THE CONCEPT OF NATURAL JUSTICE : COMMENT ON Travdncore

Rayons Ltd. v. Union of India.1

ALTHOUGH SO much has been said on the concept of natural justice2
since the advent of the Constitution in 1950, when the High Courts got
the power to issue writs,3 yet the fact is that the concept remains as
vague and elusive as ever. It has been stated by the Supreme Court more
than once that the principles of natural justice are not 'embodied rules'.
Each case has to be decided on its own merits and that the principles of natural
justice are variable according to the nature of the quasi-judicial body
which is in question, the nature of controversy which is in question, facts
and circumstances of the case, the framework of the law under which the
inquiry is held and so on.4 In one case, the Supreme Court has stated
that the test of the fairness is that the conscience of the court must be
satisfied.5 In the context of this case, the conscience of the court was
rather easily satisfied as regards fairness of the adjudicatory procedure.6
Since then, much water has flowed in the River Jumna and the courts have
become prone to demand somewhat more exacting standards of fairness
in the adjudicatory procedures, but still the rules of natural justice do not
appear to have crystallised with any definiteness. Such questions whether
the quasi-judicial body involved in a case should give a personal hearing,
whether legal representation should be allowed in quasi-judicial proceedings,
whether the decision-making body be required to give reasons for its deci-
sions, and so on continue to arise perpetually before the courts on whom
devolve the responsibility of deciding whether in a particular situation
there has or has not been violation of natural justice.
In the year 1971, the Supreme Court has made a very notable and
significant pronouncement on the concept of natural justice in Trdvancore
Rayons v. Union of India.7 In the view of this reviewer, this case is in the
same class as the Krdipak8 case decided by the Supreme Court last year,

1. A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 862.

2. For a discussion of the concept of Natural Justice, see Jain & Jain, Principles
of Administrative Law 163-209 (1971).
3. On writs, see Jain & Jain, supra note 2 at 310-396; Jain , Indian Constitutional
Law 234-252 (1970).
4. C.B. Boarding Sc Lodging v. State of Mysore, A.I.R, 1970 S.C. 2042; 1970
An. Sur. I.L. 90; Jain & Jain, supra note 2 at 182.
5. Fedco v. Bilgrami, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 415.
6. See I.L.I., Administrative Process under the Essential Commodities Act 60, 65,
66, 141. Commenting in this case, this reviewer had said, 'The right of hearing has been
diluted by the Supreme Court by its decision in the Fedco case", id at 142.
7. The case was heard by a Bench consisting of Shah and Hegde, JJ., and the
judgement was delivered by Shah, J.
8. A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 15. For comments on this
case see, \91Q> An. Sur. /.£. 88-90 ; Jain, Bias and Administrative Power: A.K. Kraipak v.
Union of India 13 J.I.L.L 362 (1971).
19721 THE CONCEPT OF NATURAL JUSTICE 603

and, therefore, deserves notice in the pages of this valued legal journal.
The case bears upon three aspects of the concept of natural justice, viz. :
(1) personal hearing ; (2) institutional decision and (3) reasoned decision.
On each of these three questions, the court appears to have taken positions
which seem to go to some extent beyond what the court has said so far.
The fact situation in the case is rather simple. The case arose under
the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, read with the Finance Act, 1955.
The appellant-company was engaged in the production of cellulose film.
The Deputy Superintendent of Central Excise took the view that the company
was producing in its factory nitro-cellulose lacquer and was using it
internally, and thus, levied an excise duty on the company. The company
challenged its liability to pay the duty on the ground that the chemical
compound in question was not nitro-cellulose lacquer, and as such was
not dutiable within the meaning of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.
In support of its position, the company produced a certificate of test issued
by the Silk Mills Research Association, Bombay. The company went in
appeal to the collector of customs against the decision of the Deputy
Superintendent. The collector consulted the chemical examiner. He
also gave hearing to the company twice. Thereafter, he rejected the
company's contention. He gave a very detailed and elaborate judgment
running into 18 typed pages in which he set out the points on which he held
against the claim of the company. Not being satisfied with the collector's
decision, the company then invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the
Government of India under section 36 of the Excises Act.9 The Govern-
ment of India exercising its powers under section 36 rejected the company's
contention and upheld the collector's decision without giving any personal
hearing to the company. While communicating its decision it used a
printed proforma wherein it was stated that it saw no justification
to interfere with the collector's decision.10 No reasons were given by the
government as to why it did not accept the company's contention or why
it agreed with the collector's view. Against the government's order, the
company filed a special leave appeal to the Supreme Court under article
136. The court accepted the appeal and remanded the case to the govern-
ment for disposal according to law.
(0 Personal Hearing
The first question raised in the appeal before the Supreme Court
9. S. 36 of the Central Excisees and Salt Act, 1944, runs as follows :
The Central Government may, on the application of any person aggrieved by
any decision or order passed under this Act or the rules made thereunder by
any Central Excise officer or by the Central Board of Excise and Customs
constituted under the Central Boards of Revenue Act, 1963, and from which
no appeal lies, reverse or modify such decision or order.
10. The order in question was commwrcated by the Joint Secretary to the Govern-
ment of India, Ministry of Finance, and ran as follows :
"The Governmsnt of India have carefully considered the points made by the
applicant (s), but see no justification for interfering with the order in appeal.
The revision application is accordingly rejected".
 604 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN LAW INSTITUTE [Vol. 14 : 4

