Supreme Court of India Page 1 of 99

http://JUDIS.NIC.
IN
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
PETITIONER:
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION ETC. ETC.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
UNION OF INDIA ETC. ETC.
DATE OF JUDGMENT03/10/1991
BENCH:
VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J)
BENCH:
VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J)
MISRA, RANGNATH (CJ)
SINGH, K.N. (J)
AHMADI, A.M. (J)
OJHA, N.D. (J)
CITATION:
1992 AIR 248
1991 SCC (4) 584
1991 SCALE (2)675
CITATOR INFO :
D
1992 SC2084
1991 SCR Supl. (1) 251

JT 1991 (6)
8
(28)
ACT:
Bhopal Gas Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act 1985:
Sections 3, 4, 9: Settlement of claims before the Apex
Court--Not affording Fairness Hearing- Non-incorporation
of re-opener clause - Whether vitiates the settlementReview of settlement---If set aside by Court-- Whether Court
has inherent jurisdiction to order restitution of the fund
to the company-Review proceedings-Court would not refuse to
afford opportunity to parties on rigid technical grounds--In
case funds found inadequate in future--Whether Union of
India as Welfare State to make good the deficiency-Whether
settlement could be set aside on mere possibility that
medical documentation and categorisation were faulty and
figures of various kinds of injuries and disablement were
undependable--Liability of tortfeasor--Award of compensation--To be proportionate to economic superiority of the
offender.
Constitution of India, 1950:
Article 136, 137, 139-A, 142, 145: Inherent jurisdiction
under Articles 136 and 142 to withdraw or transfer and
finally dispose of the main suits and pending Criminal
proceedings in the course of hearing of appeals arising out
of interlocutory orders in suits--Whether taken away by
Article 139A--Words Cause or matter appearing in Article
142---Meaning and scope of-Apex Courts power to quash
criminal proceedings---Courts order recording settlement
between parties---Such agreement if opposed to public policy- Whether void and order of settlement liable to be set
aside-Special leave jurisdiction--Nature and scope of--Main
object--To meet ends of justice--Even specific provision for
appeal under the Constitution of other laws not to limit the
jurisdiction--Stifling of prosecution doctrine --Whether
attracted where the motive is to drop Criminal as also Civil
proceedings----Doctrine of restitution---Whether applicable
to appeals under Article 136--Conferment of immunity from
criminal proceedings--Whether legislative function--Whether
amounts to preferential treatment---Settlement of claims
recorded-Review of---Whether settlement could be set aside
Page 1 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
on
252
ground of insufficiency of settlement fund-In the event of
funds being found insufficient to meet the compensation
determined Whether Union of India as Welfare State to make
good the deficiency.
Civil Procedure Code, 1908:
Order XXIII, Rule 3B; Sections 112 and 114: Settlement
recorded by Court--Principles of natural justice-Persons
whose interests affected not made co-nomine parties-Order
recording
settlement not preceded by notice to
such
persons--Whether renders the proceedings void--Doctrine of
restitution --Applicability of
Law of Torts:
Mass tort action--Court assisted settlement--Non-affording
of pre-settlement Fairness Hearing and non-incorporation
of reopener clause in the settlement---Whether vitiate the
settlement---Assessment of once and for all damages in
personal injury actions---Unforeseen but likely
future
manifestation of the injury-- An important factor to be kept
in mind.
Admnistrative Law:
Principles of Natural Justice-Audi alteram pattern
rule-Non-compliance with the rule-Effect of--To be viewed in
circumstantial flexibility.
Practice & Procedure:
Plea of invalidity based on public policy--Not barred
by rule of estoppel.
Procedural
technicalities--To yield to
paramount
considerations of justice and fairness where matter involves
moral and humanitarian considerations.
HEADNOTE:
The Union Carbide (India) Ltd.. (UCIL), a sister concern
of Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) owned and operated in
Bhopal, a chemical plant manufacturing pesticides, one of
the ingredients in the composition being Methyl Isocyanate
(MIC), considered to be the most toxic chemical in industrial use.
On the 2nd December, 1984 night there was escape of MIC
from the tanks in which it was stored. And the fumes blew
into the hutments abutting the plant premises affecting the
residents as also the flora and fauna. About 4000 people
lost their lives and the health of tens of thousands of
people was affected in various degrees of seriousness.
The Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act,
1985 was
253
passed on 29.3.1985 authorising the Government of India, as
parent patriae exclusively to represent the victims so that
the interests of victims of the disaster could be fully
protected and that the claims for compensation were pursued
speedily, effectively and to the best advantage of the
claimants. In exercise of the power conferred under the Act,
the Union of India instituted an action on behalf of the
victims against Union Carbide Corporation before the U.S.
District Court, Southern District of New York for award of
compensation for the damage caused by the disaster. A large
number of fatal accidents and personal injury actions filed
by and on behalf of about 1,86,000 victims were already
pending in courts in U.S.A. All these claims came to be
consolidated by the Judicial Panel on Multi District Litigation and assigned to U.S. District Court, Southern District
Page 2 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
of New York presided over by Judge Keenan. The claim brought

by the Union of India was also consolidated with them.
However, the UCC resisted the choice of the American
Forum on the plea of forum-non-conveniens. Judge Keenan
allowed the plea of UCC and the Union of India was constrained to alter its choice of forum and to pursue the
remedy in the District Court at Bhopal by filing a suit
seeking a compensation of 3.3 Billion Dollars against the
UCC and UCIL. Efforts for a settlement were not fruitful.
The District Court made an order directing payment of Rs.
350 cores as interim compensation. UCC challenged this award
before the High Court and the quantum of interim compensation came to be reduced to Rs. 250 cores. Both Union of
India and UCC preferred appeals by special leave against the
High Courts order.
On 14th February, 1989 this Court recorded an overall
settlement of the claims in the suit for 470 million U.S.
Dollars and the consequential termination of Civil and
Criminal proceedings. On 15th February, 1989 the terms of
the settlement signed by the Attorney General for the Union
of India and the Counsel for UCC was filed and on the basis
of the settlement, this Court passed an order recording the
terms of settlement and issuing directions as to the mode of
payment of the sum of 470 million U.S. Dollars pursuant to
and in terms of the settlement.
The said settlement was assailed in the present Petitions on
various grounds.
254
The petitioners contended that this Court had no jurisdiction to withdraw and dispose of the main suits and the
Criminal proceedings in the course of hearing of appeals
arising out of an interlocutory order in the suits. It was
further contended that the settlement recorded by this Court
was void under Order XXIII Rule 3B of the Code of Civil
Procedure as the order was not preceded by notice to the
persons whose interests would be affected and who were not
Co-nomine parties to the proceedings. It was also contended
that the orders quashing the criminal proceedings which were
serious non-compoundable offences would not amount to withdrawal of the prosecution even under the inherent powers of
this Court either under Section 482 Cr. P.C. or under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.
Conferment of criminal immunity, by this Court, it was
contended, was without jurisdiction, since it was essentially a legislative function and grant of Immunity to a particular person or persons may amount to a preferential treatment violative of the equality clause. The settlement was
also assailed on the ground that the stipulation for abstention from future criminal proceedings amounted to stifling
of the prosecution and, therefore, it was unlawful and
opposed to public policy. The settlement was also assailed
on the ground that Fairness Hearing procedure was not
followed that the quantum was inadequate and that there was
no re-opener clause which was very essential in view of
the fact that the latency period for the manifestation of
the effects of the toxic injuries was unpredictable.
It was contended that even if the settlement was to be
set aside, the funds should not be allowed to be repatriated
as that would embroil the victims in endless litigations to
realise the fruits of the decree that might be made in the
suit and to realise the order for interim payment. It was
also contended that since notices to and opportunities for
hearing of the victims represented by the Union of India,
were imperative before the settlement was recorded and the
denial of the same amounted to violation of the rules of
Page 3 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
natural justice.
It was further contended that a large number of genuine
claims stood excluded on the ground that despite notices the
claimants did not
appear for medical documentation and
so the medical documentation
done was not reliable.
255
Through the Union of India did not assail the settlement, it sought to support the petitioners challenge to the
validity of the settlement. It was contended on behalf of
the Union of India that though it did not dispute the settlement, it was not precluded from pointing out the circumstances in the case which, if accepted, would detract from
the legal validity of the settlement.
Disposing of the petitions, this Court,
HELD: (By The Court)
1. Under Article 142(1) of the Constitution, this Court
did have the jurisdiction to withdraw to itself the original
suits pending in the District Court at Bhopal and dispose of
the same in terms of the settlement. So also this Court has
the jurisdiction to withdraw the criminal proceedings.
However, in the particular facts and circumstances, the
quashing of the criminal proceedings was not justified. [372
B-C & F]
2. The settlement ordered by this Court is not void for
noncompliance with the requirements of Order XXIII Rule 3B
of the Code of Civil Procedure. [372-E]
3. The orders recording time settlement in so far as
they seek to prohibit future criminal proceedings do not
amount to conferment of criminal immunity; but merely consequential. to the quashing of the criminal proceedings.
[372-G]
4. The orders recording the settlement are not void, as
they are not opposed to public policy and do not amount to
stifling of criminal proceedings. [373-A]
5. Having regard to the scheme of the Bhopal Gas Leak
Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985, Fairness Hearing procedure is not strictly attracted to the Courts
sanctioning of a settlement. Likewise, the absence of a
Re-opener clause does not, ipso-facto, vitiate the settlement. [373-B-C]
6. If the settlement is set aside, UCC shall be entitled
to the restitution of the amount brought in by it pursuant
to the orders of this Court, subject to its complying with
the terms of the order dated 30th Nov., 1986 made by the
Bhopal District Court. [373 C-D]
256
7. The settlement is not vitiated for not affording the
victims and victim-groups an opportunity of being heard.
[373-E]
8. If the settlement fund is found to be insufficient,
the deficiency is to be made good by the Union of India.
[373 E]
9. For expeditious disposal of the claims, a time-bound
consideration and determination of the claims are necessary.
[373-F]
Per Majority: (Venkatachaliah, J. for himself, K.N. Singh
and N.D.
Ojja, jj);:
1. Article 139-A of the Constitution in terms does not
apply to the facts of the ease. The appeals were by special
leave under Article 136 of the Constitution against an
interlocutory order. Article 136 vests in the Supreme Court
a plenary Jurisdiction in the matter of entertaining and
hearing of appeals by granting special leave against any
kind of judgment or order made by a Court or Tribunal in any
Page 4 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
cause or matter and the powers can be exercised inspite of

the limitations under the specific provisions for appeal
contained In the Constitution or other laws. The powers
given by Article 136 are, however, in the nature of special
or residuary powers which are exercisable outside the purview of the ordinary laws In cases where the needs of justice demand Interference by the Supreme Court. [303-A-C]
Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh & Others,
[1955] SCR 267, relied on.
2. Any limited interpretation of the expression cause
or matter having regard to the wide and sweeping powers
under Article 136 which Article 142(2) seeks to effectuate,
limiting it only to the short compass of the actual dispute
before the Court and not to what might necessarily and
reasonably be connected with or related to such matter in
such a way that their withdrawal to the Apex Court would
enable the court to do complete justice, would stultify
the very wide constitutional powers. Situations may present
themselves before the court where the court with the aid of
the powers under Article 142(1) could bring about a finality
to
the
matters, and it is common
experience
that
day-in-and-day-out such matters are taken up and decided in
this Court. It is true that mere practice, however long,
will not legitimise issues of jurisdiction. But the argument, pushed
257
to its logical conclusions, would mean that when an interlocutory appeal comes up before this Court by special leave,
even with the consent of the parties, the main matter cannot
be finally disposed of by this Court as such a step would
imply an impermissible transfer of the main matter. Such
technicalities do not belong to the content and interpretation of constitutional powers. [304 B-G]
Halsburys Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Vol. 37,
para 22, referred to.
3. To the extent power of withdrawal and transfer of
cases to the Apex Court is, in tile opinion of the Court,
necessary for the purpose of effectuating the high purpose
of Articles 136 and 142(1), the power under Article 139A
does not to exhaust the power of withdrawal and transfer.
Article 139A, was introduced as part of the scheme of the
42nd Constitutional Amendment. That amendment proposed to
invest the Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction to determine
the constitutional validity of central laws by inserting
Articles 131A, 139A and 144A. But Articles 131A and 144A
were omitted by the 43rd Amendment Act 1977, leaving Article
139A In tact. That Article enables the litigants to approach the Apex Court for transfer of proceedings if the
conditions envisaged In that Article are satisfied. Article
139A was not intended, nor does it operate, to whittle down
the existing wide powers under Articles 136 and
142 of
the Constitution. The purposed constitutional plenitude of
the powers of the Apex Court to ensure due and proper administration of Justice is Intended to be co-extensive in each
case with the needs of justice of a given case and to meeting any exigency. [304-H: 305 A-C]
Harbans Singh v. U.P. State, [1982] 3 SCR 235, relied on.
4. In relation to the proceedings and decisions of
superior Courts of unlimited Jurisdiction, imputation of
nullity is not quite appropriate. They decide all questions
of their own jurisdiction. [309-F]
Isaacs v. Robertson, 1984(3) AER 140, relied on.
5. Under Order 32 of Supreme Court Rules, Order XXIII
Rule 3B CPC is not one of the rules expressly invoked and
made applicable. Even if the principle of natural justice
Page 5 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
underlying Order XXIII Rule 3B CPC is made to apply, the

consequences of non-compliance should not be
258
different from the consequences of the breach of rules of
natural justice implicit in Section 4 of the Bhopal Gas Leak
Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985. Having regard to
the circumstances of the case, this Court, in Sahus case
declined to push the effect of non-compliance to its logical
conclusion and declare the settlement void. In that case,
this Court considered it appropriate to suggest the remedy
and curative of at opportunity of being heard in the proceedings for review. Even assuming that the right of the
affected persons of being heard is also available at a stage
where a settlement is placed before the Court for its acceptance, such a right Is not referable to, and does not
stem from, Rule 3B of Order XXIII CPC. The pronouncement in
Sahus case as to what the consequences of non-compliance
are conclusive. [309 A-D]
Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India, [1990] 1 SCC 613, relied
on.
6. The proposition that a provision in any ordinary law
irrespective of the importance of the public policy on which
it is founded, operates to limit the powers of the Apex
Court under Article 142(1) is unsound and erroneous. The
power of the court under Article 142 in so far as quashing
of criminal proceedings are concerned is not exhausted by
Sections 320 on 321 or 482 Cr.P.C. or all of them put together. The power under Article 142 is at an entirely different level and of a different quality. Prohibitions on
limitations on provisions contained in ordinary laws cannot,
ipso-facto, act as prohibitions or limitations on the constitutional powers under Article 142. Such prohibitions or
limitations in the statutes might embody and reflect the
scheme of a particular law, taking into account the nature
and status of the authority or the court on which conferment
of powers-limited in some appropriate way is contemplated.
The limitations may not necessarily reflect or be based on
any fundamental considerations of public policy. It will be
wholly incorrect to say that powers under Article 142 are
subject to express statutory prohibitions. That would convey
the idea that statutory provisions override a constitutional. In exercising powers under Article 142 and in assessing
the needs of complete justice of a cause or matter, the
Apex Court will take note of the express prohibitions in any
substantive statutory provisions based on some fundamental
principles of public policy and regulate the exercise of its
power and discretion accordingly. The proposition does not
relate to the powers of the Court under Article 142, but
only to what is or is no complete justice of a cause or
matter and in the ultimate analysis of the
259
propriety of the exercise of the power. No question of lack
of jurisdiction or of nullity can arise. [313 H, 314 B-C,
E-G]
Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, U.P., Allahabad,
[1963] Suppl. 1 SCR 885;A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and Anr.,
[1988] 2 SCC 602, referred to.
7.1 The proposition that State is the Dominus Litis in
criminal cases, Is not an absolute one. The Society for its
orderly and peaceful development Is Interested In the punishment of the offender. The power under Article 142 is
exercised with the aid of the principles of Section 321 CPC
which enables withdrawal of prosecutions. But whether on the
merits there were justifiable grounds to quash the criminal
proceedings is a different matter. There must be grounds to
Page 6 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
permit withdrawal of the prosecution. It Is really not so

much a question of the existence of the power as one of
justificatlon for its exercise. A prosecution is not quashed
for no other reason than that the Court has the power to do
so. The withdrawal must be justified on grounds and principles recognised as proper and relevant. There is no indication as to the grounds and criteria justifying the withdrawal of the prosecution. The considerations that guide the
exercise of power of withdrawal by Government could be and
are many and varied. Government must indicate what those
considerations are. [315 E, H, 316 B-C]
72 In the instant case, the offences relate to and arise
out of a terrible and ghastly tragedy. Nearly 4,000 lives
were lost and tens of thousands of citizens have suffered
injuries in various degrees of severity. At one point of
time UCC itself recognised the possibility of the accident
having been the result of acts of sabotage. It is a matter
of importance that offences alleged in the context of a
disaster of such gravity and magnitude should not remain
uninvestigated. The shifting stand of the Union of India
on the point should not by itself lead to any miscarriage of
justice. Since there is no specific ground for withdrawal of
the prosecutions set out at that stage, the quashing of the
prosecutions requires to be set aside. [317 B-D]
State of Punjab v. Union of India, [1986] 4 SCC 335;
M.N. Sankarayarayanan Nair v. P.V. Balakrishnan & Ors.,
[1972] 2 SCR 599, relied on.
260
Sankar Rangayya v. Sankar Ramayya, AIR 1916 Mad. 463;
Biswabahan v. Gopen Chandra, [1967] 1 SCR 447; Majibar
Rahman v. Muktashed Hossein, ILR 40 Cal. 113; A.R. Antulay
v. R.S. Nayak & Anr., [1984] 2 SCC 500; Sheonandan Paswan v.
State of Bihar& On., [1987] 1 SCC 289, referred to.
8. Grant of blanket immunity is a legislative function.
Then is no power or jurisdiction vested in courts to confer
immunity for criminal prosecution and punishment. Grant of
such immunity to a particular person or persons would amount
to a preferential treatment. However, the direction that
future criminal proceedings shall not be instituted or
proceeded with must be understood as a concomitant and a
logical consequence of the decision to withdraw the pending
prosecutions. In that context, the stipulation that no
future prosecution shall be entertained may not amount to
conferment of any immunity but only to a reiteration of the
consequences of such termination of pending prosecutions.
Thus understood any appeal to the principal as to the power
to confer criminal Immunity becomes inapposite In this case.
However, In view of this Courts finding that the quashing
of criminal proceedings was not Justified and that the
orders dated 14th and 15th of February, 1989 In that behalf
require to be reviewed and set aside, as a logical corollary
and consequence thereof it is directed that all portions In
the orders of this Court which relate to the incompetence of
any future prosecutions be deleted. However, in so far as
the dropping of the proceedings In contempt envisaged by
clause (b) of para 4 of the order dated I5th February, 1989
is concerned, the same is left undisturbed. [321 B-F]
Apodaca v. Virmonies, 13 ALR 1427; Doyle v. Hafstader,
257 NY 244; Richard Nixon v. Ernest Fitzgerald, 457 US 731,
referred to.
Jurisprudence by Wortley, p. 297; Commentaries in the
Constitution of United States by Justice Storey, p. 363,
referred to.
9.1. The validity and durability of a consent order are
wholly dependent on the legal validity of the agreement on
Page 7 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
which it rests. Such an order is amenable to be set aside on

any ground which would justify the setting aside of the
agreement itself. Though the Union of India was a consenting
party to the settlement recorded by this Court, it cannot be
precluded from urging a plea as to invalidity or nullity of
the settlement On the ground of public policy. [323 D-E].
261
9.2. A contract whose object is opposed to public policy
is invalid and it is not any the less so by reason alone of
the fact that unlawful terms are embodied in a consensual
decree. [324-E].
State of Kerala & ,Anr., v. The Gwalior Rayon Silk
Manufacturing (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. etc., [1974] 1 SCR 671; State
of Punjab v. Amar Singh, [1974] 2SCC 70, relied on.
A Bankruptcy Notice, 1924(2) Ch.D. 76; Maritime Electric
Co. Ltd. v. General Dairies Ltd., AIR 1937 PC 114; Huddersfield Banking Company Ltd. v. Henry Lister & Son Ltd.,
1895(2) Ch. 273; Great North-West Central Railway Co. & Ors.
v. Charlebois and Ors., 1899 AC 114, referred to.
Corpus Juris Secondurn, Vol. 1, p.473, referred to.
10. The essence of the doctrine of stifling prosecution
is that no private person should be allowed to take the
administration of criminal justice out of the hands of the
Judges and place it in his own hands. A private party is not
taking administration of law in its own hands in this case.
It is the Union of India, as the Dominus Litis, that consented to the quashing of the proceedings. What was purported to be done was not a compounding of the offence. The
arrangement which purported to terminate the criminal cases
was one of a purported withdrawal not forbidden by any law
but one which was clearly enabled. Whether valid grounds to
permit such withdrawal existed or not is another matter.
[328-A; 329 A, D]
V. Narasimha Raju v. V. Gurumurthy Raju & Ors., [1963] 3
SCR 687; Rameshwar v. Upendranath, AIR 1926 Calcutta 451;
Ouseph Pouto & Ors. v. Catholic Union Bank Ltd. & Ors.,
[1964] 7 SCR 745, relied on.
Fry L. J. in Windill, Local Board of Health v. Vist,
[1890] 45 Ch.D. 351; Keir v. Leeman, 6 Queens Bench 308;
Majibar Rahman v. Muktashed Hossein, ILR 40 Calcutta page
113, referred to.
11.1 The distinction between the motive for entering
into agreement and the consideration for the agreement
must be kept clearly distinguished. Where dropping of the
criminal proceedings is a motive for entering into the
agreement---and not its consideration the doctrine of stifling of prosecution is not attracted. Where there is also a
pre-existing civil liability, the dropping of criminal
proceedings need not necessarily be
262
a consideration for the agreement to satisfy that liability.
[329 G-H; 330-A]
11.2 The doctrine of stifling of prosecution is not
attracted in the present case. It is inconceivable that
Union of India would, under the threat of a prosecution,
coerce UCC to pay 470 million US dollars or any part thereof
as consideration for stifling of the prosecution. [331-D]
Adhikanda Sahu & Ors. v. Jogi Sahu & Ors., AIR 1922
Patna 502; Deb Kumar Ray Choudhury v. Anath Bandhu Sen and
Ors., AIR 1931 Cal. 421; Babu Hamarain Kapur v. Babu Ram
Swarup Nigam & Ant., AIR 1941. Oudh 593; Ouseph Poulo &
Ors., v. Catholic Union Bank Ltd. & Ors., [1964] 7 SCR 745;
relied on.
12.1 On the basis of the medical research literature
placed on record, it can reasonably be posited that the
Page 8 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
exposure in such concentrations of MIC might involve delayed

manifestations of toxic morbidity, though the exposed population may not have manifested any immediate symptomatic
medical status. But the long latency period of toxic injuries renders the medical surveillance costs a permissible
claim even though ultimately the exposed persons may not
actually develop the apprehended complications. [334 B-C]
12.2. It is not the reasonable probability that the
persons put at risk will actually suffer toxic injury. in
future that determines whether the medical surveillance is
necessary. But what determines it is whether, on the basis
of medical opinion, a person who has been exposed to a toxic
substance known to cause long time serious injury should
undergo periodical medical tests in order to look for timely
warning signs of the on-set of the feared consequences.
These costs constitute a relevant and admissible head of
compensation and may have to he borne in mind in forming an
opinion whether a proposed settlement---even as a settlement--is just, fair and adequate. [336 B-D]
Ayers v. Jackson, TP, 525 A 2d 287 (N.J. 1987), referred to.
"Law of Toxic Torts" by Michael Dore; "Health Problems
of Bhopal Gas Victims", ICMR Report - April, 1986, referred
to.
13. In personal injury actions the possibilty of the
future aggravation of the condition are of consequent aggravation of damages are taken into account in the assessment
of damages. The estimate of damages
263
in that sense is a very delicate exercise requiring evaluation of many criteria some of which may border on the imponderable. Generally speaking actions for damages are limited
by the general doctrine of remoteness and mitigation of
damages. But the hazards of assessment of once and for all
damages in personal injury actions lie in many yet inchoate
factors requiring to be assessed. The likelihood of future
complications though they may mean mere assessment or evaluation of mere chances--are also put into the scales in
quantifying damages. This principle may, take care of the
victims who have manifest symptoms. But there must be provision in the settlement for medical surveillance costs and
compensation for those who are presently wholly asymptomatic
and have no material to support a present claim, but may
become symptomatic after a drawn-out of latency period. Even
if the award is an "Once and for
all" determination,
these aspects must be taken into account. [337 F-H; 338 A-B]
14. The right of the victims read into Section 4 of the
Act to express their views on a proposed settlement does not
contribute to a position analogous to that in United States
in which fairness hearings are imperative. Section 4 of the
Act to which the right is traceable merely enjoins Government of India to have due-regard to the views expressed by
victims. The power of the Union of India under the Act to
enter into a compromise is not necessarily confined to a
situation where suit has come to be instituted by it on
behalf of the victims. Statute enables the Union of India to
enter into a compromise even without such a suit. Right of
being heard read into Section 4-and subject to which its
constitutionality has been upheld in Sahus case-subjects
the Union of India to a corresponding obligation. But that
obligation does not envisage or compel
a procedure
like a Fairness Hearing as a condition precedent to a
compromise that Union of India may reach, as the situation
in which it may do so are not necessarily confined to a
suit. [340 G-H; 341 A-B].
Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India, [1990] 1 SCC 613,
Page 9 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
referred to.
Agent
Orange
Litigation,
597
Federal
Supplement
740(1984); Florida Trailer and Equipment Co. v.. Deal, 284
F.2d 567 (1960), referred to.
15. The settlement is not vitiated by reason alone of
want of a Fairness Hearing procedure preceding it. Likewise, the settlement is not vitiated by reason of the absence of a re- opener clause built into it [341 C]
264
16.1 Strictly speaking no restitution in the sense that
any funds obtained and appropriate by the Union of India
requiring to be paid back, arises. The funds brought in by
the UCC are deposited in the Reserve Bank of India and
remain under this Courts control and jurisdiction. Restitution is an equitable principle and is subject to the discretion of the Court. Section 144, Code of Civil Procedure,
embodying the doctrine of restitution does not confer any
new substantive right to the party not already obtaining
under the general law. The section merely regulates the
power of the court in that behalf. But, in the present case,
Section 144 CPC does not in terms apply. There is always an
inherent jurisdiction to order restitution a fortiorari
where a party has acted on the faith of an order of the
court. A litigant should not go back with the impression
that the judicial-process so operated as to weaken his
position and whatever it did on the faith of the courts
order operated to its disadvantage. it is the duty of the
court to ensure that no litigant goes back with a feeling
that he was prejudiced by an act which he did on the faith
of the court order. Both on principle and authority it
becomes the duty of the court to-as much moral as it is
legal to order refund and restitution of the amount to the
UCC---if the settlement is set aside. [342 H; 343 A-D]
16.2. In the instant case, the UCC transported the funds
to India and deposited the foreign currency in the Reserve
Bank of India on the faith of the Courts order. If the
settlement is set aside they shall be entitled to have their
funds remitted to them back in the United States together
with such interest as has accrued thereon. A direction to
the UCC to prove and establish compliance with the District
Courts order dated 30th November, 1986, should be sufficient safeguard and should meet the ends of justice. Accordingly, in the event of the settlement being set aside the
UCC shall be entitled to have 420 million US Dollars brought
in by it. It will be remitted to UCC by the Union of India
at the United States along with such interest as has accrued
on it in the account. But this right to have the restitution
shall be strictly subject to the condition that the UCC
shall restore its undertaking dated 27.11.1986 which was
recorded on 30.11.1986 by the District Court at Bhopal and
on the strength of which the court vacated the order of
injunction earlier granted against the UCC. Pursuant to the
orders recording the settlement, the said order dated
30.11.1986 of the District Court was set aside by this
Court. If the settlement goes, the order dated 30.11.1986 of
the District Court will automatically stand restored and the
UCC would be required to comply with that order to keep and
265
maintain unencumbered assets of the value of 3 billion US
dollars during the pendency of the suit. The right of the
UCC to obtain the refund of and to repatriate the funds shad
be subject to the performance and effectuation of its obligations under the said order of 30.11.1986 of the District
Court at Bhopal. Till then the funds shall remain within the
jurisdiction of this Court and shall not be amenable to any
Page 10 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
other legal process. [344 G-H; 34S A-D]

Binayak v. Ramesh, [1966] 3 SCR 24; jai Berham and Ors.
v. Kedar Nath Marwari and Ors. [1922] P.C.269;L. Guran Ditta
v. T.R. Ditta, [1935] PC 12; Jagendra Nath Singh v. Hira
Sahu and Ors., AIR 1948 All. 252 F.B; referred to.
17.1 Omission to comply with the requirement of the
rule of audi alteram partem, as a general rule, vitiates a
decision. Where there is violation of natural justice no
resultant or independent prejudice need be shown, as the
denial of natural justice is, in itself, sufficient prejudice and it is no answer to say that even with observance of
natural justice the same conclusion would have been reached.
But the effects and consequences of non-compliance may alter
with situational variations and particularities. [349 C-D].
17.2 In Sahu case this Court held that there was no
compliance with the principles of natural justice but also
held that the result of the non-compliance should not be a
mechanical invalidation. The Court suggested curatives. The
Court was not only sitting in judicial review of legislation, but was a court of construction also, for, it is upon
proper construction of the provisions, questions of constitutionality come to be decided. The Court was considering
the scope and content of the obligations to afford a hearing
implicit in Section 4 of the Act. It cannot be said to have
gone beyond the pale of the enquiry when it considered the
further question as to the different ways in which that
obligation could be complied with or satisfied. It cannot be
said that the observations in this regard were made by the
way and had no binding force. [349 F-H]
on.
National Textile Workers Union v. P.R. Ramakrishnan
[1983] 1 SCC 228; Institute of Chartered Accountants v. L.K.
Ratna, [1986] 4 SCC 537; K.I. Shephard v. Union of India,
[1987] 4 SCC 431; R.B. Shreeram Durga
266
Prasad v. Settlement Commission, [1989] 1 SCC 628; H.L.
Trehan v. Union of India, [1989] 1 SCC 764, referred to.
Wiseman v. Borneman, 1971 AC 297; Leary v. National
Union of Vehicle Builders, 1971 Ch.34; Calvin v. Cart, 1980
AC 576; Llyod v. Memahan, 1987 AC 625, referred to.
Administrative Law by Prof. Wade, referred to.
18. The question in the instant case is not so much as
to the consequences of the omission on the part of the Union
of India to have due regard to the views of the victims on
the settlement or the omission on the part of the Court to
afford an opportunity to the victim of being heard before
recording a settlement as it is one of the effects and
implications of the pronouncement in Sahu case. In that case
the Court expressly held that the non-compliance with the
obligation to issue notices did not, by such reason alone,
in the circumstances of the case, vitiate the settlement,
and that the affected persons may avail themselves of an
opportunity of being heard in the course of the review
petitions. It is not proper to isolate and render apart the
two implications and hold the suggested curative as a mere
obiter. Also, the petitioners who were litigating the matter
did not represent all the victims and victim-groups. [351
C-E,F]
on.
19. What was transacted with the courts assistance
between the Union of India on one side and the UCC on the
other is now sought to be made binding on the tens of thousands of innocent victims who, as the law has now declared,
Page 11 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
had a right to be heard before the settlement could be

reached or approved. The implications of the settlement and
its effect on the lakhs of citizens of this country are,
indeed, crucial in their grim struggle to reshape and give
meaning to their torn lives. Any paternalistic candescension
that what has been done is after all for their own good is
out of place. Either they should have been heard before a
settlement was approved in accordance with the law declared
by this Court or at least it must become demonstrable in a
process in which they have a reasonable sense of participation that the settlement has been to their evident advantage
or, at least, the adverse consequences are effectively
neutralised. It is of utmost importance that in an endeavour
of such great magnitude where the court is trusted with the
moral responsibility of
267
ensuring justice to these tens of thousand innocent victims,
the issues of human suffering do not become obscure in
procedural thickets. In a situation of this nature and
magnitude, the Review-proceeding should not be strict,
orthodox and conventional but one whose scope would accommodate the great needs of justice. That apart, quite obviously, the individual petitioners and the petitioner-organisations which have sought review cannot, be held to represent
and exhaust the interest of all the victims. [352 F-H; 353
A-C]
The scope of the review in the present case is to
ensure that no miscarriage of justice occurs in a matter of
such great moment. This is, perhaps, the last opportunity to
verify our doubts and to undo injustice, if any, which may
have occurred. The fate and fortunes of tens of thousands of
persons depend on the effectiveness and fairness of these
proceedings. The legal and procedural technicalities should
yield to the paramount considerations of justice and fairness. The considerations go beyond legalism and are largely
humanitarian. It is of utmost importance that great issues
of human suffering are not subordinated to legal technicalities. [354 F-G]
Shivdeo Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors. AIR 1963
SC 1909, relied on.
21. The whole controversy about the adequacy of the
settlementfund arises on account of the possibility that the
totality of the awards made on all the claims may exceed the
settlement-fund in which event the settlement-fund will be
insufficient to satisfy all the awards. This is the main
concern of the victims and victim-groups. There is, as it
now stands, a fund of one thousand two hundred crores of
rupees for the benefit of the victims. The charge that
medical documentation was faulty and was calculated to play
down the iII-effects of the exposure to MIC is not substantiated. [360 G-H; 361 A-B]
22. In bestowing a second thought whether the settlement
is just, fair and adequate, one should not proceed on the
premise that the liability of UCC has been firmly established. It is yet to be decided if the matter goes to trial.
It is true that even to the extent a settlement goes, the
idea of its fairness and adequacy must necessarily be related to the magnitude of the problem and the question of its
reasonableness must be assessed putting many considerations
into the scales. It may be hazardous to belittle the advantages of the settlement in a matter of such complexity.
Every effort should be made to protect the victims from the
prospects of a protracted,
268
exhausting and uncertain litigation. [361 C-D]
Page 12 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
Sterling v. Versicol Chemical Corp., 855 F 2d 1188

