Orayt

MADBURY V. MADISON U.S.
137 1803
Monday, August 22, 2022 3:55 AM
F:
- Thomas Jefferson defeated John Adams presidential election of 1800 dated February 17,1801.
- Just Before Thomas Jefferson finish his term he appointed 16 new recruits and 42 new justices
new of the peace this group is known as the "Midnight Judges" and ; he also reduce the number
of SUPREME COURT justice from 6 to 5.
- The appointees of Adams Senate were not valid until each of their commissions was delivered
by John Marshall in his capacity as acting Secretary of State.
- All new appointees was voided for the reason Thomas Jefferson as the New President assumed
that they could be considered VOID, since they were not delivered on time.
- The Jefferson Congress proceeded to replace the Judiciary Act of 1801 with new Judiciary Act
of 1802 that essentially restored the initial Judiciary Act of 1789.
- The new ACT sought to delay the Supreme Court in hearing the inevitable challenge to the
constitutionality of Jefferson's maneuver by canceling its term in June 1802.
- Writ of mandamus with the SUPREME COURT filed by Madbury asking to order the executive
branch to deliver his commission.
I: Whether or not the non-compliance of submitting the Commission of Appointees considered

constitutional.
R: NO, in a written opinion of Chief Justice Marshall there is to reasons why it is unconstitutional:
Firstly, it is considered illegal to refuse to delivery of Madbury's commission, Secondly, it was
normally proper for a court in such situations to order the government official in question to deliver
the commission.
CASE DIGEST FOR CONSTI 1 Page 1

ANGARA V ELECTORAL COMMISION
F: That in the elections of September 17, 1935, The petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondent
Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayo, were candidates voted for the position for
national assembly for the first district of the Provice of Tayabas. The petitioner won and took his
oath of office on November 15 1935. December 03, 1935 the National assembly passed
Resolution No.8 "Dismiss the Protest." The respondent proceed an action to file to the Electoral
Commission a "Motion to Protest" against the election of the Petitioner. December 9, 1935 the
electoral Commission adopted a resolution of paragraph 6 quoted as:" La Comision no
considerara ninguna protesta que no se haya presentado en o antes de este dia."
That on December 20, 1935 then the petitioner filed before the Electoral Commission TO
"Motion to Dismiss the Protest." The respondent filed an "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal."
alleging there is no legal basis for dismissing the protest. The Electoral Commission did decide
to DENY the petitioners "Motion to Dismiss the Protest."
I: Whether or not the Electoral Commission acted outside of its duties.
R: YES, it acted within its jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of the implied powers
granted it by the Constitution to adopt the rules and regulations essential to carry out the power
and functions conferred upon the same by the fundamental law and it acted as a legitimate
exercise of its quasi-judicial function.

MARIANO V COMELEC
F: The petitioners is assailing two (2) certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional. They assail
sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No.7854 under the ground of: (1) Section 2, did not properly identify the land area or
territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds (2) Section 51, attempts to alter or restart the "three
consecutive term" limit for local elective officials and (3) Section 52, increased the legislative district of Makati of
special law (the Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be
passed by Congress within three (3) years following the return of every census;, the increase in legislative district
was not expressed in the title of the bill; and the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with
Section 5 (3) Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands
at only 450,000.
I: whether or not the sec. 2, 51, and 52 of Republic Act No. 7854 is unconstitutional?
R: NO, The section 2, 51, and 52 of Republic Act No. 7854 are constitutional
The court ruled that:
1. Section 2: Then petitioners did not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of
Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries.
2. Section 51: The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated.
The following are the requirements:
a. here must be an actual case or controversy;
b. The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party
c. the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity
d. he decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself
3. Section 52: Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord
with section 5(3), Article VI 12 of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of
Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000).

PACU V. Secretary of Education 10/31/1955
F:
Republic Act 2706- Act No. 2706 This was known as the “Private School Law”, enacted
- This is an action of the petitioners to request the Republic Act 2706 unconstitutional on on March 10, 1917 by the Philippine Legislature, which made obligatory the recognition
the grounds of: and inspection of private schools and colleges by the Secretary of Public Instruction so as
to maintain a standard of efficiency in all private schools and colleges in the country.
○ They deprive owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and
This law was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 180 passed on November 13, 1936
property without due process of law.
which provided that: The Secretary of Public Instruction was vested with power to
○ They deprive parents of their natural rights and duty to rear their children for civic “supervise, inspect and regulate said schools and colleges in order to determine the
efficiency. efficiency of instruction given in the same.” And all private schools come under the
supervision and regulation of the Secretary of DPI, thus eliminating “diploma mills” and
○ Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to substandard schools.
prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power.
- The government's response to this petition by mimeograph is as follows:
○ the matter constitutes no justiciable controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of

