raz - respect, neutrality and authority

On Respect, Authority, and Neutrality: A Response
Author(s): Joseph Raz

Source: Ethics, Vol. 120, No. 2 (January 2010), pp. 279-301
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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On Respect, Authority, and Neutrality:
A Response
Joseph Raz
I owe a great debt to Professors Wall, Darwall, and Green for their
willingness to challenge, develop, and question some of my publications,
which forced me to confront a few of the shortcomings in my views and,
I hope, to clarify and improve some of them. Given the diversity of the
topics, I respond to each separately. I aimed to avoid minor points and
to write only on matters which affect the cogency of my views or theirs
on important issues.1 For that reason, as well as for reasons of space,
not all the issues they raise are dealt with.
Green explains and criticizes one of the most basic aspects of my
view: the way in which values provide reasons. They do so in two ways:
we have reasons to engage with value, but we also have to respect value,
meaning respect what has value for the value it has. He subjects my
account of respect to close scrutiny, and my response will start there,
before moving to examine Wall’s suggestion that considerations not
unrelated to respect argue for the adoption of a moderate principle of
political neutrality. Darwall’s critique of my account of authority appears
to relate to one albeit central application of the foregoing theory of
value and reason, but is in fact much more far reaching, challenging
my view about the way values provide reasons, and my reaction to it will
conclude this reply.
I. RESPECTING PEOPLE: THE MODESTY OF THEORY
Green sensitively delineates the contours not only of my views on respect,
but of the way they fit in the general approach to practical thought that
I endorsed. He also points to various problems to which the approach
gives rise, or as I would prefer to put it, which this approach leaves
unresolved. As I would plead guilty to most of the charges, it is useful
to start with a few words about the general outlook that informed my
writings on respect. They will explain why I doubt the possibility of
1. In particular, I avoided any questions of minor misrepresentations of my views.
Ethics 120 ( January 2010): 279–301

䉷 2010 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0014-1704/2010/12002-
0007$10.00
279
280 Ethics January 2010
meeting, at the high level of generality found in general accounts of

respect, the charges Green raises.
It is common for writers on topics in practical philosophy to seize
on terms which figure prominently in ethical, political, or legal discourse
outside the academy, assign them explanations, and give them key roles
in the theoretical accounts or practical principles that those writers
develop. My writings on respect are a case in point. In doing so, we
signal an intention both to relate to a theoretical debate about respect,
as it developed over the years, and to explain something of importance
in practical thought in the culture in which the use of the term is
prominent. One difficulty we invariably encounter is that both the phil-
osophical tradition and the culture at large contain diverse, and partially
inconsistent, strands of thought. In using “respect” to name a special
type of practical reason, I was suggesting that invocations of respect for
persons in moral thought (outside the academy), or many of them, can
be explained as appealing to reasons of that type. I was also implicitly
endorsing some, and rejecting other, parts of the philosophical writings
on the subject. All that would have been plain enough had not the use
of the term in and out of philosophy been so diverse and complex that
it would be absurd for me to claim that other explications of it are
necessarily misguided or wrong. I make no such claim, no claim beyond
saying that the account I offered can shed light both on practical reasons
and on ideas about respect for persons current in our culture.
In writing on respect, I had some specific aims, most importantly
to separate the case for the value of people from questions about the
value of their life.2 More broadly, as Green explains, I argued that the
reason to respect people that derives from the value of persons, is but
one of the reasons to respect people,3 and that all of them arise out of
the value of what is to be respected. That conclusion too had—apart
from its theoretical significance in clarifying the ways in which values
provide reasons—practical implications. It was meant to suggest a way
of avoiding the halo sometimes attached to duties of respect to persons,
and open a way of integrating those reasons with other reasons people
have, which includes, among other implications, that reasons of respect
do not trump all others. This does not mean that there is no duty to
respect persons. It means that respect spills over, in the way that Green
explains, and that not every manifestation of respect is supported by a
particularly powerful reason. There is, in some quarters, a tendency to
2. Hence the contrast between chaps. 3 (the value of staying alive) and 4 (respecting
people) of Value, Respect and Attachment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
3. There usually are additional reasons to respect people, deriving from other valuable
qualities they or their life possess. Needless to say (it is likely that) only the reasons to
respect persons as persons apply equally to all persons.
Raz On Respect, Authority, and Neutrality 281
take any invocation of reasons of respect as a winner in any argument,

and often as an occasion for banging the table. Green’s example of the
BBC program about British Muslim views on sexuality is an excellent
example. I agree with his analysis. There may even be reasons to respect
Muslims which conflict with other reasons for respecting Muslims. Since
respect can be manifested in different ways, with different practical
significance, the reasons for the different manifestations of respect may
well conflict. Even single values often display internal complexity gen-
erating conflicting reasons.
It is worth underlining another point on which Green and I agree,
namely that the fact that people can recognize and cherish respect
shown to them, and resent its absence, adds to the complexity of the
issues, in no small measure because it introduces symbolic manifesta-
tions of respect, which are necessarily conventional at least in part and
therefore contingent on current practices, and those may and do differ
across communities, including those inhabiting the same country.
While agreeing with Green’s substantive comments on the diffi-
culties of determining what to do on specific occasions, I do not share
his worries about the shortcomings of my or other theoretical writings
in this regard. Green says that such cases “reflect the ways in which
theories of value, pitched at their most abstract, are insufficiently spec-
ified to tell us much about what is required in the situations that provoke
us to wonder about respect in the first place” (227). Of course, but we
should reject any theory which provides principles specific enough so
that regarding any practical issue, one can derive from them, plus a
description of the facts, what to do. In many cases, there is no single
right action. Moreover, and most importantly, what is to be done is often
determined not by reasons of respect alone, but by a range of consid-
erations, among which reasons of respect are but one. Judgment has to
be exercised in light of the complexities of the case. Such judgments
can be explained and justified by general considerations. But that does
not imply that it is possible to know of correct principles that would
justify those judgments ahead of time, that is, in ignorance of particular
cases to which they will apply. It does not even imply that there are such
principles.
Perhaps my reply to Green’s worry about respect inflation is that
it is a theoretical worry only if one believes that philosophy can solve
practical problems, and only if one takes reasons of respect to be nec-
essarily of very great importance. I believe in neither view. Modesty about
the power of theory leaves one with unresolved hard practical decisions.
But that is life, as they say. So, when Green asks, “Why should I contribute
money to preserve religious art that does not interest me, or that is even
wasted on me, instead of donating an identical sum to preserve a wil-
derness tract to which I am passionately committed?” I feel that it may
be an easy case, and that he should give the money to preserve the
wilderness (227). What I do not agree with is that there is a theoretical
issue here. The thought that my writings on the subject encounter a
difficulty here is probably based either on a desire for theoretically
provided decision procedures or possibly on the thought that reasons
of respect must trump others and leave no room for the influence of
personal attachments, which I discuss earlier in that book.
A word about duties will help to clarify the picture. Green correctly
states my explanation of the concept. It was, however, always meant in
the spirit of my observations above about explanations of respect and
other practical concepts in common use. ‘Duties’ is a particularly elusive
concept in practical discourse today. Perhaps because of the tendency
to rights inflation, typical of a complaint culture, it often appears as if
people take all moral reasons to constitute duties. It is doubtful that
the term can be given an interesting theoretical explanation that will
be even approximately faithful to its role in current moral discourse.
In any case, and this is my fault, in Value, Respect and Attachment, the
term is used loosely (the book consists of lectures addressed to a non-
specialist audience). One thought I had, though probably failed to ex-
press adequately, is that not all reasons of respect constitute duties. Most
importantly, there are reasons of respect that are not associated with
anyone’s right to be respected, and this includes some reasons to respect
people. For example, as I explained in the book, we have reasons to
have appropriate attitudes toward people, attitudes that acknowledge
their value and are appropriate given their value. But people do not
generally have a right that we should have such attitudes. And there
are other cases of reasons of respect which are neither duties nor as-
sociated with anyone’s rights.4
II. RESPECT: A NONINSTRUMENTAL UNDERSTANDING

