The United States’ Discriminatory Protectionism against China 285

The United States’ Discriminatory

Protectionism against China

Yooyeon Noh and Jai S. Mah

The article examines the characteristics of the United States’ (US) discriminatory protection measures,
especially the antidumping (AD) duties, against China. China has been the most significant target of
US trade protectionism in terms of the absolute number as well as the intensity of measures. There
exists a positive relationship between the US bilateral trade deficit and the increase in the number of
its discriminatory trade protection measures against China. US AD decisions against China have been
led by the chemical industry, followed by the iron and steel industry. It is expected that the number of
US discriminatory trade protection measures against the Chinese textile products will increase in the
coming years, since the ten-year phase-out of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) was completed at
the end of 2004. Since discriminatory trade restrictions are costly in terms of the welfare of the concerned
countries, it would be necessary for them to apply stricter regulations regarding the discriminatory
protection measures.

I. INTRODUCTION

Despite the accomplishment of the Uruguay Round with regard to reducing tariffs,
there remain concerns that many countries are using non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to
protect their markets. One specific concern is that antidumping (AD) duties, originally
intended to remedy situations where foreign firms sell their product in the importing
country at a price that is below normal value, have been used quite often as trade pro-
tection measures selectively targeting specific countries. Since the early 1980s, the
number of AD filings has increased significantly. From January 1995 to June 2005,
41 members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) reported that they initiated
AD investigations and more than 2,700 AD cases were filed. Meanwhile, the US has
been the heaviest user of AD duties for the past decade.
Although the US has imposed AD duties as a discriminatory trade protection
measure against many countries, China has apparently been its main target in this
context since the 1990s. Many recent studies have dealt with the evolution of US AD

CHINA REPORT 42 : 3 (2006)

Sage Publications New Delhi/ Thousand Oaks/London
DOI: 10.1177/000944550604200304
Downloaded from chr.sagepub.com at Stockholm University Library on August 24, 2015
286 Yooyeon Noh and Jai S. Mah

measures and its characteristics (Mah 2000a, 2000b; Bown, Hoekman and Ozden
2003; Blonigen 2003; Irwin 2005); however, no work has focused exclusively on US
AD practices against China, which is the most conspicuous recent phenomenon
with respect to discriminatory trade protection measures. Therefore, it would be
worthwhile to take a close look at the pattern of US AD duties against China and its
prospects. The purpose of this article is to reveal the characteristics of US discrim-
inatory trade protection measures against China by closely reviewing the pattern of
the US-China bilateral trade relationship as well as US AD decisions against China.
The structure of this article is as follows. The next section reviews recent literature
that discusses the proliferation of AD uses and the motives behind this phenomenon.
Section III discusses briefly the evolution of AD regulations within the global trading
system as well as in the US. Section IV explains the overall pattern of the US-China
bilateral trade relationship. Section V examines the characteristics of US AD uses
against China. Conclusions are provided in Section VI.

II. PROLIFERATION OF AD USES

The aggressive use of AD duties as a discriminatory trade protection measure was

pioneered by four developed countries (counting the EU as one), i.e., the US, EU,
Australia and Canada, but increasingly followed by many other developed as well as
developing countries. Advocates of AD practices claim that they are essential in the
fight against predatory pricing by foreign companies. If dumped products are left
unregulated, they argue, foreign companies would harm domestic industries severely,
drive local companies out of business, take control of the market, and eventually create
monopolies. Those opposing AD practices suggest that it is just another form of pro-
tectionism that nurtures inefficient domestic industries and increases cost to consumers
in the importing country. Critics also argue that AD laws create impediments to free
trade, which results in the misallocation of global resources and disregard for compar-
ative advantage in the world economy.
A series of articles described the characteristics of US AD measures against its trading
partners. Mah (2000a) discussed the characteristics of the AD measures against
Northeast Asian countries, and whether macroeconomic variables influence the US
International Trade Commission (ITC)’s injury decisions against products from
importing countries. Mah (2000b) revealed a long-run equilibrium relationship be-
tween the US ITC’s injury decisions and macroeconomic variables. Bown et al. (2003)
found that US AD decisions were more likely to target lower-income developing
countries with higher AD duties. Blonigen (2003) found that the average dumping
margin of US AD duties increased from 15 per cent in the early 1980s to over 60 per
cent by 2000, a dramatic rise in the degree of protectionism in the case of AD duties.
As the number of new AD users increased from the early 1990s, several authors
recently began focusing on the dramatic growth in the number of countries imposing
AD duties. Miranda et al. (1998) explained the overall tendencies of AD users and
Downloaded from chr.sagepub.com at Stockholm University Library on August 24, 2015
The United States’ Discriminatory Protectionism against China 287

