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On Freedom and Necessity

Preprint · January 2021

DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.22761.31842

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(02.01.2021)

On Freedom and Necessity

Mario Radovan

Abstract: The paper deals with the issue of the relations between causality,
determinism and free will. We argue that reality is causally determined, and that in
such reality can exist freedom; moreover, causal determination is a necessary
condition for a discourse about freedom. The essential questions in this regard are
what is a person (an "I") and what is free will; these questions are regularly
neglected, which makes many discussions useless. The paper gives a critical outline
of the existentialist discourse about freedom, and of technological and psycho-social
determinism.

Key words: free will, determinism, mind, responsibility, technological determinism,

social determinism

1. Determinism and free will

1. Perennial questions are often vague. Such questions usually contain vague concepts and
they are expressed in an imprecise way. For that reasons, such questions cannot be answered in a
clear and precise way, so they become "big" and "perennial". One of such vague questions regards
the relationship between causality and free will. If all events are causally determined, how can a
person act freely and follow (materialize) her free will? Is our behaviour free or is it completely
causally determined by various forces? Such questions are vague because the concept of free will is
vague. My answer to the above question runs as follows: our behaviour is free and causally
determined. I will try to explain this answer and the question of free will in the text that follows.

2. Discussion about free will and determinism is one of the favourite topics of academic
discourse. But this issue is socially important, because it regards the issue of decision making, as
well as the issue of personal responsibility of each person for what she has done or failed to do. If
the laws of nature (physics) determine our behaviour and do not leave any space for free deviation
in one direction or other, then people do not have any merits for what they do nor are they
responsible for what they do. Consequently, nobody should be praised or blamed for anything. We
argue that the situation is exactly the opposite, as we will explain below.

3. Pierre-Simon Laplace wrote (in 1814) that if a mind were able (1) to know the states of all

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particles in the universe and all the forces acting on them at the present moment, and (2) to know all
laws according to which these particles and forces behave, and (3) to compute fast enough, then (4)
this mind could know every future and past state of the universe. To such a mind "nothing would be
uncertain": "the future and the past would be equally before his eyes". It is hard to imagine that
either people or computers could ever fulfil the conditions from Laplace's hypothetical statement,
and possess such an immense knowledge and computational power, but this statement shows what
determinism is about. Determinism says that events are causally determined, and hence (in
principle) predictable; this does not mean that we have sufficient knowledge and computational
capacities to predict them.

4. Determinism has been considered problematic, because it has been assumed that
determinism means that scientific (causally based) discourse about physical reality leaves no space
for any free will or freedom. Because if a mind which has the future "before his eyes" can (in
principle) exist, then nobody can choose to behave in a way that leads to a future that differs from
the one that this mind already sees (has "before his eyes"). Therefore, if the scientific (causal)
description of the world is correct, then it seems that there cannot be any free will (freedom) in the
world. This seems unacceptable to many (most) people, so that they reject determinism, and some
proclaimed it depressing, offensive and dangerous. We argue that determinism is an essential part of
the coherent discourse about reality and freedom, and that there is nothing bad or dangerous in it.

5. It is possible to speak about determinism at different levels of observation. The world

seems deterministic at the level of physics. At that level, determinism means that events are
causally determined and that they take place in accordance with stable (lasting) laws of physics. I
am a physical body (from which mental states emerge, but they are not a new substance) so that
physical events (forces, causes) determine what I do, what I think and what I feel. Biological
determinism says that the behaviour of living beings is determined by their biological constitution,
internal needs and outer incentives. There are other levels and forms of determinisms, such as
psychological, social, economic and technological determinism. Each of these determinisms can be
considered correct in a certain sense, but they are usually expressed in an imprecise way. In any
case, the basic problem remains the same: is reality completely determined (at any level), and in
what way and sense can freedom exist?

6. There are claims that determinism has been "proved wrong" by the discovery of the
principle of indeterminacy (or uncertainty), which is one of the basic principles in quantum theory.
However, this is not so. The principle of indeterminacy regards the behaviour of various pairs of
variables; this principle says that with the increase of experimental precision with which the value
of one of the paired variables is determined, decreases the precision with which the value of the
other variable (in the pair) can be determined. One such pair of variables are energy and time, other
pair are momentum and space (the spatial position of a particle). Some physicists (including Albert
Einstein and Roger Penrose) hold that indeterminacy is a matter of the observation of particles, and
that it regards only the possibility of knowing the subatomic phenomena, not the phenomena
(reality) themselves, which are deterministic and determined. They hold that a subatomic particle
occupies an exact position and has an exact momentum at every moment; it is only not possible to
determine these facts without interfering with them and changing them. But most physicists
(including Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg) hold that indeterminacy is not (only) a matter of
knowledge, but of physical reality itself. They say that indeterminacy is not produced by the impact
of the observation on phenomena, but is intrinsic to the subatomic processes (phenomena, entities)
themselves.

