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Gunpowder and Empire-1

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Gunpowder and Empire: Indian Case

Author(s): Iqtidar Alam Khan
Source: Social Scientist, Vol. 33, No. 3/4 (Mar. - Apr., 2005), pp. 54-65
Published by: Social Scientist
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3518112
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Gunpowder and Empire: Indian Case

The increasing use of firearms from the middle of the fifteenth century in
different parts of the world is often seen as a crucial factor in the rise of
centralized monarchical states. In Europe it was a manifestation of the
overall weakening of the position of gentry, as against the king. This was
a direct consequence of the increasing vulnerability of signioral castles to
the field artillery maintained by the king and of greater effectiveness of
the musket-wielding infantrymen against mounted knights.' In the
Islamic East, where the mounted archers were the mainstay of the
imperial authority, this phenomenon appeared to have manifested itself
in an altered form. The highly centralized empires of sixteenth century
like the Ottoman Empire, the Safavid Empire, the Uzbek Khanate and
the Mughal Empire in India are for example characterized by Marshall
G.S. Hodgson as the 'gunpowder empires'. According to him, the
changes promoted by the introduction of firearms in these states were
not restricted to army organizations. The firearms also 'gave an
increased advantage over local military garrisons, to a well organized
central power which could afford artillery'.2 In this paper*, such an
impact is examined in the context of state formation in India with a
special focus on the Mughal Empire.
A primitive type of gunpowder artillery was already in vogue in
different parts of the India during the second half of the fifteenth
century. Already by the middle of the century, there was known in North
India a firearm with designation Kashakanjirwhich threw balls 'by the
extensive force of combustible substances (darruha-i atishin)'. It was in
all probability a cannon. A weapon resembling cannon is also reported
in Kashmir. Srivara records that this weapon 'was called topa in Muslim
language while in the Kashmiri dialect it was called kanda'. He also
alludes at its being made of an alloy.3 This is also supported by allusions
in two other contemporary texts, Ma'asir-i Mahmud Shahi by Shihab
Hakim (1468) and Riyazu'l insha' by Mahmud Gawan (1470) to the
presence in Malwa and Deccan of ra'd/kaman-i ra'd (literally, lightening
/lightening bow) which are identified by Firishta as proper cannons.
According to one criptic description by Shihab Hakim, it was 'made
from an alloy of copper'.4

* Paper presented at the Medieval History Section of the Indian History

Congress Session, December 2004.

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Gunpowder and Empire: Indian Case

The destructive capacity of gunpowder artillery of fifteenth century, D-

nothwithstanding its primitive nature was vastly greater than that of the
mechanical devices of the earlier period. It is indicated by the contemporary
descriptions of sieges of Mandalgarh (1457) and Machal (1470)5 as well that of >-
Champanir (1485) recorded by Firishta (possibly copying, as was his wont, an 3
earlier text).6 This should explain why some of the forts known for their strength r
and solidity sometimes had to be redesigned in the fifteenth century. As was the
case with Vijaymandirgarh fort of Bayana, this redesigning was aimed at
enlarging the enclosed space which could have been with the idea of making it
difficult for a besieging force to aim its cannons at the built-up areas of the fort.
Other similar examples from the Aravali tract are those of the forts of
Mandalgarh and Champanir.7
The artillery pieces in India during the fifteenth century being made
uniformly of brass or bronze were naturally very costly. These were generally
beyond the means of most of the zamindars as well as the Rajput chieftains. The
ruler of Mewar was perhaps one of the few exceptions among them.8 These new
weapons were possessed in appreciable numbers only by more prosperous
regional kingdoms like those of Gujarat, Malwa, Bahmanis and Vijaynagara. Each
of them is credited with overpowering local chiefs of their regions by reducing their
forts located in less accessible tracts. The reduction of these forts was apparently
facilitated by the use of newly introduced gunpowder artillery which was as yet
beyond the reach of most of the local chiefs.
It is, therefore, understandable that the appearance of gunpowder artillery
synchronized with a distinct phase of internal consolidation leading to a limited
territorial expansion in the case of more prosperous regional kingdoms of
fifteenth century. Internal consolidation was always marked by the
strengthening of king's control over the nobles and, more importantly, by the
suppression of the local chiefs some of whom hitherto enjoyed autonomous
status on account of their large caste or tribal following and forts held by them
in peripheral zones. This is evident from the history of Gujarat and Bahmani
Empire under Mahmud Begarha (1459-1511)9 and Muhammad Shah (1463-82)
respectively."' In the case of Vijayanagara Empire again the use of firearms is
considered to be the most important factor behind its successes not only against
the Bahmanis, but also 'against the enemies within', such as powerful chiefs of
Tamil region." These developments in a way tended to conform to Marshall G.S.
Hodgson's view that the introduction of relatively expensive artillery would
often, lead to the growth of'a well organized central power'.
The impact of European gunnery introduced in India on a large scale in the
beginning of the sixteenth century was, however, a much more complex process
which I propose to examine here with reference to the rise and decline of the
Mughal Empire. 55