deciding the constitutional questions;
○ petitioners are in estoppel to challenge the validity of the said acts
○ the Acts are constitutionally valid.
- The Court asserted that Act 2706 has been enforced since 1917 and its duty is to an Act making
the inspection and recognition of private schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of
Public Instruction. Furthermore, the Court asserted that when a law has been long treated as
constitutional and important rights have become dependent thereon, the Court may refuse to
consider an attack on its validity. (C. J. S. 16, p. 204.)
FIRST ISSUE OF THE PETITIONER
- In their first proposition of the petitioners that they first need to obtain a permit from the Secretary
of Education before a private school may be opened. However, none of the petitioners has cause
to present this issue because all of the petitioners have permits to operate and there is no
implication that the Secretary of Education is trying to revoke their permits to operate. SEC. 3. Any person or group of persons desiring to open or establish a private school or
college in order to be recognized by the Government, shall incorporate under the
- Under Tyler vs. Judges, 179 U. S. 405; Hendrick vs. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610; Coffman vs. provisions of Act Numbered Fourteen hundred and fifty-nine, known as the Corporation
Breeze Corp., 323 U. S. 316-325: Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law upon Law, and shall file with the Secretary of Public Instruction
the complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation.
- Here, a Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw the The petitioners argued that they were They deprived owners of schools and colleges as well
permit of one of petitioners does not constitute a justiciable controversy. as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of law. but all of them
has permit to operate a private school issued by the SOE. There is no real or actual
- March 1924 the Philippine Legislature approved Act No. 3162 creating a Board of Educational
controversy in the issue. A jurisprudence also passed that the court will not pass a
Survey to make a study and survey of education in the Philippines and of all educational
constitutional of the a law if there is NO JUSTCIABLE CONTROVERSY.
institutions, facilities and agencies thereof. In a book report of 671 pages paragraphs taken
summarized that:
○ A private school whose permit was not granted can still operate or exist. T mere fact that the
Secretary of Education not issue a permit to a private School does not mean it cannot
operate or continue to exist
SECOND ISSUE OF THE PETITIONER
- Nowhere in this Act is there any statement of conditions, acts, or factors, which the Secretary of
Education must take into account to determine the 'efficiency of instruction.'"
- Petitioners do not show how these standards have injured any of them or interfered with their
operation. Wherefore, no reason exists for them to assail the validity of the power nor the exercise
of the power by the Secretary of Education. The petitioners did not show any proof that the Secretary of Education performed the validity of
the power or the exercise of the power by the Secretary of Education.
- Petitioner did not prove that the Secretary of Education affected them at any means that they were
deprived of their rights for the reason no petition was issued that there were any. SEC. 11-A. The total annual expense of the Office of Private Education shall be met by the
regular amount appropriated in the annual Appropriation Act: Provided, however, That for
THIRD ISSUE OF THE PETITIONER additional expenses in the supervision and regulation of private schools, colleges and
universities and in the purchase of textbook to be sold to student of said schools, colleges and
- Petitioners maintain that this is a tax on the exercise of a constitutional right—the right to open a universities and President of the Philippines may authorize the Secretary of Instruction to levy
school, the liberty to teach etc. They claim this is unconstitutional. an equitable assessment from each private educational institution equivalent to one percent of
- In these issue, the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction whatsoever to restrain the collection of taxes the total amount accruing from tuition and other fees: . . . and non-payment of the assessment
by injunction, and in so far as they seek to recover fees already paid the suit, it is one against the herein provided by any private school, college or university shall be sufficient cause for the
State without its consent. Anyway he concludes, the action involving "the legality of any tax cancellation by the Secretary of Instruction of the permit for recognition granted to it.
impost or assessment" falls within the original jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance.
The petitioner's issue is the legality of tax impost and assessment it falls within the jurisdiction of
- There are good grounds in support of Government's position. If this levy of 1 per cent is truly a the First Instance Court.
mere fee—and not a tax—to finance the cost of the Department's duty and power to regulate and
supervise private schools, the exaction may be upheld; but such point involves investigation and
examination of relevant data, which should best be carried out in the lower courts. If on the other
hand it is a tax, petitioners' issue would still be within the original jurisdiction of the Courts of
First Instance.
R: For all the foregoing considerations, reserving to the petitioners the right to institute in the proper
court, and at the proper time, such actions as may call for decision of the issue herein presented by them,
this petition for prohibition will be denied. So ordered.

"

TAN V MACAPAGAL
F: The petitioner filed a declaratory relief as taxpayers on behalf of themselves and the Filipino people, in Section 1 of the 1935 CONSTITUTION: The Congress in joint session
assailing the validity of the Laurel-Leido Resolution. Dealing the range of authority of the 1971 assembled, by a vote of three fourth of all the Members of the Senate
Constitutional Convention or defining authority of the Convention, would have this Court declare that it is " and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose
Without power, under section 1 Article XV of the Constitution and Republic Act 6132. to consider to discuss amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for that purpose.
Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when
and adopt proposals which seek to revise the present Constitution through the adoption of a form government
approved by a majority of the votes casts at an election at which the
other than the form now outlined in the present Constitution merely empowered to propose improvements to the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.
present Constitution without altering the general plan laid down there in. The Court then did send a resolution
dismissing the petitioners case. However, they sent a Thirty-Two page motion for reconsideration.
I: Whether or not the Judiciary department has the power to review the provision.
R: NO, the judiciary department cannot review the provision. The judicial department does not have any jurisdiction whatsoever on
proposed amendment that is still not enforced. Judicial department power or
Under the Supreme Court ruled that: the doctrine of separation of powers calls for the other departments being role is to interpret the law, it does not have the jurisdiction or powers to
review or implement laws.
left alone to discharge their duties as they see fit. As Justice Laurel emphatically asserted for a Judiciary is "will
neither direct nor restrain executive action or legislative action." Furthermore, the doctrine of separation of
powers calls for the other departments being left alone to discharge their duties as they see fit. Thus, as long as
any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is no room for the interposition of judicial oversight.
DOCTRINE: THE JUDICIARY DEPARTMENT ROLE IS TO INTERPRET THE LAW IT DOES NOT
HAVE THE JURISDICTION TO REVIEW OR IMPLEMENT LAWS.

