(0 P NG

PARAOlGMS

Almmcls
J

-
•
ower s

0 y . ro g, power ca
se!ves a d o e

S a es are wo k'ng o · cr as their

ow powe , a d thos at a ag to
' 0 e power m·os effc'en y wi

-
• Irrelevance of morality and ethics and law

· seeking a moral high ground is a goat hat gover ·men s cannot always achieve

deceit and violence can be highly effec ive toots for advancing nationa interests.

• home and defense ~ the highest priority-> remaining moratly righteous ·n the eyes of
international organizations can ake a backseat to nforcing foreign pol icy hat witt improve
the nation s global stature
 • I. Realists claim that survival is the pri,ncipal goal of
every 5 ate.
• II. Realists hold States to be ra ional actors. To survive,
States will maximize their tiket · ood of continuing to
exist.
• Ill. Realists assume that al!l States possess some military
I
capacity and no State knows what its neighbours intend
precisely. The world in other words, is dangerous an~ d
uncerta·n.
I • IV. in such a world it is the Great Powers- he States
I
i
\ .
\ - with most economic clout and especially, military
r- -
- '
I
might, that are decisive. IRis a story of Great Power
\ J

po itics
-""' - · .............. .., .... .1 • • 'IIW'. • ..,. • ...
. I
 •
1

• Competition between states - redefined -> not only to mili ary economical
and political power but also to a symbolic powe

• In 1990 as soft power ( ye 2008a, 2008b)

• Postmodern power (van Ham 2001) generally related to a good image .

• Favorable image and reputation = sources of power aditionally linked to the

size of territory, population and raw materials

• "brand state va Ham 2001 ' postmodern state" competition sta e"
• Thucydi des Athenian historian
(c.460 c .460 BC
. Hans J. Morg nthau G rman·
Ame ·can theo ist (1904 - 1980)
 (!) 'Love of po e_r,_ operati g throug , g eed and ~ough
. rso~ nal amb · .to , was the cause of all these evtls.' -
hucy~dides
[!] 'Th r a . of vtl is much mor forcibl principle
o hu : a ac ·o s a e p1asp c o, good' -
1

T : ucy~ i s
[!) 'Be e feared , han loved' - _ ac:. ·avetl·
oo ' :an ·s bo· to se : po er, y , is actual c·ondi ion
makes him a slave ·o he powe -of o h~e s'- a s J.
org nthau

(!] Su · zu ( e Art of War, so~o BC)

· hucyd·d·es ( is ory of ~ he Pelopon esian War, 431
BC)
oo c ~ ·~ av 11· ( , , r· i·C , 513)
obbes ( •evia han, 1651)
oo Claus witz (On War, 1827)
I amous classical realists:
l!J E.H. C rr (The Twenty Years Crisis, 1939)
oo H ns Mo ge_,_ th ( ol.tics A ~ ong ·ations, 19'48)

• Melians: What yo~ u ar . asking go . s against' hat is

ai a ·d ig , '.

(!) At I ·ans: '· is a c ssa rul o na ure hatm n

~ ule : erever t ~ ey ca I ••• [ 1 ] · e st~ 0 1 g do :a ~ ey
can an~d the e.ak suffer hat they must'
3efor ·a 1 ·,

~or among o her ·. viis c us d ~ y b . ing

isarmed, it r nders you co te p ibl '.

: e ce it com s . bou al arm

roph.~ ts h d al .
o·r io· . , a
11a ,. : d
1 Prop 1 · b er1 destro • •

'I ~ · he firs p ace, I pu . for .· a.

·. cl· ation of all manki . d, a perpetual a ··:d
rest ss d sL of power af er p·ower, hat
c as ; o ly · de at ·~ ' I

'Dur· gtl n li e i ho a co~ mm

! I

pow r to k p t em all in awe, they are in

t • at cond.tions ca:l d war; a ~ · •sue ~ a war,
I

if of ·every rna ·, agai s ~ every : ·an'.

