Indian Journal of History of Science, 44.

3 (2009) 411-433

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND THE EVOLUTION

OF ORDNANCE ESTABLISHMENT IN
BRITISH-INDIA: 1639-1856
KAUSHIK ROY*
(Received 8 May 2009)
There was a constant military interaction and upgradation of
technologies between the East India Company (hereafter EIC) and its
opponents in South Asia in order to reduce the technological lead of the
other. Technological diffusion among the princely states occurred through
the mercenary of European personnel, the EIC in turn had to regularize and
systematize its military production through the construction and
maintenance of the ordnance establishment (comprising of factories,
magazines and arsenals) in British-India. The present essay is an attempt
to trace the development of the ordnance establishment from the
seventeenth century till the 1857 uprising. The ordnance establishment
of British-India manufactured gunpowder, small arms and various types of
cannons, mortars and howitzers. The EIC found out that India had abundant
supply of saltpetre and large number of domestic animals and buying
saltpetre in India was much cheaper than importing this commodity. EIC
constructed its first gunpowder mill in Bombay in 1669 AD but by 1741,
the powder manufactured in this mill was considered superior than the
quality of powder imported from Europe. The demand for gunpowder and
guns during the Second Anglo-Maratha War helped greatly the expansion
of gunpowder and artillery manufacturing capacity of the EICs ordnance
establishment. Construction of a string of arsenals and maintenance of the
magazines along the probable routes of military deployment and especially
at the critical strategic nodes increased the operational range of the EICs
army.
Key words: Bigha, Cossipore, East India Company (EIC), Flint,
Flintlock, Gunpowder, Howitzer, Khalsa, Maund, Mortar, Saltpetre, Sonaut
rupee, Sulphur,
* An Associate Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Civil War (CSCW) at International
Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), Residence: 78/14, R.K. Chatterjee Road,
Kolkata - 700 042; email: [email protected]

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The colonialism in South Asia was mainly based on the superior military
technology in the hands of the British. Technology infused with ideas and bureaucratic
strategies, according to me, produced historical changes. The opponents of the
East India Company (hereafter EIC) in the subcontinent were equally dynamic
powers and continuously adapted and adopted new technologies in order to
reduce the technological lead of the British. Technological diffusion among the
princely states occurred through the medium of mercenary of European personnel.
The EIC on the other hand had to regularize and systematize its military production.
This resulted in the construction and maintenance of the ordnance establishment
(it comprised of factories, magazines and arsenals) in British-India. The present
essay traces the development of the ordnance establishment and its impact on
Indian society from the seventeenth century till the outbreak of the 1857-uprising.
MILITARY HARDWARE PRODUCTION IN THE PRINCELY POLITIES
From seventeenth century onwards, firearms became more important than
cavalry in the conduct of warfare. And this was a global trend.1 Let us take a
quick snap shot regarding the nature of handguns and artillery used in pre-colonial
India. The Rohillas fought as infantry and were armed with muskets. The barrels
for matchlocks were prepared by forming bits of iron into rods which were as
thick as the finger. Then, they were twisted and three or four of them joined
together. Another band of iron one third of an inch thick was welded to it. Then,
it was formed into a band which was twisted and beaten into a solid cylinder.
Finally, a hard steel chisel bored it.2 Stephen Peter Rosen claims that Indian
musket barrels were better than British barrels because they were made with
spiral rather than longitudinal welds. Hence, they were stronger and less likely to
burst and were able to take a larger gunpowder charge and shoot twice as far
as the European muskets.3
In course of time, the matchlocks were replaced by the lighter, more
reliable rapid firing flintlock muskets whose powder was ignited by a spark
produced through the action of flint on steel. The new guns were lighter and did
not require any rest and the rate of fire further improved with the use of paper
cartridges. In 1696, the Swedes introduced this weapon. The Dutch, English and
the French armies adopted flintlocks by 1700s. The flintlocks were made more
effective by replacement of the plug bayonets (which hindered firing), by ring and
socket bayonets which allowed firing with the blade in place.4 Jadunath Sarkar

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER & EVOLUTION OF ORDNANCE ESTABLISHMENT

413

tells us that the Mughal Emperor Shah Alams infantry was equipped with flintlocks.
Sarkar continues that in 1759, the Rohillas had flintlocks.5
In 1750, India produced 200,000 tons of iron, which was about the same
as in all of Europe in that year excluding Russia. And the Indian iron production
was largely devoted to shipbuilders and gun makers. Rosen asserts that qualitatively
Indian steel was better than British steel because surface iron ore was better than
that available in Europe. Indian bronze was not as good as British bronze but
Indian brass was better than European brass and made better artillery barrels.
Probably, the problem lay with the doctrine and organization of warfare.6
The Afghans and the Persians conceptualized the artillery not as an
independent battle winning arm but as a subsidiary system within the dominant
paradigm of cavalry warfare. Hence, they developed light mobile artillery known
as camel swivel guns (zamburaks or sutarnals) for supporting cavalry charges.
The camel swivel gun included the driver and the gunner sitting on the same camel.
From the Afghans and the Persians, the use of zamburaks passed on to the
Mughals. The Sikhs continued to use zamburaks (which fired 1-pound shell) till
the Second Anglo-Sikh War (1849).7 The zamburak functioned as the near
equivalent of the British Armys horse artillery gun.
Before the Battle of Third Panipat (1761), the Maratha artillery could not
be aimed properly in the battlefield,8 due to lack of elevating screws. Sadashiv
Rao Bhaus guns were made of brass (cast bronze) and were mounted on teakwood
carriages.9 Cast iron was cheaper, harder and more enduring than bronze. In
England, cast iron guns were manufactured as early as 1543.10 Deficient bellows
was the principal hurdle behind manufacturing cast iron field guns by the Indian
powers. Hence, the Indian rulers used European experts in order to establish
European style foundries11 and to cast guns for the princely armies. Before the
Second Anglo-Maratha War (1803-5), the Peshwa (hereditary Prime Minister of
the Maratha Confederacy) had 40-pounder guns which were cast by a Portuguese
in Pune. The carriages of such guns had wheels made of solid teak. After the First
Anglo-Maratha War (1774-83), Benoit De Boigne, a Savoyard was hired by the
Maratha sirdar Mahadji Sindia for modernizing his military apparatus. Sangster, a
Scoth used to cast field guns in Agra for De Boigne.12 Boigne also appointed
Perron, a French, who was an artisan skilled in operating the cannon foundry.13
Use of European mercenaries for their technical skill seemed to be a global trend.
During the early decades of the nineteenth century, the Muslim ruler of Egypt also