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 7. The latter view prevails among physicists, but I consider the former position more
coherent and convincing. Every observation (measurement) makes a certain impact on the observed
entity or phenomena. The impact on a subatomic particle can easily become relatively large. In any
case, the fact that it is not possible to determine (measure, know) some things does not mean that
these things are not determined. "One of the things which people say about quantum mechanics is
that it is fuzzy and indeterministic, but this is not true", says Penrose. "Quantum theory is
deterministic and precise"; indeterminacy only appears in the process of measurement which
"involves magnifying an event from the quantum level to the classical level". Therefore, there is no
indeterminacy in reality by itself, but only in our interaction with reality, says Penrose. I do not
have empirical (experimental) evidence in this regard, but I strongly support Penrose's position
from the logical point of view.

8. Let us mention that if the prevailing view of indeterminacy were correct, this would not
do much harm to Laplace's claim mentioned above, because his claim is hypothetical (conditional).
It says that if we had a complete knowledge of the present state of the world (universe), and a
sufficient computational power, then we could predict (compute) the future states of the world
(universe). If quantum theory claims that there cannot exist a complete knowledge of reality (even
in principle), this does not make Laplace's hypothetical claim false. The indeterminacy of reality
would only mean that the premises of Laplace's hypothetical statement cannot be fulfilled, so that
this statement would not have any effect. However, the indeterminacy principle does actually not
say that much: the fact that it is not possible to measure (or to know) some things, does not mean
that these things are not determined. In any case, being determined is not the same as being
predictable: a phenomenon can be determined but it may (currently) not be predictable, because of
the lack of relevant knowledge (data and laws) and because of the complexity of the structure of
forces that determine the phenomena.

9. Regardless of what physics says, speaking in terms of semantics (meaning of words),

indeterminacy would not bring freedom, and a complete indeterminacy would bring chaos. If
physical reality were not causally determined, it would not be possible to know much (or anything)
about it nor to predict its behaviour. Without knowledge, there can be no expectations; without
expectations (of effects) there is no choice (of an action); without choice there is no freedom.
Therefore, causal determination is obviously needed for freedom. Let us mention that instead of
being absolutely determined, the behaviour of reality could be probabilistic. In such a world, it
would not be possible to have a completely sure knowledge of the effects of some actions (causes),
but we could have certain expectations, and these expectations could be high and converge towards
certainty. On the other hand, the indeterminacy of reality would not "give space for free will", as it
is usually said; it would only limit or make impossible the knowledge of consequences, and with
this a freedom to choose.

10. Determinism and free will are not empirical issues, but conceptual issues, so that
empirical results (discoveries) cannot solve them. This is a matter of metaphysical (ontological)
assumptions and of logically consistent discourse. Each of these assumptions must be considered in
the context of other assumptions. I hold the causal determination of events a basic ontological
(metaphysical) assumption without which no reasonable discourse (explanation) would be possible.
We do not know how to explain events which we perceive except in terms of their causes: all the
rest is mystical discourse and a play with vague concepts.

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 11. The assumptions that events are causally determined means that (1) every event is
caused by a set of other events (conditions), and that (2) causal relationships are lasting: a set of
conditions (events, causes) which causes an event, causes this event always. The set of conditions
here includes circumstances; it is not always easy to distinguish the cause and the circumstances of
an event, and there is often no need to do so. If a thunder causes fire in a dry woodland, we can call
the thunder the cause of the fire, and the dryness of the woodland the circumstance which made the
fire possible. But the cause and the circumstances are needed both for an event to take place, so that
their strict separation is not necessary. The cause of an event may not be completely known. The
fact that we do currently not know the exact course of an event does not mean that this event is not
causally determined. We do not know any other way of explaining phenomena (events) except in
terms of their causes. A non-caused event is something mystical; to call an event non-caused does
not mean to explain anything.

12. The best way to understand the issue of freedom and determinism is to ask yourself in
what conditions you would feel free, says Troy Organ. Would you feel free in a world which is not
causally determined, so that predictions are not possible? Probably not, because to make a free
choice, the consequences (effects) of this choice must be predictable, so that you can have a clear
expectation of the consequences of your choice (act). You could hardly feel free in a world in which
gravity was unpredictable, buildings were falling on streets, and any event could happen at any
moment at any place. Western thinkers have spent more time and energy on the problem of free will
than this issue deserves, says Organ. And their discourse about this issue has been imprecise and
inconsistent. A scientific discourse about physical reality requires the assumption of stable causal
relationships between entities. A coherent discourse about freedom obviously requires causal
relationships and determinism of physical reality.