(1988); Florance B. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures Inc., 327
US 251, (1946); Story Parchment Company v. Paterson Parchment Papper Co., 282 US 555; Frederick Thomas Kingsley v.
The Secretary of State for India, AIR 1923 Calcutta 49,
referred
tO.
Scientific and Legal Standards of Statistical Evidence
is Toxic and Ton and Discrimination Suits by Carl Cranor
and Kurt Nutting in Law and Philosophy, Vol. 9, No.2
May,1990, referred to.
23. Indeed, in many tort actions the world-over speedy
adjudications and expeditious reliefs are not easily accomplished and many of them have ended in settlements. In the
context of the problems presented by the issues of liability
in cases of certain corporate torts beyond the corporate
veil there is an impressive body of academic opinion amongst
the schoolmen that the very theories of limited corporate
liability which initially served as incentives for commercial risk--taking needs re-thinking in certain areas of
tortious liability of Corporations. Some scholars have
advocated abolition of limited liability for knowable tort
risks. This, of course, has the limitation of one more
shade of an academicians point of view for radical changes
in law. [364 G-H; 365B]
An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation
Law, 30 U. Toronto L. J. 117 (1980); The Place of Enterprise
Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 Yale Law
Journal; Should Shareholders be personally liable for the
torts of their Corporations, 76 Yale Law Journal 1190
(1967), referred to.
24. While it may not be wise or proper to deprive the
victims of the benefit of the settlement, it is, however,
necessary to ensure that in the-perhaps unlikely--event of
the settlement--fund being found inadequate to meet the
compensation determined in respect of all the present claimants, those persons who may have their claims determined
after the fund is exhausted are not left to fend themselves.
But, such a contingency may not arise having regard to the
size of the settlement-fund. If it should arise, the reasonable way to protect the interests of the victims is to hold
that the Union of India, as a Welfare State and in the
circumstances in which the settlement was made, should not
be found wanting in making good the deficiency, if any. [365
G-H; 366-A]
269
25. The settlement was arrived at and is left undisturbed on an over-all view. The settlement cannot be assailed as violative of Mehta principle which might have
arisen for consideration in a strict adjudication. In the
matter of determination of compensation also under the
Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985,
and the Scheme framed thereunder, there is no scope for
applying the said principle inasmuch as the tort-feasor, in
terms of the settlement--for all practical purposes--stands notionally substituted by the settlement-fund which
now represents and exhausts the liability of the alleged
hazardous entrepreneurs viz., UCC and UCIL. The Mehta principle can have no application against Union of india inasmuch as requiring it to make good the deficiency, if any,
this Court does not impute to it the position of a Joint
tort-feasor but only of a welfare State. [366-H; 367 A-C]
M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, [1987] 1 SCC 395, referred to.
26. At least for a period of eight years from now the
population of Bhopal exposed to the hazards of MIC toxicity
Page 13 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
should have provision for medical surveillance by periodic

medical check-up for gas related afflictions. This shall
have to be ensured by setting up long-term medical facilities in the form of a permanent specialised medical and
research establishment with the best of expertise. An appropriate action plan should be drawn up. it will be proper
that expert medical facility In the form of the establishment of a full-fledged hospital of at least 500 bed strength
with the best of equipment for treatment of MIC related
affliction should be provided for medical surveillance and
for expert medical treatment. The State of Madhya Pradesh
shall provide suitable land free of cost. The allocation of
the land shall be made within two months and the hospital
shall be constructed equipped and made functional within 18
months. It shall be equipped as a Specialist Hospital for
treatment and research of MIC related afflictions and for
medical surveillance of the exposed population. [367D-F]
27. The Capital outlays on the hospital and its operation expenses for providing free treatment and services to
the victims should, both on humanitarian considerations and
in fulfilment of the offer made before the Bhopal Court, be
borne by the UCC and UCIL. It is not part of the function of
this Court to reshape the settlement or restructure its
terms. This aspect of the further liability is also not a
matter on which the UCC and the UCIL had an opportunity to
express their views. However, from the tenor of the written
submissions made before the District Court at
270
Bhopal, both the UCC and UCIL had offered to fund and provide a hospital for the gas victims. The UCC had reiterated
that in January, 1986, it had offered to fund the construction of hospital for the treatment of gas victims the amount
being contributed by the UCC and the UCIL in equal proportions. It is, no doubt, true that the offer was made in a
different context and before an overall settlement. But that
should not detract the UCC and the UCIL from fulfilling
these obligations, as, indeed, the moral sensibilities to
the immense need for relief in all forms and ways should
make both the UCC and UCIL forthcoming in this behalf. Such
a hospital should be a fully equipped hospital with provision for maintenance for a period of eight years which may
involve the financial outlay of around Rs. 50 crores. Contingencies such as payment of compensation to the persons
who were exposed to the Bhopal gas disaster, who though
presently asymptomatic and filed no claim for compensation
but might become symptomatic in future and the yet unborn
children of mothers exposed to MIC toxicity, who may develop
congenital defects, shall be taken care of by obtaining an
appropriate medical group insurance cover from the General
Insurance Corporation of India or the Life Insurance Corporation of India. There shall be no individual upper monetary
limit for the insurance liability. The period of insurance
cover should be a period of eight years in the future. The
number of persons to be covered by this Group Insurance
Scheme should be about and not less than one lakh of persons. Having regard to the population of the seriously
affected wards of Bhopal city at the time of the disaster
and having regard to the addition to the population by the
subsequent births extrapolated on the basis of national
average of birth rates over the past years and the future
period of surveillance, this figure broadly accords with the
percentage of population of the affected wards bears to the
number of persons found to be affected by medical categorisation. This insurance cover will virtually serve to render
the settlement an open ended one so far as the contingent
Page 14 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
class of future victims both existing and after-born are

concerned. The possible claimants fail into two categories;
those who were in existence at the time of exposure; and
those who were not yet unborn and whose congenital defects
are traceable to MIC toxicity inherited or derived congenitally. The premia for the insurance shall be paid by the
Union of India out of the settlement fund. The eligible
claimants shall be entitled to be paid by the insurer compensation on such principles and upon establishment of the
nature of the gas related toxic morbidity by such medical
standards as are applicable to the other claimants under the
Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985
and the scheme framed thereunder. The individual claimants
shall be entitled to have their claims adjudicated under the
statutory scheme. [367 G-H; 368 A-H; 369A-B; 370 B-C]
U.K. Law Commission Report on "Injuries to Unborn Children".
271
referred to.
29. There is need for expeditious adjudication and
disposal of the claims. Even the available funds would not
admit of utilisation unless the claims are adjudicated upon
and the quantum of compensation determined. Both the Union
of India and the State Government shall take expeditious
steps and set-up adequate machinery for adjudication of
claims
and
determination of
the
compensation.
The
appointment of the Claim Commissioners shall be completed
expeditiously and the adjudicative process must commence
within four months. In the first instance, there shall at
least be 40 Claim Commissioners with necessary secretarial
assistance to start the adjudication of the claims under the
Scheme. [370 C-E]
30. In the matter of disbursement of the amounts so
adjudicated and determined it will be proper for the authorities administering the funds to ensure that the compensation-amounts, wherever the beneficiaries are illiterate and
are susceptible to exploitation, are properly invested for
the benefit of the beneficiaries so that while they receive
the income therefrom they do not owing to their illiteracy
and ignorance, deprive themselves of what may turn out to be
the sole source of their living and sustenance for the
future. This Court approves and endorses the guidelines
formulated by the Gujarat High Court in Muljibhai Ajarambhai
Harijans case and the same could be usefully adopted with
appropriate modifications. Government might also consider
such investments being handled by promulgating an appropriate scheme under the Unit Trust of India Act so as to afford
to the beneficiaries not only adequate returns but also
appropriate capital appreciation to neutralise the effect of
denudation by inflation. [370 E-G; 371-H, 372-A]
Muljibhai Ajarambhai Harijan & Ant. v. United India
Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors., 1982(1) Gujarat Law Reporter 756,
referred to.
Per Ranganath Misra, J. (concurring): 1. It is interesting to note that there has been no final adjudication in a
mass tort action anywhere. The several instances which were
placed before this Court were cases where compensation had
been paid by consent or where settlement was reached either
directly or through a circuitous process. Such an alternate
procedure has been adopted over the years on account of the
fact that trial in a case of this type would be protracted
and may not yield any social benefit. Assessment of compensation in cases of this type has generally been by a rough
and ready process. In fact, every assessment of compensation
to some extent is by such process and the concept of just
compensation is an attempt to approximate compensation to
Page 15 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
the loss suffered. [279 F-H, 280-A]

2. This Court did take into account while accepting the
settlement
272
the fact that though a substantial period of time had
elapsed the victims were without relief. For quite some time
the number of claims in courts or before the authorities
under the Act were not very appreciable. Perhaps an inference was drawn from the figures that the subsequent additions were to be viewed differently. It is not to indicate
that the claims filed later are frivolous particularly on
account of the fact that there are some prima facie materials to show that the iII-effects of exposure to MIC could
manifest late. The nature of injuries suffered or the effect
of exposure are not the same or similar. Therefore, from the
mere number no final opinion could be reached about the
sufficiency of the quantum. The Act provides for a Fund into
which the decretal sum has to be credited. The statute
contemplates of a procedure for quantification of individual
entitlement of compensation and as and when compensation
becomes payable it is to be met out of the Fund. The fact
that the Union of India has taken over the right to sue on
behalf of all the victims indicates that if there is a
shortfall in the Fund perhaps it would be the liability of
Union of India to meet the same. The genuine claimants thus
have no legitimate grievance to make as long as compensation
statutorily quantified is available to them because the
source from which the compensation comes into the Fund is
not of significant relevance to the claimant. [280 B-E]
on.
3. If the litigation was to go on merits in the Bhopal
Court it would have perhaps taken at least 8 to 10 years; an
appeal to the High Court and a further appeal to this Court
would have taken in all around another spell of 10 years
with steps for expedition taken. It could be fairly assumed
that litigation in India would have taken around 20 years to
reach finality, and then steps would have to be taken for
its execution in the United States. On the basis that it was
a foreign judgment, the law applicable to the New York Court
should have been applicable and the due process clause
would have become relevant. That litigation in the minimum
would have taken some 8-10 years to be finalised. Thus,
relief would have been available to the victims at the
earliest around 2010. In the event of U.S. Courts taking the
view that strict liability was foreign to the American
jurisprudence and contrary to U.S. public policy, the decree
would not have been executed in the United States and apart
from the Indian assets of UCIL, there would have been no
scope for satisfaction of the decree. [284 C-F]
Municipal Council, Ratlam v. Vardichand & Ors., [1981] 1
SCR 97, relied on.
4. When dealing with this case this Court has always
taken a pragmatic approach. Under the constitutional discipline determination of disputes has been left to the hierarchical system of Courts and this Court at
273
its apex has the highest concern to ensure that Rule of Law
works effectively and the cause of justice in no way suffers. To have a decree after struggling for a quarter of a
century with the apprehension that the decree may be ultimately found not to be executable would certainly not have
been a situation which this Court could countenance. [285
A-C]
5. In the order of May 4, 1989, this Court clearly
Page 16 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
indicated that it is the obligation of this Court to uphold

the rights of the citizens and to bring to them a judicial
fitment as available in accordance with the laws. There have
been several instances where this Court has gone out of its
way
to evolve principles and make directions which would
meet the demands of justice in a given situation. This,
however, is not an occasion when such
an experiment
could have been undertaken to formulate principle of strict
liability at the eventual risk of ultimately losing the
legal batfie. [285 C-D]
M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, [1987]1 SCC 395; Rylends
v. Fletcher L,R., 1868(3) House of Lords 330, referred to.
6. This Court is entitled under the constitutional
scheme to certain freedom of operation. It would be wrong to
assume that there is an element of judicial arrogance in the
act of the Court when it proceeds to act in a pragmatic way
to protect the victims. It must be conceded that the citizens are equally entitled to speak in support of their
rights. Public activists should also be permitted to espouse
the cause of the poor citizens out there must be a limit set
to such activity and nothing perhaps should be done which
would affect the dignity of the Court and bring down the
serviceability of the institution to the people at large.
[285 F-H]
reffred to. v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1961] 2 All
E.R. 447,
Per Ahmadi, J. (partly Dissenting):
1.1 It is agreed that the settlement is not vitiated for not
affording the victims or victim-groups an opportunity of
being beard. But it is difficult to accept the view that if
the settlement fund is found to be sufficient the shortfall
mast be made good by the Union of India. The union of India
cannot be directed to suffer the burden of the shortfall, if
by without finding it liable in damages on any count. [375
12 In view of the observations in Sahus
case, the
scope of the inquiry of the present petitions can be said to
be a narrow one. Supposing a pre-decisional hearing was
afforded to the victims, the Courts option obviously would
have been either to approve the terms of the compromise,
274
or to refuse to superadd its seal to the settlement and
leave the parties to go to trial. The Court could not have
altered, varied or modified the terms of the settlement
without the express consent of the contracting parties. If
it were to find the compensation amount payable under the
settlement inadequate, the only option left to it would have
been to refuse to approve the settlement and turn it into a
decree of the Court. It could not have unilaterally imposed
any additional liability on any of the contracting parties.
[378 C-E]
According to the interpretation given in Sahus case
on the scope of sections 3 and 4 of the Act, a pre-decisional hearing ought to have been given but failure to do so
cannot vitiate the settlement as according to the majority
the lapse could be cured by a post-decisional hearing. The
scope of the review petitions cannot be any different at the
post-decisional stage also. [378 E-F]
1.4 On a mere possibilty of there being a shortfall, a
possibility not supported by any realistic appraisal of the
material on record but on a mere apprehension, quia timet,
it would not be proper to saddle the Union of India with the
liability to make good the shortfall by imposing an additional term in the settlement without its consent in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution or any
statute or on the premises on its duty as a Welfare State.
Page 17 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
Therefore, it is impermissible in law to impose the burden

of making good the shortfall on the Union of India and
thereby saddle the Indian tax-payer with the tort-feasors
liability. If the Settlement Fund was found inadequate, the
only logical thing was to review the settlement leaving the
parties to work out a fresh settlement or go to trial in the
pending suit. In Sahus case the victims had not been able
to show any material which would vitiate the settlement. The
voluminous documentary evidence placed on the record of the
present proceedings also does not make out a case of inadequacy of the amount, necessitating the review of the settlement. In the circumstances the Union of India cannot be
saddled with the liability to make good the deficit, if any,
particularly when it is not found to be a tort-feasor. Its
liability as a tort-feasor, if at all would have to be gone
into in a separate proceeding and not in the present petitions. [379 C-F]
Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India, [1990] 1 SCC 613, referred to.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Miscellaneous Petition
275
Nos.29377-A/88,
7942-43/89, 16093/89, 17965/89,
Review
Petition Nos. 229 and 623-24 of 2989.
IN
Civil Appeal Nos. 3187-88 of 1988.
From the Judgment and Order dated 4.4.1988 of the Madhya
Pradesh High Court in Civil Revision No. 26 of 1988.
(With W.P. Nos. 257, 297, 354, 379, 293, 399, 420/89,
231, 300, 378, 382/89 (In C.A.Nos. 3187-88/88 & I.A. NO.
1/90 (In W.P. Nos. 281/89) and W.P. Nos. 741/90, 3461/89).
Soli J. Sorabjee, Attorney General, Shanti Bhushan, Ms.
Indira Jaising, R.K. Garg, Danial Latif, B.R.L. lyengar,
P.P. Rao, Ashwani Kumar, D.N.M. Ghatate, F.S. Nariman, Anil
B. Dewan, Rajinder Singh, Prashant Bhushan, Ms. Kamini
Jaiswal, C.L. Sahu, Anil Nauriya, Vibhuti Jha, Mrs.
A. Mathur, Mrs. A. Mariarputham, R.P. Saxena, R. Venkataramani, P.K. Manohar, Madan Lokur, A.L. Trehan, Ms. C.S.
Lalitha, Harish Uppal in person, Mrs. K. Hingorani, R.B.
Mehrotra, Ms. Lalitha Kaushik, D.K. Garg, Raju Ramachandran,
Mukul Mudgal, S.R. Bhat, M.S. Ganesh, V.B. Mishra, A.N.
Khanwilkar, Ms. Madhu Khatri, P. Parmeswaran, Sakesh Kumar,
Satish K. Agnihotri, K. Kachwaha, Mrs. A.K. Verma, Ashok
Sagar, Dadachanji, Vijay Gupta, Ms. A. Subhashini, C.S.
Vaidyanathan and Ashok Singh for the appearing Parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
RANGANATH MISRA, CJ. I entirely agree with my noble and
learned Brother Venkatachaliah and hope and trust that the
judgment he as produced is the epitaph on the litigation. I
usually avoid multiple judgments but this seems to be a
matter where something more than what is and in the main
judgment perhaps should be said.
Early in the morning of December 3, 1984, one of the
greatest industrial tragedies that history has recorded got
clamped down on the otherwise quiet township of Bhopal, the
capital of Madhya Pradesh. The incident was large in magnitude - 2,600 people died instantaneously and suite a good
number of the inhabitants of the town suffered from several
ailments. In some cases the reaction manifested contemporaneously and in others the effect was to manifest itself much
later.
276
Page 18 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
Union Carbide Corporation (UCC for short), a multinational one, has diverse and extensive international operations in countries like India, Canada, West Asia, the Far
East, African countries, Latin America and Europe. It has a
sister concern known as Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL
for short). In the early hours of the 3rd of December, 1984,
there was a massive escape of lethal gas from the MIC Storage Tank of the plant into the atmosphere which led to the
calamity.
Several suits were filed in the United States of America
for damages by the local representatives of the deceased and
by many of the affected persons. The Union of India under
the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act of
1985 took upon itself the right to sue for compensation on
behalf of the affected parties and filed a suit for realisation of compensation. The suits were consolidated and Judge
Keenan by his order dated/.2th May, 1988, dismissed them on
the ground of forum non conveniens subject, inter alia, to
the following conditions:
1. Union Carbide shall consent to submit to
the jurisdiction of the Courts of India and
shall continue to waive defences based on the
statute of limitations, and
2. Union Carbide shall agree to satisfy any
judgment rendered against it in an Indian
Court, and if appealable, upheld by any appellate court in that country, whether such
judgment and affirmance comport with
the
minimal requirements of due process.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit by its decision of January 14, 1987, upheld the first
condition and in respect of the second one stated:
"In requiring that UCC consent to enforceability of an Indian judgment against it, the
district court proceeded at least in part on
the erroneous assumption that, absent such a
requirement, the plaintiffs, if they should
succeed
in obtaining an Indian
judgment
against UCC, might not be able to enforce it
against UCC in the United States. The law,
however, is to the contrary, Under New York
law, which governs actions brought in New York
to
enforce
foreign
judgments
......
foreign-country judgment that is final, conclusive and enforceable where rendered must be
recognised and will be enforced as "conclusive
between the parties to the extent that it
grants or denies recovery of a sum of money"
except that it is not deemed to be conclusive
if:
277
"1. The judgment was rendered under a system
which does not provide impartial tribunals or
procedures, compatible with the requirements
of due process of law;
2. The foreign court did not have personal
jurisdiction over the defendant".
Art. 53. Recognition of Foreign Country
Money Judgments.
Although 5304 further
provides
that
under
certain
specified
conditions a foreign country judgment need not
be recognized,
none of these conditions
would apply to the present cases except for
the possibility of failure to provide UCC with
sufficient notice of procedings or the exist-
Page 19 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
ence of fraud in
obtaining the judgment,
which do not presently exist but conceivably
could occur in the future."
The Court rejected the plea advanced by UCC of breach of
due process by non-observance of proper standards and ultimately stated:
"Any denial by the Indian Courts of due process can be raised by UCC as a defence to the
plaintiffs later attempt to enforce a resulting judgment against UCC in this country."
After Judge Keenan made the order of 12th of May, 1986,
in September of that year Union of India in exercise of its
power under the Act filed a suit in the District Court at
Bhopal. In the plaint it was stated that death toll upto
then was 2,660 and serious injuries had been suffered by
several thousand persons and in all more than 5 lakh persons
had sought damages upto then. But the extent and nature of
the injuries or the aftereffect thereof suffered by victims
of the disaster had not yet been fully ascertained though
survey and scientific and medical studies had already been
undertaken. The suit asked for a decree for damages for such
amount as may be appropriate under the facts and the law and
as may be determined by the Court so as to fully, fairly and
finally compensate all persons and authorities who had
suffered as a result of the disaster and were having claims
against the UCC. It also asked for a decree for effective
damages
on an amount sufficient to deter the defendant
and other multi-national corporations involved in business
activities from committing wilful and malicious and wanton
disregard of the rights and safety of the citizens of India.
While the litigations were pending in the US Courts an offer
of 350 million dollars had been made for settlement of the
claim. When the dispute arising out of interim compensation
ordered by the District Court of Bhopal came before the High
Court, efforts for settlement were continued. When the High
Court reduced the quantum of interim compensation from
278
Rs. 350 crores to a sum of Rs. 250 crores, both UCC and
Union of India challenged the decision of the High Court by
filing special leave petitions. It is in these cases that
the matter was settled by two orders dated 14th and 15th of
February, 1989. On May 4, 1989, the Constitution Bench which
had recorded the settlement proceeded to set out brief
reasons on three aspects
"(a) How did this Court arrive at the sum of
470 million US dollars for an over-all settlement?
(b) Why did the Court consider this sum of 470
million US dollars as just, equitable and
reasonable?
(c) Why did the Court not pronounce on
certain important
legal questions of
far-reaching importance said to arise in the
appeals as to the principles of liability of
monolithics, economically entrenched multinational companies operating with inherently
dangerous
technologies in the
developing
countries of
the third world - questions
said to be of great
contemporary
relevance to the democracies of the thirdworld?"
The Court indicated that considerations of excellence
and niceties of legal principles were greatly overshadowed
by the pressing problems of very survival of a large number
of victims. The Court also took into account the laws
Page 20 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
proverbial delays. In paragraph 31 of its order the Constitution Bench said:

As to the remaining question, it
has been said that many vital juristic principles of great contemporary relevance to the
Third World generally, and to India in particular, touching problems emerging from the
pursuit of such dangerous technologies for
economic gains by multi-nationals arose in
this case. It is said that this is an instance
of lost opportunity to this apex Court to give
the law the new direction of new vital issues
emerging from the increasing dimensions of the
economic exploitation of developing countries
by economic forces of the rich ones. This case
also, it is said, concerns the legal limits to
be envisaged by the vital interests of the
protection of the constitutional right of the
citizenry, and of the environment, on the
permissibilities of such ultra-hazardous technologies and to prescribe absolute and deterrent standards of liability if harm is caused
by such enterprises. The prospects of exploitation of cheap labour and of captive-markets,
it is said, induces multi-nationals to enter
into the developing countries for such economic-exploitation and that this was eminently an
appropriate case for a careful assessment of
the legal and Constitutional safeguards stem279
ming from these vital issues of great contemporary relevance."
The Bhopal gas leak matter has been heard in this Court
by four different Constitution Benches. The first Bench
consisted of Pathak, CJ, Venkataramiah, Misra, Venkatachaliah and Ojha, JJ. The hearing continued for 24 days. The
challenge to the validity of the Act was heard by a different Bench consisting of Mukharji, C J, Singh, Ranganathan,
Ahmadi and Saikia, JJ. where the hearing continued for 27
days. The review proceedings wherein challenge was to the
settlement were then taken up for hearing by a Constitution
Bench presided over by Mukharji, CJ with Misra, Singh,
Venkatachaliah and Ojha, JJ. as the other members. This
continued for 18 days. It is unfortunate that Mukharji, CJ.
passed away soon after the judgment had been reserved and
that necessitated a rehearing. The matters were re-heard at
the earliest opportunity and this further hearing took 19
days. Perhaps this litigation is unique from several angles
and this feature is an added one to be particularly noted.
The validity of the Act has been upheld and three separate
but concurring judgments have been delivered. At the final
hearing of these matters long arguments founded upon certain
varying observations of the learned Judges constituting the
vires Bench in their respective decisions were advanced and
some of them have been noticed in the judgment of my learned
brother.
In the main judgment now being delivered special attention has been devoted to the conduct of Union of India in
sponsoring the settlement in February, 1989, and then asking
for a review of the decision based upon certain developments. Union of India as rightly indicated is a legal entity
and has been given by the Constitution the right to sue and
the liability of being sued. Under our jurisprudence a
litigating party is not entitled to withdraw from a settlement by choice. Union of India has not filed a petition for
Page 21 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
review but has supported the stand of others who have asked
for review. The technical limitations of review have not
been invoked in this case by the Court and all aspects have
been permitted to be placed before the Court for its consideration.
It is interesting to note that there has been no final
adjudication in a mass tort action anywhere. The several
instances which counsel for the parties placed before us
were cases where compensation had been paid by consent or
where settlement was reached either directly or through a
circuitous process. Such an alternate procedure has been
adopted over the years on account of the fact that trial in
a case of this type would be protracted and may not yield
any social benefit. Assessment of compensation in cases of
this type has generally been by a rough and ready process.
In fact, every assessment of compensation to some extent is
by such process and the concept of just compensation is an
attempt to ap280
proximate compensation to the loss suffered. We have pointed
out in our order of May 4, 1989, that the estimate in the
very nature of things cannot share the accuracy of an adjudication. I would humbly add that even an adjudication
would only be an attempt at approximation.
This Court did take into account while accepting the
settlement the fact that though a substantial period of time
had elapsed the victim were without relief. For quite some
time the number of claim. In courts or before the authorities under the Act was not very appreciable. Perhaps an
inference was drawn from the figures that the subsequent
additions were to be viewed differently. I do not intend to
indicate that the claims filed later are frivolous particularly on account of the fact that there are contentions and
some prima facie materials to show that the iII-effects of
exposure to MIC could manifest late. The nature of injuries
suffered or the effect of exposure are not the same or
similar; therefore, from the mere number no final opinion
could be reached about the sufficiency of the quantum. The
Act provides for a Fund into which the decretal sum has to
be credited. The statute contemplates of a procedure for
quantification of individual entitlement of compensation and
as and when compensation becomes payable it is to be met out
of the Fund. The fact that the Union of India has taken over
the right to sue on behalf of all the victims indicates that
if there is a shortfall in the Fund perhaps it would be the
liability of Union of India to meet the same. Some of the
observations of the vires Bench support this view. The
genuine claimants thus have no legitimate grievance to make
as long as compensation statutorily quantified is available
to them because the source from which the compensation comes
into the Fund is not of significant relevance to the claimant.
When the settlement was reached a group of social activists, the Press and even others claiming to be trustees of
society came forward to question it. For some time what
appeared to be a tirade was carried on by the media against
the Court. Some people claiming to speak on behalf of the
social Think Tank in meetings disparaged the Court. Some of
the innocent victims were even brought into the Court premises to shout slogans at the apex institution. Some responsible citizens oblivious of their own role in the matter
carried on mud-slinging.
The main foundation of the challenge was twofold:
(i) The criminal cases could not have been
Page 22 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
compounded or quashed and immunity against