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utilized European advisors for making gunpowder and firearms.14 The Agra Fortress
under De Boigne became a depot for arms and munitions.15 Sindias Gwalior
Arsenal cast huge brass guns.16 De Boignes contingent was equipped with 3, 6
and 12-pounder guns. The guns constructed at Mathura and Agra had elevating
screws. These guns were modelled on the French pattern and in quality were
equivalent to those possessed by the EIC.17 Iqtidar Alam Khan asserts that
besides copying European military technology, the Marathas also resorted to
limited improvisations. The Maratha gun makers attempted to cast bronze casings
around the wrought iron barrels in order to raise the strength of wrought iron
barrels to the level of those cast in bronze, thus economizing on the use of copper
which was in short supply and costlier as well.18
Iron cannon balls were manufactured at Gwalior where there were iron
mines and saltpetre and sulphur were imported from Bikaner to Agra where
gunpowder was manufactured. In the Battle of Delhi (11 Sept. 1803) during the
Second Anglo-Maratha War, the Marathas used round, chain and grape shot
against Lord Lakes army.19 The grape shot was introduced in West Europe
during the fifteenth century. It consisted of small round shots packed in nets and
sacks and bore resemblance to cluster of grapes.20 And the muskets manufactured
in Sangsters arsenal in finish and durability were equivalent to the British products.21
Like the Maratha Confederacy, the Khalsa Kingdom from the second
decade of the nineteenth century also went to a great length in modernizing its
military apparatus. The Kashmiri artisans at Lahore manufactured muskets and
pistols. By 1837, Khalsa infantry was capable of volley firing. Ranjit Singh
manufactured cannons with the help of the French officer M. Court. Grape firing
by the Sikh guns caused lot of casualties among the EICs troops in the Battle of
Ferozeshah (21-22 December 1845). The Sikh guns were heavier in metal than
the similar caliber guns possessed by the EICs Bengal Army.22 However, the Sikh
gunners lacked adequate training.
The cavalry branch of the Indian powers remained conservative. The
cavalry of the indigenous powers did not adopt the wheellock and flintlock on a
large scale. Most of them used matchlocks. However, certain cavalry units
maintained by the EIC were equipped with advanced handguns. For instance, the
sowars of the 1st Punjab Cavalry carried carbines.23 In the final instance, the
EICs forces not only had better materials of war but the ordnance establishment
ensured a systematic supply of military hardware.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER & EVOLUTION OF ORDNANCE ESTABLISHMENT

MANUFACTURE

OF

GUNS, GUN CARRIAGES

AND

415

GUNPOWDER

The ordnance establishment of British-India manufactured gunpowder,

small arms and various types of cannons, mortars and howitzers. Gunpowder was
made by mixing together under pressure, saltpetre (nitrate), sulphur and charcoal
in the following proportion: 75 percent, 10 percent and 15 percent respectively.
The nitrate functioned as an oxidizer in the burning reaction.24 Saltpetre occurred
as nitrogenous materials rotting in the ground and was converted by bacteria to
form nitrates. High temperature and humidity in India accelerated the decomposition
process. India had abundant supply of saltpetre or potassium nitrate due to huge
demographic resources and use of large number of domestic animals especially in
Orissa and in the Ganga Valley. The earth of the Ganga Valley was richly
impregnated with saltpetre in a natural state which was extracted by lixiviation,
evaporation and crystallisation. In Bengal, saltpetre was gathered in large masses
wherever it effloresced on the soil especially during the rainy season. In India, the
men from the lonea and the nunia castes collected the saltpetre rich earth and
undertook its initial treatment to refine it by boiling it in water before it could be
used for making gunpowder.25 The EIC found out that buying saltpetre in India
was much cheaper than importing this commodity. Bengal also supplied saltpetre
to the other two British presidencies. To give an example, in 1696, a ship named
Josia Ketch belonging to the EIC transferred 700 bags of saltpetre from Bengal
to the Bombay Presidency.26 In 1689, one Daniel Chardin bought saltpetre from
Bengal for selling it to Britain. The authorities at Fort St. George complained that
this should not be allowed in future as Madras was suffering from a shortage of
saltpetre supply.27
In 1752, Lieutenant-Colonel Caroline Frederick Scott had the contract of
supplying gunpowder to Fort William.28 The EIC encouraged the contractors to
supply them with saltpetre or made advances to the assamis who were required
to furnish saltpetre to the EICs officials. While providing contract for supplying
saltpetre, advertisements were issued at Kolkata and Patna and invitations were
issued to the Indian merchants to come forward for supplying the EIC with
saltpeter. The saltpetre was stored in gunny bags, each of whose cost in 1779
varied between 8 to 12 Annas.29
Refined saltpetre increased the charge of the gunpowder. Hence, the EIC
was interested in acquiring refined saltpetre for its own use. In 1779, Dr. Bryant
Higgins, a chemist who was employed by the Board of Ordnance at Britain in his

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INDIAN JOURNAL OF HISTORY OF SCIENCE

report stated that the saltpetre supplied by EIC from Bengal and Patna were
unrefined and was not suited for making good gunpowder. In 1782, the Supreme
Council informed the Board of Trade that refined saltpetre must be acquired. The
Agent for the Manufacture of Gunpowder found out that on refining the weight
of the saltpetre was diminished by about one-fourth. In 1783, the EIC entered
into an agreement with a chief at Patna for supplying refined saltpetre. The wastage
of Patna saltpetre due to refining was about 27%. The expense of refining a
maund of saltpetre exclusive of the charge for the boiling pots came to about 12
Annas. In September 1782, 12 copper boilers were sent to Patna. On 19 November
1782, the EICs Resident at Patna sent to the Board of Trade a proposal for
contracting for the investment of saltpetre in its refined state at a cost of Sicca Rs
5.5 per maund (excluding the wages of the factory servants and the gomastas)
which will be delivered to Kolkata. One maund was equivalent to 80 pounds and
the gomastas were Indian agents of the British traders. In December 1782, the
Board of Trade informed the Supreme Council that if the price of labour, firewood
and copper boilers were taken into account then the cost of refining saltpetre
came to about Sicca Rs 3 per maund. The sub-export warehousekeeper at Patna
was in charge of refining the saltpetre. The price of saltpetre at Patna was Rs 3
Anna 12 Pice 3 per maund and the charges of transportation to Kolkata was
Anna 8 Pice 10. The total price including transportation charges came to about
Rs 4 Anna 5 Pice 1.30
During 1783-84, the contractor at Patna supplied 44,800 maunds of
refined saltpetre. The contractor charged Rs 5 Anna 8 for per maund of refined
saltpetre supplied. In addition, he charged Rs 14,173 Anna 5 as wages of the
factory servants and the gomastas. The contractor made a profit of Rs 1 Anna
8 per maund of saltpetre supplied.31 During November 1791, Jagannath Prashad,
a Hindu businessman close to the Nawab of Awadh provided the EIC with 6,300
maunds of saltpetre and by boats transferred it from Awadh to Kolkata. Prashad
had several Indian agents who collected the saltpetre from different villages on his
behalf.32 With the passage of time, the volume of saltpetre bought by the EIC
rose. Table 1 gives an account of the saltpetre bought by the EIC in India during
the period between the Fourth Anglo-Mysore War (1799) and the Second AngloMaratha War (1803-5).
The EIC found that it was easier and cheaper to acquire the other
commodities necessary for making gunpowder from India. In 1819-20, sulphur

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417

was sent from England for the manufacture of gunpowder. However, the material
deteriorated during storage. So, it was decided to use the local product. Sulphur
was procured from the Indian bazars at the price of Rs 2 Anna 12 per maund.
Due to increasing demand, the price rose to Rs 5 Anna 8 per maund. By 1822,
Table 1: Value of Saltpetre bought by the East India Company in India between 1798-1808
Date
1798-99
1799-1800
1800-01
1801-02
1802-03
1803-04
1804-05
1805-06
1806-07
1807-08

Value of Saltpetre bought in Sterling Pounds

2,26,742
4,10,928
2,28,250
96,880
1,56,596
2,39,170
1,29,192
2,17,769
1,86,896
1,79,932

Source: Appendix no. 10, Account of Sales for ten Years, from 1798-99 to 1807-08;
distinguishing India and China, and the species of goods from each, Parliamentary Papers,
Colonies, East Indies (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1971), p. 243.

