to

increased VC activities by stronger

armament and implementation of new

counter-insurgency strategies. The US army

provided the South Vietnamese with the

most modern infantry weapons, APCs and

helicopters, which were supplied in

December 1961. Another form of the US

assistance to South Vietnam was the

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam –

MACV, created on 8 February 1962.

The war was characterised by assaulting the

suspected VC positions and their

destruction by means of manoeuvre and

firepower. The most effective method was

rapid deployment of infantry units by

means of helicopters and APCs followed by

a fire supremacy attack supported by

artillery fire. For a short time, this tactic

made the VC pull back into defensive

positions and stopped it from conducting

more effective operations. In late 1962, the

Vietcong movement seemed bound to fail

and suffer a defeat. In military and comba terms, the USA and South Vietnam were

successful until the end of 1962.

However, the Viet Cong had learnt its

lessons and started to defend its positions

by means of anti-aircraft guns. In the Battle

of Ap Bac, which took place on 2 January

1963, the AVRN was defeated. Its losses

were 66 killed and 115 wounded, with 3 US

advisors killed in action and another six

wounded. The VC won the battle thanks to

changes in its tactics and inconsistencies of

the South Vietnamese command.

Conflicts in command regarding

competencies reflected the political

situation in South Vietnam. The Diem

regime spread chaos instead of stability as it

was characterised by patronage and

corruption. This lead to political unrest and

Diem became its victim in November 1963.

However, Diem’s downfall did not bring

any stability. What is more, it was followed

by several incapable governments. As a

result, it was becoming increasingly

difficult for the US advisors to support the

government and fight effectively against the

Viet Cong, which had taken control of forty

percent of the South Vietnam area in mid-

1964. Besides engagement in direct combat,

the VC units bombarded the US garrisons and

bases. For example, the Qui Nohon hotel

bombing, which took place on 10 February

1965, killed 32 US servicemen. These attacks

combined with terror directed against the

civilian population are typical example of the

fourth generation warfare [14].

In addition to providing supplies and

training the ARVN troops, the US army

was becoming increasingly active in

combat. The conflict was escalating and the

number of US troops in South Vietnam was

increasing. In 1965, General Westmoreland

stated that the VC was pushing the ARVN

troops out of heavily populated areas and

exposing the civilian population to

communist terror. That is why he demanded

that the USA deployed enough troops, who

would take over the fight against the North

Vietnamese Army (NVA), thus enabling

ARVN to protect the civilian populationMobile deployment of troops from

helicopters was a higher-level strategy. The

US advisors adopted the air-mobile strategy

between 1960 and 1962. It was successfully

used against the VC and NVA, especially

by the 1stCavalry Division (Airmobile) in

the Battle of Ia Drang, which took place in

November 1965. The 1st Airmobile

Division was equipped with the largest

amount of helicopters, which were

transporting infantry troops and artillery.

Helicopters were still used as air artillery

that supported the infantry units. Later, a

special tactic of air combat surveillance,

called “Hunter-Killer”, was developed [18].

Airmobile tactics became a characteristic

feature of the modern warfare.

Airmobile deployment of troops as well as

infantry firepower and artillery presented

the highest level of the third generation

warfare, which is also called the manoeuvre

warfare. This tactic was adopted in

operations such as “Cedar Falls”, which

took place from 8 to 26 January 1967, and

“Junction City”, conducted from 22

February to 14 May 1967.

Besides the aforementioned operations, the

US forces were engaged in destruction of

suspected or detected supply dumps and

routes (especially the Ho Chi Minh trail) by means of tactical and strategic air
warfare.

Like in previous operations, the US

deployed the most modern technologies for

identification of enemy positions, such as

motion sensors, IR sensors, different types

of defoliants, etc.

The most modern weapons were also used

by the air forces, which were conducting

the bombing campaign against North

Vietnam. They deployed essential assets,

such as intelligent munitions, electronic

warfare, etc. In terms of Douhet’s theory of

airpower, the bombing of North Vietnam

presented the climax of the third generation

warfare in technological terms.

Application of knowledge of the fourgeneration warfare

In these days, there are no ongoing

conventional conflicts, which would adopt

strategies typical for 3GW. Therefore, armed

forces have to be ready for deployment under

the 4GW conditions, which involves changes

in training of personnel and preparation of

training documentation. These changes

present a challenge also for the Armed Forces

of the Slovak Republic, which is the NATO

member state, and for the educational process

at the Armed Forces Academy as well.

Lind’s theory of the four-generation

warfare was first mentioned in the process

of military education at the Armed Forces

Academy in a textbook called Military

Tactics by P. Spilý and M. Hrnčiar [19].

The authors explain the basic characteristics

of this theory in the history introduction.

Cadets learn more about Lind’s theory inthe subjects called History of Military
Art,

History of Military Science and

Technologies as well as Tactics.

Even though the concept of generation

warfare is fairly new in the Armed Forces

of the Slovak Republic, the contemporary

security environment makes it topical

Therefore in conclusion,
During its involvement in the Vietnam War,

the US army had chances of winning

because it was at the height of its

technological, tactical and operational

advancement typical of the third generation

warfare. However, the Vietnam War was

different. W. Lind cites America’s greatest

military theorist U.S. Air Force Colonel J.

Boyd: “In Vietnam we had air superiority,

land superiority and sea superiority, but we

lost. So I realized there is something more

to it.” [20]. The US troops and their allies

(the South Vietnamese Army in particular)

fought battles typical of the fourth

generation warfare. The US forces were not

ready for such a combat. When the conflict

in Vietnam broke out, the US was just

beginning to recognise and learn conditions

of the new generation and it was not able to

fully adapt to these changes. For the US

army, the Vietnam War was a completely

different kind of conflict. What is more, it

(along with other similar conflicts such as

the Algerian War) indicated a trend in the

development of future warfare and

undoubtedly yielded the knowledge and

experience on the basis of which the world

is handling the current conflicts