2. Freedom as a prevalence

13. Various attempts have been made to soften determinism in a way that "opens the space"
for free will, but such attempts do not seem successful. On the other hand, my attempts to explain
that determinism does not present a problem do usually not manage to convince others. Let me try
one more time. Tomorrow at 5 pm I will be exactly at a certain place. I am a physical entity in the
physical world in which everything takes place in accordance with physical laws and causal
relationships. This means that the present state of the world, including myself as its part, determines
where I will be tomorrow at 5 pm. This is what determinism says, and I do not see anything
problematic in this. But what is with my freedom, you may ask: if my position tomorrow at 5 pm is
determined now, then I am not free to choose (now or tomorrow morning) to go somewhere else.
Perhaps; but the essential question here is what it means "to be free" or "to be free to choose".

14. Without defining (describing) the concepts of freedom and free choice in a clear and
precise way, arguments about freedom and free will are vague and without a clear meaning. I
always behave in the way I wish or I decided to do, to the extent that I am physically able of doing
this. But the question is in what sense can my choice (decision) be considered free. Is my choice
arbitrary or is it caused by something, and by what? Is my choice uncaused or there are some
causes behind it? Can anything be considered uncaused? In what sense can a choice be considered
free, if it is made for some reason? Is not such a choice causally determined? These are essential
questions, which most discussions do not mention. We will try to clarify and answer these questions
in the paragraphs that follow.

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 15. A person is a set (or structure) of forces which struggle with each other and with outer
forces. Each my decision (choice) is the result (outcome) of this struggle. What else could it be?
Other outcomes of this struggle (decisions, choices) have been imaginable, or "possible in
principle", but in the given constellation of forces they have not managed to materialize themselves.
This means that they were not real (material) possibilities. Every force is a tiny part of reality and it
makes an impact on the way reality (as a process) evolves. In that sense, I can consider myself free
in a deterministic reality: I, as a set (structure) of forces, play an active role in the shaping of reality
(the world). I am one set of forces among myriads of other ("outer") forces, which constantly
struggle (compete) with each other. The network of current outcomes of this struggle shapes reality,
or more precisely, this struggle and its outcomes are reality.

16. A separation of the entities (forces) which constitute me (which are "inner" to me) and
those that belong to the environment (which are "outer" to me) is difficult. The problem of how to
establish (define) a precise border between the "inner" and the "outer" of a person is not essential
for the present discourse, but this problem exists. In any case, my freedom consists in the fact that
the forces (impulses, desires) which constitute me are acting, and the stronger among them make
larger impacts on the process called reality, especially on the local reality, called my body and my
behaviour. This may not seem much, and some may not consider this enough for a "real freedom",
but I do not understand what else freedom could be. I am a part of the big play of existence, in
which I play a tiny role like other forces. It may be that it is already "decided" where I will be
tomorrow at 5 pm, but this is not relevant. I do not know this "decision" (nobody knows it), so that I
can feel free to go wherever I want, and this is how I do feel. But I also know that every entity,
including me, is part of the large play of existence, which follows its way and which cannot be
called either free or non-free, because it is unique and incomparable, and it shows no signs of a
personal will.

17. To answer the question whether a person is free or not, it is necessary to establish what
freedom and free will actually mean. But many people love to struggle about the issue of whether
something does exist or not, without trying to say what this something is. The basic question is what
the free will is; the question whether we possess it and in what sense comes after that. I do not know
what freedom could be beyond that what I said above: a "free choice" is the outcome of a struggle
of many forces. I do not know what other people mean when they speak about "free will", because
they do not say this in a precise and coherent way. I know that I can move my finger, but I do not
know what the claim that I can move my finger freely actually means. Does it mean that I can move
the finger without any reason? I do not think that there exists such an act, and if it existed, I would
consider it a chaotic behaviour rather than a free act. If I move a finger for some reason, then my act
is determined by that reason.

18. Free will is usually spoken about in the way that makes it a mysterious phenomenon. I
make a move M1 for some reason, and I do this if and only if I do not have a stronger reason to
make some other possible move M2. I am going to prepare my meal now; it may seem that I am
free to go for a walk instead of that, but I am not. The desire (or impulse) for meal is now the
strongest force in the set of forces that constitute me (or which I am) and I am not free to do
anything else now but to prepare my meal. If my desire to be slender (as a force in the set of forces
which are me) gets stronger, I may renounce the meal and go to role a stone to the top of the hill,
where I dwell now. But this "free choice" will again be the outcome of the struggle of forces. In any
case, freedom is not a matter of physics, biology or psychology: it is a matter of semantics, logic

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and a coherent discourse.

19. "We view the future as a realm of alternative possibilities; and which of these
possibilities materialize partly depends, we think, on what we ourselves freely choose to do", says
Michael Lockwood. This seems correct, except for one problem. We know what we do, but it is not
clear how we could prove that we "freely choose" what we do. It is not clear what it means to
choose freely. We do shape the future (that is, the future presents) by that what we do now, but the
concept of "free choice (will)" is not well defined or it is not defined at all. I know that I can do a
certain thing, but the claim that I can "freely choose" to do this thing says something else, and it
does not have a clear meaning. The universe is a deterministic system; each subject is a force in that
system: a force among countless forces. A force is neither "free" nor "non-free": it is simply a force.