The most serious challenge Green poses for my account of reasons of
respect reveals a serious shortcoming in my argument. He quotes me
writing: “If engaging with value is the way to realise value, respecting
value is the way to protect the possibility of that realisation” (218). And
he rightly points out that this makes reasons of respect appear to be
instrumental to the goal of engaging with value. One source of confusion
4. I should also mention that while Green distinguishes “(1) If one Js in regard to
A, then one has a duty to J respectfully” from “(2) One has a duty to J in regard to A,
because Jing is a way of respecting A,” I regard 1 as a special case of 2. My view that one
need not think of certain objects of value at all, but should have attitudes appropriate to
their value if one is aware of them, does not conflict with the fact that in order to meet
our obligations (still using the term loosely) to others, we have to make ourselves aware
of relevant conditions. Turning a blind eye, and so on, can be morally inappropriate. I
believe that neither I nor my book disagree with Green on this point.
is that behaving with respect naturally has causal consequences, includ-

ing a tendency to increase the likelihood that the respected object will
be engaged with in ways appropriate to its value. I do not wish to deny
the importance of this consideration, nor its relevance to assessing the
stringency of the reasons.
Reasons of respect having instrumental value means that the causal
consequences of compliance with them are, or are likely to be, of some
value. It does not mean that they are reasons which only people who
desire, or are committed to, the end which compliance will serve have.
They are what I call facilitative reasons, reasons which are valid in light
of the principle that “When we have an undefeated reason to take an
action, we have reason to perform any one (but only one) of the possible
(for us) alternative plans that facilitate its performance.”5 We have rea-
son to make it more likely that people will engage with value, and that
provides us with facilitative reasons to preserve objects of value. But
clearly these reasons are often not very stringent. Green is quite right
to point that out, and to point out that we tend to think that reasons
of respect are more important and have greater stringency than these
considerations would suggest.
Not that the facilitative importance of reasons of respect is negli-
gible. Even when the impact of individual action in isolation is small,
or nonexistent, it has value as contributing, again causally, to maintain-
ing or establishing a public culture of respect for value. The importance
of a public culture of appreciation of and concern for values, of all
kinds, is very great. One is tempted to say that, regarding many kinds
of value, a culture in which they are appreciated and respected is a
necessary condition for people developing a taste and an attachment
to them. Even when not a necessary condition, the existence of a sup-
portive culture is of great importance. What is always hard to gauge is
the effect on the culture of individual defection from it.
Whatever the instrumental or facilitative importance of reasons of
respect, the case I was making for their value was not instrumental.
Their dependence on engagement with value was meant to be normative
rather than causal. They are secondary to reasons to engage with value.
If there were no reasons to engage with value, the existence of objects
with values, of opportunities for valuable activities and the like, would
be pointless, and there would be no reason to respect them. So reasons
of respect depend in that way on reasons to engage. But they depend
on them in the additional way that respecting value both constitutes
and expresses openness to it. As one would expect, the boundary be-
tween openness to engagement and actual engagement with value can
5. See my “The Myth of Instrumental Rationality,” Journal for Ethics and Social Philosophy
1 (2005), http://www.jesp.org/articles/.
be thin. Regarding cultural goods and natural beauty, appreciation of

their value and respect for it is the beginning of and a part of engage-
ment with them. Though when the appreciation and respect do not
lead to deeper engagement, we would take them to have constituted
mere openness to the value. Respect for objects and opportunities of
value also expresses respect toward other people. Even if I do not care
for art, in respecting it, I express respect for, and openness toward,
people who may.
Respect for values is, in other words, noninstrumentally, or intrin-
sically, good. It is good in constituting and expressing a stance that I
called openness toward value. The openness can be greater or lesser
depending on other aspects of people’s normative and affective atti-
tudes. But it is natural to understand even its basic form as constituting
a degree of openness, just as it is natural to understand disrespect as
turning one’s back on what is disrespected.6
The expression of attitudes is generally partially conventional, and
therefore contingent. Respect is no exception. But some ways of ex-
pressing respect appear to be pretty universal. So far as I know, it is
pretty universal that care and respect are expressed in protecting and
preserving, while disrespect is expressed in indifference to preservation,
or even a desire to destroy. The fact that these are natural expressions
of respect, and that they are universally understood so, is at least part
of the case for regarding such behavior as constituting openness. And
similar considerations show that recognition of value, and the attitudes
that are apt toward objects of value, also constitute openness. These
thoughts and attitudes will be expressed with the sentence “that object
has value” only by people whose affective and intellectual lives are ab-
stract and impoverished. Normally they will be any of the myriad of
thoughts suitable to the occasion and the object, which can be described
as recognition of value, but are had by people who may not even have
the concept of value.
A final word about another of Green’s incisive questions: Do all
people have the same value and deserve the same respect? My answer
is no. People have much that is good and much that is bad about them,
and we have reason to respect them for whatever is good, and lack
respect for them for whatever is bad. But there is one reason for respect
that they all share: they are all persons (for I am using “people” as a
convenient plural of “person”). And as persons, they all deserve the
6. A fact which should be understood in ways which allow for the complexities of
human psychology, which may reverse normal meaning, as when one does something that
normally expresses rejection of another in order to express hurt, betraying one’s attach-
ment to that other. The normal always opens the possibilities of variations and reversals.
same respect, that which is due to persons.7 Of course, there may be

beings, perhaps animals of some other species, which are close to being
persons but are not quite persons, and perhaps some humans are in
that state too. The vast majority of humanity are persons, a state not
affected by IQ nor by the degree to which other faculties are developed.
The respect due to them is among the foundations of morality.
III. FROM RESPECT TO (LIMITED) NEUTRALITY?