Fort William had a huge stock of sulphur and it met the demands of the other two
presidencies.33
In 1669, the EIC constructed a gunpowder mill at Bombay. During 1673,
the powder mill at Bombay always maintained 2,000 barrels of gunpowder.34 In
1741, the gunpowder manufactured in this mill was considered superior than the
quality of gunpowder imported from Europe. Preparation of gunpowder required
pulverizing which meant the initial mixing of charcoal and sulphur. In this process,
the charcoal was broken down into particles and got mixed with sulphur. The
quality of powder was dependent on how well this was done. Initially, the labourers
used stone mortars for pressing the various components of gunpowder. During
February 1745, the gunpowder mill at Bombay was expanded and the numbers
of stamps were raised from 2 to 4. In 1768, buffaloes were used for turning the
machinery used for pressing gunpowder. Mule driven mills for grinding the ingredients
of gunpowder were already used in the Portuguese Gunpowder Factory at Goa
from 1630 onwards. In 1779, the output of the Bombay Powder Mill rose by
about 1,000 barrels per season.35 Still demand outstripped supply. In December
1786, Bengal supplied Bombay Presidency with 1,500 barrels of gunpowder.36

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The EIC also took steps for manufacturing gunpowder in Madras. In

1639, Fort St. George was constructed at Madras. Originally, the village known
as Madrasapatam was 230 miles south of Masulipatam. The Madrasapatam
village was between River Elambore (Coum) and the sea. The land was granted
by the Naik of Chingleput. Andrew Cogan was the leader of the party which
established the settlement. The initial establishment comprised of a couple of
writers, some European surgeons and artificers and an Indian powder maker
along with 25 armed guards.37 In 1690, Fort St. George was still not selfsufficient as regards the production of gunpowder. Gunpowder was still imported
from Britain.38 However, Fort St. George took steps to augment the production
of gunpowder. In April 1690, 50 pagodas were advanced to the powder maker
for manufacturing gunpowder which would be supplied to the garrison. In July
1690, for the same purpose, another 50 pagodas were given to the powder
maker.39 The demand for gunpowder rose when the EIC was engaged in fighting
the Nawab of Carnatic, Marathas and the French in the Madras Presidency. On
19 December 1753, the dispatch from the EIC to Thomas Saunders, one of their
official at London noted: As it is very dangerous to send large quantities of
gunpowder from Europe, and as with the necessary skill it can be made just as
well in India, send an exact model of a powder house and mills with a minute
description, and William Bishop to be Superintendent of the powder works on
sterling pounds 100 a year with pay as a First Lieutenant of the Military.40
The experts for manufacturing gunpowder were always imported from
Britain. In a letter dated 9 May 1764, India House at London informed Fort
William:
As a person well versed in the method of making gunpowder is extremely
difficult to found, Mr Walton has been for three or four years qualifying
himself in that manufacture and has offered his service to proceed to your
Presidency next season when he will be fully master of the whole process
to give you good assistance in this particular branch. As an encouragement
to Mr. Walton we shall appoint him a factor upon the Bengal establishment
to rank next after the lowest factor upon the list at the time of his arrival.41

The demand for gunpowder soared during the Second Anglo-Maratha

War. This, in turn witnessed the expansion of gunpowder manufacturing capacity
of the EICs ordnance establishment. On 4 May 1804, 1,000 barrels were sent
to Ishapore Powder Work which was manufacturing gunpowder. The warehouse
supplied 1,000 pounds of saltpetre to Ishapore. The Allahabad Manufactory also

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER & EVOLUTION OF ORDNANCE ESTABLISHMENT

419

started manufacturing gunpowder.42 On 26 April 1804, L. Hook, Secretary to the

government wrote to Captain A. Greene, Secretary to the Military Board: I am
directed by the governor-general in council to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter and to inform you that His Excellency approves of the military board having
authorized Captain Taylor, Agent for the Gunpowder at Allahabad, to proceed
immediately in the construction of the two additional boring houses.43 Between
1798 and 1805, the ordnance establishment of Bengal Presidency supplied the
Cape of Good Hope with gunpowder worth 11,164 sterling pounds (freight
charges not included). The factories making gunpowder generally pursued
production policy on the assumption of three years consumption in peacetime.44
As early as 1672, gun carriages were manufactured in Fort St. George
at Madras and the iron works for these carriages were imported from Britain. In
1744, timber from Tellicherry in the Malabar Coast was used for manufacturing
the gun carriages. In 1748, John Gray, the Master-Carpenter in Madras was in
charge of manufacturing gun carriages. In 1782, axles for gun carriages were
manufactured at the Fort William Arsenal. The EIC established 4 gun carriage
factories: Cossipore (1801), Seringapatnam (1802), Bombay (1810) and Fatehgarh
(1816). In 1801, there were 19 forges at the Cossipore Gun Carriage Agency.
In order to meet the extraordinary demands during the Second Anglo-Maratha
War, a temporary gun carriage factory was established at Khidderpur near Kolkata.
By March 1805, this factory manufactured 235 carriages. By 1830, the Gun
Carriage Factory at Fatehgarh was producing carriages, limbers, swivel collar iron
bars, swivel yokes for the bullocks and ammunition wagons.45
During the First Anglo-Burma War, Cossipore manufactured Royal Pattern
Black Trail Gun Carriage. The timber yard at Chitpur provided Cossipore Gun
Carriage Factory with seasoned timber (teak or Sissoo).46 In 1830, Cossipore
while producing gun carriages faced a problem in acquiring good timber. Major
L. Taylor the Garrison Engineer at Fort William in a letter dated 21 June 1830
informed Lieutenant-Colonel R. Rickett, Superintendent Engineer of the Lower
Province:
There is great difficulty in obtaining wood from the agency yard at
Cossipore. Initially we procured some timber but after cutting up they
proved to be unworkable for our purpose. It caused much additional
expenses. There is the difficulty of procuring hackeries to carry such
heavy timber, several of them having broken down, the hackery men being
unwilling to undertake the job. The military board should give permission