criminal action could not be granted; and
(ii) the quantum of compensation settled was
grossly low.
281
So far as the first aspect is concerned. the main judgment squarely deals with it and nothing more need be said.
As far as the second aspect goes, the argument has been that
the principle enunciated by this Court in M.C Mehta v. Union
of India, [1987] 1 SCC 395 should have been adopted. The
rule in Rylands v. Fletcher [1868] 3 House of Lords 330 has
been the universally accepted authority in the matter of
determining compensation in tort cases of this type. American jurisprudence writers have approved the ratio of that
decision and American Courts too have followed the decision
as a precedent. This Court in paragraph 31 of the Mehta
judgment said:
"The Rule of Rylands v. Fletcher was evolved in the year
1866 and it provides that a person who for his own purposes
brings on to his land and collects and keeps there anything
likely to do mischief if it escapes must keep it at his
peril and, if he fails to do so, is prima facie liable for
the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.
The liability under this rule is strict and it is no defence
that the thing escaped without that persons wilful act,
default or neglect or even that he had no knowledge of its
existence. This rule laid down a principle of liability that
if a person who brings on to his land and collects and keep
there anything likely to do harm and such thing escapes and
does damage to another, he is liable to compensate for the
damage caused. Of course, this rule applies only to nonnatural user of the land and it does not apply to things
naturally on the land or where the escape is due to an act
of God and an act of a stranger or the default of the person
injured or where the thing which escapes is present by the
consent of the person injured or in certain cases where
there is statutory authority. Vide Halsburys Laws of England, vol. 45, para 1305. Considerable case law has developed in England as to what is natural and what is nonnatural use of land and what are precisely the circumstances
in which this rule may be displaced. But it is not necessary
for us to consider these decisions laying down the parameters of this rule because in a modern industrial society
with highly developed scientific knowledge and technology
where hazardous or inherently dangerous industries are
necessary to carry as part of the developmental programme,
this rule evolved in the 19th century at a time when all
these developments of science and technology had not taken
place cannot afford any guidance in evolving any standard of
liability consistent with the conStitutional norms and the
needs of the present day economy and social structure. We
need not feel inhibited by this rule which was evolved in
the context of a totally different kind of rule
282
which was evolved in the context of a totally different kind of
economy. Law has to grow in order to
satisfy the needs of the
fast changing society and
keep abreast with the economic
developments taking
place in the country. As new situations
arise the
law has to be evolved in order to meet the challenge
of such new situations. Law cannot afford to remain static.
We have to evolve new principles and lay down new norms
which would adequately deal with the new problems which
arise in a highly industrialised economy. We cannot allow
our judicial thinking to be constricted by reference to the
Page 23 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
law as it prevails
in England or for the matter of that in
any other foreign country. We no longer need the crutches
of a foreign legal order.
We are certainly prepared to
receive light from whatever
source it comes but we have to
build our own jurisprudence and we cannot countenance an
argument that merely because the law in England does not
recognise the rule of strict and
absolute liability in
cases of hazardous or inherently dangerous
activities or
the rule laid down in Rylands v. Fletcher as developed in
England
recognises
certain
limitations
and
excep
tions, we in India must hold back our hands and not venture
to evolve a new principle of liability since English courts
have not
done so. We have to develop our own law and if we
find that it
is necessary to construct a new principle of
liability to deal with an unusual situation which has arisen
and which is likely to arise in future on account of hazardous or inherently dangerous industries which are concommitant to an industrial economy, there is no reason why we
should hesitate to evolve
such principle of liability merely because it has not been so done in England. We are
of the view that an enterprise which is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous industry
which poses a
potential threat to the health and safety of the
persons
working in the factory and residing in the surrounding
areas owes an absolute and non-delegable duty to the community to ensure that no harm results to anyone on account of
hazardous or inherently dangerous nature of the activity
which it has undertaken. The enterprise must be held to be
under an
obligation to provide that the hazardous or
inherently
dangerous activity, the enterprise must be
absolutely liable to
compensate for such harm and it
should be no answer to the
enterprise to say that it had
taken all reasonable care and that
the harm occurred
without any negligence on its part. Since the
persons
harmed
on
account of the
hazardous
or
inherently
dangerous activity carried on by the enterprise would not be
in
283
a position to isolate the process of operation from the
hazardous preparation of substance or any other related
element that caused the harm the enterprise held strictly
liable for causing such harm as a part of the social cost of
carrying on the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity.
If the enterprise is permitted to carry on a hazardous or
inherently dangerous activity for its profit the law must
presume that such permission is conditional on the enterprise absorbing the cost of any accident arising on account
of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity as an
appropriate item of its overheads. Such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity for private profit can be tolerated
only on condition that the enterprise engaged in such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity indemnifies all
those who suffer on account of the carrying on of such
hazardous or inherently dangerous activity regardless of
whether it is carried on carefully or not. This principle is
also sustainable on the ground that the enterprise alone has
the resource to discover and guard against hazards or dangers and to provide warning against potential hazards. We
would there fore hold that where an enterprise is engaged in
a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm results to anyone on account of an accident in the operation
of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity resulting, for example, in escape of toxic gas the enterprise is
strictly and absolutely liable to compensate all those who
are affected by the accident and such liability is not
Page 24 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
subject to any of the exceptions which operate vis-a-vis the

tortious principle of strict liability under the rule of
Rylands v. Fletcher."
In M.C. Mehtas case no compensation was awarded as this
Court could not reach the conclusion that Shriram (the
delinquent company) came within the meaning of "State" in
Article 12 so as to be liable to the discipline of Article
21 and to be subjected to a proceeding under Article 32 of
the Constitution. Thus what was said essentially obiter.
The extracted part of the conservation from M.C. Mehtas
case perhaps is a good guideline for working out compensation in the cases to which the ratio is intended to apply.
The statement of the law ex-facie makes a departure from the
accepted legal position in Rylands v. Fletcher. We have not
been shown any binding precedent from the American Supreme
Court where the ratio of M. C. Mehtas decision has in terms
been applied. In fact Bhagwati, CJ clearly indicates in the
judgment that his view is a departure from the law applicable to the western countries.
284
We are not concerned in the present case as to whether
the ratio of M.C. Mehta should be applied to cases of the
type referred to in it in India. We have to remain cognizant
of the fact that the Indian assets of UCC through UCIL are
around Rs.100 crores or so. For any decree in excess of that
amount, execution has to be taken in the United States and
one has to remember the observation of the U.S. Court of
Appeals that the defence of due process would be available
to be raised in the execution proceedings. The decree to be
obtained in the Bhopal suit would have been a money decree
and it would have been subject to the law referred to in the
judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals. If the compensation
is determined on the basis of strict liability--a foundation
different from the accepted basis in the United States -the decree would be open to attack and may not be executable.
If the litigation was to go on on merits in the Bhopal
Court it would have perhaps taken at least 8 to 10 years; an
appeal to the High Court and a further appeal to this Court
would have taken in all around another spell of 10 years
with steps for expedition taken. We can, therefore, fairly
assume that litigation in India would have taken around 20
years to reach finality. From 1986, the year when the suit
was instituted, that would have taken us to the beginning of
the next century and then steps would have been made for its
execution in the United States. On the basis that it was a
foreign judgment, the law applicable to the New York Court
should have been applicable and the due process clause
would have become relevant. That litigation in the minimum
would have taken some 8-10 years to be finalised. Thus,
relief would have been available to the victims at the
earliest around 2010. In the event the U.S. Courts would
have been of the view that strict liability was foreign to
the American jurisprudence and contrary to U.S. public
policy, the decree would not have been executed in the
United States and apart from the Indian assets of UCIL,
there would have been no scope for satisfaction of the
decree. What was said by this Court in Municipal Council,
Ratlam v. Vardichand & Ors., [1981] 1 SCR 97 may be usefully
recalled:
"Admirable though it may be, it is at once
slow and costly. It is a finished product of
great beauty, but entails an immense sacrifice
of time, money and talent.
This "beautiful" system is frequently a lux-
Page 25 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
ury; it tends to give a high quality of justice only when, for one reason or another,
parties can surmount the substantial barriers
which it erects to most people and to many
types of claims."
We had then thought that the Bhopal dispute came within
the last category and now we endorse it.
285
When dealing with this case this Court has always taken
a pragmatic approach. The oft-quoted saying of the great
American Judge that life is not logic but experience has
been remembered. Judges of this Court are men and their
hearts also bleed when calamities like the Bhopal gas leak
incident occur. Under the constitutional discipline determination of disputes has been left to the hierarchical system
of Courts and this Court at its apex has the highest concern
to ensure that Rule of Law works effectively and the cause
of justice in no way suffers. To have a decree after struggling for a quarter of a century with the apprehension that
the decree may be ultimately found. not to be executable
would certainly not have been a situation which this Court
could countenance.
In the order of May 4, 1989, this Court had clearly
indicated that it is our obligation to uphold the rights of
the citizens and to bring to them a judicial fitment as
available in accordance with the laws. There have been
several instances where this Court has gone out of its way
to evolve principles and make directions which would meet
the demands of justice in a given situation. This, however,
is not an occasion when such an experiment could have been
undertaken to formulate the Mehta principle of strict liability at the eventual risk of ultimately losing the legal
battle.
Those who have clamoured for a judgment on merit were
perhaps not alive to this aspect of the matter. If they were
and yet so clamoured, they are not true representatives of
the cause of the victims, and if they are not, they were
certainly misleading the poor victims. It may be right that
some people challenging the settlement who have come before
the Court are the real victims. I assume that they are
innocent and unaware of the rigmarole of the legal process.
They have been led into a situation without appreciating
their own interest. This would not be the first instance
where people with nothing as stake have traded in the misery
of others.
This Court is entitled under the constitutional scheme
to certain freedom of operation. It would be wrong to assume
that there is an element of judicial arrogance in the act of
the Court when it proceeds to act in a pragmatic way to
protect the victims. It must be conceded that the citizens
are equally entitled to speak in support of their rights. I
am prepared to assume, nay, concede, that public activists
should also be permitted to espouse the cause of the poor
citizens but there must be a limit set to such activity and
nothing perhaps should be done which would affect the dignity of the Court and bring down the serviceability of the
institution to the people at large. Those who are acquainted
with jurisprudence and enjoy social privilege as men educated in law owe an obligation to the community of educating it
properly and allowing the judicial process to continue un286
soiled. Lord Simonds in Shaw v. Director of Public Prosecutions, (1981) 2 All E.R. 447 said:
"I entertain no doubt that there remains in
the courts of law a residual power to enforce
Page 26 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
Let us
context:
the supreme and fundamental

law, to conserve not only the
but also the moral welfare of
remember what had once been said
purpose of the
safety and order
the State."
in a different
"It depends upon the present age whether this

great national institution shall descend to
our children in its masculine majesty to
protect the people and fulfil their great
expectations."
Let us also remember what Prof. Harry Jones in the
Efficacy of Law has said:
"There are many mansions in the house of
Jurisprudence, and I would not be little any
ones perspective on law in society, provided
only. that he does not insist that his is the
only perspective that gives a true and meaningful view of ultimate legal reality."
In the facts and circumstances indicated and for the
reasons adopted by my noble brother in the judgment. I am of
the view that the decree obtained on consent terms for
compensation does not call for review.
I agree with the majority view.
VENKATACHALIAH, J. - These Review Petitions under Article 137 and Writ Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India raise certain fundamental issues as to the
constitutionality, legal-validity, propriety and fairness
and conscionability of the settlement of the claims of the
victims in a mass-tort-action relating to what is known as
the "Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster"considered worlds industrial
disaster, unprecedented as to its nature and magnitude. The
tragedy, in human terms, was a terrible one. It has taken a
toll of 4000 innocent human lives and has left tens of
thousands of citizens of Bhopal physically affected in
various degrees. The action was brought up by the Union of
India as parens-patriae before the District Court Bhopal in
Original Suit No. 1113 of 1986 pursuant to the statutory
enablement in that behalf under the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster
(Processing of Claims) Act 1985 (Act for short) claiming
3.3 Billion Dollars as compensation. When an inter-locutory
matter pertaining to the in287
terim-compensation came up for hearing there was a Court
assisted settlement of the main suit claim itself at 470
Million U.S. Dollars recorded by he orders of this Court
dated 14th and 15th of February 1989. The petitions also
raise questions as to the jurisdiction and powers of the
Court to sanction and record such settlement when appeals
brought up against an inter-locutory order, were alone
before this court.
The Union Carbide (India) Limited (for short the UCIL)
owned and operated, in the northern sector of Bhopal, a
chemical plant manufacturing pesticides commercially marketed under the trade-names "Sevin" and "Temik". Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) is an ingredient in the composition of these
pesticides. The leak and escape of the poisonous fumes from
the ranks in which they were stored occurred late in the
night on the 2nd of December 1984 as a result of what has
been stated to be a run-away reaction owing to water
entering into the storage tanks. Owing to the then prevailing wind conditions the fumes blew into the hutments abutting the premises of the plant and the residents of that
area had to bear the burnt of the fury of the vitriolic
fumes. Besides large areas of the city were also exposed to
the gas.
Page 27 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
2. Referring to this industrial accident this Court in

the course of its order dated 4th May, 1989 had occasion to
say:
"The Bhopal Gas Leak tragedy that occurred at
midnight on 2nd December, 1984, by the escape
of deadly chemical fumes form the appellants
pesticide-factory was a horrendous industrial
mass disaster, unparalleled in its magnitude
and devastation and remaining a ghastly monument to the de-humanising influence of inherently dangerous technologies. The tragedy took
an immediate toll of 2,660 innocent human
lives and left tens of thousands of innocent
citizens of Bhopal physically impaired or
affected in various degrees. What added grim
poignance to the tragedy was that the industrial-enterprise was using Methyl Iso-cyanate,
a lethal toxic poison, whose potentiality for
destruction of life and biotic-communities
was, apparently, matched only by the lack of a
prepackage of relief procedures for management
of any accident based on adequate scientific
knowledge as to the ameliorative
medical
procedures for immediate neutralisation of its
effects."
The toll of life has since gone up to around four thousand and the health of tens of thousands of citizens of
Bhopal City has come to be
288
affected and impaired in various degrees of seriousness. The
effect of the exposure of the victims to Methyl Isocyanate
(MIC) which was stored in considerably large quantities in
tanks in the chemical plant of the UCIL which escaped on the
night of the 2nd of December 1984 both in terms of acute and
chronic episodes has been much discussed. There has been
growing body of medical literature evaluating the magnitude
and intensity of the health hazards which the exposed population of Bhopal suffered as immediate effects and to which
it was potentially put at risk.
It is stated that the MIC is the most toxic chemical in
industrial use. The petitioners relied upon certain studies
on the subject carried out by the Toxicology Laboratory,
Department of Industrial Environmental Health Sciences,
Graduate School of Public Health, University of Pittsburg
[reported in Environmental Health Perspective Volume 72,
pages 159 to 167]. Though it was initially assumed that MIC
caused merely simple and short-term injuries by scalding the
surface tissues owing to its highly exothermic reaction with
water it has now been found by medical research that injury
caused by MIC is not to the mere surface tissues of the eyes
and the lungs but is to the entire system including nephrological lymph, immune, circulatory system, etc. It is even
urged that exposure to MIC has mutagenic effects and that
the injury caused by exposure to MIC is progressive. The
hazards of exposure to this lethal poison are yet an unknown
quanta.
Certain studies undertaken by the Central Water and Air
Pollution Control Board, speak of the high toxicity of the
chemical.
The estimates of the concentration of MIC at Bhopal that
fateful night by the Board inculcate a concentration of 2670 parts per million as against the OSHA standard for work
environment of 0.02 P.P.M. which is said to represent the
threshold of tolerance. This has led to what can only be
described as a grim and grisly tragedy. Indeed the effects
Page 28 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
of exposure of the human system to this toxic chemical have

not been fully grasped. Research studies seem to suggest
that exposure to this chemical fumes renders the human
physiology susceptible to long term pathology and the toxin
is suspected to lodge itself in the tissues and cause long
term damage to the vital systems, apart from damaging the
exposed parts such as the eyes, lung membrane ere. It is
also alleged that the latency-period for the symptomatic
manifestation of the effects of the exposure is such that a
vast section of the exposed population is put at risk and
the potential risk of long term effects is presently unpredictable. It is said that even in cases of victims presently
manifesting symptoms, the prospects of aggravation of the
condition and manifestation of other effects of exposure are
289
statable possibilities.
Immediately symptomatic cases showed ocular inflamation
affecting visual acuity and respiratory distress owing to
pulmonary edema and a marked tending towards general morbidity. It is argued that analysis of
the case histories of
persons manifesting general morbidity trends at various
intervals from 3rd December, 1989 upto April, 1990 indicate
that
in all the severely affected, moderately affected
and mildly affected areas the morbidity trend initially
showed a decline compared with the acute phase. But the
analysis for the later periods, it is alleged, showed a
significant trend towards increase of respiratory, opthalmic
and general morbidity in all the three areas. It is also
sought to be pointed out that the fatal miscarriages in the
exposed group was disturbingly higher than in the control
group as indicated by the studies carried out by medical
researchers. One of the points urged is that the likely long
term effects of exposure have not been taken into account in
approving the settlement and that the only way the victims
interests could have been protected against future aggravation of their gas related health hazards was by the incorporation of an appropriate "re-opener" clause.
3. On 29th of March, 1985 the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster
(Processing of Claims) Act, 1985 (Act) was passed authorising the Government of India, as parens patriae exclusively
to represent the victims so that interests of the victims of
the disaster are fully protected, and that claims for compensation were pursued speedily, effectively, equitably and
to the best advantage of the claimants. On 8th of April,
1985 Union of India, in exercise of the powers conferred on
it under the Act, instituted before the U.S.District Court,
Southern District of New York, an action on behalf of the
victims against the Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) for
award of compensation for the damage caused by the disaster.
A large number of fatal-accidents and personal-injury
actions had earlier also come to be filed in Courts in the
United States of America by and on behalf of about 1,86,000
victims. All these earlier claims instituted in the various
Courts in United States of America had come to be consolidated by the "Judicial Panel on Multi District Litigation"
by its direction dated 6th February 1985 and assigned to
United States District Court, Southern District of the New
York, presided over by a Judge Keenan. The claim brought by
the Union of India was also consolidated with them.
The UCC held 50.9% of the shares in the UCIL. The
latter was its subsidiary. UCCs liability was asserted on
the averments that UCC, apart from being the holding company, had retained and exercised powers of
290
effective control over its Indian subsidiary in terms of its
Page 29 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
Corporate Policy and the establishment of the Bhopal Chemical Plant- with defective and inadequate safety standards
which, compared with designs of UCCs American plants,
manifested. an indifference and disregard for humansafetywas the result of a conscious and deliberate action of the
UCC. It was averred that UCC had, on considerations of
economic advantages, consciously settled and opted for
standards of safety for its plant in a developing country
much lower than what it did for its own American counterparts.The claim was partly based on Design liability on
the part of UCC. The liability was also said to arise out of
the use of ultra-hazardous chemical poisons said to engender
not merely strict liability on Rylands v. Fletcher principal
but an absolute liability on the principals of M.C. Mehtas
case.
The defences of the UCC, inter-alia, were that UCC was a
legal entity distinct in law from the UCIl that factually it
never exercised any direct and effective control over UCIL
and that its corporate policy itself recognised, and was
subject to, the over-riding effect of the municipal laws of
the country and therefore subject to the statutes in India
which prohibit any such control by a foreign company over
its Indian subsidiary, except the exercise of rights as
share-holder permitted by-law.
The UCC also resisted the choice of the American Forum
on the plea of Forum-Non-Conveniens. Union of India sought
to demonstrate that the suggested alternative forum before
the judiciary in India was not an adequate forum pointing
out the essential distinction between the American and
Indian systems of Tort Law both substantive and procedural
available under and a comparison of the rights, remedies and
procedure the competing alternative forums. The nature and
scope of a defendants plea of Forum Non-Conveniens and the
scope of an enquiry on such plea have received judicial
considerations before the Supreme Court of United States of
America in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert [330 U.S. 501], Koster
v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. 1330 U.S. 518] and Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno [454 U.S. 235].
The comparison of rights, remedies and procedures available in the two proposed forums though not a "major-factor",
nevertheless, were relevant tests to examine the adequacy of
the suggested alternative forum. System of American Tort Law
has many features which make it a distinctive system. Judge
Keenan adopting the suggested approach in Pipers decision
that doctrine of forum non conveniens was desinged in part
to help courts in avoiding complex exercises in comparative
laws and that the decision should not hinge on an unfavourable change in law which was
291
lot a major factor in the analysis was persuaded to the view
that differences in the system did not establish inadequacy
of the alternative forum in India. Accordingly on 12th of
May, 1986, Judge Keenan allowed UCCs plea and held that the
Indian judiciary must have the "opportunity to stand all
before the world and to pass judgment on behalf of its own
people".
4. Thereafter the Union of India was constrained to
alter its choice of the forum and to pursue the remedy
against the UCC in the District Court at Bhopal. That is how
Original Suit No. 1113 of 1986 seeking a compensation of 3
Billion Dollars against the UCC and UCIL came to be field at
Bhopal.
Efforts were made by the District Court at Bhopal to
explore the possibilities of a settlement. But they were not
fruitful. Zahreeli Gas Kand Sangharsh Morcha one of the
Page 30 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
victim-organisations appears to have moved the Court for

award of interim-compensation. On 13th December
1987,
The District Court made an order directing payment of Rupees
350 crores
as interim compensation. UCC challenged this
award before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. The High
Court by its order dated 4th of April,
1988 reduced the
quantum of interim compensation to Rs. 250 crores. both
Union of India and UCC brought up appeals by Special Leave
before this Court against the order of the High CourtGovernment of India asailing the reduction made by the High
Court in the quantum of interim compensation from Rs. 350
crores to Rs. 250 crores and the UCC assailing the very
jurisdiction and permissibility to grant interim compensation in a part-action where the very basis of liability
itself had been disputed. The contention of the UCC was that
in a suit for damages where the basis of the liability was
disputed the Court had no power to make an award of
interim-compensation. It was urged that in common law-and
that the law of India too-in a suit for damages no court
could award interim-compensation.
Prior to 1980 when the Rules of Supreme Court in England
were amended (Amendment No. 2/1980) Courts in United Kingdom
refused interim-payments in actions for damages. In Moore v.
Assignment Courier 1977 (2) All ER 842 (CA)], it was recognised that there was no such power in common law. It was
thereafter that the rules of the Supreme
Court were amended by inserting Rules 10 and 11 of Order 29 Rules of Supreme
Court specifically empowering the High Court to grant interim relief in tort injury actions. The amended provision
stipulated certain preconditions for the invokability of its
enabling provision. But in England Lord Denning in the Court
of Appeal thought that even under the common
by the
court could make an interim award for damages [(See Lim Poh
too v. Camden Islington Area Health Authority, (1979 1 AER
332). But his
292
view was disapproved by the House of Lords (See 1979 (2)AER
910 at pages 913, 914). Lord Scarman said:
"Lord Denning MR in the Court of Appeals
declared that a radical reappraisal of the law
is needed. I agree. But I part company with
him on ways and means. Lord Denning MR believes it can be done by the Judges, whereas I
would suggest to your Lordships that such a
reappraisal
calls for social,
financial,
economic and administrative decisions which
only the legislature can take. The perplexities of the present case, following on the
publication of the report of Royal Commission
of Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury (the Pearson report), emphasise
the need for reform of the law.
Lord Denning MR appeared, however, to think,
or at least to hope, that there exists machinery in the rules of the Supreme Court which
may be adopted to enable an award of damages
in a case such as this to be regarded as an
interim award.
It is an attractive, ingenious suggestion,
but, in my judgment, unsound. For so radical a
reform can be made neither by judges nor by
modification of rules of court. It raises
issues of social economic and financial policy
not amenable to judicial reform, which will
almost certainly prove to be controversial and
Page 31 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
can be resolved by the legislature only after

full consideration of factors which cannot be
brought into clear focus or be weighed and
assessed, in the course of the forensic process. The Judge, however, wise, creative, and
imaginative he may be, is cabined, cribbed,
confined, bound in not as was Macbeth, to his
saucy doubts and fears but the evidence and
arguments of the litigants. It is this limitation, inherent in the forensic process, which
sets bounds to the scope of judicial law
reform."
But in cases governed by common law and not affected by
the statutory changes in the Rules of Supreme Court in
U .K., the Privy Council said:
"Their Lordships cannot leave this case without commenting on two unsatisfactory features.
First, there is the inordinate length of time
which has elapsed between service of the writ
in February 1977 and final disposal of the
case in the early months of 1984. The second
is that, as their Lordships, under293
stand the position, no power exists in a case
where liability is admitted for an interim
payment to be ordered pending a final decision
on quantum of damages. These are matters to
which consideration should be given. They are,
of course, linked; though the remedy for delay
may be a matter of judicial administration, it
would be seen legislation may be needed to
enable an interim award to be made."
[See: Jamil Bin Harun v. Young Kamstah: 1984 (1)AC 529, 5381
The District Court sought to sustain the interim award
on the inherent powers of the court preserved in Section 151
CPC. But the High Court of Madhya Pradesh thought that
appeal to and reliance on Section 151 was not appropriate It
invoked Section 9 CPC read with the principle underlying the
English Amendment, without its strict pre-conditions. The
correctness of this view was assailed by the UCC before this
Court in the appeal.
On 14th February, 1989 this Court recorded an over-all
settlement of the claims in the suit for 470 million U.S.
Dollars and the consequential termination of all civil and
criminal proceedings. The relevant portions of the order of
this Court dated 14th February, 1989 provide:
(1) The Union Carbide Corporation shall pay a
sum of U.S. Dollars 470 millions (Four hundred
and seventy Millions) to the Union of India in
full settlement of all claims, rights and
liabilities related to and arising out of the
Bhopal Gas disaster.
(2) The aforesaid sum shall be paid by the
Union Carbide Corporation to the Union of
India on or before 31st March, 1989.
(3) To enable the effectuation of the settlement, all civil proceedings related to and
arising out of the Bhopal Gas disaster shall
hereby stand transferred to this Court and
shall stand concluded in terms of the settlement, and all criminal proceedings related to
and arising out of the disaster shall stand
quashed wherever these may be pending.
294
A memorandum of settlement shall be
Page 32 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
filed before us tomorrow setting forth all the

details
of
the
settlement
to
enable
consequential directions, if any, to issue."
On 15th February, 1989 the terms of settlement signed
by learned Attorney General for the Union of India and the
Counsel for the UCC was
filed. That memorandum provides:
1. "The parties acknowledge that the order
dated February 14 1989 as supplemented by the
order dated February 15, 1989 disposes of in
its entirety all proceedings in Suit No.1113
of 1986. This settlement shall finally dispose
of all past, present and future claims, causes
of action and civil and criminal proceedings
(of any nature whatsoever wherever pending) by
all Indian citizens and all public and private
entities with respect to all past, present and
future deaths, personal injuries health effects compensation, losses, damages and civil
and criminal complaints of any nature whatsoever against UCC, Union Carbide India Limited,
Union Carbide Eastern, and all of their subsidiaries and affiliates as well as each of
their present and former directors, officers,
employees, agents representatives, attorneys,
advocates and solicitors arising out
of,
relating to or concerned with the Bhopal gas
leak disaster, including past, present and
future claims, causes of action and proceedings against each other. All such claims and
causes of action whether within or outside
India of Indian citizens public or private
entities are hereby extinguished, including
without limitation each of the claims filed or
to be filed under the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster
(Registration and Processing Claims) Scheme
1985, and all such civil proceedings in India
are hereby transferred to this court and are
dismissed with prejudice, and all such criminal proceedings including contempt proceedings
stand quashed and accused deemed to be acquitted.
2. Upon full payment in accordance with the
Courts directions the undertaking given by
UCC pursuant to the order dated November 30,
1986 in the District Court, Bhopal stands
discharged, and all orders passed in Suit No.
1113 of 1986 and or in any Revision therefrom,
also stand discharged."
A further order was made by this Court on 15th February,
1989
295
which, apart from issuing directions in paragraphs 1 and 2
thereof as to the mode of payment of the said sum of 470
million U.S. Dollars pursuant to and in terms of the settlement, also provided the following:
"3. Upon full payment of the sum
referred to in paragraph 2 above:
(a) The Union of India and the State of Madhya
Pradesh shall take all steps which may in
future become necessary in order to implement
and give effect to this order including but
not limited to ensuring that any suits, claims
or civil or criminal complaints which may be
filed in future against any
Corporation,
Company or person referred to in this settle-
Page 33 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
ment are defended by them and disposed of in

terms of this order
(b) Any such suits, claims or civil or criminal proceedings filed or to be filed before
any court or authority are hereby enjoined and
shall not be proceeded with before such court
or authority except for dismissal of quashing
in terms of this order.
4. Upon full payment in accordance with the
Courts directions:
(a) The undertaking given by Union Carbide
Corporation pursuant to the order dated 30
November, 1986 in the District Court Bhopal
shall stand discharged, and all orders passed
in Suit No. 1113 of 1986 and/or in revision
therefrom shall also stand discharged.
(b) Any action for contempt initiated against
counsel or parties relating to this case and
arising out of proceedings in the courts below
shall be treated as dropped."
5. The settlement is assailed in these Review Petitions
and Writ Petitions on various grounds. The arguments of the
petitioners in the case have covered a wide range and have
invoked every persuasion--jurisdictional, legal, humanitarian and those based on considerations of public-policy. It
is urged that the Union of India had surrendered the interests of the victims before the might of multinational cartels and that what are in issue in the case are matters of
great moment to developing countries in general. Some of
these exhortations were noticed by this Court in the course
of its order of 4th May, 1989 in the following words:
"31. As to the remaining question, it has been
said that many vital juristic principles of
great contemporary relevance to the
296
Third World generally, and to India in particular, touching problems emerging from the
pursuit of such dangerous technologies for
economic gains by multi-nationals arose in
this case. It is said that this is an instance
of lost opportunity to this apex Court to give
the law the new direction on vital issues
emerging from the increasing dimensions of the
economic exploitation of developing countries
by economic forces of the rich ones. This case
also, it is said, concerns the legal limits to
be envisaged in the vital interests of the
protection of the constitutional rights of the
citizenry, and of the environment, on the
permissibility of such ultra-hazardous technologies and to prescribe absolute and deterrent standards of liability if harm is caused
by such enterprises. The prospect of exploitation of cheap labour and of captive-markets,
it is said, induces multinationals to enter
into the developing countries for such economic-exploitation and that this was eminently an
appropriate case for a careful assessment of
the legal and Constitutional safeguards stemming from these vital issues of great contemporary relevance.
On the importance and relevance of these considerations,
this Court said:
32. These issues and certain cognate
areas of even wider significance and the
Page 34 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
limits of the adjudicative disposition of some

of their aspects are indeed questions of
seminal importance.
The culture of modern
industrial technologies, which is sustained on
processes of such pernicious potentialities,
in the
ultimate analysis, has thrown open
vital and fundamental issues
of technology
options. Associated problems of the adequacy
of
legal protection against such exploitative and hazardous industrial adventurism, and
whether
the
citizens
of
the
country
are assured the protection of a legal system
which could be
said to be adequate in
a comprehensive sense in such contexts arise.
These, indeed are issues of vital importance
and this
tragedy, and the conditions
that enabled it happen, are of particular
concern.
33. The chemical pesticide industry is
a concomitant, and indeed, an integral part,
of the Technology of Chemical Farming.
297
Some experts think, that it is time to return
from the high-risk, resource-intensive, high
input, anti-ecological, monopolistic hard
technology which feeds, and is fed on, its
self-assertive attribute, to a more human and
humane
flexible:
eco-conformable,
"soft"
technology with its systemic-wisdom and opportunities
for
human
creativity
and
initiative.Wisdom demands" says Schumacher "a
new orientation of science and technology
towards the organic, the gentle the non-violent, the elegant and beautiful". The other
view stressing the spectacular success of
agricultural production in the new era of
chemical farming with high-yielding strains,
points to the break-through achieved by the
Green Revolution with its effective response
to, and successful management of the great
challenges of feeding the millions.
This
technology in agriculture has given a big
impetus to enterprises of chemical fertilizers
and pesticides. This, say its critics, has
brought in its trail its own serious problems.
The technology-options before scientists and
planners have been difficult."
6. Before we examine the grounds of challenge to the
settlement we might, perhaps, refer to three events. The
first is that the Central Bureau of Investigation, Government of India, brought criminal charges under Sections 304,
324, 326, 429 read with Section 35 of the Indian Penal Code
against Mr.Warren Anderson, the then Chairman of the UCC and
several other persons including some of the officers incharge of the affairs of the UCIL. On 7th December, 1984
Mr.Warren Anderson came to India to see for himself the
situation at Bhopal. He was arrested and later released on
bail. One of the points seriously urged in these petitions
is the validity of the effect of the order of this Court
which terminated those criminal proceedings.
The second event is that on 17th of November, 1986 the
District Court at Bhopal, on the motion of the plaintiffUnion of India, made an order restraining the UCC by an
interlocutory injunction, from selling its assets, paying
dividends, buying back debts, etc. during the pendency of
Page 35 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
the suit. On 30th of November, 1986 the District Court

