Clements Ch. 4
Clements Ch. 4
Clements Ch. 4
91
looks at the reasons for the USA’s initial and continued neutrality and why it
proved a contentious issue.
Public opinion
Wilsonianism Name given The prevailing mood in the USA was that the war in Europe had nothing to
to Wilson’s policies based on do with them. One Boston newspaper smugly reported, ‘The worst has
Christian ideas and moral befallen us in this cruel war. The price of beans has risen.’ Politicians had to
diplomacy. reflect and respond to this reluctance to become involved in events
Declaration of Neutrality thousands of miles away. One of President Wilson’s biographers, Ray
Declaration to Congress by Stannard Baker, wrote that the people were ‘not only uninformed but largely
President Wilson on 19 uninterested in the war’.
August 1914 in which he
warned US citizens against There was a widespread feeling that wars were wrong and achieved little. On
taking sides in the First World 29 August 1914, 1500 women marched down Fifth Avenue in New York in
War. black robes to the beat of drums to protest the war. Various influential leaders
including Wilson’s Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan began to
Military war games The
practice of military exercises organize campaigns against the war.
to prepare military forces for
combat.
Wilsonianism
The onset of war coincided with President Wilson’s grief over the death of
War College US college to his first wife. Nevertheless, his apparent inactivity matched the mood of the
train future military leaders in
American people. Wilson himself sought neutrality. He regarded himself as
aspects of national security
an honest broker who could negotiate a peace settlement (see pages 99–
and military strategy.
100), a view consistent with Wilsonianism.
To succeed in this and gain the trust of all parties Wilson had to be above
reproach in terms of neutrality. In his Declaration of Neutrality of 19
August 1914 he offered to mediate. He was desperate not only for the USA
to stay out, but also for the conflict to end. Wilson, it must be remembered,
was guided by a sense of Christian morality that found war abhorrent –
despite the number of times he had intervened in Latin America (see pages
81–83). Wilson also feared the war could escalate and the USA be sucked in
so he was anxious from the start to support moves to end the conflict. If the
USA was to have influence in peace-making, it would need to be beyond
reproach in its neutrality. When he discovered in autumn 1915 that his Army
General Staff had been discussing war plans in the event of US involvement
he threatened to have them all dismissed. Hearing about military war
games planned by the War College, he told his Secretary of War Newton
Baker, ‘That seems to me a very dangerous occupation. I think you had better
stop it.’
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Chapter 4: The United States and the First World War: from neutrality to involvement
Source A
An extract from the Declaration of Neutrality by President Wilson to What is Wilson warning
Congress, 19 August 1914 (found at www.firstworldwar.com/source/ US citizens against in
usneutrality.htm). Source A? According to
The people of the United States are drawn from many nations, and chiefly from the extract, explain why
the nations now at war. It is natural and inevitable that there should be the he is issuing this warning.
utmost variety of sympathy and desire among them with regard to the issues and
circumstances of the conflict.
Some will wish one nation, others another, to succeed in the momentous struggle.
It will be easy to excite passion and difficult to allay it. Those responsible for
exciting it will assume a heavy responsibility, responsibility for no less a thing
than that the people of the United States, whose love of their country and whose
loyalty to its government should unite them as Americans all, bound in honor
and affection to think first of her and her interests, may be divided in camps of
hostile opinion, hot against each other, involved in the war itself in impulse and
opinion if not in action.
Such divisions amongst us would be fatal to our peace of mind and might
seriously stand in the way of the proper performance of our duty as the one great
nation at peace, the one people holding itself ready to play a part of impartial
mediation and speak the counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a
partisan, but as a friend.
Pro-British feeling
While Wilson genuinely sought neutrality, he and many of his advisers
actually favoured the Allies, and the British in particular. This was in part due
to Wilson’s natural predilections; he enjoyed British culture and customs. He
maintained all his life fond memories of cycling around the English Lake
District as a young man and saw Britain as a centre of civilization and
decency.
Anti-German feeling
More significantly, however, Wilson agreed with his advisers, particularly his
close friend Colonel Edward House and Robert Lansing (Legal Advisor to the
State Department, and from June 1915, Secretary of State), that Germany State Department The
posed a threat to US interests and it would be better to help the Allies fight US branch of government
the Germans now than have the USA potentially fight them alone one day. responsible for the
implementation of foreign
The USA had had confrontations with Germany in Samoa in 1889 (see pages
policy.
24–25) and over Venezuela in 1902 (see page 66). Wilson worried about
Germany’s growing interests in Latin America, especially in Mexico.
93
In his message to Congress in December 1915, Wilson attacked German-
Americans for disloyalty to the USA, and refused to allow legislation
introduced from politicians from states in the Midwest with large German-
American populations, which would ban the sale of munitions to either side
in the conflict (see below).
Source B
Trade
By 1914, the USA was one of the world’s major trading nations. In that year it
exported $549 million worth of goods to Britain and showed a trading surplus
of over $300 million. It also sold over $344 million worth of goods to
Germany, with a trading surplus of $154 million. Some Americans favoured
the prevention of trade with any of the countries at war because of the
94
Chapter 4: The United States and the First World War: from neutrality to involvement
Trade favoured the Allies much more than the Germans, in part because of Munitions Weapons and
ammunition.
the effectiveness of the British blockade of Germany. Trade with the Allies,
much of which was in munitions, stood at $3.2 billion by 1916. This was ten
times that of trade with the Central Powers. By 1916 US trade with Germany
was only 1 per cent of what it had been in 1914. In its trade policies therefore
the USA could hardly be seen to be neutral – it was selling far more to the
Allies than to the Central Powers.
Borrowing
The Allies had by the end of hostilities in 1918 borrowed nearly $7 billion
from the USA, which after the war they would need to repay. By the time of
the peace settlement, Allied war debts to the USA amounted to $10.5 billion.
95
Source C
Read Source C carefully. An extract from a letter from Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan
Explain why the USA was to the Ambassador to Britain Walter Hines, 26 December 1914 (found at
angry with Britain. http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/U.S._Protests_Against_Maritime_Warfare).
The Government of the United States has viewed with growing concern the large
numbers of vessels laden with American goods destined to neutral ports in
Europe, which have been seized on the high seas, taken into British ports and
detained sometimes for weeks by the British authorities. During the early days of
the war this Government assumed that the policy adopted by the British
Government was due to the unexpected outbreak of hostilities and the necessity
of immediate action to prevent contraband from reaching the enemy. For this
reason it was not disposed to judge this policy harshly or protest it vigorously,
although it was manifestly very injurious to American trade with the neutral
countries of Europe. This Government, relying confidently upon the high regard
which Great Britain has so often exhibited in the past for the rights of other
nations, confidently awaited amendment of a course of action which denied to
neutral commerce the freedom to which it was entitled by the law of nations.
Wilson could justifiably have made far more of a protest because the British
seizure of neutral ships verged on illegality. However, Wilson faced the
dilemma that, while the British actions might have been unfair on neutral
nations, he nevertheless wanted the Allies to win the war. It was true also that
American crews were treated with courtesy, and there were no deaths. This
was in contrast with the German development of submarine warfare in which
vessels might be attacked without warning and loss of life was considerable.
96
Chapter 4: The United States and the First World War: from neutrality to involvement
Source D
Text from a notice issued by the German Embassy and published in What was the purpose of
Washington newspapers, 22 April 1915, from The American Nation, the announcement in
Vol. 2, by J.A. Garraty, published by HarperCollins, New York, 1991 Source D?
(7th edition), page 684.
NOTICE!
Travellers intending to embark on the Atlantic voyage are reminded that a state
of war exists between Germany and her allies and Great Britain and her allies;
that the zone of war includes the waters adjacent to the British Isles; that, in
accordance with formal notice given by the Imperial German Government,
vessels flying the flag of Great Britain, or any of her allies, are liable to
destruction in those waters and that travellers sailing in the war zone on ships of
Great Britain or her allies do so at their own risk.
IMPERIAL GERMAN EMBASSY WASHINGTON, D.C., APRIL 22, 1915.
97
The US 1916 presidential election
As might be expected, the issue of the war dominated the campaigns. Wilson
was in a difficult situation; the Democratic Party was campaigning on his
neutrality and during the Convention in which he was renominated,
supporter after supporter applauded the fact that ‘He kept us out of the War’.
This indeed became one of the campaign slogans. Wilson, however, was not
so sanguine. As he told his Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, ‘They
talk of me as though I were a god. Any little German lieutenant can put us
into the war at any time by some calculated outrage.’
Wilson won the election by 9.1 million to 8.5 million votes against a
respected but uncharismatic opponent, Charles Evan Hughes, who had
much the same policies towards the war. The election was close, and had as
much as to with Hughes’ political failings as with popular enthusiasm for
Wilson. For example, Hughes was indecisive on various domestic issues and
upset the popular Governor of California, Hiram Johnson, by not meeting
him when he campaigned there, thereby losing his support.
British restrictions
US trade Unrestricted
and blockade
favoured Allies submarine warfare
of German ports
Summary diagram
US neutrality, 1914–17
98
Chapter 4: The United States and the First World War: from neutrality to involvement
99
Wilson still wanted to remain above the conflict to maintain his credibility as
a peacemaker. He asked both sides on what basis they’d consider a truce. On
22 January 1917 he spoke in the Senate about the need for ‘peace without
victory’. He realized a lasting peace was unlikely if any former belligerents
were resentful. Any settlement would have to bypass any desire for revenge.
He spoke of a post-war world with the following conditions:
● freedom of the seas
● armaments’ manufacture and distribution by an international organization
● no entangling or secret alliances
● self-determination for all nations.
Source E
Fourteen Points President Wilson was, in other words, formulating what would become his Fourteen
Wilson’s blueprint for a Points (see pages 116–117) as a basis for a lasting peaceful settlement in
post-war peace settlement. which the USA would set the example of international relations to which all
Envoy Representative sent nations aspired. Referring to Wilson’s ‘Peace Without Victory’ speech, French
for a specific diplomatic premier Georges Clemenceau said, ‘Never before has any political assembly
purpose. heard so fine a sermon on what human beings might be capable of
accomplishing if only they weren’t human.’
100
Chapter 4: The United States and the First World War: from neutrality to involvement
101
Source F
Zimmermann telegram
The Zimmermann telegram was a coded telegram from German Foreign
Secretary Arthur Zimmermann to the German Ambassador to Mexico
Heinrich von Eckhart, sent on 16 January 1917. It told von Eckhart to
propose a secret alliance with Germany to the Mexican Government in
which, if they went to war with the USA, the latter would receive back Texas,
Arizona and New Mexico. British intelligence intercepted the telegram and
passed it on to the US Ambassador in Britain, Walter Page. In February 1917,
he sent a copy of the telegram to the State Department. The Ambassador
had not in fact acted on the instruction, and Mexico knew nothing of it. With
a civil war raging there Mexico was hardly in a position to make full-scale
war on the USA. Nevertheless, Wilson was affronted by this telegram and it
afforded him a further pretext for war.
Declaration of war
In April 1917, Wilson asked Congress for the authority to make war on
Germany. He realized quite simply that he had little choice; the USA had
been provoked until its credibility was threatened. The Allies, moreover, were
in trouble:
● In December 1917 Russia had withdrawn from the conflict.
● In February and March 1917, 1 million tons of Allied shipping was sunk by
U-boats.
102
Chapter 4: The United States and the First World War: from neutrality to involvement
Source G
The joint resolution by the President and Congress of the declaration of Rewrite the resolution in
war on Germany, 6 April 1917 (found at www.firstworldwar.com/source/ Source G in your own
usofficialawardeclaration.htm). words.
