Jennie Barker

POLS 2010

Professor Dancy

04/30/14

Voluntary Party Quotas as an Effective Tool for Women's Representation

I. Introduction

In 1985, the Green Party in Germany voluntarily adopted a gender quota to ensure that
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~ women were equally represented with men on their party lists. Shortly after, the dominant parties

fo1 in Germany implemented similar rules, and women's representation at the federal level doubled
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~ f.~ ~bin a decade (Brizinski 2003, 66). German political parties' adoption of a quota for women
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represents a growmg . . quotas to .increase women , s representation
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politics.

i"1 In national legislatures throughout the world, women's representation remains well below
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- _( their proportion of the actual population. According to the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the world
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average for women's representation in national legislatures in 2013 is 21.4%, and women

ftl.e constitute even less of the upper houses in legislatures (IPU 2013). To mediate this problem,
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f4't'c. nearly one hundred countries have adopted gender quotas, which require women to make up a
certain percentage of the legislatures or candidates in a party (Dahlerup 2007). Most researchers

agree that quotas are a consistent factor for recent increases in women's representation in

legislatures worldwide. Parties in nearly sixty countries have adopted a type of quota called the

voluntary party quota, making it the most common quota type in the world (Quota Project 2013).

Despite its prevalence in the real world, very little of the research conducted on quotas has

studied the effect of voluntary party quotas independently of other quota types. Furthermore, no

l
cross-national analysis or longitudinal study of only voluntary party quotas has been conducted.

Most have employed individual or regional case studies, particularly within Western Europe,

which do not show the overall trends in employing the voluntary party quota and also leave out

the experiences of parties in countries in the Global South that use voluntary party quotas. This

gap is critical because it does not show when and how voluntary party quotas are most effective,

which is essential information for understanding how political parties without quotas can best

implement quotas into their political frameworks.

To fill this gap, I will employ a cross-national, longitudinal analysis of countries that

have parties who use voluntary party quotas. I will conduct this study by measuring women's .'

representation in national legislatures after a party adopted a voluntary party quota. I will

separate these parties based on size and electoral system in order to examine if the size or

electoral system is significant in the usage of voluntary party quotas, and I will also examine if

these parties were supported by women's organizations. I expect to find that larger parties in

multi-party systems had the most success in increasing women's representation through the

usage of a voluntary party quota but that voluntary party quotas are even effective in increasing

women's political participation regardless of circumstance. This information will help to

demonstrate strategies that both parties and women themselves can take to increase their

representation in national legislatures.

II. Literature Review

The literature on quotas generally operates under the assumption that increased

representation for women in parliaments is an end for which countries should strive. There is

categorical variation in the definition for quotas, with the three categories corresponding to

reserved seats, which determine from the outset the percentage of the legislature that women
 make up; legal quotas, in which a constitutional provision or law orders all political parties to

implement quotas for women; and voluntary party quotas, which political parties choose to adopt

themselves. All quota provisions are intended to help overcome crucial barriers to women's

representation, such as lack of power in parties and male succession patterns (Dahlerup and

Freidenvall 2005, Tripp and Kang 2008). However, many studies focus only on the effects of

reserved seats and compulsory quotas, deeming them to be more effective because they are

legally mandated and therefore enforceable by law, while voluntary party quotas are not. The

studies that address voluntary party quotas do not observe them independently of other quota /,6
types. Thus, the effectiveness of voluntary party quotas has not yet been adequately studied. / '1,~f
'
~'# t; Quota adoption has been addressed in two ways: the introduction of quotas and the

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~ implementation and effectiveness of quotas. Much of the literature discussing the introduction of

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.-{ quotas focuses on the diffusion of quotas within a particular country or region (Matland and
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~,f,i)luStudlar 1996, Bauer and Burnet 2013) or the diffusion of quotas as a global phenomenon (Caul
2001, Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005, Krook 2004, Krook 2006). Many studies discuss the

regional preferences for types of quotas, such as Latin America with legal quotas, yet this

obscures the fact that some countries have multiple quota systems, with, for example, both legal

quotas and voluntary party quotas (Dahlerup 2007). Observing the diffusion of the same quota

type within a region, Caul (2001) and Matland and Studlar (1996) posit the so-called ''contagion

effect", which refers to parties adopting quotas or nominating more women after other parties in

the same country or region do. Within a country, the contagion effect can be attributed to the

competitiveness between the parties. This effect applies particularly to countries that use

voluntary party quotas, as demonstrated by case study evidence in Costa Rica and Germany