vacated that injunction on the written assurance and undertaking dated 27th November 1986 filed by the UCC to maintain
unencumbered assets of three billion U.S. Dollars. One of
the points argued in the course of the hearing of these
petitions is whether, in the event the order recording the
settlement is reviewed and the settlement set aside, the UCC
and UCIL would become entitled to the restitution of the
funds that they deposited in Court pursuant to and in
298
performance of their obligations under the settlement. The
UCC deposited 420 million U.S. Dollars and the UCIL the
rupee equivalent of 45 million U.S. Dollars. 5 million U.S.
Dollars directed by Judge Keenan to be paid to the International Red Cross was given credit to. The petitioners urge
that even after setting aside of the settlement, there is no
compulsion or obligation to restore to the UCC the amounts
brought into Court by it as such a step would prejudicially
affect the interests of the victims. The other cognate
question is whether, if UCC is held entitled to such restitution, should it not, as a pre-condition, be held to be
under a corresponding obligation to restore and effectuate
its prior undertaking dated 27th November 1987 to maintain
unencumbered assets of three billion U.S.Dollars, accepting
which the order dated 30th November, 1987 of the District
Court Bhopal came to be made.
The third event is that subsequent to the recording of
the settlement a Constitution Bench of this Court dealt with
and disposed of writ-petitions challenging the constitutionality of the Act on various grounds in what is known as
Charanlal Sahus case and connected matters. The Constitution Bench upheld its constitutionality and in the course of
the Courts opinion Chief Justice Mukharji made certain
observations as to the validity of the settlement and the
effect of the denial of a right of being heard to the victims before the settlement, a right held to be implicit in
Section 4 of the Act. Both sides have heavily relied on
certain observations in that pronouncement in support of the
rival submissions.
7. We have heard learned Attorney General for the Union
of India; Sri Shanti Bhushan, Sri R.K. Garg, Smt.Indira
Jaising, Sri Danial Latif, Sri Trehan learned senior counsel
and Shri Prashant Bhushan, learned counsel for petitioners
and Sri F.S. Nariman, learned senior counsel for the UCC,
Sri Rajinder Singh, learned senior counsel for the UCIL and
Dr;N.M. Ghatate and Sri Ashwini Kumar, learned senior counsel for the State of Madhya Pradesh and its authorities.
At the outset, it requires to be noticed that Union of
India which was a party to the settlement has not bestirred
itself to assail the settlement on any motion of its own.
However, Union of India while not assailing the factum of
settlement has sought to support the petitioners challenge
to the validity of the settlement. Learned Attorney General
submitted that the factum of compromise or settlement recorded in the orders dated 14th & 15th of February, 1989 is
not disputed by the Union of India. Learned Attorney-General
also made it clear that the Union of India does not dispute
the authority of the then Attorney General and the Advocate
on
299
record for the Union of India in the case to enter into a
settlement. But, he submitted that this should not preclude
the Union of India from pointing out circumstances in the
case which, if accepted, would detract from the legal validity of the settlement.
Page 36 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
8. The contentions urged at the hearing in support of

these petitions admit of the following formulations:
Contention (A):
The proceedings before this Court were merely
in the nature of appeals against an interlocutory order pertaining to the interim-compensation. Consistent with the limited scope and
subject-matter of the appeals, the main suits
themselves could not be finally disposed of by
the settlement. The Jurisdiction of this Court
to withdraw or transfer a suit or proceeding
to itself is exhausted by Article 139 A of the
Constitution. Such transfer implicit in the
final disposal of the suits having been impermissible suits were not before the Court so as
to be amenable to final disposal by recording
a settlement. The settlement is, therefore,
without jurisdiction
Contention (B):
Likewise the pending criminal prosecution was
a separate and distinct proceeding unconnected
with the suit from the interlocutory order in
which the appeals before this Court arose. The
criminal proceedings were not under or relatable to the Act. The Court had no power to
withdraw to itself those criminal proceedings
and quash them. The orders of the Court dated
14th and 15th of February 1989, in so far as
they pertain to the quashing of criminal
proceedings are without jurisdiction.
Contention (C):
The Court-assisted-settlement was as between, and confined to, the Union of India on
the one hand and UCC & UCIL on the other. The
Original Suit No. 1113 of 1986 was really and
in substance a representative suit for purposes and within the meaning of Order XXIII
Rule 3B C.P.C. inasmuch as any order made
therein would affect persons not eo-nomine
parties to the suit. Any settlement reached
without notice to the
300
persons so affected without complying with the
procedural drill of Order XXIII Rule 3B is a
nullity.
That the present suit is such a representative
suit; that the order under review did affect
the interests of third parties and that the
legal
effects and consequences
of
noncompliance with Rule 3B are attracted to case
are concluded by the pronouncement of the
Constitution Bench in Charanlal Sahus case.
Contention (D):
The termination of the pending criminal proceedings
brought
about by the orders dated 14th and 15th of February, 1989 is
bad in law and would require to be reviewed
and set aside on grounds that (i) if the orders are construed as permitting a
compounding of offences, they run
in the teeth of the statutory
prohibition contained in
Section 320 (9) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure; (ii) if
the orders are construed as permitting a withdrawal of the
prosecution under Section 321 Cr.P.C. they would, again, be
bad as violative of settled principles guiding withdrawal of
prosecutions; and (iii) if the orders
amounted to a quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of
Page 37 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
Criminal Procedure, grounds for such quashing

did not
obtain in the case.
Contention (E):
The effect of the orders under review interdicting and prohibiting future criminal proceedings against any person or persons whatsoever in relation to or arising out of the
Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster, in effect and substance, amounts to conferment of an immunity
from criminal proceedings. Grant of immunity
is essentially a legislative function and
cannot be made by a judicial act.
At all events, grant of such immunity is
opposed to public policy and prevents the
investigation of serious offences in relation
to this horrendous industrial disaster where
UCC had inter-alia alleged sabotage as cause
of the disaster. Criminal investigation was
necessary in public interest not only to
punish the guilty but to prevent any recurrence of such calamitious events in future.
301
Contention (F):
The memorandum of settlement and the orders of
the Court thereon, properly construed, make
the inference inescapable that a part of the
consideration for the payment of 470 million
U.S. Dollars was the stifling of the criminal
prosecutions which is opposed to public-policy. This vitiates the agreement on which the
settlement is based for unlawfulness of the
consideration. The consent order has no higher
sanctity than the legality and validity of the
agreement on which it rests.
Contention ( G ):
The process of settlement of a mass tort
action has its own complexities and that a
"Fairness-Hearing" must precede the approval
of any settlement by the court as fair,
reasonable and adequate. In concluding that
the settlement was just and reasonable the
Court omitted to take into account and provide
for certain important heads of compensation
such as the need for and the costs of medical
surveillance of a large section of population,
which though asymptomatic for the present was
likely to become symptomatic later having
regard to the character and the potentiality
of the risks of exposure and the likely future
damages resulting from long-term effects and
to build-in a re-opener clause.
The settlement is bad for not affording a
fairness-hearing and for not incorporating a
"re-opener" clause. The settlement is bad for
not indicating appropriate break-down of the
amount amongst the various classes of victimgroups. There were no criteria to go by at all
to decide the fairness and adequacy of
the
settlement.
Contention (H):
Even if the settlement is reviewed and
set aside there is no compulsion or obligation to refund and restore to the UCC the
funds brought in by it, as such restitution is
discretionary and in exercising this discre-
Page 38 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
tion the interests of the victims be kept in

mind and restitution denied.
At all events, if restitution is to be allowed, whether UCC would not be required to
act upon and effectuate its undertak302
ing dated 27th November, 1986 on the basis of
which order dated 30th November, 1986 of the
Bhopal District Court Vacating the injunction
against it was made.
Contention (I):
Notice to the affected-person implicit in
section 4 of the Act was imperative before
reaching a settlement and that as admittedly
no
such
opportunity was given
to
the
affected-person either by the Union of India
before entering into the settlement or by
the Court before approving it, the settlement
is void as violative of natural justice.
Sufficiency of natural justice at any later
stage cannot cure the effects of earlier
insufficiency and does not bring life back to
a purported settlement which was in its inception void.
The observations of the constitution Bench in
Charanlal Sahus case suggesting that a hearing was available at the review stage and
should be sufficient compliance with natural
justice, are mere obiter-dicta and do not
alter the true legal position.
Point (j):
Does the settlement require to be set aside
and the Original Suit No. 1113 of 1986 directed to be proceeded with on the merits? If not,
what other reliefs require to be granted and
what other directions require to be issued?
Re.:Contentions (A) and (B)
9. The contention articulated with strong emphasis is
that the court had no jurisdiction to withdraw and dispose
of the main suits and the criminal proceedings in the course
of hearing of appeals arising out of an interlocutory order
in the suits. The disposal of the suits would require and
imply their transfer and withdrawal to this court for which,
it is contended, the Court had no power under law. It is
urged that there is no power to withdraw the suits or proceedings dehors. Article 139-A and the conditions enabling
the application of Article 139-A do not, admittedly, exist.
It is, therefore, contended that the withdrawal of the
suits, implicit in the order of their final disposal pursuant to the settlement, is a nullity. It is urged that Article 139A is exhaustive of the powers of the Court to withdraw suits or other proceedings to itself.
303
It is not disputed that Article 139A in terms does not
apply in the acts of the case. The appeals were by special
leave under Article 136 of the Constitution against an
interlocutory order. If Article 139A exhausts the power of
transfer or withdrawal of proceedings, then the contention
as substance. But is that so?
This Court had occasion to point out that Article 136 is
worded in the widest terms possible. It vests in the Supreme
Court a plenary jurisdiction in the matter of entertaining
and hearing of appeals by granting special save against any
kind of judgment or order made by a Court or Tribunal in by
cause of matter and the powers can be exercised in spite of
Page 39 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
the limitations under the specific provisions for appeal

contained in the Constitution other laws. The powers given
by Article 136 are, however, in the nature special or residuary powers which are exercisable outside the purview of the
ordinary laws in cases where the needs of justice demand
interference
the Supreme Court. (See Durga Shankar Mehta
v. Thaiair Raghuraj singh & Others [1955] S.C.R. 267].
Article 142 (1) of the Constitution provides:
"142 (1) The Supreme Court in exercise of its
jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such
order as is necessary for doing complete
justice in any cause or matter pending before
it, and any decree so passed or order so made
shall be enforceable throughout the territory
of India in such manner as may be prescribed
by or under any law made by Parliament and,
until provision in that behalf is so made, in
such manner as the President may by order
prescribe."
[Emphasis added]
The expression "cause or matter" in Article 142 (1) is very
wide overing almost every kind of proceedings in Court. In
Halsburys Laws of England-Fourth Edition [vol 37] para 22
referring to the plenitude of that expression it is stated:
"Cause or matter-The words "cause and "matter"
are often used in juxtaposition, but they have
different meanings. "Cause" means any action
or any criminal proceedings and "matter" means
any proceedings in court not in a cause. When
used together, the words "cause or matter"
cover almost every kind of
304
proceeding in court, whether civil or criminal, whether interlocutory or final,
and
whether before Or after judgment."
[emphasis added]
Any limited interpretation of the expression "cause or
matter having regard to the wide and sweeping powers under
Article 136 which Article 142 (1) seeks to effectuate,
limiting it only to the short compass of the actual dispute
before the Court and not to what might necessarily and
reasonably be connected with or related to such matter in
such a way that their withdrawal to the Apex Court would
enable the court to do "complete justice", would stultify
the very wide constitutional powers. Take, for instance, a
case where an interlocutory order in a matrimonial cause
pending in the trial court comes up before the apex court.
The parties agree to have the main matter itself either
decided on the merits or disposed of by a compromise. If the
argument is correct this court would be powerless to withdraw the main matter and dispose it of finally even if it be
on consent of both sides. Take also a similar situation
where some criminal proceedings are also pending between the
litigating spouses. If all disputes are settled, can the
court not call up to itself the connected criminal litigation for a final disposal? If matters are disposed of by
consent of the parties, can any one of them later turn
around and say that the apex courts order was a nullity as
one without jurisdiction and that the consent does not
confer jurisdiction? This is not the way in which jurisdiction with such wide constitutional powers is to be construed. While it is neither possible nor advisable to enumerate exhaustively the multitudinous ways ill which such
situations may present themselves before the court where the
court with the aid of the powers under Article 142 (1) could
Page 40 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
bring about a finality to the matters, it is common experience that day-in-and-day-out such matters are taken up and
decided in this court. It is true that mere practice, however long, will not legitimize issues of jurisdiction. But the
argument, pushed to its logical conclusions, would mean that
when an interlocutory appeal comes up before this Court by
special leave, even with the consent of the parties, the
main matter cannot be finally disposed of by this court as
such a step would imply an impermissible transfer of the
main matter. Such technicalities do not belong to the content and interpretation of constitutional powers.
To the extent power of withdrawal and transfer of cases
to the apex court is, in the opinion of the Court, necessary
for the purpose of effectuating the high purpose of Articles
136 and 142 (1), the power under Article 139A, must be held
not to exhaust the power of withdrawal and transfer.
305
Article 139A it is relevant to mention here, was introduced
as part of the scheme of the 42nd Constitutional Amendment.
That amendment proposed to invest the Supreme Court with
exclusive jurisdiction to determine the
constitutional
validity of central laws by inserting Articles 131 A, 139A
and 144A. But Articles 131A, and 144A were omitted by the
43rd Amendment Act 1977, leaving Article 139A in tact. That
article enables the litigants to approach the Apex Court for
transfer of proceedings if the conditions envisaged in that
Article are satisfied. Article 139A was not intended, nor
does it operate, to whittle down the existing wide powers
under Article 1.36 and 142 of the Constitution.
The purposed constitutional plenitude of the powers of
the Apex Court to ensure due and proper administration of
justice is intended to be co-extensive in each case with the
needs of justice of a given case and to meeting any exigency. Indeed, in Harbans Singh v. U.P. State [1982] 3 SCR 235
the Court said:
"Very wide powers have been conferred on this Court for
due and proper administration of justice. Apart from the
jurisdiction and powers conferred on this Court under Arts.
32 and 136 of the Constitution I am of the opinion that this
Court retains and must retain, an inherent power and jurisdiction for dealing with any extra-ordinary situation in the
larger interests of administration of justice and for preventing manifest injustice being done. This power must
necessarily bc sparingly used only in exceptional circumstances for furthering the ends of justice. Having regard to
the facts and circumstances of this case, I am of the opinion that this is a fit case where this Court should entertain the present petition of Harbans Singh and this Court
should interfere."
We find absolutely no merit in this hypertechnical
submission of the petitioners learned counsel. We reject
the argument as unsound.
A similar ground is urged in support of contention [B]
in relation to such withdrawal implicit in the quashing of
the criminal proceedings. On the merits of the contention
whether such quashing of the proceedings was, in the circumstances of the case, justified or not we have reached a
decision on Contentions IDI and [E]. But on the power of the
court to withdraw the proceedings, the contention must fail.
We. accordingly, reject both Contentions [At and IB].
306
Re: Contention (C)
10. Shri Shanti Bhushan contends that the settlement
recorded on the 14th and 15th of February, 1989, is void
under Order XXIII Rule 3B, Code of Civil Procedure, as the
Page 41 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
orders affect the interests of persons not eo-nomine parties

to the proceedings, and, therefore, the proceedings become representative-proceedings for the purpose and within
the meaning of Order XXIII Rule 3-B C.P.C. The order recording the settlement, not having been preceded by notice to
such persons who may appear to the Court to be interested in
the suit, would, it is contended, be void.
Order XXIII Rule 3-B CPC provides: "Order
XXIII Rule 3B.
No agreement or compromise to be entered in a
representative suit without leave of Court.
(1) No agreement or compromise in a
representative suit shall be entered
into
without
the leave of the Court expressly
recorded in the proceedings; and any such
agreement or compromise entered into without
the leave of the Court so recorded shall be
void.
(2) Before granting such leave, the
Court shall give notice in such manner as it
may think fit to such persons as may appear to
it to be interested in the suit.
Explanation-In this rule, "representative suit" means,(a) a suit under Section 91 or Section
92.
(b) a suit under rule 8 of Order 1,
(c) a suit in which the manager of an
undivided Hindu family sues or is sued as
representing the other members of the family,
(d) any other suit in which the decree passed
may, by virtue of the provisions of this Code
or of any other law for time being in
307
force bind any person who is not named as
party to the suit."
Shri Shanti Bhushan says that the present proceedings by
virtue of clause (d) of the Explanation should be deemed to
be a representative suit and that the pronouncement of the
Constitution Bench in Sahu case which has held that Order
XXIII Rule 3-B CPC is attracted to the present proceedings
should conclude the controversy. The observations in Sahus
case relied in this behalf are these:
However, Order XX111 Rule 3B of the Code is
an important and significant pointer and the
principles behind the said provision would
apply to this case. the said rule 3B provides
that no agreement or compromise in a representative suit shall be entered into without the
leave of the Court expressly recorded in the
proceedings; and sub-rule (2) of rule 3B
enjoins that before granting such leave the
Court shall give notice in such manner as it
may think fit in a representative action.
Representative suit, again, has been defined
under Explanation to the said rule vide clause
(d) as any other suit in which the decree
passed may, by virtue of the provisions of
this Code or of any other law for the time
being in force, bind any person who is not
named as party to the suit. In this case,
indubitably the victims would be bound by the
settlement though not named in the suit. This
is a position conceded by all. If that is so,
it would be a representative suit in terms of
Page 42 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
and for the purpose of Rule 3B of Order XXIII

of the Code. If the principles of this rule
are the principles of natural justice then we
are of the opinion that the principles behind
it would be applicable, and also that section
be applicable, and also that section 4 should
be so construed in spite of the difficulties
of the process of notice and other difficulties of making "informed decision
making
process cumbersome", as canvassed by
the
learned Attorney General".
"The Learned Attorney General, however, sought
to canvas the view that the victims had notice
and some of them had participated in the
proceedings. We are, however, unable to accept
the position that the victims had notice of
the nature
contemplated under the Act upon the underlying
principle of Order XXIII Rule 3B of the Code.
It is not enough to say that the victims must
keep
vigil
and
watch
the
proceeding
.....................
In
the
aforesaid view of the matter, in our opinion,
notice was necessary. The victims at large did
not have the notice.
[Emphasis added]
11. We have given our careful consideration to this
submission. The question is whether Rule 3-B of Order XXIII,
proprio-vigore, is attracted to the proceedings in the suit
or whether the general principles of natural justice underlying the provision apply. If it is the latter, as indeed,
the Sahu case has held, the contention in substance is not
different from the one based on non-compliance with the
right of being heard which has been read into Section 4. The
Sahu case did not lay down that provisions of Order XXIII
Rule 3-B CPC, proprio-vigore, apply. It held that the principles of natural justice underlying the said provisions
were not excluded. It is implicit in that reasoning that
Order XXIII Rule 3B in terms did not apply. The Court thereafter considered the further sequential question whether the
obligation to hear had been complied with or not and what
were the consequences of failure to comply. The Court in the
Sahu case after noticing that the principle underlying Rule
3-B had not been satisfied, yet, did not say that the settlement was, for that reason, void. If as Shri Shanti Bhushan says the Sahu case had concluded the matter, it would
have as a logical consequence declared the settlement void.
On the contrary, the discussion of the effect of failure of
compliance would indicate that the court declined to recognise any such fatal consequences. The Court said:
"Though entering into a settlement
without the required notice is wrong. In the
facts and circumstances of this case, therefore,
we are of the opinion, to direct that
notice should be given now, would not result
in doing justice in the situation. In the
premises, no further consequential order is
necessary by the Court. Had it been necessary
for this Bench to have passed such a consequential order, we would not have passed any
such
consequential order in respect of
the same."
309
12. 1 .The finding on this contention cannot be different from the one urged under Contention (I) infra. If the
Page 43 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
principle of natural justice underlying Order XXIII Rule 3-B

CPC is held to apply, the consequences of non-compliance
should not be different from the consequences of the breach
of rules of natural justice implicit in Section 4. Dealing
with that, the Sahu case, having regard to the circumstances
of the case, declined to push the effect of non-compliance
to its logical conclusion and declare the settlement void.
On the contrary, the Court in Sahus case considered it
appropriate to suggest the remedy and curative of an opportunity of being heard in the proceedings for review. In sahu
decision the obligation under Section 4 to give notice is
primarily on the Union of India. Incidentally there are
certain observations implying an opportunity of being heard
also before the Court. Even assuming that the right of the
affected persons of being heard is also available at a stage
where a settlement is placed before the Court for its acceptance, such a right is not referable to, and does not
stem from, Rule 3-B of Order XXIII CPC. The pronouncement in
Sahu case as to what the consequences of non-compliance are
in conclusive as the law of the case. It is not open to us
to say whether such a conclusion is right or wrong. These
findings cannot be put aside as mere obiter.
Section 112 CPC, biter-alia, says that nothing contained
in that Code shall be deemed to affect the powers of the
Supreme Court under Article 136 or any other provision of
the Constitution or to interfere with any rules made by the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court Rules are framed and promulgated under Article 145 of the ConstitutiOn. Under Order
32 of the Supreme Court Rules, Order XXIII Rule 3-B CPC is
not one of the rules expressly invoked and made applicable.
In relation to the proceedings and decisions of superior
Courts of unlimited jurisdiction, imputation of nullity is
not quite appropriate. They decide all questions of their
own jurisdiction. In Isaacs v. Robertson,1984 (3) AER 140 at
143 the Privy Council said:
"The ........ legal concepts of voidness and
voidability form part of the English law of
contract. They are inapplicable to orders made
by a court of unlimited jurisdiction in the
course of contentious litigation. Such an
order is either irregular or regular. If it is
irregular it can be set aside by the court
that made it on application to that court; if
it is regular it can only be set aside by an
appellate court on appeal if there is one to
which appeal lies."
310
With reference to the "void" cases the Privy Council observed:
The cases that are referred to in these dicta
do not support the proposition that there is
any category or orders of a court of unlimited
jurisdiction of this kind; what they do support is the quite different proposition that
there is a category of orders of such a court
which a person affected by the order is entitled to apply to have set aside ex debito
justitiae in the exercise of the inherent
jurisdiction of the court without his needing
to have recourse to the rules that deal expressly with proceedings to set aside orders
for irregularity and give to the judge a
discretion as to the order he will make. The
judges in the cases that have drawn the distinction between the two types of orders have
Page 44 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
cautiously refrained from seeking to lay down

a comprehensive definition of defects that
bring an order into the category that attracts
ex debito justitiae the right to have it set
aside, save that specifically it includes
orders that have been obtained in breach of
rules of natural justice."
This should conclude the present Contention under C also
against the petitioners.
Re: Contention (D)
13.
This concerns the validity of that part of the
orders of the 14th and 15th of February, 1989 quashing and
terminating the criminal proceedings. In the order dated
14th February 1989 Clause (3) of the order provides:
". .... and all criminal
proceedings related to and arising out of the disaster shall stand quashed wherever these may be
pending."
Para 3 of the order dated 15th February, 1989
reads:
"Upon full payment of the sum referred to in
paragraph 2 above:
(a) The Union of India and the State of Madhya
Pradesh shall take all steps which may in
future become necessary in order to implement
and give effect to this order including but
not limited to ensuring that any suits, claims
or civil or criminal complaints which may be
filed in future against any
Corporation,
Company or person referred to in this settlement are defended by them and disposed of in
terms of this order.
311
(b) Any such suits, claims or civil or criminal proceedings filed or to be filed before
any court or authority are hereby enjoined and
shall not be proceeded with before such court
or authority except for dismissal or quashing
in terms of this order."
The signed memorandum filed by the Union of India and
the UCC includes the following statements:
"This settlement shall finally dispose of all
past, present and future claims, causes of
action and civil and criminal proceedings (of
any nature whatsoever wherever pending) by all
Indian citizens and all public and private
entitles with respect to all past, present and
future
deaths, personal injuries,
health
effects, compensation, losses, damages and
civil and criminal complaints of any nature
whatsoever against UCC, Union Carbide India
Limited, Union Carbide Eastern. and all of
their subsidiaries and affiliates as well as
each of their present and former directors,
officers, employees, agents representatives,
attorneys, advocates and solicitors arising
out of, relating or concerned with the Bhopal
gas leak disaster, including past, present and
future claims, causes of action and proceedings against each other.
and all such criminal proceedings including
contempt proceedings stand quashed and accused
deemed to be acquitted."
The order of 15th February, 1989 refers to the written
memorandum filed by the learned counsel on both sides.
Page 45 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
14. The two contentions of the petitioners, first, in

regard to the legality and validity of the termination of
the criminal proceedings and secondly, the validity of the
protection or immunity from future proceedings, are distinct. They are dealt with also separately. The first -which is considered here -- is in relation to the termination of pending criminal proceedings.
15. Petitioners learned counsel strenuously contend
that the orders of 14th and 15th of February, 1989, quashing
the pending criminal proceedings which were serious noncompoundable offences under Sections 304, 324, 326 etc. of
the Indian Penal Code are not supportable either as amounting to withdrawal of the prosecution under Section 321 Code
of Criminal Procedure, the legal tests of permissibility of
which are well set312
tied or as amounting to a compounding of the offences under
section 320 Criminal Procedure Code as, indeed, sub-section
(9) of section 320 Cr.P.C. imposes a prohibition on such
compounding. It is also urged that the inherent powers of
the Court preserved under Section 482 Cr. P.C. could not be
pressed into service as the principles guiding the administration of the inherent power could, by no stretch of imagination, be said to accommodate the present case. So far as
Article 142 (1) of the Constitution is concerned, it is
urged, that the power to do "complete justice" does not
enable any order "inconsistent with the express statutory
provisions of substantive law, much less, inconsistent with
any constitutional provisions" as observed by this Court in
Prem
Chand
Garg
v.
Excise
Commissioner,
U.P.,
Allahabad,[1963] Suppl. 1 SCR 885 at 899-900].
16. Shri Nariman, however, sought to point out that in
Prem Chand Gargs case the words of limitation of the power
under Article 142 (1) with reference to the "express statutory provisions of substantive law" were a mere obiter and
were not. necessary for the decision of that case. Shri
Nariman contended that neither in Gargs case nor in the
subsequent decision in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and
Anr.,[1988] 2 S.C.C. 602 where the above observations in
Gargs case were approved, any question of inconsistency
with the express statutory provisions of substantive law
arose and in both the cases the challenge had been on the
ground of violation of fundamental rights. Shri Nariman said
that the powers under Articles 136 and 142 (1) are overriding constitutional powers and that while it is quite understandable that the exercise of these powers, however wide,
should not violate any other constitutional provision, it
would, however, be denying the wide sweep of these constitutional powers if their legitimate plentitude is whittled
down by statutory provisions. Shri Nariman said that the
very constitutional purpose of Article 142 is to empower the
Apex Court to do complete justice and that if in that process the compelling needs of justice in a particular case and
provisions of some law are not on speaking terms, it was the
constitutional intendment that the needs of justice should
prevail over a provision of law. Shri Nariman submitted that
if the statement in Gargs case to the contrary passes into
law it would wrongly alter the constitutional scheme.
Shri
Nariman referred to a number of decisions of this Court to
indicate that in all of them the operative result would not
strictly square with the provisions of some law or the
other. Shri Nariman referred to the decisions of this court
where even non-compoundable offences were permitted to be
compounded in the interests of complete justice; where even
after conviction under Section 302 sentence was reduced to
Page 46 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
one which was less than that statutorily prescribed; where

even after declaring certain taxation laws unconstitutional
for lack of legislative competence this court directed that
313
the tax already collected under the void law need not be
refunded etc. Shri Nariman also referred to the Sanchaita
case where this Court, having regard to the large issues of
public interest involved in the matter, conferred the power
of adjudication of claims exclusively on one forum irrespective of jurisdictional prescriptions.
17. Learned Attorney General submitted that the matter
had been
placed beyond doubt in Antulays case where the
court had invoked and applied the dictum in Gargs case to a
situation where the invalidity of a judicial-direction
which, was contrary to the statutory provision, namely
section 7(2) of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 and
as such violative of Article 21 of the Constitution" was
raised and the court held that such a direction was invalid.
Learned Attorney General said that the power under Article
142 (1) could not be exercised if it was against an express
substantive statutory provision containing a prohibition
against such exercise. This, he said, is as it should be
because justice dispensed by the Apex Court also should be
according to law.
The order terminating the pending criminal proceedings is
not supportable on the strict terms of Sections 320 or 321
or 482 Cr. P.C. Conscious of this, Shri Nariman submitted
that if the Union of India as the Dominus Litis through its
Attorney-General invited the court to quash the criminal
proceedings and the court accepting the request quashed
them, the power to do so was clearly referable to Article
142(1) read with the principle of Section 321 Cr.P.C. which
enables the Government through its public-prosecutor to
withdraw a prosecution. Shri Nariman suggested that what
this Court did on the invitation of the Union of India as
Dominus Litis was a mere procedural departure adopting the
expedient of "quashing" as an alternative to or substitute
for "withdrawal". There were only procedural and terminological departures and the Union of India as a party inviting
the order could not, according to Shri Nariman, challenge
the jurisdiction to make it. Shri Nariman submitted that
the State as the Dominus Litis may seek leave to withdraw as
long as such a course was not an attempt to interfere with
the normal course of justice for illegal reasons.
18. It is necessary to set at rest certain misconceptions
in the arguments touching the scope of the powers of this
Court under Article 142(1) of the Constitution. These issues
are matters of serious public importance. The proposition
that a provision in any ordinary law irrespective of the
importance of the public policy on which it is founded,
operates to limit the powers of the Apex Court under Article
142(1) is unsound and erroneous. In both Gargs as well as
Antulays case the point was one of
314
violation of constitutional provisions and constitutional
rights. The observations as to the effect of inconsistency
with statutory provisions were really unnecessary in those
cases as the decisions in the ultimate analysis turned on
the breach of constitutional rights. We agree with Shri
Nariman that the power of the Court under Article 142 in so
far as quashing of criminal proceedings are concerned is not
exhausted by Sections 320 or 321 or 482 Cr.P.C. or all of
them put together. The power under Article 142 is at an
entirely different level and of a different quality. Prohibitions or limitations or provisions contained in ordinary
Page 47 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
laws cannot, ipso-facto, act as prohibitions or limitations

on the constitutional powers under Article 142. Such prohibitions or limitations in the statutes might embody and
reflect the, scheme of a particular law, taking into account
the nature and status of the authority or the court on which
conferment of powers - limited in some appropriate way - is
contemplated. The limitations may not necessarily reflect or
be based on any fundamental considerations of public policy.
Sri Sorabjee, learned Attorney-General, refering to Gargs
case, said that limitation on the powers under Article 142
arising from "inconsistency with express statutory provisions of substantive law" must really mean and be understood
as some express prohibition contained in any substantive
statutory law. He suggested that if the expression prohibition is read in place of provision that would perhaps
convey the appropriate idea. But we think that such prohibition should also be shown to be based on some underlying
fundamental and general issues of publicpolicy and not
merely incidental to a particular statutory scheme or pattern. It will again be wholly incorrect to say that powers
under Article 142 arc subject to such express statutory
prohibitions. That would convey the idea that statutory
provisions override a constitutional provision. Perhaps, the
proper way of expressing the idea is that in exercising
powers under Article 142 and in assessing the needs of
"complete justice" of a cause or matter, the apex court will
take note of the express prohibitions in any substantive
statutory provision based on some fundamental principles of
public-policy and regulate the exercise of its power and
discretion accordingly. The proposition does not relate to
the powers of the court under Article 142, but only to what
is or is not complete justice of a cause or matter and in
the ultimate analysis of the propriety of the exercise of
the power. No question of lack of jurisdiction or of nullity
can arise.
Learned Attorney General said that Section 320 Criminal
Procedure Code is "exhaustive of the circumstances and
conditions under which composition can be effected." [See
Sankar Rangavva v. Sankar Ramayya (AIR 1916 Mad. 463 at 485]
and that "the courts cannot go beyond a test laid down by
the Legislature for determining the class of offences that
are compoundable and substitute one of their own."
Learned
Attorney
315
General also referred to the following passage in Biswabahan
v. Gopen
Chandra [1967] SCR 447 at 451:
"If a person is charged with an offence, then
unless there is some provision for composition
of it the law must take its course and the
charge enquired into resulting either
in
conviction or acquittal."
He said that "if a criminal case is declared to be noncompoundable, then it is against public policy to compound
it, and any agreement to that end is wholly void in law."
(See ILR 40 Cal.113 at 117-118); and submitted that court
"cannot make that legal which the law condemns". Learned
Attorney-General stressed that the criminal case was an
independent matter and of great public concern and could not
be the subject matter of any compromise or settlement. There
is some justification to say that statutory prohibition
against compounding of certain class of serious offences, in
which larger social interests and social security are involved, is based on broader and fundamental considerations
of public policy. But all statutory prohibitions need not
necessarily partake of this quality. The attack on the power
Page 48 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
of the apex court to quash the crucial proceedings under