was that the government's decision was vitiated because it had decided the
matter without giving a personal hearing to the company. The significant
point to note in this connection is that the company had received personal
hearing, not once but twice, before the collector. The question considered
by the court was whether, in the circumstances, it was necessary for the
government also to give a hearing to the company. The court expressed
its annoyance and displeasure at, and even criticised, the fact that the
government had not given a personal hearing to the company. The
question raised before the collector of customs was of a complicated nature
and for its proper appreciation required familiarity with the chemical
composition and physical properties of chemical compounds produced
by the company. There was conflicting evidence before the collector as
the chemical examiner and the Silk Mills Research Association had
differed on the question of the nature of the chemical compound in question.
The court accepted it as true that "the rules do not require that personal
hearing shall be given", but still it took the view that :

[I]f in appropriate cases wheie complex and difficult questions

requiring familiarity with technical problems are raised, personal
hearing is given, it would conduce to better administration
and more satisfactory disposal of the grievances of the citizens.11

Till now, the courts have reiterated in innumerable cases that natural
justice does not always require a personal hearing and that an opportunity
to show cause through written representations, etc. is sufficient compliance
with the principles of natural justice.12 This is the prevailing norm of the
adjudicatory procedure. The pronouncement of the Supreme Court in
the Travancore case appears to break new ground and goes to show that
perhaps the court is becoming uneasy at the prevailing practice of denying
personal hearing by the large number of quasi-judicial bodies. The
significance of the Travancore case lies in the fact that the Supreme Court
has underlined the importance of personal hearing in certain circumstances.
The court has emphasized upon the need of a personal hearing in the
instant case on the ground that "complex and difficult" questions are in-
volved, and that oral hearing would conduce to better and more satisfactory
disposal of citizens' grievances. The court's statement becomes all the
more significant when it is remembered that the collector from whose order
the Government of India was hearing the appeal had personally heard the
company twice, which meant that the collector had given a through hearing
to the company. Still, the court emphasized upon the need of a 'personal
hearing' by the government. This approach may be compared with the

11. Supra note 1 at 864.

12. Jain & Jain, supra note 2 at 182-3; Board of High School v. Ghanshyam, A.I.R.
1962 S.C. 1110; 1970 An. Sur. LL. 90-91.
1972] THE CONCEPT OF NATURAL JUSTICE 60$

observation of Lord Denning in Pettv. Grey Hound Racing Association™

that "in a case such as this fairness may require an oral hearing".
In spite of the emphasis placed by the court an personal hearing in the
instant case, the fact, however, remains that the court did not quash the
government's order on this ground. This indicates that the court is not
as yet thinking of personal hearing as an inevitable procedural norm. In
the order of remand, the court did not insist on personal hearing by the
government but satisfied itself by observing that "having regard to the
complicated and technical questions involved", the central government
"may be well advised to give an oral hearing to the appellant company". 14
Prima facie, this is not a mandatory direction to the government to give
a personal hearing compulsorily in the instant case and looks more like
an advice or suggestion, but in the light of what the court has observed
in the body cf the judgement, it can be presumed that thegovernment would
give the company a personal hearing while deciding the matter again. It is
too early, however, to say as to what would be the impact of the court's
observations in the Travancore case on the future development of the right
of personal hearing as an element of natural justice. Will the quasi-judicial
bodies take the cue from the court's observations in the instant case, and
start giving personal hearing in more and more cases, especially where com-
plicated questions are involved? Would the courts insist in many more cases
than they have done hitherto that personal hearing be held ? Or, will the
present case turn out to be merely of a fleeting nature and be lost in
oblivion without making any impact on the growth of the adjudicatory
procedures in India? The predilection of this reviewer is in favour
of the first two approaches. The court has rightly pointed „ out that
oral hearing would conduce to better and more satisfactory disposal of
citizens' grievances. It will be well for India if the quasi-judicial bodies
and court were to keep this dictum in view and insist on personal hearing
in as many cases as it can possibily be done.