(Jones 2004, Davidson-Schmich 2006). This strand of literature also addresses the origins of
 quota systems and why countries or parties decide to adopt them. International influences, such

as the Beijing Conference in 1995, are cited as a contributory factor to the global diffusion of

quotas (Tripp and Kang 2008, Krook 2009, Sunn Bush 2011, Fallon, Swiss, and Vitema 2012,

Rosen 2013) Women's mobilization inside and outside of parties (Caul 2001, Krook 2009),

strategic incentives for party elites (Frechette et al 2008, Murray et al 2012), and ideological

norms and characteristics in the state or party (Caul 2001) are also contributory factors. This

research is integral to understanding why quotas have been adopted and also demonstrates the

antecedent factors as to why some quotas are more effective than others. While many of these

often do not observe the effectiveness of quotas after they have been introduced. -
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studies provide critical insight into factors that make voluntary party quotas more attractive, they

\/4. hf ~ ~ The literature on the implementation and effectiveness of party quotas addresses the

~interaction between quotas and their electoral systems (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005, Dahlerup

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Fortin-Rittberger and Eder 2013) and the importance of the quotas' institutional designs
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\ (Schwindt-Bayer 2009). The positive effect of proportional representation systems (PR),

particularly closed-list systems, over plurality systems is well established (Tripp and Kang 2008,

Paxton et al 2010, Fortin-Rittberger and Eder 2013) . Dahlerup (2007) claims that quotas may just

be symbolic if employed in an electoral system that does not work well with a particular quota

provision. However, no studies have analyzed the effects of the electoral system specifically on

voluntary party quotas. Given that voluntary quotas are the most common type of quota

provision among countries with quotas and that political party behavior is mediated by the i "?
electoral system, this constitutes a critical gap in the literature (Tripp and Kang 2008).
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~ 1 Research on institutional design also shows that quotas with enforcement mechanisms

/ .P ti and placement mandates have a more positive effect on women's representation than those
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 without these mechanisms, though this is only viewed empirically within the context of legal

quotas (Schwindt-Bayer 2009). Furthermore, empirical cross-national and longitudinal analyses

are mostly absent from the research on institutional design and the implementation of quotas in

general. Much of the research conducted on the implementation of quotas consists of individual

case studies and regional studies at a certain point in time. Thus, the connections between

quotas-particularly that of voluntary quotas given the contagion effect-and their effectiveness

in a variety of situations are not adequately explored. And, out of the cross-country analyses,

only two directly address voluntary party quotas.

P~ Cross-country analyses that use data that does not go beyond 1995-2000 are outdated

1w/!~(Tripp and Kang 2008). Indeed, Fallon, Swiss, and Vitema (2012) found in their longitudinal
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~.\- sl,.t quantitative analysis of women's political participation that quotas only became statistically

~ to significant after the UN Beijing Conference in 1995. This demonstrates that studies on quota
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l}J~J(s adoption must include post-1995 data to adequately demonstrate the effects of quota adoption ..

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examp~s data only up until I 995, thus missing out on critical ra6~
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developments. Furthermore, Caul (2001) only uses data from advanced industrialized

democracies and therefore does not address developing countries, which Rosen (2013) found as

critical in demonstrating different experiences with quotas. Four studies present cross-national
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analyses on the effectiveness of quota implementation, with two addressing voluntary quotas. .

(.-\~lu, (yaxton et al~employ a longitudinal study to determine the effects of quota {fu;h',~t11Jy
2
implementation over time. They find that quotas positively influence countries' current

~.,.'._rajectories in women's representation, thus demonstrating the effectiveness of quotas in

achieving their aim. However, Paxton et al. (2010) do not address voluntary party quotas in their

study, thus leaving out the effects of voluntary party quotas over time.
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_ -- L\e? Schwindt-Bayer (200 ) employs a cross-national study on the implementation of gender

c,,.Ji._..,1/d'-quotas in order to determine the effect of quota design on the representation of women, though
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the study only focuses on legal quotas. The study does, however, have implications for voluntary

party quotas. Schwindt-Bayer (2009) finds that legal quotas with placement and enforcement

mechanisms lead to an almost one-to-one increase in women's representation in parliament, thus

confirming previous research on the importance of enforceable quotas (Caul 2001). However,

exclusively studying legal quotas results in either an under- or overestimation of quota impact

because the interaction between different quota types go unmeasured (Krook 2013). Schwindt-

Bayer (2009) does find that some parties under the legal quota comply with the laws even

without placement mandates and clear enforcement mechanisms and therefore increase women's

representation. Thus, although the study focuses exclusively on legal quotas, it has implications

for voluntary party quotas. Furthermore, lobbying from women's groups, the desire to increase

political legitimacy, and the aim to capture women's votes encourage parties to comply with

quota laws (Schwindt-Bayer 2009). Schwindt-Bayer (2009) also finds that parties adopt

voluntary quotas because they want to stress their inclusiveness or commitment to the norm of

equality, confirming previous research (Krook 2004, Krook 2006 , Tripp and Kang 2008). Once

again, these findings have implications for voluntary party quotas because parties can choose to

adopt voluntary quotas or enforce voluntary quotas for similar reasons. Thus , although voluntary

quota laws do not have legislated enforcement mechanisms or placement mandates, parties

themselves may choose to adopt these mechanisms, thereby increasing the representation of
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women in parliaments.

~p and Kang do include voluntary party quotas in their cross-national (J':J;c

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study, they do not differentiate between voluntary and legal quotas within their models. They
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 instead use a dichotomous variable that accounts for the simple presence of quotas and not the

differentiation between the two (Schwindt-Bayer 2009). Tripp and Kang (2008) do claim that

voluntary party quotas are significantly correlated with women's representation, but they do not

present this model in their study. Tripp and Kang (2008) also find that quotas generally

overcome cultural and religious influences, as measured by the World Value Survey in 2006 and

predominant religions. Although this study does include voluntary party quotas, in one case it

uses a dichotomous variable and in the other case it does not show the model used; thus, the

results are suggestive but not conclusive.

~
YUA Ruedin (2012) pres nts contradictory evidence towards the effectiveness of voluntary <:'ptd.·t.
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gender quotas in her cross-national study. Ruedin (2012) found that voluntary party quotas are

not statistically significant when measured against cultural attitudes towards women politicians,

as measured by data from the World Value Survey in 2006. Ruedin (2012) also considers

regional differences in terms of cultural attitudes, while Tripp and Kang (2008) do not. This

echoes research conducted on voluntary party quotas in Germany, which showed that voluntary

party quotas were less effective in highly Catholic or rural areas (Davidson-Schmich 2006).

Ruedin (2012) argues that political elites within political parties are less likely to enforce

voluntary party quotas if the population at large is averse to women politicians, as this threatens

the population's support of the political elite within a particular party (Frechette et al 2008).

Therefore, studies that do not account for attitudes towards women are likely to overestimate the

effects of voluntary party quotas. However, Ruedin (2012) uses a much smaller sample size for

the model accounting for attitudes than the model without the measure of attitudes. Therefore,

this conclusion may be premature. Furthermore, Ruedin (2012) identifies more women in

parliament as having a positive effect on cultural attitudes towards women. Even if voluntary
 party quotas are not initially enforced, their presence in the party will most likely increase

women's participation in parliaments somewhat, thus creating conditions necessary for further

enforcement. For example, Fortin-Rittberger and Eder (2013) found that political parties in

Germany are less averse to placing women at the top of their party lists than previously

hypothesized, partly due to the implementation of party quotas. A more nuanced study into how

cultural attitudes affect quota implementation is required.

~ Given the contradictory evidence or lack thereof presented in these four pieces, it is

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.... evident that the results on the effectiveness of voluntary party quotas are inconclusive. A cross-

national longitudinal study on the effectiveness of voluntary party quotas over time would thus

greatly benefit the field, especially one that takes into account cultural attitudes regionally, as

measured by the data used in Ruedin (2012).

III. Theory and Hypotheses

The goal of this study is to determine the effect of voluntary party quota introduction on

~women's political representation. Thus, I will analyze the relationship between levels of

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women's descriptive political representation in parliaments over time and the introduction of

~,""'voluntary party quotas by a major party. Women's descriptive political representation refers to

the numerical representation of women in parliaments based on their proportion in the

population. I will use the definition of a "voluntary party quota" as a quota adopted individually

by a political party and written into its statute, thus disregarding targets or recommendations

some political parties may informally implement, as the effects of these strategies are difficult to

measure . Furthermore, a major party is represented in parliament if it has more than 5% of seats

during the year it implemented a quota. In this study, I postulate that voluntary party quotas ~

. .. . . . .. . '
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increase women's poht1cal representation in parharnents after a pohttcal party introduces them
 due to the competition between parties to capture votes. I also posit that certain factors -

electoral system, party size, the number of parties that adopt voluntary party quotas, and

enforcement - will interact with voluntary party quotas to increase their effectiveness on

women's political representation.

li~I(" This theory differs from many of the previous theories on the effectiveness of voluntary

~/s gender quotas. Some of the existing theories in the literature assume that voluntary party quotas
7
~ · are ineffective in increasing women's descriptive representation because voluntary party quotas

lack legalized enforcement mechanisms, which compulsory legal quotas possess. These theories

claim that voluntary party quotas act are not a committed tool for increasing women's political

representation because they are only implemented and enforced through the "goodwill" of

political parties (Jones 2004). These theories assert that quotas must possess legalized sanctions

for non-compliance, like disqualification from the election and the threat of losing state

subsidies, to actually increase women's political representation.

~

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{lata, My theory, however, does not rely on the presence of legalized mechanisms to ensure

~ that quotas will be adopted and effective. Instead, voluntary party quotas are adopted and

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. d ue tot h em. herent compet1t10n
. . b etween partJes
. to capture votes wit. h.mt he e lector al
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~'f ~ystem. Regardless of its commitment to women's equality, a party may voluntarily adopt a

quota in order to set itself apart from other parties in the electoral system. When this party adopts

a quota, other parties will then be encouraged to also adopt quotas in order to try and recapture

the votes it lost to the other party after the introduction of its quota, as the leftist Social

Democratic Party did in Germany after the Green Party introduced its quota (Brzinzki 2003).

Enforcement of quotas acts in a similar manner. Political parties therefore adopt and enforce

quotas due to more pragmatic rather than ideological reasons. Parallels of this theory can be seen
 in the adoption and implementation of gender quotas on corporate boards, a recent phenomenon

among companies in Western Europe. For example, an agricultural company in Norway

introduced a quota in order to modernize its image. Following this quota, the other large

agricultural companies also introduced quotas in order to remain competitive with the other

company (Bj¢rkhaug and S¢renson 2013). I also expect this to hold in the political realm. On the

one hand, political parties in a system without quotas will adopt them to set themselves apart

from other parties, and, on the other hand, parties will adopt quotas to ensure that they remain

competitive with their rivals. The adoption of party quotas is thus a marketing strategy for

political parties. However, instead of competing for profits, as in the corporate or business sector,

they are competing for votes through the use of voluntary party quotas. Competition, not law,

governs the adoption and enforcement of voluntary party quotas.

Thus, although voluntary party quotas do not have enforcement mechanisms or mandates

written into law, they are effective because political parties consciously choose to adopt them to

remain competitive . In most political systems, political parties act as gatekeepers to elected

office, meaning that they facilitate or hinder women's access to legislative positions. By

choosing to adopt voluntary party quotas, political parties will facilitate women's access to

legislative positions. Voluntary party quotas act similarly to compulsory quotas in that they open

opportunities for women that would otherwise not exist; thus, they will be effective in increasing

women's representatio€ypothesis 1: All else being equal, countries that have p~itical parties

with voluntary party quotas wi ll have higher levels of women's political representation than

th ose that do not ~J "

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POft>... I posit that voluntary party quotas will independently increase women's representation,
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f1~-'t''but I also expect certain conditions to enhance the effectiveness of women's representation. One
of these is the type of electoral system in which the quotas are implemented are implemented.

This hypothesis is similar to other hypotheses in the literature because proportional

representation systems are assumed to increase women's representation more effectively than

single-member district plurality or majority systems . Proportional systems have a higher district

magnitude, offering more opportunities for women to be elected within a district. Furthermore,

parties are more likely to adhere to voluntary quota laws in proportional systems because elites -

typically male politicians - are not displaced in order to adhere to the quota law. In other words,

seats must be designated specifically for a woman candidate in single-member district systems,

which may not be attractive to party elites. For example, France attempted to implement a

compulsory quota law, but parties did not follow this law given its single-member district system

(Caul Kittilson 2005). Closed-lists in proportional representation systems also enhance women's

representation because they allow for "zippered-lists," a mechanism that alternates male and

female candidates. Although my theory aligns with the previous theories, I do posit that aspirant

quotas, or quotas that identify potential women for the pool of candidates, help overcome the

barriers that exist in single-member districts. For example, the British Labour Party employs all-

women short-lists, which increased the amount of women in the House of Commons (Quota

Project). This ensures that more women make up the nomination pool, which increases the

likelihood that they will be selected as a candidate. Thus, although I expect voluntary party

quotas to be more effective in proportional representation systems, aspirant quotas can mediate

the effects of single-member districts Hypothesis 2: All else being equal, voluntary party quotas

will be more effective in closed-list proportional representation systems unless placed in the

aspirant stage of running for office.

 Party size and the number of other political parties with party quotas are two other factors

that I expect to increase the effectiveness of voluntary party quotas. In the case of party size, the

larger the party that adopts a voluntary party quota, the more likely women will be elected to the

parliament. The African National Congress in South Africa demonstrates this case. The African

National Congress was the only party that adopted a voluntary party quota in South Africa, but,

because of its dominant position in South Africa, it increased women's political representation to

nearly 30% in one election (Quota Project). Furthermore, I expect a higher number of political

parties with voluntary party quotas to enhance women's political participation. While this claim

is straightforward in that the higher number of parties with quotas is likely to lead to more

women elected to parliament, I also expect the number of parties to affect the adoption and

adherence of quotas in other parties due to increased competition among parties. I therefore

expect voluntary party quotas to be more effective if multiple parties have voluntary party

quotas, especially if one of those parties is one of the dominant parties in the statf ypothesis 3:

All else being equal, multiple large parties with voluntary quotas will increase the effectiveness

of voluntary quotas on women's political participation]

The last condition I expect to positively affect the effectiveness of voluntary party quotas

is enforcement. While voluntary party quotas are partly enforced by competition, they are

typically further enforced by women's mobilization . Thus, I posit that voluntary party quotas

will be more effective in states that have active women's labor force participation and political

mobilization. With active women's mobilization, women will be able to hold political parties

more accountable towards their adherence to the voluntary party quotas . Women who are

politically mobilized will support the parties that are committed to their interests, thus

encouraging political parties to ensure that their quotas are met. Attitudes towards women are
 also a factor in enforcement. If attitudes towards women or women leaders in a country are

largely negative, political leaders will have less of an incentive to effectively implement the

party quotas, either initially or as a strategy to remain competitive. For example, parties did not

adhere to local party quotas in more conservative and Catholic areas of Germany (Davidson-

Schrnich 2006). Therefore, I postulate that higher levels of women's mobilization and more

positive attitudes towards women will increase the effectiveness of voluntary party quotas.

fyypothesis 4: All else being equal, voluntary party quotas will be more effective in states with

positive attitudes towards women and higher levels of women's labor force participation and

political mobilization_]

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As demonstrated, my theory posits that voluntary party quotas are an effective measure

\Jl'/ . L 7 for increasing women's descriptive representation in parliaments, especially given the conditions
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l hypothesized to favor the implementation of voluntary party quotas. If these hypotheses are

confirmed, voluntary party quotas will be proven as a valid measure for increasing women's

representation in many parliaments, especially in countries that fit the favorable conditions

hypothesized above. Thus, countries like the United States, which possesses paltry representation

of women in Congress yet is reluctant to adopt legalized legislation to mediate this issue, could

adopt voluntary party quotas as a means to overcome the barriers that are preventing women

from being legislatively represented and change existing norms about women in politics.

IV. Data and Methods

~ In this study, I aim to prove that voluntary party quotas increase women's representation

V"-*
sf within parliaments. In order to test this hypothesis, I focus my analysis on the levels of women's

~SJ I representation within parliaments throughout the world . Thus, my unit of analysis is the

~,ait,.,.. parliaments within states. I employ a cross-country, longitudinal analysis to trace women's

("feiat.-1/JI,,._)
 representation in parliaments in different states in order to gauge the effect of a political party's

introduction of a voluntary party quota on women's representation. In order to measure my

dependent variable of women's representation in parliaments, I compare the percentages of

women in parliaments annually among countries. I employ an annual study in order to capture

the shifts in women's representation in all countries after they hold their elections. Employing a

non-annual study may obscure shifts in women's representation since countries hold elections in

varying years. To measure my independent variable of the introduction of voluntary party

quotas, I include percentages of women's representation before the introduction of a voluntary

party quota and after the introduction of a voluntary party quota while controlling for other

factors, such as the existence of other quota types, electoral system, size and number of parties,

and positive attitudes towards women. Changes in women's representation will thus either prove

or disprove my hypothesis that voluntary party quotas increase women's representation within

parliaments. Furthermore, I evaluate the effectiveness of quotas as measured by the percentage

of women in parliament after the voluntary party quota is introduced.

Vok>
.?,~ In order to measure women's representation in parliaments, I use data compiled by the
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i.,\or-t Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU). The IPU has measured monthly the percentage of women in
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'f the lower or single House of the 189 countries that have national legislatures since 1997. In order

to fit with the scope of my annual study, I use data starting on January 1 of each year since 1997.

The lack of data on women's percentage of parliaments before 1997 provides a limitation on this

analysis, as political parties in many countries introduced voluntary party quotas before 1997. In

order to mediate this factor, I follow Fallon, Swiss and Vitema (2012) in using the IPU's report

on women in parliaments from 1945-1995 in order to supplement the lack of data on women's

representation in parliaments. I begin my analysis in 1975, when the Socialist Left Party in
 Norway first introduced voluntary party quotas (Quota Project). Although voluntary party quotas

did not become popular in other countries until the 1980s, starting my analysis in 1975 allows

me to fully examine the state of women's political representation before political parties adopted

voluntary party quotas. To measure the introduction of voluntary party quotas, I use evidence

provided by the Quota Project, which has compiled comprehensive data on the existence of

various types of quotas within countries. In my analysis, I code for the existence of a voluntary

party quota starting in the election year after the first political party in a country adopted a

voluntary party quota. I only code for a voluntary party quota if the political party is represented

within parliament, thus demonstrating that it can make an impact on women's representation

within parliaments.

~ 0 In my analysis, I control for various factors in order to isolate the independent effect of

~~\ ~ voluntary party quotas. These factors are other quota systems, electoral system, party size,
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Jmultiple parties with quotas, and attitudes towards women. To account for the existence of other

quota systems, I use the data provided by the Quota Project on reserved seats and compulsory

legal quotas. Although examining the effect of reserved seats and compulsory legal quotas on the

effectiveness of the voluntary party quota could potentially produce beneficial results, it is

outside the realm of this study. I use IPU's Parline database to code for a country's electoral

system as well as the size of the political parties with quotas. The Parline database provides data

on percentages of the vote that political parties attain, which I compare with the parties that have

quotas. Parties that command 30% of the vote in elections are considered large parties in this

study and are coded as such. I again use the Quota Project database to account for multiple

parties with quotas, as the Quota Project compiles data on all political parties within a country

that have voluntary party quotas. Following Ruedin (2012), I use women's labor force
 participation as a proxy variable to measure attitudes towards women. Controlling for these

factors allows me to analyze the effect of voluntary party quotas independently.

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In my study, I run two analyses. For the first of these analyses , I selected all 189

M~ countries with national legislatures as cases. Controlling for factors that affect women's

representation by themselves facilitates the completion of this particular analysis. Examining all

189 legislatures allows me to examine regional variation in the effect of voluntary party quotas

on women's representation in parliaments as well as the effect of the voluntary party quotas in

countries compared with those countries without voluntary party quotas over time. My second

analysis focuses only on the cases of states with voluntary party quotas. In this analysis, I will

control for each factor except one in order to examine the interaction between voluntary party

quotas and the existence of other quota systems, electoral system, party size, multiple parties

with quotas, and attitudes towards women, respectively. This analysis will add to the literature in

demonstrating how voluntary party quotas interact with a variety of factors and how these factors

influence the effectiveness of voluntary party quotas.

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