Article 142(1 ) is iII-conceived. But the justification for
its exercise is another matter.
19. The proposition that State is the dominus Litis in
criminal cases, is not an absolute one. The society for its
orderly and peaceful development is interested in the punishment of the offender. [See A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak &
Anr. [1984] 2 SCC 500 at 508, 509 and "If the offence for
which a prosecution is being launched is an offence against
the society and not merely an individual wrong, any member
of the society must have locus to initiate a prosecution as
also
to
resist withdrawal of such
prosecution,
if
initiated."] See Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar & Ors.
[1987] 1 SCC 289 at 316].
But Shri Nariman put it effectively when he said that if
the position in relation to the criminal cases was that the
court was invited by the Union of India to permit the termination of the prosecution and the court consented to it and
quashed the criminal cases, it could not be said that there
was some prohibition in some law for such powers being
exercised under Article 142. The mere fact that the word
quashing was used did not matter. Essentially, it was a
matter of mere form and procedure and not of substance, The
power under Article 142 is exercised with the aid of the
principles of Section 321 Cr.P.C. which enables withdrawal
of prosecutions. We cannot accept the position urged by the
learned Attor316
ney-General and learned counsel for the petitioners that
court had no power or jurisdiction to make that order. We do
not appreciate Union of India which filed the memorandum of
15th February, 1989 raising the plea of want of jurisdiction.
But whether on the merits there were justifiable grounds
to quash is a different matter. There must be grounds to
permit a withdrawal of the Prosecution. It is really not so
much a question of the existence of the power as one of
justification for its exercise. A prosecution is not quashed
for no other reason than that the Court has the power to do
so. The withdrawal must be justified on grounds and principles recognised as proper and relevent. There is no indication as to the grounds and criteria justifying the withdrawal of the prosecution. The considerations that guide the
exercise of power of withdrawal by Government could be and
are many and varied. Government must indicate what those
considerations are. This Court in State of Punjab v. Union
of India, [1986] 4 SCC 335 said that in the matter of power
to withdraw prosecution the "broad ends of public justice
may well include appropriate social, economic and political
purposes". In the present case, no such endeavour was made.
Indeed, the stand of the UCC in these review petitions is
not specific as to the court to permit a withdrawal. Even
the stand of the Union of India has not been consistent. On
the question whether Union of India itself invited the order
quashing the criminal cases, its subsequents stand in the
course of the arguments in Sahu case as noticed by the court
appears to have been this:
"... The Government as such had nothing to do
with the quashing of the criminal proceedings
and it was not representing the victims in
respect of the criminal liability of the UCC
or UCIL to the victims. He further submitted
that quashing of criminal proceedings was done
by the Court in exercise of plenary powers
under Articles 136 and 142 of the Constitu-
Page 49 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
tion...."
The guiding principle in according permission for withdrawal of a prosecution were stated by this Court in M.N.
Sankarayanan Nair v.P.V. Balakrishnan & Ors. [1972] 2 SCC
599:
"...Nevertheless it is the duty of the Court
also to see in furtherance of justice that the
permission is not sought on grounds extraneous
to the interest of justice or that offences
which are offences against the State go unpunished merely because the Government as a
matter of general policy or expediency unconnected with its duty to prosecute offenders
under the law, directs the public prosecutor
to withdraw from the prosecution and the
Public Prosecutor merely does so at
317
the behest."
Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the
case involved the allegation of commission of serious offences in the investigation of which the society was vitally
interested and that considerations of public interest,
instead of supporting a withdrawal, indicate the very opposite.
The offences relate to and arise out of a terrible and
ghastly tragedy. Nearly 4,000 lives were lost and tens of
thousands of citizens have suffered injuries in various
degrees of severity. Indeed at one point of time UCC itself
recoginsed the possibility of the accident having been the
result of acts of sabotage. It is a matter of importance
that offences alleged in the context of a disaster of such
gravity and magnitude should not remain uninvestigated. The
shifting stand of the Union of India on the point should not
by itself lead to any miscarriage of justice.
We hold that no specific ground or grounds for withdrawal of the prosecutions having been set out at that stage the
quashing of the prosecutions requires to be set aside.
20. There is, however, one aspect on which we should
pronounce. Learned Attorney-General showed us some correspondence pertaining to a letter Rogatory in the criminal
investigation for discovery and inspection of the UCCs
plant in the United States for purposes of comparison of the
safety standards. The inspection was to be conducted during
the middle of February. 1989. The settlement, which took
place on The 14th of February, 1989, it is alleged, was
intended to circumvent that inspection we have gone through
the correspondence on the point. The documents relied upon
do not support such an allegation. That apart, we must
confess our inability to appreciate this suggestion coming
as it does from the Government of India which was a party to
the settlement.
However, on Contention (D) we hold that the quashing
and termination of the criminal proceedings brought about by
the orders dated 14th and 15th February, 1989 require to be,
and are, hereby reviewed and set aside,.
Re: Contention (E)
22. The written memorandum setting out the terms of the
settlement filed by the Union of India and the U.C.C. contains certain terms which are susceptible of being construed
as conferring a general future immunity from prosecution.
The order dated 15th February, 1989 provides in clause 3[a]
and 3[b]:
318
"....that any suits, claims or civil or criminal complaints which may be filed in future
Page 50 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
against any Corporation, Company or person

referred to in this settlement are defended by
them and disposed of in terms of this order".
"Any such suits, claims or civil or
criminal proceedings filed or to be filed
before any court or authority or hereby enjoined and shall not be proceeded with before
such court or Authority except for dismissed
or quashing in terms of this order."
These provisions, learned Attorney General contends,
amount to conferment of immunity from the operation of the
criminal law in the future respecting matters not already
the subject matter of pending cases and therefore, partake
of the character of a blanket criminal immunity which is
essentially a legislative function. There is no power or
jurisdiction in the courts, says learned Attorney-General,
to confer immunity for criminal prosecution and punishment.
Learned Attorney General also contends that grant of immunity to a particular person or persons may amount ) to a
preferential treatment violative of the equality clause.
This position seems to be correct. In Apodaca v.
Viramontes 13 ALR 1427, it was observed:
"
............ The grant of an immunity is
in very truth the assumption of a legislative
power....". (P.1433)
" .......... The decisive question, then, is
whether the district attorney and the district
court in New Mexico, absent constitutional
provision or enabling statute conferring the
power, are authorized to grant immunity from
prosecution for an offense to which incriminating answers provoked by questions asked
will expose the witness.
We are compelled to give a negative answer to
this inquiry. Indeed, sound reason and logic,
as well as the great weight of authority, to
be found both in text books and in the decided
cases, affirm that no such power exists in the
district attorney and the district court,
either or both, except as placed there by
constitutional or statutory language. It is
unnecesary to do more in this opinion in proof
of the statement made than to give a few
references to texts and to cite some of the
leading cases.
319
After the above observation, the court referred to the
words of Chief Justice Cardozo [as he then was in the New
York Court of Appeals] in Doyle v. Hafstader [257 NY 244]:
"
........ The grant of an immunity is in
very truth the assumption of a legislative
power, and that is why the Legislature, acting
alone, is incompetent to declare it. It is the
assumption of a power to annul as to individuals or classes the statutory law of crimes, to
stem the course of justice, to absolve the
grand jurors of the county from the performance of their duties, and the prosecuting
officer from his. All these changes may be
wrought through the enactment of a statute.
They may be wrought in no other way while the
legislative structure of our government continues what it is".
In the same case the opinion of Associate Judge Pound
who dissented in part on another point, but who entirely
Page 51 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
shared the view expressed by Chief Justice Cardozo may also

be cited:
"The grant of Immunity is a legislative function. The Governor may pardon after conviction
[NY Const. Art. 4 & 51, but he may not grant
immunity from criminal prosecution or may the
courts. Amnesty is the determination of the
legislative power that the public welfare
requires the witness to speak? [P. 1433]
Learned Attorney General referred us to the following
passage in "Jurisprudence" by Wortley:
"Again, if we say that X has an immunity from
arrest when a sitting member of the House of
Commons, then during its subsistence he has an
immunity that is denied to the generality of
citizens; there is an inequality of rights and
duties of citizens when the immunity is made
out ...... ".[p. 297]
This inequality must be justified by intelligible differentia for classification which are both reasonable and
have a rational nexus with the object.
Article 361(2) of the Constitution confers on the President and the Governors immunity even in respect of their
personal acts and enjoins no criminal proceedings shall be
instituted against them during their term of office. As to
the theoretical basis for the need for such immunity, the
Supreme Court of the United States in a case concerning
immunity from
320
civil liability [Richard Nixon v. Ernest Fitzgerald, 457 US
731:73 LEd 2d 349 said:
"
....
This court necessarily also has
weighed concerns of public policy, especially
as illuminated by our history and the structure of our government ...."
[p. 362]
"
.... In the case of the President
the inquiries into history and policy, though
mandated independently by our case, tend to
converge. Because the Presidency did not exist
through most of the development of common law,
any historical analysis must draw its evidence
primarily from our constitutional heritage and
structure. Historical inquiry thus
merges
almost at its inception with the kind of
"public policy" analysis appropriately undertaken by a federal court. This inquiry involves policies and principles that may be
considered implicit in the nature of the
Presidents office in a system structured to
achieve effective government under a constitutionally mandated separation of powers."
[p. 362 and
363]
"
...... In view of the special nature of
the Presidents constitutional office
and
functions, we think it appropriate to recognise
absolute Presidential immunity
from
damages liability for acts within the "outer
perimeter" of his official responsibility.
Under the Constitution and laws of the United
States the President has discretionary responsibilities in a broad variety of areas, many
of them highly sensitive. In many cases it
would be difficult to determine which of the
Presidents innumerable "functions"
encom-
Page 52 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
passed a particular action...."

[p.-367]
Following observations of Justice Storey in his "Commentaries in the Constitution of United States" were referred
to:
There are ...... incidental powers,
belonging to the executive department, which
are necessarily implied from the nature of the
functions, which are confided to it. Among
these, must necessarily be included the power
to perform them .... The president cannot,
therefore, be liable to arrest, imprisonment,
or detention, while he is in the discharge of
the duties of his
321
office; and for this purpose his person must
be deemed, in civil cases at least, to possess
an official inviolability".
[P-363]
23. Indeed, the submissions of learned Attorney General
on the theoretical foundations as to the source of immunity
as being essentially legislative may be sound. But the
question does not strictly arise in that sense in the
present case. The direction that future criminal proceedings
shall not be instituted or proceeded with must be understood
as a concomitant and a logical consequence of the decision
to withdraw the pending prosecutions. In that context, the
stipulation that no future prosecutions shall be entertained
may not amount to conferment of any immunity but only to a
reiteration of the consequences of such termination of
pending prosecutions. Thus understood any appeal to the
principle as to the power to confer criminal immunity becomes inapposite in this case.
24.
However, in view of our finding on contention (D)
that the quashing of criminal proceedings was not justified
and that the orders dated 14th and 15th of February, 1989 in
that behalf require to be reviewed and set-aside, the
present contention does not survive because as a logical
corollary and consequence of such further directions as to
future prosecutions earlier require to be deleted. We,
therefore, direct that all portions in the orders of this
Court which relate to the incompetence of any future prosecutions be deleted.
25. The effect of our order on Contentions [D] and [E]
is that all portions of orders dated 14th and 15th February,
1989, touching the quashing of the pending prosecution as
well as impermissibility of future criminal liability are
set-aside. However, in so far as the dropping of the proceedings in contempt envisaged by clause (b) of para 4 of
the order dated 15th February, 1989 is concerned, the same
is left undisturbed.
Contention (e) is answered accordingly.
Re. Contention (F)
26.
As we have seen earlier the memorandum of settlement as well as the orders of the Court contemplate that
with a view to effectuating the settlement there be a termination of pending criminal prosecution with a further stipulation for abstention from future criminal proceedings.
Petitioners have raised the plea- and learned Attorney
General supports them -- that the language of the memorandum
of settlement as well as the orders of the court leave no
manner of doubt that a part of the consideration for the
payment of 470 million US dollars was the stifling of the
322
prosecution and, therefore, unlawful and opposed to public
Page 53 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
policy. Relying upon Sections 23 and 24 of the Indian Contract Act it was urged that if any part of a single consideration for one or more objects or any one or any part of
any one of several considerations for a single object is
unlawful, the agreement becomes "void".
27. At the outset, learned Attorney General sought to
clear any possible objections based on estoppel to the Union
of India, which was a consenting party to the settlement
raising this plea. Learned Attorney General urged that where
the plea is one of invalidity the conduct of parties becomes
irrelevant and that the plea of illegality is a good answer
to the objection of consent. The invalidity urged is one
based on publicpolicy. We think that having regard to the
nature of plea --- one of nullity
no preclusive effect
of the earlier consent should come in the way of the Union
of India from raising the plea. Illegalities, it is said,
are incurable. This position is fairly well established. In
re A Bankruptcy Notice (1924 2 Ch.D. 76 at 97) Atkin L.J.
said:
"It is well established that it is impossible in law for
a person to allege any kind of principle which precludes him
from alleging the invalidity of that which the statute has,
on grounds of general public policy, enacted shall be invalid."
In Maritime Electirc Co. Ltd. v. General Daines Ltd. AIR
1937 PC 114 at 116-117 a similar view finds expression:
.......... an estoppel is only a rule of evidence which
under certain special circumstances can be invoked by a
party to an action; it cannot therefore avail in such a case
to release the plaintiff from an obligation to obey such a
statute, nor can it enable the defendant to escape from
statutory obligation of such a kind on his part. It is
immaterial whether the obligation is onerous or otherwise to
the party suing. The duty of each party is to obey the law.
........
The court should first of all determine the
nature of the obligation imposed by the statute, and then
consider whether the admission of an estoppel would nullify
the statutory provision.
.....
there is not a single case in which an estoppel
has been allowed in such a case to defeat a statutory obligation of an unconditional character."
The case of this Court in point is of the State o/Kerala
&Anr. v. The Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing (Wvg.) Co.
Ltd. etc. [1974] 1 SCR 671 at 688 where this court repelled
the contention that an agreement on the part of the Government not to acquire, for a period of 60 years the lands of
the company did not prevent the State from enacting or
giving
323
effect to a legislation for acquisition and that the surrender by the Government of its legislative powers which are
intended to be used for public good cannot avail the company
or operate against the Government as equitable estoppel. It
is unnecessary to expand the discussion and enlarge authorities.
We do not think that the Union of India should be precluded from urging the contention as to invalidity in-the
present case.
28. The main arguments on invalidity proceed on the
premise that the terms of the settlement and the orderS of
the court passed pursuant thereto contemplate, amount to
and permit a compounding of non-compoundable offences which
is opposed to public policy and, therefore, unlawful. The
orders of the court based on an agreement whose or part of
whose consideration is unlawful have, it is Urged, no higher
Page 54 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
sanctity than the agreement on which it is based. The orders

of the court based on consent of parties do not, so goes the
argument, reflect an adjudicative imposition of the court,
but merely set the seal of the court on what is essentially
an agreement between the parties. It is urged that the
validity and durability of a consent order are wholly dependent on the legal validity of the agreement, on which it
rests. Such an order is amenable to be set-aside on any
ground which would justify a setting aside of the agreement
itself.
These principles are unexceptionable. Indeed,
in
Huddersfield Banking Company Ltd. v. Henry Lister & Son Ltd,
[1895] 2 Ch. 273 at 276 Vaughan Williams J. said:
it seems to me that the clear result of the
authorities
is that, notwithstanding
the
consent order has been drawn up and completed,
and acted upon to the extent that the property
has been sold and the money has been paid into
the hands of the receiver, I may now set aside
tile order and arrangement upon any ground
which would justify me in setting aside an
agreement entered into between the parties.
The real truth of the matter is that
the order is a mere creature of the agreement,
and to say that the Court can set aside the
agreement -- and it was not disputed that this
could be done if a common mistake were proved
-- but that it cannot set aside an order which
was the creature of that agreement, seems to
me to be giving the branch an existence which
is independent of the tree.
[emphasis added]
324
This was affirmed in appeal by Lindley LJ. in the following
words:
"the appellants, contend that there is no
jurisdiction to set aside the consent order
upon such materials as we have to deal with;
and they go so far as to say that a consent
order can only be set aside on the ground of
fraud.
1 dissent from that proposition entirely. A consent order, I agree, is an order;
and so long as it stands I think it is as good
an estoppel as any other order. I have not the
slightest doubt on that; nor have I the
slightest doubt that a consent order can be
impeached, not only on the ground of fraud,
but upon any grounds which invalidate the
agreement it expresses in a more formal way
than usual".
[p. 280]
In Great North-West Central Railway Co. & Ors. v.
Charlebois and Ors, [1899 AC 114 at 124, the Privy Council
stated the proportion thus:
it
is quite clear that a company
cannot do what is beyond its legal powers by
simply going into court and consenting to a
decree which orders that the thing shall be
done ...Such a judgment cannot be of more
validity than the invalid contract on which it
was founded".
[emphasis added]
It is, indeed, trite proposition that a contract whose
object is opposed to public policy is invalid and it is not
any the less so by reason alone of the fact that the unlaw-
Page 55 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
ful terms are embodied in a consensual decree. In state of

Punjab v. Amar Singh, [1974] 2 SCC 70 at 90, this Court
said:
After all, by consent or agreement, parties
cannot achieve what is contrary to law and a
decree merely based on such agreement cannot
furnish a judicial amulet against. statutory
violation.... The true rule is that the contract of the parties is not the less a contract, and subject to the incidents of a
contract, because there is superadded the
command of the Judge".
29.
We do not think that the plea of "Accord and
Satisfaction" raised by the UCC is also of any avail to it.
UCC contends that the funds constituting the subject-matter
of the settlement had been accepted and appropriated by
Union of India and that, therefore, there was full accord
and satisfaction. We find factually that there is no appropriation of the funds by the Union of India.
The funds
remain to the credit of the Registrar- General of this Court
in the Reserve Bank of India. That apart as observed in
Corpus Juris Seccundum, Vol. I:
325
"an illegal contract or agreement, such as one
involving illegality of the subject matter,
one involving the unlawful sale or exchange of
intoxicating liquors, or a subletting, subleasing, or hiring out of convicts, held under
lease from the state, in violation of statute,
or stifling a prosecution for a public policy,
cannot constitute or effect an accord and
satisfaction ".
[P. 473]
[emphasis added]
30. The main thrust of petitioners argument of unlawfulness of consideration is that the dropping of criminal
charges and undertaking to abstain from bringing criminal
charges in future were part of the consideration for the
offer of 470 million US dollars by the UCC and as the offences involved in the charges were of public nature and
non-compoundable, the consideration for the agreement was
stifling of prosecution and, therefore, unlawful. It is a
settled proposition and of general application that where
the criminal charges are matters of public concern there can
be no diversion of the course of public justice and cannot
be the subject matters of private bargain and compromise.
31.
Shri Nariman urged that there were certain fundamental misconceptions about the scope of this doctrine of
stifling of prosecution in the arguments of the petitioners.
He submitted that the true principle was that while noncompoundable offences which are matter of public concern
cannot be subject-matter of private bargains and that administration of criminal justice should not be allowed to pass
from the hands of Judges to private individuals, the doctrine is not attracted where side by side with criminal liability there was a pre-existing civil liability that was
also settled and satisfied. The doctrine, he said, contemplates invalidity based on the possibility of the element of
coercion by private individuals for private gains taking
advantages of the threat of criminal prosecution. The whole
idea of applicability of this doctrine in this case becomes
irrelevant having regard to the fact that the Union of India
as dominus litis moved in the matter and that administration
of criminal justice was not sought to be exploited by any
private individual for private gains. Shri Nariman submitted
Page 56 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
that distinction between "motive" and "consideration" has

been well recognised in distinguishing whether the doctrine
is or is not attracted.
32.
The questions that arise in the present case are,
first, whether putting an end to the criminal proceedings
was a part of the consideration
326
and bargain for the payment of 470 million US :dollars or
whether it was merely one of the motives for entering into
the settlement and, secondly, whether the memorandum of
settlement and orders of this court, properly construed,
amount to a compounding of the offences. If, on the contrary, what was done was that Union of India invited the
court to exercise its powers under Article 142 to permit a
withdrawal of the prosecution and the expedient of quashing
was a mere procedure of recognising the effect of withdrawal, could the settlement be declared void ?
We think that the main settlement does not suffer from
this vice. The pain of nullity does not attach to it flowing
from any alleged unlawfulness of consideration. We shall set
out our reasons presently.
Stating the law on the matter, Fry L.J. in Windhill
Local Board of Health v. Vint. [1890] 45 Ch.D. 351 at 366
said:
"We have therefore a ease in which a contract
is entered into for the purpose of diverting
-- I may say perverting -- the course of
justice; and, although I agree that in this
ease it was entered into with perfect good
faith and with all the security which could
possibly be given to such an agreement, I
nevertheless think that the general principle
applies, and that we cannot give effect to the
agreement, the consideration of which is the
diverting the course of public justice."
In Keir v. Leeman, 16 Quecns Bench 308 at 316, 3221,
Lord Denman, C.J. said:
"The principle of law is laid down by
Wilmot C.J. in Collins v.
Blantem (a) that a
contract to withdraw a prosecution for perjury, and consent to give no evidence against
the accused, is founded on an unlawful consideration and void.
On the soundness of this decision no
doubt can be entertained,
whether the party
accused were innocent or guilty of the crime
charged. If innocent, the law was abused for
the purpose of
extortion; if guilty the law
was eluded by a corrupt compromise, screening
the criminal for a bribe.
But, if the offence is of a public nature, no
agreement can be valid that is founded on the
consideration of stifling a prosecution
for it.
327
In the present instance, the offence is not
confined to personal injury, but is accompanied with riot and obstruction of a public
officer in the execution of his duty. These
are matters of public concern, and therefore
not legally the subject of a compromise.
The approbation of the Judge (whether necessary or not) may properly be asked on all
occasions where an indictment is compromised
on the trial; plainly it cannot make that
Page 57 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
legal which the law condemns."

This was affirmed in appeal by Tindal C.J. who said (p.393):
"It seems clear, from the various authorities
brought before us on the argument, that some
misdemeanours are of such a nature that a
contract to withdraw a prosecution in respect
of them, and to consent to give no evidence
against the parties accused, is founded on an
illegal consideration. Such was the case of
Collins v. Blantern, 2 Wils. 341, 347, which
was the case of a prosecution for perjury. It
is strange that such a doubt should ever have
been raised. A contrary decision would have
placed it in the power of a private individual
to make a profit to himself by doing a great
public injury."
Narasimha Raju v. E Gurumurthy Raju & Ors. [1963] 3
S.C.R. 687 of this court is a case in point.
The first
respondent who had filed a criminal complaint in the Magistrates Court against the appellant and his other partners
alleging of commission of offences under Sections 420, 465,
468 and 477 read with Sections 107, 120B of the Indian Penal
Code entered into an agreement with the accused persons
under which the dispute between the appellant and the first
respondent and others was to be referred to arbitration on
the first respondent agreeing to withdraw his criminal
complaint. Pursuant to that agreement the complaint was got
dismissed, on the first-respondent abstaining from adducing
evidence. The arbitration proceedings, the consideration for
which was the withdrawal of the complaint, culminated in an
award and the first respondent :applied to have the award
made a rule of the court. The appellant turned around and
challenged the award on the ground that the consideration
for the arbitration-agreement was itself unlawful as it was
one not to prosecute a non-compoundable offence. This court
held that the arbitration agreement was void under Section
23 of the Indian Contract Act as its consideration was
opposed to public policy. The award was held void.
34. Even assuming that the Union of India agreed to
compound
328
non-compoundable offences, would this constitute a stifling
of prosecution in the sense in which the doctrine is understood. The essence of the doctrine of stifling of prosecution is that no private person should be allowed to take the
administration of criminal justice out of the hands of the
Judges and place it in his own hands. In Rameshwar v. Upendranath, AIR 1926 Calcutta 451,456 the High Court said:
"Now in order to show that the object of the
Agreement was to stifle criminal prosecution,
it is necessary to prove that there was an
agreement between the parties express
or
implied, the consideration for which was to
take the administration of law out of the
hands of the Judges and put it into the hands
of a private individual to determine what is
to be done hi particular case and that the
contracting parties should enter into a bargain to that effect".
[emphasis added]
Narasimha Raju (supra) this Court said .
[p.
693]
"The principle underlying this provision is obvious. Once the
machinery
Page 58 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
Of the Criminal Law is set into motion on the

allegation that a non-compoundablc offence has
been committed, it is for the criminal courts
and criminal courts alone to deal with
that
allegation and to decide whether the offence
alleged has in fact been committed or not.
The decision of this question cannot either
directly or indirectly be taken out of the
hands
of criminal courts and dealt with by,
private individuals."
[Emphasis
added]
This was what was reiterated in Ouseph Poulo & Ors. v.
Catholic Union Bank Ltd. & Ors. [1964] 7 SCR 745:
"With regard to non-compoundable offence, however,
the position is clear that no court to law can allow a
private party to take lite administration of law in its own
hands and settle the questiotion as to whettier a particular
offence has been cornmitted or not for
itself"
[Emphasis added]
329
In this sense, a private party is not taking administration of law in its own hands in this case. It is the Union
of India, as the dominus litis, that consented to the quashing of the proceedings. We have said earlier that what was
purported to be done was not a compounding of the offences.
Though, upon review, we have set aside that part of the
order, the consequences of the alleged unlawfulness of
consideration must be decided as at the time of the transaction. It is here that we see the significance of the concurring observations of Chapan J. in Majibar Rahman v. Muktashed Hossein, ILR 40 Calcutta page 113 at page 118, who
said.
"I agree, but desire to carefully confine my
reason for holding that the bond was void to
the ground that the consideration for the bond
was found by the lower Court to be a promise
to withdraw from the prosecution in a case the
compromise of which is expressly forbidden by
the Code of Criminal Procedure."
As stated earlier, the arrangement which purported to
terminate the criminal cases was one of a purported withdrawal not forbidden by any law but one which was clearly
enabled. Whether valid grounds to permit such withdrawal
existed or not is another matter.
35.
Besides as pointed out by this court in Narasimha
Rajus case (supra) the consequence of doctrine of stifling
of prosecution is attracted, and its consequences follow
where a "person sets the machinery of criminal law into
action on the allegation that the opponent has committed a
noncompoundable-offence and by the use of this coercive
criminal process he compels the opponent to enter into an
agreement, that agreement would be treated as invalid for
the reason that its consideration is opposed to public
policy". (See page 692 of the report ). In that case this
court further held that the doctrine applies "when as a
consideration for not proceeding with a criminal complaint,
an agreement is made, in substance it really means that the
complainant has taken upon himself to deal with his complaint and on the bargaming counter he has used his nonprosecution of the complaint as a consideration for the
agreement which his opponent has been induced or coerced to
enter into". (emphasis added). These are not the features of
the present case.
36.
More importantly, the distinction between the
Page 59 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
"motive" for entering into agreement and the "consideration"

for the agreement must be kept clearly distinguished. Where
dropping of the criminal proceedings is a motive for entering into the agreement --and not its consideration--the
doctrine of stifling of prosecution is not attracted. Where
there is also a
330
pre-existing civil liability, the dropping of criminal
proceedings need not necessarily be a consideration for the
agreement to satisfy that liability. In Adhikanda Sahu &
Ors. v. Jogi Sahu & Ors. AIR 1922 Patna 502, this distinction is pointed out:
"The distinction between the motive for coming
to an agreement and the actual consideration
for the agreement must be kept carefully in
view and this care must be particularly exercised in a case where there is a civil liability already existing, which is discharged or
remitted by the Agreement".
[P. 503]
In Deb Kumar Ray Choudhury V. Anath Bandhu Sen and Ors.
AIR 1931 Cal. 421. it was mentioned:
"A contract for payment of money in respect of
which a criminal prosecution was permissible
under the law, was not by itself opposed to
public policy.
...... the withdrawal of the prosecution
in the case before us might have been the
motive but not certainly the object or the
consideration of the contract as evidenced by
the bond in suit so as to render the agreement
illegal.
These decisions are based upon the facts of
the cases showing clearly that the agreements
or the contracts sought to be enforced were
the foundation for the withdrawal of noncompoundable criminal cases and were declared
to be unlawful on the ground of public policy
wholly void in law and, therefore, unenforceable. This class of cases has no application,
where, as in the present case, there was a
pre-existing civil liability based upon adjustment of accounts between the
parties
concerned."
[emphasis added]
Again in Babu Harnarain Kapur v. Babu Ram Swamp Nigam & Anr.
[AIR 1941 Oudh 593] this distinction has been pointed out:
"Though the motive of the execution
of the document may be the withdrawal of a
non-compoundable criminal case,-the consideration is quite legal, provided there is an
enforceable preexisting liability. In
the
Patna case it was observed that the distinction between the motive for coming to an
agreement and
the actual consideration for
the agreement must be kept care331
fully in view and this care must be particularly exercised in a case where there is a
civil liability already existing which is
discharged or remitted by the agreement."
[P.592]
Finally, this Court in Ouseph Poulo (supra) at
page 749 held that:
"In dealing with such agreements, it is,
Page 60 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
however, necessary to bear in mind the distinction between the motive which may operate
in the mind of the complainant and the accused
and which may indirectly be responsible for
the agreement and the consideration for such
an agreement. It is only where the agreement
is supported by the prohibited consideration
that it fails within the mischief of the
principle, that agreements which intend to
stifle criminal prosecutions are invalid."
[Emphasis added]
37. On a consideration of the matter, we hold that the
doctrine of stifling of prosecution is not attracted in the
present case. In reaching this conclusion we do not put out
of consideration that ii is inconceivable that Union of
India would, under the threat of a prosecution, coerce UCC
to pay 470 million US dollars or any part thereof as consideration for stifling of the prosecution. In the context of
the Union of India theplea lacks as much in reality as in a
sense of proportion.
38.
Accordingly on Contention (F) we hold that the
settlement is not hit by Section 23 or 24 of the Indian
Contract Act and that no part of the consideration for
payment of 470 million US dollars was unlawful.
Re: Contention (G)
39.
This concerns the ground that a
"FairnessHearing", as understood in the American procedure is mandatory before a mass- tort action is settled and the settlement in the present case is bad as no such procedure had
preceded it. It is also urged that the quantum settled for
is hopelessly inadequate as the settlement has not envisaged
and provided for many heads of compensation such as the
future medical surveillance costs of a large section of the
exposed population which is put at risk; and that Ihc toxic
tort actions where the latency-period for the manifestation
of the effects of the exposure is unpredictable it is necessary to have a "re-opener" clause as in the very nature of
toxic injuries the latency period for the manifestation of
effects is unpredictable and any structured settlement
should contemplate and provide for the possible baneful
contingencies of the future. It is pointed out for the
petitioners that the order recording the settlement and the
order dated 4th May, 1989 indicate that no provision was
made for such imminent contingencies for the future which
even in332
dude the effect of the toxic gas on pregnant mothers resulting in congenital abnormalities of the children. These
aspects, it is urged, would have been appropriately discussed before the Court, had the victims and victimgroups
had a "Fairness-Hearing". It is urged that there has been no
application of the Courts mind to matters particularly
relevant to toxic injuries. The contention is two fold.
First is that the settlement did not envisage the possibilities of delayed manifestation or aggravation of toxic
morbidity, in the exposed population. This aspect, it is
urged, is required to be taken care of in two ways: One by
making adequate financial provision for medical surveillance
costs for the exposed but still latent victims and secondly,
by providing in the case of symptomatic victims a "re-opener
clause" for meeting contingencies of aggravation of damages
in
the case of the presently symptomatic victims. The
second contention is as to the infirmity of the settlement
by an omission to follow the Fairness-Hearing procedures.
40.
On the first aspect, Sri Nariman, however,
Page 61 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
contends that the possibility that the exposed population

might develop hitherto unsuspected complications in the
future was known to and was in the mind of the Union of
India and it must be presumed to have taken all the possibilities into account in arriving at the settlement. Sri
Nariman said we now have the benefit of hindsight of six
years which is a sufficiently long period over which the
worst possibilities would have blow-over. Indeed, in the
plains in the Bhopal Court, Shri Nariman points out, Union
of India has specifically
averred that there were possibilities of such future
damage. Sri Nariman referred to the preface to the Report of
April, 1986 of the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR)
on "Health Effects of the Bhopal Gas Tragedy" where these
contingencies are posited to point out that these aspects
were in the mind of Union of India and that there was nothing unforeseen which could be said to have missed its attention. in the said preface ICMR said:
, ...... How long will they (i.e. the
respiratory, ocular and other morbidities)
last ? What permanent diabilities can be
caused? What is the outlook for these victims
? What of their off-spring?"
Shri Nariman referred to the following passage in the
introduction to the Working Manual 1 on "Health Problems of
Bhopal (;as Victims" April, 1986, ICMR;
"Based on clinical experience gained so far,
it is believed that many of them (i.e. victims) would require specialised medicare for
several years since MIC is an extremely reactive substance",
333
the possibility of the exposed population
developing hitherto unsuspected complications
in the future cannot be overlooked."
What is, however, implicit in this stand of the UCC is
the admission that exposure to MIC has such grim implications for the future; but UCC urges that the Union of India
must be deemed to have put all these into the scales at the
time it settled the claim for 470 million US dollars. UCC
also suggests that with the passage of time all such problems of the future must have already unfolded themselves and
that going by the statistics of medical evaluation of the
affected persons done by the Directorate of Claims, even the
amount of 470 million US dollars is very likely to be an
over-payment. UCC ventures to suggest that on the estimates
of compensation based on the medical categorisation of the
affected population, a sum of Rs. 440 crores could be estimated to be an over-payment and that for all the latentproblems not manifested yet, this surplus of Rs. 440 crores
should be a protectable and adequate financial cushion.
41.
We may at this stage have a brief look at the
work of the medical evaluation and categorisation of the
Health Status of the affected persons carried out by the
Directorate of Claims. It would appear that as on 31st
October, 1990, 6,39,793 claims had been filed. It was stated
that a considerably large number of the claimants who were
asked to appear for medical evaluation did not turn up and
only 3,61,166 of them responded to the notices. Their medical folders were prepared. The total number of deaths had
risen to 3,828.
The results of medical evaluation and
categorisation of the affected persons on the basis of the
data entered in their Medical Folders as on 31st October,
1990 are as follows:
No. of medical folders prepared
3,61,966
Page 62 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
No. of folders evaluated