People V. Vera
F: This is an original action instituted in this court on August 19, 1937 for the issuance of the Writ of
certiorari and of prohibition of the Court of first instance of Manila. This is the Application of the
defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng therein for probation under provisions of Act No. 4221.(G.R. No. 41200)
The petitioner filed a case that Act No. 4221 is unconstitutional. The specific rule under this probation
act wit:
"This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for
the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said
probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the
Probation Office."
The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is challenged on three principal grounds: (1) That said Act
encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Executive; (2) that it constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power and (3) that it denies the equal protection of the laws.
I:
Whether or not RA 4221 is unconstitutional?
Whether or not the petition was filed by a proper party.
R:
1. YES. It is unconstitutional.
Because, it constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial
boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void, and it is also contended that the Probation Act
violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights which prohibits the denial to any person of the equal
protection of the laws. (Act. III, sec. 1 subsec. 1. Constitution of the Philippines.) wit: "No person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
Here, The Supreme Court takes judicial notice of the fact that there are 48 provinces in the Philippines
and the Supreme Court do not think it is seriously contended that, with the fifty thousand pesos
appropriated for the central office, there can be in each province, as intended, a probation officer with a
salary not lower than that of a provincial fiscal. If this a correct, the contention that without section 11 of
Act No. 4221 said act is complete is an impracticable thing under the remainder of the Act, unless it is
conceded that in our case there can be a system of probation in the provinces without probation officers.
Therefore, it is unconstitutional.
2. NO, it the petition was not filed by a proper party.
Because the proper party for the challenge of a specific constitution or Act is the Government of the
Philippines.

Province of North Cotabato v. GRP, Esperon
Wednesday, August 24, 2022 10:06 AM
F:
The Supreme Court stressed that When an act of the President, who in our
- Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement
constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have
on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
infringed the Constitution and the laws, settling the dispute becomes the
duty and the responsibility o the courts." In the same case, the Court
- The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for upon motion of declared that "the petitions are imbued with the paramount public interest,
petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court involving a significant part of the country's territory and the wide-ranging
issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same. political modifications of affected LGUs. The assertion that the MOA-AD
is subject to further legal enactments including possible constitutional
- Process of negotiation and the concluding of several prior agreements between the two parties beginning in 1996, amendments more than ever provides the impetus for the Court to formulate
when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public, and, in this
case, the government and its negotiating entity." It added that "once a suit is
- The function of the judicial review limited to actual cases or controversies. Courts decline to issue advisory filed and the doer voluntarily ceases the challenged conduct, it does not
opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions. Courts decline to issue automatically deprive the Tribunal of power to hear and determine the case
advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions and does not render the case moot especially when the plain. tiff seeks
damages or prays for injunctive relief against the possible recurrence of the
- The Solicitor General argues that there is no justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial review in the present violation.
petitions, reasoning that stating that: "The unsigned MOA-AD is simply a list of consensus points subject to
further negotiations and legislative enactments as well as constitutional processes aimed at attaining a final
peaceful agreement. Simply put, the MOA-AD remains to be a proposal that does not automatically create legally
demandable rights and obligations until the list of operative acts required have been duly complied with."
I: Whether or not the case can be admit to judicial review
R: YES, the case can be admit to judicial review. Concrete acts under the MOA-AD are not necessary to render the
present controversy ripe. Based on the jurisprudence of Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre stated that: " By the mere enactment of
the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial
controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is
enough to awaken judicial duty."
petitions alleged that the provisions of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution. The MOA-AD provides that "any
provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon the
signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework," implying an
amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the
amendment of the Constitution.
Therefore, the petitions make a prima facie case for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual case or
controversy ripe for adjudication exists.

ATLAS FERTILIZER V SECRETARY OF DAR
F:
- The petitioners are questioning the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6657 or The
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
- The petitioners are engaged in utilizing fishponds and prawn farms
- The Section 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of R.A. 6657, in addition to that they also added
Administrative Order Nos. 8 and 10 Series of 1988 issued by the Secretary of DAR (Department
of Agrarian Reform) as Unconstitutional.
- The petitioners questioned the provision of CARL that violate the constitution. The Petitioners
asserted that CARL extend agrarian reform to aquaculture lands even as Section 4, Article XIII of
the Constitution limits agrarian reform only to agricultural lands
- On February 20, 1995 Republic Act No. 7881 was approved by congress. Provision of the said
Act premised the provisions of CARL.
- On the provisions of Republic Act No. 7881 the Republic Act No. 6657 was amended.
- On the specific provision of R.A. 7881 Section 10 (b) states that:
B.) Private lands actually, directly and exclusively used for prawn farms and fishponds shall
be exempt from the coverage of this Act: Provided, That said prawn farms and fishponds
have not been distributed and Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) issued to
agrarian reform beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. "In
cases where the fishponds or prawn farms have been subjected to the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law, by voluntary offer to sell, or commercial farms deferment or notices
of compulsory acquisition, a simple and absolute majority of the actual regular workers or
tenants must consent to the exemption within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act.
When the workers or tenants do not agree to this exemption, the fishponds or prawn farms
shall be distributed collectively to the worker beneficiaries or tenants who shall form a
cooperative or association to manage the same.
I: Whether or not the R.A. 6657 that was amended by R.A. 7881 is unconstitutional.
R: NO, it is not unconstitutional
Because the provisions of R.A. No. 7881 expressly state that: "fishponds and prawn farms are excluded
from the coverage of CARL."
Furthermore, In view of the foregoing, the question concerning the constitutionality of the assailed
provisions has become moot and academic with the passage of R.A. No. 7881.

AKBAYAN V AQUINO
F:
- This is the action of petitioners where the petitioners are obtaining the full text
of JPEPA Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement including the
negotiation process attach.
- petitioners are praying for is the disclosure of the contents of the JPEPA prior
to its finalization.
- While the final text of the JPEPA has now been made accessible to the public
However, JPEPA is still being negotiated and the initial draft at the time the
petition was filed up to the filing of petitioners.
I: Whether or not the by disclosing JPEPA considered Mootness Doctrine
R: YES, it is a Mootness Doctrine.
The Court ruled that the: Text of the JPEPA having then been made accessible to the
public, the petition has become moot and academic to the extent that it seeks the
disclosure of the "full text" thereof. The petition is not entirely moot. however,
because petitioners seek to obtain, not merely the text of the JPEPA, but also the
Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiation has been rendered
moot and academic.

NIETO JR V SEC
F:
- This is an action of the petitioner to seek reversal of the decision of which annulled the Order
of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) directing Philcomsat Holdings Corporation
(PHC) to convene its annual stockholders' meeting
- On 11 April 2006, Nieto filed a petition forcertiorari and prohibition to enjoin the SEC from
calling the PHC's annual stockholder's meeting.
- But during the the pendency of the petition before the Court of Appeals or on 1 July 2006, the
majority stockholders of PHC entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) agreeing
to unite and form a common slate for the Board in POTC, Philcomsat and PHC. They
requested the SEC to set a date for the annual stockholders' meeting. The group of Nieto was a
party to the MOU.
- On 1 September 2006, petitioner filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition in view of the MOU.
- The main issue is the authority of the SEC to call a stockholders' meeting. The MOU mooted
that issue. It mooted the case before the Court of Appeals. It mooted likewise the present
petition questioning the authority of the Court of Appeals to decide the case in spite of
petitioner's motion to withdraw petition.
- In the meeting The parties have agreed that this Memorandum of Understanding as well as the
discussions between them shall lead to a Stockholders' Agreement between them which shall
include, among others, the matters herein described, the calling of stockholders' meetings of
POTC, Philcomsat and PHC and the reorganization of the Boards of Directors of the said
corporations.
- The main point of Nieto's petition before the Court of Appeals was to oppose the calling of the
annual stockholder's meeting. By signing the MOU, Nieto agreed to the convening of the
annual stockholders' meeting. As a consequence of the MOU, Nieto no longer had any actual
relief forthcoming from the case he filed with the Court of Appeals.
I: Whether or not the petition was moot and academic.
R: YES, it is the petition is considered moot and academic. The Court of Appeals stated that A case
becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no
useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits of the case
As such in this case Roberto L. Abad (Abad), claiming to be an independent director of PHC filed
motion for leave to intervene and order to conduct a stockholders' meeting. Abad's position as an
independent director contradicts that of Nieto and the parties to the MOU, who all had agreed to call
for a stockholder's meeting.
Hence, Petition was Dismissed.

Macasiano v. NHA
F:
- Petitioner seeks to have this Court declare as unconstitutional Sections 28 and 44 of Republic
Act No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992.
- Petitioner maintains that the said provisions are unconstitutional in the premise of: (a) They
deprive the government, and more so, private property owners of their property without due
process of law and without compensation; (b) They reward, instead of punish, what this
Honorable Court has categorically declared as unlawful acts; (c) They violate the prohibition
against legislation that takes away one's property to be given to plain interlopers; (d) They
sweep overbroadly over legitimate concerns of the police power of the State; and (e) They
encroach upon the judicial power to execute its valid judgments and orders.
- The Court required comments from the respondents. In a comment of the Solicitor General wit:
He contends that there is no actual case or controversy with litigants asserting adverse legal
rights or interests, that the petitioner merely asks for an advisory opinion, that the petitioner is
not the proper party to question the Act as he does not state that he has property "being squatted
upon" and that there is no showing that the question of constitutionality is the very lis mota
presented. He argues that Sections 28 and 44 of the Act are not constitutionally infirm.
I: Whether or not the petition has no actual controversy .
R: NO, there is no actual controversy because two fundamental requisites are absent. As the
Supreme Court stated that:
"the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law are: (a) the
existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination, (b) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper party, (c) the constitutional
question must be raised at the earliest opportunity, and (d) the resolution of the constitutional
question must be necessary to the decision of the case. 9 A proper party is one who has sustained or
is in danger or sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of."
Thus, There is no actual controversy on the petition filed. THEREFORE the petition was dismissed
for lack of merit.

Kilosbayan v. Guingona
F:
- This is a special civil action of temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction that prohibits
and restrain implementation of "Contract of Lease" executed by e Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) or "lotto"
- The petitioner is Kilosbayan Incorporated implementing a non-stock domestic corporation

composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns, and lay leaders who are committed to the
cause of truth, justice, and national renewal.
- The Petitioners claim that writ:
a. Under Section 1 of the Charter of the PCSO, the PCSO is prohibited from holding and
conducting lotteries "in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person,
association, company or entity";
b. Under Act No. 3846 and established jurisprudence, a Congressional franchise is required
before any person may be allowed to establish and operate said telecommunications system;
c. Under Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, a less than 60% Filipino-owned and/or
controlled corporation, like the PGMC, is disqualified from operating a public service, like
the said telecommunications system; and
d. Respondent PGMC is not authorized by its charter and under the Foreign Investment Act
(R.A. No. 7042) to install, establish and operate the on-line lotto and telecommunications
systems
- The respondents claims on the comment of the petitioner "petitioners do not appear to have the
legal standing or real interest in the subject contract and in obtaining the reliefs sought.
I: Whether or not the petitioner has no legal standing
R: Yes, They have legal standing. As the Supreme Court stands they find the instant petition to be of
transcendental importance to the public. The issues it raised are of paramount public interest and of a
category even higher than those involved in many of the forecited cases. The ramifications of such issues
immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest
barangays of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line
lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of
the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes
aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of.
Therefore, they have legal standing because the issues brought up are important to our society.

Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita
F:
- consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused such
power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464) last September 28, 2005. They thus pray for
its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
- the President issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers,
Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials
Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other
Purposes,"7 which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately.
- three petitions, docketed as G.R. Nos. 169659, 169660, and 169667, for certiorari and prohibition,
were filed before this Court challenging the constitutionality of E.O. 464. ''
- Petitioner In G.R. No. 169667, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc. (ALG), alleging that as a
coalition of 17 legal resource non-governmental organizations engaged in developmental lawyering
and work with the poor and marginalized sectors in different parts of the country, and as an
organization of citizens of the Philippines and a part of the general public, it has legal standing to
institute the petition to enforce its constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, a
right which was denied to the public by E.O. 464,prays, that said order be declared null and void for
being unconstitutional and that respondent Executive Secretary Ermita be ordered to cease from
implementing it.
- As for petitioner PDP-Laban, it asseverates that it is clothed with legal standing in view of the
transcendental issues raised in its petition which this Court needs to resolve in order to avert a
constitutional crisis. For it to be accorded standing on the ground of transcendental importance,
however, it must establish (1) the character of the funds (that it is public) or other assets involved in
the case, (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by
the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government, and (3) the lack of any party
with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised
I: Whether or not E.O. 446 removed the view of legal standing.
R: YES, it removed the rights of the people have Legal Standing. From the conclusion of the Supreme
court. Resort to any means then by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge
information cannot be presumed valid. Otherwise, we shall not have merely nullified the power of our
legislature to inquire into the operations of government, but we shall have given up something of much
greater value and our right as a people to take part in government.
THEREFORE, Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order No. 464 (series of 2005), "Ensuring Observance of
the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the
Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution,
and For Other Purposes," are declared VOID.

Tatad v. Garcia, Jr.
F:
- The petitioners are suing as taxpayers and Senators of the Philippines. This is a petition under the rule of the
Revised Rules of the Court to prohibit respondents from further implementing and enforcing "Revised and
Restated Agreement to Build, Lease and Transfer a light Rail Transit System for EDSA and Supplemental
Agreement and the Revised and Restated Agreement To Build, Lease and Transfer a Light Rail Transit System
for EDSA.
- When The Republic Act 6957 took effect it provided two options for Financing, construction and operation of
government projects through private initiative and investment: Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) or Build-Transfer
(BT)
- The Petitioners argued that Agreements mentioned above and R.A. No. 6957 are illegal and unconstitutional.
- The Petitioners claimed that they are not real parties-in-interest and have no legal standing to institute the present
petition
I: Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing for the petition as taxpayers of the Philippines.
R: YES, they have legal standing. the action was filed by them in their capacity as Senators and as taxpayers. Based on
the jurisprudence of kilosbayan, inc V Guingoga and Bugnay Construction and development Corporation v. Laron:
" The prevailing doctrines in taxpayer’s suits are to allow taxpayers to question contracts entered into by the national
government or government-owned or controlled corporations allegedly in contravention of the law and to disallow the
same when only municipal contracts are involved"
THEREFORE, For as long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on locus standi is not reversed, we have no choice but to follow
it and uphold the legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to institute the present action

PASCUAL V SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
COMMUNICATIONS
F:
- This an action of the petitioner for declaratory relief, with injunction, upon the grounds that
Republic Act No. 920 or An Act Appropriating Funds for Public Works.
- A sum of 85,000 was approved for the for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and
improvement" of Pasig feeder road terminals
- Petitioner contested Republic Act No. 920 for being unconstitutional on the grounds of: FIRSTLY,
public Act No. 920 be declared null and void; that the alleged deed of donation of the feeder roads
in question be "declared unconstitutional and, there for, illegal"; that a writ of injunction be issued
enjoining the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the Director of the Bureau of Public
Works and Highways and Jose C. Zulueta from ordering or allowing the continuance of the
above mentioned feeder roads project, and from making and securing any new and further releases
on the aforementioned item of Republic Act No. 920 and SECONDLY, disbursing officers of the
Department of Public Works and Highways from making any further payments out of said funds
provided for in Republic Act No. 920; and that pending final hearing on the merits, a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued enjoining the aforementioned parties respondent from making and
securing any new and further releases on the aforesaid item of Republic Act No. 920 and from
making any further payments out of said illegally appropriated funds.
- the petitioners grounds on declaring RA 920 to be unconstitutional has no cause of action and the
petitioner has no legal capacity to sue.
I: Whether or not if it is legal to appropriating public funds for a public purpose.
R: YES, it is legal. According to Ruling Case law stated that:
The court ruled that: "It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public
revenue for anything but a public purpose. . . . It is the essential character of the direct object of the
expenditure which must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the interest to
be affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare,
may be ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental to the public or to the state, which results from
the promotion of private interest and the prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not justify
their aid by the use public money. "
Hence, it is legal as long as it is for the benefit of the public.

Del Mar v. Pagcor
F:
- This petition concern whether franchise granted to the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) includes the right to manage and operate jai-alai
- Petitioner Raoul B. del Mar initially filed in G.R. No. 138298 a Petition for Prohibition to prevent
respondent PAGCOR from managing and/or operating the jai-alai or Basque pelota games, by itself
or in agreement with Belle Corporation, on the ground that the controverted act is patently illegal
and devoid of any basis either from the Constitution or PAGCOR’s own Charter.
- The petitioner raised an issue to the respondent that has no - jurisdiction or legislative franchise or
acted with grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in arrogating unto
itself the authority or power to open, pursue, conduct, operate, control and manage jai-alai game
operations in the country.
- The petitioner contends that the petitioner has no legal standing to file a taxpayer’s suit based on
their cause of action nor are they the real parties-in-interest entitled to the avails of the suit.
I: Whether the petitioner has no legal standing to file a taxpayer's suit.
R: YES, they have legal standing. Based with liberal policy of the Supreme Court on Locus Standi when
a case involves an issue of overarching significance to our society, The Supreme Court finds and so hold
that as members of the House of Representatives, petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions at
bar. According to case of Kilosbayan, Inc. wit:
"We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The issues it raised are of
paramount public interest and of a category even higher than those involved in many of the a forecited
cases. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of
the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive
effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to
raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition"
Therefore, when a case concerns or issues of our society, they deserve legal standing.