Whereas the Imperial German Government has committed repeated acts of war
against the Government and the people of the United States of America; Therefore
be it Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress Assembled, that the state of war between the United States
and the Imperial German Government which has thus been thrust upon the United
States is hereby formally declared; and that the President be, and he is hereby,
authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United
States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial
German Government; and to bring the conflict to a successful termination all of the
resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States.
CHAMP CLARK
Speaker of the House of Representatives
THOS. R. MARSHALL
Vice President of the United States and President of the Senate
Approved, April 6, 1917
WOODROW WILSON
An extract from Senator William Borah on entry into the war, in Promised
Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776 According to Source H,
by Walter A. McDougall, published by Houghton Mifflin, Boston and New what limitations did
York, 1997, pages 136–37. Senator Borah place on
I join in no crusade. I seek or accept no alliance; I obligate this government to no US entry into the war?
other power. I make war alone for my countrymen and their rights for my
country and its honor.
Others, for example many of those of German origin, supported Germany and
argued that the USA had never been neutral; the German-American poet
George S. Viereck had written in 1915 that,‘Wilson prattles on about humanity
while German orphans and widows mourn graves marked,“Made in America”’,
implying that US equipment was already helping to kill Germans in the conflict.
103
Wilson’s peace US entry into
initiatives and the war German activities
ideas for a in the USA
lasting peace
Resumption of
unrestricted Sabotage,
Attracting submarine e.g. Black Tom
little warfare explosion;
interest Zimmermann
telegram
US shipping
sunk
Summary diagram
3 Key debate
Key question: What reasons have been offered by historians for the
Inter-war period The
entry of the USA into the First World War?
period between the two
world wars; in the case of Historians have emphasized differing reasons for the entry of the USA into
Canada, 1919–39. the war. In this debate we will reflect some of the perspectives and foci from
which they argue.
104
Chapter 4: The United States and the First World War: from neutrality to involvement
Neutrality rights
Writing in the 1950s, historian Carl N. Degler argued Wilson’s main reason
for involvement was legalistic. Wilson’s concept of neutrality rights followed Legalistic Following the
established international law and asserted that the USA should be free to letter of the law.
trade non-contraband goods with any belligerent it chose and American
citizens should be safe to sail in any ships. Wilson saw unrestricted
submarine warfare as illegal in international law – a crime against humanity.
105
ally, to be able to maintain its independence during the peace negotiations.
What are possible
Wilson hoped that the allies could win without full US involvement – with
reasons why Walter
Millis, writing in the the USA sufficing as the provider of war material. However, this wasn’t
1930s, and Christopher possible. By 1917 Wilson realized that ‘the world cannot be removed from the
Ray, writing in the slaughter and destruction by any other means than a major exercise of the
1990s, came to such great martial force of the Republic’.
different conclusions
about why the USA Many historians would concur with this analysis. In the 1990s, Harold Evans
entered the First World argued that Wilson followed a moral principle, believing that the USA needed
War? You can check to fight in order to make the world a better place. He contrasted Wilson with
your ideas by Theodore Roosevelt, who, he argues, would have gone to war earlier than
investigating the Wilson in order to defeat the aggressor nation (Germany), remedy US
backgrounds of these grievances and restore the balance of power. Wilson, however, went to war to
two writers. (Logic,
destroy the old forms of diplomacy and introduce a new world order based on
Emotion, History,
rights and respect for all peoples. Ross Kennedy, writing in 2008, developed
Social Sciences)
this theme. He argued that Wilson blamed the old European reliance on the
‘balance of power’ for the military expansion which had led to war. However,
Wilson also recognized that the collective security he favoured could only
come about if countries trusted each other. He particularly believed Germany
must return the lands it had taken and become a democracy before it could
be trusted to maintain the peace. Therefore, argues Kennedy, Wilson shared
the Allies’ war aims. There was always a contradiction in Wilson’s earlier
neutrality because he favoured the Allies over Germany.
In the 1960s, Hugh Brogan felt the Germans left Wilson no choice but to go
to war. He argued that Wilson’s alleged neutrality was anything but, and
eventual involvement of the USA was inevitable. He went on to suggest that
the actual timing of the entry of the USA lay with Germany. In February
1917, Germany took the decision to renew unrestricted submarine warfare,
hoping it would result in the defeat of Britain and France before the USA
was ready to fight. This gamble failed. Once it entered the struggle, however,
the aims of the USA became wider. It was fighting for a better world, where
there would be no more war, rather than simply to defeat Germany and its
allies. According to Brogan, the USA did not necessarily share the Allies’ war
aims. Brogan quotes one editor who argued that the Allies were thieves and
the Germans murderers: ‘On the whole, we prefer the thieves but only as the
lesser of two evils.’
Niall Ferguson, in his book Colossus (2003), felt that Wilson the idealist
sought to construct an entirely new international order based on fairness
and justice for all peoples. As early as December 1914 he had asserted that
any peace settlement ‘should be for the advantage of the European nations
regarded as peoples and not for any nation imposing its governmental will
upon alien people’. In May 1915, he went further: ‘every people has a right to
choose the sovereignty under which they shall live’. While the sinking of
RMS Lusitania and unrestricted submarine warfare were undoubtedly
triggers, Wilson had something more sublime in mind when he declared war.
106
Chapter 4: The United States and the First World War: from neutrality to involvement
107
Paying for the war
The war cost $33.5 billion in addition to the $7 billion lent to the Allies,
Liberty and Victory which was expected to be recouped after the conflict. Two-thirds of this cost
Loans Loans to raise money was raised by loans such as Liberty and Victory Loans whose drives were
to pay for the war effort.
very successful. There were five bond issues between April 1917 when the
War profiteering Making USA joined the war and April 1919, six months after it ended. Movie stars
excess profits during such as Charlie Chaplin, Mary Pickford and Douglas Fairbanks Jr. were
wartime, for example, by deployed to encourage people to buy bonds and the Army Signal Corps
charging artificially high
organized aerial displays during drives in particular places. The country
prices.
was plastered with bills and posters – for the third loan issue in April 1918,
9 million posters and 5 million window stickers were issued. The
Government also collected $10.5 billion in taxes in part through a steeply
graded income tax with a top level of 75 per cent. A 25 per cent inheritance
tax was also introduced.
Railroads
The railroads were run as a single centralized system to co-ordinate and
simplify what was a vital transport system for the movement of goods and
troops during wartime. Director General of Railroads William G. McAdoo
pooled all railway equipment, standardized accounting practices, raised
wages for employees and increased passenger rates.
Agriculture
Wilson appointed Herbert Hoover as his Food Administrator after entry into
the war in 1917. Hoover had co-ordinated relief efforts in Europe for
refugees in the first years of the war. In 1917, the Lever Food and Fuel
Control Act gave him the power to:
● set wheat prices at $2.20 per bushel to encourage production
● establish a government corporation to buy US and Cuban sugar to
maintain supplies
● organize a voluntary campaign to eat sensibly, thereby avoiding the need
for rationing – for example, ‘Wheatless Mondays’ and ‘Meatless
Thursdays’. Chicago residents were so successful in using leftovers that
the amount of garbage in the city fell from 12,862 to 8386 tons per
month.
Food production increased from 12.3 million to 18.6 million tons
per year and farmers’ incomes grew by 30 per cent between 1915
and 1918.
108
Chapter 4: The United States and the First World War: from neutrality to involvement
African-Americans
The period saw a flood of migrations of African-Americans from the South to
northern cities such as Chicago – as many as 500,000 migrated between 1914
and 1918. The African-American population of New York grew from 92,000 to
152,000 and that of Detroit from little more than 5000 to 41,000 between 1914
and 1918. However, while pay in industrial plants in the North was
considerably better than in the cotton fields of the South, discrimination
continued and there were serious riots against the African-American presence
in several northern cities such as East St. Louis when 39 African-Americans
were killed in the summer of 1917. The military, meanwhile, was strictly
segregated with most of the 200,000 African-American troops confined to
labour battalions. Nevertheless, their experience of less racist attitudes,
particularly among the French, led to changes in their own perceptions and
was to add to considerable racial tensions as they returned home.
109
Committee on Public Information
The Committee on Public Information (CPI) was created in April 1917, with
the goal of uniting Americans behind the war. Headed by journalist George
Creel, it sent 75,000 speakers – the ‘Four Minute Men’, so-called because they
were trained to give short speeches lasting that length of time – to argue the
case that the war was a crusade for freedom. Those who refused to buy war
bonds were attacked both verbally and physically and the earlier anti-
German propaganda (see page 94) was renewed vigorously so the Germans
Nomenclature Names were depicted as barbarous. This resulted in petty changes in nomenclature
used to refer to something. (sauerkraut, for example, became ‘liberty cabbage’ and hamburgers ‘liberty
Prohibition A constitutional sandwiches’), and, even if unwittingly, encouraged attacks on German-
amendment that placed a ban Americans and businesses with German-sounding names. The German
on the manufacture, language was removed from school curricula. One of the motives behind
transportation and sale of prohibition was the implication that Germans controlled the brewing
alcoholic beverages. It industry. It was widely believed that many German-American-owned
became law throughout the
concerns such as Ruppert, Pabst and Lieber, which had helped finance the
USA in 1919 and lasted until
national German-American Alliance to promote German interests before the
1933.
war, would now be sending profits to finance the German war effort.
Source I
110
Chapter 4: The United States and the First World War: from neutrality to involvement
An extract from the Sedition Act, 16 May 1918 (found at http://wwi.lib. In Source J, how does
byu.edu/index.php/The_U.S._Sedition_Act). Wilson define seditious
Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully make or convey false acts?
reports or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success
of the military or naval forces of the United States, or to promote the success of
its enemies, or shall willfully make or convey false reports, or false statements, …
or incite insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or
naval forces of the United States, or shall willfully obstruct … the recruiting or
enlistment service of the United States, or … shall willfully utter, print, write, or
publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of
government of the United States, or the Constitution of the United States, or the
military or naval forces of the United States … or shall willfully display the flag
of any foreign enemy, or shall willfully … urge, incite, or advocate any
curtailment of production … or advocate, teach, defend, or suggest the doing of
any of the acts or things in this section enumerated and whoever shall by word
or act support or favor the cause of any country with which the United States is
at war or by word or act oppose the cause of the United States therein, shall be
punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than
twenty years, or both.
111
Effects of the Acts
Over 2000 prosecutions were made as a result of these two pieces of
legislation. Charles Schenk, a socialist, was jailed for attempting to distribute
anti-war leaflets. One strike organizer faced twenty years in prison. An
African-American editor G.W. Bouldin of the San Antonio Inquirer was
sentenced to two years in jail for protesting in print about the execution of
African-American military personnel who rioted in Houston. He wrote that
death by firing squad was preferable to black Americans going to Europe to
fight for liberties they could not enjoy at home.
112
Chapter 4: The United States and the First World War: from neutrality to involvement
Propaganda
Emmett Jay Scott, Special Advisor on black affairs to the Secretary of War,
was tasked by the Government with selling the war to African-Americans.
He spent much of his time denying tales of ill treatment of African-American
troops; there were rumours, for example, that they were used as shock Shock troops Troops used
troops. There was only one black agent in military intelligence, Walter H. for special, often particularly
Loving, who launched his own propaganda campaign in January 1918; this dangerous, missions or
included the charismatic speaker Roscoe Conkling Simmons, who embarked ‘suicide missions’.
on a nationwide tour with the theme, ‘My Country and My Flag’. The
Committee of Public Information (CPI) also targeted African-American
audiences; indeed, the Four Minute Man Bulletin No. 33 told African-
Americans that defeat of Germany would lead to racial equality – although it
didn’t specify how.