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Social Scientist

C) During the sixteenth century, the heavy mortars produced in India

?C4 registered a striking advance. This was a direct result of improved designs and
casting methods learnt from the west through contact with the Portuguese as
also through expertise brought with him by Babur.'2 However, the problems like
co lack of mobility, proneness to accidents, slow rate of firing and large
consumption of gunpowder persisted causing a decline in their over all
~m popularity. Already by the middle of the sixteenth century these had come to be
o treated as impressive exhibits probably meant to overawe the common people
Z-- with the military prowess of the Empire than for actual use in warfare.'3
mn It is of interest to remember that in Babur's own descriptions of the battles
o of Panipat (1526) and Kanwah (1527) where he experimented with the
deployment of firearms in the battlefield with some success, heavy mortars,
(kazans) are not mentioned. Though Humayun had deployed 21 mortars in the
Battle of Kanauj (1540) these did not prove to be of much help.'4 Similarly, in
1553, Islam Shah found it difficult to carry his mortars to Punjab for checking
Humayun's anticipated advance thither.'5 In 1556, the entire park of Adil Shah
Sur's slow moving mortars was captured by the Mughals before these could be
deployed against them at Panipat.16
Under Akbar, heavy mortars did not figure prominently in the process of
territorial expansion. Apart from the sieges of Chittor (1568) and Ranthambhor
(1570), military operations leading to territorial acquisitions in the early decades
of Akbar's reign did not involve prolonged sieges requiring the use of mortars.
Mughal Empire's expansion during this phase was achieved primarily with the
use of mounted archers supported marginally by light artillery and musketeers.
In the second phase of territorial expansion under Akbar, during 1585-1601,
again artillery was used sparsely which was seemingly on account of the difficulty
of transportation.'7 This eclips in the popularity of mortars in the Mughal
Empire temporarily ended during the decades Aurangzeb was frequently faced
with the task of attacking numerous hill forts in Deccan.'8 Acquisition of a large
number of siege mortars in the Deccan towards the end of the seventeenth
century, however, did not prove to be of much strategic advantage for the
Mughals. They continued to be vulnerable to Maratha light cavalry resorting to
hit and run tactics.
From the above it is quite evident that the siege artillery of the Mughal
Empire did not command 'the fateful significance politically' that is ascribed to
the same category of firearms in a gunpowder empire of Hodgeson's
conception. Abu'l Fazl, no doubt, goes out of his way in characterizing artillery as
an instrument of empire building'9 in words remnicent of the theory of
gunpowder empires but the history of Akbar's military campaigns recorded by
him does not bear out this characterization.