~ H . :a ~ atu ·s a o I ~ seeking po· er

o In · r · · u . . r ·. . pow r
~ s.a .es are the main ac ors in
· axi ~ ·sing power is he first priority of s at s
o Po er = influe ce I

o il. ary po er is prioritised

I!J States do · ot ca · · bou: morality
o · k . o conflat politics i h orali Cde li
I ~

Balance of pow r is th way ·o preven · conflict

o Int . rna I and ex er 1b .:I cing
[!] Ulti ately, conflict is in vitabl !
 · · ary force: eapo s qu ·ity & quality, of people ·
army & q ·a ·· o e ·r t raining, stra · gic I · g, morale
· o o ·c o : arge G e po 1 d co no
I

e i Is, hnical kno - · o

• G ogra ·c o e : s ~ rat . gicall · po a · region?
D ogra · ower: large population - o be
kon~ d i . u al a e s .
d olo ·c o o so ·
& ·· ocracy

' tern t·onal pol·t·cs, lik poli ics, ·s a s ruggle for

power.' ·t po e er x·s s . 'psyc ologic 1
e a ·a b n , ose o exerc·s · nd t ~ ose ov r
whic it ·s e rcis d.'

Dis tine ·o b n v· alene and power

o e of i fl enc
oo erest defin d as po er
oo A natio ·. may a e oral laws; : his do no mean
hat e n·verse ·s gov ed by the

H:n: ~1< r 'nlh·m 1 -

.. · ildin an intern tional i ty ca b·nd ac rs togeth r

o B.,•t c.h£ tcult t chil'v nd ··lc,. sit · r ag. in t hum t l
n lUre
• E n imp r ·t in r tiona) n1muni :y an h
st~ ili in f~ s
0 long. i p "' r·
I n 1• But it m y redu h n es tt i
calnting it to dir t nni l b l\ ·e •n gr a PO\ r .
·• C i i \ of r r 1und ~r tandi g . ju li and law
0 ommon b H r in on ·hured otm) just i c nb I ~ undat i n
or comm 111it
• Po\ rful ac rs should ex r i ·. po r ith 1 gitirnac
0 I accordanc t comm nl ccept d on ention
0 h n ·is~. o ~·er c n turn against itself in a onn or Jwbri
• "Political r alism believes that politics like socie y in
general is gove ned by objec ive laws and have their
roots in human nature. ' (Mo genthau 1948: 32) - Human
nature as rooted i power: "When we speak of powe
we mean man's control overt e minds and actions of
other men.' (ibid.: 34)
"For classical realists all politics [bo h domestic and
international] is an expression of the same human drives
and subject to the same pathologies." (Lebow 2007: 55 .
• Desire for 'supranational authority'
• uclear weapons as only eat revolution in the
structure of international eta ions EVER

c •
•
r c
t
httRs: I /youtu.be/ tcUogFo9yE

Af er the collapse of the Sovi t Union ,

American neoconservatives r velled in
the unrivalled power of the USA: : I ( ... ]

they felt no reason why thei coun ry

should be bound by treaties
agreements, and norms that constrained
i s pursuit of its own interes s." (Lebow
2007: 66)
·rhe Bush administ ation s exp ri nc in
Ira drives home what is perhaps the
most impor an insight of classical
realism: that great pow rs are their own
worst en mies. ibid.: 68
I

Is a supranational world o de possible? If so how do you

foresee it coming-to-be? Is it desi able?
• Do you agree with the classical realist view of human
nature? What is the nature of humans?
Yo and yo r f ie ·d get a es d by .h po ·c . .· co
belie e you w r g o co r ~i robb ry . . u
1 .· y
I

o y . v vi . nc . · o pro - you · .· r ~ trespassing. 'This

is why th y k p you s . parat .· and ask ·.ac . of you to rat
th oth r.

•
They offer ince 1ves.