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to Captain Hutchinson to cut up the timbers and to supply me with wood

in the half wrought state.47

Rickett argued that the timber ought to be cut at the Agency Yard at
Cossipore.48 On 6 July 1830, John Craigie, Secretary of the Military Board
replied to the superintending engineer of the Lower Provinces: I am directed by
the military board to acknowledge the receipt of your letter no. 535 dated the 28th
ultimo, and to acquaint you in reply, that the board deems it expedient to adhere
to the arrangement at present in force which required executive officers at the
presidency to indent for the whole timber. The board observes that if the garrison
engineer will attend at the Cossipore Yard to ascertain that the timbers selected
for him are of good quality; the evils he complains of would not occur.49
The most important duty of the ordnance factories was to manufacture
guns. The first brass gun was manufactured at Cossipore in 1756 just before the
Battle of Plassey (1757). In 1765, India House sent to Fort William a brass 3pounder field gun which was lighter than the older patterns.50 The authorities at
Fort William were supposed to study this new gun before embarking on
manufacturing guns on their own establishments. In 1770, Captain Glass established
a foundry in Patna where casting of brass 3-pounder guns and 10-inch mortars
was done.51 Frederick of Prussia first introduced howitzer whose fire trajectory
was higher while ordinary cannons fire trajectory was flat. Hence, howitzer was
used to fire at the enemy when the friendly troops were engaged in close combat
with the enemy. The curved trajectory of a howitzer was also useful for firing
behind the enemy lines. A mortar was a small howitzer and had a far steeper
trajectory. Generally, a mortar was a short piece with a large bore and a chamber
and was primarily used to fire shells from a high angle. Whereas a mortar had a
fixed quadrant elevation of 45 degree (the range was adjusted by altering the
weight of the charge), the howitzer was able to fire at variable elevations and also
horizontally against troops in the open. Generally, howitzers were more mobile
than mortars but were approximately twice as heavy for the same bore. The
mortars and howitzers were used in siege operation in an anti-personnel role in
order to kill the defenders inside the forts.52 In 1804, in order to make up the
shortfall of guns, the EIC bought eight 4-pounder guns which were brought to
India by the Danish ship Hanna.53 Bronze 3-pounder guns were produced at Fort
William from 1809 till 1821. Bronze 4.5 inch mortars (range was 900 metres)
were manufactured at Fort William by Major J.D. Sherwood, Commissary of
Stores at Fort William (1816-37) from 1816 onwards. Captain George Hutchinson

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER & EVOLUTION OF ORDNANCE ESTABLISHMENT

421

was appointed Superintendent of the Fort William Foundry. He moved it to

Cossipore about 8.6 km north of Fort William. The Cossipore Foundry in 1834
under Hutchinson produced 3-pounder guns which had a range of 1 km. In 1840,
Archdale Wilson was put in charge of the Cossipore Foundry, and supervised the
casting of the guns. Wilson continued to remain as the Superintendent of Cossipore
till 1845. Under his supervision, bronze 4.5-inch mortars were manufactured at
Cossipore from 1841 onwards.54
Along with heavier guns, new types of guns were being manufactured
thanks to the import of machinery from Britain. During the Peninsular War, the
British Army found out that the brass ordnance was unable to fire as many rounds
as the iron ordnance. Rapid firing by the brass ordnance resulted in overheating
of the muzzles which then started to droop.55 The foundry at Fort William was
capable of making only brass guns. But, in 1834 due to the new plant imported
from Europe, the foundry at Cossipore acquired the capability of casting iron
cupolas for manufacturing iron guns. This foundry had 2 steam engines of 10 and
12 horsepower respectively, 6 gun lathes, 1 trunnion lathe, 2 mortar lathes, 2
screw cutting lathes and 7 other lathes. Thus, we see that steam power was
replacing the animal power used for driving the machinery. Between 1840-50,
Cossipore produced 12, 18, 24 and 32-pounder iron guns, 3, 6 and 9-pounder
brass guns, 8-inch 4-pounders, 8-inch 5-pounders and 10-inch iron howitzers,
12-pounder brass howitzers (for mountain warfare) and 24-pounder howitzers.56
In 1853, Cossipore manufactured 92 iron guns, 17 brass mountain howitzers
and 34 brass guns.57 In 1856, Cossipore manufactured carriages for 32-pounders
and 24-pounder guns, elevating screws for 24-pounders, 12-pounders, 9-pounders
and 6-pounder guns. During 1855-56, Cossipore manufactured 139 brass guns.
In the next year, output rose to 146 pieces. In 1856-57, the total number of brass
guns manufactured by the ordnance factories numbered to 415.58
From guns now we move to hand held firearms. The Redcoats carried
flintlocks. In 1696, Fort St. George sent 1,000 flints to Fort St. David.59 In the
1740s, the wooden ramrods were replaced by iron ramrods.60 During the Second
Anglo-Maratha War while the EICs troops had Brown Bess muskets, the French
trained Maratha infantry was equipped with matchlocks and fusils.61 Percussion
cap was introduced in 1839. It reduced misfires from 40% to 4%.62 In 1844, a
percussion cap factory was added to the Bombay Powder Mill.63 Henry Steinbach,
a Prussian mercenary officer in the Khalsa Army noted that the muskets used by

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the Sikh soldiers were inferior and incapable of throwing a ball to a significant
distance. Further, quick and repeated firings resulted in bursting of the barrels.64
Such sort of defect was unknown among the hand held firearms manufactured and
maintained by the EICs ordnance establishment in the subcontinent.
EXPANSION OF THE ORDNANCE ESTABLISHMENT IN BRITISH-INDIA
The British constructed a string of arsenals and magazines for storing and
distributing military equipment for its various detachments in the field. The arsenals
had workshops for repairing military equipment and laboratories for manufacturing
ammunition. The magazines were used mainly for storing gunpowder.65 These
arsenals and magazines were located along the probable routes of military
deployment and especially at the critical strategic nodes. Construction and
maintenance of the magazines increased the operational range of the EICs army.
The arsenals and the magazines supplied the regiments with arms and munitions
both during war and peace. During the Second Anglo-Maratha War, ammunition
for the EICs detachment serving in Rohilkhand was brought from the magazines
at Aligarh (50 miles south-east of Delhi) and Fatehgarh. During the First Siege of
Bharatpur (1804), the EICs force acquired battering guns from Fatehgarh and
Aligarh and the cannon shots from the magazines established at Agra (60 miles
east of Bharatpur), Dig and Mathura (40 miles north-east of Agra on river
Jamuna).66 In 1822, for the troops operating south of river Narmada, shots and
shells were stored at the Nagpur Magazine.67 In 1830, the 3rd Local Horse
Regiment was deployed in Saugor for internal security duties. During the month
of June, the Deputy Commissary at Saugor was ordered to provide the regiment
with the following articles: 3,200 balled cartridges for pistol, 320 pistol flints, 500
pounds of lead, 87 musketry pistols and 500 pounds of gunpowder.68
The military department took care in maintaining and expanding the arsenals,
magazines and the manufactories. The EIC from the very beginning spent lot of
money to protect their arsenals and magazines. Between 1639 and 1643, the EIC
spent 4,150 sterling pounds for fortifying Fort St. George. In February 1756, the
redoubt at Perrins Point known as the Bagh Bazar Redoubt was completed at
a cost of Rs 29,000.69 In 1801, 20 bighas of land was purchased from Mr.
Thornhill at a price of about Sikka Rs 5,000. Captain Preston of Military Engineering
Service at a cost of Rs 20,000 constructed gunsheds and building, and it came
to be known as Gun Carriage Agency Cossipore. Another Rs 20,700 was spent
for importing the machinery for the plant.70 In 1822, land worth Sicca Rs 5,289,

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Anna 12 and Paise 10 around Ishapore Powder Works was bought for expanding
the establishment. In 1822, construction of sheds for ordnance bullocks and a
puccka flat roof verandah to the house of the gunpowder agent of Allahabad and
a wall around the old burial ground cost Sonaut Rs 5,366, Anna 13 Paise 8.71
One sonaut rupee had 165 grains of silver compared to 174 grains in the Sikka
rupee. In 1822, at a cost of Sonaut Rs 2,734, Anna 1 Paise 6, a temporary gun
shed with storerooms was constructed at Mhow in central India. In 1822, Sikka
Rs 23,010 Anna 12 Paise 7 was spent for repairing and expanding the buildings
of the gun carriage agency at Cossipore.72 In 1830, a pukka road was constructed
inside the DumDum Magazine for better drainage.73 During 1830, at Fort William
13 carts and 2 bullocks were maintained for transportation of guns and ammunition.
The monthly expenditure came to about Sikka Rs 185, Anna 11 and Paise 6.74
In April 1830, Sonaut Rs 58, Anna 9 and Paise 8.5 were spent for repairing the
gun shed at Shhjahnpur.75 In 1830, a new powder magazine was constructed
at Dinapore at the cost of Rs 4,000. The capacity of this new magazine was to
hold 2,600 barrels of powder. And the superintendent engineer of the Lower
Province was ordered to repair the old magazine.76 In 1841, an aqueduct was
constructed within Fort William Arsenal at a cost of Rs 6,072 for continuous
supply of water in order to extinguish any fire, if it broke out. After six years, for
repairing the reservoirs and aqueduct of Fort William Arsenal, Rs 449, Anna 2
Paise 6 was expended. An explosion of gunpowder on 5 January 1847 destroyed
the number 3 mill house of Ishapore. For reconstructing the mill house at Ishapore,
the EIC had to spend Rs 892, Anna 1 Paise 4. For repairing the woodworks and
palisades of the Allahabad Fortress including the manufactory, the EIC from 1847
onwards had to spend annually Rs 13,550. In 1847, Rs 707 was spent for
constructing a redoubt around the Ambala Magazine.77
A sort of quasi-military industrialization which British-India underwent
strengthened the genesis of the military-fiscal organism. This also gave rise to a
bureaucracy. The Raj kept a detailed account of the correspondence between
various officials engaged in military production. On 24 June 1830, W.H. Oakes
from the military accounts office at Fort William informed the secretary and
accountant of the military board: I beg to annex copy of a charge of Sonaut Rs
543-3-6 against Captain Sommerville Executive Officer brought forward in the
cash account current from 1 May 1828 to 30 April 1829 of the agent for gun
carriages at Cossipore and to request you to forward to this office any receipt (or
copy thereof) granted by Captain Sommerville for the above sum or a statement

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showing the particulars of the account.78 Major W. Battaine, the Principal

Commissary of Ordnance, informed Lieutenant-Colonel John Craigie: I have the
honour to enclose a bill for pay to the extra magazine men employed in the arsenal
of Fort William for the month of May last, amounting to Sonaut Rupees 500,
Anna 88 and Pies 4, which I beg you will be pleased to lay before the board to
be passed.79 The governor-generals council also kept a tab on the minutest
detail regarding the labourers. And all the relevant information was recorded on
paper. Extra artisans were employed temporarily in the arsenals to tide over
emergencies for meeting extra production output. On 25 June 1830, the governorgeneral informed the military board that the superintendent and director of the
Fort William Foundry was authorized to entertain 6 extra artisans for cleaning the
new machinery recently brought by two ships of the EIC.80
Some elements within the British ruling class were against military
industrialization of British-India. They wanted to import state of the art military
hardware from the West, while some politicians and British officers wanted to
pursue the programme of limited military industrialization within India. On 15
February 1765, India House accused the Fort William authorities that the gunpowder
which had been manufactured by them and sent to London for inspection was of
bad quality. Its charge was quite low. They pointed out that the charcoal used was
bad and the brimstone and saltpetre used were not properly refined. India House
warned that gunpowder cannot be send from London due to lack of shipping
facilities and moreover even when the shipping space was available then also
sending ships laden with gunpowder made them very vulnerable to fire by accidents.
Hence, Fort William should take all possible steps for improving the quality of
gunpowder and should appoint a board which would supervise the cost, quality
and quantity of gunpowder manufactured.81
In 1811, the court of directors pointed out that the guns manufactured at
the Fort William foundry were inferior to those manufactured in Europe. So, the
court of directors wanted to close the manufactory. However, the military board
disagreed and argued that the guns manufactured at Fort William were equal in
quality if not better than those manufactured in Europe. In 1818, when the Third
Anglo-Maratha War ended, due to the insistence of Governor-General Lord
Hastings several pieces of ordnance manufactured in the ordnance factories at
India were sent to Britain and it was found out that the specimens were much
better than the products churned out by the Royal Arsenal at Woolwich.82

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425

In 1822, 11,186 barrels of defective gunpowder was manufactured at

Allahabad Ordnance Factory.83 It provided grist to the mills of the lobby which
wanted to import military hardware from Britain. But, the court of directors
ordered the EICs officials that they should encourage manufacture of military
hardware within India as a cost cutting measure. The court of directors in a letter
dated 30 September 1829 informed the Bengal Presidency: The cost of supplying
all the stores from England is prohibitive. So, you must try to obtain as much as
possible from the subcontinent. It would be cheaper. You should purchase and
manufacture some goods in India.84 The penny-pinching Governor-General Lord
Bentinck, agreed with this proposal. However, the court of directors warned that
there should be no compromise on quality. The military board was ordered to
enquire and inform the court of directors if the military hardware produced in
India though cheaper, were inferior in quality to the products manufactured in
Britain.85
Some officers tried to obstruct military industrialization in British-India.
Brigadier A. Macleod, Commandant of the Artillery on 6 July 1830 wrote to
Bentinck: As regards the court of directors letter, we must judge Indian
manufacture with regard to quality and price, it might be a case of false economy.
We demand special shells for the 9-pounder field guns and Royal Pattern cavalry
swords.86 In 1830, some military officers claimed that the brass 24-pounder
howitzer (meaning 5.5-inch) and the 9-pounder field pieces and their carriages
manufactured in India, were indeed defective. While firing, due to the thrust of
recoil, their carriages burst. The governor-general replied that further tests were
required with proper carriages before a decision could be taken. The select
committee of artillery officers at DumDum was ordered to find out the requisite
proportion of the metal used in the gun and the charge of powder.87
In 1739, at Geneva, a Swiss gun founder named Maritz invented the
boring machine. By using a lathe driven by horses, Maritz bored guns from solid
castings. The previous method was casting the piece hollow on a core.88 This new
technique was adopted by the ordnance establishment of British-India. Captain G.
Hutchinson, the Superintendent and Director of the Fort William Foundry in a
letter dated 3 July 1830 replied to the secretary of the military board: I have the
honour to inform you that the brass cylinders cast in the foundry agreeable to the
Boards order of the 8th December last, and reported ready for delivery in my
letter number 292 of the 26th February last, are still in the foundry, they are quite

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INDIAN JOURNAL OF HISTORY OF SCIENCE

perfect without a single flaw and are bored and finished according to the dimensions
stated in Mr. Edwardes letter to the commissary general.89
Some sort of research and developmental activities were undertaken in
the British-Indian ordnance establishment in order to maintain the technological
lead. The military board came into existence in 1786.90 All the inventions connected
with carriages and improvements of artillery and guns of every description came
up before the military board. The commandant of the artillery, chief engineer, the
auditor general, the adjutant-general and the quarter-master general were members
of the military board. The commander-in-chief of India was the president of the
military board.91 In 1830, for the artillery personnel a laboratory was opened at
the Dinapore Powder Magazine.92 In the same year, Captain Hutchinson of the
Bengal Engineers visited Vienna for the purpose of studying gun manufacture and
erected the first steam machinery at Cossipore.93 In April 1847, the Allahabad
Powder Magazine was supplied with lightning copper conductors on the plan
designated by Professor Farraday and approved by the British government at the
cost of Rs 1,462 Anna 5 Paise 7.94 In 1802, shrapnel shells were invented and
were used in the Peninsular War.95 Captain W. Olperts of the Bengal Artillery
invented a metallic fuze which was carried ready and fixed and was set in the field
for any distance very easily. This made the use of sharpnel shells easier.96 During
the First Anglo-Sikh War, at the Battle of Sobraon (10 February 1846), against
the Khls Army, Littlers force had 2 iron 8-inch howitzers with shrapnel shell
ammunition filled in 4.5 oz balls.97
The British were always conscious of maintaining firepower superiority
over their indigenous opponents. So, the military officials took care to upgrade
their artillery regularly and to store the latest pieces in the arsenals and magazines.
With the passage of time, the guns became heavier and their ranges increased. In
July 1830, the military board decided that 6-pounders (effective range 500 yards)
and 5.2-inch howitzers should be replaced by the 9-pounders (effective range
800 yards) and 24-pounder howitzers. And those new guns should be kept
stored in the Katak Magazine. The magazines and arsenals at Mewar and Nimach
were ordered to maintain 12-pounder brass guns.98 It is to be noted that during
the First Anglo-Sikh War (1845-6), the EIC used 8-inch howitzers.99 Horse
artillery guns were introduced in the British Army in 1793 and in the Bengal Army
in 1800. In 1803, the EIC had 3-pounder horse artillery guns. But, in 1846, the
EIC had 6-pounder horse artillery guns, and each of them weighed 4.5 cwt.100
The 9-pounder field artillery of the EIC during the Sikh Wars was drawn by

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER & EVOLUTION OF ORDNANCE ESTABLISHMENT

427

bullocks.101 Nevertheless, during the Battle of Ferozeshah, quantitatively and

qualitatively, Sikh artillery was superior than the artillery deployed by the EICs
force.102 However, the bane of the khalsa golundazs was the absence of tactical
doctrine and training.
CONCLUSION
Initially, the EIC was interested in acquiring the components of gunpowder
from India. The process of acquisition of sulphur and saltpetre involved
subcontracting to various Indian social groups. The Indian merchants and the
various communities associated with manufacturing saltpetre made hay as the
EICs demand for gunpowder rose. From late eighteenth century two lobbies
emerged within the British ruling elite: while one group was for buying the state
of art military products from Britain, the other lobby was for manufacturing the
military goods in the ordnance establishment established in British-India. By the
first half of the nineteenth century, the British-Indian Empire was dotted with
arsenals and magazines which aided the operation of the army for protecting and
expanding the frontiers of the Empire. With the passage of time, small manufactories
became transformed into full fledged factories. Gradually, the factories upgraded
and diversified the items of production. Throughout the period under review, the
flow of firearms technology was from the West to the East. While in the princely
states, the diffusion of military technology was from French sources, in the case
of the EICs ordnance establishment, the source of diffusion was Britain. The
technical designs for most of the products were obtained from Britain. Only minor
innovations occurred within the ordnance factories of British-India. After the collapse
of the princely states, their ordnance establishments were emasculated by the
British. Due to lack of shipping facilities, the supply of hardware from Britain was
uncertain and inadequate. Hence, the ordnance factories of British-India despite
the charges of churning out second grade products at higher cost, continued to
function and remained operational in the nineteenth century.
REFERENCES
1.

For a global survey see Kenneth Chase, Firearms: A Global History to 1700, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2003.

2.

T.S. Shejwalkar, Panipat: 1761, Deccan College Postgraduate and Research Institute,
Pune, 1946, p. 24; W. Egerton, An Illustrated Handbook of Indian Arms and those of
Nepal, Burma, Thailand Malaya, 1880, reprint, White Orchid Press, Bangkok, 1986,
p. 59.

428

INDIAN JOURNAL OF HISTORY OF SCIENCE

3.

Stephen Peter Rosen, Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters, International

Security, 19 (1995), 22-3.

4.

Jeremy Black, A Military Revolution? Military Change and European Society, 15501800, Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke, 1991, p. 22.

5.

Jadunath Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, vol. 2, 1754-71, 1934, reprint, Orient
Longman, Delhi, 1991, pp. 97, 122.

6.

Rosen, Military Effectiveness, 23.

7.

Shejwalkar, Panipat: 1761, p. 11; Henry Steinbach, The Country of the Sikhs, n.d.,
reprint, KLM Books, New Delhi, 1977, p. 84; W.L. MGregor, The History of the Sikhs,
vol. 2, 1846, reprint, R.S. Publishing House, Allahabad, 1979, p. 160.

8.

Shejwalkar, Panipat: 1761, p. 19.

9.

George MacMunn, Vignettes from Indian War, 1901, reprint, Low Price Publications,
Delhi, 1993, p. 23.

10.

Colonel H.C.B. Rogers, A History of Artillery, Citadel Press, New Jersey, 1975, p. 28.

11.

I.A. Khan, The Indian Response to Firearms, 1300-1750, in Brenda J. Buchanan, ed.,
Gunpowder, Explosives and the State: A Technological History, Ashgate, Aldershot,
2006, p. 60.

12.

MacMunn, Vignettes from Indian War, pp. 4, 7.

13.

Herbert Compton, A Particular Account of the European Military Adventurers of

Hindustan from 1784-1803, 1892, reprint, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1976, p.
223.

14.

Patrice Bret, Gunpowder Manufacture in Cairo from Bonaparte to Muhammad Ali:

Adaptation, Innovation and the Transfer of Technology, 1798-1820, in Buchanan, ed.,
Gunpowder, p. 218.

15.

Compton, European Military Adventurers of Hindustan, p. 47.

16.

MacMunn, Vignettes from Indian War, p. 38.

17.

Compton, European Military Adventurers of Hindustan, pp. 48, 312.

18.

Khan, Indian Response to Firearms, in Buchanan, ed., Gunpowder, p. 58.

19.

Compton, European Military Adventurers of Hindustan, pp. 311, 388.

20.

Rogers, History of Artillery, p. 24.

21.

Compton, European Military Adventurers of Hindustan, p. 47.

22.

Steinbach, Country of the Sikhs, pp. 77, 79, 91; W.L. MGregor, The History of the
Sikhs, vol. 1, 1846, reprint, R.S. Publishing House, Allahabad, 1979, p. 290; vol. 2, pp.
124, 185; Kaushik Roy, Firepower-Centric Warfare in India and the Military
Modernization of the Marathas: 1740-1818, Indian Journal of History of Science

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER & EVOLUTION OF ORDNANCE ESTABLISHMENT

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(hereafter IJHS), 40 (2005), 597-634; Technology and Transformation of Sikh Warfare:

Dal Khalsa against Lal Paltans, 1800-49, IJHS, 41 (2006), 383-410.
23.

Jos J.L. Gommans and Dirk H.A. Kolff, Introduction: Warfare and Weaponry in South
Asia, 1000-1800 AD, in Gommans and Kolff, eds., Warfare and Weaponry in South
Asia: 1000-1800, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2001, p. 28; History of the 1st
Punjab Cavalry, Civil & Military Gazette Press, Lahore, 1887, p. 3.

24.

Brenda J. Buchanan, Editors Introduction: Setting the Context, and Robert A. Howard,
Realities and Perceptions in the Evolution of Black Powder Making, in Buchanan,
ed., Gunpowder, p. 1, 13, 24.

25.

Bruce Lenman, Britains Colonial Wars: 1688-1783, Pearson, Harlow, Essex, 2001, p.
83; Asitesh Bhattacharya, Gunpowder and its Applications in Ancient India, and
Brenda J. Buchanan, Saltpetre: A Commodity of Empire, in Buchanan, ed., Gunpowder,
pp. 45, 68, 78, 87.

26.

Records of Fort St. George, Letters from Fort St. George for 1696, Superintendent of
Govt. Press, Madras, 1921, pp. 93, 97.

27.

Records of Fort St. George, Diary and Consultation Book of 1690, Superintendent
Govt. Press, Madras, 1917, p. 14.

28.

Lieutenant-Colonel E.W.C. Sandes, The Military Engineer in India (1933, reprint,

Eastbourne: The Naval & Military Press, 1997), p. 53.

29.

Fort William-India House Correspondence and other Contemporary Papers relating

thereto (Public Series), vol. 10, 1786-88, ed. by Raghubir Sinh, Manager of Publications,
Delhi, 1972, Letter dated 12 April 1786, pp. 110-11.

30.

Fort William-India House Correspondence, vol. 10, Letter dated 27 March 1787, pp.
111, 233-34.

31.

Fort William-India House Correspondence, vol. 10, Letter dated 27 March 1787, p. 234.

32.

Calendar of Persian Correspondence Being Letters which passed between some of

the Companys Servants and Indian Rulers and Notables, vol. 9, 1790-1, National
Archives of India, New Delhi, 1949, 15 Nov. 1791, no. 1652, p. 333.

33.

Para 83-4, 29 Dec. 1822, Military Letters to the Court of Directors, National Archives
of India (henceforth NAI), New Delhi.

34.

Sandes, Military Engineer in India, p. 21.

35.

History of the Indian Ordnance and Clothing Factories, Govt. of India Press, Simla,
1938, pp. 2-3; Howard, Evolution of Black Powder Mixing, and Jose Manuel de
Mascarenhas, Portuguese Overseas Gunpowder Factories, in particular those of Goa
(India) and Rio de Janerio, in Buchanan, ed., Gunpowder, pp. 25, 186, 192; Henry
Dodwell, ed., Calendar of the Madras Despatches: 1744-55, Madras Govt. Press,
Madras, 1920, p. 10.

430

INDIAN JOURNAL OF HISTORY OF SCIENCE

36.

Fort William-India House Correspondence, vol. 10, Letter dated 28 Dec. 1786, p. 463.

37.

Sandes, Military Engineer in India, p. 4.

38.

Records of Fort St. George, Diary and Consultation Book of 1690, p. 7.

39.

Records of Fort St. George, Diary and Consultation Book of 1690, pp. 27, 55.

40.

Calendar of the Madras Despatches: 1744-55, p. 221.

41.

Fort William-India House Correspondence and other Contemporary papers relating

thereto (Public Series), vol. 4, 1764-66, ed. by C.S. Srinivasachari, Manager of
Publications Govt. of India, Delhi, 1962, p. 42.

42.

To Capt. A Greene Secy. to the Military Board (hereafter MB), Fort William, from L.
Hook, 26 April 1804, To Greene, 4 May 1804, pp. 5, 8, MB Proceedings (henceforth
MBP), NAI.

43.

From L. Hook to A. Greene, 26 April 1804, pp. 7-8, MBP.

44.

An Account of the Expenses incurred by the East India Company in India and England
for the intended Expedition against the French Islands, and for the Expedition against,
and Supplies to, the Cape of Good Hope, no. 1, Parliamentary Papers (hereafter PP),
Colonies East India Sessions 1805-10 (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1971), p. 21;
Minutes of Evidence taken before the Select Committee on the Affairs of the East India
Company, Military, vol. 5, PP, 1832, Para 631-4, p. 139.

45.

History of the Indian Ordnance and Clothing Factories, pp. 14-17; Arun Bandopadhyay,
History of Gun and Shell Factory Cossipore: Two Hundred Years of Ordnance
Production in India, Allied, Kolkata, 2002, p. 16; Calendar of the Madras Despatches:
1744-55, p. 53; To Lieut.-Col. Craigie, Secy. and Accountant to the MB, Fort William,
from Capt. R.B. Fulton, Agent for Gun Carriages, Fatehgarh, Gun Carriage Agents
Office, 21 June 1830, Progs. no. 44, MBP.

46.

Article V, The Bengal Artillery, Calcutta Review, 9 (1848), 457; Bandopadhyay, Gun
and Shell Factory Cossipore, pp. 11, 17.

47.

To Lieut.-Col. R. Rickett, Superintendent Engineer, Lower Provinces, from Major L.

Taylor, Garrison Engineer, Fort William, 21 June 1830, Letter no. 22, Porgs. no. 31, MBP.

48.

To Lieut.-Col. John Craigie, Secy., MB, Fort William, from Rickett, Superintendent
Engineers Office, Barrackpore, 28 June 1830, Letter no. 535, Progs. no. 31, MBP.

49.

To the superintending engineer Lower Provinces, from John Craigie, Secy. MB, 6 July
1830, Letter no. 1672, Progs. no. 32, MBP.

50.

Fort William-India House Correspondence, vol. 4, Letter dated 26 April 1765, p. 94.

51.

S.K. Chatterji, Vintage Guns of India, Macmillan, Delhi, 2001, p. 149; Brigadier-General
H.A. Young, The East India Companys Arsenals & Manufactories, 1937, reprint, The
Naval and Military Press Ltd., Uckfield, East Sussex, n.d., p. 135.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER & EVOLUTION OF ORDNANCE ESTABLISHMENT

431

52.

Brigadier R.C. Butalia, The Evolution of the Artillery in India: From the Battle of
Plassey (1757) to the Revolt of 1857, Allied, New Delhi, 1998, pp. 10, 222, 233; Rogers,
History of Artillery, pp. 63-4.

53.

To the Governor-General Marquess of Wellesley, and to Capt. A Greene, Secy. to the

MB, MD, Fort William, 4 May 1804, MBP.

54.

Letters of Archdale Wilson, 6807-483, National Army Museum: 9107-240, 9311-79-81

(Galleries), London.

55.

Rogers, History of Artillery, p. 81.

56.

History of the Indian Ordnance and Clothing Factories, p. 9.

57.

A Brief History of the Government Gun and Shell Factory at Cossipore, p. 7. This
is an unpublished document available at the Library of Cossipore Ordnance Factory.
It was written in 2000 by an official of Cossipore Ordnance Factory.

58.

Comparative Statement of the Cost of Some Articles made at Cossipore Foundry

during the last four years, Appendix E, Progs. no. 3, 23 April 1860, Military Department
Proceedings (hereafter MDP), NAI; Annual Accounts of the Cossipore Foundry,
Progs. no. 3, 23 April 1860, Appendix B, Number of Guns made in the Foundry during
each of the last 5 years, MDP; Young, East India Companys Arsenals & Manufactories,
pp. 147-8.

59.

Letters from Fort St. George for 1696, p. 88.

60.

Eric Robson, The Armed Forces and the Art of War, in J.O. Lindsay, ed., The New
Cambridge Modern History: The Old Regime, 1713-63, vol. 7, 1957, reprint, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1966, p. 174.

61.

MacMunn, Vignettes from Indian War, p. 37.

62.

Major E.H. Cole and Major E.C. Priestley, An Outline of British Military History: 16001937, Sifton Praed & Co., London, 1937, p. 170.

63.

History of the Indian Ordnance and Clothing Factories, p. 4.

64.

Steinbach, Country of the Sikhs, p. 88.

65.

Young, East India Companys Arsenals & Manufactories, p. 42.

66.

The Second Maratha Campaign 1804-5, Diary of James Young, Officer, Bengal Horse
Artillery, ed., D.D. Khanna, Allied, New Delhi, 1990, pp. xxxiii-iv, xlii, 150, 152.

67.

Paras 87-88, 3 April 1822, Letters to the Court of Directors.

68.

To Lieut.-Col. John Craigie, Secy., MB, Fort William, from Capt. James Blair commanding
3rd Local Horse Regiment at Saugor, 19 June 1830, Progs. no. 60, MBP.

69.

Sandes, Military Engineer in India, pp. 5, 55.

70.

S.K. Biswas, Gun & Shell Factory Cossipore, unpublished paper in Cossipore
Library, pp. 1-2.

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INDIAN JOURNAL OF HISTORY OF SCIENCE

71.

Para 90, 92, 24 April and 15 Dec. 1822, Letters to the Court of Directors.

72.

Consultation nos. 230, 232, 28 June & 27 Sept. 1822, Letters to the Court of Directors.

73.

To the secy. of the MB, from W.C. Bolt, Secy. to the Govt., Military Department
(henceforth MD), 25 June 1830, Letter no. 418, Progs. no. 9, MBP.

74.

Bill no. 897, Progs. no. 94, MBP.

75.

To Craigie, Secy., MD, from A. Roberts, Kanpur, 16 April 1830, Progs. no. 94, MBP.

76.

To Capt. Penny from W. Sage, 21 June 1830, Progs. no. 24, MBP.

77.

Report on the Proceedings of the MB, Fortifications, Para 3, 12-3, 32, 30 April 1847,
Annual Report of the MB, Bengal, 1846-7, NAI.

78.

To the secy. and accountant to the MB, from W.H. Oakes, Fort William, Military
Accounts Office, 24 June 1830, Letter no. 730, Progs. no. 19, MBP.

79.

To Craigie, from Major W. Battaine, Fort William, Arsenal Office, June 1830, Letter no.
134, Progs. no. 1, MBP.

80.

To the secy. of the MB, from W.C. Bolt, Secy. to the Govt., MD, 25 June 1830, Letter
no. 416, Progs. no. 10, MBP.

81.

Fort William-India House Correspondence, vol. 4, Letter dated 15 Feb. 1765, p. 75.

82.

History of the Indian Ordnance and Clothing Factories, p. 8.

83.

Consultation no. 71 from MB, 13 Oct. 1822, Letters to the Court of Directors.

84.

Copy of a letter from the Court of Directors dated 30 Sept. 1829, Progs. no. 49, MBP.

85.

Copy of a letter from the Court of Directors dated 30 Sept. 1829, Progs. no. 49, MBP.

86.

To Lord Bentinck, Governor-General, from Brigadier A. Macleod, Commandant of

Artillery, 6 July 1830, Progs. no. 50, MBP.

87.

To the secy. to the MB, from Bolts, Secy. to the Govt., MD, 25 June 1830, Progs. no.
51, MBP; Rogers, History of Artillery, p. 74.

88.

Rogers, History of Artillery, p. 61.

89.

To the secy. to the MB, from G. Hutchinson, Capt., Superintendent and Director of the
Foundry, Fort William, 3 July 1830, Progs. no. 55, MBP.

90.

Bandopadhyay, Gun and Shell Factory Cossipore, p. 7.

91.

PP, 1832, Para 1022-5, 1116, pp. 171, 175.

92.

To Capt. Penny, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, from W. Sage, 3rd Class Executive
Ordnance Officer, Dinapore, 21 June 1830, Letter no. 65, Progs. no. 24, MBP.

93.

History of the Government Gun and Shell Factory at Cossipore, p. 13.

94.

Report on the Proceedings, Para 67, Annual Report of the MB.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER & EVOLUTION OF ORDNANCE ESTABLISHMENT

433

95.

Cole and Priestley, Outline of British Military History, p. 145.

96.

The Bengal Artillery, 490.

97.

MGregor, History of Sikhs, vol. 2, p. 338.

98.

To the writer in the Katak Magazine, from John Craigie, MB Office, 8 July 1830, Letter
no. 1753, MBP.; MGregor, History of the Sikhs, vol. 2, p. 340.

99.

Steinbach, Country of the Sikhs, p. 57.

100. Rogers, History of Artillery, p. 58; MGregor, History of the Sikhs, vol. 2, p. 46;
MacMunn, Vignettes from Indian War, p. 34; The Bengal Artillery, 442.
101. MacMunn, Vignettes from Indian War, p. 127.
102. Steinbach, Country of the Sikhs, p. 52.