20. I do not know what exactly I am, but I can imagine myself as a consciousness and a set
(or structure) of forces. I can consider myself free in the sense which I described above (as a set of
force among a myriad of forces), but not in some mystical sense beyond that. What goes beyond
that is a discourse without a clear meaning. I can be politically free and legally free (not in prison);
but to say that I am free to raise my left hand means nothing to me. I can raise my left hand, but
what does the claim that I am free to do that actually mean? Does this mean that I can do this
without any reason? On the other hand, if I do this because of some reasons - for example, to show
you that I am free - where is then freedom? Finally, to do something without a reason does not
mean to be free, but rather to behave in a random or chaotic way.

21. It has been said that determinism reduces people to helpless observers of their own fate,
but this is not so. The assumption that reality is deterministic does not imply that a person is a
helpless observer of her own fate, because each person is part of reality and a force among countless
forces which participate and struggle in the process called existence. More problematic is the
question what exactly a person (self) is. Theories of the mind have not managed to tell this in a clear
and coherent way. In fact, theories of the mind consist of several basic ideas, which do not tell
much either in formal or in operative terms. I assume here that a person is a set (structure) of forces
(impulses, desires); this is not enough for a theory, but it serves a purpose. A person does exist and
she is a set of forces which act at the stage of existence: this is enough to raise a person above the
level of a mere observer of her fate. The rules (laws of nature) according to which the outcomes of
this lasting struggle are decided are stable, and the outcomes depend on the strength of those forces
that a person is (consists of). Every person (as a set of forces) is an active player, as everything else
is. If this is not enough for her freedom, I do not know what else the freedom could be.

22 - It has been said that "there is no room" for the elusive free will in the world of atoms
and forces, chemical processes and neural impulses. Observed "from the inside, ... alternative
possibilities seem to lie open before us, ... and one of these possibilities is made actual by what we
do", says Thomas Nagel. But from the external perspective, the situation looks different. The
happening comprises acting and the circumstances (as perceived by the agent), as well as the agent
himself. There is no doing and there are no doers in such a world: there is only happening. "Given a
complete specification of the condition of the agent and the circumstances of action", it is not clear
how the agent could "contribute" anything "as source, rather than merely as the scene" of the
happening, concludes Nagel. I consider wrong the reducing of the "agent" to the "scene". The agent
is an active participant (player) in the play of existence, a force among forces. This makes the agent
free, in the sense I have described above. A person is not only an observer of the process of reality,
but is a factor that shapes this process. This is what the freedom of a person consists of. Some may

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not be happy with such a freedom, but I do not see what other kind of freedom could exist, and how
it could be coherently described.

23. A person, as a structure of forces, is what she is: to say that she is free in herself means
nothing. What does the internal freedom mean: that a person acts without any reason or cause? This
would be a chaotic behaviour rather than an authentic free behaviour. Freedom regards interactions
with the outer world: a person can be free in the context of a wider reality in the sense that it is an
active force which participates in the shaping of this reality. A subject can be considered free in
relation to its environment, but it is not clear what the claim that a person is internally free actually
means. Such claim suggest that the person is free from herself, which is a rather mystical discourse.
A self, as a structure of forces is what it is; the claim that it is free in itself is vague or empty. A self
is free in the context of the wider reality in the sense that it is an active force that participates in the
shaping of this reality.

24. A person cannot be free from her features (impulses, desires) because these features are
what the person is. I can call myself free to the extent that I am free from outer impediments; but I
cannot be free from my desires, because they are me. Should desires be considered free? If we
consider desires basic (elementary) forces, then they are neither free nor non-free: they simply are
such as they are. The fact that the forces which constitute me compete with other forces in the
process of existence makes me feel free. But basic forces cannot be considered either free or non-
free: they simply are what they are. A "self", as a structure of forces (impulses, desires), simply is
what it is; to say that it is internally free means nothing. What could this "internal freedom" mean:
that there is something above (beyond) impulses, desires and reasons, and that this something
governs person's behaviour? What could this something be? Freedom is a struggle of forces, and it
regards interactions of a person (self) with the outer world.

25. I consider myself a free person, in the sense that I am a structure of forces that struggle
with other forces in the process of existence, in which myriads of forces ceaselessly struggle with
each other. There is no any other kind of freedom either in the causally determined world or in a
coherent image of such world. I can call my "free choice" (or will) what comes from my mind (a
desire), but I know that every such choice is the product of many forces (causes). Observed from a
large distance, nothing and nobody seems free: everything is caused and everything simply
happens. However, I consider appropriate to assume that freedom does exist and that it consists in
the fact that each person is an active player in the play of existence. This freedom comes down to
the fact that stronger (larger) forces in a person and in her environment prevail and have a larger
impact on the course of events. This may seem rather little for a big word such as freedom is, but I
do not see what more than that could exist.

