Agraviador v. Agraviador, G.R. No.

170729, 8 December 2010

Doctrine:
Psychological Incapacity Under Article 36: Psychological incapacity as a ground for
annulment of marriage is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability. It refers to a severe mental disorder that incapacitates a party from
assuming and performing the essential marital obligations. It must be proven to
exist at the time of the marriage, and must be medically or clinically identified,
permanent, and grave.
Burden of Proof: The burden of proving psychological incapacity lies with the
petitioner. Any doubt is resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage, as both the
Constitution and Family Code protect the permanence of marriage.
Insufficiency of Personality Traits: Personality flaws like immaturity, irresponsibility,
and unfaithfulness do not constitute psychological incapacity. The incapacity must
be a result of a serious, debilitating psychological condition.
Facts:
Enrique Agraviador (petitioner) filed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
with Erlinda Amparo-Agraviador (respondent) on the grounds of psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The petitioner claimed that the
respondent exhibited irresponsible and neglectful behavior during their marriage,
including refusal to perform household duties, infidelity, and abandonment of their
children. He also alleged that she had an affair with a lesbian and consulted a witch
doctor. Petitioner’s claims were supported by a psychiatric evaluation that
diagnosed the respondent with a "Mixed Personality Disorder," which, according to
the report, rendered her incapable of fulfilling the essential obligations of marriage.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found merit in the petitioner's claims and declared
the marriage null and void based on the psychological incapacity of the respondent.
However, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed this decision, stating that the
psychiatric evaluation report lacked sufficient proof of a serious, permanent
disorder and failed to identify a root cause for the respondent’s incapacity. The CA
further opined that the evidence presented was more indicative of character flaws
that could not justify an annulment under Article 36, but might instead warrant a
legal separation.

Issue:
The primary issue in this case is whether the petitioner has sufficiently proven the
psychological incapacity of the respondent to justify the annulment of their
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code

Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The Court
emphasized that the burden of proof lies with the petitioner, who must show,
beyond reasonable doubt, that the spouse is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill
essential marital obligations. The ruling underscored that psychological incapacity
involves a grave and incurable mental disorder, present at the time of marriage,
and not merely a difficulty or refusal to perform marital duties. The Court clarified
that personality flaws such as irresponsibility, infidelity, or emotional immaturity do
not meet the legal threshold for psychological incapacity. Furthermore, the
psychiatric evaluation presented by the petitioner was deemed insufficient as it
lacked a thorough personal examination of the respondent and failed to establish
the severity, antecedence, and incurability of her condition. The Court reiterated the
principle that any doubt regarding the validity of marriage should be resolved in
favor of its continuity, as marriage is an inviolable institution under the Constitution
and Family Code.

Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes, G.R. No. 185286, 18 August 2010

Doctrine:
Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it
must be read in conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from Articles 35,
37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage
void ab initio, or Article 45 that would make the marriage merely voidable, or Article
55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that
these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were
indifferent on the matter. Article 36 should not be confused with a divorce law that
cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves.
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage
rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. Hence, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity.
Facts:
Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes in 1972 at
the University of the Philippines. They started as classmates and quickly became a
couple. Despite their initial closeness, their relationship faced challenges, including
financial struggles after marriage and the respondent's lack of responsibility.
Petitioner supported the family while respondent’s business ventures failed, and he
also had an extramarital affair. Over the years, their relationship worsened, with
petitioner seeking help from marriage encounter groups and counseling. In 1997,
respondent resisted psychological evaluation, and in 2001, petitioner filed for the
declaration of nullity of marriage due to psychological incapacity.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the petition for nullity based on
psychological incapacity of both parties. However, the Court of Appeals reversed
the RTC decision, declaring the marriage valid and subsisting, which led to the
appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between the parties is void ab initio on the ground of
both parties’ psychological incapacity, as provided in Article 36 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
The Court ultimately rejected the appellate court's view, reaffirming that
psychological incapacity must meet three criteria: it must be grave, juridically
antecedent (present before the marriage), and incurable. The Court concluded that
these criteria were satisfied in this case, and therefore, granted the petition to
declare the marriage void. The ruling underscores the importance of protecting the
sanctity of marriage while maintaining the integrity of the law's definition of
psychological incapacity.

The respondent’s behavior is traced back to his childhood, where his mother’s
emotional instability and poor impulse control influenced his development. He grew
up using charm and deceit to manipulate others, leading to an inability to form
lasting, healthy relationships. His narcissism, sense of entitlement, lack of empathy,
and sadistic tendencies resulted in abusive behavior towards his wife, neglect of
family responsibilities, and substance abuse.

Expert testimony diagnosed the respondent with a personality disorder, which was
deemed incurable and stable over time. Despite the Court of Appeals rejecting
these expert testimonies as hearsay due to the doctors' lack of direct interaction
with the respondent, the Supreme Court disagreed. It emphasized that the absence
of personal interviews does not invalidate the testimonies, as they were based on
the observations of multiple informants, including family members. The court also
highlighted that personality disorders, though often managed through therapy, are
generally considered incurable.

The Supreme Court rejected the appellate court's finding that the respondent's
psychological incapacity could be remedied by therapy. The respondent’s inability
to meet marital obligations, such as financial support, fidelity, and emotional
commitment, was sufficient to declare the marriage null and void from the start
under Article 36 of the Family Code.

In contrast, the court found no psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner,
noting that she had been a responsible and sincere spouse despite her challenges.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s decision and
reinstated the trial court’s ruling declaring the marriage void.

Toring v. Toring, G.R. No. 165321 3 August 2010

Doctrine:
In the leading case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al.,11 we held that
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized
by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability, to be sufficient basis to
annul a marriage. The psychological incapacity should refer to "no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage."

We are in no way convinced that a mere narration of the statements of Ricardo and
Richardson, coupled with the results of the psychological tests administered only on
Ricardo, without more, already constitutes sufficient basis for the conclusion that
Teresita suffered from Narcissistic Personality Disorder. This Court has long been
negatively critical in considering psychological evaluations, presented in evidence,
derived solely from one-sided sources, particularly from the spouse seeking the
nullity of the marriage.

The law does not require the allegedly incapacitated spouse to undergo personal
examination by a physician or psychologist to declare a marriage void under Article
36 of the Family Code. However, evidence must still meet the standards established
in Santos and Molina. This includes proving the spouse's personality profile at the
time of marriage, the root cause of the incapacity, and its gravity, permanence, and
incurability. Such evidence may come from individuals closely associated with the
incapacitated spouse, like relatives, friends, family doctors, or lawyers, who can
testify to the condition or events linked to the incapacity existing at the time of
marriage.

Facts:
The case revolves around Ricardo P. Toring's petition for annulment of his marriage
to Teresita M. Toring on the grounds of psychological incapacity, filed more than 20
years after their marriage. Ricardo and Teresita were married on September 4,
1978, and had three children. In his petition, Ricardo claimed that Teresita was
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her marital obligations due to her alleged
Narcissistic Personality Disorder. He presented evidence including a psychological
evaluation by Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran, who testified that Teresita exhibited behaviors
such as entitlement, exploitation, lack of empathy, arrogance, and a tendency to
blame others, which pointed to an incurable disorder.

Ricardo also accused Teresita of being an adulteress and a squanderer, citing

financial mismanagement, infidelity, and neglect of family responsibilities. Teresita
did not oppose the petition, nor did she testify in her defense.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially ruled in Ricardo's favor, annulling the
marriage, based on the testimony of Dr. Albaran and Ricardo's allegations.
However, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the decision, arguing
that the psychological incapacity was not adequately proven, and the RTC's ruling
did not meet the standards established by previous case law, particularly the Molina
case.

The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC's decision, stating that the trial court
failed to establish the root cause of Teresita's psychological incapacity and did not
prove that the incapacity existed before or at the time of the marriage. The CA also
found that allegations of overspending and infidelity were insufficient grounds for
annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Ricardo appealed the CA decision, asserting that the RTC had properly followed the
guidelines set by Molina and adequately established the root cause of Teresita’s
incapacity. The case was brought before the higher courts for resolution.

Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the Regional Trial Court's decision
declaring the marriage of Ricardo P. Toring and Teresita M. Toring null and void on
the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code, given
the evidence presented regarding Teresita's alleged Narcissistic Personality
Disorder and its impact on her ability to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage.

Ruling:

The petition for annulment of marriage was denied because the Court found that
the Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible error in setting aside the RTC’s
decision. The ruling emphasized the requirement for proving psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code, specifically highlighting the need for:
  Gravity, Juridical Antecedence, and Incurability: Psychological incapacity must
be grave, pre-existing (antecedent), and incurable. It should prevent the
party from understanding the essential marital obligations.
 Burden of Proof: The burden of proof lies with the petitioner. Any doubts
should be resolved in favor of the marriage's validity, consistent with
constitutional principles that protect marriage and family.
 Medical/Clinical Basis: The psychological incapacity must be medically or
clinically diagnosed, clearly explained, and proven by expert testimony. It
must be shown to exist at the time of marriage.
 Grave Illness: The psychological condition must be serious enough to prevent
the party from fulfilling the essential marital obligations, such as fidelity,
support, and mutual care.
 Root Cause and Permanence: The incapacity must have been present from
the start of the marriage, and the condition must be permanent or incurable,
even if the incapacity becomes evident later.
The Court ruled that the petitioner, Ricardo, failed to provide sufficient evidence to
prove Teresita's psychological incapacity. The psychological evaluation relied
heavily on biased sources (Ricardo and their son), and did not establish the required
link between Teresita’s alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder and her incapacity
to fulfill marital duties. Additionally, the Court emphasized that mere marital
difficulties, infidelity, or financial mismanagement do not qualify as psychological
incapacity under the law.

Thus, the Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, denying the
annulment. The ruling reinforces the requirement for clear, medically substantiated
evidence and the seriousness of the incapacity for an annulment under Article 36.

Suazo v. Suazo, G.R. No. 164493, 10 March 2010

Doctrine:
Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of
psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All
these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital
obligations that, as the cited jurisprudence holds, cannot be considered to be
constitutive of psychological incapacity in the absence of proof that these are
manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition
or illness.
Facts:
Jocelyn and Angelito, both 16, were forced into marriage in March 1986 after an
incident where they left home together for three days. Without stable means of
support, they lived with Angelito’s parents, where Jocelyn worked odd jobs while
Angelito remained jobless, drank excessively, and was physically abusive. Their
frequent violent quarrels led to Jocelyn leaving in July 1987. Angelito later cohabited
with another woman, with whom he had children.

In 1997, Jocelyn sought a declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the

Family Code, alleging Angelito’s psychological incapacity. A psychologist testified
that Angelito suffered from an incurable antisocial personality disorder rooted in his
dysfunctional upbringing. However, Angelito was not examined personally, and the
evidence relied on Jocelyn’s accounts.
The trial court annulled the marriage, citing Angelito’s irresponsibility, alcoholism,
abuse, and failure to meet marital obligations. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision, ruling that the evidence was insufficient to prove
psychological incapacity as defined by jurisprudence, emphasizing the lack of
clinical findings, permanence, and incurability of Angelito's behavior. The CA
maintained that psychological incapacity cannot be used as an excuse for failed or
unhappy marriages.
Issue:
Simply stated, we face the issue of whether there is basis to nullify Jocelyn’s
marriage with Angelito under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied Jocelyn's petition and affirmed the decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA) that Angelito’s psychological incapacity was not proven under
Article 36 of the Family Code. The Court found that the psychologist’s evaluation of
Angelito’s psychological condition was insufficient, as it was based solely on
Jocelyn’s biased accounts. The psychological report lacked depth, factual basis, and
a complete personality profile, failing to establish the root cause, gravity, or
incurability of Angelito’s alleged condition. The psychologist’s conclusions were
largely conjectural, with no concrete evidence supporting the claim that Angelito’s
personality disorder was severe and incurable.

Jocelyn’s testimony was similarly inadequate. She described Angelito’s habitual

drunkenness, gambling, refusal to work, and acts of physical violence, all of which
occurred after their marriage. However, these behaviors, while concerning, were
insufficient to prove that psychological incapacity existed at the time of the
marriage. Physical violence, though indicative of abnormal behavior, does not
constitute psychological incapacity without evidence linking it to a psychological
disorder. The Court emphasized that the law and jurisprudence require proof that
the incapacity existed at the time of the marriage and was rooted in a grave,
juridically antecedent, and incurable psychological condition.

Given these deficiencies, the Court held that the CA correctly reversed the Regional
Trial Court’s decision, as the trial court’s findings were manifestly erroneous. Jocelyn
failed to meet the evidentiary standards required under Santos v. Court of Appeals,
which outlines the requisites of psychological incapacity. Thus, the petition was
denied for lack of merit.

Yambao v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 184063, 24 January 2011

Doctrine:
Preliminarily, the Court reiterates its recent pronouncement that each case for
declaration of nullity under the foregoing provision must be judged, not on the basis
of a priori assumptions, predilections, or generalizations, but according to its own
facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-
to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.42 Judicial
understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving standards,
taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and
even canonical thought, and experience.43
While the Court has not abandoned the standard set in Molina,44 the Court has
reiterated the tenet that the factual milieu of each case must be treated as distinct
and, as such, each case must be decided based on its own set of facts.
Facts:
Petitioner Cynthia Yambao sought the nullity of her marriage with respondent
Patricio Yambao under Article 36 of the Family Code, alleging that the respondent
suffered from psychological incapacity. The petitioner claimed that respondent
failed to perform essential marital obligations, such as providing financial support,
helping raise their children, and refraining from gambling. Expert testimony
diagnosed respondent with Dependent Personality Disorder. Both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals denied the petition, holding that respondent’s faults did not
amount to psychological incapacity.
Issue:
Hence, the issue in this case can be summed up, thus: Does the totality of
petitioner’s evidence establish respondent’s psychological incapacity to perform the
essential obligations of marriage?
Ruling:
The petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code was denied due to insufficient evidence to establish psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence,
and incurability, involving an actual psychological abnormality rendering one
incapable of fulfilling essential marital obligations.

The Court held that the respondent's actions, though flawed, did not amount to
psychological incapacity. His efforts to provide for his family, despite shortcomings,
showed awareness of marital responsibilities. Emotional difficulties or neglect do not
equate to psychological incapacity, which requires proof of a severe and permanent
mental condition existing at the time of marriage.

The psychological report failed to establish antecedence, and there was no

evidence linking the respondent’s faults to a psychological disorder present during
the marriage's celebration. Additionally, the couple’s ability to raise children
together and sustain a marriage for 35 years, though marked by challenges,
undermined claims of nullity.

The Court affirmed the rulings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Hence, the
marriage remains valid.

Santiago v. People, G.R. No. 200233, 15 July 2015

Doctrine:
In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on the
circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without being aware of his previous
marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage of the accused
could she be included in the information as a co-accused.

In referring to Viada, Justice Luis B. Reyes, an eminent authority in criminal law, writes that "a person,
whether man or woman, who knowingly consents or agrees to be married to another already bound in
lawful wedlock is guilty as an accomplice in the crime of bigamy." Therefore, her conviction should only
be that for an accomplice to the crime.

Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner's illegal acts of feigning a marriage and, in
the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would only make a mockery of the
sanctity of marriage.
Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will "lend its aid to x x x one who has
consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is founded."
If the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which involves a transgression of positive
law, parties shall be left unassisted by the courts. As a result, litigants shall be denied relief on the
ground that their conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the
controversy in issue.

Facts:
Leonila G. Santiago married Nicanor F. Santos on July 29, 1997, despite his existing marriage to Estela
Galang since June 2, 1974. Santiago claimed she believed Santos was single and argued their marriage
was void due to the lack of a marriage license, as they had not cohabited for five years as required under
Article 34 of the Family Code. However, the RTC found her guilty of bigamy, rejecting her defense after
Galang testified that she had informed Santiago of the prior marriage before their wedding. The court
noted that the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity for her marriage to Santos precluded its
invalidation in the criminal proceedings. The CA upheld Santiago's conviction, affirming the credibility of
the prosecution's evidence and dismissing her arguments regarding the marriage's validity. Santiago was
sentenced to six months and one day of prisión correccional to six years and one day of prisión mayor.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner can be held liable as a co-accused in the crime of bigamy despite her
claim of lack of knowledge of Santos’s prior subsisting marriage.
Whether or not a valid second marriage is required to be proven for a conviction of bigamy under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code, and if the absence of a marriage license renders the second marriage
void.
Ruling:
The Court affirmed the conviction of Leonila G. Santiago for bigamy as an accomplice, modifying the
lower courts' decision that had originally imposed a principal penalty. The Court ruled that Santiago was
aware of her husband Santos’s first marriage, thus making her an accomplice in the crime of bigamy.
Evidence showed that she knew of the first marriage through various circumstances, including direct
statements from Santos's first wife. Despite Santiago’s claim that her marriage to Santos was void due to
the lack of a marriage license, the Court found that the couple had fraudulently misrepresented their
cohabitation to avoid legal requirements, including the five-year cohabitation condition for marriage
without a license under Article 34 of the Family Code.

The Court emphasized that Santiago’s actions of marrying Santos without fulfilling the legal
requirements and later using the falsified marriage document as her defense, undermined the sanctity
of marriage and made her guilty of bigamy. Consequently, the Court modified the sentence to reflect
her role as an accomplice, imposing an indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as
minimum to four years of prision correctional as maximum. The petition for review was denied, and the
conviction for bigamy was upheld with modification.

Montañez v. Cipriano, G.R. No. 181089, 22 October 2012

Doctrine:
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared
can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage
exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative
of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule,
no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.

Facts:
On April 8, 1976, the respondent married Socrates Flores in Lezo, Aklan. Later, while this marriage was
still valid, she married Silverio V. Cipriano on January 24, 1983, in San Pedro, Laguna. In 2001, she filed
for the annulment of her marriage to Socrates on the grounds of his psychological incapacity, and the
RTC of Muntinlupa declared the marriage null and void in 2003. The decision became final on October
13, 2003.

In May 2004, Silverio’s daughter, Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, filed a bigamy complaint against the
respondent, claiming that the respondent did not inform Silverio about her first marriage to Socrates.
On November 17, 2004, an Information for Bigamy was filed, alleging that the respondent married
Silverio while her first marriage was still valid.

Respondent filed a motion to quash the bigamy information, arguing that since her first marriage was
declared void in 2003, no valid marriage existed at the time of her marriage to Silverio, and thus, the
crime of bigamy could not have been committed. She also contended that the crime had prescribed. The
RTC denied the motion, referencing a previous case (Mercado v. Tan) where the crime of bigamy was
considered complete even before the annulment of the first marriage.

After reconsideration, the RTC ruled in favor of the respondent, citing that the law before the Family
Code did not require a judicial declaration of nullity for a second marriage to be valid. The RTC
emphasized that, given the ambiguity of the law at the time of the second marriage and the liberal
interpretation of laws in favor of the accused, the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity should not
invalidate the second marriage. Consequently, the RTC quashed the bigamy charge, dismissing the case.
Issue:
Whether the judicial declaration of nullity of a first marriage, granted prior to the enactment of the
Family Code and the ruling in Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy on psychological incapacity, is a valid defense against
a bigamy charge for contracting a second marriage before these legal developments.

Whether the trial court erred in stating that the jurisprudence before the Family Code and the Wiegel v.
Sempio-Diy ruling was ambivalent regarding the necessity of securing a declaration of nullity of the first
marriage before contracting a second marriage, thus allowing a subsequent marriage without incurring
criminal liability.

Ruling:
The petition challenging the RTC's dismissal of the Information for bigamy was filed by the private
complainant, but the Court accepted it due to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) ratifying the
petition through its comment. The key issue was whether the RTC erred in quashing the Information for
bigamy.

The Court reaffirmed that under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is committed when a
person contracts a second marriage while the first marriage is still subsisting. In this case, the
respondent's first marriage was still valid when she married Silverio in 1983, as it had not yet been
annulled. Therefore, the essential elements of bigamy were met at the time of the second marriage.

The Court emphasized that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage did not
affect the fact that the second marriage was contracted while the first was subsisting. Citing previous
rulings, such as Mercado v. Tan and Tenebro v. CA, the Court held that the crime of bigamy is
consummated when the second marriage is contracted during the subsistence of the first marriage,
regardless of later declarations of nullity.

Respondent’s argument that the Family Code should not apply retroactively was also rejected. The Court
clarified that the Family Code's provisions, including Article 40, apply retroactively in procedural matters,
and it would not allow individuals to escape prosecution for bigamy by declaring a marriage void after
contracting a subsequent one.

The Court reversed the RTC's dismissal, setting aside the Orders and remanding the case for further
proceedings.

Enriquez Vda. De Catalan v. Catalan-Lee, G. R. No. 183622, 8 February

2012
Doctrine:
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces[,] the same being considered contrary to
our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary
value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is
proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The
decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.

Facts:
Orlando Catalan, a naturalized American citizen, allegedly divorced his first wife, Felicitas Amor, before
marrying the petitioner. Orlando died intestate in 2004. Both the petitioner and Orlando's daughter
from his first marriage, respondent Louella Catalan-Lee, filed separate petitions for letters of
administration over Orlando’s estate, leading to the consolidation of cases.

Respondent opposed the petitioner’s claim, arguing that the petitioner was not an interested party due
to her alleged invalid marriage with Orlando. She cited a prior bigamy charge against the petitioner for
marrying Orlando while allegedly still married to Eusebio Bristol. However, the petitioner had been
acquitted of bigamy in 1998, with the trial court ruling that (1) Orlando’s divorce was invalid under
Philippine law, rendering their marriage void, and (2) the petitioner was never married to Eusebio.
Despite this acquittal, the RTC dismissed the petitioner’s request for letters of administration, holding
that her marriage to Orlando was invalid and that her acquittal in the bigamy case was irrelevant. The CA
affirmed this decision, reasoning that the petitioner lacked legal interest in the estate due to her invalid
marriage. Her motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner is an interested party entitled to letters of administration over the estate of
Orlando Catalan.
Whether the validity of Orlando’s foreign divorce and his subsequent marriage to the petitioner was
sufficiently proven.