56 Two other firearms introduced from Europe in the sixteenth century were:

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Gunpowder and Empire: Indian Case

(a) light cannons mounted on carriages and (b) matchlock muskets. These, no __
doubt, were easily integrated in the prevelant form of warfare based on the use of n
mounted archery by adopting variable patterns of the battle-plan of 'the Ghazis D
of Rum' introduced in India by Babur (1526). In this battle plan, light artillery ~
and musketry were protected by a barricade carrying gapes to facilitate the free 3
movement of cavalry.2) Both of these firearms appear to have contributed to the r
growth of Mughal Empire as a centralized state. The matchlock musket
particularly seems to have emerged as an instrument of centralization in so far as
its use came to acquire special relevance to centre's control of internal resources.2:
During the seventeenth century, on the other hand, dissemination of muskets
among peasant communities also became a factor contributing to the militancy
of disaffected rural population.22 It would, perhaps, be useful to dilate separately
on the status of each one of them in the Mughal system.
There was a distinct improvement in the basic design and general
performance of the light artillery during the first half of the sixteenth century
which facilitated their deployment and effective use in the siege operations as well
as open battles. The earliest specimens of these light cannons (zarb-zan) used by
Babur (1526-30) were, in all probability, miniature replicas of his heavy mortars
(kazans). Subsequently in 1540s, the size of an average light cannon was reduced
considerably. This was possibly aimed at improving the quality of casting within
the constrants imposed by the use of manual bellows. It also economised on the
quantity of gunpowder consumed.23
The introduction from Europe of the art of making less costly wrought iron
barrels naturally contributed to making light cannons much cheaper. Besides a
considerable increase in the total number of light cannons possessed by the
Mughals and their Afghan adversaries in North India, many of the local chiefs all
over the country began to possess them in limited numbers. These light cannons
when combined with musketry were generally percieved as effective in defending
fortified positions. The enhanced military clout of the Rajput chieftains,
controlling strongholds on the outer periphery of the Gangetic plain during the
first half of the sixteenth century, may perhaps be linked to this development.24
The exceptionally favourable terms offered by Akbar to the Rajput chieftains to
induce them to join his service may be viewed from this perspective as well.
The Mughal response to the increased effectiveness of the light cannons was
represented by their attempt from the very beginning, to enforce imperial
monopoly on the production and use of every kind of firearms.25 It also led to a
drive on their part to increase manifold the number of light cannons in their
arsenal. Under Akbar there was a concerted attempt to further improve and also
to add to their variety. These improvements seems to have led to the division of
light cannons cast in bronze/brass as well as those forged from wrought iron
into two broad categories: (a) zamburaks carried with king in the so-called 57

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Social Scientist

o 'artillery of stirrup'; and (b) still lighter pieces like narnals and gajnals distribu
?r'4 for deployment on the ramparts of the forts located in different provinces
Perhaps, the most important innovation relating to military use of firear
I in the Mughal Empire during seventeenth century was the placing of light
E - cannons on some kind of swivels mounted on camels.27 It is likely that the notion
~- of a light cannon fitted to a swivel on the back of a camel, the shaturnal (camel
~m barrel), came to India from West Asia some time in the beginning of the
o seventeenth century. This cannon is described by Bernier as a 'small field piece'.
- Being better tuned to the requirements of battles fought with fast moving
rn cavalry, shaturnals often played a far more important role in action than the
o 'artillery of strirrup' represented by a comparatively small number of medium
size cannons mounted on horse drawn carriages. The shaturnals were seemingly
Indian and West Asian substitutes for the latest cast-iron field guns of Europe
with the significant difference that these, instead of rendering obsolete the
dominant form of mounted cambate, tended to give it added support. Despite
the constraints imposed by the necessity of camel to kneel on the ground to open
fire, the shaturnals often proved to be more effective than the cannons carried on
slow moving carriages. The speed with which several hundred pieces of light
cannon, capable of keeping up fairly rapid fire, could be moved from one point
to another during the battle would, on many an occasion, be crucial to the
outcome of a sharply contested action.28 This is for example borne out by Mirza
Nathan's account of the Battle of Daulabapur (1612)29 and those of the Battle of
Samugar (1658) by Bernier and Manucci.-'
The shaturnals were of course not out of the reach for many of the rebellious
Rajput chiefs and Marhatta sardars defying the Mughals during the second half
of the seventeenth century. But the rebels were certainly not in a position to
deploy them in a matching strength. To this limited extent, it would appear, the
increasing presence of the shaturnals in the field artillery, contributed to the
Mughal Empire's holding on its own in the face of mounting rebellions down to
the end of Aurangzeb's reign.
Matchlock maskets present in India from the early phase of Mughal
conquest (1526-56)3' came to be regarded as effective weapons of general
combat. As was the case at Panipat in 1526, these came to be used from behind
barricades formed by bullock-carts tied together in pairs for harassing the on
rushing cavalry. The musketeers would some time also provide cover during the
battle to artillery carts on the move which appears to have been their role at
Knwah (1527).32 This had a parallel in muskets' singular contribution to the
Ottoman victories over Shah Ismail at Chaldiran (1514) and over Mamluks in
1517.33 From the history of Mughal Empire in India many more instances can be
cited to illustrate that sometimes a skilful use of muskets could prove to be of

58

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Gunpowder and Empire: Indian Case

critical significance in deciding the outcome of a battle. This role of musketeers _n

would often tend to get enhanced in localised small scale conflicts." c
In this context William Irvin's view that down to the middle of the eightee
century, the bow and arrow was considered in India a much more effect
instrument of combate than the musket35 meeds to be viewed in its pro
perspective. This view seems to be mainly based on a statement of Bernier
he is comparing the 'astonishing quickness' with which the mounted arc
discharged their arrows with the slowness of horsemen carrying muskets who
were obliged to dismount for firing a volley. There is no denying the fact that
much more time would pass between each matchlock shot than between the
shooting of successive arrows. But the simple point is that the matchlock fire
could hit much harder with a pelet and be effective upto a much longer distance;
and thus frequency alone could not be the decisive factor. The musket fitted with
matchlock when used from the ground in a skilful manner could prove to be a
devastating instrument of war. Even a small number of matchlockmen fighting
from the ground, if deployed innovatively, could contribute to breaking up the
onslaught of a much larger body of horsemen.3
The recognition of muskets as an increasingly effective factor in warfare is
reflected in the anxiety of the Mughal imperial authority to retain a large body of
musketeers. The strength of foot-musketeers in the service of Mughal king rose
from roughly 1200 in 1526 to 35,000 around 1595.37 Abu'l Fazl accordingly
classifies musketeers (banduqchis) as part of the royal household (manzil abadi)
and not as part of the army (sipah abadi)." It is understandable that along with
artillery (involving heavy expenditure) comparatively affordable muskets
should have been controlled exclusively by the Emperor. This would suggest that
the muskets too were considered a major instrument of power. Leaving muskets
entirely to the care of the nobles was evidently not considered safe.
Under Akbar's mansab system, from the very beginning, the officers were
allowed to have in their contingents among dakhili foot-soldiers a partly of foot-
musketeers whose strength would be 121/2 per cent of the total number of
horsemen in the contingent. In other words, there would be present in each
contingent one musketeer for eight horsemen. But, on paper, these dakhili
musketeers also were treated as personnel in the direct employ of the Emperor
and were paid their stipends not by the officers concerned but by the central
treasury.39 This system appears to have continued in the seventeenth century in a
modified form. The term dakhili fell in disuse, but the officers often came to
maintain a larger number of musketeers than prescribed under the rules framed
during Akbar's reign. An inventory (siyaha) of the detachment commanded by
Bahramand Khan in 1689 shows a ratio of one musketeer to five horsemen.4"
Some times under Aurangzeb, select nobles were also allowed the rare privilege of
59