26. Determinism is the only coherent view in the context of the scientific discourse about
reality, and it does not exclude freedom. On the contrary, it is not possible to speak about freedom
in a coherent way without determinism. To be free means to be able to choose; to choose, one must
have a reliable expectation about the consequences of a choice; the consequences of an act (choice)
can be foreseeable (expected) only if events are causally determined and predictable. Therefore,
freedom can exist only in the reality (world) in which events are causally determined. "All one can
say about freedom and determinism is that the former is inconceivable without the latter", says Troy
Organ. This may not be all, but this is correct.

27. The assumption that a "free choice" cannot exist in the reality in which phenomena are

7
causally determined is vague. Every force is "free" to "choose" according to its ability to prevail in
the struggle with other forces. If events were not causally determined, it would not be possible to
speak about free choice in a coherent way; on the other hand, it is possible to speak about freedom
in a deterministic reality. A discourse about freedom as a causeless behaviour is very vague: such
discourse is mystical or meaningless. Should such freedom transcend laws of physics or biology or
of the legal system? Some people are ready to sacrifice the coherence of discourse with the aim to
preserve their mythical and mystical freedom, but such sacrifices do not help because they do not
achieve anything.

28. In spite of my deterministic understanding of existence, I feel free to take a break in my

writing now. I know that my free decision to do this is the result of many factors (causes); but so
what: what else could a decision be if not the result of certain reasons? On what basis could I decide
anything if not on the basis of some factors that make me take a decision? And this is exactly what
determinism says. But am I free not to take a break now? In principle yes, of course; but the
relevant factors (forces, causes) are such that I will take a break now.

3. Determinism and responsibility

29. Determinism has been challenged from various sides. How can a person be considered
responsible for what she has done if the world is deterministic? - runs one critical question. A
defendant in a court can admit that he committed the act he has been accused for, but he can claim
that he is not responsible for what he has done, because he was determined to do what he has done.
"I understand you perfectly" - replies the judge - "and I know that if I were you, I would have
committed the same thing you have done. But I happened to be the judge, and I am determined to
sentence you to six months in prison, in the same way as you would sentence me if you were me
and I were you". In sum, determinism does not change anything in practical terms. The fact that the
behaviour of people is causally determined does not make the discourse about responsibility
meaningless. On the contrary, rewards and punishments are forces (incentives) by means of which a
society exerts its influence on the behaviour of its members. If reality were not deterministic,
rewards and punishments would make no sense, because it would not be possible to know what
effects they would have.

30. Determinism does not change anything in the scope of rewarding and punishment,
although many people have difficulties with the understanding this fact. Let us mention that the
court of law takes mental insanity as the sufficient reason not to consider a person responsible for
what she has done. But the question is whether those perpetrators of criminal acts who have been
considered mentally sane were really able ("free") not to do what they have done. They could be
considered victims of their mental constitutions, of what they have experienced in their lives, and of
the circumstances in which they found themselves. Such questions are difficult to answer for
various reasons, and we cannot deal with such issues here. We can only say that determinism does
not change anything in the scope of juridical practice, because if offenders are determined to
commit crime, judges are determined to sentence them for these crimes. The concept of
responsibility is actually superfluous. Society adopts and practices certain institutional responses
(punishments) for certain behaviours (offences) with the aim to deter people from such behaviours.
This is all that is needed in this regard and nearly all that can be said about this issue in a coherent
way.

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 31. There are claims that if reality were deterministic then it would make no sense to
commend or to condemn a person for her ethical attitudes and behaviour, because a person could
not be considered responsible for her attitudes and behaviour. "Praise and blame, reward and
punishment become pointless if the individual was unable to do otherwise", says Burton Porter.
This is a shallow and wrong discourse. Praises and blames are forces (incentives) which are
expected to exert influence on the person to whom they are addressed, as well as on the behaviour
of others. Such expectations are based precisely on the assumption that reality - physical, mental
and social - is deterministic. Rewards and punishments would be useless and pointless if reality
were not deterministic. In such a case, it would not be possible to know the effects of any action, so
that all actions would become pointless.

32. "There is no point in making any moral recommendations if everyone must think and act
as they do, if their behavior is unavoidable and unchangeable", says Porter. This is a vague and
wrong discourse. The claim that behaviour is "unavoidable and unchangeable" suggests that we, as
individuals and society, cannot change anything, and that it is the same what we do. But this is not
so. Behaviour is determined by causes, so that a behaviour can be avoided or changed by changing
the causes (forces) that have impact on it. This is why a society must promote ethical rules of
conduct, and practice punishment and rewarding, as the forces (means) that exert influence on the
behaviour of its members. And for punishment and rewards to have the expected effects, reality
must be deterministic. The negation of determinism does not lead to freedom and responsible
behaviour, but to chaos. By rewarding and condemning, society exerts influence on future events
and tries to control them. Hence, society has to reward and condemn its members.