Prisoners
dilemma

co ess

con ess

5 years 5 years 0 year 20 years

e ain
sile

20 years 0 year 1 year ' year

C 20 0 Encyclo
 •
1
c

• 1. Nuclear-armed rivals are reluct a t t o fight each ot her, which gives them
less reason to fea r each other
• 2. When powers are separated by !large bodies of water
• 3. Power asymmetry: "The configuration of power that generates most fear is
a multipolar system t hat contains a potential hege,m on - what I call
"unbala ced multi polari . y" ." (ibid. : 46)

Off sive R lis : 1' o r

why e t powers c not
co m"t to peace ea shei
200 )

• 1. States are unlikely to agree

on how peace is best achieved
• 2. St ates cannot be sure t hat
such efforts would be successf._..

Defe. ~si e (Wal. z) Offens· e ( .earsheimer)

(!) ates concerned i1h su · ·va (!) tate . ar concern. d with
and security y gaining , ower and ant o be a
: ow ) : ege o
ory pr diets a balanc · of h· th ·ory predicts pri , ,acy
po ·er Ini .ia es (crisis?)
l!J R •.o •·s ( o perceive i
• Goal is to maximise power
hostility) potential
[!) Goal is to achie e pari ~ & Intentions unclear and
. . . . . - -

sufficie t deterrent •
ggresst e
[!] Objectives and policies clearly
defned
 r n ~h

D {! nsi altz)
· Offence- defenc balance
• oo muc of~ ns and ot
11

risk our o n sutvi al

(o her may balance agains
i

you)
tates realise this and limi ·
their appetite
·~ . ars be gr; a po ·ers
I

the efore limited

 \\' 1 di tribur n in int rn· ti ,r I t , 11

uW o a 81 olar Unipol r
S tem 'eg mony)

•
••.
•••·C::~
•
. - .
-~
•
- R;s
·
• •• • •

·~ .

ores abr 1

• Is a bipolarity (two great powers more

mul ipo _arity (three or more great pow
Three arguments for bipolarity:
• 1. Mo e great powers means more chanc
• 2. Greater equa:Uty between the grea po
• 3. here is less chance of m,iscalculation
Two arguments for multipolarity
• 1. Easier to d feat aggressors (i. e . Napoleo
Nazi Germany ,
• 2. Less hostility between great powers beca
attentlon

Wh t do you

• httQs: I /youtu. belsUKblujiRyk

• Reflect on this conflict

• How can you relate what we'v
studied today?
 •

• h tQs:/ IY.outu.be/sUKblujffiyl

• Reflect on this confilict

• How can you relate what we 'v
studi,ed today?

• In groups of 4, pick a case study (an event involving 2 or more countries) and
reftect on wha ~ we've discussed today

• How can classicail realism aid our unders anding of the case study?
• How can structural realism aid our understanding of the case study?
• In what ways are the theories 1nsuff1c1ent in explaining the case study?

• Lebow R. N. 2007. Classical Realism. In: Dunne T. Kurki M. and Smith S.

eds. International Relations Theories: Discipline and Dfvers;ty. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
• Mearsheimer J. J., 1994. The False Promise of lnternatitonallnstitutions. In:
M.ingst K. A.. and Snyder J. .. eds. 2014. Essential Readings in World
Politics. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
• Mearsheime, J. J., 2001. Anarchy and the S ruggte for Power. In: Mingst K.
A. and Snyder, J. L., eds. 2014. Essential Readings in World Politics. New
York: W. W. Norton & Company.
• Mearsheimer J. J., 2007. Structural Realism. In: Dunne, T., Kurki,. M. and
Smith, S. eds. International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Morgenthau H. J., 1948. A Realist Theory of International Politics. In: M1ngst,
K. A. and Snyder J. L. eds. 2014. Essent;al Readings in World Politics. New
York: W. W. Nor on & Company.
• Morgenthau, H. J., 1967. The Balance of Power. In: Mingst K. A. and Snyder
J .. L. , eds . 2014. Essential Readings in World Politics. New York: W. W. Norton
& Company.