3,58,712
No. of folders categorised
3,58,712
No injury
1,55,203
Temporary injuries
1,73,382
Permanent injuries
18,922
Temporary disablement
caused by a
Temporary injury
7,172
Temporary disablement
caused by a
permanent injury
1,313
Permanent Partial disablement
2,680
334
Permanent total disablement
40
Deaths
3,828
42. On the medical research literature placed before us
it can reasonably be posited that the exposure to such
concentrations of MIC might involve delayed manifestations
of toxic morbidity. The exposed population may not have
manifested any immediate symptomatic medical status.
But the long latency-period of toxic injuries renders
the medical surveillance costs a permissible claim even
ultimately the exposed persons may not actually develop the
apprehended complications. In Ayers v. Jackson TP, 525 A
2d.287 N.J.1987, referring to the admissibility of claims of
medical surveillance expenses, it was stated:
"The claim for medical surveillance expenses
stands on a different footing from the claim
based on enhanced risk. It seeks to recover
the cost of periodic medical examinations
intended to monitor plaintiffs health and
facilitate early diagnosis and treatment of
disease caused by plaintiffs exposure to
toxic chemicals ..... ".
"....The future expense of medical monitoring,
could be a recoverable consequential damage
provided that plaintiffs can establish with a
reasonable degree of medical certainty that
such expenditures are "reasonably anticipated"
to be incurred by reason of their exposure.
There is no doubt that such a remedy would
permit the early detection and treatment of
maladies and that as a matter of public policy
the tort-feasor should bear its cost.
Compensation for reasonable and
necessary
medical expenses is consistent with wellaccepted legal principles. It is also consistent with the important public health interest
in fostering access to medical testing for
individuals whose exposure to toxic chemicals
creates an enhanced risk of disease. The value
of early diagnosis and treatment for cancer
patients is welldocumented."
"Although some individuals exposed to hazardous chemicals may seek regular medical surveillance whether or not the cost is reimbursed, the lack of reimbursement will undoubtedly deter others from doing so. An
application of tort law that
335
allows post-injury, pre-symptom recovery in
toxic tort litigation for reasonable medical
surveillance costs is manifestly consistent
with the public interest in early detection
and treatment of disease.
Page 63 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
Recognition of pre-symptom claims for medical

surveillance serves other important public
interests. The difficulty of proving causation, where the disease is manifested years
after exposure, has caused many commentators
to suggest that tort law has no capacity to
deter pollutors, because the costs of proper
disposal are often viewed by pollutors as
exceeding the risk of tort liability
......
"
"Other considerations compel recognition of a
pre-symptom medical surveillance claim. It is
inequitable for an individual,. wrongfully
exposed to dangerous toxic chemicals
but
unable to prove that disease is likely to have
to pay his own expenses when medical intervention
is
clearly
reasonable
and
necessary ........................... "
"Accordingly, we hold that the cost of medical
surveillance is a
compensable item of damages where the proves demonstrate, through
reliable expert testimony predicated upon the
significance and extent of exposure to chemicals, the toxicity of the chemicals, the
seriousness of the diseases for which individuals are at risk, the relative increase in the
chance of onset of disease in those exposed,
and the value of early diagnosis, that such
surveillance to monitor the effect of exposure
to
toxic
chemicals
is
reasonable
and
necessary ...... "
In the "Law of Toxic Tons" by Michael Dore, the same
idea is expressed:
"In Myers v. Johns-Manville Corporation, the
court permitted plaintiff prove emotional harm
where they were suffering from "serious fear
or emotional distress or a clinically diagnosed phobia of cancer." The court distinguished, however, between a claim for fear of
cancer and a claim for cancerphobia. The
former could be based on plaintiffs fear,
preoccupation and distress resulting from the
enhanced risk of cancer but the latter would
require
expert
opinion
testimony ....................... "
"The reasonable value of future medical services required by a
336
defendants conduct is recoverable element of
damage in tradition and toxic tort litigation.
Such damages have been awarded even in circumstances where no present injury exists but
medical testimony establishes that such future
medical surveillance is reasonably required on
the basis of the conduct of a particular
defendant .......................... "
It is not the reasonable probability that the persons
put at risk will actually suffer toxic injury in future that
determines whether the medical surveillance is necessary.
But what determines it is whether, on the basis of medical
opinion, a person who has been exposed to a toxic substance
known to cause long time serious injury should undergo
periodical medical tests in order to look for timely warning
signs of the on-set of the feared consequences. These costs
constitute a relevant and admissible head of compensation
Page 64 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
and may have to be borne in mind in forming an opinion

whether a proposed settlement -- even as a settlement -- is
just, fair and adequate.
43.
Sri Nariman, however, urged that the only form of
compensation known to the common law is a lumpsum award -- a
once and for all determination of compensation for all
plaintiffs losses, past, present and future -- and that
split-trials for quantification of compensation taking into
account future aggravation of injuries, except statutorily
enabled, are unknown to common law.
Indeed, that this is the position in common law cannot
be disputed. In an action for negligence, damages must be
and are assessed once and for all at the trial of such an
issue. Even if it is found later that the damage suffered
was much greater than was originally supposed, no further
action could be brought. It is well settled rule of law that
damages resulting from one and the same cause of action must
be assessed and recovered once and for all. Two actions,
therefore, will not lie against the same defendant for
personal injury sustained in the same accident. (See Churlsworth and Percy on Negligence [1990] 8th Edn. Para 43.
Indeed, even under the Common Law, as administered in
U.K. prior to the introduction of sec.32A of the Supreme
Court Act 1981, Lord Denning thought that such special
awards were not impermissible. But as pointed out earlier
the House of Lords in Lim Poh Choo v. Camden Islington, did
not approve that view.
Later sec.32A of the Supreme Court Act, 1981 expressly
enabled award of provisional damages and Order 37 Rules 7 to
10 (Part II) Rules of
337
Supreme Court provided for the assessment of such further
damages. The contention of the UCC is that the common law
rule of once and for all damages is unuttered in India
unlike in England where split awards are now statutorily
enabled and that, therefore, references to future medical
surveillance costs and "re-opener" Clauses are inapposite to
a once for all payment. The concept of re-opener clause in
settlement, it is contended, is the result of special legal
requirements in certain American jurisdictions and a settlement is not vitiated for not incorporating a "re-opener"
clause or for not providing for future medical surveillance
costs inasmuch as all these must be presumed to have engaged
the minds of the settling parties at the time of a once for
all settlement. Shri Nariman pointed out that the American
case of Acushnet River v. New Bedford Harbour, 712 F 2d
Supp. 1019 referred to by the learned Attorney-General was a
case where the "re-opener" clause was a statutory incident
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act, 1980.
But petitioners say that in the process of evolving what
is a fair, reasonable and adequate settlement some of the
elements essential and relevant to fairness and adequacy
such as provision for future medical surveillance and the
likely future, but yet unforeseen, manifestation of toxic
injury, having regard to the nature of the hazard, have not
been kept in mind and, therefore, the approval accorded to
the settlement is on an incomplete criteria. But UCC would
say that Union of India was aware of the possibility of such
future manifestations of the effects of the exposure and
must be deemed to have kept all those in mind at the time of
settlement.
44.
But the point to emphasise is that those who were
not parties to the process of settlement are assailing the
settlement on these grounds. In personal injury actions the
Page 65 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
possibility of the future aggravation of the condition and

of consequent aggravation of damages are taken into account
in the assessment of damages. The estimate of damages in
that sense is a very delicate exercise requiring evaluation
of many criteria some of which may border on the imponderable. Generally speaking actions for damages are limited by
the general doctrine of remoteness and mitigation of damages. But the hazards of assessment of once and for all
damages in personal injury actions lie in many yet inchoate
factors requiring to be assessed. It is in this context we
must look at the very proper refusal of the courts to
sacrifice physically injured plaintiffs on the alter of the
certainty principle. The likelihood of future complications--though they may mean mere assessment or evaluation of
mere chances--are also put into the scales in qualifying
damages. This principle may, as rightly pointed out by Sri
338
Nariman, take care of the victims who have manifest symptoms. But what about those who are presently wholly a symptomatic and have no material to support a present claim ?
Who will provide them medical surveillance costs and if at
some day in the future they develop any of the dreaded
symptoms, who will provide them with compensation ? Even if
the award is an "once and for all" determination, these
aspects must be taken into account.
45.
The second aspect is the imperative of the
exercise of a "Fairness-Hearing" as a condition for the
validity of the settlement. Smt. Indira Jaising strongly
urged that in the absence of a "Fairness-Hearing" no settlement could at all be meaningful. But the question is whether
such a procedure is relevant to and apposite in the context
of the scheme under the Act. The "Fairness-Hearing" in a
certified class of action is a concept in the United States
for which a provision is available under rule 23 of US
Federal Rules of Procedure. Smt. Indira Jaising referred to
certain passages in the report of Chief Judge Weinstein in
what is known as the Agent Orange Litigation (597 Federal
Supplement 740 (1984), to indicate what according to her,
are the criteria a Court has to keep in mind in approving a
settlement. The learned judge observed (at page 760 para 9):
"In deciding whether to approve the settlement
the Court must have a sufficient grasp of the
facts and the law involved in the case in
order to make a sensible evaluation of the
ligations prospects. (See Malchman v. Davis,
706 F.2d, 426, 433 (2d Cir.1983). An appreciation of the probabilities of
plaintiffs
recovery after a trial and the possible range
of damages is essential. The cases caution,
however, that the court"should not ....
turn
the settlement hearing into a trial or rehearsal of the trial. "Flin v. FMC Corp.,528
F.2d, 1169, 1172(4th Cir. 1975), Cert. denied,
424 U.S. 967, 96 S.Ct. 1462, 47 L.Ed.2d
734(734(1976), quoting Teachers Ins. & annuity
Assn of America v. Beame, 67 F.R.D. 30,
33(S.D.N.Y.1975). See also Malchman v. Davis,
706 F.2d 426, 433 (2D Cir. 1983)."
"A democratic vote by informed members of the
class would be virtually impossible in any
large class suit. The costs of ensuring that
each member of the class in this case fully
understood the issue bearing on settlement and
then voted on it would be prohibitive and the
enterprise quixotic. Even though hundreds of
Page 66 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
members of the class were heard from, there

was an overwhelminglv large silent majority.
In the final analysis there was and can be no
"consent" in any meaningful sense."
[Emphasis added]
339
Learned Judge also referred to the nine relevant factors: (1) The complexity expense and likely duration of the
litigation, (2) The reaction of the class of the settlement,
(3) The stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery
completed, (4) The risks of establishing liability, (5) The
risks of establishing damages (6) The risks of maintaining
the class action through the trial, (7) The ability of the
defendants to withstand a greater judgement, (8) The range
of reasonableness of the settlement fund in the light of the
best possible recovery and, (9) the range of reasonableness
of the settlement fund to a possible recovery in the light
of all the attendant risks of litigation. But the limits
were also indicated by learned Judge:
Thus the trial court has a limited scope of
review for determining fairness. The very
purpose of settlement is to avoid trial of
sharply disputed issue and the costs of protracted litigation."
"The Court may limit its fairness proceeding
to whatever is necessary to aid it in reaching
a just and informed decision. Flirt v. FMC
Corp. 528 F.2d at 1173. An evidentiary hearing
is not required."
The settlement must, of course, be an informed one. But
it will be an error to require its quantum to be co-extensive with the suit claim or what, if the plaintiffs fully
succeeded, they would be entitled to expect.
The Bhopal Gas Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act,
1985, has its own distinctive features. It is a legislation
to meet a one time situation. It provides for exclusivity of
the right of representation of all claimants by Union of
India and for divesting the individual claimants of any
right to pursue any remedy for any cause of action against
UCC and UCIL. The constitutionality of this scheme has been
upheld in the Sahus case. Sri Nariman contended that the
analogy of "Fairness-Hearing" euvisaged in certified class
action in the United States is inapposite in the context of
the present statutory right of the Union of India. Shri
Nariman referred to the following statement of the Court in
Saint case:
"...Our attention was drawn to the provisions
of Order 1 Rule 8(4) of the Code. Strictly
speaking Order 1, Rule 8 will not apply to a
suit or a proceeding under the Act. It is not
a case of one having common interest with
others.
Here the plaintiff the Central Government has replaced and divested tire victims."
[Emphasis added]
340
Consistent with the limitations of the scope of the
review, says Shri Nariman, the Court cannot go behind the
settlement so as to take it back to a stage of proposal and
order a "Fairness Hearing". He urged that a settlement was
after all a settlement and an approval of a settlement did
not depend on the legal certainty as to the claim or counter
claim being worthless or valuable. Learned counsel commended the following passage from the judgment in the Court of
Appeal for the Fifth Circuit stated in Florida Trailer and
Page 67 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
Equipment Co. v. Deal,284 F.2d 567 (1960):

"
...................... The probable outcome in the event of litigation, the relative
advantages and disadvantages are, of course,
relevant factors for evaluation. But the very
uncertainties of outcome in litigation, as
well as the avoidance of wasteful litigation
and expense, lay behind the Congressional
infusion of a power to compromise. This is a
recognition of the policy of the law generally
to encourage settlements. This could hardly be
achieved if the test on hearing for approval
meant establishing success or failure to a
certainty. Parties would be hesitant to explore the likelihood of settlement apprehensive as they would then be that the application for approval would necessarily result in
a judicial determination that there was no
escape from liability or no hope of recovery
and (thus) no basis for a compromise."
Sri Nariman also pointed out that In Agent Orange settlement only a small fraction of one percent of the class
Came forward at the fairness hearings; that there was no
medical evidence nor a mini-trial about the factual aspects
of the case and that in the end: "the silent majority remains inscrutable". It is pointed out that in United Kingdom
a different variant or substitute of fairness hearing obtains.
Order 15 Rule 13, Rules of Supreme Court makes
provision for orders made in representative actions binding
on persons, class or members of a class who cannot be ascertained or cannot be readily ascertained.
46.
In our opinion, the right of the victims read
into section 4 of the Act to express their views on a proposed settlement does not contribute to a position analogous
to that in United States in which fairness hearings are
imperative.
Section 4 of the Act to which the right is
traceable merely enjoins Government of India to have dueregard to the views expressed by victims. The power of the
Union of India under the Act to
341
enter into a compromise is not necessarily confined to a
situation where suit has come to be instituted by it on
behalf of the victims. Statute enables the Union of India to
enter into a compromise even without such a suit. Right of
being heard read into sec. 4--and subject to which its
constitutionality has been upheld in Sahus case--subjects
the Union of India to a corresponding obligation. But that
obligation does not envisage or compel a procedure like a
"Fairness-Hearing" as a condition precedent to a compromise
that Union of India may reach, as the situations in which it
may do so are not necessarily confined to a suit.
Accordingly, contention (G) is answered against petitioners.
We hold that the settlement is not vitiated by
reason alone of want of a "Fairness-Hearing" procedure
preceding it. Likewise, the settlement is not vitiated by
reason of the absence of a "re-opener" clause built into it.
But there is one aspect as to medical surveillance costs and
as to a provision for possible cases which are now a-symptomatic and which may become symptomatic after a drawn-out of
latency period. We will discuss that aspect under Point (J)
infra.
Re: Contention (H)
47. The question is if the settlement is reviewed and
set aside what should happen to the funds brought in by the
UCC pursuant to the order. This question was raised by the
Page 68 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
petitioners and argued before us by the parties inviting a

decision. We propose to decide it though the stage for
giving effect to it has not yet arrived.
The stand of the Union of India and other petitioners is
that even upon a setting aside of the settlement, the funds
should not be allowed to be repatriated to the United States
as that would embroil the victims in endless litigations to
realise the fruits of the decree that may be made in the
suit and to realise the order for interim-payment. The stand
of the Union of India as recorded in the proceedings dated
10.4.1990 is as follows:
"1.
It is submitted that the Union
of India consistent with its duty as parens
patriae to the victims cannot consent to the
taking away by Carbide of the moneys which are
in India outside the jurisdiction of Indian
Courts.
2. At this stage, the Union of India is
not claiming unilaterally to appropriate the
moneys, nor to disburse or distribute the
same. The moneys can continue to be deposited
in the Bank as
342
at present and earn interest subject to such
orders that may be passed in appropriate
proceedings by courts.
3. It is submitted that in view of the facts
and circumstances of the case, the previous
history of the litigation, the orders passed
by the district court Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh
High Court and this Honble Court, and the
undertakings given by UCIL and Carbide to
Courts in respect of their assets, this Honble Court may, in order to do complete justice
under Article 142 of the constitution, require
retention of the moneys for such period as it
may deem fit, in order to satisfy any decree
that may be passed in the suit including the
enforceable order of the M.P. High Court dated
4th April 1988."
48. It is urged by the learned Attorney General that
restitution being in the nature of a proceedings inexecution, the party claiming that benefit must be relegated to
the court of first instance to work out its remedies. It is
also urged that the UCC did not bring in the funds on the
faith of the courts order, but did so deliberately and on
its own initiative and choice and deposited the funds to
serve its own interest even after it was aware of the institution of the proceedings challenging the settlement in an
attempt to effectuate a fait-accompli. It is further said
that the order of the High Court directing payment of interim compensation of Rs. 250 crores is operative and since the
UCC has not sought or obtained any stay of operation of that
order, the sums to the extent of Rs. 250 crores should not,
at all events, be permitted to be repatriated.
Learned Attorney General also sought to point out that
the UCC had, subsequent to the settlement, effected certain
corporate and administrative changes and without a full
disclosure by the UCC of these changes and their effect on
the interests of the claimants, the funds should not be
permitted to be taken out of the courts jurisdiction,
though, however, Government of India should not also be free
to appropriate or use the funds.
49. We are not impressed by any of these contentions. It
is not shown that the UCC brought-in the monies with any
Page 69 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
undue haste with a view to confronting Union of India with a

fait accompli. The records indicate a different complexion
of the matter. The payment appears to have been expedited at
instance by the Union of India itself.
50. Strictly speaking no restitution in the sense that
any funds obtained and appropriated by the Union of India
requiring to be paid back
343
arises.
The funds brought in by the UCC are deposited in
the Reserve Bank of India and remain under this Courts
control and jurisdiction. Restitution is an equitable principle and is subject to the discretion of the Court. Section
144, Code of Civil Procedure, embodying the doctrine of
restitution does not confer any new substantive right to the
party not already obtaining under the general law. The
section merely regulates the power of the court in that
behalf,
51. But, in the present case, Section 144 CPC does not
in terms apply. There is always an inherent jurisdiction to
order restitution a fortiorari where a party has acted on
the faith of an order of the court. A litigant should not go
back with the impression that the judicial-process so operated as to weaken his position and whatever it did on the
faith of the courts order operated to its disadvantage. It
is the duty of the court to ensure that no litigant goes
back with a feeling that he was prejudiced by an act which
he did on the faith of the courts order. Both on principle
and authority it becomes the duty of the court to -- as much
moral as it is legal -- to order refund and restitution of
the amount to the UCC-- if the settlement is set aside.
In Binayak v. Ramesh, [1966] 3 SCR 24 this Court dealing
with scope of Section 144 CPC observed:
".
......... The principle of the doctrine
of restitution is that on the reversal of a
decree, the law imposes an obligation on the
party to the suit who received)the benefit of
the erroneous decree to make restitution to
the other party for what he has lost. This
obligation arises automatically on the reversal or modification of the decree and necessarily carries with it the right to restitution of all that has been done under the
erroneous decree; and the court in making
restitution is bound to restore the parties,
so far as they can be restored, to the same
position they were in at the time when the
Court by its erroneous action had displaced
them from ...........
[p.27]
In Jai Berham and others v. Kedar Nath Marwari and
Others [1922] P.C. 269 at 271 the Judicial Committee noticed
that:
"The auction-purchasers have parted with their
purchasemoney which they paid into Court on
the faith of the order of
344
confirmation and certificate of sale already
referred to ....... ".
and said:
"
............ and it would be inequitable
and contrary to justice that the judgmentdebtor should be restored to this property
without making good to the auction-purchaser
the moneys which have been applied for his
benefit."
Page 70 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
In L.
said:
Guran Ditta v. T.R. Ditta, [1935] PC 12
Lord
Atkin
"
...........
The duty of the Court when
awarding restitution under sec. 144 of the
Code is imperative. It shall place the applicant in the position in which he would have
been if the order had not made: and for this
purpose the Court is armed with powers [the
may is empowering, not discretionary] as to
mesne profits, interest and so forth. As long
ago as 1871 the Judicial Committee in 3 P.C.
465 (1) made it clear that interest was part
of the normal relief given in restitution: and
this decision seems right to have grounded the
practice in India in such cases ........ "
[P. 13]
In Jagendra Nath Singh v. Hira Sahu and
others. AIR 1948 All. 252 F.B. Motham J.
observed:
"Every Court has a paramount duty to ensure
that it does no injury to any litigant and the
provisions of Sec. 144 lay down a procedure
where effect can be given to that general
provision of the law. The Court should be slow
so to construe this section as to impose a
restriction upon its obligation to act right
and fairly according to the circumstances
towards all parties involved."
[p.253]
52. We are satisfied in this case that the UCC transported the funds to India and deposited the foreign currency
in the Reserve Bank of India on the faith of the Courts
order. If the settlement is set aside they shall be entitled
to have their funds remitted to them back in the United
States together with such interest as has accrued thereon.
So far as the point raised by the learned Attorney-General
as to the corporate changes of the UCC is concerned, we
think, a direction to the UCC to prove and establish compliance with the District Courts order dated 30the November,
1986,
345
should be sufficient safeguard and should meet the ends of
justice.
53
Accordingly, in the event of the settlement being
set aside the UCC shall be entitled to have 420 million US
Dollars brought in by it remitted to it by the Union of
India at the United States along with such interest as has
accrued on it in the account.
But this right to have the restitution shall be strictly
subject to the condition that the UCC shall restore its
undertaking
dated
27.11.1986 which was
recorded
on
30.11.1986 by District Court at Bhopal and on the strength
of which the court vacated the order of injunction earlier
granted against the UCC. Pursuant to the order recording the
Settlement, the said order dated 30.11.1986 of the District
Court was set-aside by this Court. If the settlement goes,
the order dated 30.11.1986 of the District Court will automatically stand restored and the UCC would be required to
comply with that order to keep and maintain unencumbered
assets of the value of US 3 billion dollars during the
pendency of the suit. The right of the UCC to obtain the
refund of and repatriate the funds shall be subject to the
performance and effectuation of its obligations under the
said order of 30.11.1986 of the District Court at Bhopal.
Till then the funds shall remain within the jurisdiction of
Page 71 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
this Court and shall not be amenable to any other legal

process. The Contention (H) is disposed of accordingly.
Re: Contention (1)
54. The contention is that notices to and opportunities
for hearing of the victims, whom the Union of India claims
to represent, were imperative before the proposed settlement
was recorded and this, admittedly, not having been done the
orders dated 14th and 15th February, 1989 are nullities as
these were made in violation of the rules of natural justice. Shri Shanti Bhushan urged that the invalidity of the
settlement is squarely covered and concluded, as a logical
corollary, by the pronouncement of the Constitution Bench in
Sahu case. He referred to and relied upon the following
observations of Chief Justice Sabyasachi Mukharji in Sahus
case:
"It has been canvassed on behalf of the victims that the Code of Civil Procedure is an
instant example of what is a just, fair and
reasonable procedure, at least the principles
embodied therein and the Act would be unreasonable if there is exclusion of the victims
to vindicate properly their views and rights.
This exclusion may amount to denial of justice. In any case, it has been suggested and
in our opinion there is a good deal of force
in this contention, that if a part of the
claim, for good reasons or bad, is
346
sought to be compromised or adjusted without
at least considering the views of the victims
that would be unreasonable deprivation of the
rights of the victims .......... "
" ............. Right to a hearing or representation before entering into a compromise
seems to be embodied in the due process of law
understood in the sense the term has been used
in the constitutional jargon of this country
though
perhaps
not
originally
intended .............. "
"In view of the principles settled by this
court and accepted all over the world, we are
of the opinion that in a case of this magnitude and nature, when the victims have been
given some say by section 4 of Hie Act in
order to make that opportunity, contemplated
by sec. 4 of the Act meaningful and effective,
it should be so read that the victims have to
be given an opportunity of the making their
representation before the court comes to any,
conclusion in respect of any settlement."
"In our opinion, the constitutional requirements, the language of the section, the purpose of the Act and the principles of natural
justice lead us to this interpretation of
section 4 of the Act that in case of a proposed
or contemplated settlement,
notice
should be given to the victims who ace affected or whose rights are to be affected
to ascertain their views. Section 4 is significant. It enjoins the Central Government only
to have "due regard" to any matters which such
person may require to be urged. So the obligation is on the Central Govt. in the situation
contemplated by Sec. 4 to have due regard to
the views of the victims and that obligation
Page 72 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
cannot be discharged by the Central Government

unless the victims are told that a settlement
is proposed, intended or contemplated. It is
not necessary that such views would require
consent of all the victims. The Central Govt.
as the Representative of the victims must have
the views of the victims and place such views
before the court in such manner it considers
necessary before a settlement is entered into.
If the victims want to advert to certain
aspects of the matter during the proceedings
under the Act and settlement indeed is an
important stage in the proceedings, opportunities must be given to the victims. Individual
notices may not be necessary. The court can,
and in our opinion should, in such situation
formulate modalities of giving notice and
public
347
notice can also be given inviting views of the
victims by the help of mass media."
" ........... The Act would be bad if it
is not construed in the light that notice
before any settlement under sec.4 of the Act
was required to be giver .......... "
[Emphasis Supplied]
Shri Shanti Bhushan urged that with these findings and
conclusions the only logical resultant is that the settlement must be declared a nullity as one reached in violation
of the rules of natural justice. For Shri Shanti Bhushan,
the matter is as simple as that.
But after making the observation excerpted above, the
Constitution Bench, having regard to the nature of this
litigation, proceeded to spell out its views and conclusions
on the effect of non-compliance of natural justice and
whether there were other remedial and curative exercise.
Chief Justice Mukharji noticed the problem arising out of
non-compliance thus:
"
.........
It further appears that that
type of notice which is required to be given
had not been given. The question therefore, is
what is to be done and what is the consequence
? The Act would be bad if it is not construed
in the light that notice before any settlement
under sec. 4 of the Act was required to be
given. Then arises the question of consequences of not giving the notice ........ "
[Emphasis supplied]
Learned Chief Justice proceeded to say:
"
........... In this adjudication, we are
not strictly concerned with the validity or
otherwise of the settlement, as we have indicated hereinbefore. But constitutional adjudication cannot be divorced from the reality
of a situation, or the impact of an adjudication. Constitutional deductions are never made
in the vacuum. These deal with lifes problems
in the reality of a given situation. And no
constitutional adjudication is also possible
unless one is aware of the consequences of
such an adjudication. One hesitates in matters
of this type where large consequences follow
one way or the other to put as under what
others have put together. It is well to remember, as old Justice Holmes, that time has
Page 73 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
upset many fighting faiths and one must always