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O recruiting foot-musketeers directly in their contingents who would ag

r-4 treated as being in the central government's service (naukar-i sarkar-i w
There is some evidence indicating that from the latter part ofAkbar's reig
the foot-musketeers came to partly replace ordinary cavalry as the instrum
of local control. The use of musketeers in village level operations could have b
a much less costly affair than the cavalry troops of any variety as is suggeste
the salaries of the two type of troopers. The deference between the salari
o centrally maintained yakaspa sawars and foot-musketeers (sair piy
Z banduqchi) ranged from 41/2: 25 to 6:25.42 Moreover, the total cost of equ
a cavalry trooper, even of the meanest order, inclusive cost of a horse (wit
apparel), weapons and armour, would be quite considerable. This cost woul
much higher than the cost of a musket and ammunition needed for equipp
musketeer.43 Under Todar Mal's regulations of 27th R.Y. /1582-3, the jagirdar
well as the officials of the territory yielding revenues for imperial treas
(khalisa) could take the help of the imperial musketeers stationed in every loca
under the command of an amir-i chakla (commandant of a chakla, a territo
unit within a province). For this assistance they were made 'responsible for
collection of one dam per bigha of cultivated land for the mainten
(nigahdasht) of the musketeers. That this system was actually enforced in
of the provinces is borne out by the extant text of one of Akbar's orde
appointing a faujdar in the province of Lahore.44
Many instances can be cited to illustrate the effective use of muskets by
Mughals against defiant rural populace as well as rebellious chiefs during
seventeenth century.45 These go to clearly indicate that down to the en
Aurangzeb's reign the matchlock musket played a conspicuously significant
as an instrument of local control.
Rapid dissemination of muskets in the countryside during the first hal
the seventeenth century made the task of exercising local control and of ens
the smooth flow of land revenue more onerous. Even a marginal improve
in the fighting efficiency of the disaffected peasants and zamindars
consequence of their access to muskets of even most primitive type wou
become a matter of grave concern to the Mughal authorities. One respons
the Mughal imperial system to this new situation was the creation u
Jahangir (1605-1627) of a corps of mounted musketeers called barqa
among the centrally maintained ahdi horsemen.46 A few decades later, som
the senior nobles, for example Mirza Raja Jai Singh also came to enrol, pos
with the tacit approval of the imperial authority, in their contingents mu
carrying horsemen.47 Down to 1658, one knows on Bernier's testimony, mo
these barqandaz troops were yak aspa horsemen riding yabu or still more inf
moutns.48

60 This attempt at combining horsemanship with the use of musket was

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Gunpowder and Empire: Indian Case

obviously aimed at enhancing the striking power of the musketeers against the _-
rural rebels for whose suppression they are known to have been frequently
employed in localized military operations since Akbar's time. The performance
of mounted musketeers in a large scale action like Battle of Samugar (1658) p-
would no doubt appear to be rather not very impressive as compared to that of 3
mounted archers forming the bulk of opposing armies. This should not, r
however, blur one's view of the effective role that the barqandaz troops often
played in scattered operations. They came to be frequently used in the Deccan as
well as in other regions against dispersed resistance of the local authorities
particularly that of the Marhatta sardars. The effectiveness of mounted
musketeers in dispersed fighting is borne out by a number of episodes recorded
in waqa'i' sarkar Ajmer wa Ranthambhor and Mazhar-i Shahjahani.49
Though the number of mounted musketeers in the contingents of select
nobles (the Kachchwaha chief of Amber being one of them) may have increased
appreciably during Aurangzeb's reign, but the muskets used by them as also by
most of the barqandaz ahdis continued to be unwieldy matchlocks which could
be fired only after dismounting. On the other hand, during the same period,
some of the rural insurgents in North India, like Jats of Mathura region started
using matchlocks5' which were in-any-case more efficient than the crudely made
arquebuses available to them till then. It could have been partly in response to
this situation that there was created in the Mughal army a body of mounted
musketeers possessing the skill of firing their muskets without dismounting.
Islam Khan Rumi's barqandaz retainers were perhaps one such group. They are
reported to have been the experts of Ottoman style of fighting based on the use
of musket (madar-i jang-i Rumi bar banduq bud).' It is likely that these new type
of musketeer horsemen were armed with the Turkish versions of European
flintlocks. Specimen discription of a flintlock reproduced by Anand Ram Kayath
in Siyaq-nama (1696)52 indicates that this musket was known in the Mughal
military establishment during Aurangzeb's reign. But, as is evident from
Bhimsen's description of Islam Khan Rumi's clumsy method of supplying
gunpowder to his horsemen during an skirmish with Marathas, the rigidity of
the Mughal military organization based on a contract system did not suit this
new form of warfare. Apparently, the new system required a more centralized
organization of production, distribution and supply of firearms of different
types which was practically ruled out in the mansab system of the Mughals.5 It is,
therefore, understandable that, despite there being strong reasons for shifting to
this new form of musketeering, the flintlock musket and the skill of using it from
horseback did not find wide acceptance in the Mughal Empire.
While concluding this discussion one may reiterate that of all the different
type of firearms introduced by Babur in India, the wide use of matchlock
musket, perhaps, had particular relevance to centre's control of internal 61