Flattery
Flattery involved making African-American leaders feel valued and therefore
‘buying’ their loyalty. In June 1918, George Creel of the CPI staged a three-
day conference of leading African-American editors who, in the words of
Emmett Jay Scott, should lead ‘negro public opinion … along helpful lines
rather than along lines that make for discontentment and unrest’. He went
on, ‘This is not the time to discuss race problems. Our first duty is to fight
and to continue to fight until the war is won. Then we can adjust the
problems that remain in the life of the colored man. This is the doctrine we’re
preaching to the Negroes of this country.’ Scott did, however, ask for
grievances to be addressed. The request resulted in two documents:
● The Bill of Particulars: this suggested ways in which the Government
could gain the support of African-Americans – by passing anti-lynching
legislation, for example, abolishing segregation on railways and improving
the treatment of African-American soldiers.
● Address to the Committee on Public Information: this was written by African-
American leader W.E.B. Du Bois and stressed that improved conditions and
reforms would make African-American soldiers more effective in their duties.
They were not attaching a price to loyalty – but it would be in the
Government’s own interests to improve conditions, Du Bois argued.
Suppression
The Espionage and Sedition Acts (see page 111) were used to full force in
monitoring the African-American press. The Post Office Solicitor William H.
Lamar, tasked with the role of censoring seditious material, searched for
hidden meanings in ostensibly uncontroversial articles. He even banned one
journal for quoting the view of Thomas Jefferson, Founding Father and
former President, that Ireland should be a republic. Editors came to realize
that their periodicals weren’t being judged on what was meant by the
content but on how officials interpreted that content within the context of
the time.
113
The periodical of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP), The Crisis, came in for particular attention, in part because
NAACP African-American it was the most influential liberal African-American mouthpiece – between
organization to promote civil 1917 and 1918 it increased circulation from 41,000 to 74,000. It was warned
rights, founded in 1909. ‘to publish only facts and constructive criticism’ and avoid anything that
might cause dissatisfaction among African-American troops. The Socialist
Messenger meanwhile faced problems when it suggested that African-
Americans shouldn’t volunteer to make the world safe for democracy
because ‘We would rather make Georgia safe for the negro’. Its editors, A.
Philip Randolph and Chandler Owen, found themselves briefly jailed for
such comments; they were released because they were presumed to be the
dupes of white socialists who told them what to write.
Patriotism of African-Americans
The patriotism of African-Americans in wartime could not reasonably be
questioned – over 360,000 volunteered for service, of whom 200,000 served
abroad. The propaganda disseminated by men like Emmett Jay Scott, however,
was clearly skewed. By July 1918, most African-American organs were
supporting the war. However, their experiences abroad did help develop a sense
of black consciousness and determination to improve conditions on their return.
Source K
114
The USA during
the First World War
Propaganda
Mobilization
and civil liberties
Chapter 4: The United States and the First World War: from neutrality to involvement
and finance civil liberties
Co-ordinated Single centralized Settled industrial Set wages and Liberty Bonds Mainly supportive
Lever Act, 1917
finance and system disputes standards of and Victory Loans roles
supplies employment Increased taxes
Summary diagram
116
Chapter 4: The United States and the First World War: from neutrality to involvement
Wilson’s gambles
Wilson clearly staked his career on the success of the Conference and it
could be argued he ignored political realities both at home and abroad in his
determination to drive a lasting peace. Having been fêted and cheered to an
almost embarrassing degree on his journey to Paris, he was at his most
imperious and aggressive during the actual Conference. At one point, during
a discussion on veterans’ pensions, he burst out, ‘Logic! Logic! I don’t give a Veterans’ pensions
damn for logic!’ He chose four delegates to accompany him, none of whom Pensions received by former
was a current Republican politician, even though the Senate (with its servicemen.
Republican majority) would have to pass any agreement. This was
particularly resented by Henry Cabot Lodge, Chairman of the powerful
Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
117
Moreover, Wilson was so determined to see a lasting settlement that he
gambled with his own health. He had the first of the strokes that would
finally incapacitate him on 3 August, but before this he was already showing
signs of extreme stress and paranoia, working eighteen-hour days squatting
uncomfortably over huge maps spread out on the floor, with areas and
regions cut out like jigsaw pieces, and being obsessed with French spies. He
seemed exhausted and increasingly illogical in his views. Overall, Wilson’s
behaviour suggested he was losing self-control and colleagues began to fear
for both his mental and physical health. Poor health and illness probably
clouded his judgement and ability to tolerate any opposition. As will be seen,
Wilson was to make some poor decisions and tactical errors in his battle to
sell the peace and League of Nations to Americans.
The process
The peace-making process was very fractured, with delegates from different
countries sometimes coming to blows. Germany itself hadn’t been invited to
the negotiations; a settlement would be imposed upon it. In the event most
decisions were made by the ‘Big Three’: the USA, Britain and France. Each
had a different agenda. The war on the Western Front had largely been
fought on French soil. France therefore sought a harsh settlement both so
that Germany would have to pay for its reconstruction and so that it would
never be strong enough to attack France again. The British leader, David
Lloyd George, saw the problems and resentment from Germany that would
accrue if the settlement were too harsh, but the British population largely
wanted some form of revenge. Wilson’s idea of a lasting peace settlement
based on fairness and moral principles did not necessarily receive a
sympathetic audience within this atmosphere.
Wilson, moreover, faced two significant disadvantages in his attempts to
influence proceedings:
● The USA had not suffered like France and other countries over whose lands
the war had been fought and so their priorities were different. France, in
particular, sought to weaken Germany both for purposes of retribution and
to ensure Germany would not be strong enough to attack it again.
● Wilson’s priority was to gain acceptance of the League of Nations. In
order to achieve this he would have to compromise over other issues such
as self-determination and German war guilt.
With the disjointed peace-making process and widespread accusations that
Germany was being treated badly, many in the USA were increasingly
cynical not only about the whole peace-making process but also the
involvement of the USA in foreign affairs generally. Wilson got a forewarning
of the problems he would face at home when he returned to the USA for a
short visit. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge had organized a petition signed by
39 of his Republican colleagues, hoping to delay any consideration of the
League of Nations until the peace settlement was signed. Wilson, however,
had insisted that acceptance of the League of Nations should be part of the
peace settlement and therefore it was to be written into all the treaties.
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Chapter 4: The United States and the First World War: from neutrality to involvement
The Fourteen
Points
• Membership of Differences of
League of Nations opinion over:
• German war guilt
• reparations
• self-determination
in practice
• revenge and
retribution
• need to keep
Germany weak
• need to
compromise over
treaties in order
to gain accept-
ance for the
League of
Nations
Summary diagram
119
Why did the USA fail The League of Nations
to join the League of
Wilson returned to the USA in July 1919 determined to gain Congressional
Nations?
approval for the treaties and membership into the League of Nations.
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Chapter 4: The United States and the First World War: from neutrality to involvement
was his refusal to compromise that finally lost him the battle. Lodge had
introduced a compromise bill into the Senate in November, which Wilson
told Democrats to oppose; it therefore failed, by 53 to 38 votes. When the
original peace settlement with the Covenant in its original form was
presented to the Senate in March 1920, it passed by 49 to 35 votes. This,
however, was seven votes short of the required two-thirds majority needed
for approving treaties. Had Wilson been able to win over seven Democrats
who possibly held only moderate reservations, the USA would have joined
the League of Nations and the ensuing history of the world may have been
very different.
Knox-Porter Resolution
Because the Covenant of the League of Nations was attached to all the peace
treaties, in rejecting this, the USA was effectively refusing to sign the peace
treaties ending the war. This obstacle was overcome by issuing the Knox-
Porter Resolution declaring the war was over, and in October 1921 the
Senate passed the peace treaties with the exception of the clauses relating to
the League of Nations.
Wilson tried to make the League of Nations a major issue in the 1920
presidential election, and the Democratic candidate James M. Cox promised,
if elected, that the USA would join. However, he was defeated and the
subsequent Republican presidents of the following decade became very
much associated with isolationism.
Senate votes
Summary diagram
121
6 Overview: the isolationist
impulse
Key question: To what extent was the USA isolationist during the 1920s?
Senate Foreign Relations Many commentators at the time spoke of US foreign policy in the 1920s as a
Committee Senate
return to isolationism (see page 10), citing in particular its refusal to join the
committee responsible for
the oversight of foreign
League of Nations and avoidance of foreign entanglements – a return in
affairs. other words to the ideas of the Founding Fathers with which we began this
book (see page 11).The decade saw two Republican presidents, Warren
World Court Also known
Harding (1921–1923) and Calvin Coolidge (1923–1929), who were very much
as the Permanent Court of
International Justice, this was committed to laissez-faire policies at home and wary of commitments abroad.
set up under the auspices of In this they were supported by the powerful Senate Foreign Relations
the League of Nations in Committee, chaired by Henry Cabot Lodge from 1919. The USA had, for
1920 to help countries settle example, begun informally to co-operate with the League of Nations,
disputes peacefully by passing particularly in terms of combating trade in opium, slavery and armaments.
judgements. The Senate did on several occasions, however, refuse to join the World
Court, feeling it could result in unnecessary foreign commitments.
Source L
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Chapter 4: The United States and the First World War: from neutrality to involvement
grow in the western hemisphere in Canada and Latin America both in terms
of economic and cultural influence and, especially in the latter, in terms of
political influence, too.
League of Nations
Although it did not join the League of Nations, it was involved in many of its
activities and had official representation at the League’s headquarters in
Geneva from 1925. In 1924, the Rockefeller Foundation gave $500,000 to Rockefeller Foundation
the League of Nations’ health service. Philanthropic organization
founded in 1913 by John D.
Trade Rockefeller to do good
Trade was vastly important to the USA. The value of exports rose from $3.8 works throughout the world.
billion in 1922 to $5.1 billion in 1929. The automobile industry was Multinational companies
particularly important; it accounted for 10 per cent of manufactured exports Companies with branches
in 1929. In 1920 the Merchant Marine Act allocated $125 million to finance and interests in different
the construction of merchant ships that were to carry US goods all over the countries.
world.
Investment
The decade saw the development of multinational companies often
dominated by US interests. The USA had $4 billion invested in 1300 foreign
firms. Its main markets were Canada, western Europe and Japan. US
investment in the Canadian car industry had effectively destroyed domestic
manufacture.
In this section we will examine the influence of the USA in Latin America
following the First World War, moving from economic penetration to political
involvement. The former belligerent countries of Europe were largely
bankrupted and deeply in debt as a result of the cost of the war. They were in
no position to resume their former level of economic involvement in Latin
America; the USA as the largest creditor nation as a result of the war was in
a position to supplant them. The USA also helped nations in Latin America
through philanthropic ventures, for example, the work of the Rockefeller
Foundation.
123
Source M
What can be inferred from A comparison of US and British investment in Latin America in 1913 and
the figures in Source M about 1929, from Investments of US Capital in Latin America by M. Winkler,
US and British investment in World Peace Foundation, 1929, cited in ‘Latin America and the
South America between International Economy from the First World War to the World
1913 and 1929? Depression’, by R. Thorp, in The Cambridge History of Latin America,
Vol. IV, L. Bethell (ed.), published by Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1986. The figures are in millions of dollars.
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Chapter 4: The United States and the First World War: from neutrality to involvement
proposed that the USA should extend its influence through its economic
power while keeping military costs to a minimum. The State Department
employed experts such as economist Edwin Kemmerer to take a lead in Kemmerer Plans Plans
Latin America. When countries asked for US investment, Kemmerer and his drawn up to help stabilize
colleagues would draw up plans to stabilize the economies – the so-called and develop the economies
Kemmerer Plans – and US personnel would usually remain to supervise of Latin American countries,
offering, for example, advice
their implementation. Often the plans would involve setting up a central
on sound currency and
bank while officials would put local entrepreneurs in touch with US central banks to facilitate the
financiers. The aim was that US investors could profit but local populations financial infrastructure to pay
would also benefit from a stronger economy through rising living standards for increased trade and
and greater economic security. industrial development.
Source N
Problems of US involvement
This involvement did come at a cost and the USA had to intervene to protect
the investments, the property and sometimes the physical safety of its
citizens. It sought to avoid loans being spent fraudulently on luxuries for
corrupt officials or on armaments, and there was always concern that a
recipient country would get so much in debt that the loans couldn’t be
repaid. It genuinely hoped its investments would help countries develop
sound economies with rising standards of living for all citizens.
US military intervention, when it was felt to be necessary, was always
expensive and unpopular with taxpayers. Many in Congress followed the
lead of Senator William Borah who argued that the USA should withdraw its
military forces where appropriate and let the countries govern themselves.
Secretary of State Hughes argued in 1923 that the USA should only use
military force to protect the Panama Canal (see pages 67–69) and then only
as a last resort.
The decade therefore saw agreements including the settlement of old
disputes and the withdrawal of US troops where possible, to be replaced by
local militias loyal to the USA.
125
Kemmerer Plans Automobile manufacture
and sales
Sixty-one US
bank branches US investment in Telecommunications –
Latin America ITT
Summary diagram
Colombia
In 1921, the USA gave Colombia $25 million in compensation for its role in
the 1903 revolt, which saw the independence of Panama, clearing the way for
the construction of the Panama Canal (see pages 67–69).
Mexico
The Mexican Civil War had ended in 1920 with the presidency of Álvaro
Obregón. However, the USA withheld official recognition of his Government
because of outstanding debts and the issue of compensation for US citizens
whose property was destroyed during the conflict. One of Obregón’s major
problems was to achieve some degree of financial security. Mexico had
Default on international defaulted on its international debts as early as 1914, after which the USA
debts Where a government and other countries withdrew recognition of the Mexican Government. In
refuses to pay back its debts June 1922 the then Finance Minister, de la Huerta, agreed to repay $500,000
to other countries. but it was left to his successor, Alberto Pani, to sign the Bucareli Accords in
August 1923 in which compensation for damaged foreign property was
agreed. As a result, the USA did restore recognition, and Mexico was allowed
to borrow again on the international markets.
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Chapter 4: The United States and the First World War: from neutrality to involvement
What impression of himself is Augusto Sandino (in the centre) on his way to Mexico in June 1929 to
General Sandino trying to canvass support (from the US National Archives and Records
create in Source O? Note in Administration).
particular his clothing in
contrast with that of the other
figures in the photograph.
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Chapter 4: The United States and the First World War: from neutrality to involvement
Involvement
• Nicaragua, 1926:
US troops invaded –
Good Neighbor founded National
Guard
• Withdrawal of
troops: Dominican
Republic, 1924;
Nicaragua, 1925
• Agreements:
Mexico: 1923
Bucareli Accords;
Colombia, 1925:
$25 million
compensation
Summary diagram
US political involvement
in Latin America
8 International agreements
Key question: How extensively did the USA involve itself in international
agreements?
Anglo-Japanese Alliance
An alliance between Britain
The USA signed international agreements with various degrees of
and Japan, dating from 1902
commitment and enthusiasm during the 1920s. As well as the formal and due for renewal in 1922.
agreements the USA was often prepared to exert its influence less formally.
This section examines both of these.
129
Pacific and preferred to detach Britain from Japanese friendship. Britain,
however, was keen for renewal, as was the dominion of Australia, because
they believed the treaty acted as a stabilizing factor on Japan and prevented
Japanese aggression.
The Washington Naval Conference was a compromise, to detach Britain from
a Japanese alliance while creating assurances for future stability. While it has
been criticized for its limitations, it was the first disarmament agreement,
setting an important precedent.
The Agreement was made between four powers in 1921: the USA, Britain,
Japan and France. Italy became a signatory in 1922.
● It froze battleship strengths at immediate post-war levels, persuading
Japan to accept less tonnage than Britain and the USA. In 1922, Italy also
signed to accept parity with France. The agreement stipulated that Britain
and the USA were to have 525,000 tons, Japan, 315,000 and Italy and
France, 175,000.
● Britain, the USA, Japan and France signed the Four Power Treaty in which
they agreed to respect their respective interests in East Asia and re-affirm
the Open Door policies in China (see page 73).
● There were specific agreements – Japan, for example, promised to remove
its troops from the Chinese province of Shantung while the USA agreed
not to reinforce its military presence in Guam.
Limitations
Ratification Approval of a President Harding, in his speech asking for Senate ratification of the
measure by voting. agreements, assured his audience that acceptance implied ‘no commitment
Dawes Plan Plan of 1923 to armed force, no alliances, no written or moral obligation to join in
which offered Germany defence’. The agreements, in other words, had no force and no sanctions
scaled-down reparations and would be forthcoming if any signatory broke them. A second attempt to
provided it with a loan of reduce naval strength in 1927 failed to come to any agreement.
$250 million to help stabilize
the currency. International debt
Young Plan Plan of 1929 International debt was at the heart of the international tensions of the 1920s.
offering to further scale down The priority of the USA was for European countries such as Britain and
German reparations. France to repay the loans they had taken out to finance the First World War.
When the problem of their ability to repay came up, President Coolidge is
reported to have said, ‘They hired the money, didn’t they?’ Although the
quotation is possibly fictitious, it did accurately express the sentiment of
many Americans that the countries should repay their loans. However, most
European countries, still suffering from depressed economic conditions
arising from the war, simply could not afford to repay them.
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Chapter 4: The United States and the First World War: from neutrality to involvement
131
Source Q
What can be inferred from An excerpt from the hearings of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Source Q about the Relations in December 1928 concerning the Kellogg–Briand Pact (found
commitment of Secretary of at avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kbhear.asp).
State Kellogg to the Kellogg– Senator SWANSON. As I understand from what you say, if this multilateral
Briand Pact? treaty is violated by any other nation, there is no obligation, moral or legal, for
us to go to war against any nation violating it?
Secretary KELLOGG. That is thoroughly understood. It is understood by our
Government; and no other government made any suggestion of any such thing. I
knew, from the attitude of many governments, that they would not sign any treaty
if there was any moral obligation or any kind of obligation to go to war. In fact,
Canada stated that. The other governments never suggested any such obligation.
International
agreements
Successes Failures
1928: Kellogg–Briand
Pact: International
agreement to settle
disputes peacefully
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Chapter 4: The United States and the First World War: from neutrality to involvement
9 Key debate
Key question: How far do historians agree about the level of the USA’s
involvement in foreign affairs in the 1920s?
133
individuals and concerns implement their policies. He goes on to quote the
use of what Joseph Nye of Harvard University described in 1990 as ‘soft
power’ – global influence emanating not from military might, but economic
and cultural influence and technical superiority. Others have argued
similarly. Michael Parrish, writing in 1992, argued that the hope was to gain
the benefits of economic influence with minimum cost in terms of both
budget and military involvement – hence the recruitment and training of
groups friendly to the USA, such as the National Guard in Nicaragua.
Historian Paul A. Carter in the 1960s argued that foreign entanglements
continued in the face of isolationism. He gave the example of the navy,
which expanded despite budget cuts elsewhere because of the growing fear
of Japan. Carter cited historian Alexander DeConde in support of his
arguments; DeConde had suggested isolation was a geopolitical fact of life in
the USA for much of the nineteenth century, but isolationism was an
attempt to maintain the policy despite the nineteenth-century conditions no
longer being applicable. The expansion of US global trade, and faster ships
and communication, also contributed to the increasing impracticality of
isolationism.
While acknowledging its impracticability, historian Selig Adler wrote in the
1950s that isolationism persisted because it had a wide group of adherents,
particularly in the Midwest where the geopolitical argument based in the
geographical isolation of the USA from world events might still be relevant
and where there was strong anti-British feeling. This argument echoed that
of journalist John Gunther in Inside USA, published in 1947, who felt that
Midwesterners still sympathized with the isolationist impulse even after – or
because of – the Second World War.
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Chapter 4: The United States and the First World War: from neutrality to involvement
Isolationism
• Non-membership
of World Court
• Withdrawal of Involvement
troops from
Dominican • International
Republic and agreements
Nicaragua • Involvement in
work of League
of Nations and
World Court
• Trade and invest-
ment throughout
the world
• Intervention
in Latin America Summary diagram
135
Examination advice
How to answer ‘to what extent’ questions
The command term ‘to what extent’ is a popular one in IB exams. You are
asked to evaluate one argument or idea over another. Stronger essays will
also address more than one interpretation. This is often a good question in
which to discuss how different historians have viewed the issue.
Example
‘The US decision to enter the First World War on the side of the
Allies was mainly in response to unrestricted German submarine
warfare.’ To what extent do you agree with this statement?
1. First, take at least five minutes to write a short outline. Here you can list
the different reasons the USA entered the war and what, if any,
connection there was with unrestricted German submarine warfare. An
example of an outline is given below:
Context:
USA declared its neutrality as Europe went to war in 1914.
U SA favoured Allies over Central Powers. Wilson’s top advisers tilted
towards Allies.
Anti-German propaganda in US press.
U SA had previous confrontations with Germany (Samoa,
Venezuela) and feared Germany’s growing interests in Mexico.
N onetheless, public was generally anti-war and had elected Wilson
in 1916 on his anti-war platform.
P revious unrestricted German submarine warfare (1915) had not
pushed the USA into war.
Economic reasons:
Big business (banks and munitions makers) wanted USA to win.
Most US trade was with Allied countries.
I mportance of trade with both Allies and Germany: 40 per cent of
government revenues came from tariffs.
Some historians state that USA had found other markets and that
its economy was strong.
Moral reasons:
W ilson wanted to go to war to ensure a fair peace and introduce a
new world order.
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Chapter 4: The United States and the First World War: from neutrality to involvement
137
3. In the body of the essay, you need to discuss each of the points you raised
in the introduction. Devote at least a paragraph to each one. It would be a
good idea to order these in terms of which ones you think are most
important. Be sure to make the connection between the points you raise
and the major thrust of your argument. You will be assessed according to
your use of evidence to support your thesis. You may well argue that you
do not agree with the idea that it was mainly German unrestricted
submarine warfare that drove the USA to war in April 1917 as long as you
are able to offer supporting historical evidence.
4. In the conclusion, be sure to offer final remarks on the degree to which
you agree or disagree with the idea that German U-boat attacks on US
ships was the main reason the USA went to war in 1917. Do not add any
new information or themes in your concluding thoughts. An example of a
good concluding paragraph is given below.
5. Now try writing a complete answer to the question, following the advice
above.
Examination practice
Below are two exam-style questions for you to practise on this topic.
1 Analyse the social impact of the First World War on one country in the region.
(For guidance on how to answer ‘analyse’ questions, see pages 167–169.)
2 Evaluate the reasons the USA did not join the League of Nations.
(For guidance on how to answer ‘evaluate’ questions, see pages 30–32.)
138