wager ones salvation upon some prophecy based
upon
348
imperfect knowledge. Our knowledge changes;
our perception of truth also changes ........
"
............
No man or no mans right
should be affected without an opportunity to
ventilate his views. We are also conscious
that justice is a psychological yearning, in
which men seek acceptance of their view point
by having an opportunity of vindication of
their view point before the forum or the
authority enjoined or obliged to take a decision affecting their right. Yet, in the particular situations, one has to bear in mind
how an infraction of that should be sought to
be removed in accordance with justice. In the
facts and the circumstances of this case where
sufficient
opportunity is available
when
review application is heard on notice, as
directed by Court, no further opportunity is
necessary and it cannot be said that injustice
has been done. do a great right" after all, it
is permissible sometimes "to do a little
wrong". In the facts and circumstances of the
case,
this
is
one
of
those
rate
occasions ..........
[Emphasis supplied]
Chief Justice Mukharji also observed;
But having regard to the urgency of the
situation and having regard to the need for
the victims for relief and help and having
regard to the fact that so much effort has
gone in finding a basis for the settlement,
we, at one point of time, thought
that a
post-decisional hearing in the facts
and
circumstances of this case might be considered
to be sufficient compliance with the requirements of principles of natural justice as
embodied under Sec. 4 of the Act. ........ "
[p. 63]
In the facts and the circumstances of this,
therefore, we are of the opinion, to direct
that notice should be given now, would not
result in doing justice hi the situation. In
the premises, no further consequential order
is necessary by this Court. ........ "
[P. 65]
While Shri Nariman understandably strongly relies on
these observations as the law of the case, Shri Shanti
Bhushan seeks to deny them any binding force on the ground
that they were mere passing observations
349
inasmuch as the question of validity of the settlement was
not before the court in Sahu case Shri Shanti Bhushan relied
upon several pronouncements of this Court :viz. National
Textile Workers Union v. P.R. Ramakrishnan, [1983] 1 SCC 228
Institute of Chartered Accountants v. L.K. Ratna, [1986] 4
SCC 537, K.I. Shephard v. Union of India, [1987] 4 SCC 431,
R.B. Shreeram Durga Prasad v. Settlement Commission, [1989]
1 SCC 628 and H.L. Trehan v. Union of lndia [1989] 1 SCC 764
to emphasise the imperatives of observance of natural justice and the inevitability of the consequences the flow from
a non-compliance of the requirements of a pre-decisional
Page 74 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
hearing.
These are all accepted principles. Their wisdom, verity
and universality in the discipline of law are well established. Omission to comply with the requirements of the rule
of Audi Alteram Pattern, as a general rule, vitiates a
decision. Where there is violation of natural justice no
resultant or independent prejudice need be shown, as the
denial of natural justice is, in itself, sufficient prejudice and it is no answer to say that even with observance of
natural justice the same conclusion would have been reached.
The citizen "is entitled to be under the Rule of law and not
the Rule of Discretion" and "to remit the maintenance of
constitutional right to judicial discretion is to shift the
foundation of freedom from the rock to the sand".
But the effects and consequences of non-compliance may
alter with situational variations and
particularities,
illustrating a "flexible use of discretionary remedies to
meet novel legal situations". "One motive" says Prof. Wade
"for holding administrative acts to be voidable where according to principle they are void may be a desire to extend
the discretionary powers of the Court". As observed by Lord
Reid in Wiseman v. Borneman [1971 AC 297] natural justice
should not degenerate into a set of hard and fast rules.
There should be a circumstantial flexibility.
In Sahu case this Court held that there was no compliance with the principles of natural justice but also held
that the result of the non-compliance should not be a mechanical invalidation. The Court suggested curatives. The
Court was not only sitting in judicial review of legislation; but was a court of construction also, for, it is upon
proper construction of the provisions, questions of constitutionality come to be decided. The Court was considering
the scope and content of the obligations to afford a hearing
implicit in Section 4 of the Act. It cannot be said to have
gone beyond the pale of the enquiry when it considered the
further question as to the different ways in which that
obligation could be complied with or satisfied. This is, in
substance, what the Court has done and that is the law of
the case. It cannot be said that these observations were
made by the way and had no binding force.
350
Sri Garg submitted that when the Union of India did not,
even primafacie, probabilise that the quantification reflected in the settlement was arrived on the basis of rational criteria relevant to the matter, the determination
fails as the statutory authority had acted ultra-vires its
powers and trusts under the statutory scheme. Sri Garg said
that it would be a perversion of the process to call upon
the victims to demonstrate how the settlement is inadequate.
There was, according to Sri Garg, no material to shift the
risk of non-persuasion. Sri Garg urged that unless the
elements of reasonableness and adequacy- even to the extent
a settlement goes -are not established and the quantification shown to be justified on some tenable basis the settlement. would incur the criticism of being the result of an
arbitrary action of Government.
Shri Shanti Bhushan, however, strongly commended the
following observations of Megarry J in Leary v. National
Union of Vehicle Builders [1971] Ch.34 which were referred
to with approval by the court in Institute of Chartered
Accountants v. L.K. Ratna [1986] 4 SCC 537 as to the effect
of non-observance of natural justice:
"If one accepts the contention that a defect
of natural justice in the trial body can be
cured by the presence of natural justice in
Page 75 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
the appellate body, this has the result of

depriving the member of his right of appeal
from the expelling body. If the rules and the
law combine to give the member the right to a
fair trial and the right of appeal, why should
he be told that he ought to be satisfied with
an unjust trial and a fair appeal? Even if the
appeal is treated as a hearing de novo, the
member is being stripped of his right to
appeal to another body from the effective
decision to expel him. I cannot think that
natural justice is satisfied by a process
whereby an unfair trial, though not resulting
in a valid expulsion, will never-the-less have
the effect of depriving the member of his
right of appeal when a valid decision to expel
him is subsequently made. Such a deprivation
would be a powerful result to be achieved by
what in law is a mere nullity; and it is no
mere triviality that might be justified on the
ground that natural justice does not mean
perfect justice. As a general rule, at all
events, I hold that a failure of natural
justice in the trial body cannot be cured by a
sufficiency of natural justice in an appellate
body."
Prof. Wade in his treatise on Administrative Law observes:
"If natural justice is violated at the first
stage, the right of appeal is not so much a
true right of appeal as a corrected initial
351
hearing: instead of fair trial followed by
appeal, the procedure is reduced to unfair
trial followed by fair trial."
We might recall here that the Privy Council in Calvin v.
Carr [1980] AC 576 had expressed its reservations about
Megarry Js General Rule in Learvs case. However, the
reservations were in the area of domestic jurisdiction,
where contractual or Conventional Rules operate. The case
did not involve a public law situation. But the House of
Lords in Llyod v. Memahan [1987] AC 625 applied the principle to a clearly public law situation. The principle in
Learys might, perhaps, be too broad a generalisation.
But the question here is not so much as to the consequences of the omission on the part of the Union of India to
have "due regard" to the views of the victims on the settlement or the omission on the part of the Court to afford an
opportunity to the victims of being heard before recording a
settlement as it is one of the effects and implications of
the pronouncement in Sahu case which is the law of the case.
In Sahu case the Court , expressly held that the non-compliance with the obligation to issue notices did not, by such
reason alone, in the circumstances of the case, vitiate the
settlement, and that the affected persons may avail themselves of an opportunity of being heard in the course of the
review petitions. It is not proper to isolate and render
apart the two implications and hold the suggested curative
as a mere obiter.
55. While reaching this conclusion, we are not unmindful of the force of the petitioners case. The Sahus case
laid down that Section 4 of the Act contemplated and conferred a right on the victims of being heard. It also held
that they were not so heard before the Government agreed to
the terms of the settlement. According to the Sahus case,
the victims should have an opportunity of being heard in the
Page 76 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
Review Proceedings. The petitioners who were litigating the

matter did not represent all the victims and victim-groups.
56.
In the ultimate analysis, the crucial question is
whether the opportunity to the affected persons predicated
in the Sahu case can reasonably be said to have been afforded. Indeed, at the very commencement of the hearing of the
review petitions, Smt. Indira Jaising made a pertinent
submission that the court should determine and clarify the
nature and scope of the review hearing: whether they partake
of the nature of a "Fairness Hearing" or of the nature of a
"post-decisional hearing" or whether the court would device
some way in which the victims at large
352
would have an effective sense of participation as envisaged
in the Sahu decision. Smt. Indira Jaising submitted that
opportunity of being heard in the review suggested and
indicated by the Sahu decision cannot be understood to
confer the opportunity only to those who were eo-nomine
parties to the review petitions.
57. In the present hearings Shri Nariman placed before
us a number of press-clippings to show that, from time to
time, largely circulated newspapers in the country carried
detailed news reports of the settlement and of the subsequent legal proceedings questioning them. Shri Narimans
contention is that in view of this wide publicity the majority of the affected persons must be presumed to have had
notice, though not in a formal way and to have accepted the
settlement as they had not bestirred themselves to move the
Court.
58. Shri Nariman also raised what he urged were basic
objection as to the scope of the review jurisdiction and to
the enlargement of the scope of the review hearings to
anything resembling a "Fairness Hearing" by treating the
concluded settlement as a mere proposal to settle. Shri
Nariman said that the Court could either review the orders
dated 14th and 15th February, 1989 if legal grounds for such
review under law were strictly made out or dismiss the
review petitions if petitioners fail to make out a case in
accordance with the accepted principles regulating the
review jurisdiction; but the court could not adopt an intermediate course by treating the settlement as a proposed
or provisional settlement and seek now to do what the Union
of India was expected to do before the settlement was
reached.
59.
The whole issue, shorn of legal subtleties, is a
moral and humanitarian one. What was transacted with the
courts assistance between the Union of India on one side
and the UCC on the other is now sought to be made binding on
the tens of thousands of innocent victims who, as the law
has now declared, had a right to be heard before the settlement could be reached or approved. The implications of the
settlement and its effect on the lakhs of citizens of this
country are, indeed, crucial in their grim struggle to
reshape and give meaning to their torn lives. Any paternalistic condescension that what has been done is after all for
their own good is out of place. Either they should have been
heard before a settlement was approved in accordance with
the law declared by this Court or it, at least, must become
demonstrable in a process in which they have a reasonable
sense of participation that the settlement has been their
evident advantage or, at least, the adverse consequences are
effec353
tively neutralised. The ultimate directions on Point J that
we propose to issue will, we think, serve to achieve the
Page 77 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
last mentioned expectation. Legal and procedural technicalities should yield to the paramount considerations of justice
and humanity. It is of utmost importance that in an endeavour of such great magnitude where the court is trusted with
the moral responsibility of ensuring justice to these tens
of thousand innocent victims, the issues of human suffering
do not become obscure in procedural thickets. We find it
difficult to accept Shri Narimans stand on the scope of the
review. We think that in a situation of this nature and
magnitude, the Review-proceeding should not be strict,
orthodox and conventional but one whose scope would accommodate the great needs of justice. That apart, quite obviously, the individual petitioners and the petitioner-organisations which have sought review cannot, be held to represent
and exhaust the interest of all the victims.
Those represented by the petitioner-organisations--even
if their claims of membership are accepted on face value-constitute only a small percentage of the total number of
persons medically evaluated. The rest of the victims constitute the great silent majority.
When an order affects a person not a party to the proceedings, the remedy of an affected person and the powers of
the Court to grant it are well-settled. For instance, in
Shivdeo Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors. AIR 1963 SC
1909 on a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution by A for cancellation of the order of allotment
passed by the Director of Rehabilitation in favour of B, the
High Court made an order cancelling the allotment though B
was not a party. Later, B filed a writ petition under Article 226 for impleading him as a party and for re-hearing the
whole matter. The High Court granted it. Before this Court,
the objection was this:
Learned counsel contends that Art. 226 of the
Constitution does not confer any power on the
High Court to review its own order and, therefore, the second order of Khosla, J, was
without jurisdiction."
This Court rejected the contention observing that:
"It is sufficient to say that there is nothing
in Art. 226 of the Constitution to preclude a
High Court from exercising the power of review
which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or
to correct grave and
354
palpable errors committed by it. Here the
previous order of Khosla, J., affected the
interests of persons who are not made parties
to the proceedings before him. It was at their
instance and for giving them a hearing that
Khosla, J., entertained the second petition.
In doing so, he merely did what the principles
of natural justice required him to do. It is
said that the respondents before us had no
right to apply for review because they were
not parties to the previous proceedings. As we
have already pointed out, it is precisely
because they were not made parties to the
previous proceedings, though their interests
were sought to be affected by the decision of
the High Court, that the second application
was entertained by Khosla, J."
60. The nature of the present review proceedings is
indeed suigeneris. Its scope is pre-set by the terms of the
order dated 4th May 1989 as well as what are further neces-
Page 78 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
sarily implicit in Sahu decision. In the course of the order

dated 4th May 1989, it was observed.
"
........ If, owing to the pre-settlement
procedures being limited to the main contestants in the appeal, the benefit of some contrary or supplemental information or material,
having a crucial bearing on the fundamental
assumptions basic to the settlement, have been
denied to the Court and that as a result,
serious miscarriage of justice, violating the
constitutional and legal rights of the persons
affected, has been occasioned, it will be the
endeavour of this Court to undo any such
injustice. But that, we reiterate, must be by
procedures recognised by law. Those who trust
this Court will not have cause for despair."
The scope of the review in the present case is to ensure
that no miscarriage of justice occurs in a matter of such
great moment. This is, perhaps, the last opportunity to
verify our doubts and to undo injustice, if any, which may
have occurred. The fate and fortunes of tens of thousands of
persons depend on the effectiveness and fairness of these
proceedings. The legal and procedural technicalities should
yield to the paramount considerations of justice and fairness. The considerations go beyond legalism and are largely
humanitariam. It is of utmost importance that great issues
of human suffering are not subordinated to legal technicalities.
But in view of our conclusion on point J that on the
material on record, the settlement-fund should be sufficient
to meet the needs of a just compensation and the order we
propose to pass with regard to point J, the grievance of the
petitioners on the present contention would not, in our
opinion really survive. Contention (1) is answered accordingly.
355
Re: Point (J)
61. Before we go into the question whether the settlement should be set aside on grounds of inadequacy of the
settlement fund, certain subsidiary contentions and arguments may be noticed. They deal with (i) that there has been
an exclusion of a large number of claims on the ground that
despite service of notices they did not respond and appear
for medical documentation and (ii) that the whole exercise
of medical documentation is faulty and is designed and tends
to exclude genuine victims. These contentions are really not
directly germane to the question of the validity of the
settlement. However, they were put forward to discredit the
statistics emerging from the medical documentation done by
the Directorate of Claims on which the UCC sought to rely.
We may as well deal with these two contentions.
62. The first contention is that the claims of a large
number of persons who had filed their claims are not registered on the ground that they did not respond to the notices
calling upon them to undergo the requisite medical tests for
medical documentation. It was urged that no effective service of notice had taken place and that the claims of a large
number of claimants---according to them almost over 30% of
the total number---- have virtually gone for default. While
the victim-groups allege that there was a systematic attempt
to suppress the claims, the Directorate of Claims would say
that the lack of response indicated that the claims were
speculative and spurious and, therefore, the claimants did
not offer themselves to medical examination.
In order to appreciate this grievance of the victim-
Page 79 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
groups it is, perhaps, necessary to advert to the provisions

of the Act and the Scheme attracted to this stage of processing of the claims. Section 9 of the Act enjoins upon the
Central Government to frame a Scheme providing for any or
all of the matters enumerated in clauses (a) to (i) of Subsection (2) of Sec. 9. The Scheme, known as the "Bhopal Gas
Leak Disaster (Registration and Processing of
Claims)
Scheme, 1985," was promulgated by notification dated 24th
September, 1985, published in the Gazette of India. Para 4
of the Scheme deals with the manner of filing of claims and
specifies the forms in which they should be filed. Para 5(1)
requires the Deputy Commissioner of Claims to place the
claims in the appropriate category amongst those enumerated
in sub-para (2) of para 5. Sub-para (2) requires the registration of the claim under various heads such , as "death";
"total disablement resulting in permanent disability to earn
livelihood"; permanent partial disablement effecting the
overall capacity of a person to earn his livelihood";
"temporary partial disablement resulting in reduced
356
capacity to earn livelihood" and so on. Sub-paras (3), (4)
and (5) of para 5 of the Scheme provide:
"(3) On the consideration of a claim made
under paragraph 4 of the Scheme, if the Deputy
Commissioner is of the opinion that the claim
falls in a category different from the category mentioned by the claimant, he may decide
the appropriate category after giving
an
opportunity to the claimant to be heard and
also after taking into consideration any facts
made available to him in this behalf by the
Government or the authorities authorised by
the Government in this behalf.
(4) Where the Deputy Commissioner is of the
opinion that a claim made under paragraph 4
does not fall in any of the categories specified in sub-paragraph (2) he may refuse to
register the claim:
Provided that before so refusing he shall give
a reasonable opportunity for a personal hearing to the claimant.
(5) If the claimant is not satisfied with the
order of the Deputy Commissioner under subparagraph (3) or sub-paragraph (4) he may
prefer an appeal against such order to the
Commissioner, who shall decide the same."
The stage at which medical examination was required
related presumably to the exercise under sub-paragraph (3)
of Para 5 of the Scheme. Failure of a claimant to respond to
the notice and offer himself for medical examination would
entail a refusal to register the claim. It is manifest that
such a refusal is apealable under the scheme.
But this
grievance does not survive in view of the stand taken by the
Government in these proceedings. In the affidavit of Sri
Ramesh Yashwant Durve, dated 5th December, 1989 in W.P. No.
843/88, it is stated:"That all claimants who did not respond to the
first notice were given a second and then a
third notice to appear at one of the medical
documentation centers for their medical examination. Wide publicity was also done by way of
beating of drums in mohallas, radio announcements and newspaper advertisements. In addition to all these, ward committee members were
also involved in motivating the claimants to
Page 80 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
get themselves medically examined. All those

claimants who approach the Director of Claims
even now are given a fresh date on which to
appear for medical examination and are informed accordingly.
357
Although the medical documentation exercise is
completed, even then if a claimant fails to
appear for medical examination after service
of all three notices and he makes an application for medical examination, his medical
examination is arranged at one of the two
medical documentation centers---TB Center and
JP Hospital-specially kept functioning for
such claimants. It is relevant to point out
that this arrangement has been approved by
Supreme Court vide order dated 29 September,
1989 .......... "
"For the reasons given above, a fresh public
notice and fixing of dates for medical documentation is also not needed. It may be pointed out here that these people will still have
an opportunity to file claims when the Commissioner for Welfare of the gas victims issues a
notification in terms of para 4(i) of Bhopal
Gas Leak Disaster (Registration & Processing
of Claims) Scheme, 1985 inviting claims."
This assurance coupled with the right of appeal should
sufficiently safeguard the interests of genuine claimants.
63. It was urged by the petitioners that the very concept of injury as an element in the eligibility for medical
documentation was erroneous as it tended to exclude victims
who did not have or retain some medical documentation of
their initial treatment immediately after the exposure. The
stand of the Director of Claims on the point is this: -"That it is unlikely that a person who was
injured and suffered during the post-exposure
period is not in possession of any form of
medical record.
The line of treatment was
widely publicised. Therefore, the patient must
have received treatment from one of the private practitioners, if not from one of the
many temporary and permanent govt./semi-govt.
institutions or institutions run by voluntary
organisations, and he must be in possession of
some form of record.
Every claimant is advised to bring relevant
medical record at the time of medical examination. Documents of post-exponsure
medical
record are accepted even after the medical
documentation of the claimant is over.
It is incorrect to say that the documents for
post-exposure
358
period are just not available. Had it been
so, 55% of the claimants who fail in category
B to CF would also have been categorised
as A. In this connection it may be clarified
that even in post-exposure period prescriptions were issued. Besides this,
private
practitioners were also issuing prescriptions
in printed form. It is therefore incorrect to
say that there is dearth of documentation.
However, bearing this point in mind, a very
liberal approach in admitting documents was
Page 81 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
adopted as will be clear from the guidelines

for evaluation. It will also be relevant here
to state that the claimants are being helped
to get the benefit of any medical records
available in any hospital or
dispensary.
Institutions like ICMR, COM (Gas Relief),
Jawahar Lal Nehru Hospital, Bhopal Eye Hospital, Indian Red Cross Society, BHEL Hospital
and the Railway Hospital have treated numerous
gas victims during the post-exposure period.
The relevant medical records from them have
been retrieved and are being linked with the
respective claim folders so that the benefit
of such post-exposure record is extended to
these claimants.
It will be irrational and unscientific to
admit all claims without reference to any
documentary evidence as suggested by
the
petitioner ........
(See the affidavit dated 5th December, 1989 of
Sri Ramesh Yeshwant Durve filed in W.P. No.
843/88.)
63. As to the charge that after the purported settlement, Government is playing down the seriousness of the
effects of the disaster, and that the medical documentation
did not help proper evaluation it is, perhaps, necessary to
read the affidavit dated 5th December, 1989 of the Additional Director of Claims, in W.P. No. 843 of 1988. The Additional Director says:
The Medical Documentation Exercise has been
an unique effort. It was possibly for the
first time that such a comprehensive medical
examination (with documentation evaluation and
categorisation) of such a large population was
undertaken anywhere in the world. There was no
earlier experience or expertise to fail back
upon. The whole exercise had, therefore, to be
conceived,
conceptualised and
concretised
locally. But care was taken to ensure that the
guidelines were approved by legal and medical
experts not only at the State level but also
at
359
the National level. The guidelines were
also approved by
GOIs Committee of
Experts
on
Medical
Documentation.
In
other words, a systematic arrangement was
organised to make
the most objective
assessment of the medical health status of
the claimants in a scientific manner.
It has to be recognised in this context that
the guidelines for categorisation can only be
a broad indicator as it is not possible for
anyone to envisage all types of situations and
prescribe for them. Likewise, the examples
cited are only illustrative examples and not
exhaustive instructions.
Hundreds of graduate and post-graduate doctors
assisted by qualified para-medical staff have
examined the claimants with the help of sophisticated equipments. It cannot be reasonably contended that all of them have colluded
with the Government to distort the whole
exercise.
The exercise of categorisation is not just an
Page 82 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
arithmetical exercise directly flowing from

the evaluation sheet. Had it been so. the same
Assistant Surgeon, who does the evaluation can
him self do the categorisation also. Post
graduate specialists have been engaged for
this work because the total medical folder has
to be assessed keeping the evaluation sheet as
a basic indicator. In doing the categorisation, the postgraduate specialist takes into
account symptoms reported, clinical findings,
specialists opinions and investigation reports."
The Additional Director accordingly assests:
"...it will be meaningless to suggest that the
Govt. is jeopardising the interests of the
claimants
by deliberately distorting
the
Medical Documentation Exercise. Similarly, it
will be absurd to suggest that the Govt. is
trying to help UCC in any way."
The Additional Director also refers to the attempts by
unscrupulous persons to exploit the situation in pursuit of
unjust gains and how the authorities had to encounter attempts of impersonation and "attempts by claimants to pass
of others urine as their own." It was said that there were
urine-donors. The affidavit also discloses certain real
practices involving medical prescriptions and certificates
by some members of the medical profession and ante-dated
urine-thiocynate estimations. The Additional Director says
that despite all this Government endeavoured to give the
360
benefit to the claimants wherever possible. It is stated:
The State Govt. had to preserve the scientific character and ensure the credibility of the
exercise of evaluation. Beating this limitation in mind, wherever possible, the government has attempted to give the benefit to the
claimants. The various guidelines relating to
documentation of the immediate postdisaster
phase are proof of this intention. At the same
time, government have had to adhere to certain
quality standards so that the exercise could
stand up to scrutiny in any Court of law or in
any scientific form."
The stand of the Directorate cannot be brushed aside as
arbitrary. However, provisions of appeal ensure that in
genuine cases there will be no miscarriage of justice.
64. Shall we set aside the settlement on the mere
possibility that medical documentation and categorisation
are faulty? And that the figures of the various kinds of
injuries and disablement indicated are undependable? As of
now, medical documentation discloses that "there is no
conclusive evidence to establish a casual link between
cancer-incidence and MIC exposure". It is true that this
inference is tentative as it would appear studies are continuing and conclusions of scientific value in this behalf
can only be drawn after the studies arc over. While the
medical literature relied upon by the petitioners suggests
possibilities of the exposure being carcinogenic, the ICMR
studies show that as of now the annual incidence of cancer
registration is more among the unexposed population as
compared to the exposed population." (See Sri Ramesh Yeshwant Durves affidavit dated 5th December, 1989, para 9).
Similarly, "there is no definite evidence that derangement
in immune system of the gas exposes have taken place". But
the literature relied upon by petitioners does indicate
Page 83 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
that such prognosis cannot be ruled out. These matters are

said to be under close study of the ICMR and other research
agencies using, as indicated, the "multi-test CMI technique
to screen the status of the immune system".
65.
But the whole controversy about the adequacy of
the settlement-fund arises on account of the possibility
that the totality of the awards made on all the claims may
exceed the settlement-fund in which event the settlementfund will be insufficient to satisfy all the Awards. This is
the main concern of the victims and victim-groups. There is,
as it now stands, a fund of one thousand two hundred crores
of rupees for the
361
benefit of the victims. The main attack on its adequacy
rests solely on the possibility that the medical documentation and categorisation based thereon, of the victims
medical status done by the Directorate of Claims is faulty.
The charge that medical documentation was faulty and was
calculated to play down the iII-effects of the exposure to
MIC is, in our opinion, not substantiated. This attack
itself implies that if the categorisation of the claimants
on the basis of the severity of the injuries is correct then
the settlement-fund may not, as a settlement, be unreasonable.
66.
At the same time, it is necessary to remind ourselves that in bestowing a second thought whether the settlement is just, fair and adequate. We should not proceed on
the premise that the liability of the UCC has been firmly
established. It is yet to be decided if the matter goes to
trial. Indeed, UCC has seriously contested the basis of its
alleged liability. But it is true that even to the extent a
settlement goes, the idea of its fairness and adequacy must
necessarily be related to the magnitude of the problem and
the question of its reasonableness must be assessed putting
many considerations into the scales. It may be hazardous to
belittle the advantages of the settlement in a matter of
such complexity. Every effort should be made to protect the
victims from the prospects of a protracted, exhausting and
uncertain litigation. While we do not intend to comment on
the merits of the claims and of the defences, factual and
legal arising in the suit, it is fair to recognise that the
suit involves complex questions as to the basis of UCCs
liability and assessment of the quantum of compensation in a
mass tort action. One of the areas of controversy is as to
the admissibility of scientific and statistical data in the
quantification of damages without resort to the evidence as
to injuries in individual cases.
67. Sri Nariman contended that scientific and statistical evidence for estimates of damages in toxic tort actions is permissible only in fairness hearings and such
evidence would not be so admissible in the proceedings of
adjudication, where personal injury must be proved by each
individual plaintiff. That would, indeed, be a struggle with
infinity as it would involve individual adjudication of tens
of thousands of claims for purposes of quantification of
damages.
In an article on Scientific and Legal Standards of
Statistical Evidence in Toxic Tort and Discrimination Suits
by Carl Cranor and Kurt Nutting (See: Law and Philosophy
Vol. 9 No. 2 May, 1990) there is an interesting discussion
as to what would be the appropriate standard of evidence in
presenting and evaluating scientific and statistical information for use in legal proceedings. The learned authors
say:
.
362
Page 84 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
"These are two of the main sides in the controversy concerning the kind and amount of
scientific
evidence necessary to
support
legally a verdict for the plaintiff. Black
seems to urge that courts should only accept
evidence that is scientifically valid, and
adhere to the standards of evidence implicit
in the discipline, while the Ferebee court
urges that plaintiffs in presenting scientific
evidence
and expert scientific
testimony
should be held to legal standards of evidence.
Powerful forces are arrayed on both sides of
this issue. On the side of requiring scientific testimony only to measure up to legal
standards of evidence, the social
forces
include plaintiffs or potential plaintiffs,
plaintiffs attorneys, public interest groups,
consumer advocacy groups, all individuals who
are concerned to make it somewhat easier to
recover damages under personal injury law for
alleged injuries suffered as a consequence of
activities of others. On the other side of the
same issue are defendants, potential defendants (typically corporations, manufacturing
firms) and, interestingly, the
scientific
community." [Page 118]
In Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp. (855 F 2d 1188
(1988)) the US Court of Appeals tended to the view that
generalised proof of damages is not sufficient to prove
individual damages and that damages in mass tort personal
injury cases must be proved individually by each individual
plaintiff. The Court held:
"We cannot emphasise this point
strongly
enough because generalised proof will not
suffice to prove individual damages. The main
problem on review stems from a failure to
differentiate between the general and the
particular. This is an understandably easy
trap to fall into in mass tort litigation.
Although many common issues of fact and law
will be capable of resolution on a group
basis, individual particularised damages still
must be proved on an individual basis."
68.
While Shri Nariman contends that admissibility of
scientific and statistical evidence is confined to Fairness
Hearings alone and not in adjudication where personal injury
by each individual plaintiff must be proved, the learned
Attorney-General, however, urges that such evidence and
estimates of damages are permissible in toxic-tort actions
and says that the fundamental principle is and should be
that countless injured persons must not suffer because of
the difficulty of proving damages with certainty or because
of the delay involved in pursuing each individual claim. He
363
referred to the following passage in Florance B. Bigelow v.
RKO Radio Pictures Inc., (327 US 251, 264 (1946):
"the most elementary conceptions of justice
and public policy require that the wrong doer
shall bear the risk of the uncertainty which
his own wrong has created."
Learned Attorney General also urged that in tort actions
of this kind the true rule is the one stated in Story Parchment Company v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co. (282 US 555,
568):
"The rule which precludes the recovery of
Page 85 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
uncertain damages applies to such as are not

the certain result of the wrong, not to those
damages which are definitely attributable to
the wrong and only uncertain in respect of
their amount. Taylor v. Bradley, 4 Abb. App.
DEc. 363,366, 367, 100 Am. Dec. 415:
It is sometimes said that speculative damages
cannot be recovered, because the amount is
uncertain; but such remarks will generally be
found applicable to such damages as it is
uncertain whether sustained at all from the
breach. Sometimes the claim is rejected as
being too remote. This is another mode of
saying that it is uncertain whether such
damages resulted necessarily and immediately
from the breach complained of.
The general rule is, that all damages resulting necessarily and immediately and directly
from the breach are recoverable, and not those
that are contingent and uncertain. The later
description embraces, as I think, such only as
are not the certain result of the breach, and
does not embrace such as are the certain
result, but uncertain in amount.
Where the tort itself is of such a nature as
to preclude the ascertainment of the amount of
damages with certainty, it would be a perversion of fundamental principles of justice to
deny all relief to the injured person, and
thereby relieve the wrongdoer from making any
amend for his acts. In such case, while the
damages may not be determined by mere speculation or guess, it will be enough if the evidence show the extent of the damages as a
matter of just and reasonable
inference,
although the result be only approximate. The
wrongdoer is not entitled to complain that
they cannot be measured with the
364
exactness and precision that would be possible
if the case, which he alone is responsible for
making,were otherwise.
And in Frederick Thomas Kingsley v. The Secretary of
State for India, (AIR 1923 Calcutta 49), it was observed:
"Shall the injured party be allowed to recover
no damages (or merely nominal) because he
cannot show the exact amount of the certainty,
though he is ready to show, to the satisfaction of the Jury, that he has suffered large
damages by the injury ? Certainty, it is true,
would be thus attained, but it would be the
certainty of injustice. Juries are allowed to
act upon probable and inferential, as well as
direct and positive proof. And when, from the
nature of the case, the amount of damages
cannot be estimated with certainty, or only a
part of them can be so estimated, we can see
no objection to placing before the Jury all
the facts and circumstances of the case,
having any tendency to show damages, or their
probable amount, so as to enable them to make
the most intelligible and probable estimate
which the nature of the case will permit."
The risk of the uncertainty, says learned AttorneyGeneral, should, in such cases, be thrown upon the wrongdoer
Page 86 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
instead of upon the injured party. Learned Attorney General