noticed the emergence of increased AD enforcement by developing countries. Lindsay

and Ikenson (2001) viewed these new users as following the ‘bad US example’ of
protecting domestic industries from foreign competition, and regarded this phe-
nomenon as a great threat to US interests. Zanardi (2004) presented data indicating
that US exporters had also become targets of AD duties as their use spread beyond
‘traditional users’. The US has recently become the third most-targeted country with
respect to foreign AD actions, trailing only China and Korea. Mah and Kim (2006)
focused on the case of a developing country—Korea—as an active user of AD duties.
Prusa (2005) suggested several reasons for the proliferation of AD measures to
most parts of the world: the lack of a theoretical foundation justifying AD duties; the
discretion involved in calculating dumping margins; the vagueness of WTO
regulations with regard to AD; the failure of the WTO to develop meaningful rules
for implementing AD; and the success of the WTO in lowering tariffs, which led
countries to use AD to restore order to the domestic market. According to Prusa,
among these, the discretion in the calculation of the dumping margin is an especially
strong factor in the case of the US. The US Department of Commerce has been
suspected for using its discretion in order to obtain the highest possible dumping
margin to protect domestic industries.

III. AD REGULATIONS IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM

Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) explicitly authorises
the imposition of AD duties on imports from a particular country where the following
conditions are satisfied: the existence of a dumping margin; material injury to a do-
mestic industry; and causal relationship between dumped imports and material injury.
As the first attempt to mitigate problems of dumped imports in the global trading
system, the Antidumping Code came into force in 1967 as a result of the Kennedy
Round. Although the Tokyo Round Code came into being in 1980, modifying the
previous Agreement, it had weaknesses arising from the voluntary, non-mandatory,
nature of the Code. The negotiations in the Uruguay Round have resulted in a revision
of the Tokyo Round Code. Although the AD Code of the Uruguay Round includes
the special and differential treatment of developing countries, the cumulation provision
in Article 5 of the Uruguay Round AD Code may deprive them of the possibilities of
preferential treatment.
For the US, the Congress passed legislation that changed various features of
US AD laws in the 1970s and 1980s, making AD duties more like trade protection
measures (Irwin 2005). In particular, the Trade Act of 1974 expanded the definition
of ‘dumping’, which allowed imports to be actionable if they were sold below cost,
even if domestic and foreign prices were the same. In addition, under the Trade and
Tariff Act of 1984, the US ITC started to accumulate the imports of all countries
subject to AD investigation when making an injury determination, which allegedly
increased the benefit to domestic firms filing petitions targeting several different
Downloaded from chr.sagepub.com at Stockholm University Library on August 24, 2015
288 Yooyeon Noh and Jai S. Mah

countries for dumping the same product (Hansen and Prusa 1996). According to
Mah (2000a), as a result of the inclusion of such a provision, small developing eco-
nomies became more likely to be subject to the imposition of AD duties.
In addition to these changes in the AD law, administrative changes affected the
increase in the number of AD cases in the US. In 1979, the Commerce Department
was delegated full responsibility for determining dumping margins from the Treasury
Department. Since the former is mainly in change of protecting and nurturing the
domestic industries, the US government became more likely to determine the
existence of positive dumping margin, that is, more protective of domestic industries.
Meanwhile, the ITC determines whether or not a domestic industry is materially
injured by foreign dumping. Many have noted the US ITC’s procedure for determining
material injury to be very vague and non-transparent (see Hansen and Pursa 1996;
Mah 2000a, 2000b).

IV. TRADE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA

The total volume of trade between the US and China rose rapidly after the two
countries established diplomatic relations, signed a bilateral trade agreement in 1979,
and provided mutual Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment in 1980. Total trade
volume between the two nations rose from $4.8 billion in 1980 to $231.4 billion in
2004. Along with the growing total trade volume, the US bilateral trade deficits with
China have gradually increased.
Table 1 shows the increasing and unequal trade balance between the US and China
and highlights the growing contribution of China to the overall trade deficit of the
US. As seen in the table, US imports from China have grown faster than its exports
to China, resulting in an overall trade deficit. Until the late 1980s, the US trade de-
ficits with China were negligible and accounted for less than 6 per cent of the total
US trade deficit. Since then, its trade deficit with China has grown significantly due to
a surge in US imports of Chinese goods, reaching its peak in 2004, when it accounted
for nearly one-quarter of total US trade deficits. In 2004, imports from China amounted
to US$ 196.7 billion, sharing 13.3 per cent of total US imports, and, consequently,
China became the fourth-largest supplier of US imports (United States Trade Repre-
sentative 2004). Thus, the continuing and increasing bilateral trade deficits may
explain the United States’ selective protectionism against China since the 1990s.
At the sectoral level, a substantial proportion of Chinese exports to the US
concentrates on labour-intensive industries. Table 2 shows the values of the top five
US imports from China from 1990 to 2004. Imports of commodities made in five
industries—power generation equipment, electrical machinery and sound equip-
ment, miscellaneous manufactured articles (such as toys and games), furniture, and
footwear—accounted for almost two-thirds of total US imports from China in 2004.

Downloaded from chr.sagepub.com at Stockholm University Library on August 24, 2015

The United States’ Discriminatory Protectionism against China 289

Table 1
Trade between the United States and China: 1985–2004
(unit: US$ billion)

US Trade US Overall Trade

US Exports US Imports Balance with Balance with Rest
Year to China from China China (A) of the World (B) A/B (%)
1985 3.8 3.9 –0.06 –122.1 0.05
1986 3.1 4.8 –1.7 –145.1 1.2
1987 3.5 6.3 –2.8 –159.6 1.8
1988 5.0 8.5 –3.5 –127.0 2.8
1989 5.8 12.0 –6.2 –109.6 5.7
1990 4.8 15.2 –10.4 –103.1 10.1
1991 6.3 19.0 –12.7 –67.0 19.0
1992 7.5 25.7 –18.2 –84.5 21.5
1993 8.8 31.5 –22.7 –115.6 19.6
1994 9.3 38.8 –29.5 –151.4 19.5
1995 11.7 45.6 –33.9 –160.5 21.1
1996 12.0 51.5 –39.5 –168.5 23.4
1997 12.8 62.6 –49.8 –182.6 27.3
1998 14.3 71.2 –56.9 –233.4 24.4
1999 13.1 81.8 –68.7 –331.9 20.7
2000 16.3 100.1 –83.8 –436.5 19.2
2001 19.2 102.3 –83.1 –410.9 20.2
2002 22.1 125.2 –103.1 –470.3 21.9
2003 28.4 152.4 –124.0 –535.7 23.1
2004 34.7 196.7 –162.0 –651.7 24.9
Source: Data complied by the authors from the US Department of Commerce.

Table 2
Top 5 US Imports from China, 1990–2004
(unit: US$ billion, per cent)

Item 1990 1994 1998 2002 2004

Power Generation Equipment 0.5 2.4 7.6 20.2 43.9
(3) (6) (11) (16) (22)
Electrical Machinery/Equipment 1.9 6.5 12.8 24.4 40.2
(13) (17) (17) (19) (20)
Apparel 2.1 5.2 10.6 14.4 17.2
(14) (13) (15) (12) (9)
Furniture 0.3 1.6 3.9 9.9 14.4
(2) (4) (5) (8) (7)
Footwear and Parts thereof 1.5 5.3 8.0 10.2 11.4
(10) (14) (11) (8) (6)
Top 5 Total 6.3 21.0 42.9 79.1 127.0
(41) (54) (60) (63) (65)
Total Imports 15.2 38.8 71.2 125.2 196.7
Source: Data compiled by the authors from US Department of Commerce.

Downloaded from chr.sagepub.com at Stockholm University Library on August 24, 2015

290 Yooyeon Noh and Jai S. Mah

V. ANTIDUMPING MEASURES AGAINST CHINA

The US has played a paradoxical role in the development of the global trading system,
championing the principle of free trade yet opting for various discriminatory trade
policies against its trading partners. Although most economists believe that AD duties
are not beneficial to overall national welfare, such duties have been sought frequently
by American policymakers to protect domestic industries.
Although the number of US AD investigations was not very significant in the late
1970s, it surged from the early 1980s on and since then the US has remained the
heaviest user of AD measures in the global trading system. Table 3 shows the number
of AD investigations initiated in the period July 1980–June 2005 by the most active
AD users. The US as the heaviest user has continuously increased its AD investigations
until the mid-1990s, which then decreased somewhat, but have rebounded strongly
in the most recent period. By contrast, the EU, which is often considered yet another
of the largest AD users and even initiated more investigations than the US in the
early 1980s, shows a relatively smaller increase in the number of its AD investigations
during the period, which has even decreased in recent years. The total number of AD
investigations initiated by each of the three other traditional users—Australia, Canada
and New Zealand—are 876, 535 and 92, respectively, which is smaller than that of
the US.

Table 3
Number of AD Investigations Initiated by Reporting Countries:
Top 10 Users, July 1980–June 2005

Countries July 1980–1984 1985–1989 1990–1994 1995–1999 2000–June 2005 Total

Untied States 188 221 254 134 224 1021
Australia 255 196 251 101 73 876
European Union 195 205 159 186 132 577
Canada 179 120 103 56 77 535
India 0 0 9 131 281 421
South Africa 0 0 47 129 62 238
Argentina 0 0 44 94 99 237
Mexico 0 27 96 37 45 205
Brazil 0 6 52 68 51 177
New Zealand 1 20 25 24 22 92
Source: Data compiled by the authors from WTO (1995–2005), Semi-Annual Reports of the Committee
on Anti-dumping Practices under Article 16.4 of the Agreement; Prusa (2005) for data from 1980
to 1994.

Table 4 reflects US AD activities against its ten most-frequently investigated coun-

tries during 1990–2004. The US has imposed AD duties on Chinese products most
frequently. The likelihood of having investigations resulting in the imposition of AD
duties by US trading partners is also the highest for the Chinese, as high as 68 per
cent, which is substantially higher than that for the other countries, such as those in
the East Asian bloc, which are between 47 per cent and 61 per cent, as well as for econ-
omies in the rest of the world, which is between 22 per cent and 53 per cent.
Downloaded from chr.sagepub.com at Stockholm University Library on August 24, 2015
The United States’ Discriminatory Protectionism against China 291

Table 4
US AD Activities against Its Ten Most-Frequently Investigated Trading Partners, 1990–2004

Investigations Resulting
Rank Country AD Investigation (A) in Duties (B) A/B (%)
1 China 90 61 67.8
2 Japan 54 33 61.1
3 South Korea 39 20 51.3
4 Taiwan 32 15 46.9
5 Mexico 28 11 39.3
6 India 28 11 39.3
7 Canada 27 6 22.2
8 Germany 26 10 38.5
9 Brazil 25 12 48.0
10 Italy 19 10 52.6
Sources: US International Trade Commission (2004); US ITC (2005) for 2004 data.

As regards being the target of AD investigations, China has also become a common
target of dumping charges for most of its trading partners. In recent years, the number
of AD cases against China has skyrocketed. From January 1995 to June 2004, some
434 AD cases were initiated and 317 definitive AD measures were imposed out of those
investigations. Figure 1 illustrates the numbers of definitive AD measures against China
by importing countries since 1995. Among developed countries, the US has been the
heaviest user of AD measures against China. It is interesting to note that Chinese ex-
ports have increasingly been hit by developing countries as well over the past ten
years. In particular, India has imposed AD measures more often than the US.
One of the major reasons China is attacked heavily by the US’ selective protection
measures is that it is one of the world’s lowest-cost producers (McGee and Yoon 1998).
Due to the cost structure of its industries and economy as well as the fact that it tends
to manufacture products at the low-quality end, it is able to export a wide range of
products at lower prices than its competitors.
Another reason for such severe protectionism against China is the growth in bilateral
trade with China. As trade values increase, it is natural to see an increase in dumping
investigations. Thus, it might be more appropriate to measure the intensity of AD
uses against China adjusted against the value of imports. The AD intensity would
not only show an alternative measure of the long-run growth in AD but also facilitate
comparing AD activities across countries (Prusa 2005). Messerlin (2004) demonstrates
that China has been targeted much more intensively by the US than by other developed
countries, not only in the sense of the initiation of investigations in absolute terms but
also the AD intensity, defined as the number of AD duties imposed relative to import
values.
Table 5 presents an overview of the number of US AD investigations against China
along with the US bilateral trade balance with China during the period 1980–mid-2005.
As the number of US AD decisions against China has increased from the early 1980s,
its share has increased abruptly from 3.9 per cent during the period 1980–1984 to
11.9 per cent during the period 1990–1994, and further to 17.0 per cent for 2000–2004.

Downloaded from chr.sagepub.com at Stockholm University Library on August 24, 2015

 292
Figure 1
Total Number of AD Measures Taken against Chinese Exporters during January 1995–June 2005 (by country)

Downloaded from chr.sagepub.com at Stockholm University Library on August 24, 2015

Source: WTO (1995–2005), Semi-Annual Reports of the Committee on Anti-dumping Practices under Article 16.4 of the Agreement.
Yooyeon Noh and Jai S. Mah
The United States’ Discriminatory Protectionism against China 293

Table 5
US Bilateral Trade Balance with China and Number of AD Investigations
against China and the World, 1985–2004

Bilateral Trade Balance AD Investigated AD Filed against

(US$ billion) against China (A) the World (B) A/B(%)
1985 –0.06 4 82 4.9
1986 –1.7 3 63 4.8
1987 –2.8 0 36 0.0
1988 –3.5 1 38 2.6
1989 –6.2 1 29 3.4
1990 –10.4 4 21 19.0
1991 –12.7 8 65 12.3
1992 –18.2 6 89 6.7
1993 –22.7 3 36 8.3
1994 –29.5 11 59 18.6
1995 –33.9 6 18 33.3
1996 –39.5 4 13 30.8
1997 –49.8 2 23 8.7
1998 –56.9 1 33 3.0
1999 –68.7 6 50 12.0
2000 –83.8 6 35 17.1
2001 –83.1 8 92 8.7
2002 –103.1 8 35 22.9
2003 –124.0 9 35 25.7
2004 –162.0 8 33 24.2
1985–1989 –14.3 9 248 3.6
1990–1994 –93.5 32 270 11.9
1995–1999 –248.8 19 137 13.9
2000–2004 –556.0 39 230 17.0%
Source: US International Trade Commission (2004); US ITC (2005) for 2004 data.

It is noteworthy that China alone shared more than 30 per cent of US AD decisions
after the settlement of the Uruguay Round. In addition, China has continuously
faced the largest number of US AD decisions even after becoming a formal member
of the WTO in November 2001. Table 5 also presents some correlations between the
number of US AD decisions against China and the US-China bilateral trade balance.
Since the US-China bilateral trade deficits surpassed US$10 billion in 1990 for the
first time, US AD decisions against China accounted for almost one-fifth of US AD
decisions as a whole. Thus, it can be inferred that there exists a positive relationship
between the US bilateral trade deficits and the number of its AD decisions against
China.
Table 6 shows the sectoral distribution of US AD decisions against China for the
period 1980–2004. The chemical industry (39 per cent of the total) and the iron and
steel industry (26 per cent of the total) have been most frequently hit by US AD
measures, followed by the agricultural sector (7 per cent) and the textile and apparel
industry (7 per cent). It is interesting to find that the US imposes relatively fewer AD
measures in machinery and electronics industries, even if the majority of US imports
Downloaded from chr.sagepub.com at Stockholm University Library on August 24, 2015
294 Yooyeon Noh and Jai S. Mah

Table 6
Number of US AD Investigations against China by Industry, 1980–2004

Industry Number of AD Investigated

Iron and Steel 26 (24%)
Chemical 39 (36%)
Machinery 8 (8%)
Electric Appliances and Electronics 4 (4%)
Textile and Apparel 7 (7%)
Agricultural Products 8 (7%)
Others 15 (14%)
Total 107
Sources: US International Trade Commission (2004); US ITC (2005) for 2004 data.

from China belong to these two industries. Although the textiles and clothing sector
shared only 7 per cent of the number of US-imposed AD measures against China in
1980–2004, its share may increase substantially in the near future, since China is the
largest supplier of textiles and clothes in the world and the Multi-Fibre Arrange-
ment (MFA)—which regulated the developed countries’ imports of clothes and textile
products quantitatively for the past decades—was phased out by the end of 2004.

VI. CONCLUSION

Over the years, GATT/WTO members have agreed to promote trade liberalisation
by eliminating tariffs. In conjunction with the substantial liberalisation of trade that
has occurred in both developed and developing countries, pressure for trade protection
has been channelled more frequently toward trade remedies that are permitted in the
WTO system. AD duties have been the most frequently used trade remedy measure.
Indeed, the relevant literature acknowledges that the AD practice is simply another
form of trade protectionism that nurtures inefficient industries, targets developing
countries selectively, and creates an impediment to national welfare. Nonetheless,
AD practices have spread worldwide, especially since the 1980s.
While promoting free trade in the global trading system, the US has been the
heaviest user of AD duties to protect its domestic industries from selected foreign ex-
porters. About a quarter of US AD measures have been concentrated against China
since the 1990s. When examining the pattern of US AD activities against China, the
current article notices the following characteristics. First, the absolute number and
the intensity of protection measures against China are far higher than those against
other countries. Second, there exists a positive relationship between the US bilateral
trade deficits and the number of its AD decisions. In other words, a rapid increase in
the US bilateral trade deficits with China has resulted in an increase in the number of
US AD decisions against China. Third, US AD decisions against China have targeted

Downloaded from chr.sagepub.com at Stockholm University Library on August 24, 2015

The United States’ Discriminatory Protectionism against China 295

the chemical industry the most, followed by the iron and steel industry. Although
the number of US AD decisions against Chinese textile products is relatively insignifi-
cant, it is expected to increase in the coming years, since the ten-year phase-out of the
Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) was completed at the end of 2004.
WTO regulations regarding AD duties are very vague and leave room for mem-
ber countries to use them as discriminatory practices so as to protect their domestic
industries. Not surprisingly, discriminatory trade restrictions are costly in terms of
the welfare of the concerned countries such as the US and China. Therefore, it would
be necessary for them and the global trading system to institute and apply stricter
regulations regarding AD measures.

REFERENCES

Blonigen, B.A., ‘Evolving Discretionary Practices of US Antidumping Activities’, NBER Working Paper,
No. 9625, 2003.
Blonigen, B.A. and C. Bown, ‘Antidumping and Retaliation Threats’, Journal of International Economics,
Vol. 60, No. 2, 2003, pp. 249–73.
Bown, C.P., B. Hoekman and C. Ozden, ‘The Pattern of US Antidumping: The Path from Filing to
WTO Dispute Settlement’, World Trade Review, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2003, pp. 319–74.
Hansen, W. L. and T. J. Prusa, ‘Cumulation and ITC Decision-making: the Sum of the Parts is Greater
than the Whole’, Economic Inquiry, Vol. 34, No. 3, 1996, pp. 746–69.
Irwin, D.A., ‘The Rise of US Anti-dumping Activity in Historical Perspective’, The World Economy,
Vol. 28, No. 5, 2005, pp. 651–68.
Mah, J., ‘The United States’ Antidumping Decision against Northeast Dynamic Economies’, The World
Economy, Vol. 32, No. 3, 2000a, pp. 1701–9.
———, ‘Antidumping Decisions and Macroeconomic Variables in the USA’, Applied Economics,
Vol. 32, No. 13, 2000b, pp. 1701–9.
Mah, J. and Y. Kim, ‘The Macroeconomic Determinants of Antidumping Duties: The Case of Korea’,
Journal of Policy Modeling, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2006, pp. 157–62.
Messerlin, P., ‘China in the World Trade Organization: Antidumping and Safeguard’, World Bank Economic
Review, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2004, pp. 105–30.
Miranda, J., R.A. Torres and M. Ruiz, ‘The International Use of Antidumping: 1987–1997’, Journal of
World Trade, Vol. 32, No. 5, 1998, pp. 5–71.
McGee, R.W. and Y. Yoon, ‘Antidumping and the People’s Republic of China: Five Case Studies,’ Working
Paper 98.2, The Dumont Institute for Public Policy Research, 1998.
Prusa, T. J., ‘On the Spread and Impact of Antidumping’, Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 34, No. 3,
2001, pp. 591–611.
Prusa, T. J. and Skeath S., ‘Modern Commercial Policy: Managed Trade and Retaliation?’, in E.K. Choi
and J. Harrigam (Eds.), Handbook of International Trade, Volume 2 (London: Blackwell, 2004).
Prusa, T.J., ‘Anti-dumping: A Growing Problem in International Trade’, The World Economy, Vol. 28,
No. 5, 2005, pp. 683–700.
US Department of Commerce, ‘TradState ExpressTM’ (http://tse.export.gov), 2005, Accessed 11 November
2005.
US International Trade Commission, Import Injury Investigations Case Statistics (FY 1980–2003)
(Washington, DC: ITC, 2004).
US International Trade Commission, Annual Report 2005 (Washington, DC: ITC, 2004).

Downloaded from chr.sagepub.com at Stockholm University Library on August 24, 2015

296 Yooyeon Noh and Jai S. Mah

United States Trade Representative, ‘America’s Trade with China’, (http://www.ustr.gov/Document_

Library/Fact_Sheets/2004/America’s_Trade_with_China.html), 2005, Accessed 11 November 2005.
World Trade Organization, Semi-Annual Reports of the Committee on Anti-dumping Practices under
Article 16.4 of the Agreement (Geneva: WTO, 1995–2005).
Zanardi, M., ‘Anti-Dumping: What are the Numbers to Discuss at Doha?’, The World Economy, Vol. 27,
No. 3, 2004, pp. 403–33.

Authors’ Address: Researchers, Korea Institute for International Economic Policy

(KIEP), Seoul 120-750, South Korea. E-mail: [email protected]
Downloaded from chr.sagepub.com at Stockholm University Library on August 24, 2015