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Social Scientist

O resources in the Mughal Empire. That is why muskets were considered

'honourable' not only when carried by cavalry but also in the hands of ordinary
Ca musketeers firing from the ground.54 The high status of musket was reflected in
< Humayun's establishing in 1535 a rule that his leaving the Diwan would be
announced by firing of a musket.55 Significantly, Abu'l Fazl makes it a point to
~- mention his hero Akbar's interest in this weapon and his being unsurpassed in
nm making and handling it. In A'in-i Akbari one of the three military skills
o3 prescribed for a commandant administering a province is that of shooting with
Z musket. It is put at par with horsemanship and archery.56 It is, therefore, not
mo surprising that the foot-musketeers, though poorly paid as compared to cavalry
o troopers, were allowed certain concessions like, for example, payment in advance
a part of salaries which was not deducted during campaigns.57 Their average
stipends were always higher than those of ordinary foot-soldiers of other
categories.58
A similar situation obtained with regard to mounted musketeers. As early as
1636 sih aspa (3 horse) and chahar aspa (4 horse) ahdi barqandaz staioned in
Deccan were allowed to maintain one horse less than the number indicated by
their ranks (du aspa). Till then this privilege was not allowed to ordinary ahdi
horsemen.59 Again additional payment to some of the horsemen in the
contingent of the Kachchwaha chief of Amber during Aurangzeb's reign, on their
equipping themselves with muskets (azafa ba-shart-i banduq) also appears to
point to musket's special status as a weapon of war in the Mughal Empire.6"
Although, as Irfan Habib stresses, the main strength of the Mughals lay in their
mounted archery,6' the matchlock musket appears to have contributed from the
very beginning significantly to the exercise of imperial control over disaffected
localities or tracts.

Iqtidar Alam Khan was formerly Professor of History at the Aligarh Muslim University,
Aligarh.

Notes

1 Cf. Carlo M. Cipola, Guns and Sails in the Early Phase of European Expansion,
1400-1700, London, 1965, p.28; Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Mili-
tary Innovation and Rise of the West, 1500-1800, Cambridge, 1988, p.8.

2 Marshall, G.S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: The Gunpowder Empires and
Modern Times, Vol.III, pp.17-18, 26.

3 Ibrahim-i Qawam Faruqi, Sharafnama-i Ahmad Munnairi (1457-75), MS entitled

62 Farhang-i Ibrahimi, AMU, Aligarh, Habib Ganj Collection 53/22, unde

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Gunpowder and Empire: Indian Case

Kashakanjir. See also Jonaraja, Rajatarangini (1459) tr. by T.C. Dutt, Kings of n0
Kashmir, Delhi, 1968, pp.105-6 and Srivara, Jaina Rajatarangini, (1486), tr. by Q'
Kashi Nath Dhar, New Delhi, 1996, p.39. -

4 Shihab Hakim, Ma'asir-i Mahmud Shahi

1968, pp.56, 87; Mahmud Gawan, Rayazu'l Insha (1470), ed. M. Shafi, Lahore, 3
1941-9, p.72. See also Iqtidar A. Khan, Gunpowder and Firearms: Warfare in 7
Medieval India, New Delhi, 2004, p.42. p

5 Ma'asir-i Mahmud Shahi, pp.85-9 and Rayaz

6 Muhammad Qasim Hindu Shah Firishta, Tari

1884, pp.202, 251.