Ruling:
The Court held that the RTC and CA failed to consider the prior finding in Crim. Case No. 2699-A that the
petitioner had no valid marriage with Eusebio Bristol. This oversight led to an erroneous conclusion that
the petitioner was not an interested party.
The Court ruled that the petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence to prove the validity of Orlando’s
U.S. divorce and their subsequent marriage, as required by jurisprudence (Garcia v. Recio). Thus, the
case was remanded to the RTC for further reception of evidence. If the validity of the divorce and
marriage is established, the petitioner has the preferential right to the letters of administration;
otherwise, the letters may be issued to the respondent as the next of kin.

Social Security Commission v. Azote, G.R. No. 209741, 15 April 2015

Doctrine:
Using the parameters outlined in Article 41 of the Family Code, Edna, without doubt, failed to establish
that there was no impediment or that the impediment was already removed at the time of the
celebration of her marriage to Edgardo. Settled is the rule that “whoever claims entitlement to the
benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence.”[28] Edna
could not adduce evidence to prove that the earlier marriage of Edgardo was either annulled or
dissolved or whether there was a declaration of Rosemarie’s presumptive death before her marriage to
Edgardo. What is apparent is that Edna was the second wife of Edgardo. Considering that Edna was not
able to show that she was the legal spouse of a deceased-member, she would not qualify under the law
to be the beneficiary of the death benefits of Edgardo.
Although the SSC is not intrinsically empowered to determine the validity of marriages, it is required by
Section 4(b) (7) of R.A. No. 8282[29] to examine available statistical and economic data to ensure that
the benefits fall into the rightful beneficiaries.
It is of no moment that the first wife, Rosemarie, did not participate or oppose Edna’s claim.
Rosemarie’s non-participation or her subsequent death on November 11, 2004[32] did not cure or
legitimize the status of Edna.

Facts:
Edgardo, a Social Security System (SSS) member, married Edna in 1992, and they had six children. He
designated Edna and their children as beneficiaries in his 1994 and 2001 SSS Form E-4 submissions.
However, when Edgardo died in 2005, Edna's claim for death benefits was denied because an earlier
1982 Form E-4 named Rosemarie Azote as Edgardo's wife-beneficiary and Elmer Azote as a dependent.
The SSS dismissed Edna’s petition, citing Edgardo’s prior marriage to Rosemarie and the absence of
evidence of its dissolution. The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed, ruling that Edna’s designation as wife-
beneficiary in the 1994 Form E-4 superseded the 1982 form, and substantial evidence supported her
claim. Rosemarie’s failure to appear was deemed a waiver of her claim. The CA’s decision is now under
review.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Social Security Commission (SSC) lacks
authority to determine the validity or invalidity of Edgardo's marriages.

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in granting Edna’s claim and finding her entitled to Social
Security benefits as Edgardo's wife.

Whether or not the designation of Edna as wife-beneficiary is valid despite the subsistence of Edgardo’s
prior marriage to Rosemarie.

Whether or not the Court of Appeals’ findings of fact were unsupported by evidence, particularly
regarding Edgardo’s prior marriage and its effect on Edna’s eligibility as a legitimate spouse and
beneficiary.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that the petition is meritorious and granted the same. Under Republic Act No. 8282
(Social Security Act), only the legal spouse of a deceased member qualifies as a primary beneficiary.
Evidence showed that Edgardo’s first marriage to Rosemarie remained valid, as no proof of annulment
or presumptive death was presented before Edgardo’s subsequent marriage to Edna. Consequently,
Edna’s marriage to Edgardo was void, disqualifying her as a legal spouse and primary beneficiary. The
Court emphasized that the designation of beneficiaries must conform to the law, and the SSC acted
correctly in denying Edna’s claim based on substantial evidence. Rosemarie’s non-participation did not
legitimize Edna’s status. Thus, the CA’s decision was reversed, and Edna’s claim for death benefits was
denied.

Republic v. Tampus, G.R. No. 214243, 16 March 2016

Doctrine:
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief
that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 4119 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family
Code), there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death: (1) that the
absent spouse has been missing for four (4) consecutive years, or two (2) consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article
391 of the Civil Code; (2) that the present spouse wishes to remarry; (3) that the present spouse has a
well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and (4) that the present spouse files a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.20

The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all the foregoing requisites under Article
41 of the Family Code exist. Since it is the present spouse who, for purposes of declaration of
presumptive death, substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue, it stands to reason that the burden
of proof lies with him/her. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence.21

The "well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her
belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on
these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already
dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort, not a passive one. As such, the mere absence of the
spouse for such periods prescribed under the law, lack of any news that such absentee spouse is still
alive, failure to communicate, or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not
suffice.22 The premise is that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden
of complying with the stringent requirement of "well-founded belief which can only be discharged upon
a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent
spouse's whereabouts, but more importantly, whether the latter is still alive or is already dead.
Facts:
Respondent Nilda B. Tampus filed a petition to declare her husband, Dante L. Del Mundo, presumptively
dead after 33 years of no communication since he left for a combat mission in Jolo, Sulu in 1975, shortly
after their marriage. Despite her efforts to locate him, including inquiries with his family and neighbors,
his whereabouts remained unknown. The RTC granted the petition, finding her belief in Dante's death
well-founded. The CA affirmed, noting her diligence in searching for Dante and the long lapse of time
supporting the presumption of death. The Republic, represented by the OSG, challenged the ruling but
was denied relief, prompting this petition.
Issue:
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC Decision
declaring Dante as presumptively dead.
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious. Under Article 41 of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of presumptive
death requires proof of four requisites, including the present spouse’s "well-founded belief" that the
absent spouse is dead, which necessitates diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the latter. In this
case, while Nilda testified that she inquired with Dante’s parents, relatives, and neighbors, she failed to
actively search for him through other means, such as seeking assistance from the AFP or authorities.
Moreover, her claims were unsupported by corroborative evidence or witness testimony. Given her lack
of diligence, Nilda failed to establish the required "well-founded belief" of Dante’s death. Thus, the
Court grants the petition, reverses the CA’s decision, and denies Nilda’s petition to declare Dante
presumptively dead.

Republic v. Sareñogon, Jr., G.R. No. 199194, 10 February 2016

Doctrine:
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy to question the RTC’s
Decision in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death.

The "well-founded belief" requisite under Article 41 of the Family Code is complied with only upon a
showing that sincere honest-to-goodness efforts had indeed been made to ascertain whether the absent
spouse is still alive or is already dead

Facts:
On November 4, 2008, respondent Jose Sareñogon, Jr. filed a petition before the RTC of Ozamiz City
seeking the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Netchie Sareñogon, under Article 41 of the
Family Code to enable him to remarry.

Jose testified that he and Netchie married in 1996 but lived together for only a month before they
separately left the country for work—Jose as a seaman and Netchie as a domestic helper in Hong Kong.
After three months, he lost all contact with Netchie and could not locate her through inquiries with her
relatives and friends, who also had no knowledge of her whereabouts. His brother and Netchie’s aunt
corroborated his testimony, affirming that no one knew of her location.
The RTC found that Jose had proven by preponderance of evidence that his wife had been absent for
over four years and declared her presumptively dead for purposes of remarriage. The Republic, through
the OSG, filed a Rule 65 petition for certiorari before the CA, alleging grave abuse of discretion.

The CA dismissed the petition, ruling that the Republic had used the wrong remedy. It held that the
Republic’s allegations involved errors of judgment, not grave abuse of discretion, which are correctible
through appeal, not certiorari. It affirmed the RTC’s compliance with procedural requirements, including
the publication of the initial hearing notice.

Hence this petition.

The Republic asserts that a Rule 65 petition is the proper remedy to challenge an RTC’s immediately final
and executory decision on presumptive death. It argues that Jose’s efforts to locate Netchie did not
generate a well-founded belief of her death, as he failed to seek help from relevant government
agencies and provided no corroborating evidence or detailed circumstances of his search. The Republic
warns against the misuse of Article 41 of the Family Code to terminate marriages and points out that
Jose did not categorically declare his intent to remarry, a key element under Article 41.

Jose argues that the CA correctly dismissed the Republic’s petition since it merely questioned the RTC’s
appreciation of evidence, which is not proper in a Rule 65 petition. He claims the Republic should have
filed a motion for reconsideration, a plain and adequate remedy. He also maintains that the RTC acted
properly, having complied with the publication requirement, and its factual findings deserve respect.
Jose adds that granting the Republic’s petition would infringe upon judicial discretion.

Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Republic's Rule 65 petition for review on certiorari
on the ground that the RTC decision should have been appealed, despite its immediate finality under the
law.

Whether the respondent's efforts to locate his missing wife sufficiently establish a "well-founded belief"
that she is probably dead.

Ruling:
The petition is meritorious.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to challenge the RTC’s immediately final and
executory decision in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41
of the Family Code. Jurisprudence, including Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, Republic v. Tango, and
Republic v. Cantor, affirms that such decisions cannot be appealed but may be questioned through a
Rule 65 petition for grave abuse of discretion.

Regarding the "well-founded belief" requirement under Article 41, this standard demands diligent and
honest efforts to ascertain whether the absent spouse is still alive or dead. Mere absence,
unsubstantiated inquiries, or reliance on presumptions are insufficient. Courts impose a strict standard
to prevent abuse of the law and uphold the sanctity of marriage.
In this case, Jose’s efforts fell short of the required diligence. He failed to present corroborating
witnesses, seek help from relevant agencies, or provide detailed evidence of a comprehensive search.
Thus, the RTC’s finding of "well-founded belief" was baseless.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The CA’s decision is REVERSED, and the RTC decision is
DISMISSED.

Republic v. Granada, G.R. No. 187512, 13 June 2012

Doctrine:
Clearly, a petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of
contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding "as
provided for" under the Family Code.

Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a petition for
declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be
immediately final and executory.

By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately
final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's
judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under
Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a
petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition
should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be
sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and
the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of
choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is
because the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of
judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.

In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in
rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Facts:
This Rule 45 petition seeks to reverse the Court of Appeals (CA) resolutions affirming the Regional Trial
Court's (RTC) grant of Yolanda Cadacio Granada's petition for the declaration of presumptive death of
her husband, Cyrus Granada.

Yolanda and Cyrus married in 1993, but Cyrus went to Taiwan in 1994 for work and ceased
communication. After nine years of no contact and failed attempts to locate him, Yolanda filed a petition
to declare him presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code. The RTC granted the petition in
2005, but the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
argued that Yolanda failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus. The RTC denied the Republic's motion
for reconsideration in 2007.
The OSG filed an appeal to the CA, but the appellate court dismissed it, ruling that decisions in summary
proceedings under Article 41 are immediately final and executory, per Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino. The
Republic's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied, prompting this petition.

Issue:
Whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that the Decision of the RTC in a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon
notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal

Whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family Code based on the evidence that respondent
presented
Ruling:
We affirm the petition.

The Court of Appeals (CA) correctly dismissed the Republic's appeal challenging the Regional Trial
Court’s (RTC) decision granting the petition for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of
the Family Code. Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, the CA held that such proceedings are summary in
nature, and judgments rendered therein are immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties,
as explicitly provided under Articles 247 and 253 of the Family Code. Ordinary appeal is thus unavailable,
and the proper remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

While the Republic argued that Republic v. Jomoc superseded Bermudez-Lorino, the Court clarified that
Jomoc did not alter the rule on the finality of judgments in summary proceedings. Subsequent rulings,
including Republic v. Tango, affirmed that judgments in such cases are immediately final, with certiorari
being the only available remedy for errors amounting to grave abuse of discretion.

As to whether Yolanda failed to establish a well-founded belief of her husband’s death, the RTC’s
decision on this matter is already final and immutable. Any error in fact or law in the RTC’s findings
cannot be revisited. Thus, the CA properly upheld the dismissal of the Republic's appeal.

WHEREFORE, the CA's Resolutions dated 23 January 2009 and 3 April 2009 are AFFIRMED.

Republic v. Narceda, G.R. No. 182760, 10 April 2013

Doctrine:
In summary proceedings under the Family Code, such as petitions for the declaration of presumptive
death, judgments are immediately final and executory by express provision of Article 247. A party
aggrieved by such a judgment may not appeal, but may file a petition for certiorari if there is an abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Facts:
Robert P. Narceda filed a Petition for Judicial Declaration of the Presumptive Death of his wife, Marina B.
Narceda, who went missing in 1994 after going to Singapore. Despite inquiries, Robert could not locate
her, and he eventually filed a petition for her presumed death in 2002. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Balaoan, La Union, granted his petition on May 5, 2005, declaring Marina’s presumptive death. The
Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA),
arguing that Robert failed to establish a "well-founded belief" that Marina was dead. The CA dismissed
the appeal, ruling that the RTC’s decision was immediately final and executory under Article 247 of the
Family Code, which governs summary proceedings like this one. The OSG filed a motion for
reconsideration, but it was denied, prompting the Republic to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Whether Robert established a "well-founded belief" that Marina was dead.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the CA’s decision. It ruled that the RTC's decision in
the summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death was immediately final and executory
by express provision of Article 247 of the Family Code. The Court emphasized that in summary judicial
proceedings under the Family Code, the remedy for a losing party is not an ordinary appeal but a
petition for certiorari, which was not filed by the OSG. The Court also clarified that a party cannot appeal
a judgment in a summary proceeding unless there is an abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction, which
was not established in this case. Consequently, the decision of the RTC, declaring the presumptive death
of Marina, became final and executory, and the Republic’s appeal was not entertained.

Republic v. Cantor, G.R. No. 184621, 10 December 2013

Doctrine:
Certiorari is an appropriate remedy to challenge judgments in summary proceedings under the Family
Code if there is an abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction, even when the judgment is final and
executory. Moreover, the "well-founded belief" under Article 41 of the Family Code requires diligent,
active efforts to locate the absent spouse, which the present spouse failed to demonstrate in this case.
Facts:
Jerry F. Cantor and Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor were married on September 20, 1997, but had a violent
quarrel shortly after their marriage. Following the quarrel, Jerry left their home in January 1998, and
Maria Fe did not see or hear from him again. Despite her efforts to locate him, including inquiring with
family members and checking hospital directories, she could not find any trace of Jerry. In May 2002,
more than four years after his disappearance, Maria Fe filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Koronadal City for the declaration of her husband’s presumptive death. The RTC granted the
petition, declaring Jerry presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code, concluding that Maria
Fe had a well-founded belief that he was dead. The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that
Maria Fe had not conducted a sufficient search. The CA dismissed the petition, affirming the RTC’s order.
The Republic then elevated the case to the Supreme Court, challenging the decision on grounds that the
RTC’s judgment in summary proceedings was not subject to appeal, but could be reviewed on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether certiorari can be used to challenge decisions or final orders of trial courts in petitions for the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code.

Whether the respondent had a well-founded belief that her husband was already dead.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition.

The Court reiterated that judgments in summary proceedings, such as the declaration of presumptive
death, are immediately final and executory per Article 247 of the Family Code, making them
unappealable. However, certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy for questioning any abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. This is in line with the doctrine that even final decisions can
be subject to certiorari if there is grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction.
The Court emphasized that the present spouse must prove a "well-founded belief" that the absent
spouse is dead, a stricter standard than the prior Civil Code requirement. It ruled that the respondent's
efforts were insufficient, as they lacked the necessary diligence and corroborative evidence to support
her belief. The Court outlined that mere inquiries without active search, failure to report the
disappearance to authorities, and lack of supporting testimony did not meet the legal standard. The
Court also stressed the importance of protecting marriage and not allowing petitions for presumptive
death to bypass the sanctity of marriage.

Santos v. Santos, G.R. No. 187061, 8 October 2014

Doctrine:
The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death obtained by extrinsic fraud is an
action to annul the judgment. An affidavit of reappearance is not the proper remedy when the person
declared presumptively dead has never been absent.

Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment, order, or resolution
has become final, and the "remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other appropriate
remedies) are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner."

Extrinsic fraud involves acts outside of the trial that prevent a party from having a fair opportunity to
contest the case.

An action for annulment must be filed within four years from the judgment in cases of extrinsic fraud,
and laches may bar the action if not filed within the prescribed period.
Facts:
Ricardo T. Santos filed a petition for the declaration of his wife Celerina J. Santos as presumptively dead
after she allegedly disappeared in 1995. The trial court granted his petition, declaring Celerina
presumptively dead on July 27, 2007. Ricardo remarried in 2008 based on this declaration.
Celerina learned of the petition and judgment only in October 2008, when it was too late for her to
appeal. She then filed a petition for annulment of judgment, alleging extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction, arguing that Ricardo made false representations regarding her absence and that the court
lacked jurisdiction due to procedural defects (such as non-publication of the petition).
The Court of Appeals dismissed her petition, stating that the proper remedy was an affidavit of
reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code, which is applicable to an absent spouse who later
reappears.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment, stating
that the appropriate remedy was an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code.
Whether Celerina's petition for annulment based on extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction was valid.
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious. Annulment of judgment is the proper remedy when the judgment has
become final, and other remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. The grounds
for annulment include extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Celerina’s petition sufficiently alleged fraud
and jurisdictional issues in the original proceedings, including false allegations by Ricardo regarding her
absence and the lack of proper notice. Her petition for annulment was filed within the four-year period
allowed by law and before laches could bar it.

The Family Code provides that an affidavit of reappearance may terminate a subsequent marriage but
does not nullify its effects. Thus, Celerina's filing for annulment of judgment was justified as it seeks not
only to terminate the subsequent marriage but also to nullify the effects of the declaration of
presumptive death.

The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals to determine the existence of extrinsic fraud and the
merits of the annulment petition.

Republic v. Orcelino-Villanueva, G.R. No. 210929, 29 July 2015

Doctrine:
Article 41 of the Family Code provides that before a judicial declaration of presumptive death may be
granted, the present spouse must prove that he/she has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead.
In this case, Edna failed. The RTC and the CA overlooked Edna’s patent noncompliance with the said
requirement.

The well-founded belief in the absentee’s death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her belief
was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on these
efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It
necessitates exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one). Mere absence of the spouse (even
beyond the period required by law), lack of any news that the absentee spouse is still alive, mere failure
to communicate, or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice. The premise
is that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of complying with the
stringent requirement of "well-founded belief" which can only be discharged upon a showing of proper
and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse’s whereabouts
but, more importantly, whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.

This strict standard approach ensures that a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article
41 of the Family Code is not used as a tool to conveniently circumvent the laws in light of the State’s
policy to protect and strengthen the institution of marriage. Courts should never allow procedural
shortcuts but instead should see to it that the stricter standard required by the Family Code is met.
Facts:
Edna Orcelino-Villanueva sought to have her husband, Romeo L. Villanueva, declared presumptively
dead after he went missing in 1993. Despite her efforts, which included returning to the Philippines and
inquiring with family and friends, she received no information about his whereabouts. She filed a
petition for presumptive death, which was granted by the RTC, and later affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC decision declaring Romeo Villanueva presumptively dead
despite the lack of sufficient evidence to support Edna's well-founded belief.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed the CA’s decision. It found that Edna’s efforts
were insufficient to prove a well-founded belief in her husband’s death, as they were merely passive and
lacked corroborative evidence. The Court emphasized the need for diligent and active efforts to locate
an absent spouse before a declaration of presumptive death can be made.

Republic v. Catubag, G.R. No. 210580, 18 April 2018

Doctrine:
Article 41 of the Family Code requires the present spouse to establish four conditions for the declaration
of presumptive death: (1) the absentee spouse has been missing for at least four years, or two years if
there is danger of death; (2) the present spouse wishes to remarry; (3) the present spouse has a well-
founded belief that the absentee is dead; and (4) the present spouse has filed for a summary proceeding
for the declaration of presumptive death. The burden lies with the present spouse to prove the
existence of a well-founded belief in the absentee's death, which must be supported by diligent efforts
to locate the missing spouse.

Basic is the rule that the nature of the proceeding determines the appropriate remedy or remedies
available. Hence, a party aggrieved by an action of a court must first correctly determine the nature of
the order, resolution, or decision, in order to properly assail it.

[T]he right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a statutory
privilege. Since, by express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered in
summary judicial proceedings in Family Law are "immediately final and executory," the right to appeal
was not granted to any of the parties therein. The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the
petition for declaration of presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It had no right to appeal
the RTC decision of November 7, 2001.[24]

While parties are precluded from filing a motion for reconsideration or a notice of appeal, in a petition
for declaration of presumptive death, they may challenge the decision of the court a quo through a
petition for certiorari to question grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Facts:
The case involves a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, challenging the
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 3, 2013, and December 6, 2013, which
dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Ludyson C. Catubag. The CA ruled that the
petition was fatally defective for failure to file a motion for reconsideration. The petition also challenges
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuao, Cagayan's Decision dated May 23, 2013, which declared
Ludyson's wife, Shanaviv G. Alvarez-Catubag, presumptively dead after she disappeared in 2006. Despite
extensive efforts to locate her, including searches and media broadcasts, Shanaviv remained missing,
prompting Ludyson to file a petition for presumptive death in 2012. The RTC granted the petition,
allowing Ludyson to remarry. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the RTC decision,
leading to the CA's dismissal of the certiorari petition for procedural reasons, which is now being
contested in this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner's resort to a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 to challenge the decision of
the RTC declaring Shanaviv presumptively dead was proper.
Whether or not private respondent complied with the essential requisites of a petition for declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code.

Ruling:
The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. It emphasized that the correct remedy in challenging the
decision in summary proceedings for presumptive death is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The
Court found that private respondent did not satisfy the stringent requirements for proving a "well-
founded belief" that his wife was dead. Mere allegations of inquiries and broadcasts were insufficient to
establish the required diligence. The Court emphasized the importance of demonstrating active efforts,
such as reporting to authorities and presenting corroborative evidence, to prevent circumvention of the
law’s marriage protection policy.
The petition was granted, and the RTC and CA decisions were annulled and set aside. Private
respondent's petition for the declaration of presumptive death was denied.
Tadeo-Matias v. Republic, G.R. No. 230751, 25 April 2018
Doctrine:
A petition for the declaration of presumptive death under the Civil Code is not a valid suit, as it only
establishes a rule of evidence and cannot be the subject of an independent action or proceeding.
A judicial pronouncement declaring presumptive death is not necessary for claims based on Articles 390
and 391 of the Civil Code, as the presumption arises by operation of law once the factual conditions are
met.
The PVAO and AFP may decide claims for death benefits based on the presumption of death under the
Civil Code without requiring a court declaration of presumptive death.
Facts:
Estrellita Tadeo-Matias filed a petition on April 10, 2012, before the RTC of Tarlac City to have her
husband, Wilfredo N. Matias, declared presumptively dead after he went missing in 1979. Wilfredo, a
member of the Philippine Constabulary, disappeared during his service and was later declared missing
by the National Police Commission. Estrellita sought the declaration to claim financial benefits under
P.D. No. 1638. The RTC granted her petition on January 15, 2012, declaring Wilfredo presumptively
dead. However, the Republic filed a petition for certiorari, and on November 28, 2012, the Court of
Appeals annulled the RTC decision, ruling that the petition was improperly based on Article 41 of the
Family Code instead of the correct provisions of the Civil Code and that the RTC had no authority to
declare a person presumptively dead in an independent action. Estrellita’s motion for reconsideration
was denied, leading to the appeal.
Issue:
Whether the petition for the declaration of presumptive death was correctly filed under Article 41 of the
Family Code.
Whether a court declaration of presumptive death is required before a claimant can secure death
benefits from the PVAO or AFP for a missing serviceman.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the appeal, affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA). The Court
ruled that the petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by the petitioner was not based on
the proper legal framework and should have been dismissed. The petition was incorrectly filed under
Article 41 of the Family Code (FC), which applies to remarriage cases, while the petitioner intended to
rely on the Civil Code provisions concerning presumptive death. The RTC’s decision was set aside
because no court has jurisdiction to hear a petition solely for the declaration of presumptive death
under the Civil Code, as it merely serves as a rule of evidence, not a basis for an independent lawsuit.
Additionally, the Court emphasized that the Philippine Veterans' Affairs Office (PVAO) and the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) could grant death benefits without requiring a court declaration of
presumptive death.

Castillo v. De Leon Castillo, G.R. No. 189607, 18 April 2016

Doctrine:
The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance with the law in effect
at the time of its celebration. In this case, the law in force at the time Lea contracted both marriages was
the Civil Code. The children of the parties were also born while the Civil Code was in effect i.e. in 1979,
1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must resolve this case using the provisions under the Civil Code on
void marriages, in particular, Articles 80,26 81,27 82,28 and 83 (first paragraph); and those on voidable
marriages are Articles 83 (second paragraph),30 8531 and 86.

Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the following ways: (1) a void
marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage from the beginning - while in a voidable marriage,
the marriage is valid until annulled by a competent court; (2) a void marriage cannot be ratified, while a
voidable marriage can be ratified by cohabitation; (3) being nonexistent, a void marriage can be
collaterally attacked, while a voidable marriage cannot be collaterally attacked; (4) in a void marriage,
there is no conjugal partnership and the offspring are natural children by legal fiction, while in voidable
marriage there is conjugal partnership and the children conceived before the decree of annulment are
considered legitimate; and (5) "in a void marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is
necessary," while in a voidable marriage there must be a judicial decree.

Under the Civil Code, a judicial decree is not necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage,
especially when the marriage was contracted prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The subsequent
marriage is valid if the first marriage is void due to lack of a marriage license, and this is governed by the
prevailing jurisprudence before the Family Code came into effect.

Facts:
Petitioner, Renato A. Castillo, filed a petition for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage to Lea P.
De Leon Castillo, claiming that their marriage was bigamous because Lea was previously married to
Benjamin Bautista. The RTC declared the second marriage void ab initio on the grounds of bigamy.
Respondent, Lea, opposed the petition, asserting that her first marriage was void due to lack of a
marriage license and the absence of a valid solemnizing officer.

In a subsequent decision, the RTC declared Lea's first marriage null and void. However, the Court of
Appeals reversed the RTC decision, ruling that Lea’s second marriage to Renato was valid, even without
a judicial declaration of nullity for her first marriage, and that the law applicable to their marriages was
the Civil Code since both marriages occurred before the Family Code's effectivity.
Issue:
Whether the CA was correct in ruling that the second marriage between Renato and Lea was valid, even
though the first marriage had not been judicially declared null before the second marriage was
contracted.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court upheld the CA's decision and affirmed the validity of the second marriage between
petitioner and respondent.

The Court ruled that the Civil Code provisions on void marriages apply to the case, as the marriages
occurred before the Family Code came into effect in 1988. According to the Civil Code, a marriage can be
considered void without the need for a judicial decree of nullity, particularly when the marriage is void
for reasons such as the absence of a marriage license. The Court emphasized that the jurisprudence
from Mendoza, Aragon, and Odayat did not require a judicial decree to declare the first marriage void
before contracting a second marriage.

The Family Code’s requirement for a judicial decree of nullity applies only to marriages contracted after
its effectivity. The Court clarified that the Family Code cannot be applied retroactively as it would violate
the vested rights of the parties and their children born during the period governed by the Civil Code.

Vitangcol v. People, G.R. No. 207406, 13 January 2016

Doctrine:
Persons intending to contract a second marriage must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their
first marriage. If they proceed with the second marriage without such a declaration, they are guilty of
bigamy, regardless of evidence regarding the nullity of the first marriage.
Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts
having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond
question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy.
Should the requirement of judicial declaration of nullity be removed as an element of the crime of
bigamy, Article 349 of Revised Penal Code becomes useless. "[A]ll that an adventurous bigamist has to
do is to . . . contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first
marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration
of nullity of the first." Further, "[a] party may even enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a
requisite—usually the marriage license—and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without
obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void.
Facts:
Norberto A. Vitangcol was charged with bigamy after contracting a second marriage with Alice G.
Eduardo in 1994, while still married to Gina M. Gaerlan.
The prosecution presented a marriage contract between Norberto and Gina, establishing the first
marriage.
Alice later discovered Norberto’s first marriage and filed a complaint for bigamy.
Norberto argued that his first marriage lacked a valid marriage license, as evidenced by a certification
from the Office of the Civil Registrar, which had no record of the marriage license.
However, Norberto did not secure a judicial declaration of nullity for his first marriage and proceeded
with his second marriage.
Issue:
Whether the Certification from the Civil Registrar stating that no marriage license could be found proves
the nullity of Norberto’s first marriage and exonerates him from the charge of bigamy.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Norberto for bigamy. The Court held that the absence of a
marriage license, as reflected in the Civil Registrar’s certification, does not automatically nullify the first
marriage. Norberto failed to present any judicial declaration of nullity for his first marriage. The Court
emphasized that persons contracting a second marriage must first secure a judicial declaration of the
nullity of their first marriage before proceeding with a subsequent marriage.

o Castro v. Gregorio, G.R. No. 188801, 15 October 2014

Doctrines:
Service of Summons
The policy of the law is clear. In order to maintain harmony, there must be a showing of notice and
consent. This cannot be defeated by mere procedural devices. In all instances where it appears that a
spouse attempts to adopt a child out of wedlock, the other spouse and other legitimate children must be
personally notified through personal service of summons. It is not enough that they be deemed notified
through constructive service.

Consent
It is settled that "the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action." As Jose filed the petition for adoption on August 1, 2000, it is Republic Act
No. 855256 which applies over the proceedings. The law on adoption requires that the adoption by the
father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his
legitimate children.
Extrinsic Fraud
Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in litigation committed outside of the
trial of the case, whereby the defeated party is prevented from fully exhibiting his side of the case by
fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, such as by keeping him away from court, by giving
him a false promise of a compromise, or where the defendant never had the knowledge of the suit, being
kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff, or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority
connives at his defeat.

Facts:
The case revolves around the adoption of two children, Jed and Regina, by Atty. Jose Castro, which was
challenged by his estranged wife, Rosario, and their daughter, Joanne. Jose filed for adoption in 2000,
claiming the children were his illegitimate offspring with Lilibeth, his former housekeeper. Rosario later
alleged that Jose falsified documents, claiming the children were actually the legitimate children of
Lilibeth and Larry, Jose's driver and alleged lover. Rosario argued the adoption was fraudulent, as
neither she nor Joanne was informed of the proceedings. Despite these claims, the trial court approved
the adoption, and the decision became final. Rosario and Joanne filed a petition to annul the judgment,
citing fraud and lack of notice, but the Court of Appeals dismissed it, stating the alleged fraud was
intrinsic and the trial court’s decision had attained finality. The appellate court acknowledged Jose’s
questionable actions but emphasized that it was bound by the doctrine of immutability of final
judgments.

The petitioners argued that the appellate court erred in dismissing their claim of extrinsic fraud, citing
fabricated consent and falsified birth certificates that concealed the adoption proceedings from them.
They contended that the adoption lacked due process, proper notice, and the necessary consent of
Joanne, as required for the adoption of illegitimate children.

The respondents countered that the petitioners' interests were represented by the Solicitor General and
that constructive notice through publication fulfilled the notice requirement. They also claimed the
fraud alleged was intrinsic, not extrinsic, and that the petitioners were not indispensable parties, as
adoption is an action in rem where only the state is indispensable.

Issues:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for annulment of judgment for failure of
petitioners to (1) show that the trial court lacked jurisdiction and (2) show the existence of extrinsic
fraud.

Ruling:
The petition is granted.
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
Under Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, annulment of judgment is an extraordinary remedy
available only when no other remedies (e.g., new trial, appeal, or petition for relief) are available due to
no fault of the petitioner. It is limited to two grounds: lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud. Lack of
jurisdiction refers to the court's inability to preside over the action, subject matter, or parties, while
extrinsic fraud prevents a party from fully presenting their case. The doctrine of immutability of
judgments discourages such actions to ensure finality and judicial efficiency. In this case, the grant of
adoption should be annulled because the trial court lacked jurisdiction and the decision was procured
through extrinsic fraud.
Jurisdiction over adoption proceedings vis-à-vis the law on adoption
Petitioners successfully argued that the adoption decree was invalid due to non-compliance with
Republic Act No. 8552, which requires the consent of the spouse and legitimate children of the adopter.
Jose, the adopter, fraudulently secured an affidavit of consent from his wife and falsely claimed to have
no legitimate children, depriving Rosario and Joanne of notice and the opportunity to oppose the
adoption. This extrinsic fraud rendered the trial court's jurisdiction defective and invalidated the
adoption. The Supreme Court annulled the trial court's decision, citing violations of mandatory statutory
requirements and procedural safeguards.

o Bartolome v. Social Security System, G.R. No. 192531, 12 November 2014

Doctrines:
As we have previously declared, rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode
or proceedings in order to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to
amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.
Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law because any
resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law.

As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies
and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.18 In other words, the concept
of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions
between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.

The concept of equal protection, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1)
The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane tothe purpose of the law; (3) It is not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
"Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."
Facts:
This appeal, filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, seeks to annul the March 17, 2010 decision of the
Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. SL-18483-0218-10, which denied petitioner
Bernardina P. Bartolome’s claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626. The claim arose
from the death of her biological son, John Colcol, who died in a workplace accident aboard the vessel
Maersk Danville. The ECC upheld the denial of the claim by the Social Security System (SSS) on the
ground that John, having been legally adopted by his great-grandfather, Cornelio Colcol, no longer
recognized Bernardina as a legitimate parent or beneficiary under the Employees’ Compensation
Program. The ECC ruled that the rights of a biological parent are transferred to the adoptive parent
following a valid adoption, thereby disqualifying Bernardina as either a primary or secondary beneficiary
under the law. Aggrieved, Bernardina filed the present petition after her motion for reconsideration was
denied.

Issues:
Whether or not the biological parents of a covered employee, who has been legally adopted, qualify as
secondary beneficiaries and are therefore entitled to receive benefits under the Employees'
Compensation Program (ECP)

Ruling:
The petition is meritorious, as the Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC) erred in denying the
petitioner’s claim for death benefits. The ECC wrongly presumed that John’s adoptive father, Cornelio,
was still alive despite the petitioner presenting Cornelio’s death certificate. This evidence confirmed his
death in 1987, restoring the petitioner’s status as a dependent parent. Furthermore, the ECC’s
restrictive interpretation of "dependent parents" under Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of its Amended Rules as
limited to "legitimate parents" deviates from the broader and inclusive language of Article 167(j) of the
Labor Code. This misinterpretation constitutes unauthorized administrative legislation and violates the
equal protection clause by discriminating against illegitimate parents. The petitioner’s dependency on
John was well-supported by documentary evidence, and the restoration of parental authority after
Cornelio’s death further reinforces her qualification as John’s secondary beneficiary.

o Geronimo v. Santos, G.R. No. 197099, 28 September 2015

Facts:
In 2001, Karen Santos filed a complaint against Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo, seeking the annulment
of a document titled Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman, which they had executed to declare themselves
the only heirs of her deceased parents, Rufino and Caridad Geronimo. The property in dispute was a
parcel of land in Paombong, Bulacan. Santos claimed to be the sole heir under intestacy law, but the
defendants contended that she was not their brother's legitimate child, alleging she was adopted.

Santos presented a birth certificate as proof of her filiation, but the defendants argued that it had been
tampered with. They also contested her legitimacy, citing the absence of records showing Caridad’s
maternity leave and other evidence of Santos’ adoption. However, the court ruled in favor of Santos,
declaring that the extrajudicial settlement executed by the defendants was invalid because she was
Rufino's legitimate child, supported by her consistent status as such, including her use of the family
name and financial support from her adoptive parents.

The defendants appealed, arguing that the court improperly accepted secondary evidence of filiation
when a birth certificate had been presented. They also contended that they should have the right to
contest her legitimacy. However, the Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's ruling, finding that
Santos’ status as Rufino’s legitimate child was sufficiently established by secondary evidence, such as
her long-standing recognition as a family member.

The petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied, leading to this petition, where they raised issues
about the admissibility of secondary evidence and their right to challenge the plaintiff's filiation.

Issue:
Whether or not proof of filiation can be raised as a collateral issue in a case for annulment of documents
and recovery of possession

Ruling:
The petition is granted, reversing the trial court's decision that the respondent is the legitimate child and
sole heir of the deceased spouses, Rufino and Caridad. The trial court's finding was based on
questionable secondary evidence, including a tampered birth certificate, which the appellate court
found invalid due to alterations. The court emphasized that proof of legitimacy under Article 172 of the
Family Code should be proven through a direct action, not as a collateral issue in other cases.

The petitioner's argument was that legitimacy should only be established in a separate action, not in the
context of a case involving the annulment of documents and recovery of possession. While the rule on
legitimacy applies to direct actions, the case at hand involves a claim that the respondent was not a child
of the deceased couple at all. The court acknowledged that secondary evidence can be admissible when
contesting a person's parentage but concluded that the evidence did not sufficiently establish the
respondent's filiation.

The birth certificate presented was found to have irregularities, including superimposed entries on the
birth date and informant's name. These alterations, along with other evidence questioning the
respondent's parentage, led to the conclusion that the respondent is not the child of Rufino and
Caridad, despite previous claims of continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. The court
emphasized that the respondent failed to explain the irregularities in the birth certificate, and the
evidence did not substantiate her claim to be the legitimate child of the deceased spouses.

o Gotardo v. Buling, G.R. No. 165166, 15 August 2012

Doctrines:
In Herrera v. Alba,34 we stressed that there are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional
paternity action that parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of
legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and the child. We explained that a
prima facie case exists if a woman declares — supported by corroborative proof — that she had sexual
relations with the putative father; at this point, the burden of evidence shifts to the putative father.

We explained further that the two affirmative defenses available to the putative father are: (1)
incapability of sexual relations with the mother due to either physical absence or impotency, or (2) that
the mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of conception.

We have recognized that "[f]iliation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also
to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in this case) or
inheritance. [In paternity cases, the burden of proof] is on the person who alleges that the putative
father is the biological father of the child."

One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. We
have held that such other proof of one's filiation may be a "baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a
family bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting [his] pedigree,
admission by silence, the [testimonies] of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130
of the Rules of Court."

Facts:
On September 6, 1995, Divina Buling filed a complaint for compulsory recognition and support pendente
lite, claiming that petitioner was the father of her child, Gliffze. The petitioner denied paternity, leading
to a trial where the respondent testified about their relationship and intimate encounters. The
respondent gave birth to Gliffze in March 1995, but the petitioner failed to provide support, prompting
her demand for recognition and support. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the case for
insufficient evidence, citing inconsistencies in the respondent’s testimony. The Court of Appeals (CA)
reversed this decision, finding that the inconsistencies were minor and that the evidence supported the
respondent’s claim. The petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the CA erred in its
evaluation of the evidence. The respondent maintained that the CA’s decision was correct, supported by
sufficient evidence.

Issue:
Whether or not CA committed a reversible error in rejecting the RTC appreciation of the respondent’s
testimony, and that the evidence on record is insufficient to prove paternity

Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals (CA) ruling, rejecting the petitioner’s claims and
upholding the decision to recognize the paternity of Gliffze. The respondent presented sufficient
evidence, including corroborative testimony, to establish a prima facie case of paternity. Despite some
inconsistencies in her testimony, the Court found no substantial contradictions, explaining that these
were misunderstandings rather than material discrepancies. The petitioner failed to prove his claims of
infidelity, and his denial could not overcome the respondent’s clear assertions. The Court also upheld
the ₱2,000 monthly child support, emphasizing that support obligations follow from filiation, with the
amount adjustable based on the parties’ means and the child’s needs. The petition was denied, and the
CA’s decision was affirmed.

o Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014

Doctrine:
The RH Law affirms the state’s obligation to protect public health and respect individual religious beliefs
while promoting reproductive health rights. It emphasizes a balanced approach wherein the government
may regulate the exercise of religious beliefs if it involves acts that affect public welfare, applying the
“compelling state interest” test.

Facts:
The Reproductive Health Law (RH Law), officially designated as Republic Act No. 10354, was enacted by
the Philippine Congress on December 21, 2012, and signed into law by President Benigno Aquino III. This
law aims to guarantee universal access to methods of contraception, fertility control, sexual education,
and maternal care. Shortly after its enactment, various petitioners, including James and Lovely-Ann
Imbong, on behalf of themselves and their minor children, and several other individuals and groups,
filed petitions before the Supreme Court of the Philippines challenging the law’s constitutionality on
several grounds. These petitioners argued that the RH Law infringes upon the constitutional right to life
of the unborn, the right to health, the right to religious freedom, among others. The respondents in the
case are key government officials tasked with the law’s implementation. The Supreme Court issued a
Status Quo Ante Order, temporarily halting the law’s implementation, and conducted a series of oral
arguments to hear both sides.

Issues:
The Supreme Court dealt with procedural and substantive issues, including:
1. Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
2. Whether the RH Law violates the constitutional right to life of the unborn.
3. Whether the RH Law infringes on the right to health by promoting access to contraceptives.
4. Whether the RH Law violates the freedom of religion and the right to free speech of individuals
opposed to its mandates.
5. Whether certain provisions within the RH Law are void for being vague or for imposing involuntary
servitude.Buy vitamins and supplements

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that it has the authority to review the RH Law and that there is an actual case
or controversy, making the issue ripe for judicial determination. It held that the RH Law does not violate
the constitutional right to life of the unborn, as it expressly prohibits abortion and only permits
contraceptives that prevent the fertilization of the ovum. Furthermore, the Court found that the law
does not infringe upon individuals’ right to health but instead promotes it by providing access to safe
and legal family planning methods. It also ruled that the requirement for religious objectors to refer
patients does not violate religious freedom or free speech, as it constitutes a reasonable regulation to
achieve the law’s objectives. However, the Court declared some provisions unconstitutional for
overstepping the powers granted to implementing bodies or for violating the due process rights of
individuals.

o Recto v. Trocino, A.M. No. RTJ-17-2508, 7 November 2017

Doctrines:
Gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of the basic rules and settled jurisprudence.17 A judge owes it
to his office to simply apply the law when the law or a rule is basic18 and the facts are evident.19 Not to
know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

Article 176 of the Family Code explicitly confers the sole parental authority of an illegitimate child to the
mother. This preference favoring the mother is reiterated in Article 213 of the Family Code which
provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother. Only the most
compelling of reasons, such as the mother's unfitness to exercise sole parental authority, shall justify her
deprivation of parental authority and the award of custody to someone else.21 The mother's fitness is a
question of fact to be properly entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court.
A protection order is issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children, their
family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs.23 It is issued for the purpose of
safeguarding the offended party from further harm, minimizing any disruption in the victim's daily life,
and facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim to independently regain control over her life. A
protection order may be issued ex parte if the court finds that there is danger of domestic violence to the
offended party. This provisionary protection order, however, may be issued only if the court finds that
the life, limb or property of the offended party is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe
that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of violence or
to prevent such violence, which is about to recur. If after examining the verified petition and its
accompanying affidavits the court is satisfied that there is, indeed, a reasonable ground to believe that
an imminent danger of violence against the offended party exists or is about to recur, it may issue a TPO
ex parte.

Facts:
Marie Roxanne G. Recto filed an administrative complaint against Judge Henry J. Trocino for issuing an
ex parte Temporary Protection Order (TPO) in a custody case involving her illegitimate 15-month-old
child. She alleged bias, gross ignorance of the law, and grave oppression, arguing that Judge Trocino
misapplied R.A. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act) instead of the Family Code
and A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC (Rule on Custody of Minors). Recto contended that illegitimate children are
under the mother’s sole parental authority unless compelling reasons exist, as provided by Article 213 of
the Family Code, and accused the judge of procedural lapses, jurisdictional errors, reliance on
hypothetical grounds, and collusion with the petitioner, Peña.

In defense, Judge Trocino maintained that the TPO was validly issued under A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC as an
ancillary remedy, claiming good faith and judicial discretion in prioritizing the child’s welfare. He
asserted jurisdiction under B.P. 129 and A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, denied collusion with Peña, and noted
his voluntary inhibition from the case, as well as the complainant’s challenge to the TPO before the
Court of Appeals.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found no evidence of bias but held Judge Trocino liable for
gross ignorance of the law for misapplying legal principles in issuing the TPO. Due to his compulsory
retirement and prior administrative violations, the OCA recommended a ₱60,000 fine.

Issue:
Whether or not Judge Trocino acted with gross ignorance of the law in issuing an ex parte Temporary
Protection Order (TPO) and granting temporary custody of the minor child to Peña.

Ruling:
The Court found Judge Trocino guilty of gross ignorance of the law for issuing an ex parte Temporary
Protection Order (TPO) that granted temporary custody of a minor child to Peña and imposed a
protection order against the complainant without adhering to the correct legal procedures. The Court
stressed that child custody is governed by the Family Code, particularly Articles 176 and 213, which
prioritize the mother’s custody unless she is unfit. The rule on provisional custody under A.M. No. 03-04-
04-SC also mandates a specific order of preference for awarding custody, which Judge Trocino failed to
follow. Moreover, a Temporary Protection Order can only be issued if there is proof of imminent danger
of violence, as provided under A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC and R.A. No. 9262. Peña's petition lacked sufficient
allegations of abuse, and thus, the issuance of the TPO was improper. Given that Judge Trocino had
previously been administratively penalized for other infractions, the Court ruled that his actions
amounted to gross ignorance of the law. As a result, the Court imposed the penalty of forfeiture of all
his retirement benefits—excluding accrued leave credits—due to his compulsory retirement, effective
July 15, 2006.

o Masbate v. Relucio, G.R. No. 235498, 30 July 2018

Doctrines:
Parental Authority and Its Application: Is a juridical institution granting parents rights and duties over
their children, particularly their custody. In cases involving illegitimate children, the mother is granted
sole parental authority, and the father is generally not entitled to custody unless the mother is unfit.
Tender-Age Presumption: Mandates that no child under seven years of age should be separated from the
mother unless there are compelling reasons. This presumption can only be overturned if there is evidence
showing that the mother is unfit, with examples of compelling reasons including neglect, immorality, or
maltreatment.
Best Interests of the Child: The overriding principle in child custody cases is the best interest of the child.
The Court clarified that the child's welfare, both material and emotional, must be the primary
consideration in any decision about custody. This includes examining the suitability of potential
custodians, including the parents, grandparents, or other family members.

Facts:
Queenie was born to Renalyn and Ricky James, who were not married. After their relationship ended in
2015, Renalyn went to Manila, leaving Queenie in the care of Ricky James. In November 2015, Renalyn’s
parents took Queenie from school, claiming they had full custody due to a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA) from Renalyn. Ricky James filed a petition for habeas corpus and custody. The RTC ruled that
custody should go to Renalyn, citing the Family Code’s tender-age presumption, but Ricky James
contended that the RTC did not conduct a full trial and denied him due process. The CA remanded the
case for trial, affirming Renalyn’s custody pending resolution but granting Ricky James visitation rights.
The CA also clarified that Ricky James could take Queenie out once a month for up to 24 hours. The
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied it, maintaining that a trial was
necessary to resolve the custody issue.

Issue:
The main issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly remanded the case a quo for
determination of who should exercise custody over Queenie.

Ruling:
The petition was partly granted. The Court emphasized that the writ of habeas corpus can be invoked in
cases where the custody of a minor is unjustly withheld from the rightful custodian. The requisites for
granting the writ in custody disputes include the petitioner’s right to custody, the wrongful withholding
of custody, and the child’s best interests in being with the petitioner. Parental authority, typically shared
by married parents, is exclusive to the mother in the case of illegitimate children, such as the child in this
case, unless the mother is deemed unfit. The Court further clarified that the tender-age presumption,
which generally favors the mother’s custody of children under seven, can only be overridden for
compelling reasons, such as neglect or immorality. The Court rejected the petitioners’ argument that
this presumption does not apply to unmarried parents, reiterating that Article 213 of the Family Code
applies regardless of the parents' marital status. The Court ruled that the case should be remanded to
the trial court to determine if the mother is unfit to care for the child and, if so, whether it would be in
the child’s best interest to live with the father rather than the grandparents. The Court stressed that the
welfare of the child is the paramount consideration in custody disputes, and temporary custody should
be decided only after trial.

o Gamboa-Hirsch v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 174485, 11 July 2007

Doctrines:
Best Interest of the Child:
In all decisions concerning children, the best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration,
as emphasized in the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Child and Youth Welfare Code.

Tender-Age Presumption (Article 213, Family Code):

The presumption that the mother is the preferred custodian of children aged seven and below can only
be overcome by compelling evidence of the mother's unfitness, which must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence such as neglect, abandonment, immorality, or other grounds provided by law.

Sole Custody of the Mother:

The mother’s custody of her child under the age of seven should only be disturbed if she is proven to be
unfit to provide care. In the absence of such evidence, the mother is entitled to sole custody.

Facts:
Agnes Gamboa-Hirsch and Franklin Harvey Hirsch were married on December 23, 2000, and had a
daughter, Simone Noelle Hirsch, born on December 21, 2002. Their marriage began to deteriorate in
2005 due to differing living preferences. Agnes wanted to live in Makati, while Franklin preferred staying
in Boracay.

On March 23, 2006, Agnes asked for Franklin’s permission to take their daughter Simone to Makati for a
brief vacation, which Franklin agreed to. However, Agnes did not return, leading Franklin to file a
petition for habeas corpus on May 19, 2006, to compel Agnes to produce Simone.

The Court of Appeals (CA) issued a writ of habeas corpus and later, on June 8, 2006, granted Franklin
joint custody of Simone. Agnes filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it on August 3,
2006. Agnes filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court (SC), seeking to set aside the CA's
decision and obtain sole custody of Simone.

Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in granting joint custody of Simone to both parents, despite the
tender-age presumption favoring the mother’s custody under Philippine law.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Agnes, granting her sole custody of Simone and setting aside the
June 8, 2006 Decision and the August 3, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals.

The SC found that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion by granting joint custody. The Court
emphasized that the best interests of the child should be the primary consideration in custody cases, as
per the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Child and Youth Welfare Code.

The Court highlighted the tender-age presumption under Article 213 of the Family Code, which favors
the mother’s custody of children aged seven and below, unless there is compelling evidence that she is
unfit. In this case, no such evidence of Agnes' unfitness (e.g., neglect, immorality, abuse) was presented.
Therefore, the SC concluded that no compelling reason existed to deny Agnes custody.

The Court reiterated that the mother was not shown to be unsuitable to have custody, and her
capability to care for Simone was not questioned. As a result, the SC awarded sole custody of Simone to
Agnes.

o Dacasin v. Dacasin, G.R. No. 168785, 5 February 2010

Doctrines:

Jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts over Civil Cases:

Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, which
includes actions for specific performance, such as the enforcement of a joint custody agreement. Even
though the Illinois court retained jurisdiction for enforcement of its divorce decree, it did not extend to
enforcement of the separate post-divorce custody agreement executed by the parties in the Philippines.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law, and regional trial courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over civil
actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, including those for specific performance.

Binding Nature of Foreign Divorce Decrees:

Foreign divorce decrees obtained by one spouse are binding on the other spouse, provided they are valid
under the laws of the foreign jurisdiction. This is consistent with the principle that an alien spouse of a
Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad, as long as it is valid according to the national law
of the foreign spouse.
A foreign divorce obtained by a foreign national spouse is valid and binding in the Philippines, provided it
is valid under the laws of the foreign spouse’s jurisdiction, irrespective of who obtained the divorce.

Inapplicability of Private Agreements Contravening Mandatory Custody Laws:

Philippine law mandates that a child under seven years of age shall be under the sole custody of the
mother (Article 213, Family Code). Private agreements that contravene this mandatory rule are void. In
this case, the joint custody agreement violated the mandatory provision granting the mother sole
custody of children under seven years old, rendering the agreement void ab initio.
Any private agreement contravening mandatory provisions of law, such as child custody laws under the
Family Code, is void ab initio.

Best Interest of the Child Doctrine:

In child custody cases, the paramount consideration is the best interest of the child. The Court held that
despite the void agreement, the trial court should still resolve the issue of custody, as Stephanie, now
nearly 15, is no longer under the mandatory maternal custody rule. The trial court should now determine
custody based on the child's best interests.
In child custody cases, the best interest of the child is the paramount consideration, and custody
arrangements must be determined based on this principle.

Limits of Parental Authority after Divorce:

While the Family Code generally grants joint parental authority over minor children to parents who are
not separated, upon separation or divorce, the mother is granted sole custody of children under seven
years old. This provision is mandatory and cannot be altered by private agreement. However, for
children older than seven, parents may agree on custodial arrangements subject to the child's best
interests.
Parental authority over a child under seven years old is vested solely in the mother, and private
agreements to the contrary are void. For children over seven, parents may agree on custodial
arrangements, subject to the child's best interest.

Facts:
Petitioner Herald Dacasin (an American citizen) and respondent Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin (a Filipino)
were married in Manila in 1994. They have a daughter, Stephanie, born in 1995. In 1999, the Illinois
court granted a divorce and awarded sole custody of Stephanie to Sharon, retaining jurisdiction for
enforcement purposes.
In 2002, Herald and Sharon executed an agreement in Manila to share joint custody of Stephanie,
designating Philippine courts as the forum for resolving disputes. However, in 2004, Herald filed a suit in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati to enforce the agreement, alleging that Sharon violated it by
exercising sole custody.

Sharon filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Illinois court’s retained jurisdiction over the case
precluded the Philippine court from taking cognizance of the suit. The trial court agreed and dismissed
the case for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that the agreement contravened Philippine law and that the
Illinois divorce decree was binding under the nationality rule.

Herald sought reconsideration, arguing that the Illinois divorce decree was invalid and that the
agreement was independent of it. The trial court denied reconsideration.

Issue:
Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to enforce the joint custody agreement between Herald and
Sharon.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision, ruling that while the trial court had jurisdiction
over the suit, it could not enforce the joint custody agreement, as it was void under Philippine law.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's orders and remanded the case for further proceedings. The
trial court was directed to resolve the custody issue based on the best interest of the child, taking into
account that Stephanie was now nearly 15 years old, which placed her case outside the mandatory
maternal custody rule. The trial court was allowed to consider evidence on the appropriate custodial
arrangement for Stephanie.

o Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. v. Abejar, G.R. No. 170631, 10 February 2016
Doctrine:
Registered-Owner Rule: This rule places primary liability on the registered owner of a vehicle involved in
an accident, superseding some aspects of employer liability doctrine (Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil
Code).
Disputable Presumption: Upon proving registered ownership, there is a presumption that the conditions
for employer liability under Article 2180 are met unless the employer can show otherwise.
Real Party in Interest: Individuals who exercise substitute parental authority can be real parties in
interest capable of filing a suit for damages under Rule 3, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
and relevant Family Code articles.

Facts:
On July 13, 2000, Jesmariane Reyes was struck by a van driven by Jimmy Bautista, employed by Caravan,
a tour company. After the accident, Bautista failed to take Reyes to the hospital, though she was
eventually helped by a civilian. Reyes died two days later. Ermilinda Abejar, Reyes' aunt, filed a damages
suit against Bautista and Caravan. The trial court found Bautista grossly negligent and awarded damages.
The Court of Appeals modified the award, reducing moral damages, adding death indemnity, and
imposing interest on the amounts due. Caravan appealed, arguing that Abejar lacked standing and
challenging the damages awarded, but the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration.
Caravan now claims it should not be held solidarily liable, but Abejar asserts that as the van's registered
owner, Caravan is liable for Bautista’s actions.
Issues:
1. Whether Abejar is a real party in interest who may bring an action for damages against Caravan.
2. Whether Caravan should be held liable as an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court upheld that Ermilinda Abejar, as the substitute parent of Jesmariane Reyes, was a
real party in interest and had standing to sue for damages following Reyes' death. The Court also
affirmed that Caravan, as the registered owner of the van, was liable for Reyes' death under the
employer’s liability provisions of Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. The registered-owner rule
created a presumption of liability, which Caravan failed to rebut by demonstrating due diligence in the
hiring and supervision of its driver, Bautista. Caravan's failure to show proper oversight and
documentation regarding Bautista's qualifications was insufficient to avoid liability.

o Aquinas School v. Inton, G.R. No. 184202, 26 January 2011

Doctrine:
Employer-Employee Relationship (Four-Fold Test):
An employer-employee relationship is determined by four criteria: (1) selection and engagement of the
employee, (2) payment of wages, (3) power to dismiss, and (4) control over the employee's work. The
most critical element is control, which refers to the employer’s right to direct the manner and means of
performing the work.

Responsibility of Educational Institutions:

An educational institution is responsible for ensuring that only qualified individuals, such as teachers or
catechists, are entrusted with the education and well-being of its students. However, the school is not
automatically liable for the actions of outside catechists unless it exercises sufficient control over their
methods or fails in its duty to screen and oversee them properly.

Facts:
In 1998, Jose Luis Inton, a grade three student at Aquinas School, was physically punished by Sister
Margarita Yamyamin, a religion teacher, for disobeying her instructions. Yamyamin kicked the child and
shoved his head into a seat after he repeatedly left his assigned seat. The incident led to a civil case filed
by the Intons, Jose Luis' parents, seeking damages. They also filed a criminal case against Yamyamin,
who pleaded guilty. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) awarded damages to Jose Luis, and the Court of
Appeals (CA) held Aquinas School solidarily liable with Yamyamin, finding that an employer-employee
relationship existed. Aquinas filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether Aquinas School should be held solidarily liable with Sister Margarita Yamyamin for the
damages awarded to Jose Luis.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Aquinas School, reversing the Court of Appeals' decision. The Court
clarified that the relationship between Aquinas and Yamyamin did not meet the requirements for an
employer-employee relationship under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as Aquinas did not have control
over the means and methods by which Yamyamin taught. The Court applied the "four-fold test" for
determining an employer-employee relationship, particularly emphasizing the element of control. While
the school did not directly control Yamyamin's teaching, it took reasonable steps to ensure she was
qualified and would behave properly towards the students, such as verifying her credentials and
providing her with orientation and teaching materials. The Court concluded that Aquinas was not
solidarily liable for the damages.

o St. Joseph's College v. Miranda, G.R. No. 182353, 29 June 2010

Doctrine:
Proximate Cause and Negligence of Schools: The proximate cause of an injury is not always the student's
actions, but rather the failure of the school and its personnel to exercise proper care, which may be the
immediate cause of the incident. Schools must be vigilant and take adequate safety measures to prevent
accidents, especially when engaging students in dangerous activities like science experiments.

Facts:
On November 17, 1994, Jayson Miranda, a Grade 6 student at St. Joseph’s College, was injured during a
science experiment about fusion of sulfur powder and iron filings under the supervision of teacher
Rosalinda Tabugo. Jayson, despite repeated warnings, looked into a heated test tube before the
compound had cooled, causing an explosion that resulted in chemical burns to his left eye.
Jayson underwent surgery and treatment, with his mother incurring significant expenses to attend to
him.
Jayson’s family filed a lawsuit against the school, claiming negligence, since the school failed to prevent
the accident despite knowing the risks involved in the experiment and not implementing safety
measures like protective gear.
Issue:
Whether the proximate cause of Jayson’s injury was his own negligence in disregarding instructions.
Whether the school, its administrators, and the teacher were liable for the injury.

Decision:
The Court found that the proximate cause of Jayson’s injury was not solely his failure to follow
instructions but rather the school’s negligence in ensuring a safe environment. The school and its staff
were deemed negligent for allowing a risky science experiment to proceed without taking adequate
precautions. The Court highlighted the duty of schools to provide a safe environment, especially during
experiments involving hazardous materials. While Jayson violated instructions, the accident could have
been avoided if the school had implemented safety measures, provided protective gear like goggles, and
ensured that a teacher was present throughout the experiment.

Additionally, the Court determined that teacher Tabugo’s absence during the experiment contributed to
the negligence. The school's management was criticized for its lack of vigilance, as it failed to provide
adequate supervision during a potentially dangerous activity. Under Article 218 of the Family Code and
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which impose special parental authority and responsibility on schools,
administrators, and teachers, the Court held that schools are liable for damages caused by their
employees in the course of their duties under the principle of respondeat superior.

The Court upheld the lower court’s decision, ordering the school to pay actual damages for medical
expenses, moral damages for the anguish caused by the injury, and attorney's fees. The ruling reinforced
the doctrine that the liability of schools for injuries sustained by students during school activities is not
negated by the student’s negligence if the school fails to take necessary precautions. In this case, the
school’s failure to provide adequate safety measures and supervision was the proximate cause of the
injury. The decision emphasized the need for schools to exercise a high degree of care in managing
foreseeable risks during potentially hazardous activities like science experiments.

o St. Luke's College of Medicine-William H. Quasha Memorial Foundation v. Perez, G.R. No. 222740, 28
September 2016

Facts:
In February 2010, St. Luke's sent 4 of its 4 th year medical students to the clinic, namely: Spouses Perez's
daughter Jessa, Spouses Quintos' daughter Cecille, Jerillie Ann Murillo (Murillo) and Miguel Rafael
Ramos (Ramos). They were tasked to complete a four-week clerkship rotation at the clinic and like the
previous batches, they were housed in the second floor of the clinic in the Municipality of Cabiao, Nueva
Ecija. When their shift ended at 5pm, the group went for a jog and returned to the clinic at around 7pm.
They went out at 9pm to buy beverages, cooking oil and other items needed for their breakfast the next
day and went to sleep sometime after midnight. Ramos admitted that one of the beverages they bought
was an alcoholic beverage called The Bar, which consisted of either vodka or gin. Ramos was awakened
sometime between 3 to 3:30am when he heard Murillo shouting from the other side of the room that
there was a fire. Ramos immediately ran to the door which led to the living room and when he opened
the same, he saw thick smoke coming from living room. He ran to the bathroom to get a pail of water
with which he tried to extinguish the fire. The girls, who had followed him to the bathroom, stayed
behind. He went back to the bathroom and poured water on the girls in an attempt to alleviate the
extreme heat coming from the fire. Unfortunately, the fire resulted in the deaths of the Jessa and Cecille
due to asphyxia. As a result of the deaths, St. Luke's compensated the parents of the three deceased
students in the amount of PhP300,000.00 each from insurance proceeds. BFP conducted an
investigation and certified that the fire was purely accidental in nature due to unattended cooking and
that the students were drinking alcoholic beverages on the night of the fire, to which the parents did not
accept. They believed that there was a cover-up. Spouses Perez sought the help of NBI. NBI then
declared that the construction of the clinic building was in violation of the Revised Fire Code of the
Philippines, that the cause of the fire was due to faulty electrical wiring, and that St. Luke’s negligence is
criminal in nature. All the windows at the second floor are also covered by permanent iron grills. There
are no fire exits, fire alarms, fire extinguishers, sprinklers, emergency lights. The main and secondary
panel boards were wrongly situated at the ground floor, above which is the location of a comfort room,
where water could easily slip to the panel boards. As a learning institution, which sends out its students
to rural areas to comply with its curriculum requirement, St. Luke's has the duty and responsibility to see
to it that the premises to where it sends its students are safe. RTC dismissed the spouses’ complaint. CA
reversed. The CA held that although schools cannot be insurers of its students against all risks, the safety
of the victims was within the reach of petitioners and the hazard of a fire was not unforeseeable. Also,
while the fire was beyond the control of petitioners, their decision to house their students in a place
where there are no means of escape in case of such an emergency shows a blatant disregard for the
students' welfare

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner St. Luke’s College commit breach of contract through negligence

Ruling:
Yes, petitioner is negligent. When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is
established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to
comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would
presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a
profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements
and observe its rules and regulations. It is settled that in culpa contractual, the mere proof of the
existence of the contract and the failure, of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of
relief. In the case at bar, it was amply shown that petitioners and the victims were bound by the
enrollment contracts, and that petitioners were negligent in complying with their obligation under the
said contracts to ensure the safety and security of their students. For this contractual breach, petitioners
should be held liable.

o Gan v. Republic, G.R. NO. 207147, 14 September 2016

Doctrine:
The Court reinforced that an illegitimate child may only use the father’s surname with express
acknowledgment by the father. Moreover, consistent informal and official use of a name is insufficient
justification for its legal change without meeting strict legal criteria.

Facts:
Emelita Basilio Gan, born on December 21, 1956, was an illegitimate child to Pia Gan, a Chinese national,
and Consolacion Basilio, a Filipino citizen. Her birth certificate recorded her name as “Emelita Basilio.”
She claimed to have used “Emelita Basilio Gan” in her academic, employment, marriage, and other
official records.

On June 29, 2010, Gan filed a petition for correction of name with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Libmanan, Camarines Sur, aiming to change her name from “Emelita Basilio” to “Emelita Basilio Gan.”
However, the RTC deemed this a change of name rather than a mere correction and instructed Gan to
amend her petition according to Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.

On August 3, 2010, Gan submitted an amended petition for change of name containing the same
allegations but reformulated as a legal name change request. The RTC scheduled the initial hearing on
August 10, 2010, publicized in a local newspaper. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing
the Republic, entered a notice of appearance and authorized the Provincial Prosecutor to assist in
proceedings.

On July 19, 2011, after proceedings, the RTC of Libmanan, Camarines Sur granted the petition, allowing
Gan to change her birth certificate name to “Emelita Basilio Gan,” emphasizing this change’s necessity to
prevent confusion in her records. However, the OSG sought reconsideration, arguing Gan, being
illegitimate, had not proven paternal recognition, which was required to use her father’s surname. On
October 17, 2011, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration.
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). On April 26, 2013, the CA reversed the RTC’s
decision, citing Article 176 of the Family Code (as amended by Republic Act No. 9255), which restricts
illegitimate children to use their mother’s surname unless acknowledged by their father. The CA
highlighted that Gan provided no evidence of such paternal recognition.

Gan filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court, insisting that official acknowledgment of her
records justified the name change to eliminate confusion.
Issues:

1. Whether an illegitimate child can adopt her father’s surname without sufficient evidence of paternal
recognition.
2. Whether repeated and consistent use of a surname in informal and official records justifies a legal
name change.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court denied the petition.

Paternal Surname Use: The Supreme Court affirmed that the use of a father’s surname by an illegitimate
child required express paternal recognition. Citing Article 368 of the Civil Code and subsequent Family
Code provisions before RA 9255, the Court concluded that Gan lacked sufficient evidence of recognition
by her father.

Reason for Name Change: The Court reiterated that a change of name is a legal privilege, not a right. The
overarching justifications, mainly to avoid confusion, did not meet the threshold of “proper and
reasonable cause” required under Rule 103. The legal stipulations at the user’s birth (1956 provisions)
did not provide an exception to support this name change.

o Grande v. Antonio, G.R. No. 206248, 18 February 2014

Doctrine:
Illegitimate Children’s Right to Choose a Surname: Under Article 176 of the Family Code (as amended by
RA 9255), illegitimate children have the right to use either their mother’s or their father’s surname. The
choice is discretionary and not obligatory, as the law uses the permissive term "may."

Best Interest of the Child: The best interest of the child is the paramount consideration in all decisions
concerning the child’s welfare, including the choice of surname.

Legislative Authority Over Administrative Rules: Administrative rules and regulations cannot extend or
contradict a legislative act. In this case, the IRR of RA 9255 mandating the use of the father’s surname
was found to be inconsistent with the Family Code and was therefore voided.

Facts:
Petitioner Grace Grande and respondent Patricio Antonio were involved in an illicit relationship during
which two children were born. However, Antonio was already married to another woman. The children
were not recognized by Antonio in the Civil Registry. In 2007, after their relationship soured, Grande
moved to the United States with the children. Subsequently, Antonio filed a petition in court seeking the
judicial recognition of his paternity over the children, a change of their surname to "Antonio," and an
arrangement for shared parental authority and custody. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of
Antonio, granting him partial custody, parental authority, and ordering the children's surname to be
changed to "Antonio."
Grande appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), which modified the RTC ruling. The CA
awarded sole custody to Grande, granted Antonio visitation rights, and ruled that the children could use
Antonio’s surname, but only with the mother’s consent.

Grande sought further review, particularly questioning whether the law allowed the father to compel
the children to adopt his surname without the mother’s consent.

Issue:
Whether the father has the right to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children upon his
recognition of their paternity, despite the mother's objections.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court partially granted the petition of Grande. It held that under Article 176 of the Family
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, an illegitimate child may use the father's surname if the
filiation has been expressly recognized by the father, either through a record of birth or a private
document. The law, however, uses the word "may," which is permissive, not mandatory. This grants the
child the discretion to decide whether to use the father's surname, subject to the child's best interest.

The Court emphasized that it is not within the mother or father's sole discretion to determine the
surname of an illegitimate child; rather, the child has the right to choose. The Court also clarified that
the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9255 could not override the clear provision of the
Family Code, thus invalidating the IRR's provision requiring the mandatory use of the father's surname
upon recognition.

The Court noted that the children's best interest should guide decisions regarding their surname,
underscoring that the choice should not be made by the parents alone. In this case, the children, aged
13 and 15, had expressed opposition to adopting Antonio’s surname, though their statements were not
part of the trial court's proceedings.

o Remo v. Secretary of Foreign Affairs, G.R. No. 169202, 5 March 2010

Doctrine:
A married woman may revert to her maiden name in her passport only in specific instances such as
divorce, annulment, or the death of her husband, as provided under Section 5(d) of Republic Act No.
8239 (Philippine Passport Act of 1996). A general law such as the Civil Code, which allows a married
woman to use either her maiden name or her husband's surname, yields to the special law governing
passport issuance.
Rule of Law:
Section 5(d) of RA 8239 limits the cases where a married woman may revert to her maiden name in her
passport to instances of divorce, annulment, or the death of the husband.
A special law, such as RA 8239, prevails over a general law, such as the Civil Code, in cases of conflict.
The reversion to a maiden name in a passport requires the severance of the marriage.

Facts:
Maria Virginia V. Remo, a married Filipino citizen, applied for the renewal of her expired passport. She
requested to revert to her maiden name in the replacement passport. The Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) denied her request, stating that under the Philippine Passport Act, a married woman can only
revert to her maiden name if her marriage is annulled, dissolved, or if her spouse is deceased. This
decision was upheld by the Office of the President and the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether a married woman, who has used her husband’s surname in a previous passport, can revert to
her maiden name in a replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her marriage.

Ruling:
The petition was denied. The Supreme Court held that while the Civil Code allows a married woman to
choose between using her maiden name or her husband's surname, the special law, RA 8239, governing
passport issuance, limits the instances when a woman may revert to her maiden name in a passport.
These instances include the death of the husband, annulment, divorce, or declaration of marriage
nullity. Since petitioner’s marriage remained subsisting, she could not revert to her maiden name in the
replacement passport. The Court emphasized that a general law (the Civil Code) must yield to a special
law (RA 8239), and that the reversion of a married woman to her maiden name in a passport is only
allowed when the marriage is dissolved in the specified ways.

The Court also noted that passports are official documents of identity and nationality, and the
government has a vested interest in ensuring consistency and integrity in the issuance and amendment
of passports. Therefore, the request to change names on a whim could lead to confusion and
inconsistencies, which is not permissible.

o Yasuo Iwasawa v. Gangan, G.R. No. 204169, 11 September 2013

Doctrines: first, that public documents, such as those from the civil register, are self-authenticating and
prima facie evidence of their contents; and second, that a judicial declaration of nullity of a prior
marriage is required before contracting a second valid marriage, as failure to do so results in a bigamous
and void second marriage under Article 35(4) of the Family Code.

Facts:
In 2002, Yasuo Iwasawa, a Japanese national, met Felisa Custodio Gangan in the Philippines. Felisa
introduced herself as single, and the two developed a relationship. Later that year, Iwasawa returned to
the Philippines, and they married on November 28, 2002, in Pasay City before moving to Japan. In July
2009, Iwasawa noticed Felisa’s unusual behavior, and upon confrontation, she admitted to receiving
news about the death of her previous husband, Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo, whom she had married
on June 20, 1994. Iwasawa verified this information and discovered that Felisa’s earlier marriage made
their union bigamous. Consequently, Iwasawa filed a petition to declare his marriage null and void under
Article 35(4) in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

During the trial, Iwasawa presented documentary evidence from the National Statistics Office (NSO),
including marriage certificates, a death certificate, and an NSO certification confirming both marriages.
However, the RTC denied the petition on September 4, 2012, citing insufficient evidence to establish
Felisa’s prior marriage, as Iwasawa lacked personal knowledge of it. The court also rejected the NSO
documents due to the absence of testimony from the NSO Records Custodian. A motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied on October 16, 2012.

Iwasawa elevated the case to the Supreme Court through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45, arguing that NSO documents are public records, self-authenticating, and prima facie evidence of the
facts they contain, without the need for custodial testimony. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
supported this argument, emphasizing jurisprudence on the admissibility of public documents.
Issue:
1. Whether the RTC erred in requiring the testimony of the NSO Records Custodian to validate public
documents presented by the petitioner.
2. Whether the evidence presented by the petitioner was sufficient to declare the marriage null and
void.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Iwasawa, holding that the RTC erred in requiring the testimony of
the NSO Records Custodian. It reiterated that documents from the civil register are public records under
Article 410 of the Civil Code and are prima facie evidence of their contents without further proof of
execution or authenticity. The Court further held that the documentary evidence presented conclusively
established the bigamous nature of the marriage, as Felisa’s first marriage was still valid and subsisting
at the time of her second marriage. Thus, the second marriage was declared null and void.

o Baldos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170645, 9 July 2010

Doctrine:
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions applies to public documents, such
as a certificate of live birth. Once a birth is duly registered, the registered certificate of live birth is
considered prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated therein. The burden of proving the falsity
of the public document falls on the party challenging the registration.

Facts:
Reynaldo Pillazar (alias Reynaldo Estares Baldos) was born on October 30, 1948, but his birth was not
registered until 36 years later, on February 11, 1985. The certificate of live birth indicated Nieves Baldos
as his mother. In March 1995, Nieves filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City
seeking the cancellation of the late registration, claiming that Reynaldo was not her son.

The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition, ruling that the evidence presented by Nieves was
insufficient to support her claim. The court found that documentary evidence and the testimony of
disinterested neighbors indicated that Reynaldo was indeed Nieves’ son. The court further held that
personal reasons, such as Reynaldo’s failure to meet Nieves' expectations, did not justify canceling a
validly executed birth registration.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that P.D. No. 651 did not prohibit the
late registration of births occurring before January 1, 1974. It emphasized that the purpose of the decree
was to encourage the registration of births and deaths.

Issues:
The central issue is whether the late registration of Reynaldo’s birth was valid under Presidential Decree
No. 651 (P.D. No. 651), which governs the late registration of births in the Philippines.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals and dismissed the petition. It ruled that the late
registration of Reynaldo’s birth was governed by Act No. 3753 (the Civil Registry Law) and not by P.D.
No. 651, as Reynaldo’s birth occurred before the decree’s effective date. Under Act No. 3753 and related
administrative orders, the late registration of Reynaldo’s birth followed the required legal process. The
Court affirmed the presumption of regularity of the public document—the certificate of live birth. The
burden was on Nieves to prove the falsity of the document, which she failed to do.

o Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, G.R. No. 189476, 2 February 2011

Doctrine:
The correction of entries in the civil registry that affects one's civil status, particularly the change of a
person's legitimacy to illegitimacy, is a substantial and controversial alteration that can only be allowed
after proper adversarial proceedings under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 103, which governs
changes of name, is not sufficient when the change impacts one's legal status or civil status in relation to
parents.

Facts:
Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo (respondent) filed a petition in 2008 to change his name
from "Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo" to "Julian Edward Emerson Marquez-Lim Coseteng."
He claimed that his parents, Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng, were
never legally married. He submitted supporting documents such as a certification from the National
Statistics Office and his academic records showing he had been using "Coseteng" as his surname. The
trial court granted the petition for a change of name, also directing the Civil Registrar to delete certain
entries from the respondent’s birth certificate, such as the date of his parents' marriage and his father’s
name.

The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied, and subsequently filed a petition for
review with the Supreme Court. The Republic argued that the change sought would alter respondent's
civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, and should have been filed under Rule 108, not Rule 103.

Issue:
Whether the change of name petition that effectively alters the respondent’s civil status from legitimate
to illegitimate should have been filed under Rule 108 instead of Rule 103.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court erred in granting the petition under Rule 103. The Court
held that Rule 103 governs changes of name but is not applicable when the change affects one’s civil
status. Since the respondent’s petition sought to change his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate,
the petition should have been filed under Rule 108. Rule 108 specifically governs the cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil register that involve substantial changes, such as those affecting one’s
legitimacy.

The Court emphasized that such a significant alteration must be pursued through adversarial
proceedings, ensuring that all parties who have or may have an interest in the matter, such as the civil
registrar and the respondent's parents, are made parties to the case. The trial court’s decision to
proceed without proper parties and venue violated procedural requirements, as respondent failed to
implead the necessary parties, including his parents and the Civil Registrar of Makati where his birth
certificate was registered.

o Republic v. Lugsanay Uy, G.R. No. 198010, 12 August 2013

Doctrine:
In petitions for correction or cancellation of entries in the civil register that involve substantial or
controversial changes, such as those relating to citizenship, filiation, or legitimacy, strict compliance with
the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandatory. The failure to implead indispensable
parties, such as the individuals whose interests are directly affected by the correction, is not cured by
mere publication. A petitioner must ensure that all interested or affected parties are notified and given
the opportunity to contest the petition.

Facts:
Dr. Norma S. Lugsanay Uy filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in her Certificate of Live Birth, seeking
to correct her first name, surname, and citizenship. She claimed that her birth certificate inaccurately
listed her name as "Anita Sy" and identified her as a Chinese citizen. Dr. Uy argued that she has always
been known as "Norma S. Lugsanay" and that her correct citizenship is Filipino, as reflected in her other
legal documents and the birth certificates of her siblings. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted her
petition for correction, and the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed this decision.

Issue:
Whether the RTC and CA erred in granting the petition for correction of entries in Dr. Uy’s birth
certificate despite the failure to implead and notify indispensable parties, particularly her parents and
siblings, whose interests were directly affected by the proposed corrections.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the petition should be dismissed. The Court held that while the correction
of civil registry entries can be made under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, substantial errors involving
changes to citizenship, filiation, or legitimacy require strict compliance with procedural requirements,
particularly the proper impleading and notification of all indispensable parties. In this case, the RTC and
CA erred in granting the correction without ensuring that Dr. Uy’s parents and siblings, who would be
affected by the changes in her surname and citizenship, were impleaded and notified. The Court
emphasized that a failure to comply with these requirements compromises the fairness of the
proceedings and may lead to fraud or mischief.

o Chua v. Republic, G.R. No. 231998, 20 November 2017

Doctrine:
The Supreme Court reaffirmed that there are valid grounds for granting a name change, such as to avoid
confusion, provided that such a change does not prejudice the public interest.
Facts:
Eric Sibayan Chua initiated a legal action seeking to change his surname from “Kiat” to “Chua,” asserting
that this modification was to align with his father, Cheong Kiat’s change of surname to “Chua” post his
birth. This petition was rooted in Eric’s birth to a Chinese father, Cheong, and a Filipino mother, Melania
Sibayan, on November 8, 1973. Despite his birth certificate displaying “Kiat,” Eric adopted “Chua” based
on his father’s alleged surname change. The petition, filed on January 7, 2013, as Special Proceeding
Case No. 907 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Balaoan, La Union, unfolded with Eric providing a
blend of personal testimony and documentation—excluding his birth certificate—all which identified
him as “Eric Sibayan Chua.”

Upon the RTC’s favorable judgement, the Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General,
propelled the case to the Court of Appeals, which overturned the RTC’s decision citing a lack of
substantial evidence for the name change. Eric’s subsequent appeal brought the matter before the
Supreme Court.
Issues:
– Whether Eric Sibayan Chua provided a compelling legal and factual basis for the change of name from
“Eric Sibayan Kiat” to “Eric Sibayan Chua.”
– The application of legal grounds permissible for a name change in Eric’s scenario.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Eric Sibayan Chua, reinstating the Regional Trial Court’s decision
that allowed the name change. The Supreme Court emphasized that, although insufficient evidence was
provided for the father’s surname change from “Kiat” to “Chua,” Eric’s longstanding use of “Chua”
across numerous official documents and personal identification, coupled with the acknowledgment of
this name within his community, warranted the change to avoid confusion. The decision was
underpinned by considerations of precedent cases and the guidelines established in Republic v.
Coseteng-Magpayo, affirming several grounds on which a name change could be based, notably to
prevent confusion.

o Republic v. Tipay, G.R. No. 209527, 14 February 2018

DOCTRINE:
Substantial changes in the civil registry, such as corrections involving sex and name, may be corrected
through a petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. As long as the procedural requirements,
including publication and proper parties to the case, are met, substantial corrections can be made in
adversarial proceedings.

FACTS:
Virgie (Virgel) L. Tipay filed a petition on February 13, 2009, for the correction of several entries in his
birth certificate, which reflected errors in his gender ("FEMALE" to "MALE"), his first name ("VIRGIE" to
"VIRGEL"), and his date of birth (from no entry to February 25, 1976). These errors were acknowledged
by his mother and were supported by a medical certificate and a baptismal certificate. The Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Lupon, Davao Oriental granted the petition, correcting the entries. The Republic of the
Philippines appealed, arguing that these changes were substantial and should have been made under
Rule 103, not Rule 108.

ISSUES:

Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to correct substantial changes in the birth certificate under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court.
Whether the correction of the birth date (from May 12, 1976 to February 25, 1976) was supported by
sufficient evidence.
RULING:
The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, which upheld the RTC's ruling that the
correction of the entries in Virgel's birth certificate was properly filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. The Court clarified that Rule 108 applies to both clerical and substantial errors, provided the
necessary adversarial proceedings are followed, including notification to the local civil registrar and the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), and publication of the petition.
The Court also agreed with the correction of the first name and gender as the appropriate changes, but
it disagreed with the correction of the date of birth, as the evidence was insufficient to overcome the
presumption of validity of the NSO-issued birth certificate, which indicated a birth date of May 12, 1976.

o Tan-Andal v. Andal, G.R. No. 196359, 11 May 2021

Doctrine:

Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code does not require medical or clinical
identification but encompasses clear acts of dysfunctionality in personality that hinder the fulfillment of
marital obligations.

Property relations between parties in a void marriage are governed by the rules of co-ownership in
proportion to actual contributions unless proven solely attributable to one party.

In child custody matters post parental separation, the primary consideration is the child’s best interest,
which typically aligns with awarding custody to the parent who has shown continuous support and care.

Facts:
Mario Victor M. Andal and Rosanna L. Tan were married on December 16, 1995. They had a daughter,
Ma. Samantha, but after four years of marriage, the couple separated in 2000 due to Mario’s alleged
psychological incapacity. Post-separation, Rosanna maintained sole custody of their child. Mario initially
filed for custody, arguing equal rights over Ma. Samantha, while Rosanna filed for the declaration of
nullity of marriage, attributing Mario’s psychological incapacity as the cause.

During their marriage, Mario displayed behavior suggestive of psychological issues, such as unaccounted
absences, financial irresponsibility, drug use, and instances suggesting paranoia. Post-maternity, Mario’s
behavior worsened; he did not support Rosanna nor their daughter and engaged in drug use that led to
negligence and paranoid behavior. When these problems persisted, Rosanna eventually petitioned the
Regional Trial Court to commit Mario to a drug rehabilitation center.

Rosanna presented Dr. Valentina Del Fonso Garcia as an expert witness, who diagnosed Mario with a
narcissistic antisocial personality disorder and substance abuse disorder with psychotic features. These
disorders prevented Mario from fulfilling his marital and parental responsibilities. Despite these findings,
the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision to void the marriage.

Issues:
1. Whether Mario’s marriage to Rosanna is void due to psychological incapacity.
2. Whether the property acquired during their union should be considered communal.
3. Whether the custody of Ma. Samantha was rightfully awarded to Rosanna.

Ruling:
The Court grants the Petition for Review on Certiorari, finding that clear and convincing evidence
supports Rosanna’s claim of Mario’s psychological incapacity. The Supreme Court holds that
psychological incapacity is not limited to medically diagnosed mental disorders but includes character
traits that prevent compliance with essential marital obligations. Property relations are governed by
Article 147, where only properties jointly acquired through the efforts of the spouses are considered
common. In this case, it was proven that Rosanna and her father funded the construction of the family
home, and Rosanna received the contested property through donation, making Mario ineligible for a
share in the property. Custody of Ma. Samantha is rightfully awarded to Rosanna, as she consistently
demonstrated care and support for the child during their separation.

o Alanis III v. CA, G.R. No. 216415, 11 November 2020

Doctrine:
The Supreme Court solidified the doctrine that, under Article 364 of the Civil Code, and in line with the
state policy of gender equality, a legitimate child is entitled to use the surname of either parent as a last
name. Also, procedural rules can be relaxed for compelling reasons of substantive merit, especially
when such relaxation aligns with the principles of justice and equity.

Facts:
Anacleto Ballaho Alanis III, born to Mario Alanis y Cimafranca and Jarmila Imelda Ballaho y Al-Raschid,
petitioned the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City to legally change his given name from
“Anacleto Ballaho Alanis III” to “Abdulhamid Ballaho.” He stated that he had been using his mother’s
maiden name and wished to be known officially by it, as his parents separated when he was five years
old and he was raised by his mother. The trial court denied the petition, stating that there was no legal
ground for the change of name and that correcting his other records instead to reflect his birth
certificate would be more appropriate.

Anacleto appealed the decision, but his counsel was unable to file the notice of appeal on time due to a
shooting incident, leading to a belated appeal. He then sought certiorari from the Court of Appeals (CA),
which affirmed the RTC’s decision, holding that procedural rules cannot be relaxed as the filing was out
of time. Anacleto, represented by a new counsel, filed this Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme
Court.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition for
certiorari due to procedural technicalities.
2. Whether legitimate children have the right to use their mother’s surname as their own.
3. Whether the petitioner has established recognized grounds for changing his name to “Abdulhamid
Ballaho” from “Anacleto Ballaho Alanis III.”

Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed the CA and RTC’s orders. It stated that while the
petitioner did not show any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA, the core substantial issues
warranted a delve due to the equitable jurisdiction of the Court. The Court emphasized the
constitutional principle of the fundamental equality of women and men before the law, and thereby
affirmed that “principally” using the father’s surname does not mean “exclusively.” Based on the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the Women in
Development and Nation Building Act, the Court signaled a more gender-equal interpretation of the
surname usage. The Court also addressed the petitioner’s desire to avoid confusion due to his
community knowing him by the name he has been using his entire life, finding this a reasonable ground
to warrant the change.

o Malaki v. People, G.R. No. 221075

Doctrine:
A party to a civil marriage who converts to Islam and contracts another marriage, despite the first
marriage’s subsistence, is guilty of bigamy, as are the parties involved in the subsequent marriage.
The Muslim Code does not exculpate individuals from criminal liability for bigamy if the conditions set
for subsequent marriages under Islamic law are not fulfilled.

Facts: Francis D. Malaki, Sr. and Jacqueline Mae A. Salanatin were accused of bigamy because Francis
contracted a second marriage with Jacqueline while his first marriage with Nerrian Maningo-Malaki was
still in effect. Francis and Nerrian were married in March 1988 under the rites of the Iglesia ni Cristo, and
begot two children before Francis eventually abandoned the family in 2005. Following his departure,
Francis converted to Islam and subsequently married Jacqueline, also in 2005. During the trial, the
defense was that they could not be criminally liable for bigamy because they were both Muslims at the
time of the second marriage.Family vacation packages

Issues:
1. Whether the conversion to Islam of a person married under civil law exempts them from criminal
liability for subsequently contracting another marriage.
2. Whether the subsequent marriage of a convert to Islam is valid without the compliance of the formal
requisites under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.

Ruling:
1. The Supreme Court rejected the contention that conversion to Islam exempts Francis from criminal
liability for bigamy. It held that the Muslim Code (Presidential Decree No. 1083) does not apply to
Francis’ first marriage with Nerrian, which remains governed by the Civil Code (now the Family Code),
and the Revised Penal Code’s provisions on bigamy.
2. The Supreme Court also found that both Francis and Jacqueline failed to comply with the substantive
and procedural requirements for a valid subsequent marriage under the Muslim Code. This
noncompliance and the failure to notify the proper Sharia court and obtain acquiescence from the first
wife reaffirmed their guilt of bigamy.

o Aguino v. Aquino, G.R. Nos. 208912 and 209018

Doctrine:

The doctrine established is that nonmarital children have the right to inherit from their ascendants by
representation, notwithstanding the prohibition in Article 992 of the Civil Code, in light of constitutional
and international law principles.
Facts:
In 2003, Rodolfo C. Aquino petitioned for letters of administration for the estate of his deceased father,
Miguel T. Aquino, who died intestate leaving behind properties. Rodolfo claimed that the estate was to
be divided among Miguel’s second wife, two sons with his first wife—including Rodolfo—, and the heirs
of another predeceased son. Angela K. Aquino alleged being the daughter of Arturo C. Aquino (Arturo),
Miguel’s other predeceased son. Born after Arturo’s death, Angela was not married, but there was no
legal barrier to her parents’ union had Arturo lived. Angela’s relationship with the Aquinos, as well as
evidence of recognition by Miguel and his family, formed the basis of her claim to a share in Miguel’s
estate. The RTC granted Angela’s petition, considering her an acknowledged child of Arturo, and entitled
her to a share in Miguel’s estate. This decision was overturned by the CA, which ruled Angela failed to
prove filiation and could not inherit due to Article 992 of the Civil Code, barring nonmarital children
from inheriting from their parents’ legitime relatives. Angela and Rodolfo then filed separate petitions
before the Supreme Court.

Issues:
1. Whether a nonmarital child can inherit by right of representation from their grandparent’s estate,
despite the prohibition in Article 992 of the Civil Code.
2. Whether the nonmarital child could prove filiation with the deceased parent to entitle them to a
share in the intestate estate.

Ruling:
The Court held that a nonmarital child, such as Angela, can inherit from her grandfather by right of
representation, notwithstanding her parents’ marital status and the “iron curtain” rule in Article 992.
The Court reinterpreted Article 992 to harmonize it with constitutional mandates for equal protection,
due process, and international obligations protecting the rights and interests of children.
Angela must still prove her filiation to partake in Miguel’s estate. Given the conflicting findings of the
lower courts on her filiation, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the RTC for the reception of
evidence, including DNA testing if appropriate, to determine Angela’s entitlement.

Atienza vs. Brillantes, A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, March 29, 1995

Doctrine:
Judicial Declaration of Nullity (Article 40 of the Family Code): A judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage is required for remarriage, even if the first marriage occurred before the effectivity of
the Family Code. Procedural laws, such as Article 40, apply retroactively unless they impair vested rights.

Moral Fitness in the Judiciary: Judges must adhere to the highest standards of morality in both their
professional and personal lives. The Code of Judicial Ethics requires that judges be free from even the
appearance of impropriety to maintain public confidence in the judiciary. Immorality or deceit renders a
judge unfit to discharge their duties.

No Duality of Morality: A judge's private life is as subject to scrutiny as their professional conduct.
Grossly immoral acts undermine public trust and violate the judicial office's ethical demands.
Facts:
Lupo A. Atienza filed a complaint for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against Judge
Francisco Brillantes, Jr., alleging that Brillantes was cohabiting with Yolanda De Castro, with whom
Atienza had two children. Atienza claimed Brillantes prevented him from visiting his children and
alienated their affection. Atienza also alleged Brillantes was married to Zenaida Ongkiko, with whom he
had five children.

Brillantes admitted to undergoing two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko in 1965 but claimed both
were void for lack of a marriage license. Believing himself single, he married De Castro in Los Angeles in
1991. He argued that Article 40 of the Family Code, requiring a judicial declaration of nullity for
remarriage, did not apply retroactively to his case.
Issue:
Whether Judge Brillantes is guilty of gross immorality and unfitness to remain in the judiciary.
Ruling:
The Court dismissed Judge Brillantes from service, with forfeiture of all benefits and disqualification
from reappointment to any government position.
Fuentes vs. Roca, G.R. No. 178902, April 21, 2010
Doctrine:
Facts:
Sabina Tarroza sold a lot to her son Tarciano Roca in 1982. Six years later, Tarciano offered the lot for
sale to Manuel and Leticia Fuentes, conditioned upon securing the consent of his estranged wife,
Rosario Roca. The Fuentes spouses relied on an affidavit of consent notarized by Atty. Romulo Plagata,
who claimed Rosario signed it in Manila. However, Rosario’s signature was later contested as forged.
After Tarciano and Rosario passed away, their heirs (the Rocas) sought annulment of the sale, alleging
lack of spousal consent. The Fuentes spouses argued that Rosario’s consent was validly given, and any
challenge was barred by prescription.

Issue:
Whether or not Rosario Gabriel Roca's signature on the affidavit of consent to her husband Tarciano
Roca’s sale of their conjugal property was forged.
Whether or not the Rocas' action for the declaration of nullity of the sale already prescribed.
Whether or not only Rosario, as the wife whose consent was allegedly not obtained, could bring the
action to annul the sale.
Whether Judge Brillantes is guilty of gross immorality and unfitness to remain in the judiciary.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court declared the sale void for lack of the wife’s written consent. It noted the following:

Rosario’s signature on the affidavit of consent was forged, evidenced by significant differences in her
handwriting.
Under Article 124 of the Family Code, the absence of written spousal consent renders the sale of
conjugal property void. This action does not prescribe.
The Rocas, as heirs, had the standing to challenge the void sale since the conjugal property reverted to
the heirs upon the death of Rosario and Tarciano.
The Court ordered restitution to the Fuentes spouses, including the return of the purchase price with
legal interest. Additionally, as builders in good faith, the Fuentes spouses were entitled to compensation
for improvements made to the property under Article 448 of the Civil Code.

Bernabe vs. Alejo, G.R. 140500, January 21, 2002

Doctrine:
Illegitimate children who were minors when the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died
during their minority retain their vested right under Article 285 of the Civil Code to file an action for
recognition within four years after reaching the age of majority. This vested right cannot be impaired by
the subsequent enactment of the Family Code.
Facts:
Adrian Bernabe, through his mother, filed a case for recognition as the illegitimate son of the late Fiscal
Ernesto Bernabe, who allegedly fathered him. Fiscal Bernabe died in 1993, and the complaint was filed
in 1994. The trial court dismissed the case, citing the Family Code’s provision that such actions must be
brought during the putative parent's lifetime. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal,
ruling that Adrian’s right to recognition was governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code, which allowed
minors four years after reaching majority age to file such actions.
Issue:
Whether Adrian's right to file an action for recognition under Article 285 of the Civil Code was barred by
the enactment of the Family Code.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Adrian, holding that:

Adrian's right to file an action for recognition had already vested under Article 285 of the Civil Code
before the Family Code took effect. The Family Code explicitly states that its retroactive application must
not impair vested rights.
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides minors the right to file an action for recognition within four years
after reaching majority age if the putative parent died during their minority.
Illegitimate children, including those not classified as natural children, may still invoke Article 285 for
recognition, as supported by case law.
The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' ruling, remanding the case to the trial court for proceedings on
the merits.

Niñal vs. Badayog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000

Doctrine:
The heirs of a deceased person have the legal personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity
of their parent’s marriage even after the parent’s death. A void marriage is considered non-existent
from the beginning and can be questioned by any proper interested party at any time. Article 47 of the
Family Code, which limits the period and parties allowed to file annulment actions, does not apply to
petitions for the declaration of nullity of void marriages.
Facts:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones, with whom he had children (petitioners). After
Teodulfa’s death, Pepito married Norma Badayog without securing a marriage license, invoking the
exception for couples who had cohabited for at least five years. Pepito passed away in 1997, and his
children filed a petition to nullify the marriage with Norma, claiming it was void due to the lack of a valid
marriage license. The trial court dismissed the case, ruling that the heirs lacked the personality to file
such a petition after their father’s death.
Issue:
Is the second marriage between Pepito and Norma void for lack of a marriage license?
Do the heirs of Pepito have the legal personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage after his death?
Ruling:
The second marriage between Pepito and Norma was declared void ab initio due to the absence of a
valid marriage license. The five-year cohabitation period required for exemption under Article 76 of the
Civil Code was not met because Pepito was legally married to Teodulfa for most of the claimed period of
cohabitation.
The heirs of Pepito have the legal personality to file the petition. The action to declare the nullity of a
void marriage does not prescribe and can be initiated even after the death of one or both parties. The
Court clarified that unlike voidable marriages, which require direct proceedings during the lifetime of
the parties, void marriages can be questioned at any time as they are deemed never to have existed.

Gotia vs. Campos-Rueda, G.R. 11263, November 2, 1916

Doctrine:
The husband’s legal obligation to support his wife persists even when the wife resides separately,
provided there are justifiable grounds for such separation. Article 149 of the Civil Code, which allows the
husband the option to support the wife within the conjugal home, is not absolute and may be restricted
in cases where the wife's separation arises from the husband's wrongful conduct.
Facts:
The plaintiff-wife and defendant-husband were married on January 7, 1915. Shortly after, the wife left
the conjugal home due to the husband's persistent demands for unchaste acts and his subsequent
maltreatment when she refused. The wife sought refuge with her parents and filed a complaint seeking
support from the husband outside the conjugal domicile. The trial court dismissed the case, holding that
the husband could not be compelled to support the wife outside his home unless a decree of legal
separation or divorce was obtained. The wife appealed.
Issue:
Can a husband be compelled to provide support to his wife outside the conjugal domicile without a
decree of legal separation or divorce?
Ruling:
Yes, the husband can be compelled to provide support to his wife outside the conjugal domicile. The
Supreme Court held that the husband’s right under Article 149 of the Civil Code to provide support
within the conjugal home is not absolute. When the wife’s separation is justifiable due to the husband's
wrongful acts, the option is restricted. The obligation to provide support arises from the natural and
legal duty of the husband, independent of the existence of legal separation or divorce.

The trial court’s order dismissing the case was reversed, and the husband was directed to provide
support to the wife.

Perido vs. Perido, citing Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, G.R. No. L-28248, March 12, 1975
Doctrine:
In the absence of cogent proof to the contrary, the presumption of marriage arising from cohabitation
and deportment as husband and wife prevails. Property inherited by a spouse before marriage is their
exclusive property, while property registered under the name of a spouse and explicitly stating marital
status is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership.
Facts:
Lucio Perido was married twice—first to Benita Talorong, with whom he had three children, and second
to Marcelina Baliguat, with whom he had five children. Lucio and Marcelina executed a "Declaration of
Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition" of properties inherited and owned. The children from Lucio’s first
marriage sought annulment of the partition, claiming fraud and illegitimacy of the children from the
second marriage. They also argued that the disputed properties belonged to the conjugal partnership of
Lucio and Benita.
Issue:
Were the children of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat legitimate?
Were the properties exclusive to Lucio or conjugal assets of his first marriage?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals' decision affirming the trial court's findings:

The children of Lucio and Marcelina were legitimate. Evidence established that Benita died during the
Spanish regime, allowing Lucio to remarry before the birth of his children with Marcelina. Cohabitation
and deportment as husband and wife gave rise to a presumption of marriage.
Except for Lot 458, all properties were Lucio's exclusive properties, inherited before both marriages. Lot
458 was found to be conjugal property of Lucio and Marcelina, as indicated in its title.
The petitioners failed to present evidence sufficient to rebut these presumptions. The partition among
all legitimate heirs remained valid.

Mariategui vs. CA, G.R. No. L-57062, January 24, 1992

Doctrine:
Imprescriptibility of Partition: Partition actions do not prescribe unless there is clear repudiation of co-
ownership communicated to all co-owners.
Presumption of Marriage: Cohabitation as husband and wife gives rise to a presumption of a valid
marriage unless rebutted by evidence.
Proof of Legitimate Filiation: Continuous acknowledgment and possession of status as legitimate
children satisfy the requirements under Article 172 of the Family Code.
Facts:
Lupo Mariategui, who died intestate in 1953, was married three times and left several heirs from these
marriages. After his death, some of his heirs executed a deed of extrajudicial partition adjudicating Lot
No. 163 of the Muntinglupa Estate among themselves, excluding the children from Lupo’s third marriage
with Felipa Velasco (Jacinto, Julian, and Paulina). The excluded heirs filed an action in 1973, claiming co-
ownership over the properties and seeking their shares through partition and annulment of the deed of
partition.

The defendants contended that the plaintiffs’ claim was time-barred by prescription and argued that the
children from the third marriage were not legitimate heirs.

The trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the plaintiffs failed to prove their status as legitimate
heirs. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision, holding that the plaintiffs were legitimate
heirs and entitled to their shares in the estate.
Issue:
Whether the action for partition was barred by prescription.
Whether the plaintiffs (children of the third marriage) were legitimate heirs entitled to inherit from Lupo
Mariategui.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' ruling, holding as follows:

Action for Partition and Prescription:

The Court reiterated that an action for partition is imprescriptible as long as the co-ownership has not
been repudiated. A co-owner cannot acquire the shares of others through prescription unless there is
clear, unequivocal, and communicated repudiation of the co-ownership.
The defendants’ registration of Lot No. 163 in their names in 1971 did not constitute valid repudiation
because it was done fraudulently and without informing the excluded heirs. Thus, the 1973 filing of the
partition action was timely.
Legitimacy of Plaintiffs:

Evidence established that Lupo and Felipa were lawfully married, based on their cohabitation, public
acknowledgment, and testimonies of the plaintiffs.
The Court presumed the legitimacy of the children, emphasizing that no evidence was presented to
rebut this presumption. Jacinto’s birth certificate further supported this conclusion.
Under Article 172 of the Family Code, legitimate filiation may be established through the record of birth
or continuous possession of status as legitimate children, both of which were sufficiently proven in this
case.
The Court upheld the plaintiffs’ status as legitimate heirs and ruled that they were entitled to their
rightful shares in the estate. The defendants were directed to reconvey the plaintiffs' shares or
compensate them for the fair market value if reconveyance was no longer possible.
Sermonia vs. CA, G.R. No. 109454, June 14, 1994
Doctrine:
In the crime of bigamy, the prescriptive period of 15 years begins to run only upon discovery of the
bigamous marriage by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. The principle of constructive
notice applicable to property transactions does not extend to criminal cases of bigamy, as marriage is
not a property transaction but a cherished social institution safeguarded by law.
Facts:
Jose C. Sermonia contracted a second marriage with Ma. Lourdes Unson on February 15, 1975, while his
first marriage to Virginia C. Nievera was still valid and subsisting. The second marriage was publicly
celebrated and registered with the civil registry.

In 1992, Sermonia was charged with bigamy. He argued that the crime had already prescribed because
the registration of the second marriage in 1975 constituted constructive notice to the offended party,
starting the 15-year prescriptive period. The prosecution countered that prescription should begin only
from the discovery of the bigamous marriage in July 1991.

The trial court denied Sermonia’s motion to quash, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial.
Issue:
When does the prescriptive period for bigamy begin to run: upon the registration of the second
marriage (constructive notice) or upon its discovery by the offended party?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The prescriptive period for bigamy begins
upon actual discovery of the bigamous marriage. The principle of constructive notice does not apply to
bigamy because:

Bigamous marriages are typically concealed by the offender.

Requiring routine inspections of marriage registries by the offended party is impractical.
Marriage is not equivalent to a property transaction; thus, no counterpart provision to constructive
notice exists in laws governing marriage registration.
The Court emphasized that allowing the prescriptive period to run from the date of registration would
encourage bigamists to exploit procedural technicalities, undermining the sanctity of marriage as a
social institution.

Disposition:
The petition was denied, and the decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.

People vs. Malabago, G.R. No. 115686, December 2, 1996

Doctrine:
Parricide is committed when a person kills their spouse, and the relationship between the victim and the
accused must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. A trial judge may intervene to clarify points during
testimony, provided it is done in the interest of justice, and does not violate the constitutional rights of
the accused.
Facts:
Pedro Malabago was charged with parricide for killing his wife, Letecia Romano Malabago, on January 5,
1994. The prosecution presented the testimony of Guillerma Romano, the victim's mother, who
witnessed the killing. She described an argument between the couple, followed by Malabago hacking his
wife twice with a bolo. Letecia died immediately from the injuries. Malabago fled the scene but was
later arrested. The defense raised alibi and questioned the credibility of the testimony, while also
challenging the charge of parricide, the proof of death, and the cause of death. The trial court found
Malabago guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and imposed the death penalty.
Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in convicting Pedro Malabago of parricide, considering the defense's
claims regarding the evidence and the procedural conduct of the trial.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision with modification. It ruled that the prosecution
adequately established the fact of marriage between the accused and the victim, the cause of death,
and the participation of the accused in the crime. The court found no grave abuse of discretion in the
trial court’s conduct, and the evidence presented was sufficient to convict Malabago of parricide.
However, the Court ruled that the aggravating circumstance of treachery was improperly applied, as the
killing was not premeditated. The Court also ruled that the trial court erred in not considering the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The death penalty was replaced with life imprisonment.

Modified Sentence: Life imprisonment (replacing death sentence), plus civil indemnity for the heirs of
the victim.

Trinidad vs. CA, G.R. No. 118904, April 20, 1998

Doctrine:
1. Proof of Marriage and Filiation: Marriage and filiation can be proven through relevant evidence such
as witness testimony, baptismal certificates, photographs, and common reputation, among others.
2. Non-prescription of Partition Actions: An action to demand partition is imprescriptible unless there is
a clear repudiation of the co-ownership which must be communicated to the co-owner.
3. Collateral Attack on Legitimacy: Filiation cannot be subject to a collateral attack.
Facts:
Arturio Trinidad filed a complaint for partition and damages on August 10, 1978, against Felix and
Lourdes Trinidad in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Aklan, alleging he was the legitimate son of the
late Inocentes Trinidad, one of the three children of Patricio Trinidad, who had inherited four parcels of
land. Felix died on October 28, 1982, without issue, and was not substituted. The trial court ruled in
favor of Arturio on July 4, 1989, acknowledging him as the legitimate son and thus entitled to a portion
of the property.

The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) by Lourdes Trinidad. The CA reversed the trial
court’s decision on December 1, 1994, citing insufficient evidence of Arturio’s parents’ marriage and
noting that acquisitive prescription had set in. Arturio’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA
on February 8, 1995. Arturio then sought review by the Supreme Court (SC).
Issue:
Whether Arturio Trinidad presented sufficient evidence of his parents’ marriage and his filiation to
Inocentes Trinidad.
Whether Arturio’s status as a legitimate child can be subject to collateral attack in an action for partition.
Whether Arturio’s claim to the property was barred by acquisitive prescription.
Ruling:
1. Evidence of Marriage and Filiation:
– The SC found that Arturio successfully proved the marriage between Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad
Molato through relevant testimonies and documentary evidence, including a baptismal certificate.
Witnesses testified to the marriage and the couple’s behavior as husband and wife.
– For filiation, there were testimonies, baptismal records, and photographs indicating Arturio’s
legitimacy, which outweighed the denial by the private respondents.

2. Collateral Attack on Legitimacy:

– The SC acknowledged that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked. However, since Arturio provided
adequate evidence of his filiation without needing to rely on this doctrine, the need to rule on this
collateral attack was rendered unnecessary.

3. Acquisitive Prescription:
– The SC disagreed with the CA on acquisitive prescription. Since possession by a co-owner does not
prescribe ownership in the absence of clear repudiation, Arturio’s claim was not time-barred as there
was no evidence of any express repudiation of co-ownership.
The SC reinstated the trial court’s decision, affirming Arturio’s legitimate status and his right to a share
of the property.

De Jacob vs. CA, G.R. No. 135216, August 19, 1999

Doctrine:
Presumption of Valid Marriage
The law presumes that a man and a woman who live together as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage. This presumption is based on the societal importance of marriage and the
expectation that individuals will not live in violation of law and decency by falsely holding themselves
out as married. Absent evidence to the contrary, a presumption in favor of marriage is made when
parties act as if they are married.
Doctrine: Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio (Always presume marriage).

Collateral Attack on Voidable Marriage

A voidable marriage may only be attacked in a direct proceeding, whereas a void marriage may be
subjected to a collateral attack. This principle was invoked to reject the claim that the marriage was void
due to the lack of a marriage license. Since the parties lived together as husband and wife for more than
five years, the marriage was considered valid under the exceptions in Article 76 of the Civil Code.
Doctrine: A voidable marriage can only be challenged in a direct proceeding.

Secondary Evidence for Lost or Destroyed Documents

When the original document is lost, destroyed, or unavailable, secondary evidence may be introduced to
prove the document’s contents. This includes testimony and other documentary evidence to establish
the execution of the document and its subsequent loss. The Court clarified that evidence proving the
execution of a document is not dependent on the availability of the original but can be established
through collateral or primary evidence.
Doctrine: Secondary evidence is allowed to prove the contents of a document if its original is lost or
destroyed, provided the execution and loss are proven.

Competence of Testimonial Evidence in Proving Marriage

Marriage can be proven by any competent and relevant evidence, including testimony from the parties
to the marriage, witnesses, or the officiating priest. The absence of a marriage certificate does not
invalidate the marriage as long as other competent evidence supports the existence of the marriage.
Doctrine: Marriage may be proven by testimonial evidence even in the absence of a marriage certificate.
Burden of Proof in Adoption Cases
In adoption cases, the burden of proof lies with the person claiming the adoption. The Court reiterated
that the claimant must provide sufficient evidence to establish the adoption. In this case, the
respondent failed to prove the adoption and did not provide credible evidence of the alleged adoption
by Dr. Jacob.
Doctrine: The burden of proving adoption lies on the person claiming the adoption.
Facts:
In this case, the petitioner, Tomasa, claimed to be the surviving spouse of Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and
presented a reconstructed Marriage Contract as evidence of their marriage. However, the respondent,
Pedro, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo, providing an adoption order issued by Judge
Jose L. Moya in 1961. During the estate settlement proceedings, Pedro sought to intervene and assert
his rights as Alfredo's heir, challenging the validity of the marriage between Tomasa and Alfredo.

Tomasa contested Pedro's claim, filing a complaint for injunction, while the issues raised in the case
were the validity of her marriage and Pedro’s status as the legally adopted son. The trial court found
irregularities in the reconstructed Marriage Contract, concluding it was not valid. Regarding the
adoption, the court examined handwriting experts who confirmed the authenticity of Judge Moya's
signature on the adoption order. The trial court ruled in favor of Pedro, recognizing him as the sole heir
of Alfredo.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, citing insufficient evidence to prove the
authenticity of the reconstructed Marriage Contract and supporting the finding that Pedro was Alfredo’s
legally adopted son. Tomasa's petition for review was later filed before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
a) Whether or not the marriage between the plaintiff Tomasa Vda. De Jacob and deceased Alfredo E.
Jacob was valid; and

b) Whether defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, declaring her marriage to Dr. Alfredo Jacob valid and
rejecting the adoption claim of respondent Pedro Pilapil.

First Issue: Validity of Marriage

The Court upheld the validity of the marriage between Dr. Alfredo Jacob and the petitioner. Respondent
Pilapil's claim that the marriage was void due to the absence of a marriage license was dismissed. The
Court noted that, under Article 76 of the Civil Code, a marriage license was not necessary because the
couple had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and a sworn affidavit supported
this. The Court also ruled that secondary evidence, such as testimonies and affidavits, was admissible to
prove the marriage due to the loss of the original marriage certificate. Additionally, the Court
emphasized that marriage can be proven by other competent evidence, including testimonies from
witnesses and the officiating priest.

Second Issue: Validity of Adoption Order

The Court rejected Pilapil's claim of being adopted by Dr. Jacob. The Court found that the authenticity of
the Adoption Order was questionable, citing the testimony of Judge Moya, who denied issuing the
adoption order and disputed the signature. The Court also considered expert testimonies that revealed
discrepancies between the signature on the order and Judge Moya's actual signature. Further, the Court
highlighted the lack of records and the absence of proof that Pilapil had been treated as an adopted
child by Dr. Jacob. The Court concluded that Pilapil failed to prove the adoption, and the adoption was
declared non-existent.

The Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and declared the marriage valid and the adoption
non-existent.

Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003

Doctrine:
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

Avenido vs. Avenido, G.R. No. 173540, January 22, 2014

Doctrine:
Presumption of Marriage: The fact of marriage may be proven by competent and relevant evidence
other than a marriage certificate. The presumption of lawful marriage is applied when parties have lived
together as husband and wife and have publicly presented themselves as married.
Secondary Evidence of Marriage: Even in the absence of the original marriage contract, secondary
evidence such as testimonies, certifications, and other documents can be admitted to prove the fact of
marriage if the due execution and loss of the marriage certificate are established.
Facts:
Tecla Hoybia Avenido filed a complaint against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido, claiming that she was
the legal wife of Eustaquio Avenido, who had been living with Peregrina after leaving Tecla in 1954.
Tecla sought to have the marriage between Peregrina and Eustaquio declared null and void due to
bigamy, arguing that her own marriage to Eustaquio, solemnized on 30 September 1942, was valid.
Peregrina, in her defense, argued that she was the legitimate surviving spouse of Eustaquio, and that
their marriage on 3 March 1979 was valid.

Tecla presented evidence to substantiate her marriage to Eustaquio, including testimonies from family
members and various certifications from government agencies. Peregrina, however, presented a
marriage contract and other documents to support her claim. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in
favor of Peregrina, dismissing Tecla's petition. Tecla appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which
reversed the RTC decision, declaring Tecla's marriage to Eustaquio valid and the subsequent marriage to
Peregrina as bigamous and null.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTC decision and declaring the marriage between
Tecla and Eustaquio valid while declaring the marriage between Peregrina and Eustaquio bigamous and
void.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the CA's decision, holding that the marriage between Tecla and Eustaquio
was valid. The Court emphasized that while a marriage certificate is primary evidence, the fact of
marriage can also be proven by other competent evidence such as testimonies and certifications. It was
established that Tecla's marriage to Eustaquio was valid through the testimonies of her family members
and supporting documentary evidence. The Court also clarified that secondary evidence, including
testimonies and certifications, was admissible due to the loss of the original marriage contract.
Therefore, the marriage between Peregrina and Eustaquio was declared null and void due to bigamy.

De Mijares vs. Villaluz, A.C. No. 4431, June 19, 1997

Doctrine:
A lawyer must maintain good moral character to remain in the legal profession, and any conduct that is
grossly immoral, deceitful, or unlawful may lead to suspension or disbarment. A wrong cannot be
justified by another wrong, especially when the wrong is committed by a legal professional. The sanctity
of marriage and the integrity of legal obligations must be upheld.
Facts:
Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda. de Mijares filed a complaint for disbarment against former Court of Appeals
Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, charging him with gross immorality and grave misconduct. The complaint was
based on Villaluz’s bigamous actions, specifically his secret marriage to Lydia Geraldez while still married
to Mijares, and his subsequent conduct after marrying Mijares in January 1994. Villaluz claimed the
marriage to Mijares was a "sham" to assist her in an immorality case, but it was later revealed that he
had falsified his civil status when marrying Geraldez, and had no legal grounds for such a defense.
Issue:
Whether Villaluz’s conduct, involving deceit and gross immorality, warrants disbarment or suspension
from the practice of law.
Ruling:
The Court found Villaluz guilty of gross misconduct and immoral conduct, which violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The Court emphasized that even if the marriage between Villaluz and
Mijares was a "sham," it did not justify his actions. Despite his advanced age and years of service in the
judiciary, the Court opted for a suspension of two years rather than disbarment, with a warning that any
future misconduct would lead to harsher penalties. Villaluz was suspended from practicing law for two
years, effective upon notice, for his gross misconduct.

Cercado-Siga vs. Cercado, G.R. No. 185374, March 11, 2015

Doctrine:
Church registries are considered private documents and are subject to authentication requirements. For
a document to be admitted as an ancient document, it must meet specific criteria: it must be over 30
years old, produced from proper custody, and unblemished by any alteration.
Facts:
Petitioners Simplicia Cercado-Siga and Ligaya Cercado-Belison filed a complaint against respondents
over the estate of Vicente Cercado, Sr. and Leonora Ditablan. Petitioners claimed they were the
legitimate children of Vicente and Benita Castillo, who were married on 9 October 1929, but
respondents argued that Vicente and Leonora were validly married in 1977. To prove their claim,
petitioners presented a marriage contract (Contrato Matrimonial) issued by the Iglesia Filipina
Independiente. However, the Court of Appeals ruled that this document, being a private document, was
inadmissible without proper authentication.
Issue:
Whether the Contrato Matrimonial, issued by the Iglesia Filipina Independiente, can be admitted as
evidence to prove the existence of the marriage between Vicente and Benita.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals’ decision that the marriage contract was a private
document and could not be admitted without proper authentication. While the contract was over 30
years old, it did not meet the requirements for an "ancient document" because it was not shown to have
been kept in proper custody. The Court emphasized that church records, although related to public
matters, are considered private documents unless authenticated. Thus, the petitioners failed to prove
their claim by preponderance of evidence. The case highlights the importance of proper documentation
and authentication in proving the existence of a marriage.
Republic vs. Albios, G.R. No. 198780, October 16, 2013
Doctrine:
A marriage entered into for the purpose of obtaining a specific benefit, such as acquiring foreign
citizenship, is not void ab initio if the essential requisites of marriage, particularly consent, are present.
Facts:
Daniel Lee Fringer, an American citizen, and Liberty Albios were married on October 22, 2004, in
Mandaluyong City. Shortly after the marriage, they separated, and Albios petitioned for the declaration
of nullity of their marriage, claiming that it was a sham, entered into solely for Albios to obtain American
citizenship in exchange for $2,000. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) declared the marriage void, citing lack
of genuine consent, with the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming this decision. The Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) appealed, arguing that the marriage, though entered into for personal gain, was not void
as it met all legal requisites.
Issue:
Whether a marriage contracted solely for the purpose of obtaining American citizenship and in exchange
for $2,000 is void ab initio due to lack of consent.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the marriage was valid, as it was entered into with genuine consent.
Although the purpose of the marriage was for Albios to acquire American citizenship, both parties freely
and intelligently consented to the marriage. The Court explained that while the marriage might be seen
as a "sham" for immigration purposes, it was not void ab initio as the essential requisite of consent was
not lacking. The Court emphasized that marriages entered into for various purposes, including
convenience or financial gain, are valid as long as the legal requisites are met. Therefore, the petition
was granted, and the CA decision was annulled. The case was dismissed for lack of merit.

Morigo vs. People, G.R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004

Doctrine:
The retroactive declaration of a marriage as void ab initio means that, legally, the parties were never
married. Hence, the offense of bigamy cannot be committed in the absence of a valid marriage.
Facts:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were married on August 30, 1990, but the marriage ceremony lacked a
solemnizing officer and was thus invalid. Lucia filed for divorce in Canada, which was granted in 1992.
Lucio remarried Maria Jececha Lumbago in October 1992. In 1993, Lucio filed for judicial declaration of
nullity of his marriage to Lucia, which was granted in 1997. However, Lucio was charged with bigamy in
1993. The trial court convicted him, but the Court of Appeals upheld the conviction despite the nullity of
his first marriage being declared after the second marriage.
Issue:
Whether Lucio Morigo is guilty of bigamy despite the declaration of nullity of his first marriage.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and acquitted Lucio Morigo. It held
that, since his first marriage was void ab initio (from the beginning), there was no valid marriage to serve
as the basis for a bigamy charge. The principle of retroactive nullity of marriage meant that Lucio was
never legally married to Lucia, and as such, could not be convicted of bigamy. The issue of good faith or
lack of criminal intent was rendered moot. The petition was granted, and Lucio Morigo was acquitted.

Ronulo vs. People, G.R. No. 182438, July 2, 2014

Doctrine:
The performance of a marriage ceremony without a valid marriage license constitutes an illegal marriage
ceremony punishable under Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The State has a vested interest
in the sanctity and regulation of marriage, which includes penalizing acts that undermine its legal
requirements.
Facts:
Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were set to marry on March 29, 2003, at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish
Church, but the officiating priest refused to solemnize the marriage due to their failure to secure a
marriage license. They then sought the services of Fr. Rene Ronulo, an Aglipayan priest, who conducted
a ceremony in the Aglipayan Church despite being informed by the couple that they lacked a marriage
license. Subsequently, an information for violation of Article 352 of the RPC was filed against Fr. Ronulo
for performing an illegal marriage ceremony.
Issue:
Whether Fr. Rene Ronulo's conduct of the marriage ceremony without a valid marriage license
constitutes a violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, and whether the penalty imposed was
correct.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that Fr. Ronulo's conduct
amounted to the performance of an illegal marriage ceremony. The Court found that the elements of
the crime were proven: the presence of the contracting parties and their declaration that they take each
other as husband and wife, in accordance with the minimum requirements for a valid marriage
ceremony under the Family Code, were met. The Court ruled that the petitioner’s knowledge of the lack
of a marriage license rendered the ceremony illegal, and the imposition of the penalty of a ₱200 fine
under Section 44 of the Marriage Law was correct. The Court emphasized the State's interest in ensuring
the legal sanctity of marriage, regardless of religious rites, and upheld the penalty for violating the
regulations under Article 352 of the RPC.

Republic vs. Olaybar, G.R. No. 189538, February 10, 2014

Doctrine:
A petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court for the correction or cancellation of civil registry entries
may be used to address substantial errors, including the forgery of signatures, without declaring the
marriage void. This procedure is an appropriate adversarial proceeding and does not substitute for a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage when the marriage itself is non-existent.
Facts:
Respondent, Merlinda L. Olaybar, discovered from the National Statistics Office (NSO) that she was
supposedly married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean national, on June 24, 2002, in a ceremony
performed at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cebu. Olaybar denied having
knowledge of the marriage and claimed she was not present at the ceremony and did not appear before
the solemnizing officer. She also asserted that the signature on the marriage certificate was not hers but
was forged. As a result, she filed a petition to cancel the entries in the marriage contract, particularly in
the wife portion, alleging that her identity had been misused.

During the trial, Olaybar presented evidence, including the testimony of a document examiner who
confirmed the forgery of her signature, and a court stenographer who testified that the woman who
allegedly married Ye Son Sune was not Olaybar. The trial court ruled in favor of Olaybar, directing the
cancellation of the entries related to her in the marriage contract.
Issue:
Whether the cancellation of the marriage certificate entries, which in effect declared the marriage void,
was appropriate under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court upheld the RTC's decision. It ruled that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, which governs
the correction or cancellation of civil registry entries, can be used to rectify substantial errors, such as
the forgery of a signature. The Court clarified that Rule 108 proceedings are adversarial, not summary,
and that they are an appropriate forum for addressing substantial errors in the civil registry.

The Court distinguished this case from a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, stating that
the marriage did not exist because the respondent was not the person who entered into the marriage
contract. It emphasized that the proceedings were not about validating or invalidating the marriage
itself but rather about correcting the record to reflect the truth.

The petition for review was denied, and the RTC's decision to cancel the entries in the marriage
certificate was affirmed.

De Castro vs. De Castro, G.R. No. 160172, February 13, 2008

Doctrine:
The absence of a marriage license in the solemnization of a marriage renders the marriage void ab initio.
A false affidavit, which fails to meet the legal requirements, does not substitute for a marriage license,
as it cannot protect against the scandal of cohabitation outside a valid marriage. Additionally, a void
marriage may be collaterally attacked in proceedings where it is essential to the determination of the
case, such as actions for support.
Facts:
Petitioner and respondent planned to marry in 1994 but failed to obtain a marriage license, instead
executing a false affidavit stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for at least five
years. They were married in March 1995, but did not live together as husband and wife. In November
1995, respondent gave birth to a child, Reianna Tricia A. De Castro. In 1998, respondent filed for
support, asserting that petitioner was both her husband and the father of the child. Petitioner denied
the marriage’s validity and contested the child’s filiation.
Issue:
Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage in an action for
support.
Whether the child is the legitimate daughter of the petitioner.
Ruling:
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision that the child was the legitimate daughter of
petitioner and respondent, ruling that the marriage remained valid until properly nullified. The Court
held that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage as it was essential to
the issue of support. It further ruled that the marriage was void ab initio due to the absence of a
marriage license and the submission of a false affidavit. Additionally, the child was acknowledged as the
petitioner’s illegitimate daughter, based on documentary evidence and admissions made by petitioner.
The petition was granted in part, reinstating the trial court’s decision.

Kho vs. Republic, G.R. No. 187462, June 16, 2016

Doctrine:
A marriage solemnized without the requisite marriage license is void ab initio, unless it falls under
specific exceptions. The burden of proving the existence of a valid marriage license rests on the party
asserting the validity of the marriage. The certification from the Local Civil Registrar attesting to the
absence of a marriage license is sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of validity.
Facts:
Petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with respondent, alleging that
their marriage, solemnized on June 1, 1972, was void for lack of a marriage license. Petitioner presented
a certification from the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar, confirming that no marriage
license was issued for their union. Respondent claimed that they obtained the necessary marriage
license, but failed to provide concrete evidence to support this assertion. The RTC ruled in favor of the
petitioner, declaring the marriage void. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision,
presuming the existence of a marriage license and declaring the marriage valid.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTC decision and declaring the marriage valid
despite the absence of proof of a marriage license.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court reversed the CA decision, ruling that the marriage between petitioner and
respondent was void ab initio due to the absence of a marriage license. The Court emphasized that the
certification from the Local Civil Registrar, coupled with the respondent's failure to provide evidence of
the issuance of a marriage license, sufficiently proved the lack of a valid marriage license. The burden of
proving the validity of the marriage lay with the respondent, who failed to discharge that burden.
Therefore, the marriage was declared null and void under the Civil Code.

Go-Bangayan vs. Bangayan, G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013

Doctrine:
Waiver of Right to Present Evidence: A party's failure to present evidence despite multiple opportunities
and warnings from the trial court constitutes a waiver of the right to present such evidence. A grant for
continuance or postponement is not a matter of right, but a matter of discretion for the trial court, and
parties cannot complain of deprivation of this right after their refusal to proceed.

Void and Inexistent Marriages: A marriage solemnized without a marriage license, except in cases where
no license is required by law, is void ab initio (from the beginning). Furthermore, a marriage that is
fictitious or simulated, even if acknowledged as a marriage by the parties involved, is considered non-
existent under the law.

Bigamy and Validity of Prior Marriages: A subsequent marriage is not considered bigamous if the first
marriage is valid, and the second marriage is void for reasons other than the existence of the first
marriage (e.g., lack of marriage license). The absence of a valid marriage license in a subsequent union
prevents the application of bigamy charges.

Co-Ownership in Cohabitation: In cases of cohabitation without the benefit of marriage, properties

acquired by the parties through joint contribution are owned in common in proportion to their
respective contributions, under Article 148 of the Family Code. The presumption is that contributions
are equal unless proven otherwise.

Judicial Discretion and Inhibition of Judges: The refusal of a judge to inhibit themselves from a case is a
matter of judicial discretion, and bias, malice, or corruption must be proven with extrinsic evidence to
justify a call for inhibition. A judge's decision alone, even if the language used is critical or
uncomplimentary, is insufficient to prove prejudice.
Facts:
The case involves Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) seeking a declaration of the non-existence or
nullity of his marriage to Sally Go-Bangayan (Sally), which he claims was bigamous and lacked the formal
requisites of a valid marriage. Benjamin was previously married to Azucena Alegre (Azucena), and after
she left for the U.S., Benjamin lived with Sally from 1982 until their separation in 1994. During their
relationship, they acquired several properties. Sally later filed criminal charges against Benjamin for
bigamy and falsification, using a simulated marriage contract.
Benjamin filed a petition for the nullity of his marriage to Sally, requesting a partition of properties. Sally
countered with a claim for conjugal rights over 37 properties, which the trial court dismissed, ruling that
Benjamin and Sally were never legally married. The trial court declared their marriage void, forfeited
Sally's share in some properties, and ruled that the properties should be divided according to the Family
Code.
Sally appealed to the Court of Appeals, which partly granted her appeal. The Court of Appeals upheld
the trial court's ruling on the nullity of the marriage but modified the property division. It found that
certain properties should be owned exclusively by Benjamin, others exclusively by Sally, and the
property under TCT No. 61722 to be co-owned but with Benjamin’s share going to his conjugal
partnership with Azucena. Sally’s motion for reconsideration was denied, and she subsequently
petitioned before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial court’s ruling that
Sally had waived her right to present evidence;

(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial court’s decision
declaring the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and non-existent; and

(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming with modification the trial
court’s decision regarding the property relations of Benjamin and Sally.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the petition filed by Sally has no merit and affirmed the decision of the
Court of Appeals. The Court held that Sally waived her right to present evidence in her case due to
multiple delays, all requested by her, and a final warning from the trial court. Sally’s failure to present
evidence despite these opportunities was deemed a waiver of her right to do so. Furthermore, the
marriage between Sally and Benjamin was declared void ab initio and non-existent, as it lacked a
marriage license and was not recorded with the proper authorities. The Court clarified that Benjamin's
prior marriage to Azucena remained valid, and the relationship between Benjamin and Sally did not
constitute bigamy, as the purported marriage was not legally valid. Regarding property relations, the
Court ruled that Sally and Benjamin's cohabitation without marriage was governed by Article 148 of the
Family Code, meaning only properties acquired through joint contribution could be co-owned, excluding
several properties that were inherited from Benjamin’s father. Sally's challenge to the trial judge’s
refusal to inhibit himself was also rejected, as no evidence of bias or malice was found. The decision of
the Court of Appeals was affirmed.

Capili vs. People, G.R. No. 183805, July 3, 2013

Doctrine:
Elements of Bigamy: The crime of bigamy requires the existence of a subsisting marriage when a second
marriage is contracted, and the second marriage must have the essential requisites for validity. A
subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the second marriage does not bar prosecution for bigamy if
the first marriage was valid and subsisting when the second marriage occurred.

Consummation of Bigamy: The crime of bigamy is consummated when the second marriage is
contracted during the subsistence of a valid first marriage, even if the second marriage is later declared
void.
Effect of Judicial Declaration of Nullity: The presumption is that a marriage is valid until a competent
court declares it void. A party who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the
nullity of the first marriage risks prosecution for bigamy.

Criminal Liability for Bigamy: Criminal liability attaches to the offender when the second marriage is
contracted during the existence of a valid first marriage, and remains until extinguished by law.
Facts:
The petitioner, James Walter P. Capili, was charged with bigamy for contracting a second marriage with
Shirley G. Tismo on December 8, 1999, while still married to Karla Y. Medina-Capili. The RTC of Antipolo
City later declared the second marriage void, and Capili filed a motion to dismiss the bigamy charge
based on this declaration. The RTC of Pasig City granted his motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed
the decision, and Capili filed a petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether the subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage serves as a valid ground for
the dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative, affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court held
that the crime of bigamy was consummated when the second marriage was contracted while the first
marriage was still valid. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the second marriage does not
bar the prosecution for bigamy, as the criminal liability for bigamy attaches when the second marriage
occurs, not when it is later declared void. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

Wiegel vs. Sempio-Dy, G.R. No. L-53703, August 19, 1986

Doctrine:
Voidable Marriages: A marriage that is vitiated by force exerted on both parties is considered voidable,
not void, under Article 85 of the Civil Code. Such a marriage remains valid until annulled.

Presumption of Validity: A marriage remains valid unless annulled by a competent court. In the absence
of a judicial declaration of annulment, the first marriage remains valid, and a subsequent marriage
contracted while still valid is considered void under Article 80 of the Civil Code.

No Need for Proof of Prior Marriage: A party seeking to declare a marriage void does not need to prove
the existence of a prior marriage once the marriage is recognized as valid unless a judicial declaration of
nullity has been made.
Facts:
Respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel filed a petition for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage to
petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel. The basis was Lilia’s previous marriage to Eduardo A. Maxion, which she
claimed was null and void due to being forced into it. In the pre-trial, the issue agreed upon by both
parties was the status of Lilia's first marriage, specifically whether it was void or voidable. Lilia requested
to present evidence on two points: (1) the force in her first marriage, and (2) the fact that her first
husband was already married to someone else. The court ruled against allowing this evidence and
ordered that the case be resolved based on agreed facts. Lilia challenged these orders via certiorari.
Issue:
Whether the respondent court erred in denying the petitioner’s motion to present evidence regarding
the vitiation of her first marriage and the prior marriage of her first husband.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the respondent court’s orders. It ruled that the first
marriage, assuming it was vitiated by force, was voidable and not void, and thus valid until annulled.
Since Lilia had not annulled her first marriage, it remained valid, rendering her subsequent marriage to
Karl Heinz Wiegel void under Article 80 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, there was no need to introduce
evidence regarding her first husband's prior marriage because a marriage remains valid unless declared
otherwise by a court, and it was clear that Lilia was still married when she married Wiegel.

Terre vs. Terre, A.M. No. 2349, July 3, 1992

Doctrine:
Grossly Immoral Conduct: Engaging in actions that show unfitness to remain a member of the bar, such
as contracting a second marriage while a prior one is subsisting, abandonment of a spouse, and
misleading a spouse into believing a marriage is void ab initio, constitutes grossly immoral conduct
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, justifying disbarment.

Moral Fitness for Bar Membership: A lawyer must exhibit the highest standard of moral integrity, as
moral unfitness or misconduct undermines public trust in the legal profession and its responsibility in
upholding marriage as a basic social institution.
Facts:
Complainant Dorothy B. Terre filed a complaint against respondent Atty. Jordan Terre, accusing him of
grossly immoral conduct for contracting a second marriage to Helina Malicdem while his first marriage
to Dorothy remained subsisting. Respondent had convinced Dorothy that her previous marriage to
Merlito A. Bercenilla was void ab initio and thus she was free to marry him. After marrying Dorothy on
June 14, 1977, and having a child with her, Atty. Terre abandoned her and later married Helina
Malicdem in May 1981. Dorothy filed complaints against him for abandonment and bigamy. Atty. Terre
evaded multiple attempts to serve the complaint and failed to present evidence when hearings were
scheduled.
Issue:
Whether Atty. Jordan Terre's actions, including marrying a second woman while his first marriage
remained valid, constituted grossly immoral conduct, thereby justifying disbarment.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court disbarred Atty. Jordan Terre, finding that his conduct exhibited grossly immoral
behavior. His actions—abandoning his wife after receiving financial support through law school,
marrying another woman while his first marriage was still valid, and misleading his wife about the
validity of their marriage—were deemed unfit for a member of the Bar. The Court emphasized that his
conduct undermined the sanctity of marriage, which is a core social institution. Therefore, Atty. Terre
was disbarred and his name was struck from the Roll of Attorneys.

Bobis vs. Bobis, G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000

Doctrine:
The pendency of a civil case for the declaration of nullity of a marriage does not constitute a prejudicial
question to a criminal case for bigamy. The presumption is that the first marriage subsists until a judicial
declaration of its nullity is made, and the second marriage is void if contracted during the subsistence of
the first marriage.
Facts:
Respondent Jose B. Bobis contracted his first marriage with Maria Dulce B. Javier on October 21, 1985.
Without obtaining an annulment or nullification, he entered into a second marriage with petitioner
Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996. A criminal case for bigamy was filed against him in 1998. In
response, he filed a civil action for the judicial declaration of the nullity of his first marriage, claiming it
was void for lack of a marriage license. He also moved to suspend the bigamy case, invoking the civil
case as a prejudicial question. The trial court granted the motion to suspend. Petitioner then filed for a
review of the decision.
Issue:
Whether the filing of a civil case for the declaration of nullity of a marriage constitutes a prejudicial
question to a criminal case for bigamy.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner and reversed the trial court's decision to suspend the
bigamy case. It held that the pendency of a civil case for the declaration of nullity of the first marriage is
not a prejudicial question to the criminal case for bigamy. A prejudicial question must involve an issue
that is so intimately connected with the criminal case that its resolution is necessary to determine
whether the criminal case may proceed. In this case, the civil action does not resolve whether the
respondent's second marriage is valid since the first marriage is presumed valid until a court declares it
null. The Court emphasized that a person may not use a civil case for nullity as a means to delay or avoid
prosecution for bigamy, and that the validity of the first marriage must be established through a judicial
declaration. Consequently, the criminal case for bigamy should not have been suspended.

The petition for review was granted, and the Regional Trial Court’s order to suspend the criminal case
was reversed. The trial court was ordered to immediately proceed with the criminal case for bigamy.

Mercado vs. Tan, G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000

Doctrine:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is required before contracting a subsequent
marriage, even if the previous marriage is void.
One who enters into a subsequent marriage without obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of
bigamy, as the crime of bigamy is consummated when the subsequent marriage occurs before the legal
dissolution of the first marriage.
A void marriage is not automatically treated as null and void for purposes of remarriage until a judicial
declaration of nullity is issued.
Facts:
Petitioner Dr. Vincent Paul G. Mercado appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming his
conviction for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Mercado had married Ma. Consuelo
Tan on June 27, 1991, while still legally married to Ma. Thelma Oliva. The first marriage was not judicially
declared null and void until after the bigamy charge was filed.

Dr. Vincent Mercado was married to Ma. Thelma Oliva on April 10, 1976, and later married Ma.
Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991. Despite the existence of the first marriage, Mercado entered into the
second marriage without first obtaining a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage. After
the bigamy charge was filed, Mercado sought to have his first marriage declared void, which was
granted on May 6, 1993.
Issue:
Whether the element of a previous legal marriage exists to convict Mercado of bigamy.
Whether a liberal interpretation of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Articles 36 and
40 of the Family Code, negates Mercado's guilt.
Whether Mercado is entitled to an acquittal based on reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Dr. Mercado for bigamy. It held that under Article 40 of
the Family Code, a judicial declaration of the nullity of a void previous marriage is required before
remarriage, even if the marriage is considered void. The Court emphasized that the crime of bigamy is
committed when a subsequent marriage occurs before the legal dissolution of the first marriage,
regardless of whether the first marriage is void. In this case, Mercado contracted a second marriage
while his first marriage was still subsisting, and the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
came after the second marriage was entered into.

The Court also rejected the argument that the first marriage’s nullity should have been presumed, ruling
that a judicial declaration is necessary to avoid ambiguity and ensure legal clarity. Therefore, the
conviction for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was upheld.

Damages: The Court rejected the respondent's claim for damages and attorney's fees because she did
not appeal the Court of Appeals' ruling on the matter.

Cariño vs. Cariño, G.R. No. 132529, February 2, 2001

Doctrine:
For purposes other than remarriage, no judicial declaration of nullity is required to declare a marriage
void ab initio. Evidence may be presented in other proceedings to prove such nullity.
Article 147 of the Family Code governs the property regime of unions void for reasons other than legal
incapacity or impediment. Article 148 applies to bigamous or adulterous relationships, where property is
owned in proportion to actual contributions.
Facts:
SPO4 Santiago Cariño contracted two marriages: one with Susan Nicdao in 1969 and another with Susan
Yee in 1992. Nicdao bore two children, while Yee cohabited with Cariño from 1982 until his death in
1992. Both women claimed his death benefits. Yee alleged that the first marriage lacked a marriage
license, rendering it void ab initio. Yee sought a share of the benefits Nicdao received. The trial court
declared Nicdao’s marriage void, applying Article 148 to divide the benefits. The Court of Appeals
affirmed.
Issue:
Was the marriage of Nicdao and Cariño void for lack of a marriage license?
Are the benefits from government agencies properly allocable to Yee as part of the deceased's
property?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled:

The marriage of Nicdao and Cariño was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
However, since Yee’s marriage was also void (due to bigamy), she had no legal right to claim the death
benefits, which passed to the deceased’s heirs by intestate succession.
Disposition:
The petition was granted, reversing the lower court’s rulings. The complaint was dismissed. The death
benefits belonged to the legal heirs, including Nicdao’s children.

Tenebro vs. CA, G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004

Doctrine:
Bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code - The essential elements of bigamy are: (a) an
existing valid marriage, (b) a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of the first, (c) the second
marriage has the requisites for validity, and (d) no legal dissolution or presumption of death for the
absent spouse.
Retroactive Effect of Nullity - The judicial declaration of nullity due to psychological incapacity retroacts
only to the civil aspects of marriage. It does not exempt individuals from criminal liability for bigamy, as
the crime is consummated by the act of contracting the second marriage.
Sanctity and Permanence of Marriage - The State criminalizes bigamy to preserve the integrity and
sanctity of marriage, which is a foundational social institution.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Veronico Tenebro for bigamy, sentencing him to an
indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months as minimum to 8 years and 1 day as maximum. The
decision underscores the State's commitment to upholding the institution of marriage and penalizing its
deliberate disregard.

Facts:
Veronico Tenebro contracted three successive marriages. He first married Hilda Villareyes in 1986, then
Leticia Ancajas in 1990, and finally Nilda Villegas in 1993. Ancajas later discovered the first marriage,
prompting her to file a bigamy case against Tenebro. During the trial, Tenebro claimed that his marriage
to Villareyes was invalid and that his second marriage to Ancajas was declared void due to psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Despite these arguments, the trial court convicted
Tenebro of bigamy, a decision later affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Tenebro elevated the case to the
Supreme Court, arguing that the declaration of nullity of his second marriage retroacted to the date of
celebration, negating his criminal liability for bigamy.
Issue:
Does the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity retroact to negate criminal liability for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code?
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of a second or
subsequent marriage does not retroact to negate criminal liability for bigamy. The crime of bigamy is
consummated upon contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid prior
marriage. The retroactive effect of a nullity declaration pertains only to civil aspects, such as marital
status, but does not absolve an individual of criminal liability.

Abunado vs. People, G.R. No.159218, March 30, 2004

Doctrine:
Bigamy is a public offense, and the pardon or consent of the offended party does not extinguish criminal
liability.

A void or voidable marriage is presumed valid until declared otherwise by a competent court.

A declaration of nullity of the first marriage does not retroactively absolve liability for bigamy committed
before such declaration.

The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides for mitigating circumstances in imposing penalties.
Disposition:

The petition was denied, and the conviction and modified penalty were affirmed.
Facts:
Salvador Abunado married Narcisa Arceño in 1967. Narcisa later discovered that Salvador contracted a
second marriage with Zenaida Biñas in 1989, while their marriage was still subsisting. Narcisa filed a
bigamy case against Salvador in 1995. Salvador claimed his first marriage with Narcisa was void and
argued for the dismissal of the case due to an allegedly defective information and the pendency of an
annulment petition he later filed. Despite his defenses, the trial court convicted Salvador of bigamy, and
the Court of Appeals modified the penalty to account for his advanced age. Salvador sought relief with
the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Was the information defective due to a typographical error regarding the date of the bigamous
marriage?
Does the consent or condonation of the offended spouse absolve the accused from criminal liability for
bigamy?
Does the subsequent declaration of nullity of the first marriage constitute a prejudicial question that
suspends the prosecution of the bigamy case?
Was the penalty imposed proper under the circumstances?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Salvador Abunado for bigamy.

Defective Information:
The typographical error in the information was immaterial as the alleged acts and dates were sufficiently
established during trial. Salvador was adequately informed of the nature of the accusation.

Consent or Condonation:
The Court rejected Salvador's claim that Narcisa's alleged consent or condonation absolved him, holding
that bigamy is a public offense and a pardon by the offended party does not extinguish criminal liability.

Prejudicial Question:
The Court ruled that the pendency or subsequent resolution of the annulment case did not affect the
bigamy charge. Bigamy is consummated upon contracting a second marriage while the first marriage is
still subsisting, even if the first marriage is later declared void.

Penalty:
The Court upheld the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals, considering Salvador’s mitigating
circumstance of advanced age and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Salvador was sentenced to
imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1)
day as maximum.

Jarillo vs. People, G.R. No. 164435, September 29, 2009

Doctrine:
The crime of bigamy is consummated upon contracting a second marriage without judicial nullity of the
first, even if the first marriage is later declared void.
Criminal liability for bigamy is not erased by a subsequent nullity declaration of the prior marriage.
The prescriptive period for bigamy begins from the date the crime is discovered by the offended party or
authorities.
Facts:
Victoria Jarillo was charged with bigamy for contracting a second marriage with Emmanuel Uy in 1979,
despite her prior marriage to Rafael Alocillo in 1974 and 1975. At the time of her second marriage, her
first marriage had not been judicially annulled. In 2000, Uy discovered Jarillo’s earlier marriage and filed
for the annulment of their marriage. Meanwhile, Jarillo sought a declaration of nullity for her marriage
to Alocillo, which was eventually declared void in 2003 on the ground of psychological incapacity.

The trial court convicted Jarillo of bigamy, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Jarillo argued
that her first marriage was void ab initio, that Uy was aware of her previous marriage, that the crime
had prescribed, and that there was no valid marriage license for her marriages.
Issue:
Whether the subsequent declaration of nullity of the first marriage serves as a valid defense against a
charge of bigamy.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed Jarillo's conviction but reduced her penalty. It held:

Presumption of Validity of Marriage: A marriage is presumed valid until annulled by a competent court.
Jarillo’s first marriage had not been declared void at the time of her second marriage, making her
second marriage bigamous.
Subsequent Nullity Declaration Irrelevant: Following Tenebro v. CA, the Court ruled that the subsequent
declaration of nullity of the first marriage does not extinguish criminal liability for bigamy. The crime was
consummated when the second marriage was contracted without judicial nullity of the first.
Prescription: Jarillo failed to prove that Uy discovered her first marriage earlier than 1999. The
prescriptive period for bigamy only begins upon discovery.
Penalty Imposition: The Court found the penalty proper under the Indeterminate Sentence Law but
reduced it for humanitarian reasons due to the void status of the first marriage and Jarillo’s abusive
circumstances.
Modified Penalty:

Jarillo was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 2 years, 4 months, and 1 day (prision correccional)
as minimum to 8 years and 1 day (prision mayor) as maximum.

Zamora vs. CA, G.R. No. 141917, February 7, 2007

Doctrine:
Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code refers to a mental, not physical, incapacity
that prevents a party from fulfilling the essential marital obligations. Mere refusal to cohabit or to bear
children, without showing an inherent psychological defect existing at the time of the marriage, does
not constitute psychological incapacity.
Expert testimony, while helpful, is not mandatory in cases of psychological incapacity, provided the
totality of evidence sufficiently proves the condition.
Psychological incapacity must be grave, existing at the time of the marriage, and proven by evidence of
its manifestations.
Facts:
Bernardino Zamora and Norma Mercado Zamora were married on June 4, 1970, in Cebu City. In 1972,
Norma left for the United States to work and subsequently became a U.S. citizen. The couple lived
together for only three years during their marriage and had no children. Bernardino filed a petition for
the declaration of nullity of marriage, alleging that Norma was psychologically incapacitated due to her
refusal to bear children and abandonment. Norma denied these allegations and instead pointed to
Bernardino's infidelity as the reason for their estrangement.

The trial court dismissed the case, finding no evidence of psychological incapacity. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court’s decision, citing the absence of proof that Norma’s refusal to bear children and
her actions were due to psychological illness.
Issue:
Whether the marriage between Bernardino and Norma can be declared void under Article 36 of the
Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decisions of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals.

The Court ruled that Bernardino failed to prove psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Psychological incapacity must be grave, permanent, and incurable, and its manifestations must be
rooted in conditions existing at the time of marriage. Mere refusal to bear children or cohabit, as alleged
by the petitioner, does not establish psychological incapacity. Furthermore, the totality of evidence
presented was insufficient to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.

The Court also emphasized that while expert testimony is not mandatory, evidence must adequately
establish the party’s psychological incapacity. In this case, the petitioner did not substantiate his claims
with sufficient factual or expert evidence.

Republic vs. Tanyag-San Jose, G.R. No. 168328, February 28, 2007
Doctrine:
Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability. It is a malady so grave as to render a spouse incapable of fulfilling marital
obligations.
Expert opinions based solely on one-sided accounts are unreliable. Personal examination of the alleged
incapacitated spouse, while not mandatory, ensures more credible findings.
Facts:
Laila Tanyag-San Jose married Manolito San Jose in 1988, and they had two children. Laila claimed
Manolito was jobless, addicted to gambling and drugs, and unwilling to fulfill his marital duties. In 1999,
Laila filed a petition for nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Dr. Tayag, a psychologist,
concluded Manolito had "Anti-Social Personality Disorder" based on Laila's narration, as Manolito was
not personally examined. The trial court denied the petition, holding that psychological incapacity was
not proven. The Court of Appeals reversed, declaring the marriage void ab initio.
Issue:
Was Manolito’s alleged psychological incapacity proven under Article 36 of the Family Code?
Was the Court of Appeals correct in deviating from the guidelines in Republic v. Molina?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision and reinstated the trial court's denial of the
petition.
On psychological incapacity: The Court held that Laila failed to establish that Manolito's alleged
incapacity met the requisites of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. Dr. Tayag’s findings were
based solely on Laila's account, making them hearsay and unreliable.
On deviation from Molina: The Court ruled that the guidelines in Molina are binding, and no exceptional
circumstances warranted deviation. Manolito’s behavior, while irresponsible, did not constitute
psychological incapacity under Article 36.
Disposition
Petition granted. The marriage between Laila and Manolito was declared valid.

Azcueta vs. Republic, G.R. No. 180668, May 26, 2009

Doctrine:
Article 36, Family Code: Psychological incapacity must meet the following criteria:

It must be medically or clinically identified.

It must exist at the time of marriage.
It must be permanent and incurable.
It must be grave to the extent that it renders a spouse incapable of performing marital obligations.
Marcos v. Marcos: A personal examination of the allegedly incapacitated spouse is not mandatory to
establish evidence of psychological incapacity.

Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina: The burden of proof lies with the plaintiff, and any doubt
regarding the psychological incapacity should favor the validity of the marriage.

Facts:
This case involves a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the Court of Appeals (CA)
decision that reversed the Regional Trial Court's (RTC) declaration of nullity of the marriage between
Marietta and Rodolfo Azcueta under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC found Rodolfo
psychologically incapacitated, citing emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, dependency on his mother,
and inability to fulfill marital obligations. Psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Cecilia Villegas diagnosed Rodolfo
with Dependent Personality Disorder, deeming his incapacity severe, incurable, and rooted in his
upbringing. However, the CA ruled that Marietta failed to prove that Rodolfo's alleged incapacity was
grave, incurable, or existing before the marriage, noting that his behavior stemmed from youth and
emotional immaturity rather than psychological incapacity. The Solicitor General, supporting the CA,
argued that the totality of evidence presented was insufficient to establish psychological incapacity
under Article 36. The issue before the Supreme Court is whether Marietta's evidence meets the required
standard to nullify the marriage.
Issue:
1. Whether the totality of evidence was sufficient to prove Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code.

2. Whether psychological incapacity needs to be personally examined by a psychiatrist or psychologist.

3. Whether Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity existed at the time of or prior to the marriage ceremony.

4. Whether Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was severe, permanent, and incurable.

5. Whether Rodolfo’s actions resulted from psychological incapacity or merely from youth and
emotional immaturity.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the petitioner had sufficiently established
Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity through both direct testimony and psychiatric evaluation, applying
the totality of evidence standard. It reiterated in Marcos v. Marcos that a personal examination of the
psychologically incapacitated spouse is not a sine qua non for declaring a marriage null, emphasizing
that the totality of evidence suffices. The Court found that Rodolfo’s dysfunctions, rooted in a deep-
seated dependency on his mother, existed prior to the marriage and became manifest after the
marriage. Supported by expert testimony, the Court held that Rodolfo’s condition was severe,
permanent, and incurable, rendering him incapable of fulfilling essential marital obligations. In response
to the Court of Appeals’ characterization of Rodolfo’s behavior as youthful immaturity, the Supreme
Court highlighted the clinical diagnosis of Dependent Personality Disorder by Dr. Villegas, underscoring
that this constituted a juridically significant condition under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Kalaw vs. Fernandez, G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015

Doctrine:
Psychological Incapacity under Article 36: The term refers to a mental illness that is grave, permanent,
and existing at the time of the marriage, making a party unaware of essential marital duties and
responsibilities.
Totality of Evidence Consideration: Courts are directed to consider the totality of the evidence, expert
evaluations, and factual circumstances, without strict reliance on rigid guidelines from Republic v. Court
of Appeals (Molina case).
Expert Testimony Credibility: Expert opinions should be weighed alongside other substantial evidence.
Courts can determine psychological incapacity without personal examinations if the presented evidence
comprehensively substantiates the incapacity.
Facts:
Valerio E. Kalaw filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Ma. Elena Fernandez
under Article 36 of the Family Code, alleging the psychological incapacity of his wife, Ma. Elena
Fernandez, to perform essential marital obligations. Kalaw claimed that Fernandez’s behaviors, including
frequent mahjong sessions, visits to beauty parlors, partying with friends, and alleged infidelity,
constituted psychological incapacity. He presented expert witnesses, a psychologist Dr. Cristina Gates
and a canon law expert Fr. Gerard Healy, to support his claim. However, Fernandez refuted these
allegations, arguing she played mahjong with her husband’s consent and did not neglect her family
duties.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of Kalaw, declaring the marriage null and void based on
psychological incapacity. The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed this decision, stating that the evidence
presented was insufficient to support the claim of psychological incapacity. The Supreme Court affirmed
the CA decision on September 19, 2011, leading to Kalaw’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether the findings of the RTC regarding the psychological incapacity of Ma. Elena Fernandez should
be upheld.
Whether the expert opinions presented by Dr. Gates and Fr. Healy sufficiently proved Fernandez’s
psychological incapacity.
Whether the sufficiency of the evidence was adequately considered in declaring the psychological
incapacity of both parties or only one party.
Ruling:
Findings of the RTC: The Supreme Court initially dismissed the RTC’s findings and the expert opinions
presented by Kalaw, citing inadequate bases. However, upon reconsideration, the Court ruled that the
RTC, having direct access to the testimonies and psychological evaluations, should hold its findings valid
unless manifestly erroneous. The RTC’s assessment deserved ing of weight as they closely examined the
demeanor and credibility of the witnesses and evidence presented.

Expert Opinions: The Supreme Court retracted its previous disregard for the expert opinions of Dr. Gates
and Fr. Healy. Dr. Gates based her conclusions not solely on Kalaw’s testimonies but on various
interviews and clinical records indicating Fernandez’s personality disorder diagnoses. Similarly, Fr.
Healy’s expert testimony on the canon law’s standards for psychological incapacity was deemed
pertinent given the origin of Article 36 from Canon Law. The lack of a direct psychological examination of
Fernandez did not invalidate the findings as the totality of other presented evidence sufficed.

Sufficiency of Evidence: The Supreme Court acknowledged that while there might be no overwhelming
evidence of Fernandez’s alleged habits, the overall diagnostic evaluations and background checks
validated the claims of psychological incapacity. Moreover, both parties’ mutual psychological incapacity
to perform marital duties was substantiated, reflecting an irreparable flaw in the marital bond.

Hence, the Supreme Court granted the Motion for Reconsideration, reinstating the RTC’s decision, which
nullified the marriage ab initio based on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.