(ii) Institutional Decision:

In the Travancore case, the court also happens to make some adverse
remarks on the operation of the system of institutional decisions
in India. A large number of statutes confer power on the central
government to decide various matters. A statutory decision-making
power is exercised by the department concerned with the subject-
matter of the statute in question. When power to decide a matter is
conferred on the central government, it is not usually prescribed as to
which official, at what level, in the concerned department will have to
exercise the power and decide the matter. As already stated, in the instant
case the power conferred on the government by section 36 of the Central
Excises Act was involved. The government's order disposing of the

13. (1968) 2 W.L.R. 1471. It was a case of taking disciplinary action against a
licensed trainer of greyhounds on the charge that his dog had been drugged.
14. Supra note 1 at 866.
606 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN LAW tNSTlfUTE [Vol. 14 :4
revision petition from the collector's order merely stated lhat all the
points made by the company had been carefully considered by the govern-
ment and it sees no justification for interfering with the collector's order.15
The government's order was issued in a printed form and was signed by
the Joint Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance.
Commenting on the order, the court observed that there is a bare assertion
by the Joint Secretary in his communication that the Government of India
had "carefully considered the points made by the applicants". There was
however, no evidence as to who considered the points "and what was
considered". The order did not disclose the name or designation of the
authority of the Government of India who considered the "points" made
by the company. It was impossible to say whether the officer was familiar
with the subject-matter so that he could decide the dispute without elucida-
tion and merely on a perusal of papers. The order was communicated in
a printed form. Expressing its dissatisfaction with this type of procedure,
the court emphasized that by section 36, the central government was invested
with the judicial power of the state, and orders involving important disputes
were brought before the government. Therefore, a person who approaches
the government in exercise of his statutory right for the adjudication of a
dispute, is entitled to know, at least, the official designation of the person
who has considered the matter, what was considered by him, and the reasons
for recording a decision against him. The court has thus clearly expressed
its dislike of an unidentified official disposing of a matter in a quasi-
judicial proceeding. In this connection, it appears to be relevant to take
notice of another case, decided by the Supreme Court last year, and in
which also the court had made some similar observations. In Mahabir Prasad
Santosh Kumdr v. State of U.P.,16 a licence under the U.P. Sugar Dealers'
Licensing Order, 1962, to deal wholesale trade in sugar, was cancelled
by the licensing authority who was the District Magistrate. Under the
relevant rules, there existed a provision for an appeal to the state govern-
ment. An appeal was taken to the state government but it was also rejected.
Commenting on the way the authorities had functioned in the case, the
court characterised the same as revealing "a disturbing state of aftairs"
in which the "authorities have disclosed by their conduct a reckless disregard
of the rights of the appellants". Apart from other reasons which prompted
it to use such harsh language (the main cause for this being that no reasons
had been given by any of the authorities), the court also stated :

From the materials on the record it cannot be determined as

to who considered the appeal addressed to the State Govern-
ment, and what was considered by the authority exercising
power on behalf of the State Government.

15. Supra note 10.

16. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1302. For a comment on this case see 1970 An. Sur. LL,
99.
1972] THE CONCEPT OE NATURAL JUSTICE 661

It appears, therefore, that lately the Supreme Court has been express-
ing its dislike of the system of an institutional decision in which an
unidentified official disposes a matter in exercise of a quasi-judicial power.
It is, however, too early to say whether it has assumed the status of a
binding norm of the process of adjudication that an identified officer
should hear and decide the matter. The court, though has expressed its
displeasure on this score, yet has not so far quashed any quasi-judicial
decision on this ground. Time alone can show whether the court will
go to the extent of making it a binding rule of administrative adjudication.
The attitude displayed by the court in the cases cited here is, however, at
variance with the stand taken by the House of Lords in Local Government
Board v. Arlidge,11 where the demand to particularise the judge in the
department, "to individualise" the department, was characterised as
"grotesque". In none of the cases mentioned here has the Supreme Court
referred to this observation of the House of Lords. It does not appear
that the courts in England have revised their attitude in this respect. It,
therefore, would mean that the Supreme Court is adopting a view different
from the English attitude. Needless to say that it would be conducive to the
better administration if the person concerned were to know who the judge
was. In the United States, a similar problem has been solved by holding
a hearing before a hearing officer on whose report the decision is taken
by the department concerned. This is provided for under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, 1946.18

(///) Reasoned Decision

The most significant aspect of the Travancore case, however, is the

emphasis placed by the Supreme Court on the giving of reasoned decisions
by quasi-judicial bodies. As already stated, the collector of customs while
rejecting the company's appeal from the order of the Deputy Controller
imposing the excise duty on its production, gave an elaborate decision
running into 18 typed pages. From the collector's order, the company
took the matter in revision, to the central government. The government
rejected the appeal withont giving any reasons. The government's order
was challenged before the Supreme Court on the ground, inter alia, that
it gave no reasons. The court accepted this contention and quashed the
order on the ground that it was not a speaking order. The order was in
a printed form which merely asserted that government had carefully con-
sidered the 'points' made of by the company but saw no justification for
interfering with the order in appeal and, accordingly, rejected the revision
application. The court commented very adversely on the government's
order. The court emphasized that the government's power under

17. (1915) A.C. 120.

18. Schwartz, American Administrative Law 144-60 (1962); Byse, The Federal
Administrative Procedure Act, 1 J.I.LI. 89, 98. (1958-59); Jain & Jain, supra note 2 at
201.
608 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN LA W INSTITUTE [Vol. 14 : 4

section 36 of the Central Excises Act was of a judicial nature and orders
involving important disputes are brought before the government. Frcm
the orders of the government, appeals could be brought before the Supreme
Court under article 136. The court would find it impossible to exercise
its jurisdiction under article 136, and to decide the dispute, without there
being a speaking order of the authority from which it is hearing the appeal.
For a proper discharge of the court's function, the authority's order should
set out the nature of the dispute, the arguments in support thereof raised
by the aggrieved party, and should reasonably disclose that the matter
received due consideration at the hands of the competent authority. The
court pointed out that the exercise of the right of appeal to it would be
futile if the authority chose not to disclose the reasons in support of the
decision reached by it. Emphasizing this point further, the court observed :

To enable the High Court or this Court to exercise its constitu-

tional powers, not only the decision, but an adequate disclosure
of materials justifying an inference that there has been a judicial
consideration of the dispute by an authority competent in that
behalf in the light of the claim made by the aggrieved party,
is necessary. If the officer acting on behalf of the Govern-
ment chooses to give no reasons, the right of appeal will be
devoid of any substance.19

An interesting aspect of the matter, however, is whether the higher

tribunal should also give its own reasons when it is upholding the decision
of the lower tribunal which is a reasoned decision. This argument was
raised before the court. It was contended in support of the validity of
the government's order that the collector of customs had given a reasoned
deeision and since the gov eminent was merely dismissing the petition against
the decision, the government was not bound to give any reasons, for it must
be assumed that the government had accepted every reason given by the
collector. Dismissal of the petition against the collector's order meant that
the government fully endorsed the reasons given by the collector and in-
corporated these reasons into its own decision. From the previous case-law
on the question of reasoned decisions, the line of argument could be fully
supported. As for example, in M.P. Industries v. Union of India,20 by
majority, the Supreme Court had taken the view that where a higher tribu-
nal was affirming the decision of the lower tribunal, it was not obligated
to give fuller reasons if the lower tribunal had given a reasoned decision.

19. Supra note 1 at 864.

20. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 671. The majority judgment was delivered by Bachawat
and Mudholkar, JJ. Subba Rao, J., dissented from the majority and took the view that
reasons must be given by the higher body even when the lower body had given a reasoned
decison which was being affirmed. Subba Rao, J's view has now been vindicated in the
Travancore case.
1972] THE CONCEPT OF NATURAL JUSTICE 609

This had been the prevailing norm 21 prior to the Travancore case. For
example, in the Bhagat Paja2la case, the order of the central government
hearing an appeal from the state government was quashed because neither
the central nor the state government had given any reasons. Reasons
had, hcwever, to be given when the appellate authority was reversing the
order of the lower authority, or where the higher authority was accepting the
decision of the lower authoirty but either the reasons given by the lower
authority were scrappy or nebulous; or when the order of the lower authority
contained some bad reasons and some good reasons, the higher authority
even when endorsing the order of the lower authority should give its own
reasons. Prior to the instant case, there appears to be no case where the
Supreme Court might have insisted on the higher body to give its own
reasons when the order of the lower authority which it was affirming was
fully a reasoned one. But now the Supreme Court has given a new direc-
tion to the rule of reasoned decision by insisting that the higher tribunal
should also give its own reasons in support of its decision irrespective of
the fact that it is only affirming the decision of the lower tribunal which
has given a reasoned decision. In the instant case, on the ground of
failure of the government to give a reasoned decision, the government's
order was quashed even though the collector's order which it affirmed
was elaborate and reasoned. The court pointed out that the communica-
tion from the government gave no reasons in support of the order; the
appellant company was merely informed that the Government of India
did not see any reasons to interfere 'with the order in appeal'. The com-
munication does not disclose the points which were considered by the
government, and for what reasons those were rejected by it. The court
characterised this as a "totally unsatisfactory method of disposal of a case
in exercise of the judicial power vested in the Central Government." 22
The court has dilated upon the absolute necessity of giving sufficient
reasons which disclose the proper appreciation of the problem to be solved,
and the mental process by which the conclusions are reached in cases where
a non-judicial body exercises judicial functions. In such a situation, the
court would require to be satisfied that the decision has been reached after
due consideration of the merits of the dispute, uninfluenced by extraneous
considerations of policy or expediency. The court justified its insistence
on reasoned decisions by a quasi-judicial body because of two advantages
that would flow therefrom: (1) the aggrieved party in a proceeding before
the court has the opportunity to demonstrate that the reasons which
persuaded the authority to reject his case were erroneous; (2) the obligation
to record reasons operates as a deterrent against possible arbitrary action

21. Bhagat Raja v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1606; Income Tax Commis-
sioner v. Walchand, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1435; Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar v. State oj
U.P., A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1302;S\atQ of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Nath, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1297;
Jain & Jain, supra note 2 at 196.
2\a. Bhagat Raja v. Union of India, supra note 21.
22. Supra note U at 865.
610 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN LAW INSTITUTE [Vol. 14 : 4

by the executive authority invested with the judicial power. Consequently,

the government's order in the Travancore case was quashed and the case
remanded to the central government for being disposed of according to
the law.
The case thus clearly spells out the obligation of a quasi-judicial body
to give reasons for their decisions. Undoubtedly, there are several advant-
ages in this. Firstly, as the court itself has pointed out, it acts as a restraint
on the body in question against any possibility of use of its power in an
arbitrary manner. Needless to say that in the modern world when so many
administrative authorities are being given quasi-judicial powers, it is a
demand of prudence that chances of misuse of power by such bodies are
minimised and reasoned decisions by such bodies can act as a built-in
control mechanism of great significance. Secondly, an aggrieved party
would be in a better position to plead his case before a higher bedy if he is
aware of the reasons on which the lower body has held against him. In
the absence of reasons, he has to grope in the dark and thus he cannot be
held to have had a fair hearing before the higher authority if he is not aware
of the points which have gone against him. He can argue effectively
before the higher tribunal only if he knows the conclusions of the lower
tribunal. In these days of hierarchical quasi-judicial adjudication, if the
process is not to be a sham or showy, but effective to uphold the due rights
of the people, it appears to be a matter of first principle that a decision-
making tribunal must give its own reasons for its decision. Thirdly, the
ultimate tribunal should also state its own reasons for deciding the matter
in the way it does, irrespective of the fact whether the lower tribunal has
given the reasons or not, and whether it is upholding or negativing the
decision of the lower tribunal. This is obviously necessary if the judicial
review guaranteed by the Constitution under articles 226 and 136 is not to
be a sham but effective.
An interesting side-light on the instant case is that it has been stated
in the judgment that the M.P. Industries220 case was "in effect" overruled
by the Bhagat Raja22 case. The judgment in the Bhdgat Raja case was
delivered by Justice Mitter and Justice Shah was a member cf the Full
Bench which decided the matter. He elaborately discussed there the
question of liability of quasi-judicial body to give reasons and was quite
insistent that such bodies should give reasoned decisions. However, the
fact remains that in that case, the state government had not given any
reasons while rejecting the appellant's claim, and the central government
also gave no reasons while accepting the state government decision. In
this situation, the Supreme Court quashed the central government's order.
In the M.P. Industries case, the state government's order was a reasoned
one and the central government accepted the same without giving reasons.

22a. Supra note 20.

23. Ibid.
 1972] THE CONCEPT OF NATURAL JUSTICE 611

The Supreme Court refused to quash the order. Thus, the fact situation
in the two cases was not exactly similar. In many cases subsequent to the
Bhagat Raja case, the view had been expressed that when the lower body
has given a reasoned decision, the upper body may not give a reasoned
decision if it was affirming the order, barring certain exceptions.24 It would,
therefore, be clear that the Travancore case does take the matter of reasoned
decision much further ahead than had been done before in any decision
of the Supreme Court.
The Travancore case is thus of unique significance in the area of Indian
Administrative Law. It has clarified the position as to reasoned decisions.
The position as it obtains at present is that each tribunal or quasi-judicial
body in the chain should give its own reasons for its decision irrespective
of the fact whether the lower body has given its reasons or not. Needless
to say that this practice would greatly improve adjudicatory process in the
country. The obligation to give reasons is bound to instill in such bodies
a greater sense cf responsibility and care in disposing of cases coming
before them for adjudication. When this happens, situations like the one
revealed in the Mdhabir Pershad case would become rare. 25 Such revela-
tions do not credit to the administration.
Since the advent of the Independence, the task of improving the
adjudicatory process has fallen on the shoulders of the courts as there has
not been any conscious efforts made by the government to improve
administrative procedure. In England, the importance of giving reasoned
decisions was recognised by the Donoughmore Committee as early as 1932.
The committee formulated the principle that a party is entitled to know
the reasons for the decision and recommended the acceptance of this
principle as a part of natural justice. Nothing happened till the Franks
Committee reporting in 1957 insisted that there should be a general practice
that adjudicatory bodies give reasons for their decisions.26 Accordingly,
the obligation to give reasoned decisions was imposed by the Council and
Tribunals Act, 1958. But the reasons are to be given only when demanded
by the party concerned. However, this obligation is imposed only on the

24. For example, in H.M. Ahmad v. State, A.I.R. 1970 All. 46. Justice Pathak
culled out the proposition, after reviewing the earlier Supreme Court cases, that when
the inferior authority sets out its reasons, and the superior authority agrees with the same,
it does not need to specify the reasons in its order but merely refer to the reasons given
by the inferior authority : 1970 An. Sur. I.L. 98. Even recently in Chowgule & Co. v.
Union of India, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2021, the Supreme Court has ruled that :
The Central Government is to give reasons while rejecting the revision appli-
cation under rule 54 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, unless the State
Government had already in its order of rejection given the grounds, and the
Central Government referred to them in its revising capacity (Emphasis supplied).
25. Supra note 21 ; 1970 An. Sur. I.L. 99. A trading licence was cancelled with-
out giving any reasons either by the licensing authority or the state government hearing
appeal therefrom. See supra note 16 for comments of the Supreme Court.
26. Report of the Franks Committee 24, 75.
612 JO URNAL OF THE INDIAN LA W INSTITUTE [Vol. 14 : 4

tribunals specified in the Act. On tribunals falling outside the purview

of the Act, no such obligation rests. The courts have refused to impose
any such obligation as a part of natural justice.27 In the United States,
a similar obligation was imposed by the Administrative Procedure Act,
1946.28 In England, the Council on Tribunals constantly endeavours to
improve the adjudicatory procedures. Nothing of the kird has happpened
in India. The courts have, therefore, assumed the responsibility to do what-
ever they can to safeguard the rights of the people and also to improve
administrative procedures. The courts in India have played a great creative
role in this direction of which the instant case constitutes but one example.
It is of interest to note that the obligation to give reasoned decisions imposed
in India through judicial process is wider in scope than that imposed by
statute in Engand though it appears to be narrower than that imposed
in the United States.29
M.P. Jain*

27. Lord Denning, in R. v. Gaming Board for Great Britain, ex parte Benaim,
(1970) 2 W.L.R. 1009.
28. S. 8 (b) of the A.P.A. requires administrative decisions to be accompanied
by findings and conclusions, as well as the reasons or basis therefor, upon all material
issues of law, facts or discretion presented on record.
29. Street criticises the provision in the Tribunals and Inquiries Act as inadequate ;
See Harry Street, Justice in the Welfare State 67-6§ (1968).
* Professor of Law, University of Delhi.