33. Determinism does not change anything in the social practice of praising and blaming, as
well as it does not change anything in the legal practice. Society condemns what it considers
harmful and what it does not want to happen; society praises what it considers useful and what it
wants to promote among its citizens. That is nearly all. Society does not condemn people simply
because they "caused" something or are "responsible" for something. Society condemns people with
the aim to discourage certain kinds of behaviour and to protect its members and itself from such
behaviour. A serial killer may not be "responsible" for the fact that he is such as he is, but society
must stop him and try to deter others from behaving like him; in this way the society protects its
members and itself. A punishment may not be (or seem) just, but it serves practical purposes. In any
case, if determinism compels a criminal to commit a crime, it also compels the judge to sentence
him, so that everything functions normally. On the other hand, the absence of determinism leads to
chaos.

34. I presented the issue of determinism and free will, and proposed a simple solution to this
perennial problem. Some questions always remain open to a certain extent. One such issue is the
definition of a person (self); the issue of what counts as an impediment (to a free activity) is also
rather open. In any case, I consider causal determinism the only coherent and useful view of reality,
so that I have no choice but to be a causal determinist. Determinism cannot be proved either correct
or wrong in the empirical way. Causal determination of events is a basic metaphysical assumption,
without which we would not be able to explain events in rational way. Determinism can be analysed
and discussed in the context of other assumptions (metaphysical and psychological) as well as in
terms of its logical and practical consequences. But determinism cannot be proved beyond the level
of consistency of discourse and rationality of explanation. We hold that we have shown that the
discourse of determinism is consistent, which is more than it can be said for the discourse of those
who criticise it.

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 4. A play with vague concepts

35. Some existentialist authors push the discourse about freedom to the extreme. They argue
that every individual is completely free to choose his values, aims and behaviour as he wants. This
may look appealing, but this is a shallow play with words. What does it mean to be completely free?
Am I free not to feel pain in my left knee; to marry the Miss of China; to become the king of India,
or an Indian elephant? Am I free to be young and rich; to live forever; to jump through the window
here and now? Every person lives in a space shaped (determined) by many factors and limitations,
as well as by her personal needs and aspirations. Personal situation and aspirations, as well as the
material and social environment, determine the behaviour of every person. The scope of freedom of
an individual may seem large, but when all factors are taken into consideration, this scope radically
shrinks. People seem free to a much larger extent than animals, trees and rivers are, but the
discourse about absolute freedom is vague or meaningless. Is a sane person free not to feel sadness
and regret when faced with a tragic event? Where does the freedom end, and necessity begins? It is
difficult to answer to such questions, and the discourse of existentialists does not help in this regard.
Their discourse about freedom is mostly a trivial and often irresponsible play with vague concepts.

36. Existentialists argue that we are radically free, and that we have no way to get rid of our
freedom, because we choose freely also when we choose to discard our freedom. Whatever we do,
we always act freely and we are always responsible for what we do and for what we make of
ourselves. The awareness of their radical freedom frightens people and fills them with anguish;
hence, most people try to run away from their freedom, say existentialists. Such discourse looks like
an empty play with words, because human reality is exactly the opposite. Anguish does not spring
from the awareness of radical freedom, but from the lack of freedom and choice. Anguish springs
from the awareness of our radical limitation and impotence. Our sublime desires often cannot be
realized; our great endeavours are often spoiled by accidents and other forces. The tragic sense of
life springs from the awareness of the radical limitation of human life. This holds for every mortal
human being, but for many people the lack of freedom and opportunity in this life and world is very
painful and harmful. Countless people live and die in harsh conditions which they have no real
possibility to change or escape. Countless people are compelled to live in misery and to suffer
injustice and abuses. To claim that people live in anguish because they are radically free seems
perverse and cruel towards more than a billion people who do not have food or clean water today,
and towards countless helpless victims of all sorts of monsters and madmen around the world.

37. Such interpretation of the existentialist discourse may look partial, but they describe
human reality in strange way which I consider wrong and misleading. They claim that people try to
get rid of their "burden of freedom" by adopting various narratives and fashions. But people adopt
narratives and join cultural and political communities because they have such mental and social
needs. People do not adopt narratives and join communities because they are afraid of being free,
but because they are afraid of being alone, and because they are exposed to strong social pressures
to do so. Most people live in a social environment which compels them to adopt its narrative and
way of behaviour to be able to live and survive. At the most basic level, people are beings whose
desires and aspiration transcend their possibilities. This fills people with the sense of limitation and
impotence (or "anguish") rather than with the sense of freedom. We must get old and die, which has
not been our free choice. People adopt religions and other narratives and behaviours, with the aim to
transcend their painful sense of impotence rather than with the aim to run away from their freedom.

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There are some good things in the existentialist narrative, but it contains things which I consider
wrong and harmful.

38. Existentialists argue that "existence precedes essence", because what a person is at a
given moment, is the result of the past free choices that she has made. The mysterious claim that
existence precedes essence is wrong. Because the past choices were the consequences of what a
person has been - of her essence - which manifests itself in specific choices that she made in given
situations. What else can determine a choice that a person makes if not her essential features
(inherent needs, fears and desires) and the circumstances in which she finds herself? "During the
course of our 'upsurge' into the world, we acquire various characteristics, some of them of crucial
importance in our biographies", explains David Cooper. "We become writers, criminals, cowards,
or whatever. We acquire, if you so wish, essences". This is wrong; essence is exactly that what we
do not acquire; essence is something we have always already had. To be a writer or a waiter is
nearly the same; profession is not an essential element (feature) of being a person and a human
being. The essential features of human beings regard their inherent limitations, anxieties and
yearnings. We desire to be forever young, but we are getting old and we must die, and we are aware
of all that; we are pervaded with anxiety because of our limitations and ephemerality, and with
yearning for that which we cannot attain. These are the essential elements of human nature - or the
essence of being a human being. This is the essence of every human being, writers and waiters
included.

39. I am free to follow my wishes, says Schopenhauer, but I am not free to choose my
wishes. In other words, a person can do what she wishes, but she cannot choose her wishes: she
cannot decide what her wishes are. Einstein was allegedly impressed by this claim (fact), so that he
adopted determinism. But the issue of choosing among the existing wishes is not so simple as it
may seem. Some people make strange choices which are the consequences of their peculiar mental
constitutions and mental states rather than of a great freedom of choice. A person may choose to
spend three days in a cage with a hundred poisonous snakes, for fun or with the aim to break the
world record, but I am not impressed by the freedom of her choice. I feel sorry for such a person; I
do not see a great freedom in her act, but rather a desperate desire (need) to become "somebody" by
doing something extraordinary, regardless of how meaningless and harmful it may be. In sum,
without taking into account all factors that influence a choice, a discourse about the free choice is
vague and mostly worthless. Every decision is a product of some factors; otherwise, it would not be
a decision at all, but an arbitrary act. The claim that we cannot choose which wishes we have is
correct, but a discourse about the choosing freely among the existing wishes is problematic.
Concepts of free will and free choice are problematic at all levels of observation and discourse.

5. Technological and social determinism

40. Roughly speaking, technological determinism argues that technological changes cause
changes in society, and that technology shapes human lives and history. Such a claim can be
considered obviously correct and obviously wrong. It is correct, because technology has facilitated
many activities and enterprises which would not have been feasible without technology. It is wrong,
because technology does not cause anything; people are the ones who act and who cause events.
People create and use technological means led by their needs and inclinations, as well as by the
dominant narrative and socioeconomic system of the society in which they live. More efficient
technological means have allowed those who have possessed them to impose their power and will

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upon those who have been technologically weaker. If technological determinism claims that people
have shaped the world and history by means of technology, then it is obviously right. But if
technological determinism claims that technology itself has shaped the world and history, than it is
trivially wrong.

41. The position opposite to technological determinism argues that the development and use
of technology have been caused and shaped by social factors. This means that social and historical
effects and events, which technology has facilitated are socially determined. This view is called by
names such as social determinism, social constructivism, SST (Social Shaping of Technology) and
others. Technological determinism has been described in different ways, and the view that opposes
it has been described in different ways too, so that the names mentioned above do not necessarily
mean the same to all people. Technological determinism presents technology as an autonomous
force which changes society and history; contrary to this, social determinism considers technology
and the ways it is used a product of human needs and inclinations. We will call this view psycho-
social determinism because it stresses the role of individual inclinations (human nature) and the
tendencies in the behaviour of communities. We argue that technological and psycho-social
determinism are two sides of the same story, but that the latter view is much closer to the truth.
Human inclinations, which manifests themselves in narratives and in socioeconomic systems,
determine the development and use of technology, and with this the course of history.

42. In the context of the discourse about technological determinism there are claims that
technology has become autonomous, in the sense that it develops according to its own logic, and
that its development is mainly out of human control. Such claims are vague; technology does not
have any logic; the alleged logic of technology is a manifestation of the logic of human inclinations
and behaviour. People have needs, fears and desires, which determine their behaviour. The alleged
logic of technology is the logic of people: not of every individual, but of those power-holders who
have the possibility to exert impact on the course of events. People develop those technologies
which they need and wish to have, and they use them in the ways which are determined by their
needs and passions. Technology by itself neither causes events nor acts autonomously; technology
is only a means. People and societies create technologies and use them in the ways they do, and by
this they determine the way (history) of humanity.

43. When a technology becomes widely used, it often seems that it cannot be controlled by
anybody any more. It seems impossible to withdraw from use technologies such as the internet and
mobile telephones, but this is not because of the logic of technology, but because of people's
individual and collective needs and desires. Curiosity, a desire for adventure, the will for power and
domination belong among human features; people also need communication, friendship and love.
These and other needs and inclinations determine what kind of technologies people develop and in
what ways they use them. People's individual and collective needs, inclinations and aspirations are
the forces that shape technology, society and history. In their activities people use technology, but
this does not mean that technology causes the behaviour of people and determines the course of
history. People do that by means of technology.

44. The development and use of science and technology has been directed by human needs
and inclinations. Technology reveals these needs and inclinations, much more than it changes them.
People are restless creatures and they love to explore their world and themselves, often touching
extremes. Power and action are their passion and aim; technology gives operative power and
facilitates action, and because of that most people love technology. Technology is the expression

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and product of human needs and inclinations at the individual and collective level, as well as the
means by which people aim to realize their needs, inclinations and aspirations. People and their
technologies live and act together, but people are the ones who shape this interactive relationship,
and their historical way towards the horizon of the possible. Technological changes are not the
cause of social changes; technology facilitates many things, but it is not the cause that people do
these things. Technologies related to transportation and military power have facilitated conquests,
colonialism and global wars, but they have not caused them. These technologies have only
facilitated the realization of people's inclinations - especially of the inclinations of power-holders
who control the development of new technologies and the ways in which they are used. Technology
has played an essential role in people's lives and in history, but human inherent anxieties and
yearnings have been the moving forces of history and they have shaped its ways.

45. New technologies open new possibilities of the realization of individual and collective
inclinations, but these technologies do not decide which of these possibilities people will choose.
Speaking in operative terms, technology shapes human life and history, but it does this in the ways
that people decide; technology itself has been chosen and produced by people and their desire for
operative power. Technology does not determine individual choices, social and cultural changes,
and the course of history: it only makes them possible. Technology opens many ways, but people
decide which one they will follow and how they will move along that way. Technology does change
the world and history, but only as a means; it always does this in the ways determined by human
needs and ambitions. People are the only entities that can be said to determine events and that can
be considered autonomous. Human inherent anxieties and yearnings are the autonomous entities
which govern everything else. Technology is a product of these anxieties and yearnings; it is the
means by which people try to calm down their anxieties and fears, to find an outlet for their
restlessness, and to satisfy or spend their yearnings. The appearances of new technologies have
often been followed by certain social changes and historical events. But technology itself does not
determine changes and events; it makes them possible, but they are caused by people and by their
anxieties and yearnings, which are the basic forces that move people and history.

6. Concluding remarks

46. The perennial search for the "room for free will", in people and in the world, has
produced a lot of confused and incoherent discourse. What does the "room for free will" mean?
What does "free will" mean? What does "will" mean? These are essential questions, but passionate
seekers for freedom do not deal with such questions; they tirelessly seek for the mysterious "room".
Such a room does not exist, and even if it existed, we would not know what to put in it. There are
only countless forces and their ceaseless struggle; there is no free will beyond these forces and their
struggle. The issue of determinism and free will is not an empirical issue, but a conceptual issue, so
that empirical discoveries cannot solve it. Causal determination of phenomena is a basic
metaphysical (ontological) assumption, and it must be considered in a coherent way in the context
of other basic assumptions on which human cognition and discourse are based. Causal
determination of everything that happens is a metaphysical assumption, without which we could not
explain events in a rational way. We do not know how to explain the reality we perceive, except in
terms of causes and effects; all the rest is a play with vague concepts.

47. Technology is not autonomous, nor does it have its own logic which determines the
course of events and of history. The development and use of technology, as well as the structure of

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 social power and the course of history, manifest and materialize the logic of human situation and
inclinations. Technology opens new possibilities of human activities; the decisions that people take
in this space of possibilities determine our fate as individuals and as human community. If there is
any autonomy in all this, it belongs to people; if there is anybody who chooses and decides, these
are people; if the course of events follows a logic, this is the logic of people and of their needs and
inclinations; if there is a will that shapes our lives and the course of history, this is the will of
people. The possibilities that technology gives to people influence the choices they make, but
people are the ones who are autonomous, who choose, who have a logic (nature) and will. But the
concept "people" is vague. Most people have very little possibility to exert a relevant impact on the
world in which they live. The most aggressive people seize the power and they chose and decide for
all of us: they shape the world and our lives. People are the one who decide, not technology, but
some people (power-holders) decide for all of us. It is another matter what common people would
do if they had the power to do what they want, but we cannot deal with this matter here. Let me
only mention that "the will of the people" can be equally bad as the will of the masters.

48. People produced a sufficient technological power to destroy themselves, together with
virtually all other forms of life on the earth. Good people always hope that this will not happen but
this may happen. A nuclear war could be started by a madman and then it would be difficult to stop
it. A total destruction could happen accidentally, by mistake, or by an event of a new kind which we
do currently not know. The destruction may not take place at once, in the form of a dramatic event;
a self-destruction may take place gradually and slowly, and it may already be taking place. We may
already be on the way of self-destruction, and we may not be able to change this way, to abandon it.
Not because technology compels us to follow the way of self-destruction, but because the irrational
and destructive inclinations in human nature have prevailed. This is psycho-social determinism;
people are curious creatures.

***

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