also urged that, on first principle, in cases where thousands have been injured, it is far simpler to prove the
amount of damages to the members of the class by establishing their total damages than by collecting and aggregating
individual claims as a sum to be assessed against the defendants. He said statistical methods are commonly accepted
and used as admissible evidence in a variety of contexts
including quantification of damages in such mass tort actions. He said that these principles are essential principles of justice and the Bhopal disaster is an ideal setting
for an innovative application of these salutary principles.
69.
The foregoing serves to highlight the complexities of the area. Indeed, in many tort actions the worldover speedy adjudications and expeditious reliefs are not
easily accomplished and many of them have ended in settlements. In the context of the problems presented by the
issues of liability in cases of certain corporate torts
beyond the corporate veil there is an impressive body of
academic opinion amongst the school men that the very theories of limited corporate liability which initially served
as incentives for commercial risk-taking needs re-thinking
in certain areas of tortious liability of Corporations. Some
scholars have advocated abolition of
365
imited liability
for "knowable tort risks". (See "An
Economic Analysis of Limited liability
117 1980" "The
Limited Liability in Corporation Law (30 U.Toronto LJ. , (
Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate
Conduct" (90Yale Law Journal 1 (1980); "Should Shareholders
be personally liable for the torts of their Corporations?"(76 Yale Law Journal 1190 (1967). This, of course, has the
limitation of one more shade of an academicians point of
view for radical changes in law.
70.
With the passage of time there are more tangible
details available by way of the proceedings of the Directorate of Claims which has medically evaluated and categorised
nearly 3,60,000 affected persons. We have looked into the
formats and folders prepared by the Directorate of Claims
for the medical evaluation of the conditions of the victims.
Some sample medical dossiers pertaining to some individual
claimants containing an evaluation of the data pertaining to
the medical status of the persons have also been shown to
us. It is on the basis of such medical dossiers that evaluation and categorisation are stated to have been done. The
guidelines for carrying out these medical evaluations, it is
stated, have been formulated and issued by the Government of
India.
71.
Petitioners seriously assail the correctness of the
guidelines for medical evaluation as also the result of the
actual operational processes of evaluation based thereon.
Petitioners described the results indicated by the medical
categorisation done by the Directorate of Claims which
showed only 40 cases of total permanent disablement as
shocking and wholly unrelated to the realities. Indeed, some
learned counsel for the petitioners, of course in a lighter
vein, remarked that if these were the final figures of
injuries and incapacitations caused by the Bhopal Gas Leak
Disaster, then UCC should be entitled to a refund out of the
sum settled and wondered why, in the circumstances, UCC was
taking shelter under the settlement and fighting shy of a
trial.
It appears to us that particulars care has gone into the
prescription of the medical documentation tests and the
formulation of the results for purposes of evaluation and
Page 87 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
categorisation.
72.
After a careful thought, it appears to us that while
it may not
be wise or proper to deprive the victims of the
benefit of the settlement, it
is, however, necessary to
ensure that in the-perhaps unlikely--event of
the settlement-fund being found inadequate to meet the compensation
determined in respect of all the present claimants, those
persons who may
have their claims determined after the
fund is exhausted are not left to fend
themselves. But,
such a contingency may not arise having regard to the size
366
of the settlement-fund. If it should arise, the reasonable
way to protect the interests of the victims is to hold that
the Union of India, as a welfare State and in the circumstances in which the settlement was made, should not be
found wanting in making good the deficiency, if any. We hold
and declare accordingly.
73.
It is relevant here that the Union of India while,
quite fairly, acknowledging that there was in fact such a
settlement, however, sought to assail its validity on certain legal issues. But the factum of the settlement was not
disputed. Indeed, Union of India did not initiate any substantive proceedings of its own to assail the agreement or
the consensual element constituting the substratum of the
order of the Court. The legal contentions as to the validity
of the settlement were permitted to be raised in as much as
that an order made on consent would be at no higher footing
and could be assailed on the grounds on which an agreement
could be. But, as stated earlier, the factum of the consensual nature of the transaction and its existence as a fact
was not disputed. Those legal contentions as to the validity
have now failed. The result is that the agreement subsists.
For all these reasons we leave the settlement and the
orders dated 14/15th February, 1989---except to the extent
set
aside
or
modified
pursuant
to
the
other
findings---undisturbed.
74.
We may here refer to and set at rest one other
contention which had loomed in the hearings. The petitioners
had urged that the principles of the liability and the
standards of assessment of damages in a toxic mass tort
arising out of a hazardous enterprise should be not only on
the basis of absolute liability-not merely on Rylands v.
Fletcher principle of strict liability--not admitting of any
exceptions but also that the size of the award be proportional to the economic superiority of the offender, containing a deterrent and punitive element. Sustenance was sought
from M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 1086. This
argument in relation to a proceeding assailing a settlement
is to be understood as imputing an infirmity to the settlement process as not being informed by the correct principle
of assessment of damages.
Respondents, however, raised
several contentions as to the soundness of the Mehta principle and its applicability. It was also urged that Mehta
principle, even to the extent it goes, does not solve the
issues of liability of the UCC as distinct from that of UCIL
as Mehta case only spoke of the liability of the offending
enterprise and did not deal with principles guiding the
determination of a holding-company for the torts of its
subsidiaries.
It is not necessary to go into this controversy. The settlement was
367
arrived at and is left undisturbed on an over-all view. The
settlement cannot be assailed as violative of Mehta principle which might have arisen for consideration in a strict
Page 88 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
adjudication. In the matter of determination of compensation

also under the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (P.C) Act, 1985, and
the Scheme flamed thereunder, there is no scope for applying
the Mehta principle inasmuch as the tort-feasor, in terms of
the settlement -for all practical purposes--stands notionally substituted by the settlementfund which now represents
and exhausts the liability of the alleged hazardous entrepreneurs viz., UCC and UCIL. We must also add that the Mehta
principle can have no application against Union of India
inasmuch as requiring it to make good the deficiency, if
any, we do not impute to it the position of a joint tortfeasor but only of a welfare State. There is, therefore, no
substance in the point that Mehta principle should guide the
quantification of compensation to the victim-claimants.
75. This necessarily takes us to the question of the
medical surveillance costs; and the operational expenses of
the Hospital. We are of the view that for at least a period
of eight years from now the population of Bhopal exposed to
the hazards of MIC toxicity should have provision for medical surveillance by periodic medical check-up for gas related afflictions. This shall have to be ensured by setting up
long-term medical facilities in the form of a permanent
specialised medical and research establishment with the best
of expertise. An appropriate action-plan should be drawn up.
It will be proper that expert medical facility in the form
of the establishment of a full-fledged hospital of at least
500 bed strength with the best of equipment for treatment of
MIC related affliction should be provided for medical surveillance and for expert medical treatment. The State of
Madhya Pradesh shall provide suitable land free of cost. The
allocation of the land shall be made within two months and
the hospital shall be constructed, equipped and made functional within 18 months. It shall be equipped as a Specialist Hospital for treatment and research of MIC related
afflictions and for medical surveillance of the exposed
population.
76.
We hold that the capital outlays on the hospital
and its operation expenses for providing free treatment and
services to the victims should, both on humanitarian considerations and in fulfilment of the offer made before the
Bhopal court, be borne by the UCC and UCIL. We are conscious
that it is not part of the function of this Court to reshape the settlement or restructure its terms. This aspect
of the further liability is also not a matter on which the
UCC and the UCIL had an opportunity to express their views.
However, from the tenor of the written submissions
368
made before the District Court at Bhopal in response to the
proposal of the Court for "reconciliatory substantial interim relief" to the gas victims, both the UCC and UCIL had
offered to fund and provide a hospital for the gas victims.
The UCC had re-called that in January, 1986, it had offered
"to fund the construction of hospital for the treatment of
gas victims the amount being contributed by the UCC and the
UCIL in equal proportions". Shri Nariman had also referred
to this offer during the submissions in the context of the
bona fides of the UCC in that behalf. It is, no doubt, true
that the offer was made in a different context and before an
overall settlement. But that should not detract the UCC and
the UCIL from fulfilling these obligations, as indeed, the
moral sensibilities to the immense need for relief in all
forms and ways should make both the UCC and UCIL forthcoming
in this behalf. Such a hospital should be a fully equipped
hospital with provision for maintenance for a period of
eight years which in our estimate might together involve the
Page 89 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
financial outlay of around Rs. 50 crores. We hope and trust

that UCC and UCIL will not be found wanting in this behalf.
77. Then comes the question which we posed at the end of
paragraph 44. This concerns the exposed members of the
populace of Bhopal who were put at risk and who though
presently a symptomatic and filed no claim for compensation
might become symptomatic in future. How should cases of yet
unborn children of mothers exposed to MIC toxicity where the
children are found to have or develop congenital defects be
taken care of?
The question is as to who would provide compensation for
such cases?
We are of the view that such contingencies shall be
taken care of by obtaining an appropriate medical group
insurance cover from the General Insurance Corporation of
India or the Life Insurance Corporation of India for compensation to this contingent class of possible prospective
victims. There shall be no individual upper monetary limit
for the insurance liability. The period of insurance cover
should be a period of eight years in the future. The number
of persons to be covered by this Group Insurance scheme
should be about and not less than one lakh of persons.
Having regard to the population of the seriously affected
wards of Bhopal city at the time of the disaster and having
regard to the addition to the population by the subsequent
births extrapolated on the basis of national average of
birth rates over the past years and the future period of
surveillance, this figure broadly accords with the percentage of population of the affected wards bears to the number
of persons found to be affected by medical categorisation.
This insurance cover will virtually serve to render the set369
tlement an open ended one so far as the contingent class of
future victims both existing and after-born are concerned.
The possible claimants fall into two categories: those who
were in existence at the time of exposure; and those who
were yet unborn and whose congenital defects are traceable
to MIC toxicity inherited or derived congenitally.
In so far as the second class of cases is concerned,
some aspects have been dealt with in the report of the Law
Commission in United Kingdom on "Injuries to Unborn Children". The Commission, referring to the thenexisting Law,
said:
"7. Claims for damages for pre-natal injuries
have been made in many other jurisdictions but
there is no English or Scottish authority as
to whether a claim would lie and, if it did,
what rules and limitations should govern it.
In our working paper we did not attempt to
forecast how such a claim would be decided if
it came before a court in this country, although we did add, as an appendix to the
paper, a brief account of some of the decisions of courts in other jurisdictions..."
"8. It is, however, important from our point
of view to express our opinion (reinforced by
our general consultation and supported by the
report of the Scottish Law Commission) that it
is highly probable that the common law would,
in appropriate circumstances, provide a remedy
for a plaintiff suffering from a pre-natal
injury caused by anothers fault. It is important to make our opinion on this point clear
because, on consultation, it has become apparent that many people think that we were, in
Page 90 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
our working paper, proposing the creation of

new liabilities, whereas it is probable that
liability
under the common
law
already
exists ..... ".
Thereafter in United Kingdom, the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act, 1976, was brought forth. Section
1 (1) of that Act says:
(1) If a child is born disabled as
the result of such an occurrence before its
birth as is mentioned in sub-section (2)
below, and a person (other than the childs
own mother) is under this section answerable
to the child in respect of the occurrence, the
childs disabilities are to be regarded as
damage resulting from the wrongful act of that
person and actionable accordingly at the suit
of the child."
It is not necessary for the present purpose to go into other
features of
370
that legislation and the state of corresponding law in
India. Our present question is as to how and who would
provide compensation to the two class of cases referred to
us earlier. We hold that these two classes of cases are
compensatable if the claimants are able to prove injury in
the course of the next eight years from now.
The premia for the insurance shall be paid by the Union
of India out of the settlement fund. The eligible claimants
shall be entitled to be paid by the insurer compensation on
such principles and upon establishment of the nature of the
gas related toxic morbidity by such medical standards as are
applicable to the other claimants under the Bhopal Gas Leak
Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985, and the scheme
framed thereunder. The individual claimants shall be entitled to have their claims adjudicated under the statutory
scheme.
78. We must, however, observe that there is need for expeditious adjudication and disposal of the claims. Even the
available funds would
admit of utilisation unless the
claims are adjudicated upon and the quantum of compensation
determined. We direct both the Union of India and the State
Government to take expeditious steps and set-up adequate
machinery for adjudication of claims and determination of
the compensation. The appointment of the Claim Commissioners
shall be completed expeditiously and the adjudicative process must commence within four months from today. In the
first instance, there shall at least be 40 Claim Commissioners with necessary secretarial assistance to start the
adjudication of the claims under the Scheme.
79. In the matter of disbursement of the amounts so
adjudicated and determined it will be proper for the authorities administering the funds to ensure that the compensation-amounts, wherever the beneficiaries are illiterate and
are susceptible to exploitation, are properly invested for
the benefit of the beneficiaries so that while they receive
the income therefrom they do not, owing to their illiteracy
and ignorance, deprive themselves of what may turn out to be
the sole source of their living and sustenance for the
future. We may usefully refer to the guide-lines laid down
in the case of Muljibhai Ajarambhai Harijan & Anr. v. United
India Insurance Co. Ltd.& Ors., 1982 (1) Gujarat Law Reporter 756. We approve and endorse the guidelines formulated by
the Gujarat High Court. Those guidelines, with appropriate
modifications, could usefully be adopted. We may briefly
recapitulate those guidelines:
Page 91 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
(i) The Claims Commissioner should, in the

case of minors, invariably order the amount of
compensation awarded to the
371
minor to be invested in long term fixed deposits at least till the date of the minor attaining majority. The expenses incurred by the
guardian or next friend may, however, be
allowed to be withdrawn;
(ii) In the case of illiterate claimants also
the Claims commissioner should follow the
procedure set out in (i) above, but if lump
sum payment is required for effecting purchases of any movable or immovable property
such
as, agricultural implements,
assets
utilisable to earn a living, the Commissioner
may consider such a request after making sure
that the amount is actually spent for the
purpose
and the demand is not
a
ruse
to .withdraw money;
(iii)
In the case of semi-literate persons
the Commissioner should ordinarily resort to
the procedure set out in (ii) above unless he
is satisfied that the whole or part of the
amount is required for expanding any existing
business or for purchasing some property for
earning a livelihood.
(iv) In the ease of widows the Claims Commissioner should invariably follow the procedure
set out in (i) above;
(v) In personal injury cases if further treatment is necessary withdrawal of such amount as
may be necessary for incurring the expenses
for such treatment may be permitted;
(vi)
In all cases in which investment in
long term fixed deposits is made it should be
on condition that the Bank will not permit any
loan or advance on the fixed deposit and
interest on the amount invested is paid monthly directly to the claimant or his guardian,
as the case may be.
It should be stipulated that the FDR shall
carry a note on the face of the document that
no loan or advance will be allowed on the
security of the said document without express
permission.
(vii)
In all eases liberty to apply for
withdrawal in case of an emergency should be
available to the claimants.
Government might also consider such investments being
handled by
promulgating an appropriate scheme under the
Unit Trust of India Act so
372
as to afford to the beneficiaries not only adequate returns
but also appropriate capital appreciation to neutralise the
effect of denudation by inflation.
80. Point (J) is disposed of in terms of the foregoing
directions.
81.
We might now sum up the conclusions reached, the
findings recorded and directions issued on the various
contentions:
(i) The contention that the Apex Court had no
jurisdiction to withdraw to itself the original suits pending in the District Court at
Bhopal and dispose of the same in terms of the
Page 92 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
settlement and the further contention that,

similarly, the Court had no jurisdiction to
withdraw the criminal proceedings are rejected.
It is held that under Article 142(1) of the
Constitution, the Court had the necessary
jurisdiction and power to do so.
Accordingly, contentions (A) and (B) are held
and answered against the petitioners.
(ii)
The contention that the settlement is
void for non-compliance with the requirements
of Order XXIII Rule 3B, CPC is rejected.
Contention (C) is held and answered against
the petitioners.
(iii)
The contention that the Court had no
jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceedings
in exercise of power under Article 142(1) is
rejected. But, in the particular facts and
circumstances, it is held that the quashing of
the criminal proceedings was not justified.
The criminal proceedings are, accordingly,
directed to be proceeded with. Contention (D)
is answered accordingly.
(iv) The orders dated 14th 15th of February,
1989 in so far a, they seek to prohibit future
criminal proceedings are held no to amount to
a conferment of criminal immunity; but are
held to be merely consequential to the quashing of the criminal proceedings.
Now that the quashing is reviewed, this part
of the order i
373
also set aside. Contention (E) is answered
accordingly.
(v) The contention (F) that the settlement,
and the orders of the Court thereon, are void
as opposed to public policy and as amounting
to a stifling of criminal proceedings is
rejected.
(vi) Having regard to the scheme of the Bhopal
Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act,
1985, the incidents and imperatives of the
American Procedure of Fairness Hearing is
not strictly attracted to the Courts sanctioning of a settlement. Likewise, the absence
of a "Re-opener" clause does not, ipso facto,
vitiate the settlement. Contention (G) is
rejected.
(vii)
It is held, per invitim, that if the
settlement is set aside the UCC shah be entitled to the restitution of the US 420 million
dollars brought in by it pursuant to the
orders of this Court.
But, such restitution shall be subject to the
compliance with and proof of satisfaction of
the terms of the order dated 30th November
1986, made by the Bhopal District Court.
Contention (H) is rejected subject to the
condition aforesaid.
(viii) The settlement is not vitiated for not
affording the victims and victim-groups an
opportunity of being heard. However, if the
settlement-fund is found to be insufficient,
the deficiency is to be made good by the Union
of India as indicated in paragraph 72. Conten-
Page 93 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
tion (I) is disposed of accordingly.

(ix) On point (J), the following findings are
recorded and directions issued:
(a) For an expeditious disposal of the claims
a time-bound consideration and determination
of the claims are necessary. Directions are
issued as indicated in paragraph 77.
(b) In the matter of administration and disbursement of the compensation amounts determined, the guide-lines contained in the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in Muljibhai v.
United India Insurance Co, are required to be
taken into account and, wherever apposite,
applied. Union of India is also directed to
examine whether an appropriate scheme under
the Unit Trust of India Act could be evolved
for the benefit of the Bhopal victims.
374
(c) For a period of 8 years facilities for
medical surveillance of the population of the
Bhopal exposed to MIC should be provided by
periodical medical check-up. For this purpose
a hospital with at least 500 beds strength,
with the best of equipment and facilities
should be established. The facilities shall be
provided free of cost to the victims at least
for a period of 8 years from now. The state
Government shall provide suitable land free of
cost.
(d)
In respect of the population of the
affected wards, [excluding those who have
filed claims], Government of India shall take
out an appropriate medical group insurance
cover from the Life Insurance Corporation of
India or the General Insurance Corporation of
India for compensation to those who, though
presently asymtomatic and filed no claims for
compensation, might become symptomatic
in
future and to those later-born children who
might manifest congenital or prenatal MIC
related afflictions. There shall be no upper
individual monetary limit for the insurance
liability. The period of insurance shall be
for a period of eight years in future. The
number of persons to be covered by this group
shall be about one lakh persons. The premia
shall be paid out of the settlement fund.
(e)
On humanitarian consideration and in
fulfilment of the offer made earlier, the UCC
and UCIL should agree to bear the financial
burden for the establishment and equipment of
a hospital, and its operational expenses for a
period of eight years.
82. In the result, the Review Petitions arc allowed in
part and all the contentions raised in the Review-Petitions
and the I.As in the civil appeals are disposed of in terms
of the findings recorded against the respective contentions.
In the light of the disposal of the Review-petitions, the
question raised in the writ-petitions do not survive. The
writ-Petitions are dismissed accordingly without any order
as to costs.
AHMADI, J. I have carefully gone through the elaborate
judgment prepared by my learned Brother Venkatachaliah, J.
and I am by and large in agreement with his conclusions
except on a couple of aspects which I will presently indi-
Page 94 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
cate.
375
The points which arise for determination on the pleadings, documents and submissions made at the Bar in the
course of the hearing of these petitions have been formulated at points (A) to (J) in paragraph 8 of my learned Brothers judgment and the conclusions reached by him have been
summarised and set out in the penultimate paragraph of his
judgment at (i) to (ix), with their sub-paragraphs. I am in
agreement with the conclusions at (i) to (vii) which answer
contentions (A) to (H). So far as conclusion (viii) pertaining contention (I) is concerned. I agree that the settlement
is not vitiated for not affording the victims or victimgroups an opportunity or being heard but I find it difficult
to persuade myself to the view that if the settlement. Fund
is found to be insufficient the shortfail must be made good
by the Union of India. For reasons which I will presently
state I am unable to comprehend how the Union of India can
be directed to suffer the burden of the shortfall, if any,
without finding the Union of India liable in damages on any
count.
As
regards
conclusion
(ix)
referable
to
contention(J). I am in agreement with sub-paragraphs (a),
(b) and (d) thereof but so far as sub-paragraphs (c) and (e)
are concerned I agree with the directions therein as I
understand them to be only recommendatory in nature and not
linked with the settlement.
In Charan Lal Sahus case [1990]1 SCC 613 this Court
upheld the constitutional validity of the Bhopal Gas Leak
Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act,. 1985 (herein after
called the Act). In that case although the question referred to the Bench was in regard to the constitutional
validity of the said enactment, submissions were made on the
question whether the impugned settlement was liable to be
set aside on the ground that it was in flagrant violation of
the principles of natural justice, in that, the victims as
well as the victim-groups had no opportunity to examine the
terms of the settlement and express their views thereon.
Mukharji, CJ. who spoke for the majority (Ranganathan, J.
and myself expressing separately) observed that on the
materials available "the victims have not been able to show
at all any other point or material which would go to impeach
the validity of the settlement". It was felt that though
the settlement without notice to the victims was not quite
proper, justice had in fact been done to the victims but did
not appear to have been done. Taking the view that in entering upon the settlement regard should have been had to the
views of the victims and for that purpose notices should
have been issued before arriving at the settlement, the
majority held that "post- decisional notice might be sufficient but in the facts and circumstances of this case, no
useful purpose would be served by giving a post-decisional
hearing having regard to the
376
circumstances mentioned in the order of this Court dated May
4, 1989, and having regard to the fact that there are no
further additional data and facts available with the victims
which can profitably and meaningfully be presented to controvert the basis of the settlement and further having
regard to the fact that the victims had their say or on
their behalf their views have been agitated in the proceedings and will have further opportunity in the pending review
proceedings". It would, therefore, appear that the majority
had applied its mind fully to the terms of the settlement in
the light of the data as well as the facts and circumstances
placed before it and was satisfied that the settlement was a
Page 95 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
fair and reasonable one and a postdecisional hearing would

not be of much avail. Referring to the order of May 4, 1989
carrying the Courts assurance that it will be only too glad
to consider any aspect which may have been overlooked in
considering the terms of the settlement, Mukharji, CJ.,
opined that the further hearing which the victims will
receive at the time of the hearing of the review petitions
will satisfy the requirement of the principles of natural
justice. K.N. Singh, J. while agreeing with the view expressed by Mukharji, CJ. did not express any opinion on the
question of inadequacy of the settlement. In the circumstances it was held that there was no failure of justice
necessitating the setting aside of the settlement as violative of fundamental rights. After stating this the learned
Chief Justice observed tha while justice had in fact been
done, a feeling persisted in the minds of the victims that
they did not have a full opportunity to ventilate their
grievances in regard to the settlement. In his view this
deficiency would be adequately met in the hearing on the
Review Petitions (the present petitions). After taking
notice of the aforesaid view expressed by the learned Chief
Justice, Ranganathan, J. (myself concurring) observed as
under:
"Though we are prima facie inclined to agree
with him that there are good reasons why the
settlement should not be set aside on the
ground that the principles of natural justice
have been violated quite apart from the practical complications that may arise as a
result of such an order, we would not express
any final opinion on the validity of the
settlement but would leave it open to be
agitated to the extent permissible in law in
the
review petition pending before
this
Court."
It is, therefore, manifest from the above that the Sahu
Bench was prima facie of the view that the settlement was
not liable to be set aside on
377
the ground that the principles of natural justice had been
violated. Mukharji, CJ. went on to say that no useful purpose would be served by a post-decisional hearing and that
the settlement was quite reasonable and fair. Of course K.N.
Singh, J. did not express any opinion on the inadequacy of
the settlement amount but he was otherwise in agreement with
the view expressed by Mukharji, CJ. on all the other points.
The view of Ranganathan, J. and myself is evident from the
passage extracted above.
This case has gone through several twists and turns. One
of the worlds worst disaster occurred on the night between
2nd and 3rd December, 1984 choking several tO death and
injuring thousands of residents living near about the industrial plant of UCIL. Litigation was initiated on behalf of
some of the victims in the U.S. District Court, Southern
District of New-York presided over by Judge Keenan. After
the enactment of the Act on 29th March, 1985, the Union of
India also approached Judge Keenan with a complaint. Judge
Keenan ultimately terminated the proceedings before him on
the ground of forum-non-convenience. Thereafter the Union
of india representing the victims file a suit for damages in
the Bhopal District Court against the UCIL as well as the
UCC in which an order for interim compensation was made
against which an appeal was filed in the High Court. The
matter was brought to this Court against the High Court
order. It was during the hearing of the said matter that a
Page 96 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
court assisted settlement was struck and orders were passed

recording the same on 14th/15th February, 1989. On 4th May,
1989 this Court gave its reasons for the settlement. Soon a
hue and cry was raised against the settlement by certain
victims and victim groups. In the meantime petitions were
filed in this Court challenging the constitutional validity
of the Act on diverse grounds. In the course of the hearing
of the cases raising the question of validity of the Act
submissions were also made regarding the validity of the
settlement. The hearing continued from 8th March, 1989 to
3rd May, 1989 and the same received wide publication in the
media. The judgment in the said case was pronounced on 22nd
December, 1989 upholding the validity of the Act.. In the
meantime petitions were filed under Article 137 of the
Constitution to review the settlement. Several Writ Petitions under Article 32 also came to be filed. These came up
for hearing before a Constitution Bench presided over by
Mukharji,CJ. The hearing continued for more than two weeks
and the media carried reports of the day to day court proceedings throughout the country. Unfortunately, before the
judgment could be pronounced a tragic event took place.
Mukharji, CJ. passed away
378
necessitating a rehearing by a Constitution Bench presided
over by Misra, CJ. This hearing lasted for about 18 to 19
days and received the same wide coverage in the press, etc.
In fact considerable heat was generated throughout the court
hearings and the press also was none too kind on the court.
It is, therefore, difficult to imagine that all those who
were interested in the review of the settlement were unaware
of the proceedings. Mr. Nariman has placed on record a
number of press-clippings to make good his point that newspapers having large circulation throughout the country
carried news regarding the settlement and subsequent attempts to challenge the same. Can it then be said that the
victims were unaware of the proceedings before this Court ?
To say so would be to ignore the obvious.
In view of the observations in Sahus case, the scope
of the inquiry in the present petitions can be said to be. a
narrow one. One way of approaching the problem is to ask
what the Court could have done if a pre-decisional hearing
was afforded to the victims. The option obviously would have
been either to approve the terms of the compromise, or to
refuse to super add the Courts seal to the settlement and
leave the parties to go to trial. The Court could not have
altered, varied or modified the terms of the settlement
without the express consent of the contracting parties. If
it were to find the compensation amount payable under the
settlement inadequate, the only option left to it would have
been to refuse to approve the settlement and turn it into a
decree of the Court. It could not have unilaterally imposed
any additional liability on any of the contracting parties.
If it found the settlement acceptable it could turn it into
a Courts decree. According to the interpretation put by
the majority in Sahus case on the scope of sections 3 and 4
of the Act, a pro-decisional hearing ought to have been
given but failure to do so cannot vitiate the settlement as
according to the majority the lapse could be cured by a
post-decisional hearing. The scope of the review petitions
cannot be any different at the post. decisional stage also.
Even at that stage the Court can either approve of the
settlement or disapprove of it but it cannot, without the
consent of the concerned party, impose any new or additional
financial obligations on it. At the post decisional stage it
must be satisfied that the victims are informed of or alive
Page 97 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
to the process of hearing, individually or through press

reports, and if it is so satisfied it can apply its mind to
the fairness and reasonableness of the settlement and either
endorse it or refuse to do so. In the present case the
majority speaking through Brother Venkatachaliah, J. has not
come to the conclusion that the settlement does
379
not deserve to be approved nor has it held that the settlement-fund is inadequate. Merely on the apprehended possibility that the settlementfund may prove to be inadequate, the
majority has sought to saddle the Union of India with the
liability to make good the deficit, if any. The Union of
India has not agreed to bear this liability. And why should
it burden the Indian tax-payer with this liability when it
is neither held liable in tort nor is it shown to have acted
negligently in entering upon the settlement? The Court has
to reach a definite conclusion on the question whether the
compensation fixed under the agreement is adequate or otherwise and based thereon decide whether or not to convert it
into a decree. But on a mere possibility of there being a
shortfall, a possibility not supported by any realistic
appraisal of the material on record but on a mere apprehension, quia timet, it would not be proper to saddle the Union
of India with the liability to make good the shortfall by
imposing an additional term in the settlement without its
consent, in exercise of power under Article 142 of the
Constitution or any statute or on the premises of its duty
as a welfare State. To my mind, therefore, it is impermissible in law to impose the burden of makinggood the shortfall
on the Union of India and thereby saddle the Indian taxpayer with the tortfeasors liability, if at all. If I had
come to the conclusion that the settlement-fund was inadequate, I would have done the only logical thing of reviewing
the settlement and would have Left the parties to work out a
fresh settlement or go to trial in the pending suit. In
Sailits case as pointed out by Mukharji, CJ. the victims
had not been able to show any material which would vitiate
the settlement. The voluminous documentary evidence-placed
on the record of the present proceedings also does not make
out a case of inadequacy of the amount, necessitating a
review of the settlement. In the circumstances I do not
think that the Union of India can be saddled with the liability to make good the deficit, if any, particularly when
it is not found to be a tortfeasor. Its liability as a
tortfeasor, if at all, would have to be gone into in a
separate proceeding and not in the present petitions.
These, in brief, are my reasons for my inability to agree
with the latter part of conclusion (viii) imposing a liability on the Union of India to make good the deficit, if any.
One word about the shifting stand of the Union of
India. It entered into a Court assisted settlement but when
the review applications came up for hearing it supported the
review petitioners without seeking the Courts leave to
withdraw from the settlement on permissible grounds or
itself filing a review petition. To say the least this
conduct is indeed
380
surprising.
I would have liked to reason out my view in greater
detail but the constraint of time does not permit me to do
so. The draft of the main judgment was finalised only yesterday by noon time and since the matter was already listed
for judgment today, I had only a few hours to state my
views. I had, therefore, no time to write a detailed judgment but just a little time to indicate in brief the crux of
Page 98 of 99
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN
some of the reasons for my inability to agree with the view

expressed in the judgment of Brother Venkatachaliah, J. on
the question of Union of Indias liability to make good the
deficiency, if any.
G.N.
Petitions
disposed of.
381
Page 99 of 99

Supreme Court of India Page 1 of 99

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Supreme Court of India Page 1 of 99

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Supreme Court of India Page 1 of 99

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

http://JUDIS.NIC.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

1991 SCR Supl. (1) 251

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

of New York presided over by Judge Keenan. The claim brought

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

cause or matter and the powers can be exercised inspite of

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

underlying Order XXIII Rule 3B CPC is made to apply, the

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

permit withdrawal of the prosecution. It Is really not so

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

which it rests. Such an order is amenable to be set aside on

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

exposure in such concentrations of MIC might involve delayed

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

other legal process. [344 G-H; 34S A-D]

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

had a right to be heard before the settlement could be

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Sterling v. Versicol Chemical Corp., 855 F 2d 1188

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

should have provision for medical surveillance by periodic

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

class of future victims both existing and after-born are

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

the loss suffered. [279 F-H, 280-A]

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

indicated that it is the obligation of this Court to uphold

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Therefore, it is impermissible in law to impose the burden

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

proverbial delays. In paragraph 31 of its order the Constitution Bench said:

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

compounded or quashed and immunity against

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

subject to any of the exceptions which operate vis-a-vis the

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

the supreme and fundamental

"It depends upon the present age whether this

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

2. Referring to this industrial accident this Court in

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

of exposure of the human system to this toxic chemical have

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

victim-organisations appears to have moved the Court for

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

can be resolved by the legislature only after

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA