IDB WORKING PAPER SERIES No.

IDB-WP-108

The Making of Policy

Institutionalized or Not?

Carlos Scartascini
Mariano Tommasi

November 2009

Inter-American Development Bank

Department of Research and Chief Economist
The Making of Policy

Institutionalized or Not?

Carlos Scartascini
Mariano Tommasi

Inter-American Development Bank

2009
Cataloging-in-Publication data provided by the
Inter-American Development Bank
Felipe Herrera Library

Scartascini, Carlos G., 1971-

The making of policy : institutionalized or not? / Carlos Scartascini, Mariano Tommasi.

p. cm. (IDB Working Paper Series ; 108)
Includes bibliographical references.
1. Latin America—Politics and government. 2. Politics, Practical—Latin America. 3. Policy sciences. I.
Tommasi, Mariano, 1964-. II. Inter-American Development Bank. III. Title. IV. Series.

JL966 .S33 2009

320.98 S27---dc22

© Inter-American Development Bank, 2009

www.iadb.org

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 Abstract *

This paper develops a framework for analyzing different policymaking

styles, their causes and their consequences in Latin America, finding that
lower institutionalization and greater use of alternative political technologies
(APTs) are more likely the lower the cost of using these technologies, the
higher the potential damage they can cause, the lower the wealth of the
economy, and the more asymmetric the distribution of de jure political
power. Moreover, strategic complementarity exists in the use of alternative
political technologies; for instance “bribes by the rich” and “protests by the
poor” are likely to be countervailing forces, and will both occur in polities
with weaker political institutions.

Keywords: Political institutions, Public policies, Institutional strength,

Protests, Alternative Political Technologies, Development, Judicial
independence, Party institutionalization, Congress capabilities, Cabinet
stability, Corruption

JEL Classification: D72, D74, D78, H89, K42

*
We received valuable comments and suggestions from Jon Eguia, David Epstein, Macartan Humphreys,
Graciela Kaminsky, Humberto Llavador, Cesar Martinelli, Massimo Morelli, Vicky Murillo, Pablo Pinto,
Adam Przeworski, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Frances Rosenbluth, Ken Scheve, Ernesto Stein, David Stasavage,
Susan Stokes, Razvan Vlaicu, Federico Weinschelbaum, and seminar participants at Columbia, George
Washington, the Inter-American Development Bank, New York University, Universidad de San Andrés,
Yale, the Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association Meeting in Rio de Janeiro, the Latin
American and Caribbean Economic Association Political Economy Group Meeting in Cartagena, and the Yale
Conference on Fighting and Voting. We are indebted to Fabiana Machado for allowing us to draw freely
from our joint ongoing empirical work on protests in Latin America, as well as for valuable suggestions and
insights. We are particularly indebted to Laura Trucco for extraordinary research assistance.

5
1. Introduction
Formal analysis of policymaking within the realm of political institutions has deepened our
understanding of how political institutions shape economic policies. There is by now a rich
and growing literature on the impact of various legislative and electoral institutions on a
number of relevant policy outcomes, such as the size of general public goods, targeted
transfers, local public goods, and rent extraction by politicians. Persson and Tabellini
(2000) is presently the standard textbook treatment of this literature. 1
In almost all of this literature, most or all of the relevant action takes place within
the context of these formal institutional rules and relatively formalized institutional arenas
(the voting booth, the building of Congress, etc.). That is certainly a very good
approximation for policymaking in various countries at some moments in time (mostly
developed countries in the last several decades), but it is a much rougher approximation of
present-day policymaking in other countries or even in most countries at other points in
history.
Other than voting, forming political parties, bargaining in the legislature, and the
like, there are a number of alternative political technologies (such as threats of violence
and of disruption of economic activity) that individuals or groups could utilize in order to
influence collective decisions. As Persson and Tabellini themselves state (Persson and
Tabellini, 2000: 10) in the introduction to their textbook: “Citizens interact with politicians
in two ways: through voting at the elections, and through lobbying by organized interest
groups. We neglect other forms of political participation, such as protests. Protests are
certainly important in the real world, and we wish we had more to say about them. But they
have rarely been studied formally by economists, or political scientists (an exception is the
interesting work by Lohmann (1994, 1998)).” In this paper we take a step towards
incorporating alternative political technologies (such as protesting) into models of
institutions and policies.

1
A number of important contributions have been produced since that book was published. Another
contemporaneous textbook treatment of the field of Political Economy in economics is provided by Drazen
(2000), which is more explicit in the treatment of various substantive areas of (macro)economic policy, and
less explicit in institutional comparative statics of the type emphasized in Persson and Tabellini (2000).
Dewan and Shepsle (2008a, 2008b) and Besley (2004) provide interesting, albeit idiosyncratic, updated
surveys. Alesina, Persson and Tabellini (2006) is a highly readable recent statement by some of the founding
fathers of the field.

6
 This paper is an exploration on the implications of an enlarged political action space
for the study of institutions and policymaking. 2 We investigate the way in which the
presence of these alternative political technologies (APTs), in interaction with formal
political institutions and underlying socioeconomic structures, influences the workings of
institutions, policy outcomes, and the use of such technologies in equilibrium.
One implication of our analysis is the fact that different countries will have different
degrees of institutionalization in the way in which collective decisions are made. This is
consistent with many observations on, for instance, contemporary policymaking in Latin
America (e.g., Stein et al, 2008). 3 Such comparisons reveal important variation across
countries and over time in the degree to which formal institutions such as Congress and
political parties are the central locus of programmatic demands by socioeconomic actors,
and (conversely) the degree to which socioeconomic interests use, instead, alternative
political technologies to influence policymaking.
As emphasized in the more abstract literature on institutions, institutions are
equilibrium phenomena. As such, they reflect past investments, they summarize
information, beliefs and expectations, and they incorporate self-reinforcement effects. 4 It is
therefore quite natural to use that general logic to think about the determinants of the
relevance of specific institutional arenas for policymaking. When Congress and the
political party system are the effective conduits of preference aggregation and political
bargaining, various relevant actors will place their bets (that is, their investments) in those
2
We are not the first authors to consider the impact of alternative political technologies on some aspects of
the workings of formal political institutions. Notable recent contributions in that spirit include Ellman and
Wachtekon (2000) who study electoral competition under the threat of political unrest, and Dal Bó and Di
Tella (2003) and Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Di Tella (2006) who study political agency in models in which interest
groups can cause politicians harm. This is also related to earlier insights in Grossman (1991), Hirshleifer
(1995, 2001), Skaperdas (2006) and references there. (See also Humphreys, 2001). Some of the intuitions of
this paper are reminiscent of results in the international relations literature, for instance “bargaining in the
shadow of power” (Powell, 1999). Przeworski (2008) is a very insightful effort motivated by the same facts as
this paper (road blockades by farmers in Argentina). We are indebted to Adam Przeworski for generously
sharing his ideas on these issues.
3
Our applied focus on countries with an intermediate level of both economic and institutional development is
also a motivation for attempting to develop models that combine the analysis of behavior within the rules of
formal institutions with behavior outside those channels. Studies of policymaking in developed countries tend
to place great emphasis on formal political institutions and arenas, while studies in the political economy of
development, until recently, paid scant attention to those details (compare textbook treatments of US politics
such as Schmidt, Shelley and Baredes, 1991, with textbook treatments of African politics such as Chazan et
al, 1999). Geddes (2002) provides an insightful overview of the recent move in the political economy of
development toward incorporating the study of the details of operation of democratic institutions. See also
Bates (1990).
4
See for instance Aoki (2001), Pierson (2004), Greif and Laitin (2004), and Greif (2006).

7
institutions, most citizens will believe that those are the spaces where relevant decisions are
made, and this whole logic would reinforce and become self-fulfilling. On the contrary, if
such institutional arenas are not taken too seriously, and everybody knows that the way of
getting something out of the political system is to blockade a road or to bribe the president,
those investments in the institutionalization of Congress or parties will not be undertaken,
and the lack of institutionalization will be reinforced. 5
A related implication of our analysis, which fits naturally with the logic of
institutions above, is that there is multiplicity of equilibria. Polities might be stuck with
higher or lower levels of institutionalization. While polities in more institutionalized
equilibria will behave as predicted in the “tidy” literature on political institutions and
policies, polities in less institutionalized equilibria might behave differently. This could
have important implications for cross-national empirical analysis on the effects of formal
political rules on public policy.
Section 2 introduces the general logic of studying institutions and policymaking in
the presence of alternative political technologies. Section 3 develops a specific model
within that general logic, featuring a formal legislative bargaining arena and a specific
alternative technology (“road blockades”). Section 4 describes the general implications of
the model and presents various comparative statics results. One of the most interesting
(albeit not surprising) results is that, ceteris paribus, the more uneven the distribution of
political power within formal institutions, the more likely we are to observe extensive use
of alternative political technologies and low degrees of institutionalization. Section 5
presents three levels of empirical evidence (preliminarily consistent with the logic of the
paper): international cross-country correlations, individual-level survey responses for 17
Latin American countries, and a narrative of the case of Bolivia over the last 25 years,
which is suggestive of a switch from a more to a less institutionalized equilibrium. Section
6 briefly discusses one extension introducing more than one alternative political
technology. It suggests an equilibrium complementarity across the use of various such

5
As mentioned in Section 4, two countries of similar levels of development (Argentina and Chile) present a
very stark contrast in the dynamics of institutionalization of Congress, the political party system, the Judiciary
and the Bureaucracy after the democratization process of the 1980s. All these institutions are much weaker in
Argentina than in Chile (contrast Spiller and Tommasi 2007 with Aninat et al., 2008), and this correlates with
higher levels of corruption and higher levels of non-institutionalized mechanisms of political pressure such as
road blockades and the like. (Section 6 below predicts a positive correlation between corruption and the use of
APTs).

8
technologies (the rich bribing their way into policy favoritism is likely to coexist with the
poor protesting in the streets). Section 7 concludes the paper by reviewing our objectives
and results and by plotting the next steps in this agenda.

2. The General Logic: Institutional Behavior and Alternative Political

Technologies
Take any model that treats political institutions as the rules of a game in which policies are
decided; these rules could be those that regulate elections, government formation,
legislative procedures, judicial review, and the like. Panel (a) of Figure 1 represents that
type of game, as in any of the various models summarized in Persson and Tabellini (2000).
(In the specific example we develop below, that model will be one of legislative bargaining,
developed originally in Baron and Ferejohn, 1989). 6

Figure 1. Policymaking Games

Panel a. The Basic “Persson-Tabellini” Model

Panel b. A broader game with two arenas

6
The description of those games involves also a description of the underlying economic structure and policy
problem. In our example below, as in Baron and Ferejohn (1989), that structure will consist of splitting a pie
of fixed size.

9
 Most of those models presuppose that actors only play within those rules and within
those institutions. As stated in the introduction, that is not a bad approximation to use in
studying broad issues of policymaking in a number of polities today, but it seems to miss a
very important part of the action in other cases.
Our modeling strategy consists of calling that game the institutionalized part of the
game—i.e., the part of a broader game (with multiple arenas) that takes place inside those
institutionalized arenas. To that game, we add a prior stage in which actors choose between
participating in that institutionalized game and participating in alternative arenas. 7 Also,
we will need to specify the feasible actions in these alternative arenas, the protocols of
interaction within those arenas, and the protocols of interaction among formal and informal
arenas.
Panel (b) of Figure 1 presents a scheme of this broader game. Borrowing the
language used by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006a and 2006b), we call de jure political
power the one assigned by formal political institutions, and de facto political power the one
assigned by the technologies of alternative political action. For instance, if the alternative
to institutionalized decision-making was the threat of violence, such power would be
conferred by the capacity to exercise violence. More generally, what alternative political
technologies are we referring to? Classifying a set of various possible political actions
(actions to influence collective decision-making) into “institutionalized” versus
“alternative” is to some extent an arbitrary choice. Which way one wants to classify things
in practice would depend on the exact question at hand.
Figure 2 presents some examples of political actions. Some of them, towards the
left of the diagram in white, are closer to the more institutionalized end of the spectrum
(forming a political party, writing to your congressman), while others, towards the right of
the diagram in dark grey, are clearly within the realm of the alternative (road blockades,
physical threats). A number of other political actions are harder to classify, including
various forms of lobbying, 8 as well as public demonstrations to inspire sympathy in public

7
The actors we have in mind are underlying socioeconomic groups. At the level of abstraction where we will
be working in the simple model of Section 3, these actors will choose between (“direct democracy”)
participation in a legislative assembly, and exercising alternative action elsewhere. Clearly, enriching the
details of political agency by explicitly modeling representative democracy is a next step in the agenda.
8
Lobbying by interest groups is an activity that has been well studied in political economy and in political
science. The best know treatment by economists is that of Grossman and Helpman (1994, 2001). We believe
that some forms of lobbying, within certain rules, would fit more naturally in the “institutionalized” part of

10
opinion (Alston, Libecap and Mueller, 2008). Some actions such as capital flight to avoid
excessive taxation are in principle part of the economic side of the model and not part of
the political action space, unless they involve explicit political coordination. 9 Strategies
employed by trade unions, for instance, vary from the extremely institutionalized (“playing
golf with Republican legislators”), to the constitutionally sanctioned right to strike
exercised impeccably, to the borderline-criminal physical intimidation utilized in some
countries at some points in time. 10 Going into the darker side of Figure 2 and of reality,
some strategies we would have no doubt in classifying as “alternative,” such as that
exercised by Colombian drug lords when offering new judges the choice between plata
(bribes) or plomo (bullets), described in Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Di Tella (2006).

Figure 2. Alternative Political Technologies

More Institutionalized Less Institutionalized

forming a political party demonstrations

to inspire sympathy

writing to your congressman legal strikes road blockades

campaign contributions subtle coordination coordinated economic

of capital flight disruption
bribes
clean lobbying
“plata”
violent threats
“plomo”

the game—as when Grossman and Helpman say, referring to the US, “according to the survey findings, the
activities undertaken by the greatest numbers of organized interest groups are those intended to educate and
persuade lawmakers of the wisdom of the groups’ position.” (Grossman and Helpman, 2001: 4). Other forms
of business influence (quite prevalent in several Latin American countries and various other places) are much
closer to the darker part of Figure 2. Understanding why some forms of business participation in
policymaking are more prevalent than others across different polities is an important pending research
question; see Schneider (2009) and Spiller and Liao (2008) for some relevant insights. We believe that some
of the logic of this paper, properly adjusted, could be helpful in thinking about those issues.
9
Such explicit coordination by business actors is pervasive in many accounts of politics and economic
policymaking in developing countries. See for instance Dornbusch and Edwards (1991), Bruno (1993), and
Fanelli and McMahon (2006).
10
See for instance Murillo and Schrank (2009), Farber (1986), Przeworski (1985) and Austin-Smith et al
(2008).

11
 In the rest of the paper we will work at some level of abstraction, focusing on a
“black or white” classification in which some actions will take place clearly within the
“institutional” realm and others clearly outside formal institutional channels. 11 For
concreteness, we will speak as if the alternative political technology (APT) in question
involves road blockades or street protests, but in principle, the abstract formulation we
utilize could also represent technologies such as collective action by some economic sectors
that could damage the economy. The choice of road blockades as our illustration is not
accidental, since at the time of this writing road blockades are a common form of political
action, influencing decisions taken in more formal arenas in various Latin American
countries such as Argentina and Bolivia (see Section 5).
In the model, we will be assuming that the decisions to take the institutional road or
the “street” road are indeed alternatives. This is a simplified way of capturing an important
point of our argument, which emphasizes the investment component of institutions. 12 One
can think of examples in which certain political actors will take different roads depending
on what the environment has to offer them. For instance, there will be circumstances in
which business interests will invest more resources in strengthening right-wing political
parties and think tanks that defend their general interests (as they do in Chile) than in
bribing politicians, judges, or bureaucrats to obtain special privileges for their firm or sector
(as they do in Argentina). As extensively recognized in the literature on democratization,
current political losers might accept their short-term fate gracefully and invest in doing
better in the electoral and coalitional arena next time, or they can use violence in an attempt

11
Our use of the terms institutions and institutionalization shifts back and forth between more formal
theoretical notions and more commonplace usage. One can (as we do in our model) assign a great deal of
structure to actions “in the street” and in a strict sense call such actions highly “institutionalized.” That said,
most people who are not professional social scientists would agree to call bargaining in Congress more
institutional behavior than burning tires in the street (no matter how structured the latter activity might be).
12
Political actions such as voting, campaigning for your favorite candidate, writing letters to your
Congressperson, participating in peaceful protests, participating in violent protests, threatening to kill your
opponents, or killing Supreme Court Judges need not be substitutes. Under some conditions they are used
jointly and under some conditions they are used separately in different political equilibria by different actors.
A more general understanding of the conditions under which various political actions are complements or
substitutes is an important question that we do not answer in this paper. What we do is emphasize one set of
mechanisms, particularly investment under some constraints, which makes some actions alternative to others.
It turns out that the particular actions we model in this paper, even though potentially complements in some
environments, are in practice substitutes within our empirical sample. In Section 5.2 we provide evidence
indicating that protesting in the streets and more institutionalized forms of political participation (such as
voting or contacting your Congressman) are substitutes in most of Latin America.

12
to change outcomes. 13 These different types of decisions have an important investment
component and are likely to reinforce the degree of institutionalization or lack thereof over
time. 14 An important aspect of this logic is what Aoki (2001, Chapter 5) calls the co-
evolution and complementarity of institutions and human asset types. Particular institutions
(and institutional equilibria) will lead people to invest in assets more productive in those
environments, reinforcing the prevalent form of institutionalization (or lack thereof). In the
example of this paper, for instance, the type of leadership more functional for getting your
way in Congressional bargaining might be very different from the type of leader that
specializes in violence (or in corrupting politicians).
The actors in our game, then, will have to make a prior decision of whether to enter
the more formal or the less formal arenas of political action. 15 These decisions at the level
of individual actors, are then aggregated in order to find an equilibrium to this broader
game. Both the individual choices and the polity-level equilibrium will be highlighted in
the empirics of Section 5.
In the next section we present one specific model of policy determination in the
presence of formal political institutions and of alternative political technologies. In Section
4 we return to some general considerations, using the model as explicit illustration of some
of those considerations.

3. One Specific Model 16

Any model within the framework we are suggesting will need to specify three components
that will constitute sets of exogenous parameters for comparative statics purposes. These
components are: (1) policy problem (mapping from feasible policy vectors to utilities of the
players, which subsumes aspects of the socioeconomic structure as well as available policy
technologies); (2) political institutions; and (3) alternative political technologies (and the
protocols of interaction among different political arenas).
13
See for instance Przeworski (2005), Benhabib and Przeworski (2006), and Wantchekon (2000).
14
See for instance Pierson (2004). Recent works emphasizing the dynamics of investment in institutions
include Besley and Persson (2007), especially Section 4, and Lagunoff (2001).
15
Within the specific model of the next section, we have also worked out the case in which actors could
participate in both arenas, and many of the results are the same. Still, for substantive reasons related to the
logic of institutions and investment explained in the text, we want to emphasize the case in which these are
alternative arenas.
16
The game is presented and analyzed in the text in a stylized and intuitive manner. See the Appendix for a
more formal treatment.

13
3.1 Presentation of the Model
In the example we present here, these components are specified as follows.

(1) Policy problem

The policy problem consists of splitting a pie of size 𝑋𝑋 among 𝑛𝑛 risk-neutral players. This
is a standard allocation problem which has been extensively studied in conjunction with the
set of political rules we assume in (2), and it is a good general approximation for a number
of situations where distributional issues are central.

(2) Political institutions

Political institutions consist of one variant of a well-known legislative bargaining model set
forth by Baron and Ferejohn (1989). Each of the 𝑛𝑛 players has an ex ante probability 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 of
being recognized as agenda setter, with i’s ordered in such a way that 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 increases in 𝑖𝑖 ;
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 < 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖+1 . It is more straightforward to think about this simple example being a case of direct

democracy, in which the 𝑛𝑛 players who could go to Congress are the citizens themselves.
Alternatively, we can think of the 𝑛𝑛 players as the underlying socioeconomic
constituencies, each of which could be represented in Congress by a perfect agent. (We
refer to agency problems in Section 7).
After the agenda setter proposes an allocation, a vote is taken among all the
members of Congress. If a majority accepts the proposal of the agenda setter, then that
proposal constitutes the outcome of the collective legislative decision. If the proposal is not
accepted by a majority, then the collective legislative decision is a status quo allocation
which, for simplicity, we normalize to 0 for every player.
We use this very simple “closed rule” formulation of the legislative bargaining
problem for brevity. The main logic we are trying to pursue in this paper does not depend
on any specific extensive form of the institutionalized game; 17 the crucial individual
decisions and equilibrium features depend on comparing the expected values of
participating in the institutionalized decision-making process with that of using
alternatives. 18
(3) Alternative political technologies and interactions with formal political arenas

17
We are indebted to Massimo Morelli for highlighting this point.
18
Furthermore, the expected values of the particular formulation we use are analogous to the actual allocation
that would be obtained under an open rule protocol with no discounting between rounds.

14
Any assumption one can make regarding alternative political technologies will embed
(“physical” and “institutional”) considerations about the effects of those “alternative”
actions on the utilities of players (the ones undertaking the action and the rest of the polity),
and about collective action technologies, commitment technologies, and allocation
protocols in informal arenas. The main purpose of this paper is to promote the extension of
analysis of policymaking under formal political institutions to include the explicit modeling
of these outside options, rather than peddling any particular assumption about (or example
of) APTs. For concreteness, in the rest of the paper we focus on a specific example (“road
blockades” or “going to the street”). Clearly, modifying any of the assumptions below
constitutes an interesting exercise of comparative statics on these alternative political
technologies.
Protesting has an individual cost 𝑐𝑐. If at least 𝑇𝑇 players decide to protest they can
(credibly) threaten to inflict a damage of size 𝐾𝐾 to the economy, with 2 ≤ 𝑇𝑇 and 0 < 𝐾𝐾 < 𝑋𝑋.
If less than 𝑇𝑇 people protest, they cannot cause any damage. This very simplified damage
technology is represented in Figure 3, where 𝑚𝑚 stands for the number of people who choose
to use this alternative. This very simple formulation captures in a stark manner some
properties of our framework, which we discuss in more detail in the next section. 19 We also
assume that “The Street” acts as a unified actor, ignoring collective action issues among the
protesters (after the threshold 𝑇𝑇). Furthermore, we assume that The Street is endowed with a
commitment technology, so that it can commit ex ante to cause or not to cause damage in
response to specified actions by players in Congress. 20

19
In particular it embeds a scale economy / strategic complementarity which will be the seed of multiplicity
of equilibria. For more sophisticated treatments of this threshold logic see Lohmann (1994) and references
therein. The seminal model is in Granovetter (1978).
20
For computational simplicity we will assume that whatever is given to protesters is shared equally among
them. This could be due to the structure of programs or policies that they receive (rural protesters in Argentina
fight for lower taxes on agricultural exports, urban protesters fight for receiving social programs).

15
 Figure 3. Damage Technology

The timing of the game, represented in Figure 4, is as follows:

1. At the beginning of the game, each actor (simultaneously) decides whether to go to
Congress or to “go to the street” to protest. Let 𝑚𝑚 be the number of players that go to the
street and 𝑛𝑛 − 𝑚𝑚 the number of players that go to Congress. We denote by ℳ the set of
players in the street and by 𝒩𝒩\ℳ the set of players in Congress. 21
2. Nature chooses an agenda setter μ among those players that went to Congress. Each
𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑖
player in Congress has probability ∑ of being recognized as the agenda setter.
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝒩𝒩\ℳ 𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑖

3. The 𝑚𝑚 actors in the street decide how much to request from Congress. Let 𝑍𝑍 denote the
total amount they request. Given the commitment assumption, they will be making a threat
of causing damage 𝐾𝐾 unless a total amount equal to or greater than 𝑍𝑍 is granted to them.
4. The agenda setter in Congress proposes an allocation, a vector 𝑆𝑆 𝝁𝝁 = �𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝝁𝝁 �𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 of shares,
with ∑𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ≤ 1 and 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ∈ [0,1].
5. The 𝑛𝑛 − 𝑚𝑚 players in Congress vote on the agenda setter’s proposal. If more than half of
the members of the legislature accept the proposal, it constitutes the collective legislative

21
As explained in the Appendix, each player chooses an action 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ∈ {0,1}, where 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 = 1 means going to
Congress, and 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 = 0 means going to the street. The summation of all 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 `s will be interpreted later as
investment in formal institutions.

16
decision. If 𝑆𝑆 𝝁𝝁 is not accepted by a majority, then the legislative decision allocates 0 to all
players. 22 Let S = {𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 }𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denote the final outcome of the legislative process.
6. Those in the street, if 𝑇𝑇 or more, decide whether to cause damage or not. (This is an
irrelevant decision point under the assumption of commitment in 3, but we keep it here for
future extensions).
7. The allocation is implemented. If no damage was caused, each player receives 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 𝑋𝑋.
If damage was caused, each player receives 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 (𝑋𝑋 − 𝐾𝐾).

Figure 4. Timing of the Game

3.2 Solving the Model 23

We proceed by backward induction from the last stages of the game in Figure 4. Given the
assumption of commitment by protesters, stages 6 and 7 are mechanically implemented
after decision 4-5 is made. The latter is just a standard Baron-Ferejohn game, with a small
twist. It is easy to show that the agenda setter will give 0 to all other players in Congress
and allocate the whole pie (except anything given to the protesters) to himself or herself. 24
The novel question is how much to give to the protesters. Clearly, if 𝑚𝑚 < 𝑇𝑇, the agenda
setter will give nothing to protesters. If 𝑚𝑚 ≥ 𝑇𝑇, then the amount he or she will allocate to

22
Again, this very stark formulation is chosen for expositional simplicity.
23
The solution is proven formally in the Appendix.
24
More generally, the allocation among the 𝑛𝑛 − 𝑚𝑚 players in Congress could be defined as s i = 0 for any 𝑖𝑖
not part of the winning coalition, s i = ε for those 𝑖𝑖’s in the winning coalition other than the agenda setter,

and s i = 1 −  n − m  − 1ε for the agenda setter. We follow the standard convention of letting ε go to zero,
 2 
  
and of assuming that players who are indifferent between two actions at zero will chose the one they would
have chosen for ε>0. As already stated, the fact that the other members of Congress get zero is just for
computational simplicity. What actually matters for the relevant decisions is their expected utility in Congress
before the agenda setter was selected by nature. This is a reduction of a richer intertemporal structure (where
those “included” will eventually get their share) into a one-period model.

17
the protesters will depend on the amount 𝑍𝑍 that they request. If they request 𝑍𝑍 > 𝐾𝐾, the
agenda setter will give them nothing, since it is better to keep (𝑋𝑋 − 𝐾𝐾) than (𝑋𝑋 − 𝑍𝑍). If they
request 𝑍𝑍 ≤ 𝐾𝐾, then the agenda setter will grant them 𝑍𝑍. This response will lead the
protesters (in stage 3) to request exactly 𝑍𝑍 = 𝐾𝐾, since they will get nothing if they go above
𝐾𝐾, and 𝐾𝐾 is preferred to anything below it. (As stated, we assume that whatever is given to

protesters is shared equally among them, so that each protester will receive 𝐾𝐾/𝑚𝑚.)
Given that stage 2 is a move by nature, this brings us to the key choice of arenas in
stage 1. Given each player’s expectation of what he will receive if he goes to Congress, and
his expectation of what he will receive if he goes to the street, each player has to decide
between these two arenas, taking as given the choices of all the other (𝑛𝑛 − 1) players.
Finding equilibria to this game consists of finding the Nash equilibrium to these 𝑛𝑛
individual decisions. We present the results in the following proposition, which is
presented more formally and proven in the Appendix.

PROPOSITION 1:
(a) There always exists a Full Institutionalization Equilibrium in which everybody is in
Congress and no alternative arenas are used.
(b) For some parameter values, there is a Low Institutionalization Equilibrium in which
𝑚𝑚∗ actors go to the street.

The existence of the Full Institutionalization Equilibrium (FIE) is guaranteed by the

fact that if only one player chooses to be in the street, he or she will be unable to credibly
threaten to cause any damage, and hence receive zero from the agenda setter, getting a final
payoff of – 𝑐𝑐, which is less than what he or she would expect to receive in Congress. Hence
no one would want to deviate unilaterally from a full institutionalization equilibrium.
Figure 5 provides an intuitive representation of the Low Institutionalization
Equilibrium (LIE). The figure plots the value of being in Congress (the upward-sloping
curve) and the value of being in the street (the downward-sloping curve) from the point of
view of an individual player as a function of his/her type, under the assumption (which is
true in the type of LIE equilibria we select) 25 that all players of lower type will be in the
street, and all players of higher type will be in Congress. Let 𝑚𝑚∗ be the highest integer to
25
See Appendix.

18
the left of the point where these two curves intersect. Players 1 to 𝑚𝑚∗ (those with the lowest
ex ante probabilities of being selected agenda setter in Congress) will go to the street, and
players 𝑚𝑚∗ + 1 to 𝑛𝑛 will go to Congress.

Figure 5. Low Institutionalization Equilibrium

𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
(𝑋𝑋 − 𝐾𝐾) � 𝑛𝑛 �
∑𝑗𝑗 =𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗

𝐾𝐾
− 𝑐𝑐
𝑖𝑖

𝑖𝑖
𝒎𝒎 ∗ 𝒎𝒎∗ + 𝟏𝟏
𝑛𝑛
max 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 min 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
iϵℳ iϵ𝒩𝒩∖ℳ
Go to street Go to Congress

19
The Full Institutionalization Equilibrium takes us back to “the world of Persson and
Tabellini” in which the institutionalized part of the game is the only relevant one. The Low
Institutionalization equilibrium, on the other hand, will be characterized by the use of
alternative political technologies and by weakness of formal institutional arenas.
In the next section we interpret these results and provide some comparative statics
and empirical predictions, as well as a slightly broader discussion.

4. Results
The simple model we have presented in Section 3 already contains the flavor of the more
general points we want to raise in this paper. One first result we want to highlight is the
following:

4.1 Result 1: There are Different Degrees of Institutionalization in Equilibrium.

If we interpret the summation of action 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ’s (the choice of going to Congress) as the
aggregate investment in formal institutions, it will be technically trivial—but substantially
important—to add the effects of these aggregate investments. This captures in a blunt
manner a very important aspect of the variation of institutions across countries. In their
choice of arena, the actors of the model are deciding whether to take the institutionalized
route or not. In this simple formulation the aggregation of this behavior (that is, the number
of people operating through formal institutions) is what we can call the degree of
institutionalization in equilibrium.
Investing in technologies that increase strength and capabilities in the
institutionalized game (such as getting a PhD in Public Policy) or in technologies that
increase strength and capabilities in the street (such as buying weapons), clearly would
have a different impact on the productivity and strength of formal institutions, as well as on
the quality of the output the polity generates. There are various reasons (beyond our simple
static model) why more institutionalized collective decision-making arenas will lead to
better policies and better outcomes, such as providing a better structure for exchange of
information and for the agreement and enforcement of intertemporal cooperation.
According to Pierson (2004: 107) “political institutions can serve to coordinate the behavior
and expectations of decentralized actors (Carey, 2000) and to facilitate bargaining by
creating monitoring bodies, issue linkages, and mechanisms for making credible

20
commitments (Keohane 1984; Weingast 2002).” Scartascini, Stein and Tommasi (2009)
show that more institutionalized policymaking environments lead to policies that are more
stable, (yet) more adaptable to changing circumstances, more coordinated and coherent, and
better implemented.
Take the literal example of the institution we model here: Congress. Legislatures
are critical institutions in the effective functioning of a democratic system and in the
policymaking process. Yet, the extent and nature of the role played by legislatures in the
policymaking process vary greatly from country to country. The sheer magnitude of
academic studies of the US Congress proves the importance of that institution in American
politics and policymaking, establishing a number of relevant stylized facts: members of the
US Congress exhibit remarkable longevity, and they tend to specialize in committees; the
US Congress plays an active role in policymaking, it engages in considerable oversight of
the public bureaucracy, and it is the focus and main entry point of political action by any
interest group attempting to influence American policymaking. 26 None of these features is
true for the Argentine Congress, in spite the fact that Argentina is a country whose
constitutional structure has strong similarities with that of the US (Jones et al., 2002). The
comparison can also be taken among countries of similar levels of development: the
Chilean legislature plays a much more important role in the policymaking process of that
country than does its Argentine counterpart. These different roles in policymaking are
associated with various measures of legislators’ and legislatures’ capabilities, which have a
clear investment component: legislators’ duration, legislators’ education, degree of
specialization in policymaking committees, resources available for policy analysis, esteem
in the eyes of the public, and appreciation of the legislature as an important place from the
point of view of politicians’ careers. 27 Saiegh (2009) and Stein and Tommasi (2007)
provide wider comparisons, showing a strong correlation of such objective indicators of
Congress capabilities with assessments about the importance of Congress in policymaking
across 18 Latin American countries. 28

26
See for instance Weingast and Marshall (1988), Shepsle and Weingast (1995), Diermeier, Keane and Merlo
(2005), and Grossman and Helpman (2001) and references there.
27
See, for instance Spiller and Tommasi (2008), Aninat et al. (2008), Tommasi (2008), and Saiegh (2009).
28
In the empirical section below we provide some evidence using indicators of the strength/quality of various
political institutions along the lines just suggested for the case of Congresses.

21
 Result 1 also relates to another important general point, central to theoretical
discussions about the notion of institutions in institutional economics and institutional
politics. Academic and common usage of the term institutions refers to two related but
distinct concepts: “institutions as rules” and “institutions as equilibria.” The most common
cited definition of institutions in modern social science is probably that of Douglass North:
institutions “are the rules of the game in a society, or more formally, are the humanly
devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North, 1990: 3). A number of scholars
have recently turned to a conception of institutions which identifies the essence of
institutions as being equilibrium phenomena rather than rules. Exact definitions vary among
these authors, but the core idea is that it is ultimately the behavior of others, rather than the
rules themselves, that induces each person to behave (or not to behave) in the way
prescribed by the rules. 29 Our model captures that distinction in a very simple framework.
We have political institutions as rules in the allocation of de jure political power, but we
also have different degrees of institutionalization in equilibrium, as captured by 𝑛𝑛 − 𝑚𝑚∗ (and
the associated investments). The notion of institutions as equilibria very naturally takes us
to the second point we want to highlight:

4.2 Result 2: (If) Strategic Complementarities Exist, a Multiplicity of Equilibria Follows

The stark assumptions of the model in Section 3 are just one example of possible forces
leading to multiplicity of equilibria through strategic complementarities. In the literal
formulation we use, the strategic complementarity appears through the shape of the
function representing the damage technology in Figure 3: if only a very small number of
actors participate in a street blockade, they will not be able to make any credible threat of
further damage. 30 That being the case, the incentive of an additional actor to participate in
APTs is very low, so that (up to a point), the decision to go to the street is a strategic
complement across players. 31

29
See for instance Aoki (2001), Calvert (1995a, 1995b), Carey (2000), Dixit (2009), Fearon (2006), Greif
(2006), and Greif and Kingston (2008).
30
Parameters such as 𝑐𝑐 or 𝑇𝑇 in our model will depend on various issues, including the “repression
technologies” in place. One can also think that, in the more dynamic version of this story, institutionalized
actors might invest resources in improving repression, which would be another detraction of resources from
more “productive” institutional investments. (We thank Susan Rose-Ackerman for highlighting this point).
31
One could make somewhat equivalent assumptions in the functioning of the formal institutional arena, and
that might give rise to a third type of equilibrium, a Non-Institutionalized Equilibrium. Coming from that
corner could be an interesting extension if one wants to link the logic of this paper with discussion about

22
 More generally, there are a number of forces that make various actions strategic
complements, which reinforces the tendency of this type of models to generate multiple
equilibria. In Section 6 we briefly discuss a simple extension with two types of alternative
political actions, and we notice that there are reasons why a more extensive use of one APT
is likely to induce a more extensive use of the other APT. This seems to be an example of a
more general point: there are various reasons to believe that non-institutionalized or de-
institutionalized activities of one type are likely to induce de-institutionalized activities of
other types. There are, then, complementarities among various non-institutionalized
actions, as well as complementarities among various institutionalized actions. This is
consistent with findings in Stein and Tommasi (2007) within Latin America, and
Scartascini et al. (2009) for a larger sample of countries, reporting a positive correlation
across a number of measures of institutional strength in various domains (policymaking
capabilities of Congress, party system institutionalization, Judicial independence, strength
and independence of the bureaucracy, etc.)
The fact that there is multiplicity of equilibria has potentially important implications
in terms of theory, in terms of interpreting and analyzing empirical evidence, and also in
terms of thinking about possible practical recommendations. Even using the simple two-
equilibrium model presented above, one can say the following. If the polities we observe
“in reality” are all in the institutionalized equilibrium, then the standard type of political
economy model—which presupposes that what we call the institutionalized part of the
game is all that there is—will be the right model to describe what we observe and to
generate empirical implications. In that case, after this detour we would be back “in the
world of Persson and Tabellini.” But if, on the contrary, several or all polities are in the
other equilibrium, we will observe plentiful use of alternative political technologies and
polities with weaker institutions. The possibility of having different polities at different
equilibria might also have important implications for cross-national empirical analysis on
the effects of formal political rules on public policy. We elaborate on this point in the
concluding section.
Multiplicity of equilibria also implies that two countries with similar fundamentals
(in terms of socioeconomic structure and political institutions as rules) might end up

moving from anarchy to some forms of institutionalization (Hirschleifer, 1995; Barzel, 2002; Dixit, 2003 and
2009; Skaperdas, 2006; and references there).

23
“stuck” in different equilibria. And as stated above, these things could create strong path
dependence, with these different equilibria being self-reinforced by investments over time
(Pierson, 2004). On the other hand, this multiplicity also gives rise to the possibility of
observing equilibrium switches, a point that we develop more fully in Section 5 with the
illustration of the Bolivian example, a country which seems to have gone from a cycle of
institutionalization in the 1980s and 1990s to a cycle of de-institutionalization after that, the
latter cycle being associated with a great increase in the use of alternative political
technologies.

4.3 Set of Results 3: Comparative Statics

One important question is what are the implications of equilibrium multiplicity for
attempting to map the predictions of the model into empirical evidence. Fortunately, the
particularly simple structure of the model of Section 3 enables us to make some
comparative static predictions in spite of the fact that we have multiple equilibria. Under
the maintained assumptions of the model, the FIE always exists, while the LIE exists for
some parameter values and not for others. This means that for some parameter values we
will have only the FIE (call that set of parameters F), while for other parameter values we
can have both types of equilibrium (call that set of parameters B). If the real world were
fully described by this model, then we would expect that in polities characterized by a
vector of parameters belonging to F we should observe the characteristics associated with
the FIE, while in polities characterized by a vector of parameters belonging to B we could
observe either of the equilibria. Assigning in that latter case a non-zero probability to each
of the equilibria will be enough to generate empirical predictions. If conducting
comparative statics on one given parameter (say α) increases the set of other parameters for
which LIE is an equilibrium, then we will say that increasing parameter α increases the
possibility of observing the Low Institutionalization Equilibrium (and its associated
properties).
It turns out that, in the simple structure of our model, any comparative statics
exercise that (using the language of the previous paragraph) increases the possibility of
LIE, also increases the number 𝑚𝑚∗ of people going to the streets within the LIE (see
Appendix), so that the derivative of 𝑚𝑚∗ with respect to any parameter is a sufficient statistic

24
for the way in which that parameter affects the degree of institutionalization in either
interpretation (within LIE, or in terms of probability of being in LIE as opposed to FIE).
Using that logic, it is easy to show the comparative static results summarized in Table 1
(see Appendix).

Table 1. Comparative Statics

Probability of being in the non-

Parameter institutionalized equilibrium
(or inverse degree of
institutionalization )

 Cost of using APT (c) (-)

 Damage potential (K) (+)

 Wealth (X)
(-)

 Asymmetry distribution of de jure (+)

political power (asymmetry distribution
of Pi’s)

Not surprisingly the probability of being in the LIE increases as the use of APTs
becomes less costly, as the potential damage APTs can cause increases, and as the wealth
of the economy decreases. More interestingly, the probability of being in a Low
Institutionalization Equilibrium increases as the distribution of de jure political power
becomes more asymmetric. As the vector of 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ’s becomes more asymmetric, more actors at
the lower end of that distribution will find participation in formal political institutions less
appealing, inducing more street action and lower institutionalization. 32

32
This result has a clear flavor of “exclusion of the poor,” and we believe that to be an important case in
reality. Yet, the result is more general than that, and it applies to any case in which the de jure power of a
relevant set of political actors tends to under-represent them in comparison to their ability to put collective
action together and threaten economic disruption. The very visible 2008-2009 demonstrations of rural
producers in Argentina against large increases in export taxes by the Cristina Fernández de Kirchner
administration are a case in point. Those demonstrators were not the dispossessed, but a segment of the
Argentina middle and upper class underrepresented in the Argentine political system.

25
5. Some Empirical Evidence
This section suggests that the implications that can be derived from a simple model such as
the one above, and from the more general logic presented in the paper, are not inconsistent
with some preliminary evidence. We do not take this evidence as conclusive, but we see it
as encouraging further theoretical and empirical work along these lines. We provide
evidence at three levels. Section 5.1 shows some cross-national correlations consistent with
the predictions of the model. Section 5.2 summarizes individual level evidence from
Machado et al. (2009), which is also consistent with some predictions of the model. Section
5.3 presents a narrative of events in Bolivia in the last 25 years which seems consistent with
a switch from a more institutionalized to a less institutionalized equilibrium, along the lines
suggested in the paper.

5.1. Cross-Country Correlations

The model and logic presented above imply a number of correlations. One such
implication would be:

Implication 1: A negative correlation exists between the strength (quality) of political

institutions and the use of alternative political technologies.

In previous work we have attempted to develop (drawing from in depth analyses of several
Latin American countries, as well as available broader international data sources) a number
of indicators of the workings of political institutions that seem good proxies for the strength
of policymaking institutions as understood in this paper (see Stein and Tommasi, 2007, for
Latin America, and Scartascini, Stein and Tommasi (2009) for a broader cross-section of
countries). Those measures, which try to proxy judicial independence, congress
capabilities, party system institutionalization, and bureaucratic quality are constructed from
a number of international data sources (see Berkman et al., 2009).
On the other hand, the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive provides
information on a number of political activities that can naturally proxy for some of the
APTs that we emphasize in the paper. In particular, there are measures of anti-government
demonstrations, strikes, riots, political assassinations, guerrilla warfare, government crises,

26
purges, and revolutions. One commonly utilized index combines the first three types of
political activity under the heading of “Internal Conflict.”
The measures of institutional quality tend to be negatively correlated with the
various measures of conflict, with the coefficients being statistically significant when we
run univariate and multivariate regressions with some standard controls such as GDPpc,
regional dummies, level of democracy, etc. To save on space we report here only one such
correlation, in Figure 6, which shows the correlation between the measure of internal
conflict and a measure of institutional strength that combines variables that capture the
degree of judicial independence, congress capabilities, party institutionalization and
bureaucratic quality. 33

Figure 6. Correlation (Institutional Strength; Use of Alternative Political

Technologies)
4
Internal Conflict
0
-2 2

-2 -1 0 1 2
Institutional Strength Index
* controlling for LnGDPpc and regional dummies

Our model also has implications for correlations among institutional and conflict variables
with some characteristics of policy outcomes. For instance, the following:

Implication 2: A positive correlation between weaker institutions, more use of alternative

political technologies, and favoritism in public policies.

33
For details on the construction of the variable see Machado, Scartascini, and Tommasi (2009)

27
De jure political institutions that generate more biased policy outcomes are likely to lead to
increased use of alternative political technologies by the losers, and this would induce
weaker total investments in the institutionalization of the system. In the figure, we show
the correlation between the APTs and a measure of biases in government policy called
favoritism, compiled by World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report
(GCR). 34

Figure 7. Correlation (Use of APTs, Favoritism in Public Policies)

4
Internal conflict
0
-2 2

-1 0 1 2
Favoritism
* controlling for LnGDPpc and regional dummies

Certainly, we are not the first authors to report correlations such as those in Figures 6 and 7,
and those correlations do not say anything about causality. Further work with a more fully
specified theoretical and empirical model will be necessary to address issues of causality.
As a (small) step in the direction of addressing issues of causality, we have started
to investigate individual level data for 18 Latin American countries, which lead to some

34
This particular variable measures whether when deciding upon policies and contracts, government officials
usually favor well-connected firms and individuals or are neutral among firms and individuals. We have
averaged the responses for the years for which the data is available (2002, 2005, and 2006). See Berkman et
al. (2009) for details and other measures of “public-regardedness.”

28
interesting findings in their own right, as reported in Machado, Scartascini and Tommasi
(2009), part of which we summarize in the next section.

5.2. Individual-Level Regressions

In this section we explore the effect of the degree of institutionalization on individuals’
propensity to participate in protest in Latin American countries. Our analysis is based on
data for 17 countries gathered by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) in
2008. These surveys were designed to be representative of the voting-age population in
each of the countries, 35 with subnational units chosen randomly using probabilities
calculated based on the most recent census data. The survey covers a broad spectrum of
topics ranging from assessments of the economic situation to respondents’ engagement in
different forms of political participation.
Among those questions there is one which is of particular interest as a dependent
variable in our analysis: Have you participated in a protest or demonstration in the past
twelve months? Sometimes, almost never, never.
One interesting finding already shows up in summarizing some of these dependent
variables at the country level. As Figure 8 suggests, Latin American citizens view
contacting their Congress representatives and protesting in the streets as alternative political
options. 36

35
The countries and respective number of observations are: Mexico (1,560), Guatemala (1,538), El Salvador
(1,549), Honduras (1,522), Nicaragua (1,540), Costa Rica (1,500), Panama (1,536), Colombia (1,503),
Ecuador (3,000), Bolivia (3,003), Peru (1,500), Paraguay (1,166), Uruguay (1,500), Brazil (1,497), Venezuela
(1,500), Argentina (1,486), and the Dominican Republic (1,507). Chile was also surveyed, but no question on
protest participation was asked.
36
Machado, Scartascini, and Tommasi (2009) explore this issue in more detail and provide a contrast with the
literature on post-materialist protests in OECD countries where individuals more likely to protest are also
more likely to use more institutionalized channels of political participation.

29
 Figure 8. Congress or the Street?(17 Latin American Countries, 2008)

.3
Bolivia

Argentina
Percentage who Participated in Protest
.2 .25

Peru
Venezuela
Ecuador Honduras
.15

Paraguay

Nicaragua
Panama
.1

Colombia Uruguay
Guatemala
Costa Rica
Mexico
Rep. Dom
Bras
.05

El Salvador

.02 .04 .06 .08

Percentage who contacted Member of Congress

The independent variables are the expected determinants of individual participation

in protests. Some of those individual-level explanatory variables were chosen based on the
literature on protest participation (surveyed in Machado, Scartascini and Tommasi, 2009).
We additionally included the country-level institutional variables explained in Section 5.1
above.
We estimated a random intercepts logit estimation including country level
covariates, and we obtained very similar results using the pooled specification with
clustered jack-knife standard errors, which we omit due to space limitations. Table 2
summarizes for 17 countries the analysis for the dependent variable reported participation
in protest. (The details of the estimation are provided in Machado, Scartascini and
Tommasi, 2009). The explanatory variables below the red line are the individual-level
variables, most of which take the expected signs and significance. 37 Of more direct interest

37
The cases where the results of the pooled data are a bit more surprising can be better understood by running
the model for each individual country. Sometimes an insignificant coefficient in the pooled data masks a mix
of positive-and-significant and negative-and-significant coefficients at the country level. An interpretation of

30
for this paper are the country-level covariates (above the line). Except for ratings of the
quality of the bureaucracy, all proxies of the functioning of institutions have a negative and
significant estimated effect on the likelihood of protest participation. The results indicate
that stronger institutions and less biased policies are associated with a lower tendency to
use the alternative political technology of protests.

this country-level variation is provided in Machado et al. (2009) and it is broadly consistent with the general
logic of this paper. Countries with better institutions present patterns of protest participation somewhat
different from countries with very poor institutions.

31
 Table 2. Who Protests? Individual-Level Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Congress Capabilities -0.762***

(0.273)
Judicial Independence -0.206***
(0.066)
Parties Index -0.182**
(0.088)
Bureaucracy Index -0.174
(0.246)
Institutional Stregth Index -0.398***
(0.126)
Respect Institutions -0.032** -0.031** -0.032** -0.032** -0.031**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Parties Represent 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.017
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Experience with Corruption 0.276*** 0.276*** 0.277*** 0.277*** 0.276***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Interpersonal Trust 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.144***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Vote for Opponent 0.284*** 0.281*** 0.286*** 0.284*** 0.281***
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
Extreme Ideology 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.070***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Interest in Politics 0.404*** 0.403*** 0.404*** 0.403*** 0.403***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Understand Politics 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Male 0.111** 0.110** 0.111** 0.111** 0.110**
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
Education 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Log(Income) 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.012
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Constant -2.506*** -3.530*** -2.961*** -3.821*** -3.536***
(0.611) (0.284) (0.596) (0.466) (0.281)
Observations 13968 13968 13968 13968 13968
R-squared . . . . .
Number of pais 17 17 17 17 17
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors in parentheses

32
5.3. Narrative of an Equilibrium Switch: Bolivia (1982-2009) 38

Bolivia, like most of Latin America, returned to democratic rule in the 1980s, following a
history of short-lived democratic experiences interrupted by military dictatorships. In the
words of Fabrice Lehoucq “although the history of Bolivia is filled with extra-constitutional
seizures of power and military governments, by the mid-1980s it had become a stable
country. Political succession had become orderly with the 1985 election of the MNR’s
leader Victor Paz Estenssoro.” “Paz’s final presidency marked the beginning of fifteen
years of stable democracy” (Lehoucq, 2008: 112).
Not only did the general notion of democracy as acceptance of electoral results
begin to take hold, but there was also an increased and strengthened role for some specific
institutional arenas such as political parties and Congress. “Both left and right in the
country’s multiparty system agreed to abide by election results, no matter how unpalatable
these might be” (Lehoucq, 2008: 113). “During the 1980s and 1990s traditional political
parties played the most important role in the policymaking process . . . . After the recovery
of democracy in 1982, the Legislative branch played a paramount role in Bolivia” (Jemio et
al., 2009: 19).
Anyone who follows international news would immediately recognize that
somewhere along the line over the last decade this process of institutionalization came to a
halt and, furthermore, it has reversed dramatically. More directly to the point of this paper,
the Bolivian political and policymaking process has moved “from Congress to the streets.”
According to Jemio, Candia and Evio,

it is evident from the discussion above that the policymaking process in

Bolivia has experienced dramatic shifts over time. Traditional political
parties have lost legitimacy and representation, and social movements have
become paramount players in the policymaking process. Regional
organizations and regional governments have also acquired a significant
leverage in the policymaking process. Congress has also experienced a

38
This section draws extensively from Jemio, Candia and Evio (2009), Lehoucq (2008), and Evia, Laserna,
and Skaperdas (2008). Actually, the connection between this paper and the Bolivian evidence runs both ways:
it was our reading of the Bolivian experience what gave us the final push to write the paper. We are indebted
to Luis Carlos Jemio (former Finance Minister of Bolivia) and to Fabrice Lehoucq (one of the foremost
experts on Bolivian politics in US academia) for valuable discussions of the Bolivian case. They are not
responsible for our (possibly faulty) interpretation of the case.

33
 significant lost of legitimacy as a key arena in the policymaking process.
The streets on the other hand seem to have an upper hand in influencing the
policymaking process . . . . Finally, the representative democracy system has
lost ground to a more participative and direct type of democracy, where
currencies such as the “cabildo,” the referendum and the assembly are
dominant in the policymaking process.

The above description of the changes in the Bolivian policymaking process seems
quite consistent with a switch from a more institutionalized to a less institutionalized
equilibrium according to the logic of this paper. Furthermore, various details of this
process also seem consistent with the details of our model.
According to the model, one of the factors likely to lead to people taking the streets
as opposed to investing in playing within institutions is the perception that the
institutionalized system generates results biased against their interests. According to Jemio,
Candia and Evio (2009):

exclusion was a norm for organizing ruling coalitions that were not
infrequently fraught of corruption 39 . . . . As Congress and political parties
lost their representativeness of the population, citizen’s organizations were
active and vocal in channeling their demands. These organizations were not
part of the national policymaking process . . . . Therefore their voice was
only heard when they exerted some sort of pressure. . . . Road blockades,
strikes, marches, hunger strikes, were the means by which these
organizations fought and attained their objectives. These mechanisms have
proven to be increasingly effective to the point of almost replacing the
formal policymaking process.

The latter statements reflect the increased collective action of alternative political
organizations, the lowering of participation costs in the street, and the increased used of
these alternative venues to pressure for policy benefits.
39
See the extension in the next section to the alternative political technology of bribes, where we predict that
more extensive use of this technology (more bribes, i.e., more corruption) is likely to lead to more protests
and to lower institutionalization.

34
 All this complex process which we have very sketchily and selectively described
(we refer the reader to Jemio, Candia and Evio, 2009; Lehoucq, 2008, and Evia, Laserna
and Skaperdas, 2008, for much richer treatments and further references), is not without
costs. Among the various costs and threats that the Bolivian polity faces in its current state,
we highlight one of particular relevance for the general point of this paper: these new
arenas are far worse than others for internalizing long-term agreements and objectives. In
the words of Jemio, Candia and Evia: “Policy objectives have become essentially short-
sighted and productivity goals have been largely neglected.”

6. An Extension: More than One Alternative Political Technology

The alternative political technology we have explicitly emphasized in the paper is a labor-
intensive one that seems to “favor” the poor and politically excluded. Even within the
narrow confines of our model, however, that is not necessarily the only possible
interpretation, since what the model really says is that those who are underrepresented in
formal political institutions vis-à-vis their capacity for alternative political action are likely
to undertake such actions. As suggested by the example of Argentina mentioned above,
those actors are not necessarily the economically excluded. In the case of Argentina one of
the most vocal actors in “the street” have been middle class and upper middle class
agricultural producers who tend to be underrepresented in the Argentine political system
due to some peculiarities of its federalism (Tommasi, 2006, 2008 and references therein),
and that have “somehow” recently found their way into collective action on the roads. 40
This suggests that the bare formulation of the APT in our model is indeed more generally
applicable than it seems at first glance.
Nonetheless, an interesting extension would consist of a richer set of APTs with
different types of socioeconomic actors having differential access to each of the
technologies. One technology used extensively throughout the world and in Latin America
is the one that gives some particularly well-placed or well-endowed actors privileged access

40
Similar cases are those of truck drivers in France, or trade unions more generally. Trade unions in Latin
America tend to represent not the lowest quintiles of the income distribution but the mid and in some cases
even upper quintiles (Schneider and Karchner, 2007; Saavedra and Tommasi, 2007), and they are certainly
political actors with privileged access to some traditional but also to some alternative political technologies.
(As mentioned in Section 7, their access to de jure political power might well be a historical response to their
de facto political power, along the lines of Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005, as described by Collier and Collier
1979).

35
to the policymaking process. Such technology (“bribes”), unlike the one modeled so far,
seems to be the realm of the rich.
In a companion paper (Scartascini, Tommasi and Trucco, 2009) we are working on
an extension in which there are two APTs: bribes and road blockades. One of the main
intuitions that is emerging from that ongoing exercise is the presence of a strategic
complementarity between the use of bribes and the use of road blockades. In one simple
formulation we have already worked out, bribes operate as a wedge that lowers the value of
what is obtained through institutional channels, inducing substitution towards the street (as
will be induced by any cost, say agency cost, of using formal institutions). Another route
that we are still exploring emphasizes the asymmetry of access to this bribe technologies; in
reduced form this seems to have the same effects as a more uneven distribution of de jure
political power, which we have already shown to increase action in the streets. In that way,
we can see “bribes by the rich” and “protests by the poor” as countervailing forces that tend
to happen together in polities with weaker political institutions. 41
Such an extension generates empirical correlations similar in spirit to the ones
presented in Section 5. We expect bribes to be positively correlated with the use of other
alternative political technologies such as protests, and negatively correlated with the
strength of institutions. Figures 9 and 10 show some correlations generated with similar
data and procedures as those described in Section 5. The proxies for bribes we are using
are various measures of (high level) corruption as reported by Transparency International,
the International Country Risk Guide, the Global Corruption Barometer, and the World
Economic Forum. Similar patterns are found with the individual level data; for instance
Table 2 shows that a higher perception of corruption increases the likelihood of protest. The
remark about the fact that we are not the first to identify these correlations and about the
insufficient evidence on causality also applies, but it is still encouraging that our model is
consistent with these factual correlations.

41
Some of these results are proven in Trucco (2009).

36
 Figure 9. Correlation (Corruption, Protests)

4 2
Internal Conflict
0 -2

-4 -2 0 2
Corruption
* controlling for LnGDPpc and regional dummies

Figure 10. Correlation (Corruption, Institutional Strength)

2
Institutional Strength Index
-1 0-2 1

-3 -2 -1 0 1 2
Corruption
* controlling for LnGDPpc and regional dummies

37
7. Conclusion
The objective of this paper is to suggest a framework (a modeling strategy) to articulate
insights from the rich literature on the effects of political institutions on policy into a
broader view of policymaking, by endowing political actors with a larger action space.
Such an effort could prove particularly useful for the study of policymaking in developing
democracies, as well as for integrating such analyses across countries of different levels of
economic and institutional development.
The framework we suggest allows generating comparative statics predictions from
economic structure, formal political rules, and alternative political technologies, to the
workings of institutions, the use of alternative political technologies, and policy outcomes.
The model presented in this paper has the following implications.

1. Different countries have different degrees of institutionalization in their

policymaking process.
2. There is multiplicity of equilibria. This allows: similar countries to be
stuck at different levels of institutionalization, self-reinforcing dynamics,
as well as the possibility of equilibrium switches (as the one documented
for the Bolivian case).
3. The possibility of institutionalized policymaking increases as the cost of
alternative political actions increases, as the damage these alternatives
can cause decreases, and as the economy becomes wealthier.
4. In cases in which the distribution of de jure political power is very
asymmetric, it is more likely to observe use of alternative political
technologies as well as low degrees of institutionalization.
5. High costs or inefficiencies (for instance due to agency problems) in the
use of formal political institutions can lead to the use of alternative
political technologies as well as to low degrees of institutionalization.
6. There are some strategic complementarities across the use of different
alternative political technologies. For instance, the use of bribes by the
rich is likely to occur at the same time as the use of street demonstrations
by the poor.

38
 There are various pending tasks in the agenda described in the paper. Many of them
consist of enriching various aspects of the model to permit comparative static exercises on
economic structure, alternative political technologies, and formal political institutions. To
begin with, one can give more detailed structure to the economy and/or more specific
characteristics to the actors in the policy game game. One set of actors of special relevance
might be, for instance, trade unions, which would be associated with a particular set of
institutionalized and non-institutionalized technologies. The choice of a more or less
institutionalized strategy might depend on the advantages offered by each course of action,
as a function of formal political institutions and of the space of feasible mappings from
policy to utilities of their members (Murillo and Schrank, 2009).
In our description of alternative political technologies so far, we have presented a
fairly “flat” topography. In reality, the costs and potential effects of various forms of
collective action are distributed in much more specific manners. For instance, the various
𝑐𝑐(𝑖𝑖)’s of different actors could be a function of who else is participating in that activity,

facilitating collective action across particular sets of agents, such as urban consumers or
workers in sectors with high “damage capacity,” among others. More generally, there are
various structural, historical, and perceptual factors that affect specific forms of collective
action such as protests. 42
Perhaps the most natural set of extensions would come from fishing in the abundant
pond of formal models of political institutions for various aspects which might allow for
richer institutional comparative statics. For instance, what would be the effect of
alternative electoral rules (proportional versus majoritarian) on the degree of
institutionalization of policymaking? 43 What would be the effect of alternative regime types
(parliamentary of presidential) on the degree of institutionalization of policymaking?
In order to answer such questions, one will need to move in the direction of
representative democracy, with models that permit exploring the electoral connection and

42
𝑐𝑐(𝑖𝑖)’s as well as potential rewards from such activities will be a function not only of who else protests, but
also of the history of organization of such movements (as seen in the Bolivian case), and of the beliefs about
the legitimacy of the protest by other actors who might matter for the degree of repression. That is, for
instance, why some forms of protest in France are very common, while others are quickly repressed.
43
One might hypothesize that proportional representation systems, by allowing a better representation of
minorities might lead to more symmetric distributions of de jure political power and hence to more
institutionalized behavior. For instance, unions are known to make less frequent use of strikes in such
systems. On related issues, see Cusack, Iversen and Soskice (2007).

39
agency issues. Citizen-candidate models a la Besley and Coate (1997) or Osborne and
Slivinski (1996) might constitute a natural step in that direction.
An exercise which could be attempted and that is close in spirit to the main points of
this paper would be to study “hyperpresidentialism as an equilibrium.”
Hyperpresidentialism is an important concern of political scientists about the tendency of
presidents in Latin America, Russia, and other developing presidential democracies to over-
stretch their formal powers and to govern with little consideration for the legislative (and
often judicial) branches. Some of the logic developed here (and in line with well-known
work by Weingast, 1997) might be used to study that tendency as something happening in
weakly-institutionalized equilibria, in such a way that an identical set of formal rules might
lead to different forms of equilibrium behavior. 44
From our logic of equilibria with different degrees of institutionalization, there
might be important considerations for the econometric analysis of the effects of
constitutional rules on policymaking and performance. Even beyond the very relevant
issues of measurement and methodology raised in Persson and Tabellini (2003), Acemoglu
(2005), and elsewhere, the logic of this paper sheds some new light (and possible shadows)
on such exercises. It might be the case that the effects of constitutional rules on
policymaking and performance will be conditional on the type of equilibrium achieved by
each polity. The standard literature gives a number of predictions that are conditional on
the fact of being at a full institutionalization equilibrium. Each such prediction needs to be
explored under the assumption of being in a low institutionalization equilibrium. Then, one
needs to consider the possibility that the parametric changes implicit in the comparative
statics might lead to equilibrium switches. How to take such more involved predictions to
econometric analysis is an issue that exceeds what we can say now, but that is worth
exploring in future work. “Institutionalization” variables like the ones described in Section
5 (and more fully in Scartascini et al 2009) might become handy in such efforts.
The model and logic we have presented here has treated constitutional rules as
exogenous, a natural first modeling step (Diermeier and Krehbiel, 2003). This can be
embedded in a richer game in which such rules are chosen at an earlier stage, having our

44
Saiegh (2009) shows varying degrees of importance of Congress in policymaking in different Latin
American countries. As suggested in IDB (2005), the tendency of the executive to attempt to govern without
Congress is not monotonically related to legislative powers of the president or other constitutional features.

40
model here as a continuation subgame. Such modeling strategy would be quite
complementary to the Acemoglu-Robinson (2005) logic, providing a bit more structure to
their (unmodeled) threat of collective action due to temporary de facto power. 45

45
As highlighted earlier such logic could be applied to study the distribution of de jure political power of
fairly specific socioeconomic actors or organized groups such as trade unions. See also Boix (1999) and
Cusack, Iversen and Soskice (2007).

41
Appendix
A.1 The Game
There are 𝑛𝑛 risk-neutral players. The set of players is 𝒩𝒩 = {1,2, … 𝑛𝑛}. The economy is
subject to the aggregate constraint ∑𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑋𝑋. Each player maximizes his piece of the pie
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0, net of a possible cost 𝑐𝑐 that they pay in some cases. Each agent is endowed with 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
units of de jure political power, with 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 < 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖+1 , and ∑𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = 1. The timing of the game is
as follows.
Stage 1: Each player (simultaneously) chooses an action 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ∈ {0,1}, where 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 = 1 means
going to Congress, and 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 = 0 means going to the street; which carries a cost 𝑐𝑐. Let 𝑚𝑚 be
the number of players who go to the street, and 𝑛𝑛 − 𝑚𝑚 the number of players who go to
Congress. Let ℳ denote the set of players in the street, and 𝒩𝒩\ℳ the set of players in
Congress.
Stage 2: Among those that went to Congress, Nature will choose an agenda setter 𝜇𝜇. Each
𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑖
player 𝑖𝑖 in Congress will have a probability ∑𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 𝒩𝒩\ℳ 𝑝𝑝 𝑗𝑗
of being recognized as the agenda

setter.
Stage 3: Assumption A1: The 𝑚𝑚 players in the street become a unitary actor, “The Street.” 46
Assumption A2: The Street splits whatever it receives equally among its members.
Assumption A3: The Street is endowed with a commitment technology; the players in the
street can (credibly) threaten to cause damage 𝑑𝑑 as a function of the share 𝑧𝑧 of the total pie
received by each of them. Let 𝑇𝑇 ≥ 2 be threshold of critical mass for action in the street. If
𝑚𝑚 < 𝑇𝑇, the amount of damage they can cause is zero, that is 𝑑𝑑(𝑧𝑧) = 0 for all 𝑧𝑧. If 𝑚𝑚 ≥ 𝑇𝑇,
𝑑𝑑(𝑧𝑧): [0,1] → {0, 𝐾𝐾}. Let 𝑑𝑑(𝑧𝑧)𝜖𝜖𝜖𝜖, where 𝒟𝒟 is the set of functions mapping [0,1] onto
{0, 𝐾𝐾}. 47 (We assume for brevity that the range of the damage function can only take
discrete values 0 or 𝐾𝐾, but nothing of substance will change if we let a continuous range
𝑑𝑑 ∈ [0, 𝐾𝐾].)
Stage 4: After listening to the threat of The Street, the agenda setter in Congress (𝑖𝑖 = 𝜇𝜇)
𝝁𝝁
proposes an allocation, a vector of shares 𝑆𝑆 𝝁𝝁 = �𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 �𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , subject to ∑𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ≤ 1 and

46
In the text of the paper we use 𝑍𝑍 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 to denote the total amount received by all those in the street.
47
If nobody goes to the street (𝑚𝑚 = 0), this stage becomes irrelevant (as does stage 6), and the game reduces
to a traditional legislative bargaining game with only stages 2, 4, and 5. (Stage 7 trivially implements what is
decided in 5).

42
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ∈ [0,1]; that is, 𝑆𝑆 𝝁𝝁 (𝑑𝑑): 𝒟𝒟 → ∆𝑛𝑛 . For brevity we introduce the ex post distributional
assumption A2 as an ex ante constraint on the agenda setter’s proposal, by requiring at this
𝝁𝝁
stage that 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 𝑧𝑧 𝝁𝝁 for all 𝑖𝑖 ∈ ℳ.
Stage 5: The 𝑛𝑛 − 𝑚𝑚 players in Congress vote on 𝑆𝑆 𝝁𝝁 . Let 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖 ∈ {0,1} denote the voting
choice of legislator 𝑖𝑖, where 0 and 1 respectively represent voting against and for the agenda
setter’s proposal. We will assume that legislators vote only on the basis of their individual
share, so that 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ): [0,1] → {0,1}. To avoid some sources of multiplicity not germane to
the objectives of this paper, we assume that in case of indifference, 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖 = 1 (assumption
A4). 48 The outcome of the legislative process, 𝑆𝑆, will be: 49
1
⎧ 𝑆𝑆 𝝁𝝁 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖 ≥ (𝑛𝑛 − 𝑚𝑚)
⎪ 2
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝒩𝒩\ℳ
𝑆𝑆 =
⎨{𝑠𝑠 = 0} 1
⎪ 𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖 < (𝑛𝑛 − 𝑚𝑚) .
2
⎩ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝒩𝒩\ℳ

Stage 6 (from the text) is mechanically implemented given our commitment assumption.
Stage 7: The allocation is implemented. If no damage was caused, each player receives
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 𝑋𝑋. If damage was caused, each player receives 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 (𝑋𝑋 − 𝐾𝐾). The parameters of
the game are 𝑛𝑛, 𝑋𝑋, 𝐾𝐾, 𝑇𝑇, 𝑐𝑐, {𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 }𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 .

48
In this way we get rid of two sources of multiplicity. On the one hand, we are considering only equilibria in
which voters do not choose weakly dominated strategies, having them always act as if they were pivotal. On
the other hand, we make the payoff given to members of the winning legislative coalition converge to their
status quo payoff.
49
Nothing of substance will change if we let the legislative status quo vector of shares be non-zero. This
could be an additional source of heterogeneity, all of which is captured here in an ex ante sense by the vector
of 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ’s.

43
A.2 Solution of the Game
Let Γ denote a partition of the set of players into ℳ and 𝒩𝒩\ℳ. Take any Γ and any
realization of the agenda setter 𝜇𝜇 consistent with that Γ, and call 𝐺𝐺(Γ, 𝜇𝜇) the game from
stage 3 onwards with partition of players Γ and agenda setter 𝜇𝜇. The equilibrium play of
that game will generate payoffs 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 (Γ, 𝜇𝜇) for each player 𝑖𝑖. We will solve the game in two
steps: first we will find the (subgame perfect) equilibrium for any 𝐺𝐺(Γ, 𝜇𝜇), and then we will
find Nash equilibria to the venue choices of all players in stage 1, having the expected
values over 𝜇𝜇, 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 (Γ), as continuation payoffs. We focus on pure strategies throughout.

Step 1. Solving 𝐺𝐺(Γ, 𝜇𝜇).

𝜇𝜇
�𝑑𝑑 ∗ (𝑧𝑧), 𝑆𝑆 𝝁𝝁∗ (𝑑𝑑), �𝜙𝜙𝑗𝑗∗ �𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 �� � constitute a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium for 𝐺𝐺(Γ, 𝜇𝜇) if:
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 𝒩𝒩\ℳ

1. For all 𝑑𝑑(𝑧𝑧), 𝑆𝑆 𝝁𝝁 :

𝜇𝜇 𝜇𝜇
𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖∗ �𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 � maximizes payoffs to 𝑖𝑖, given �𝜙𝜙𝑗𝑗∗ �𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 �� , for all 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝒩𝒩\ℳ.
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 𝒩𝒩\ℳ\{i}
𝜇𝜇
2. Given �𝜙𝜙𝑗𝑗∗ �𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 �� , for all 𝑑𝑑(𝑧𝑧):
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 𝒩𝒩\ℳ

𝑆𝑆 𝝁𝝁∗ (𝑑𝑑) maximizes payoff to the agenda setter µ.

𝜇𝜇
3. Given �𝜙𝜙𝑗𝑗∗ �𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 �� , 𝑆𝑆 𝝁𝝁∗ (𝑑𝑑):
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 𝒩𝒩\ℳ

𝑑𝑑∗ (𝑧𝑧) maximizes payoffs to The Street.

We solve 𝐺𝐺(Γ, 𝜇𝜇) by backward induction from stage 5 to stage 3.

Stage 5: given the status quo payoffs of zero, assumption A4 assures that any proposal
greater or equal to zero will be accepted by all members of Congress. This implies
𝑆𝑆 = 𝑆𝑆𝜇𝜇 . (1)
𝝁𝝁
Stage 4: given (1), 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 0 ∀𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝒩𝒩\ℳ\{μ}, since the agenda setter will try to keep as much
of the pie as possible for himself. With regards to how much to give to The Street, the
decision depends on the number of players in the street, as well as on the amount they
request. In case of 𝑚𝑚 < 𝑇𝑇, given that 𝑑𝑑(𝑧𝑧) = 0 ∀z, there is no reason to give anything to
the street, and 𝑧𝑧 𝜇𝜇 = 0. If 𝑚𝑚 ≥ 𝑇𝑇, then the amount given to The Street by the agenda setter
will depend on the 𝑑𝑑(𝑧𝑧) function. The agenda setter will pick the lowest 𝑧𝑧 such that

44
𝑑𝑑(𝑧𝑧) = 0, and compare giving that 𝑧𝑧 to all players in the street, to giving them 0 and
suffering the damage 𝑑𝑑(0). Hence, the setter’s problem consists of
max𝑧𝑧 �{1 − 𝑚𝑚 × 𝑧𝑧̂ }𝑋𝑋, 𝑋𝑋 − 𝑑𝑑(0)�, (2)
where 𝑧𝑧̂ = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚{𝑧𝑧|𝑑𝑑(𝑧𝑧) = 0}.
Stage 3: (The problem for The Street is trivial when 𝑚𝑚 < 𝑇𝑇; we focus on the case 𝑚𝑚 ≥ 𝑇𝑇.)
The Street’s problem consists of maximizing 𝑧𝑧 subject to (2). Given that in the second
option they get zero, their problem reduces to announcing a function 𝑑𝑑(𝑧𝑧) that: (i)
minimizes 𝑋𝑋 − 𝑑𝑑(0): and (ii) minimizes {1 − 𝑚𝑚 × 𝑧𝑧̂ }𝑋𝑋, subject to {1 − 𝑚𝑚 × 𝑧𝑧̂ }𝑋𝑋 ≥ 𝑋𝑋 −
𝐾𝐾
𝑑𝑑(0). (i) implies 𝑑𝑑(0) = 𝐾𝐾. (ii) implies = 𝑧𝑧̂ . Any function 𝑑𝑑(𝑧𝑧) that satisfies those
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚

two conditions constitutes a solution to The Street’s problem. For brevity we focus on
𝐾𝐾
𝐾𝐾 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑧𝑧 <
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑑𝑑(𝑧𝑧) = � 𝐾𝐾 (3)
0 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑧𝑧 ≥
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚

The above reasoning can be summarized in the following Lemma. 50

Lemma 1: under the maintained assumptions of the model, subgame perfect equilibria to
G(Γ,µ) will imply the following equilibrium play:
(a) If m<T:
⋅ The Street announces anything.
𝝁𝝁
⋅ The agenda setter proposes 𝑆𝑆𝜇𝜇 = �𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 �𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝒩𝒩 such that

𝜇𝜇 1 𝑖𝑖 = 𝜇𝜇
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = � (4)
0 𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝜇𝜇
⋅ All players in Congress accept the proposal.
⋅ No damage is caused.
⋅ The allocation is
𝑋𝑋 𝑖𝑖 = 𝜇𝜇
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = �
0 𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝜇𝜇

(b) If m≥T:
⋅ The Street announces (3).

50
In the case in which 𝑚𝑚 = 𝑛𝑛, there will be no one in Congress; but it is easy to see that 𝑚𝑚 = 𝑛𝑛 cannot
happen in equilibrium, since in that case any player switching venues would become the agenda setter and
increase his payoff.

45
 𝜇𝜇
⋅ The agenda setter proposes 𝑆𝑆 𝝁𝝁 = �𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 �𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 such that

1 − 𝐾𝐾�𝑋𝑋 𝑖𝑖 = 𝜇𝜇
𝝁𝝁
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = � 0 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝒩𝒩\ℳ\{μ} (5)
𝐾𝐾� 𝑖𝑖 ∈ ℳ
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
⋅ All players in Congress accept the proposal.
⋅ No damage is caused.
⋅ The allocation is
𝑋𝑋 − 𝐾𝐾 𝑖𝑖 = 𝜇𝜇
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = �0 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝒩𝒩\ℳ\{μ}
𝐾𝐾� 𝑖𝑖 ∈ ℳ
𝑚𝑚

From Lemma 1 it is easy to compute the continuation values of the different configurations
of venue choices in stage 1, before 𝜇𝜇 is realized in stage 2. These expected values from
venue choice 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 , as a function of all other players’ choices 𝒂𝒂−𝒊𝒊 ,will constitute the elements
of the payoff matrix of the stage 1 game.

Step 2. Nash Equilibria of Stage 1 Game.

There are two types of equilibria in this game: (a) Full Institutionalization Equilibria
(FIE) in which all players choose to go to Congress and a standard Baron-Ferejohn game
results from stage 2 onwards, and (b) Low Institutionalization Equilibria (LIE) in which
𝑚𝑚∗ > 0 players go to the street. In the next step we show that a FIE exists for all parameter
values under our maintained assumptions. After that, we analyze Low Institutionalization
Equilibria.
It is easy to see that if everybody is in Congress, nobody wants to deviate from that,
for all the feasible parameters of the game. If everybody was in Congress, and one player
was to deviate and go to the street, the number of players in the street would be one, which
is smaller than 𝑇𝑇 and hence insufficient to produce any damage. The allocation resulting
from that path will lead to 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 0 for the deviating player. His payoff in the street will then
be equal to – 𝑐𝑐, while his expected payoff in Congress would have been 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝑋𝑋. This
deviation is never profitable. (Notice that the continuation of the game in this type of
equilibrium is as specified in part (a) of Lemma 1).

46
 We now proceed to characterize Low Institutionalization Equilibria. Let Γ ∗ denote
a partition being considered as possible equilibrium, with ℳ ∗ its associated set (with
measure 𝑚𝑚∗ ) of players in the street. In any LIE it has to be the case that no player in the
street wants to switch to Congress and no player in Congress wants to switch to the street.
It is easy to see from Lemma 1 that it is not possible to have a LIE in which m*<T, since in
such case players in the street would be receiving a payoff of −𝑐𝑐, which would be
dominated by the expected payoff in Congress to anyone switching. Hence in any LIE the
continuation game has to be as specified in part (b) of Lemma 1.
For a partition to be an equilibrium one, it has to be the case that no player in
Congress would rather be in the street. That is, ∀𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝒩𝒩\ℳ ∗ :

𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑖 𝐾𝐾
(𝑋𝑋 − 𝐾𝐾) � �≥ − 𝑐𝑐,
∑𝑗𝑗 ∈𝒩𝒩\ℳ ∗ 𝑝𝑝 𝑗𝑗 𝑚𝑚 ∗ +1

which implies
∑𝑗𝑗 ∈𝒩𝒩\ℳ ∗ 𝑝𝑝 𝑗𝑗 𝐾𝐾
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ≥ � − 𝑐𝑐� ≡ 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿 (Γ ∗ ); (6)
(𝑋𝑋−𝐾𝐾) 𝑚𝑚 ∗ +1

so that 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿 (Γ ∗ ) constitutes the lowest possible 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 that will rather stay in Congress for an
arbitrary partition Γ ∗ . Condition (6) is necessary for Γ ∗ to be an equilibrium partition.
A similar reasoning can be applied to players in the street, only that two situations have to
be considered in that case, depending on whether the number of players in the street m∗
induced by Γ ∗ is equal to or greater than 𝑇𝑇.
For Γ ∗ such that 𝑚𝑚∗ > 𝑇𝑇 to be an equilibrium partition, it has to be the case that
∀𝑖𝑖 ∈ ℳ ∗ :
𝐾𝐾 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
− 𝑐𝑐 ≥ (X − K) � �,
𝑚𝑚 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + ∑𝑗𝑗 ∈𝒩𝒩\ℳ ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗
which implies
𝐾𝐾
∑𝑗𝑗 ∈𝒩𝒩\ℳ ∗ 𝑝𝑝 𝑗𝑗 � ∗ −𝑐𝑐�
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑚𝑚
𝐾𝐾 ≡ 𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈 (Γ ∗ ). (7)
(X−K)−� ∗ −𝑐𝑐�
𝑚𝑚

For Γ ∗ such that 𝑚𝑚∗ = 𝑇𝑇 to be an equilibrium partition, it has to be the case that ∀𝑖𝑖 ∈ ℳ ∗ :
𝐾𝐾 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
− 𝑐𝑐 ≥ X � �,
𝑇𝑇 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + ∑𝑗𝑗 ∈𝒩𝒩\ℳ ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗
which implies

47
 𝐾𝐾
∑𝑗𝑗 ∈𝒩𝒩\ℳ ∗ 𝑝𝑝 𝑗𝑗 � −𝑐𝑐�
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝐾𝐾
𝑇𝑇
≡ 𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈 (Γ ∗ ). (7’)
X−� 𝑇𝑇 −𝑐𝑐�

The difference between (7’) and (7) lies in the absence of the term 𝐾𝐾 in the denominator,
since when 𝑚𝑚∗ = 𝑇𝑇, anyone moving from the street to Congress will make The Street’s
threat of damage no longer feasible. 51
(6) and (7) are necessary and sufficient conditions for Γ ∗ such that 𝑚𝑚∗ > 𝑇𝑇 to be an
equilibrium partition. (6) and (7’) are necessary and sufficient conditions for Γ ∗ such that
𝑚𝑚∗ = 𝑇𝑇 to be an equilibrium partition.
These conditions allow for two types of LIE: one in which the partition is such that
the greatest 𝑖𝑖 in ℳ ∗ is smaller than the least 𝑖𝑖 in 𝒩𝒩\ℳ ∗ , that is all types in Congress are
larger than all types in the street (call those LIE1); and one in which that condition is not
satisfied (LIE2). In the rest of this appendix as well as in the text we focus on equilibria
LIE1, and reserve the terminology LIE to refer to LIE1. Other than being more intuitive
and allowing for a briefer exposition of the subsequent analysis, this choice can be justified
by two results proven in an additional appendix, available upon request: (i) for any vector
of parameters for which a LIE2 exists, there exists also a LIE1; and (ii) if we take two
partitions Γ and Γ ′ with the same number of players in each venue (𝑚𝑚 and 𝑛𝑛 − 𝑚𝑚) that
differ only on the venue choice of one player from each arena (say players 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗 switch
places), the sum of utilities of those two players will be higher in the partition in which the
higher type is in Congress and the lower type is in the Street.
We analyze now the parameter values under which LIE exists. We can explain the
results with the visual aid of Figure A-1. Let the horizontal axis represent ℝ+ as well as the
set of players 𝑖𝑖 ordered from 1 to 𝑛𝑛.

51
The fact that the bound has the form 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈 depends on (𝑋𝑋 − 𝐾𝐾) − �𝐾𝐾�𝑚𝑚∗ − 𝑐𝑐� ≥ 0 for the 𝑚𝑚∗ of the
partition under consideration. Otherwise the condition would be of the form 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈 with 𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈 < 0, so that
nobody who has been assigned to the street would want to move, and we might have various ways of
partitioning people across venues for some parameter values. All the logic of the analysis below goes through
also in that case. In particular, see the distinction between LIE1 and LIE2 below: when selecting to focus on
LIE1, we are leaving aside such sources of multiplicity.

48
Figure A1. Low Institutionalization Equilibria

𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝑉𝑉01 (𝑖𝑖) = 𝑋𝑋 � 𝑛𝑛 �
∑𝑗𝑗 =𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗

𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾1 (𝑖𝑖) = (𝑋𝑋 − 𝐾𝐾) � 𝑛𝑛 �
∑𝑗𝑗 =𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗

𝐾𝐾
𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾0 (𝑖𝑖) = − 𝑐𝑐
𝑖𝑖

𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇1 𝑇𝑇2 𝑇𝑇3 𝑇𝑇4 𝑛𝑛

𝑇𝑇1 < 𝑚𝑚∗ → ∃ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿

𝑇𝑇2 = 𝑚𝑚2∗ → ∃ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝑇𝑇3 = 𝑚𝑚3∗ → ∄ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝑇𝑇4 > 𝑚𝑚∗ → ∄ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿

49
Take any vector of all the parameters of the game except 𝑇𝑇. Let 𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎 (𝑖𝑖) represent the value
of action 𝑎𝑎 ∈ {0,1} for player 𝑖𝑖 when potential damage is 𝐷𝐷 ∈ {0, 𝐾𝐾}, under the assumption
(from LIE1) that all players to his left are choosing the street (𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 = 0 ∀𝑗𝑗 < 𝑖𝑖) and all
players to his right are choosing Congress (𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 = 1 ∀𝑗𝑗 > 𝑖𝑖). We have then
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾1 (𝑖𝑖) = (𝑋𝑋 − 𝐾𝐾) � 𝑛𝑛 �
∑𝑗𝑗 =𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝑉𝑉01 (𝑖𝑖) = 𝑋𝑋 � 𝑛𝑛 �
∑𝑗𝑗 =𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗
𝐾𝐾
𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾0 (𝑖𝑖) = − 𝑐𝑐
𝑖𝑖
𝑉𝑉00 (𝑖𝑖) = −𝑐𝑐
The three first functions are plotted in figure A-1. 52 Let 𝑚𝑚∗ be the largest integer such that
𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾0 ( ) ≥ 𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾1 ( ). The identification of the set of parameter vectors for which there is a
LIE can be visualized by juxtaposing the parameter 𝑇𝑇 with the rest of parameters
summarized in the functions plotted in Figure A-1. If 𝑇𝑇 < 𝑚𝑚∗ , then the threat of damage 𝐾𝐾
is credible, the relevant curve for the value of being in Congress is 𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾1 (𝑖𝑖), and we have a
LIE in which players 1 through 𝑚𝑚∗ go to the street and players 𝑚𝑚∗ + 1 through 𝑛𝑛 go to
Congress. If 𝑇𝑇 > 𝑚𝑚∗ , then the value of being in the street would be 𝑉𝑉00 (𝑖𝑖) = −𝑐𝑐, and that
cannot be an equilibrium, as already stated. For 𝑇𝑇 = 𝑚𝑚∗ , the relevant comparison for the
(now pivotal) player 𝑖𝑖 = 𝑇𝑇 = 𝑚𝑚∗ is between 𝑉𝑉01 (𝑖𝑖) and 𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾0 (𝑖𝑖). If 𝑉𝑉01 (𝑖𝑖) ≤ 𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾0 (𝑖𝑖), then he
chooses the street and we have a LIE. If 𝑉𝑉01 (𝑖𝑖) > 𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾0 (𝑖𝑖), then he would choose Congress
and we do not have a LIE.
We summarize the analysis in the following proposition, which is the more formal
equivalent of (heuristic) Proposition 1 in the text.

Appendix Proposition 1:
Let 𝑚𝑚∗ ≡ max{i| 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝒩𝒩 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾0 (𝑖𝑖) ≥ 𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾1 (𝑖𝑖)}
(a) A Full Institutionalization Equilibrium in which ℳ ∗ = ∅ and 𝒩𝒩\ℳ ∗ = 𝒩𝒩 exists for
all values of parameters.

52
The functions are written and plotted as continuous for expositional purposes, even though for a given set
of 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 s they are discrete functions.

50
(b) A Low Institutionalization Equilibrium in which ℳ ∗ = {1,2, … 𝑚𝑚∗ } and 𝒩𝒩\ℳ ∗ =
{𝑚𝑚∗ + 1, 𝑚𝑚∗ + 2, … 𝑛𝑛} exists if T<𝑚𝑚∗ or if T=𝑚𝑚∗ 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾0 (𝑖𝑖) ≥ 𝑉𝑉01 (𝑖𝑖).

We have established conditions for the existence of LIE, in which players up to 𝑚𝑚∗
are in the street and players from 𝑚𝑚∗ + 1 are in Congress. In such cases, the equilibrium
conditions 𝑉𝑉 0 (𝑚𝑚∗ ) ≥ 𝑉𝑉 1 (𝑚𝑚∗ ) and 𝑉𝑉 1 (𝑚𝑚∗ + 1) ≥ 𝑉𝑉 0 (𝑚𝑚∗ + 1) are satisfied. For
simplicity, in any case of indifference we assign 𝑚𝑚∗ to the street and 𝑚𝑚∗ + 1 to Congress.
Under those conditions 𝑚𝑚∗ is unique for any set of parameters for which LIE exists, which
facilitates the comparative statics.

A.3 Comparative Statics

We can use Figure A-1 to intuitively visualize comparative statics results from the
parameters of the model to 𝑚𝑚∗ . As asserted in the body of the paper, these comparative
statics could be interpreted as referring both to the number of people in the street within a
LIE, and to the possibility of existence of LIE (vis-à-vis FIE that always exists), where
“possibility” is defined in terms of the size of the set of parameters (other than the one
being changed) for which the conditions for existence of LIE are satisfied. First of all, it is
clear that a larger 𝑇𝑇 makes LIE less likely. For all other parameters, we can see their effect
by shifting the curves 𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾0 (𝑖𝑖) and 𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾1 (𝑖𝑖) in Figure A-1, and by noticing that the larger 𝑚𝑚∗ ,
the weaker the requirements on all other parameters for the existence of LIE. It is easy to
see that an increase in 𝑐𝑐 shifts 𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾0 (𝑖𝑖) down, tending to decrease 𝑚𝑚∗ , hence decreasing the
possibility of LIE. Increasing 𝑋𝑋 has the same effect through an upward shift of 𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾1 (𝑖𝑖).
Decreasing 𝐾𝐾 also decreases both 𝑚𝑚∗ and the probability of LIE through leftward shifts in
both curves.
Comparative statics on the distribution of 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 s can be a bit more involved. Here we
prove the effect of increasing the asymmetry of 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 s (or the inequality in the distribution of
de jure political power) in a particular way. Let 𝑃𝑃(𝑖𝑖) = ∑𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 be the cumulative density
function counting from 𝑛𝑛 to 𝑖𝑖. Notice that 𝑃𝑃(𝑖𝑖) decreases in 𝑖𝑖. Let 𝑞𝑞 be another distribution,
with cumulative 𝑄𝑄(𝑖𝑖) = ∑𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=𝑖𝑖 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 . For brevity and simplicity of exposition we will speak as
if the functions where continuous, while the proper logic is the discrete equivalent of what
we say. We will say that 𝑄𝑄(∙) is more unequal than 𝑃𝑃(∙) if 𝑄𝑄(∙) is equally or more elastic

51
than 𝑃𝑃(∙) for all 𝑖𝑖, and it is strictly more elastic for at least one 𝑖𝑖. This means that changes
in 𝑖𝑖 lead to larger changes in the probability under 𝑞𝑞 than under 𝑝𝑝. Notice that this condition
implies that 𝑃𝑃(∙) first order stochastically dominates 𝑄𝑄(∙). We show that a more unequal
distribution leads to more people in the street. 𝑄𝑄(∙) more unequal than 𝑃𝑃(∙) implies
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝑖𝑖 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝑖𝑖 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝑖𝑖 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝑖𝑖 𝑞𝑞 𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑖 𝑞𝑞 𝑗𝑗 𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑖
� �≥� � ⇒ ≤ ⇒ ≤ ⇒ ∑𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=𝑖𝑖 𝑞𝑞 𝑗𝑗
≤ ∑𝑛𝑛 .
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝑄𝑄 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝑃𝑃 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝑄𝑄 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝑃𝑃 𝑄𝑄(𝑖𝑖) 𝑃𝑃(𝑖𝑖) 𝑗𝑗 =𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝 𝑗𝑗

As we can see in Figure A-2, this implies that in the case of more unequal distribution of
power, there will be more (or at least not fewer) people in the street.

Figure A2. More Unequal Distribution 𝒒𝒒 Leads to Larger 𝒎𝒎∗

𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
(𝑋𝑋 − 𝐾𝐾)
∑𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
(𝑋𝑋 − 𝐾𝐾)
∑𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=𝑖𝑖 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗

𝐾𝐾
− 𝑐𝑐
𝑖𝑖

𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛
𝑚𝑚∗ (approx.) for 𝑚𝑚∗ (approx.) for
distribution 𝑝𝑝 distribution 𝑞𝑞

52
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