I share the approach that informs Wall’s article as well as most of his
conclusions. Perhaps there is no practical question on which his views
bear, regarding which we would differ. But there is nevertheless a certain
difference that I would like to record. But first I need to set the scene
and indicate our agreement.
Wall agrees that the various doctrines of state neutrality advanced
so far are open to serious criticism and should be rejected. He articulates
one such principle, closely modeled on Rawls’s view: “[LSN:] It is im-
permissible for the state to intend to favor or promote any permissible
ideal of a good human life over any other permissible ideal of a good
human life, or to give greater assistance to those who pursue it. A per-
missible ideal of a good human life, for the purposes of this principle,
is an ideal of a good human life that is consistent with the requirements
of justice for a modern democratic society, where the requirements of
justice are not themselves founded on or tied to any particular ideal of
a good human life” (239).
He does, however, recommend a restricted neutrality principle:
“[RNP:] If two or more ideals of a good human life are eligible for
those who live in a particular political society, and if these ideals have
adherents in that political society, and if these ideals cannot be ranked
by reason as better or worse than one another, then the state, to the
extent that it aims to promote the good in this political society, should
be neutral between these ideals in its support of them” (238).
It is not clear how restrictive is the qualification “to the extent that
it aims to promote the good in this political society.” Possibly the qual-
ification does not restrict a perfectionist government at all, for by def-
inition the ideals of which it speaks are neither better nor worse than
each other, and therefore promoting one at the expense of the other
7. Some people believe that “deserve” (in “deserve respect”) is used “loosely” or in
a different sense from “deserve” in “deserve to be rewarded for their efforts” or in some
such context. Also, some may feel that the respect due to people qua people is different
respect from that due to, say, great composers qua great composers. I share neither of
these views. The grounds of, respectively, desert and respect in these examples differ, and
the respect may well have to be manifested (partly) in different ways. But the words are
used in the same sense in all these contexts and express the same concepts.
will not promote the good in that society.8 Some people may think that
the good is promoted if more people come to pursue one of these ideals
and are diverted away from ineligible or unworthy ones. We may suppose
that they could be attracted to one worthwhile and eligible ideal but
not to others. So according to those people, by preferring that ideal
over others, the state would be promoting the good. If this is the case,
then RNP has this practical implication: it excludes promoting the good
for this reason or in this way. It excludes consideration of the number
of people who follow or are likely to come to follow one or another
ideal principle. Other people would deny that the good is advanced if
more people pursue good and eligible ideals—their good is advanced
but not the good in some general sense. But then, I hope that in writing
about “promoting the good,” Wall meant nothing more than making
it more likely that people will have a good life, or as I would prefer to
put it: enabling people to have a good life.9 Practically speaking, it does
not matter which view Wall takes on this point, as he makes clear (on
p. 245) that he recognizes that numbers count, and concludes that RNP
does not apply in cases similar to the one I mentioned or in some others
where the number of followers of different good and eligible ideals is
not equal.
But then we are back with the possibility that RNP is not really a
principle because it makes no difference. In the circumstances to which
it applies, there is no possibility of acting “to promote the good.” Wall’s
aim in putting forward the principle seems to be to stop “arbitrary”
action which favors some worthwhile and eligible ideal over others. But
such favoring by being arbitrary is declared not “to promote the good.”
Hence, the principle does not actually forbid such actions. This seems
to be a technical point calling for a technical modification of the prin-
ciple. But I will not offer such a modification, not being sure how Wall
would want to proceed at this point. I will rather assume that an ap-
propriate modification has been put in place.
I hope it is not unfair to summarize Wall’s view as saying that the
guide to political action is sound aggregation. When all other consid-
erations have been given their due significance, and the only issue re-
maining is the allocation of support among eligible ideals which will
8. The RNP does apply to cases in which the state proposes action in order to promote
the good because it mistakes the situation, not realizing that the case is of a choice between
options, none of which is superior to any of the others. But we do not need principles
to direct states not to act on mistakes. Besides, to know that RNP applies, one must realize
that the case is of a choice among options, none of which are better than any of the
others, and therefore it can be applied correctly only if one is not mistaken.
9. See my “The Role of Well-Being,” Philosophical Perspectives 18 (2004): 269–94, and
also “Liberating Duties,” in Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1994).
affect only goods with which people’s self-worth is associated, then num-
bers will not count, for favoring one such ideal over others will adversely
affect people’s sense of their own merited self-worth. The RNP kicks in
and governs the allocation in such cases.
Wall explains the point: “According to Rawls, a secure sense of self-
worth comprises two elements. First, it includes a person’s conviction
that his projects and ideals are worth pursuing. Second, it includes a
person’s sense of confidence in his ability to successfully pursue or
realize his projects and ideals” (248). As Wall mentions, there is a good
deal more to a sense of self-worth than that. For example, central to it
is confidence in one’s own ability to judge what is worth pursuing in
the first place. He rightly draws attention to the fact “that a person’s
sense of self-worth also is a function of his membership in various groups
to which he belongs and identifies with. A person’s sense of self-worth
can be damaged if he becomes ashamed of who he is, as opposed to
what he has done or is doing in pursuit of his projects and ideals”
(248–49). He says that “self-respect is valuable, but only conditionally.
It is valuable on the condition that it is merited, and to merit self-respect
a person must pursue a way of life that is worthy of pursuit” (249).
Sometimes a person should not respect himself, and is not entitled to
expect others to respect him. I am not sure that the conditions for these
self-regarding and other-regarding conclusions are the same.10 But we
need not dwell on this here. Wall’s point is that there are occasions
where “in order for the state to do its part in enabling its members to
have a fitting sense of self-worth . . . it needs to avoid taking sides, and
being seen to be taking sides, between worthwhile ideals of the good
that have adherents in the political society over which it exercises au-
thority” (255). I agree, and I think that Wall’s sensitive discussion helps
to indicate which occasions these are. So why did I express some dis-
content with his position?
It strikes me as slightly odd that one would have a principle, RNP
or any other, to guide one in deciding the cases to which RNP applies.
As I said, I am inclined to agree with Wall as to what the state should
do in these cases. So why not acknowledge that the agreement is due
to our agreement on the principle which governs these cases? I doubt,
however, that it makes much sense to say that the cases are governed
by a principle. We come to the conclusion that this is what is to be done
by considering which reasons apply to those situations, finding that one
reason, call it a reason of self-respect, dominates all others and should
determine our conduct, and that that reason dictates that the state
10. And I probably go further than Wall is willing to go in demanding such respect
from the state. See my “Freedom of Expression and Personal Identification,” Oxford Journal
of Legal Studies 11 (1991): 303.
should not treat the eligible and worthwhile ideal of any person in a
way which undermines the self-respect of its inhabitants. That does not
seem to be the normal circumstance in which talk of principles is at
home. Some principles are not much more than statements that there
is a reason to do something. That the state should support social con-
ditions that are conducive toward people being able to feel (merited)
self-respect is a principle in that sense.11 At other times they are state-
ments of conclusive, or nearly conclusive, reasons. The RNP belongs
with the second kind of principles (as is evident from the careful way
Wall demarcates the conditions for its application to make sure that it
applies only where it prevails). But such principles are usually marked
by having relatively straightforward conditions of application, conditions
whose realization can be ascertained without considering all the reasons
for or against acting one way or the other. The LSN is a good example.
It says that it is impermissible for the state to intend to favor or promote
any permissible ideal of a good human life. Since it applies to all state
actions, all we need, to know that it applies, is that the action under
consideration be a state action. The RNP is not like that. To know that
it applies, we need to examine all the reasons which apply to the action
under consideration, and if we conclude that in the circumstances (a)
reasons of self-respect dominate, and (b) favoring one ideal over others
would undermine it, then we know that it applies, though—of course—
by that time we no longer need to apply it. We have already established
what to do.
The preceding statement exaggerates the case to make it more
dramatic and to save us from the caveats that an accurate statement
would require. But the point is sound. It is not that the principle is false
but that it is not the sort of thing that normally we identify as a principle.
Two additional points are important in explaining this reaction. First,
reasons of self-respect do apply in other contexts as well; that is, they
apply in contexts in which they do not dominate, and where the right
action is either one that ignores them or one that is a compromise
between them and other considerations. Second, even when they dom-
inate, it is not always the case that favoring one eligible and worthwhile
ideal over others undermines the self-respect of those whose ideal is
disfavored. As Wall makes clear, we are dealing here with symbolic ac-
tions, and their meanings depend on the common views of people in
that country, especially the views of those who follow the relevant ideal.
Those people may, and often do, discriminate between various ways of
11. Statements about what we ought to or should do are stronger than statements
about what reasons apply to us—see my “Reasons: Explanatory and Normative,” in New
Essays on the Explanation of Action, ed. C. Sandis (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009),
184–202.
favoring ideals, and do not regard all of them as offensive to followers

of the nonfavored ones. I suppose that my conclusion is that I agree
with Wall’s views and find them a valuable addition to the writings on
these topics. But I think that in wrapping up his views in the form of
a principle of neutrality, he expresses not so much a sound moral out-
look as a desire to find common ground with the misguided advocates
of neutrality principles, a desire which I do not share.
IV. DARWALL ON RIGHTS AND DUTIES

The reasons Green, Wall, and I discussed would normally be classified
as moral reasons. None of us drew attention to this fact, as we were
concerned not with the classification of reasons but with the way they
bear on what we ought to do. I was assuming that moral reasons are
just reasons, and that all reasons bear on what one ought to do. We
tend to notice that reasons are moral only if we think that they are
important reasons, but important general reasons have unimportant
implications in some contexts (there are trivial violations of any reason,
however important), and therefore their being moral reasons does not
tell us much about their bearing on what one ought to do.12
In previous work as well as in his contribution to this symposium,
Darwall takes a different view. At least some moral reasons, he thinks,
have a special character that has considerable bearing on what one
ought to do. He calls these reasons second-personal reasons. All rights
and duties, he thinks, are second-personal reasons. He explains: “I call
these reasons second-personal to highlight this relation to address,
which is necessarily always to someone (an addressee) and so in that
sense second-personal, even when the addressee is oneself, the public
at large, or anyone at all, real or imagined” (257). Since the addressee
can be oneself, the public at large, or some imagined person, I think
that the term “second-personal” is misleading, suggesting that there is
a real person who is second to the person addressing him, that is, who
is not identical with him. I will therefore avoid the term when I can
conveniently do so, referring instead to duties and rights, and so on.
Of course, the choice of terminology does not affect the argument.
Darwall has some interesting criticism of my own explanation of
practical authority. As he explains, he was motivated to advance it be-
cause he took it to be inconsistent with what he wrote about authority
in his book. He claimed that people have authority only regarding what
he calls their second-personal reasons. I did not include any similar con-
dition in my account. Hence, he thought my account could be presented
12. I have argued in more detail for the theoretical unimportance of the classification
of reasons into moral and others in chaps. 11 and 12 of Engaging Reason (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999).
as a rival to his. Referring to my Normal Justification Thesis (NJT) he

explains: “The objection to my irreducibility claim would then proceed
as follows. If the reasons with which an agent would better comply were
not themselves second-personal reasons, it would then follow that some-
one could acquire practical authority over her owing entirely to non-
second-personal considerations. So there might be good arguments to
second-personal claims (e.g., A’s authority over B and consequently A’s
authoritative demands of B) that do not depend on premises in which
second-personal concepts and reasons figure in any way” (258).
My explanation of authority is an attempt to explain authority over
people of the kind that governments claim to have over their subjects,
parents over their children, and so on. It does not purport to be part
of an account of rights and duties in general, as Darwall’s own writings
on authority are. It is therefore no more in competition with his views
on authority than any explanation of rights and duties that does not
include anything like his second-personal reasons. The sins of all these
accounts, mine included, could be sins of omission. That is, they may
be right in what they say, but require supplementation. They have to
include the claim that only second-personal reasons can be duties, or
rules made by authorities, and so on. Later in his contribution, Darwall
recognizes this possibility. He does, however, find faults in my account
that even that addition would not repair. I will address his criticism
below. But first let me explain why I do not think that whatever its faults,
my account of authority will be improved by the kind of augmentation
I mentioned.
The reason has to do with the failure of Darwall to explain duties
and rights. In the following remarks, I will raise what I regard as some
unanswered questions regarding Darwall’s explanation and use of what
he calls second-personal reasons. He uses his ideas about those reasons
to explain more than rights and duties. I will address their application
to the explanation of rights and duties only. It will be evident, however,
that there is reason to think that if they fail in that task, they fail al-
together. To simplify, I will, as Darwall does, use “duties” and “obliga-
tions” interchangeably and will not consider duties which are not meant
to protect rights. The questions to be raised apply to them too, but it
simplifies the exposition to ignore them.
It is common ground to both of us, as well as to most others who
have written about rights, that when there are rights that have corre-
sponding duties (and I think that, like me, Darwall thinks that all rights
have corresponding duties), then those duties are duties that are in
some sense owed to the right-holder. The targets of explanation are
primarily these notions; that is, what is the difference between a duty
and practical reasons which are not duties, and what is it for a duty to
be owed to a particular person? As I mentioned (in Sec. I above), I
tend to think that in contemporary usage, “duty” does not signify a

normatively distinctive category, other than the fact that only categorical
reasons, that is, ones whose application is not conditional on the agent’s
inclinations or preferences, and so on, can give rise to duties. In insti-
tutional contexts, where talk of duty is particularly at home, they indicate
categorical protected reasons, and outside such contexts, the term is
used when the reasons are of some importance. I have a more definite
view of when duties are owed to a person, which is when their justifi-
cation turns on the fact that they protect or promote an interest of the
person to whom they are owed, and this also means that that person
has a right, a right which is protected by these duties.13 The fact that
duties that protect rights are justified by reference to the interest of the
right-holder has a variety of important implications, mostly ones which
depend on further circumstances, and therefore do not necessarily apply
to all rights. For example, many rights can be transferred by the right-
holder, thus changing the person to whom the duties attached to the
right are owed. That is a result of the fact that often the interest of the
right-holder is precisely in having the power to transfer a right, by way
of gift or sale, or to transfer some subsidiary rights, as when people lend
or lease property. Even when this is not the main interest of the right-
holder in the right, it may be an implication of the justifying interest
which the right and its attendant duties protect that an aspect of the
right is the power of the right-holder to forego respect for it on occasion,
or just waive it permanently. A right that is not in that way subject to
his will may not be justified; that is, it would not be justified to hold
others subject to duties even when the right-holder forgives violations
or waives the right. These remarks require of course much more careful
delineation, and I have discussed some of them on various occasions.
I mention them here to indicate that the difference between Darwall
and myself is not about what is to be explained but about the nature
of the explanation. For Darwall offers a very different one.
He acknowledges that, for example, the fact that it is bad to cause
gratuitous pain is a reason not to do so. But he quite rightly points out
that the proposition “people have a right that others should not cause
them gratuitous pain” is not entailed by the mere fact that others have
a reason not to do so. It means more than that. Darwall’s explanation
is:
Suppose, however, that you take yourself to have a right (specifically,
a “claim right”) not to be caused gratuitous pain. Were you to think
that, I take it, you would have also to think that you have as right-
holder some standing or authority to claim or demand that people
13. See The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), chap. 7.
not step on your feet without your consent and, specifically, that
the person currently stepping on your foot not have done so, that
he get off, and so on. . . . Moreover . . . you must also think that
you have some standing, again as the right-holder, to hold the
person accountable for having stepped on your feet, for example,
to object, to ask him his reasons, to demand an apology, to forgive
him if he apologizes, and so on. Since the idea of a right is con-
nected in this way to the (right-holder’s) authority to claim or
demand and hold accountable, it is a second-personal reason. (262)
What kind of authority does he have in mind here? “Authority” is
a word rich in subtle and nuanced meanings,14 not all relevant here.
But two are. One is the concept used when saying that one has authority
to enter a restricted area, or to read one’s employer’s appointment book.
Here “having authority to F” means being permitted to F. Note that
being permitted to F is not the same as it being okay to F. I may scratch
my nose, but I do not need permission to scratch my nose, nor is there
anyone who can, who has the authority to, permit me to scratch my
nose. Permission implies an exception to a general prohibition, and
normally, though not always, someone who has authority in the second
sense, to prohibit and to exempt from the prohibition. This second
sense is authority as the power to impose duties on others simply by
expressing an intention to do so.
My account of authority that Darwall criticizes is of that second
concept of authority.
There is no indication that Darwall thinks that the authority he
refers to here is the authority that I explain, namely, the authority to
impose new duties on another. Nor would it be reasonable to think that
rights always involve such a power. And since they do not, that power
is not part of what rights as such consist in. He seems to use “authority”
interchangeably with “standing.” It is reasonable to assume that the
correct account of standing will identify the kind of authority Darwall
thinks is part of what duties and rights consist in or presuppose.
The difficulty is that “standing” is mostly at home in legal contexts.
When a stranger I sit next to on the bus asks me, “Have you made
arrangements for your retirement?” I am unlikely to say: “You have no
standing in this matter.” If I am annoyed, I may say: “Mind your own
business.” Or I may simply ask in return: “Have you?” I find it difficult
to imagine situations in which “standing” would be used conversation-
ally. That does not show that it should not be used in a theoretical
account of rights or duties. But it means that we do not have an un-
problematic grasp of the phenomena referred to. Nor is it entirely clear
14. For a somewhat more detailed discussion, see The Authority of Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press 1979), chap. 1.
what the term refers to in its legal use. Does legal standing normally
refer to procedural normative power, that is, the normative power to
start a certain kind of legal process, such as an action in court? This
may not be the right account. If the issue of standing is not raised early
in a process, it may be too late to raise it later. In particular, a court’s
decision given in an action that the plaintiff had no standing to initiate
is unlikely to be void, and often not even voidable, on that ground. So
perhaps legal standing is a permission to initiate a legal process, which
is not invalidated if it is initiated without it. Whatever we think of legal
standing, and possibly there are different kinds of legal standing, outside
the law it is hard to apply the term to any normative power since there
are no formalized processes which one initiates relying on the standing.
One is simply engaging in an act of communication. Such an act can
be improper, meriting the response “This is none of your business” or
“Mind your own business,” and that suggests that when it is proper, it
is a permission, a permission to intrude into the affairs of another.
Normally we should not do so, but sometimes we have standing, that
is, a permission to do so.
It is possible that I am relying on too narrow a range of concepts,
thus missing some of the richness of the idea of standing. But there is
also a theoretical advantage in explaining the rich range of normative
phenomena as variations on some basic types. It makes it easier to
understand the interrelations of the phenomena. And absent a more
concrete objection or alternative, I will proceed on the assumption that
“standing” refers to a permission, and consequently, that the authority
Darwall’s account repeatedly refers to is a permission.
According to Darwall, when someone, call her Abigail, is under an
obligation to F, others are permitted to act toward her in ways they are
not permitted to behave toward people generally, not even toward peo-
ple who have reason to F, which is not a duty to F. People are permitted
to demand or to claim performance of the duty, and if Abigail is in
breach of her duty, they are permitted to require that she should com-
pensate, or apologize, and so forth. Clearly, however, there is more to
a duty to F than a reason to F coupled with others being permitted to
demand compliance or compensation or apology for breach. Presum-
ably there is some connection between the reason and the permission,
and that connection is crucial to the existence of the duty. Darwall marks
the connection by saying that the person under the duty, Abigail in our
example, is responsible or accountable to others.
Given the many senses in which “responsibility” is used, it may help
avoid confusion if we focus on the idea of accountability, which is more
specific. Who is Abigail accountable to regarding her duty to F? It turns
out that according to Darwall she is doubly accountable. She is ac-
countable to all members of the moral community, and she is account-
able in an additional way to the person whose right her duty is a duty
to respect, whose right will be violated if she will not F. Let me give
him too a name for ease of reference: let him be Abe. In explaining
the two aspects of accountability, Darwall suddenly turns to an obser-
vation about moral emotions: “Although the victim of wrongdoing has
the distinctive standing to resent or forgive an injury, he has no special
standing others do not have to blame the wrongdoer or to hold him
responsible through . . . reactive attitudes such as indignation. This is
an authority that anyone has as a representative of the moral community,
indeed, that the wrongdoer has himself and that he exercises when, in
blaming himself, he feels guilt” (262).15
It is clear, however, that he does not think that the special account-
ability Abigail owes Abe consists of which emotions would be appropriate
for her to feel. He says that “both [reasons] involve an authority to make
claims and demands and to hold accountable, although in different
ways” (263).16 I will return to the special standing of Abe, the right-
holder, below. But first we can dismiss, I think, the thought that duties
are marked by special accountability to people as representatives of a
moral community, and that is because of the accumulated force of sev-
eral considerations.
First, everyone who is subject to practical reasons at all, every ra-
tional agent, is a member of the moral community. There is no indi-
cation to the contrary in Darwall, and none would be morally acceptable.
Second, while Darwall sometimes refers to people as taking up a
second-person standpoint, that seems to consist in nothing more than
saying that the speaker or someone else has a right or a duty. There is
no separate action, or thought, which constitutes the taking up of that
alleged standpoint. As a result, the very idea that there is a separate
standpoint involved is not given any meaning.
Third, and similarly, since whenever we talk to people about their
rights and obligations we act as “representatives” of the moral com-
munity, there is no specific meaning to the idea of being such a rep-
resentative. We need not feel, believe, or express in any way the thought
that we act as such representatives, nor can we stop being such repre-
sentatives simply by denying that we are, as I am here doing. So, it is
not clear that the idea has any distinct content, and since there is noth-
ing to being a member of the community other than being a rational
15. Though it is not distinctively up to the victim whether to have the attitude of
blame, the victim may have a distinctive standing to blame the wrongdoer overtly. I am
indebted to a referee for prompting me to clarify this point.
16. The context of the observation is very obscure, referring as it does to a reason
a right-holder has. Typically having a right involves a reason or duty others have toward
the right-holder. Right-holders do not have reasons just in virtue of being right-holders.
However, I believe that I do not distort Darwall when using the quotation as I do.
agent, a condition quite distinct from membership of any community

we may think of, there does not seem to be much meaning to the idea
of a moral community in the first place.
Fourth and finally, it is neither true that we are permitted to address
others, even complete strangers, about their conduct only when duties
are involved, nor that we are always permitted to address others, even
strangers, about their conduct when duties are involved. No special
standing or authority is required by one to form beliefs about another’s
conduct, nor to have feelings or emotions in reaction to other people’s
conduct. Nor is it the case that people must suppress the natural ex-
pression of their emotions, which betray themselves in their facial ex-
pressions, tone of voice, and so on. Finally, people do not require per-
mission to express their opinions or feelings, including expressing them
forcefully. It does not follow that it is always a good idea to do so.
Expressing opinions, offering advice, reproaching others (or oneself )
and the like are acts which should be done for sufficient reasons only.
But we may have such good reasons regarding people’s conduct when
no rights or duties are involved and may lack it when rights and duties
are involved. It all depends on the circumstances, to coin a phrase.
Similarly, what one says in exhortation or reproach, and so on, should
be modulated to the seriousness of the matter. But sometimes behavior
that does not involve breach of duty is more seriously reprehensible
than one which does. It is true that some expressions of reproach,
notably using words like “it is my right,” are specific to conduct affecting
rights and duties. But that just goes to show that we should express
ourselves truly and sensibly, given the subject matter we address. It does
not show that there is a special permission unique to rights and duties.
We can illustrate this point with two examples. Darwall gives the
example of someone who fails to prepare for his retirement as a case
in which no duty is involved. What, however, is inappropriate in people
expressing strong disapproval of such behavior, urging that person to
change his ways and start saving for retirement and so on? Of course,
normally only friends should do so. But there is no hard and fast rule
about that. If a few strangers fall into conversation while drinking in a
bar, and the conversation turns to preparation for retirement, they may
well reproach the one who did nothing to protect his future. Now turn
to breach of obligations. A person who is rude to his young child is in
breach of obligation, but “mind your own business” would be an ap-
propriate rebuke to reproaches from busybodies. This, you may rightly
point out, is just my moral view. It is, but there is no reason to think
that the disagreement about who may draw the attention of those who
are subject to certain reasons for action to the existence of those reasons,
and reproach them for noncompliance, is a dispute about whether those
reasons are duties.
So far I have ignored the special position that a right-holder has

regarding the duties that protect his rights. As I explained above, in my
view these are primarily that the duties are justified by their service
to the right-holder’s interests, and secondarily by some of the conse-
quences of this fact, such that in many cases the right-holder can waive
the right, or some aspects of it. Darwall’s explanation of the special
standing of the right-holder in terms of a permission to demand per-
formance of the duty, or compensation or apologies for its breach, fails.
Even on his own account, the permission extends to others as well. This
applies to compensation and apology too. I can demand of Abigail that
she compensate Abe and apologize to him, when she violates his rights.
That she owes an apology to him, or to him in particular (sometimes
people can and do appropriately apologize to people other than the
victim of their violations) is an acknowledgment that the duty derived
from his interests, and therefore it was he who was let down by its
violation. The duty to compensate is part of the “logic” of practical
reasons generally: if you fail to completely or perfectly comply with
reasons which apply to you (be they duties or otherwise), you should
do the next best thing to come as close to complete compliance as
possible. Compensation is one way of doing so. That at any rate is my
explanation of these phenomena.17 I am not sure what Darwall’s is, for
he focuses not on the apology and the duty to compensate but on the
permission to claim them. We are permitted to claim them because
those people owe them. And it is that fact which needs explaining, not
the permission to claim. But here I am merely repeating, or applying
to this case, the considerations I explained above.
Perhaps surprisingly, when discussing the right-holder’s special
standing, Darwall shifts attention to the fact that the wronged right-
holder has standing to feel resentment and indignation. The reason is,
presumably, that he thinks that he has an argument against views like
mine here, namely, that my explanation of rights in terms of the interests
of the right-holder cannot explain why resentment is appropriate. It is
a victim of the “wrong kind of reason” fallacy. Whether or not one agrees
with Darwall’s views about these emotions,18 they do not support his
explanation of rights and duties. They come too late in the order of
explanation: resentment is appropriate (among other cases) when one
is hurt by an unjustified violation of one’s rights. So one needs to es-
17. See my “Numbers, With and Without Contractualism,” Ratio 16 (2003): 346–67,
and “Responsibility and the Negligence Standard,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies
(forthcoming).
18. I disagree with much of what he says, though his identification of what he calls
the right kind of reason is very similar to my analysis of standard reasons. See my “Reasons:
Practical and Adaptive,” in Reasons for Action, ed. D. Sobel and S. Wall (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2009).
tablish that such a violation occurred first, and independently of any-

thing about resentment. I have argued above that Darwall fails to do
so.
It is possible, however, that considerations about the appropriate-
ness of resentment and other emotions could expose the flaw in my
explanation of rights: it must be such as to make sense of the fact that
unjustified violation of rights can make resentment appropriate. And I
believe that my account meets this test. I should add that I do not think
that resentment is appropriate only when one’s rights are unjustifiably
violated. Causing one significant hurt or harm by knowing and wanton
disregard of one’s interests would make resentment appropriate even
when the conduct does not violate one’s rights. In any case, my account,
which admits of rights only when one’s interests are of a nature to
impose on others a duty to protect them, amply explains why unjustified
rights violation may make resentment apt. Darwall does not challenge
that. He simply endorses Strawson’s view that social desirability cannot
justify resentment, and so on, adding that the desirability of holding
someone responsible does not justify holding them responsible. None
of this bears on my account of rights. It may be desirable, may be even
socially desirable, that I should be poorer than I am, or richer than I
am. By my account of the matter, nothing of the kind establishes any-
thing regarding my rights, because it does not establish that others have
a duty to make me either richer or poorer.
V. DARWALL ON THE NORMAL JUSTIFICATION THESIS

The failure of Darwall’s account of rights and obligations does not in
the least vindicate my account of authority. Nor does it show that his
criticism of it is without merit. He draws attention to some features of
my account which others have found problematic as well. It is, however,
not easy to isolate the challenging points from others which seem to
me less worthwhile. This is due in part to the fact that my account of
authority is complex, and developed over the years. At its core are three
theses: the Normal Justification Thesis, the Preemption Thesis, and the
Dependence Thesis. But they do not exhaust the account. Most im-
portantly, it contains some points of conceptual clarification that I ad-
vanced early in my reflections on the subject,19 as well as examples of
some contexts in which an authority is legitimate even if it does not
meet the conditions of the NJT, and some contexts in which it is not
legitimate even if it does meet them. There were of course writings
aimed primarily at explaining the application of the account in the
theory of law, and elsewhere, and some defenses and modifications of
it. While I tried to be explicit about such modifications, I never pre-
19. See Raz, Authority of Law.
sented the account in all its parts in any single publication (nor unfor-
tunately was I as clear as could be wished in its presentation). Partly
this is a matter of personal temperament, and partly a result of a feeling
that the account is in any case an incomplete account of the core of
the idea of practical authority, that it should be supplemented in various
ways to make it sensitive to various circumstances, and that in the nature
of the subject there is no possibility of a comprehensive statement of
the nature of practical authority which will not require further refine-
ment when applied to (the ever evolving and changing) types of situ-
ations and institutions. This approach manifested itself in the fact that
the NJT was presented as no more than an explanation of normal jus-
tifications, and by the fact that in The Morality of Freedom, in which it has
its most complete discussion, I did not invoke my earlier writing on
exclusionary and protected reasons (protected reasons are facts which
constitute a—first order—reason to F and an exclusionary reason not
to fail to F for a certain range of excluded reasons).20 My thought was
that the arguments there presented yield a conclusion, expressed in the
Preemption Thesis, which stands on its own. It assigned to authoritative
directives a feature that I believed may well be best explained by saying
that they constitute protected reasons. But possibly there are other,
better explanations of it, and there is no need to saddle the account of
authority with a commitment to that way of explaining the preemptive-
ness of authoritative directives. That having been said, let us turn to
Darwall’s objections.
As I understand him, Darwall argues that no preemptive reasons
are created by the fact that the conditions set in the NJT are met. As I
have just indicated, it is not my claim that whenever these conditions
are met, the authority is legitimate. Whether or not it is depends on
further normative, often moral, considerations. But Darwall’s objections
are not undermined by these aspects of my account of authority. In fact,
so far as I can see, his objection is not specifically to the claim that the
NJT may give rise to preemptive reasons.21 Rather it is that, in itself,
20. Ibid., 18, 21.

21. This is fortunate, as it means that the criticism is not undermined by the fact
that he misrepresents the Preemption Thesis. He never states its content. The closest he
comes is when he writes: “The idea underlying Raz’s Preemption Thesis is that in deciding
what directives to issue, an authority will take account of first-order reasons, at least within
some range, for and against actions that would be prescribed by directives the authority
is considering and that an authoritative directive preempts the reasons for acting that the
authority has already taken into account; specifically, it preempts or excludes the reasons
for performing any action that would violate the directive” (268). In fact, the underlying
idea is that a legitimate authority ought to consider certain reasons and that its directives
preempt the reasons that it ought to have considered (though if the fact that it ignored
some of them or got them so wrong deprives it of legitimacy, then the thesis does not
apply). Similarly, the fact that at times he misrepresents the nature of exclusionary reasons
meeting the conditions of the NJT does not give rise to reasons of any
kind.
His most general objection is expressed as a denial that III can be
derived from II in the following passage:
II. There is reason for B to treat A’s directives as giving him preemptive
reasons.
III. A’s directives actually do give B preemptive reasons. (269)
He admits for the sake of the argument that when the conditions of
the NJT apply, II is true, but denies that III follows from it. He treats
it as a question of whether we have reason to believe that III. His ob-
jection is: “For III to be true whenever II is true, the reasons that speak
in favor of B’s believing that A’s directives create exclusionary reasons,
or B’s regarding or treating A’s directives as creating them, would also
have somehow to make B’s belief or way of seeing or treating things
true or correct” (269–70). I would agree with that. The argument is not
that one has those derivative reasons stated in III because it would be
good to believe in them. It is that it is good to believe in them because
they are there. They are there by reasoning analogous (some would say
identical) to that which establishes the existence of instrumental rea-
sons: you have reason to do A, doing B (walking to the station, obeying
the authority) will facilitate doing A, therefore you have reason to do
B. It is more complicated to establish that the authoritative reasons are
preemptive, and that was all I argued for in presenting my account of
authority. But that point is not challenged by Darwall.22
Toward the end of his essay, Darwall raises another objection,
namely, that my account cannot explain the accountability of those
subject to the authority toward the authority. Needless to say, my doubts
about Darwall’s own understanding of accountability make me doubt
the validity of his criticism (I am more used to the idea that those in
authority are accountable to their subjects than to the thought that their
subjects are accountable to them) and impede my ability to understand
it. But perhaps a clue is offered in Darwall’s use of the notion of “being
answerable” at this juncture. Perhaps what he has in mind is the familiar
fact that legal authorities can impose sanctions for breach of duties they
is—for the same reason—irrelevant to his argument. As he rightly points out, exclusionary
reasons are reasons not to act for certain reasons: “As Raz usually defines the general
category of exclusionary reason, namely, as a second-order reason not to be moved by or
to act for certain first-order reasons” (272). It is therefore unfortunate that much of his
discussion on pp. 272–73 turns on the case for or against considering certain matters, which
is irrelevant to the issue.
22. Later on, referring to the wrong kind of reason argument, he writes: “The fact
that one has reason to adopt an attitude does not in general make it the case that the
attitude is true, correct, or ‘fitting’” (270). That is of course true but, as explained in the
text, irrelevant.
have imposed, or that they can provide remedies for (what they con-
sider) harmful and unjustified invasions of individual rights. If that is
what he has in mind, then up to a point we agree. That an authority is
entitled to impose a duty to F does not entail that it is entitled to impose
a sanction for failing to F, or a remedy should any right be violated
thereby. One needs a separate argument for that, and the argument—
on my account—would be provided if NJT would apply to those addi-
tional measures. It may not, even when it applies to the demand to F.
In the case of the law, we assume that the two go together, but when
we think of the authority of voluntary associations, we readily perceive
the possibility of a gap between their authority to impose demands on
their members and their authority to impose sanctions for violations of
those demands, or remedies for their breach. The example of voluntary
associations may provide an answer to the question: does it not follow
that there is no authority without the double power—the power to
demand an action, and the power to impose a sanction or demand a
compensation for breach of the first demand? This double power theory
of authority, a variant on my own account, is appealing, but in this radical
form, there seem to be persuasive counterexamples. I am not, of course,
suggesting that the double power view would quell Darwall’s doubts.
But some variants of it, yet to be formulated and explored, may appeal
to those who do not share his own theory and yet are inclined to question
my account on this point.
VI. THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL AUTHORITY

One of the failings of my explanation of the service conception, as I
call my account of authority of which the NJT is a part, was a failure to
explore the way it relates to epistemic authority. Darwall’s retirement
example helps to bring the issue into focus. I agree with Darwall that
his imagined expert has no practical authority over him. It is not entirely
clear how this is meant to be a counterexample to my account. Perhaps
this way: she tells him, “If you decide to invest in a pension fund invest
in this and that fund.” I make the directive conditional in order to avoid
the question whether she can be known to be an expert on whether
Darwall should invest in a pension fund at all. To be an expert on that,
she needs much more than financial expertise. She needs extensive
knowledge of Darwall’s health, family, their health and finances, the
type of lifestyle which would be good for him when old, and so on.
Darwall, in setting out the example, assumes that her directives would
be the directives one would give if one knew all of that and made no
mistakes. However, that is not enough to endow her with authority over
me. Darwall needs to be able to know that that is the case, and if she
does not have good knowledge and understanding of all these matters,
he has no reason to think that her directives will be sound ones. So let
us assume that her directive is conditional, limiting her authority to

what she knows about: financial matters.
Does she not then have authority to tell Darwall what to do? For
Darwall the answer is: no, because he is not answerable to her. For me
it is, if anything, the other way around. I am not answerable to her
because she has no authority. But why does she not have authority? She
has epistemic authority. He should believe that if he is to invest in a
pension fund, he should invest in the fund she designated, and he
should believe that because that is her opinion and she is an expert.
Suppose that Darwall believes that. In that case, she no longer meets
the condition of the NJT. She believes that if he is to invest in a pension
fund, he should invest in this particular one, and he believes the same.
She does not know what he should do better than he does.
This leads me to think that the explanation of Darwall’s example
is that the NJT is not met when the only reason to think that an au-
thoritative instruction is correct is that it represents an expert view about
what is good to do, a view which is not based on the fact that the expert
will so instruct, or has so instructed. At least this is the case regarding
people who can follow theoretical authorities. Small children and some
mentally handicapped people may not have that ability, while being able
to follow practical authorities. It does not follow that expertise is not
relevant to practical authorities. It is, but only when it is mixed with
other considerations, such as need for coordination, for concretizing
indeterminate boundaries, and the like.

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On Respect, Authority, and Neutrality: A Response

Author(s): Joseph Raz

1. In particular, I avoided any questions of minor misrepresentations of my views.

Ethics 120 ( January 2010): 279–301

meeting, at the high level of generality found in general accounts of

take any invocation of reasons of respect as a winner in any argument,

II. RESPECT: A NONINSTRUMENTAL UNDERSTANDING

is that behaving with respect naturally has causal consequences, includ-

be thin. Regarding cultural goods and natural beauty, appreciation of

same respect, that which is due to persons.7 Of course, there may be

III. FROM RESPECT TO (LIMITED) NEUTRALITY?

favoring ideals, and do not regard all of them as offensive to followers

IV. DARWALL ON RIGHTS AND DUTIES

as a rival to his. Referring to my Normal Justification Thesis (NJT) he

tend to think that in contemporary usage, “duty” does not signify a

agent, a condition quite distinct from membership of any community

So far I have ignored the special position that a right-holder has

tablish that such a violation occurred first, and independently of any-

V. DARWALL ON THE NORMAL JUSTIFICATION THESIS

19. See Raz, Authority of Law.

20. Ibid., 18, 21.

VI. THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL AUTHORITY

us assume that her directive is conditional, limiting her authority to

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