7 Cf. Gunpowder and Firearms, pp.48-9.

8 Ma'asir-i Mahmud Shahi, p.56. The chief of

two kaman-i ra'ds made of an alloy of copper (h
1442-3.

9 See Gunpowder and Firearms, pp.50-2.

10 Haroon Khan Sherwani, The Bahmanis of Deccan, Hyderabad, 1953, pp.296, 323-
4. Bahamani Kingdom is described as attaining 'a height unequalled in the whole of
its history' during the 'premiership' of Mahmud Gawan under Muhammad Shah
Bahmani. Cf. Rayazu'l Insha, p.72. Mahmud Gawan is reported to have used
kaman-i ra'd.

11 Burton Stein in The Cambridge Economic History of India, eds., Tapan

Raychaudhuri and Irfan Habib, Vol.1, c.1200-1750, Cambridge, 1982, p.119.

12 See Iqtidar A. Khan in Journal of Royal Asiatic Society, April 1999, pp.27-34.

13 Gunpowder and Firearms, pp.94-5.

14 Mirza Haidar Doghlat, Tarikh-i Rashidi, MS, AMU, Aligarh, University Collection,
No.34, f.351a.

15 'Abdul Qadir Badauni, Muntakhab-ut-tawarikh, (1596), ed. Ahmad 'Ali and

others, Vol.I, Calcutta, 1869, p.412.

16 Abu'l Fazl, Akbar-nama, ed. Agha Ahmad 'Ali and 'Abd al-Rahim, Vol.11, Calcutta,
1873-87, p.36; Nizam al-Din Ahmad, Tabaqat-i Akbari, ed. B. De, Vol.11,
Calcutta, 1913, p.131.

17 Cf. W.H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power, Technology, Armed Force and Society since
A.D. 1000, Chicago, 1982, pp.95, 98. Attributes the 'precarious' nature of Mughal
control in the Deccan to the difficulty of moving siege guns long distance overland'.

18 Gunpowder and Firearms, pp.97-7.

19 A'in-i Akbari, (1598), Vol.1, 1893, p.82. See also Journal of Royal Asiatic Society,
April 1999, p.27.

20 Cf. A.S. Beveridge, Babur-nama in English, reprint, London, 1969, pp.550, 568-9.

21 Gunpowder and Firearms, pp.85 f.n. 46, 150.

22 Op.cit., pp. 164-5. 63

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 lOMoARcPSD|28180216

Social Scientist

Ln 23 Op.cit., pp.74-9.
0
N 24 Op.cit., pp.103, 120-21 f.ns. 43 & 44.
L.

25 Op.cit., pp.91-2. Compare A'in-i Akbari, Vol.I, p.82 and Babur-nama in English,
L _ I p.117.
2 - 26 A'in-i Akbari, Vol.1, p.82.
27 Francois Bernier, Travels in the Mogul Empire, 1656-58, tr. A. Cons
by V.A. Smith, London, 1916, p.254.
0

Z 28 Compare, Gunpowder and Firearms, pp.107-10.

29 J.N. Sarkar, Military History of India, reprint, Delhi, 1970, p.89.
o
> 30 Bernier, p.49; Nicolao Manucci, Storia do Mogor, 1656-1712, tr. William Irvine,
Vol.I (London, 1907-8), reprint Calcutta, 1965, p.254.

31 For an arguement that muskets brought to India by Babur were matchlocks of

Ottoman origin see Gunpowder and Firearms, p. 143.

32 Babur-nama in English, pp.468-9, 473-4, 557-8, 568-9.

33 Devid Ayalon, Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom, London, 1962,
pp.60, 88-9.

34 Yusuf Mirak, Mazhar-i Shahjahani (1634), ed. Pir Hasamuddin Rashidi, Part 2,
Karachi, 1961, pp. 139-40. There is described a skirmish between a party of Mughal
horsemen using muskets and a large band of Nahmardi tribesmen of pargana
Sehwan (Sind).

35 William Irvine, The Army of the Indian Moghuls, reprint New Delhi, 1962, p.103.

36 Cf. Sidi Ali Reis, Travels and Adventures of the Turkish Admiral Sidi Ali Reis, tr. A.
Vamberey, London, 1899, pp.37. A band of 30 foot-musketeers forced a large body
of Rajput horsemen to retire.

37 Gunpowder and Firearms, p. 150.

38 Ain-i Akbari, Vol.I, pp.84-5.

39 Op.Cit., Vol.I, pp.121, 134. Compare Shireen Moosvi, The Economy ofthe Mughal
Empire, c.1595: A Statistical Study, O.U.P., 1987, p.223. She interpretes the text
here differently.

40 Selected Documents of Aurangzeb's Reign, ed. Yusuf Husain Khan, Hyderabad,

1958, pp.200-1.

41 For Maha Singh Bhadoria's request to be allowed such a privilege see Waqa'i'Sarkar
Ajmer wa Ranthambhor, (1678-80), MS, Asafia Library, Hyderabad, Fan-i Tarikh,
Aligarh transcript, pp.417-18.

42 Irvin, The Army of the Indian Moghuls, p.173. Compare R.A. Alvi, Studies in the
History of Medieval Deccan, Delhi, 1977, p.30.

43 The lowest cost of the musket as given by Abu'l Fazl is /2 a rupee while the price of
a horse is set at Rs.2 Again an ordinary handgun could be obtained for half the cost
64 of an ordinary sword. Cf. A'in-i Akbari, Vol.1, p.82.

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Gunpowder and Empire: Indian Case

44 Abu'l Fazl, Akbar-nama, Vol.III, ed. Agha Ahmad 'Ali and 'Abd al-Rahim, _D
Calcutta, 1887, p.382. Cf. Abu'l Qasim Namakin, Munshat-i Namakin, MS
AMU, University Collection 26, f.675b. -

45 Cf. Gunpowder and Firearms, pp. 153-4. >

46 For a reference to barqandaz sawars see Tuzuk-i Jahang
Ghazipur and Aligarh, 1863-4, p.238. 7

47 For a reference to a barqandaz sawarserving in t

suba Deccan in the year 1636, see Select Document
Husain Khan, Hyderabad, 1950, p.25. Compare, G

48 Bernier, p.217. For musketeers participating i

mentions three rates of payment: Rs.20/- Rs. 15/
obviously are not the scales of foot-musketeers
Rs.6/- per month. Cf. Shireen Moosvi, The Econom
p.227. yak aspa ahdis were paid Rs.20/- per mon

49 This is borne out by a perusal of Jaipur Recor

Rajasthan State Archives, Bikaner.

50 Manucci, Storia do Mogor, 1656-1712, tr. W.

reprint, Calcutta, 1965, p.131.

51 Bhimsen, Nuskha-i Dilkusha, MS., Br. Library,

52 Nand Ram Khayasth, Siyaq-nama, Lucknow, 18

53 Athar Ali, The Mughal Nobility under Aurang

p.xx) was first to make this point.

54 For a contrary view see Stewart Gordon, 'The l

Military Forces by the Eighteenth-century Rule
and Social History Review, Vol.xxxv, No.3 and J
London, 2002, p.161.

55 Khawar Shah bin Qibad al-Husaini (d.1565), T

British Library, Add. 23513, ff. 228b-229a.

56 A'in-i Akbari, VOl.I, p.83, 196; See also, 'Ali A

Nawab Ali, Vol.I, Baroda, 1928, p.167.

57 Cf. Ruqq'a-i Hakim Abu'l Fath Gilani, ed. M

1968, p.128.

58 A'in-i Akbari, Vol.1, pp.82, 134; Shireen Moo

Empire, pp.229-30. Compare, Irvine, The Army
173.

59 Select Documents of Shah Jahan's Reign, ed. Y

60 Several such orders are to be found in the bundl

i bakhshi, farsi, 1129H/ 1774 Sambat: in Rajasthan

61 Irfan Habib, The Agrarian System of Mughal E

edition, New Delhi, 1999, p.364. 65

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