Sta. Rosa Realty Devt. Corp v. Amante
F:
- Before this petition there is a decision of Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board ordering the compulsory acquisition of
petitioner's property under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
- The petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation( SRRDC) was registered owner of -
two parcels of land with a total areal of 254.6 hectares .
- Petitioner stated that the parcel land they own are watersheds which provide clean portable -
water to the canlubang community.
- Petitioner alleged that respondents usurped its rights over the property, thereby destroying the
ecosystem
- Under Republic Act No. 6657, there are two modes of acquisition of private land: compulsory
and voluntary. In the case at bar, the Department of Agrarian Reform sought the compulsory
acquisition of subject property under R. A. No. 6657, Section 16 specifically b) c) and d) wit:
b. Within thirty (30) days from the date of the receipt of written notice by personal delivery
or registered mail, the landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform the
DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer.
c. If the landowner accepts the offer of the DAR, the LBP shall pay the landowner the
purchase price of the land within thirty (30) days after he executes and delivers a deed of
transfer in favor of the government and other muniments of title
d. In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct summary administrative
proceedings to determine the compensation for the land requiring the landowner, the LBP
and other interested parties to submit fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice. After
the expiration of the above period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR
shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for decision
I: Whether or not the petitioner may bring the petition to court after the acquisition of their property.
R: YES, they can bring the matter to court. However, under R.A. No 6657 Sec 16 wit: "it must be
Within thirty (30) days from the date of the receipt of written notice by personal delivery or registered
mail, the landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or
rejection of the offer."
Therefore, if within 30 days the owner did not reply respond the matter deemed submitted for
decision .

TANADA V CUENCO
F:
- This is an action of the petitioner where they instituted the case at bar against Senators Cuenco and
Delgado, and said Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, as well as
Fernando Hipolito, in his capacity as Cashier and Disbursing Officer of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal.
- The petitioners pointed out that that on February 22, 1956, as well as at present, the Senate consists
of 23 Senators -who belong to the Nacionalista Party, and one (1) Senator-namely, petitioner,
Lorenzo M. Tañada-belonging to the Citizens Party; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate, in
nominating Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and the Senate, in choosing these respondents, as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, had "acted absolutely without power or color of
authority and in clear violation .. of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution." Petitioners added
that the respondents "acted absolutely without color of appointment or authority and are unlawfully,
and in violation of the Constitution, usurping, intruding into and exercising the powers of members
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
- The main allegations of the petition is the legality, and validity of the election of respondents
Senators Cuenco and Delgado
- Respondents, likewise, allege, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that: (a) this Court is
without power, authority of jurisdiction to direct or control the action of the Senate in choosing the
members of the Electoral Tribunal; and (b) that the petition states no cause of action, because
"petitioner Tañada has exhausted his right to nominate after he nominated himself and refused to
nominate two (2) more Senators", because said petitioner is in estoppel, and because the present
action is not the proper remedy. .
I: Whether or not the case or the issue raise a political question.
R: NO, it does not raise a political question.
Under the Supreme Court ruled: The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice
of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional
limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate prove of the
judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection therewith.
Hence, the petition is denied.

DAZA V SINGSON
F:
- On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a
political realignment in the House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party
formally resigned from that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and
correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17 members
- Because of this development the petitioner was removed from the Commission on Appointment.
The petitioner challenged his removal from the Commission on Appointments and the assumption
of his seat by the respondent,
- The Respondent asserted that the issue or question raised by the petitioner is a political in nature
and so beyond the jurisdiction of the Court.
- The Supreme Court hold the contrary of the respondents assertion. Stating that the Court has the
competence to act on the matter at bar. Our finding is that what is before us is not a discretionary
act of the House of Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature.
What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the
petitioner from the Commission on Appointments.
I: Whether or not the issue or question is political in nature.
R: YES, it is political in nature However, the issue presented to the Supreme Court is justiciable rather
than political. Involving as it does the legality and not the wisdom of the act complained of, or the manner
of filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution. Even if the question were
political in nature, it would still come within the Supreme Court powers of review under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon the Supreme Court by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which
includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government.
HENCE, the court has jurisdiction over the case stating on Article VIII, Section 1:" The Judicial power
shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be establish by law." Because the
issue is involving legality and not the wisdom of the act and in the manner of filling the Commission on
Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution.

Gonzales V Comelec
Wednesday, August 24, 2022 3:23 PM
F:
- This is an original action of the petitioner prays judgement as follows:
○ Restraining
- The Commission on Elections from enforcing Republic Act No. 4913, or from performing
any act that will result in the holding of the plebiscite for the ratification of the
constitutional amendments proposed in Joint Resolutions Nos. 1 and 3 of the two Houses of
Congress of the Philippines, approved on March 16, 1967;
- The Auditor General from passing in audit any disbursement from the appropriation of
funds made in said Republic Act No. 4913;
- the Director of Printing from printing ballots, pursuant to said Act and Resolutions;
Declaring said Act Unconstitutional and void
- The majority view — although the votes in favor thereof are insufficient to declare Republic Act No.
4913 unconstitutional — as ably set forth in the opinion penned by Mr. Justice Sanchez, is, however,
otherwise
it should be noted that the contested Resolutions were approved on March 16, 1967, so that, by
November 14, 1967, our citizenry shall have had practically eight (8) months to be informed on the
amendments in question
I: Whether or not the Republic Act 4913 is Unconstitutional.
R: NO, it not unconstitutional based on majority vote of the congress. The supreme court do not believe it has
been satisfactorily shown that Congress has exceeded the limits thereof in enacting Republic Act No. 4913.
Presumably, it could have done something better to enlighten the people on the subject-matter thereof. But,
then, no law is perfect. No product of human endeavor is beyond improvement. Otherwise, no legislation
would be constitutional and valid.
Therefore, Republic Act 4913 is valid for the reason that the majority vote of the congress votes for it.

LAMBINO V COMELEC
Wednesday, August 24, 2022 2:51 PM
F:
- This an action of the petitioners to amend the 1987 Constitution.
- The opposing intervenors also challenged (1) the Lambino Group’s standing to file the petition; (2)
the validity of -the signature gathering and verification process; (3) the Lambino Group’s
compliance with the minimum requirement for the percentage of voters supporting an initiative
petition under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;12 (4) the nature of the proposed
changes as revisions and not mere amendments as provided under Section 2, Article XVII of the
1987 Constitution; and (5) the Lambino Group’s compliance with the requirement in Section 10(a)
of RA 6735 limiting initiative petitions to only one subject
I: Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative.
R: NO, Lambino Group did not comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Because
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people’s
initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
"Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein"
Therefore, The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain the meaning of an
amendment “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition

Magallona vs Ermita
Wednesday, September 7, 2022 10:47 AM
F: This provision writs and the constitutionality of RA 9522. The RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized
the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely,
the kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands" whose islands generate
their own applicable maritime zone.
The petitioners argued two principal grounds to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on the wit: (1) RA
9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, reach of the Philippine state's sovereign power
violation of Article 1 of the 1987 constitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary
treaties (2) RA 9522 opens the country's waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels
and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country's nuclear-
free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions.
The respondent officials raised that (1) the petition's compliance to the case grounded on alleged lack of
Locus Standi and (2) the propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of
RA 9522. The respondents defended RA 9522 as the country's compliance with UNCLOS III. Responded add
that RA 9522 does not undermined the country's security, environment and economic interests or relinquish
the Philippines' claim over Sabah.
I: Is the RA 9522 valid or accordance with the Constitution?
R: YES RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool to demarcate the Country's Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf under
UNCLOS II, not to Delineate Philippine Territory.
The Petitioners submit that RA 9522"dismembers a large portion of the national territory because it discards
the pre-UNCLOS II demarcation of the Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties,
successively encoded in the definition of national territory under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitution. Thus
the Philippine Sovereignty over territorial waters extends hundreds of nautical miles around the Philippine
archipelago, embracing the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris.
Evidently the Supreme Court argued that UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition of territory it is
a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones, contiguous zones, exclusive
economic zones and continental shelves that UNCLOS III Delimits. UNCLOS III was the culmination of
decade-long negotiations among United Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in
the world's oceans and submarines areas recognizing coastal and archipelagic States graduated authority over
a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coast
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out
specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as
geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of
UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:
Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic
zone and the continental shelf. – The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive
economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance

with article . (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with
precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the
international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties
exercise treaty based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the
jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33),
and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and
continental shelf (Article 77).
Even under petitioners’ theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the waters within the
rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn
in accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw the baselines in conformity with UNCLOS
III. The baselines cannot be drawn from the boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area delineated in
the Treaty of Paris, but from the "outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago."
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners
claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely,
lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, not by executing multilateral treaties
on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime
zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead
governed by the rules on general international law.

X Javellana v. Executive Secretary
F:
- Ratification of the 1971 Constitutional Convention

WILLIE YU V SANTIAGO
Wednesday, September 7, 2022 1:51 PM
Facts:
- This is a controversy that originated with a petition for habeas corpus filed with the Court on 4 July
1988 seeking the release from detention of herein petitioner.
- After manifestation and motion of the Solicitor General of his decision to refrain from filing a return of
the writ on behalf of the CID, respondent Commissioner thru counsel filed the return.
- Counsel for the parties was heard in oral argument on 20 July 1988.
- An internal resolution of 7 November 1988 referred the case to the Court en banc.
- The Court denied the Habeas Corpus under the grounds of:
○ (1) jurisdiction of the CID over a naturalized Filipino citizen
○ (2) validity of warrantless arrest and detention of the same person.
- Petition filed a Reconsideration with prayer for a restraining order. However, the Court resolved to
deny with finality the aforesaid motion for reconsideration, and further resolved to deny the urgent
motion for issuance of a restraining order dated 28 November 1988.
- petitioner filed a motion for clarification with prayer for restraining order on 5 December 1988.
- Acting on said motion, a temporary restraining order. Respondent Commissioner filed a motion to lift
TRO on 13 December 1988, the basis of which is a summary judgment of deportation against Yu issued
by the CID Board of Commissioners on 2 December 1988. Petitioner also filed a motion to set case for
oral argument on 8 December 1988.
I: Whether or not the petitioner can be released from detention after renouncing his Philippine citizenship.
R: No. He cannot be released.
The Court ruled that:

While still a citizen of the Philippines who had renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely and forever all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to "maintain true
faith and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines," he declared his nationality as Portuguese in
commercial documents he signed, specifically, the Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. filed in
Hongkong sometime in April 1980.
To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered together constitute an express renunciation of
petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. In Board of Immigration Commissioners
us, Go Gallano, express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and
explicitly and not left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after
having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired
his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport and represented
himself as such in official documents even after he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such
resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of
Philippine citizenship.
This Court issued the aforementioned TRO pending hearings with the Board of Special Inquiry, CID.
However, pleadings submitted before this Court after the issuance of said TRO have unequivocally shown
that petitioner has expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship. The material facts are not only established
by the pleadings — they are not disputed by petitioner. A rehearing on this point with the CID would be
unnecessary and superfluous. Denial, if any, of due process was obviated when petitioner was given by the
Court the opportunity to show proof of continued Philippine citizenship, but he has failed.
Hence, he is denied.

AZNAR V COMELEC
Wednesday, September 7, 2022 2:36 PM
F:
-This is a previous action of the petitioner to file and disqualify Emilio "Lito" Osmena for running
for a position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections on
the grounds of:
○ that private respondent is an American citizen: Application for Alien Registration Form No. 1
of the Bureau of Immigration signed by private respondent dated November 21, 1979.
○ (Exh. "B"); Alien Certificate of Registration No. 015356 in the name of private respondent
dated November 21, 1979
○ Exh. "C"); Permit to Re-enter the Philippines dated November 21, 1979
○ (Exh. "D"); Immigration Certificate of Clearance dated January 3, 1980
○ (Exh. "E"). (pp. 117-118, Rollo)
- The Private respondent however concludes that:he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the
legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmeña,
Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March
25, 1987; that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out
of the country for more than six months; and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines
since 1965.
- On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed the Board of Canvassers to proclaim the
winning candidates. Having obtained the highest number of votes, private respondent was
proclaimed the Provincial Governor of Cebu.
- The Petition filed was dismissed for disqualification for not having been timely filed and for lack of
sufficient proof that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen. They filed another petition.
I: Whether or not the private respondent should be disqualified for public office.
R: No. The respondent should not be disqualified.
Under the Court ruled that: In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present
direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for
under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express
renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or
laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmeña did not lose his
Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing
In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the United States of America,
the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private respondent was issued alien certificate of registration
and was given clearance and permit to re-enter the Philippines by the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation. Petitioner assumed that because of the foregoing, the respondent is an American and "being
an American", private respondent "must have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the
U.S. Naturalization Laws."
Furthermore, Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and who are not.
Whether or not a person is considered an American under the laws of the United States does not concern
Us here. By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private respondent is a
Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that private respondent had lost his
Therefore, the petition is denied for lack of evidence of the petitioner.

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MADBURY V. MADISON U.S.

I: Whether or not the non-compliance of submitting the Commission of Appointees considered

CASE DIGEST FOR CONSTI 1 Page 1

I: Whether or not the Electoral Commission acted outside of its duties.

CASE DIGEST FOR CONSTI 1 Page 2

The court ruled that:

CASE DIGEST FOR CONSTI 1 Page 3

- The government's response to this petition by mimeograph is as follows:

○ the matter constitutes no justiciable controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of

○ petitioners are in estoppel to challenge the validity of the said acts

○ the Acts are constitutionally valid.

FIRST ISSUE OF THE PETITIONER

SECOND ISSUE OF THE PETITIONER

CASE DIGEST FOR CONSTI 1 Page 4

CASE DIGEST FOR CONSTI 1 Page 5

CASE DIGEST FOR CONSTI 1 Page 6

Whether or not the petition was filed by a proper party.

2. NO, it the petition was not filed by a proper party.

CASE DIGEST FOR CONSTI 1 Page 7

I: Whether or not the case can be admit to judicial review

CASE DIGEST FOR CONSTI 1 Page 8

CASE DIGEST FOR CONSTI 1 Page 9

I: Whether or not the by disclosing JPEPA considered Mootness Doctrine

R: YES, it is a Mootness Doctrine.

CASE DIGEST FOR CONSTI 1 Page 10

I: Whether or not the petition was moot and academic.

Hence, Petition was Dismissed.

CASE DIGEST FOR CONSTI 1 Page 11

I: Whether or not the petition has no actual controversy .

CASE DIGEST FOR CONSTI 1 Page 12

- The petitioner is Kilosbayan Incorporated implementing a non-stock domestic corporation

- The Petitioners claim that writ:

I: Whether or not the petitioner has no legal standing

CASE DIGEST FOR CONSTI 1 Page 13

I: Whether or not E.O. 446 removed the view of legal standing.

CASE DIGEST FOR CONSTI 1 Page 14

CASE DIGEST FOR CONSTI 1 Page 15

I: Whether or not if it is legal to appropriating public funds for a public purpose.

R: YES, it is legal. According to Ruling Case law stated that:

Hence, it is legal as long as it is for the benefit of the public.

CASE DIGEST FOR CONSTI 1 Page 16

I: Whether the petitioner has no legal standing to file a taxpayer's suit.

CASE DIGEST FOR CONSTI 1 Page 17

CASE DIGEST FOR CONSTI 1 Page 18

I: Whether or not the case or the issue raise a political question.

R: NO, it does not raise a political question.

Hence, the petition is denied.

CASE DIGEST FOR CONSTI 1 Page 19

I: Whether or not the issue or question is political in nature.

CASE DIGEST FOR CONSTI 1 Page 20

I: Whether or not the Republic Act 4913 is Unconstitutional.

CASE DIGEST FOR CONSTI 1 Page 21

CASE DIGEST FOR CONSTI 1 Page 22

I: Is the RA 9522 valid or accordance with the Constitution?

CASE DIGEST FOR CONSTI 1 Page 23

CASE DIGEST FOR CONSTI 1 Page 24

CASE DIGEST FOR CONSTI 1 Page 25

R: No. He cannot be released.

The Court ruled that: