Download the full version of the ebook now at ebookgrade.

com

Bolivar American Liberator

https://ebookgrade.com/product/bolivar-american-
liberator/

Explore and download more ebook at https://ebookgrade.com

 Recommended digital products (PDF, EPUB, MOBI) that
you can download immediately if you are interested.

American Slavery American Freedom

https://ebookgrade.com/product/american-slavery-american-freedom/

ebookgrade.com

American Cinema American Culture 4th Edition by John

Belton

https://ebookgrade.com/product/american-cinema-american-culture-4th-
edition-by-john-belton/

ebookgrade.com

All American Boys

https://ebookgrade.com/product/all-american-boys/

ebookgrade.com

American Born Chinese

https://ebookgrade.com/product/american-born-chinese/

ebookgrade.com
American Corrections 8th

https://ebookgrade.com/product/american-corrections-8th/

ebookgrade.com

American Corrections 9th

https://ebookgrade.com/product/american-corrections-9th/

ebookgrade.com

Magruder's American Government

https://ebookgrade.com/product/magruders-american-government/

ebookgrade.com

American Conspiracy Theories

https://ebookgrade.com/product/american-conspiracy-theories/

ebookgrade.com
Other documents randomly have
different content
 It does not much matter which of our two definitions of a “mind”
we adopt. Let us, provisionally, adopt the first definition, so that a
mind is all the mental events which form part of the history of a
certain living body, or perhaps we should rather say a living brain.
We can now tackle the question which is to decide whether we
are emergent materialists or not, namely:
Is a mind a structure of material units?
I think it is clear that the answer to this question is in the
negative. Even if a mind consists of all the events in a brain, it does
not consist of bundles of these events grouped as physics groups
them, i.e. it does not lump together all the events that make up one
piece of matter in the brain, and then all the events that make up
another, and so on. Mnemic causation is what concerns us most in
studying mind, but this seems to demand a recourse to physics, if
we assume, as seems plausible, that mental mnemic causation is
due to effects upon the brain. This question, however, is still an open
one. If mnemic causation is ultimate, mind is emergent. If not, the
question is more difficult. As we saw earlier, there certainly is
knowledge in psychology which cannot ever form part of physics.
But as this point is important, I shall repeat the argument in
different terms.
The difference between physics and psychology is analogous to
that between a postman’s knowledge of letters and the knowledge
of a recipient of letters. The postman knows the movements of
many letters, the recipient knows the contents of a few. We may
regard the light and sound waves that go about the world as letters
of which the physicist may know the destination; some few of them
are addressed to human beings, and when read give psychological
knowledge. Of course the analogy is not perfect, because the letters
with which the physicist deals are continually changing during their
journeys, as if they were written in fading ink, which, also, was not
quite dry all the time, but occasionally got smudged with rain.
However, the analogy may pass if not pressed.
 It would be possible without altering the detail of previous
discussions, except that of Chapter XXV, to give a different turn to
the argument, and make matter a structure composed of mental
units. I am not quite sure that this is the wrong view. It arises not
unnaturally from the argument as to data contained in Chapter XXV.
We saw that all data are mental events in the narrowest and strictest
sense, since they are percepts. Consequently all verification of
causal laws consists in the occurrence of expected percepts.
Consequently any inference beyond percepts (actual or possible) is
incapable of being empirically tested. We shall therefore be prudent
if we regard the non-mental events of physics as mere auxiliary
concepts, not assumed to have any reality, but only introduced to
simplify the laws of percepts. Thus matter will be a construction built
out of percepts, and our metaphysic will be essentially that of
Berkeley. If there are no non-mental events, causal laws will be very
odd; for example, a hidden dictaphone may record a conversation
although it did not exist at the time, since no one was perceiving it.
But although this seems odd, it is not logically impossible. And it
must be conceded that it enables us to interpret physics with a
smaller amount of dubious inductive and analogical inference than is
required if we admit non-mental events.
In spite of the logical merits of this view, I cannot bring myself
to accept it, though I am not sure that my reasons for disliking it are
any better than Dr. Johnson’s. I find myself constitutionally incapable
of believing that the sun would not exist on a day when he was
everywhere hidden by clouds, or that the meat in a pie springs into
existence at the moment when the pie is opened. I know the logical
answer to such objections, and qua logician I think the answer a
good one. The logical argument, however, does not even tend to
show that there are not non-mental events; it only tends to show
that we have no right to feel sure of their existence. For my part, I
find myself in fact believing in them in spite of all that can be said to
persuade me that I ought to feel doubtful.
There is an argument, of a sort, against the view we are
considering. I have been assuming that we admit the existence of
other people and their perceptions, but question only the inference
from perceptions to events of a different kind. Now there is no good
reason why we should not carry our logical caution a step further. I
cannot verify a theory by means of another man’s perceptions, but
only by means of my own. Therefore the laws of physics can only be
verified by me in so far as they lead to predictions of my percepts. If
then, I refuse to admit non-mental events because they are not
verifiable, I ought to refuse to admit mental events in every one
except myself, on the same ground. Thus I am reduced to what is
called “solipsism”, i.e. the theory that I alone exist. This is a view
which is hard to refute, but still harder to believe. I once received a
letter from a philosopher who professed to be a solipsist, but was
surprised that there were no others! Yet this philosopher was by way
of believing that no one else existed. This shows that solipsism is not
really believed even by those who think they are convinced of its
truth.
We may go a step further. The past can only be verified
indirectly, by means of its effects in the future; therefore the type of
logical caution we have been considering should lead us to abstain
from asserting that the past really occurred: we ought to regard it as
consisting of auxiliary concepts convenient in stating the laws
applicable to the future. And since the future, though verifiable if
and when it occurs, is as yet unverified, we ought to suspend
judgment about the future also. If we are not willing to go so far as
this, there seems no reason to draw the line at the precise point
where it was drawn by Berkeley. On these grounds I feel no shame
in admitting the existence of non-mental events such as the laws of
physics lead us to infer. Nevertheless, it is important to realise that
other views are tenable.
 CHAPTER XXVII
MAN’S PLACE IN THE UNIVERSE

In this final chapter, I propose to recapitulate the main conclusions

at which we have arrived, and then to say a few words on the
subject of Man’s relation to the universe in so far as philosophy has
anything to teach on this subject without extraneous help.
Popular metaphysics divides the known world into mind and
matter, and a human being into soul and body. Some—the
materialists—have said that matter alone is real and mind is an
illusion. Many—the idealists in the technical sense, or mentalists, as
Dr. Broad more appropriately calls them—have taken the opposite
view, that mind alone is real and matter is an illusion. The view
which I have suggested is that both mind and matter are structures
composed of a more primitive stuff which is neither mental nor
material. This view, called “neutral monism”, is suggested in Mach’s
Analysis of Sensations, developed in William James’s Essays in
Radical Empiricism, and advocated by John Dewey, as well as by
Professor R. B. Parry and other American realists. The use of the
15
word “neutral” in this way is due to Dr. H. M. Sheffer, formerly of
Harvard, who is one of the ablest logicians of our time.

15
See Holt’s Concept of Consciousness,
preface.

Since man is the instrument of his own knowledge, it is

necessary to study him as an instrument before we can appraise the
value of what our senses seem to tell us concerning the world. In
Part I we studied man, within the framework of common-sense
beliefs, just as we might study clocks or thermometers, as an
instrument sensitive to certain features of the environment, since
sensitiveness to the environment is obviously an indispensable
condition for knowledge about it.
In Part II we advanced to the study of the physical world. We
found that matter, in modern science, has lost its solidity and
substantiality; it has become a mere ghost haunting the scenes of its
former splendours. In pursuit of something that could be treated as
substantial, physicists analysed ordinary matter into molecules,
molecules into atoms, atoms into electrons and protons. There, for a
few years, analysis found a resting-place. But now electrons and
protons themselves are dissolved into systems of radiations by
Heisenberg, and into systems of waves by Schrödinger—the two
theories amount mathematically to much the same thing. And these
are not wild metaphysical speculations; they are sober mathematical
calculations, accepted by the great majority of experts.
Another department of theoretical physics, the theory of
relativity, has philosophical consequences which are, if possible,
even more important. The substitution of space-time for space and
time has made the category of substance less applicable than
formerly, since the essence of substance was persistence through
time, and there is now no one cosmic time. The result of this is to
turn the physical world into a four-dimensional continuum of events,
instead of a series of three-dimensional states of a world composed
of persistent bits of matter. A second important feature of relativity-
theory is the abolition of force, particularly gravitational force, and
the substitution of differential causal laws having to do only with the
neighbourhood of an event, not with an influence exerted from a
distance, such as gravitation formerly seemed to be.
The modern study of the atom has had two consequences which
have considerably changed the philosophical hearing of physics. On
the one hand, it appears that there are discontinuous changes in
nature, occasions when there is a sudden jump from one state to
another without passing through the intermediate states.
(Schrödinger, it is true, questions the need for assuming
discontinuity; but so far his opinion has not prevailed.) On the other
hand, the course of nature is not so definitely determined by the
physical laws at present known as it was formerly thought to be. We
cannot predict when a discontinuous change will take place in a
given atom, though we can predict statistical averages. It can no
longer be said that, given the laws of physics and the relevant facts
about the environment, the future history of an atom can
theoretically be calculated from its present condition. It may be that
this is merely due to the insufficiency of our knowledge, but we
cannot be sure that this is the case. As things stand at present, the
physical world is not so rigidly deterministic as it has been believed
to be during the last 250 years. And in various directions what
formerly appeared as laws governing each separate atom are now
found to be only averages attributable in part to the laws of chance.
From these questions concerning the physical world in itself, we
were led to others concerning the causation of our perceptions,
which are the data upon which our scientific knowledge of physics is
based. We saw that a long causal chain always intervenes between
an external event and the event in us which we regard as perception
of the external event. We cannot therefore suppose that the external
event is exactly what we see or hear; it can, at best, resemble the
percept only in certain structural respects. This fact has caused
considerable confusion in philosophy, partly because philosophers
tried to think better of perception than it deserves, partly because
they failed to have clear ideas on the subject of space. It is
customary to treat space as a characteristic of matter as opposed to
mind, but this is only true of physical space. There is also perceptual
space, which is that in which what we know immediately through the
senses is situated. This space cannot be identified with that of
physics. From the standpoint of physical space, all our percepts are
in our heads; but in perceptual space our percept of our hand is
outside our percept of our head. The failure to keep physical and
perceptual space distinct has been a source of great confusion in
philosophy.
In Part III we resumed the study of man, but now as he appears
to himself, not only as he is known to an external observer. We
decided, contrary to the view of the behaviourists, that there are
important facts which cannot be known except when the observer
and observed are the same person. The datum in perception, we
decided, is a private fact which can only be known directly to the
percipient; it is a datum for physics and psychology equally, and
must be regarded as both physical and mental. We decided later
that there are inductive grounds, giving probability but not certainty,
in favour of the view that perceptions are causally connected with
events which the percipient does not experience, which may belong
only to the physical world.
The behaviour of human beings is distinguished from that of
inanimate matter by what are called “mnemic” phenomena, i.e. by a
certain kind of effect of past occurrences. This kind of effects is
exemplified in memory, in learning, in the intelligent use of words,
and in every kind of knowledge. But we cannot, on this ground,
erect an absolute barrier between mind and matter. In the first
place, inanimate matter, to some slight extent, shows analogous
behaviour—e.g. if you unroll a roll of paper, it will roll itself up again.
In the second place, we find that living bodies display mnemic
phenomena to exactly the same extent to which minds display them.
In the third place, if we are to avoid what I have called “mnemic”
causation, which involves action at a distance in time, we must say
that mnemic phenomena in mental events are due to the
modification of the body by past events. That is to say, the set of
events which constitutes one man’s experience is not causally self-
sufficient, but is dependent upon causal laws involving events which
he cannot experience.
On the other hand, our knowledge of the physical world is purely
abstract: we know certain logical characteristics of its structure, but
nothing of its intrinsic character. There is nothing in physics to prove
that the intrinsic character of the physical world differs, in this or
that respect, from that of the mental world. Thus from both ends,
both by the analysis of physics and by the analysis of psychology, we
find that mental and physical events form one causal whole, which is
not known to consist of two different sorts. At present, we know the
laws of the physical world better than those of the mental world, but
that may change. We know the intrinsic character of the mental
world to some extent, but we know absolutely nothing of the
intrinsic character of the physical world. And in view of the nature of
the inferences upon which our knowledge of physics rests, it seems
scarcely possible that we should ever know more than abstract laws
about matter.
In Part IV we considered what philosophy has to say about the
universe. The function of philosophy, according to the view
advocated in this volume, is somewhat different from that which has
been assigned to it by a large and influential school. Take, e.g.
Kant’s antinomies. He argues (1) that space must be infinite, (2) that
space cannot be infinite; and he deduces that space is subjective.
The non-Euclideans refuted the argument that it must be infinite,
and Georg Cantor refuted the argument that it cannot be. Formerly,
a priori logic was used to prove that various hypotheses which
looked possible were impossible, leaving only one possibility, which
philosophy therefore pronounced true. Now a priori logic is used to
prove the exact contrary, namely, that hypotheses which looked
impossible are possible. Whereas logic was formerly counsel for the
prosecution, it is now counsel for the defence. The result is that
many more hypotheses are at large than was formerly the case.
Formerly, to revert to the instance of space, it appeared that
experience left only one kind of space to logic, and logic showed this
one kind to be impossible. Now, logic presents many kinds of space
as possible apart from experience, and experience only partially
decides between them. Thus, while our knowledge of what is has
become less than it was formerly supposed to be, our knowledge of
what may be is enormously increased. Instead of being shut in
within narrow walls, of which every nook and cranny could be
explored, we find ourselves in an open world of free possibilities,
where much remains unknown because there is so much to know.
The attempt to prescribe to the universe by means of a priori
principles has broken down; logic, instead of being, as formerly, a
bar to possibilities, has become the great liberator of the
imagination, presenting innumerable alternatives which are closed to
unreflective common sense, and leaving to experience the task of
deciding, where decision is possible, between the many worlds
which logic offers for our choice.
Philosophical knowledge, if what we have been saying is correct,
does not differ essentially from scientific knowledge; there is no
special source of wisdom which is open to philosophy but not to
science, and the results obtained by philosophy are not radically
different from those reached in science. Philosophy is distinguished
from science only by being more critical and more general. But when
I say that philosophy is critical, I do not mean that it attempts to
criticise knowledge from outside, for that would be impossible: I
mean only that it examines the various parts of our supposed
knowledge to see whether they are mutually consistent and whether
the inferences employed are such as seem valid to a careful scrutiny.
The criticism aimed at is not that which, without reason, determines
to reject, but that which considers each piece of apparent
knowledge on its merits and retains whatever still appears to be
knowledge when this consideration is completed. That some risk of
error remains must be admitted, since human beings are fallible.
Philosophy may claim justly that it diminishes the risk of error, and
that in some cases it renders the risk so small as to be practically
negligible. To do more than this is not possible in a world where
mistakes must occur; and more than this no prudent advocate of
philosophy would claim to have performed.
I want to end with a few words about man’s place in the
universe. It has been customary to demand of a philosopher that he
should show that the world is good in certain respects. I cannot
admit any duty of this sort. One might as well demand of an
accountant that he should show a satisfactory balance sheet. It is
just as bad to be fraudulently optimistic in philosophy as in money
matters. If the world is good, by all means let us know it; but if not,
let us know that. In any case, the question of the goodness or
badness of the world is one for science rather than for philosophy.
We shall call the world good if it has certain characteristics that we
desire. In the past philosophy professed to be able to prove that the
world had such characteristics, but it is now fairly evident that the
proofs were invalid. It does not, of course, follow that the world
does not have the characteristics in question; it follows only that
philosophy cannot decide the problem. Take for example the
problem of personal immortality. You may believe this on the ground
of revealed religion, but that is a ground which lies outside
philosophy. You may believe it on the ground of the phenomena
investigated by psychical research, but that is science, not
philosophy. In former days, you could believe it on a philosophical
ground, namely, that the soul is a substance and all substances are
indestructible. You will find this argument, sometimes more or less
disguised, in many philosophers. But the notion of substance, in the
sense of a permanent entity with changing states, is no longer
applicable to the world. It may happen, as with the electron, that a
string of events are so interconnected causally that it is practically
convenient to regard them as forming one entity, but where this
happens it is a scientific fact, not a metaphysical necessity. The
whole question of personal immortality, therefore lies outside
philosophy, and it is to be decided, if at all, either by science or by
revealed religion.
I will take up another matter in regard to which what I have said
may have been disappointing to some readers. It is sometimes
thought that philosophy ought to aim at encouraging a good life.
Now, of course, I admit that it should have this effect, but I do not
admit that it should have this as a conscious purpose. To begin with,
when we embark upon the study of philosophy we ought not to
assume that we already know for certain what the good life is;
philosophy may conceivably modify our views as to what is good, in
which case it will seem to the non-philosophical to have had a bad
moral effect. That, however, is a secondary point. The essential thing
is that philosophy is part of the pursuit of knowledge, and that we
cannot limit this pursuit by insisting that the knowledge obtained
shall be such as we should have thought edifying before we
obtained it. I think it could be maintained with truth that all
knowledge is edifying, provided we have a right conception of
edification. When this appears to be not the case it is because we
have moral standards based upon ignorance. It may happen by good
fortune that a moral standard based upon ignorance is right, but if
so knowledge will not destroy it; if knowledge can destroy it, it must
be wrong. The conscious purpose of philosophy, therefore, ought to
be solely to understand the world as well as possible, not to
establish this or that proposition which is thought morally desirable.
Those who embark upon philosophy must be prepared to question
all their preconceptions, ethical as well as scientific; if they have a
determination never to surrender certain philosophic beliefs, they are
not in the frame of mind in which philosophy can be profitably
pursued.
But although philosophy ought not to have a moral purpose, it
ought to have certain good moral effects. Any disinterested pursuit
of knowledge teaches us the limits of our power, which is salutary;
at the same time, in proportion as we succeed in achieving
knowledge, it teaches the limits of our impotence, which is equally
desirable. And philosophical knowledge, or rather philosophical
thought, has certain special merits not belonging in an equal degree
to other intellectual pursuits. By its generality it enables us to see
human passions in their just proportions, and to realise the absurdity
of many quarrels between individuals, classes, and nations.
Philosophy comes as near as possible for human beings to that
large, impartial contemplation of the universe as a whole which
raises us for the moment above our purely personal destiny. There is
a certain asceticism of the intellect which is good as a part of life,
though it cannot be the whole so long as we have to remain animals
engaged in the struggle for existence. The asceticism of the intellect
requires that, while we are engaged in the pursuit of knowledge, we
shall repress all other desires for the sake of the desire to know.
While we are philosophising, the wish to prove that the world is
good, or that the dogmas of this or that sect are true, must count as
weaknesses of the flesh—they are temptations to be thrust on one
side. But we obtain in return something of the joy which the mystic
experiences in harmony with the will of God. This joy philosophy can
give, but only to those who are willing to follow it to the end,
through all its arduous uncertainties.
The world presented for our belief by a philosophy based upon
modern science is in many ways less alien to ourselves than the
world of matter as conceived in former centuries. The events that
happen in our minds are part of the course of nature, and we do not
know that the events which happen elsewhere are of a totally
different kind. The physical world, so far as science can show at
present, is perhaps less rigidly determined by causal laws than it was
thought to be; one might, more or less fancifully, attribute even to
the atom a kind of limited free will. There is no need to think of
ourselves as powerless and small in the grip of vast cosmic forces.
All measurement is conventional, and it would be possible to devise
a perfectly serviceable system of measurement according to which a
man would be larger than the sun. No doubt there are limits to our
power, and it is good that we should recognise the fact. But we
cannot say what the limits are, except in a quite abstract way, such
as that we cannot create energy. From the point of view of human
life, it is not important to be able to create energy; what is important
is to be able to direct energy into this or that channel, and this can
do more and more as our knowledge of science increases. Since
men first began to think, the forces of nature have oppressed them;
earthquakes, floods, pestilences, and famines have filled them with
terror. Now at last, thanks to science, mankind is discovering how to
avoid much of the suffering that such events have hitherto entailed.
The mood in which, as it seems to me the modern man should face
the universe is one of quiet self-respect. The universe as known to
science is not in itself either friendly or hostile to man, but it can be
made to act as a friend if approached with patient knowledge.
Where the universe is concerned, knowledge is the one thing
needful. Man, alone of living things, has shown himself capable of
the knowledge required to give him a certain mastery over his
environment. The dangers to man in the future, or at least in any
measurable future, come, not from nature, but from man himself.
Will he use his power wisely? Or will he turn the energy liberated
from the struggle with nature into struggles with his fellow-men?
History, science, and philosophy all make us aware of the great
collective achievements of mankind. It would be well if every
civilised human being had a sense of these achievements and a
realisation of the possibility of greater things to come, with the
indifference which must result as regards the petty squabbles upon
which the passions of individuals and nations are wastefully
squandered.
Philosophy should make us know the ends of life, and the
elements in life that have value on their own account. However our
freedom may be limited in the causal sphere, we need admit no
limitations to our freedom in the sphere of values: what we judge
good on its own account we may continue to judge good, without
regard to anything but our own feeling. Philosophy cannot itself
determine the ends of life, but it can free us from the tyranny of
prejudice and from distortions due to a narrow view. Love, beauty,
knowledge, and joy of life: these things retain their lustre however
wide our purview. And if philosophy can help us to feel the value of
these things, it will have played its parts in man’s collective work of
bringing light into a world of darkness.
 INDEX

Æther or empty space, 107

Analogy, positive and negative, 271
Analysis of Sensations (Mach), 292
Animal Intelligence (Thorndike), 30
Animal learning, study of, 29 ff.
Thorndike’s laws of, 31 f.
learned reactions, 35 f.
A priori, causation not regarded as, 150
knowledge, 249 f., 265
probability, on Keynes’s theory, is, 274
logic, 296
Aristotle, 226
Association, principle of, 33 f., 48, 64, 180
Aston, Dr. F. W., 99
Atom, theory of the, 98 ff.
centre from which radiations travel, 157
philosophical consequences of modern study of the, 293
Attention, 205

Bacon, 80
Behaviourism, its view of man, 70 ff.
where it breaks down as a final philosophy, 129
dilemma put to, 133
its propositions as to thought examined, 169 ff.
and logic, 263
Behaviourism (Watson), 22, 31, 33
“Belief”, 254, 258 ff.
definition of, 261
Beliefs, defects in common, 3 ff.
Bergson, 71, 73, 198
Berkeley, 246 f.
Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage (Cannon), 218
Body, human, 25, 139
Bohr, Niels, his addition to the theory of atoms, 101 ff.
Bradley, monistic view of, 251
criticism of his argument against relations, 252
Braithwaite, R. B., 269
Brentano, 202
Broad, Dr., 188, 195, 282, 292
Buddha, 227
Butler, Samuel, 71

Cannon, 218
Cantor, Georg, 296
Casuistry, 225
Causation, as an a priori belief, 5, 150
notion of “necessary” sequence, 115
conception of, in science, 144 ff.
“Cause”, Kant’s category of, 248 f.
“Chrono-geography”, 283
Cognition, 61, 202 f., 217
Conation, 202
Conception, 203
“Conditioned reflexes”, 35
Confucius, 227
Conscience, 228
“Consciousness”, 60
William James’s views on, 210
two different meanings of the word, 210
criticism of common sense view of, 211 ff.
self, 214
William James’s views approved, 217
one kind of mnemic effect, 288
Continuity in nature, 108
Correlation, laws of, 117
Critique of Practical Reason (Kant), 249
Curiosity, 220

Dalton, 98
“Data”, 266 f., 276
De Broglie, 278
Decalogue, the, 227
Descartes, 9, 162 ff., 237 ff.
Desire, behaviourist view of, 90 f.
introspective view of, 221 ff.
Dewey, John, 292
Discontinuity in nature, 101, 106, 108
Dreams, 62, 127, 175, 176, 185, 189, 193
Dualism of mind and matter, 141, 239
Ductless glands, the, 218

Eddington, Professor, 273, 279

Education, 233
Einstein, 96, 116, 239, 242, 249
Electron, 99 ff., 118, 145
“Emergent” properties, 282
Emotions, essential physiological conditions of the, 118
subject to “Conditioning”, 119
generate irrational opinions, 120
Energy, radiation of, from matter into empty space, 145
propagation in empty space, 145
impact on matter in empty space, 146
Essays in Radical Empiricism (William James), 210, 292
Ethics, views of the ancients on, 227
theory that virtue consists in obedience to authority, 227 ff.
utilitarian theory of, 229 f.
the concept of “good”, 230
mainly social, 233
the supreme moral rule, 234 f.
Events, in physics, 110 f.
string of, 118 f.
“mental”, 141, 280 ff.
structure and mathematical laws of, 157
minimal, 277
matter constructed out of, 278
Experience, effects of, in a reaction to stimulus, 180 ff.

Familiarity, a stage in memory, 195 f.

Fear and Rage, 219
Feeling, as mental occurrence, 202
Forces, 111, 114, 117, 120 f.
Form, reaction to, 85 f.
Freudian “unconscious” the, 221

Galileo, 80
Generalisations, 271 f.
Geodesic, 112, 117
Geometry, as empirical as geography, 249 f.
Gestaltpsychologie, 37, 41, 43, 68, 247
Gravitation, 116 f., 145, 279
Griffith, Mr. Percy, 118
Habit-formation, 36
Habit-memory, 188, 196
Hegel, 227, 229, 251
Heisenberg, 96, 105, 278, 293
Heisenberg-Schrödinger theories of atomic structure, 243
Heraclitus, 251
Huc, Monsieur, 232
Hume, 180, 191, 247 f.

Images, visual, auditory and tactual, 176

behaviourist explanation of, 177 f.
difference between sensations and, 179 ff.
definition of, 184 f.
first stage in memory, 195
Imagination, analysis of, 190 ff.
essence of, 191
exceptional gifts of, 193
and belief, 193 f.
difference between memory and, 194
Induction problem of validity of, 14
as a practice, 80 f.
principle of, 268 f.
logical problem of, 269 ff.
Mr. Keynes’s examination of, 270 ff.
Inference, “physiological”, 13, 80 ff., 135
syllogistic, 79
inductive and mathematical, 83 ff.
“Innate ideas”, doctrine of, 245
Interval, space-like and time-like, 110 f.
Introspection, 10, 11, 12, 172 f., 201 ff.

James, William, 210, 223.

Kant, 80, 201, 239, 248, 296
Keynes Mr., on problems of induction, 269 ff.
Köhler, 37 ff.
Knowing, as mental occurrence, 202
Knowledge, as displayed in reactions to environment, 17 ff.
perceptual, 58 ff.
behaviourist view of, 88 ff.
difference between introspective and other, 215
a priori, 249 f.
limitations on, imposed by structure of language, 264 f.
Knowledge-reaction, 216, 282

Language, as a bodily habit, 43 ff.

psychological side of, 48
words in an ideal logical, 256 f.
and things, relation between, 264
Laws, causal, 144 ff.
evidence for, 147
universal characteristics of, 149
Learning, laws of, 23, 29 ff.
two ways of, 39
in infants, 41, 48
by increase of sensitivity, 95 f.
Leibniz, 239, 241 f.
Le Problème logique de l’induction (Jean Nicod), 269, 273
Locke, 244 ff.
Logic, 263, 296
“Logical atomism”, 248

Mach, 214, 292

Man, his relation to the Universe, 292, 295, 298 ff.
Materialism, as a philosophy, 159
Mathematical Theory of Relativity (Eddington), 283
Matter, the structure of the atom, 98 ff.
essence of, 146 f.
as conceived in modern physics, 157, 293
old view of, now untenable, 158 ff.
constructed out of events, 278
permanence of, only approximate, 279
possibly a structure of mental units, 290
Maxwell’s equations, 107, 145
Meaning, 52, 71, 82
Meinong, 202
Memory, behaviourist theory of, 71 ff.
its reference to the past, 188 ff.
feeling of pastness complex, 190
more fundamental than imagination, 190
vital difference between imagination and, 194
Dr. Broad’s view on reference to the past, 195
stages of, 195 ff.
immediate, 196 f.
true recollection, 197 ff.
trustworthiness of, 199
Memory and testimony, 5 ff.
Mendeleev, 99
“Mental” events, 114, 141 f., 280 f.
“Mental” occurrences, 201, 212
Mentality of Apes (Köhler), 37 ff., 62
Mill, J. S., his canons of induction, 269 f.
Mind and matter, conventional notions of, 141
distinction between, illusory, 142, 201
gap between, how filled in, 148
interaction between, 150
theory of “neutral monism”, 206 ff.
Cartesian dualism, 239
Leibniz’s theory of, 241
Mind, a cross-section in a stream of physical causation, 150
modern conception of, 280 ff.
emergent from events, 284
definitions of a, 285 ff.
Minkowski, 239
Mneme (Semon), 49
“Mnemic” effects, 49, 209, 295
“Mnemic” occurrences, 49, 180 f.
Monads, 241
Monists and pluralists, controversy between, 251 ff.
pluralism the view of science and common sense, 253
Moore, Dr. G. E., on notion of “good”, 230
“Moral issues”, 227
Motion, 119, 163
Mystics, 229, 264, 300

Names, 53
Necessity, anthropomorphic notion of, 115, 117
“Neutral monism”, theory of, 206 ff., 210, 282, 292
Newton, 242
Nisbet, R. H., on probability, 275

Object, what happens when we see an, 146 f.

Objective and subjective study, 30
Objectivity, 154 f., 169
Ogden and Richards, Messrs., 52

Parmenides, monistic view complete in, 251

Parry, Professor R. B., 292
Perception, difference between introspection and, 10 f.
a species of sensitivity, 59, 123
and inference, 65 f.
from objective standpoint, 66 ff.
 of external event, analysis of, 123 ff.
element of subjectivity in, 130 ff.
and causal laws of physics, 145 ff.
its relation to the object causal and mathematical, 149
from introspective standpoint, 201 ff.
Perceptive knowledge, stages in act of, 18 ff.
Percepts, 133, 135, 137 ff.
Perspective, 152
Philosophy, the business of, 2, 236
Behaviourism as a, 129 ff.
Utilitarian, 229 f.
systems of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, 237 ff.
Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, 244 ff.
conscious purpose of, 299
Physics, modern, 97
causal laws in, 114 ff., 145 ff.
and perception, 123 ff.
spatial relations in, 137 ff.
our knowledge of, 151 ff.
only mathematical properties of, discoverable, 157
less deterministic than formerly, 239
and psychology, 282, 289
Pictures, as representations, 183
“Planck’s Constant”, 101 f.
Plato, 226
Poetry, 220
Probability, fundamental in science, 274
a priori on Mr. Keynes’s theory, 274
“frequency”, theory of, 274 f.
Psychology, 16, 172, 184
and physics, 282, 289
“Psychophysical parallelism”, 238
“Public good”, the, 230
Publicity, in the case of physical phenomena, 170

Quantum changes, 106

Radio-activity, 99, 103

Reactions, learned, 21, 33, 35, 36, 49, 81
Realism, naive, 175
Recognition, two forms of, 196
Recollection, true, 197 ff.
Relations, Bradley’s argument against, 252
cause of confusion about, 264
Relativity, theory of, “space-time” instead of one cosmic time
and space, 108
some results of the, 108 ff.
“events” instead of bodies moving, 110
relations between “events”, 110 f.
no “forces” in the, 111
philosophical consequences of the, 293
“Right conduct”, 230
Rutherford, Sir E., 99, 101

Santayana, Mr., 230

Schiller, Dr. F. C. S., 79
Schrödinger, 98, 105, 278, 293, 294
Self-observation, 126, 161 ff.
basis of Descartes’s system, 162 ff.
Dr. Watson’s views, 167 ff.
gives knowledge not part of physics, 175
Semon, 49, 180
Sensation, difference between images and, 179
acoleuthic, 197
as opposed to perception, 204
Sensitivity, 59 f., 88, 123, 177
Sentences, 51, 54, 75, 255, 264
Sequence, laws of, 116
Shakespeare, 192
Sheffer, Dr. H. M., 282, 292
Sight, compared with touch, 156 f.
Size, sense of, 153
Socrates, 226
“Solipsism”, 291
Sommerfeld, 103
Space, one persistent, abolished in relativity theory, 108
physical and perceptual, 137 ff., 241 f., 294
Space-time, in theory of relativity, 108 ff.
structure of, 145
point-instant in, 278
“Specious present”, 195, 197
Spinoza, 238, 251
Stars and Atoms (Eddington), 279
“Statement”, definition of a, 260
Subjectivity, 129, 133, 135, 154 f.
Substance, 5, 242 ff., 293
Syllogism, the, 80
Syntax, influence of, on philosophy, 243
connection between laws of physics and laws of, 263

Talking without thinking, 190

Tendency, quantitative laws of, 144
Testimony, 11 f., 170
The Analysis of Matter (Bertrand Russell), 278
The Meaning of Meaning (Ogden and Richards), 52
The Mind and Its Place in Nature (Dr. Broad), 76, 188, 282
Thorndike’s “provisional laws”, 31 ff.
Thought, 163 ff., 174, 240, 263
Time, not cosmic, 108 ff., 158
Touch, compared with sight, 156
Treatise on Probability (Keynes), 269 ff.
Truth, 94, 261 f.
Truth and Falsehood, causes of mystery about, 254
two questions in, 254 ff.
meaning of a sentence examined, 255 f.
grounds on which statements are regarded as true or false,
257
ultimate test of falsehood, 258
“belief”, 258 ff.
problems of, 259 ff.

Universals, 53, 203

Universe, the, philosophy concerned with, 236
man’s relation to, 298 ff.
“Unlearned Equipment”, 22
Utilitarian philosophy, 229 f.

Vitalists, 25
Volition, 61

Watson, Dr. J. B., 10, 21, 22, 31, 33, 35, 36, 37, 70 ff., 126 ff.,
162, 167 ff., 177, 188, 219, 223, 259
Waves in empty space, 107 f.
Whitehead, Dr., 159
“Will”, 223 f.
Willing, as mental occurrence, 202
Winds of Doctrine (Santayana), 230
Wish-fulfilment and dread-fulfilment, 194
Wittgenstein, 264
Words, purpose of, 11 f.
 as physical occurrences, 44 ff.
spoken and written, 46 f.
how acquired by infants, 48 ff.
meaning of, 52, 256
relations of, 56
in an ideal logical language, 256 f.
World, the physical, nature of our
knowledge of, 151 ff.
a four-dimensional continuum of events, 293
our knowledge of, purely abstract, 295

THE END
 NORTON BOOKS
Paul Bekker The Story of Music $3.50
Everett Dean Martin Psychology 3.00
The Meaning of a Liberal Education 3.00
Daniel Gregory Artistic Ideals
Mason 2.50

H. A. Overstreet Influencing Human Behavior 3.00

A Book About Ourselves 3.00
Bertrand Russell Philosophy 3.00
Thomas E. Tallmadge The Story of Architecture in

America 3.50
John B. Watson Behaviorism 3.00

THE NEW SCIENCE SERIES

Edited by C. K. Ogden

C. Judson Herrick Fatalism or Freedom 1.00

I. A. Richards Science and Poetry 1.00

Vilhjalmur Stefansson The Standardization of Error 1.00

Announcements of other volumes in this series, and a

complete catalogue of Norton Books sent on request

W · W · NORTON & COMPANY, INC.

70 Fifth Avenue New York
 Transcriber’s Notes
Hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a
predominant preference was found in the original book;
otherwise they were not changed.
Original text mostly placed commas and periods after
closing quotation marks, but occasionally placed them before
closing quotation marks. This inconsistency has not been
changed here.
Simple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced
quotation marks were remedied when the change was
obvious, and otherwise left unbalanced.
Footnotes have been sequentially renumbered and placed
just below the paragraphs that reference them.
The index was not checked for proper alphabetization or
correct page references.
Page 207: “this is a causal word” originally was printed as
“this a a causal word”; changed here by Transcriber.
*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PHILOSOPHY ***

Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions

will be renamed.

Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S.

copyright law means that no one owns a United States
copyright in these works, so the Foundation (and you!) can copy
and distribute it in the United States without permission and
without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, set forth in the
General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to copying and
distributing Project Gutenberg™ electronic works to protect the
PROJECT GUTENBERG™ concept and trademark. Project
Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if
you charge for an eBook, except by following the terms of the
trademark license, including paying royalties for use of the
Project Gutenberg trademark. If you do not charge anything for
copies of this eBook, complying with the trademark license is
very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose such
as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and
research. Project Gutenberg eBooks may be modified and
printed and given away—you may do practically ANYTHING in
the United States with eBooks not protected by U.S. copyright
law. Redistribution is subject to the trademark license, especially
commercial redistribution.

START: FULL LICENSE