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AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL SERVICES:
THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE
INDIVIDUAL LAWYER AND
OF THE ORGANIZED BAR
Elliott E. Cheatham*

A wide gap separates the need for legal services and its satisfac-
tion, as numerous studies reveal. Looked at from the side of the
layman, one reason for the gap is poverty and the consequent
inability to pay legal fees. Another set of reasons is ignorance
and fear on the part of those who could pay. There is ignorance of
the need for and the value of legal services, and ignorance of where
to find a dependable lawyer. There is fear of the mysterious proc-
esses and delays of the law, and there is fear of overreaching and
overcharging by lawyers, a fear stimulated by the occasional expo-
sure of shysters. Looked at from the side of the lawyer, a major
reason for the gap is the standards of the profession that strike down
intermediaries providing counsel, however dependable and trust-
worthy they may be. An accompanying reason where the potential
client is hated by the public is the lawyer's fear that hatred of
the client will be visited on him.
This discussion is concerned primarily with the prospective
client who could pay for legal services but is deterred for one reason
or another from obtaining them. It will first sketch three facts as to
lawyers and as to laymen that deserve attention. Then it will
consider who has the responsibility for providing counsel and will
outline what the organized bar has thus far done. Next it will suggest
the possibility now opened by the Supreme Court of the United
*States of a reconsideration of the subject on its merits. Finally, it
will outline possible methods of providing services and some relevant
factors.
A. THREE BASIC FACTS
At the start of a discussion of the availability of legal services,
three facts call for consideration. One is the privileged position of
the legal profession. Another is the changing condition of our
society and of those in need of legal services. The third is the

* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law; A.B., University of

Georgia; LL.B., Harvard University.
 AVAILABILITY OF COUNSEL

paradoxical combination of public and private aspects of the law-

yer's work.

Noblesse Oblige
How would the reader translate this often quoted phrase
concerning the obligations of the nobility of the Old Regime, so
that its essence has meaning and application for us? The best I can
do is, privilege brings responsibility.
The exclusive privilege to practice law belongs to the legal
profession. This exclusive privilege of lawyers has as its necessary
corollary the prohibition of the "unauthorized practice of law."
Accompanying the prohibition of the unauthorized practice of law
by laymen, there has developed a standard of the profession which
has been read into the law. The standard is that there can be no lay
intermediary between lawyer and client. This means that no individ-
ual, corporation or cooperative may employ a lawyer and furnish
his services to clients.
Each aspect of the foregoing limitations is supported by a wise
policy. The condemnation of the unauthorized practice of law is
designed to protect the public from legal services by persons un-
skilled in the law. The prohibition of lay intermediaries is intended
to insure the loyalty of the lawyer to the client unimpaired by inter-
vening and possibly conflicting interests. The scope of the limita-
tions, however, determined as it is by the courts, has given rise to
much controversy. At times they have been set aside entirely be-
cause of weightier countervailing policies. Thus, laymen have in
some instances been allowed to practice before petty or specialized
tribunals. Liability insurance companies are permitted to provide
counsel for the insured, and in some states professional corporations
are allowed to practice law. For our purposes, however, the impor-
tant fact is not the scope of or the exceptions to the exclusive
privilege of lawyers. It is that as to a wide range of activities lawyers
have the exclusive privilege.

Social Change and Growing Affluence

The increasing rapidity of social change is a mark of our times.
The point was put sharply by a great philosopher and mathema-
tician who lived from the middle of the Victorian era past the end
of World War II:
The recent shortening of the time-span between notable changes
in social customs is very obvious, if we examine history ....
The conclusion to be drawn from this survey is a momentous
one. Our sociological theories, our political philosophy, our practical
 UCLA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12: 438

maxims of business, our political economy, and our doctrines of

education, are derived from an unbroken tradition of great thinkers
and of practical examples, from the age of Plato in the fifth century
before Christ to the end of the last century. The whole of this tradi-
tion is warped by the vicious assumption that each generation will
substantially live amid the conditions governing the lives of its fathers
and will transmit those conditions to mould with equal force the
lives of its children. We are living in the first period of human his-
tory for which this assumption is false ...
Today this time span is considerably shorter than that of human
life, and accordingly our training must prepare individuals to face
a novelty of conditions.'

A group of recent interrelated changes bears directly on the

availability of legal services. One is the leveling up of income
of the American people. This means that an increasing proportion
of the population have the problems that wealth brings and with
which lawyers are needed to deal.2 Another change is the con-
stantly accelerating urbanization of the country and the decline
of personal and neighborhood knowledge of whom to retain as a
professional man. No longer is the typical small client a man who
knows that Squire Smith is a good lawyer and that Lawyer Quirk is
one to avoid. A third change is the reliance of individuals on their
group organizations-such as labor unions and cooperatives-for
the protection of their interests. Perhaps a fourth should be added
-the cost of the professional man's office and the rising level of fees.
The law and its institutions change as social conditions change.
They must change if they are to preserve, much less advance, the
political and social values from which they derive their purposes
and their life. This is true of the most important of legal institutions,
the profession of law. The profession, too, must change when condi-
tions change in order to preserve and advance the social values that
are its reasons for being.
"The Forces Which Will Continue to Shape the Profession" is
the title of a little item I wrote several years ago in a section on
"The American Scene." The influential factors listed there were
political, economic and social, intellectual, ethical, and leadership.
While the list of factors is pretty good, the order is wrong. The
reason it is wrong is that first things are not put first, as illustrated
by a question Mr. Justice Frankfurter used to ask his students,
"Who was the most important law reformer of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries?" The students would invariably mention such
distinguished men of law as Mansfield and Bentham. Mr. Frank-

1 WHITEHEAD, ADVENTURES OF IDEAS 116-18 (1933).

2 See TWEED, THE LEGAL AID SocIETY, NEW YORK CITY, 1876-1951, 97 (1954).
1965] AVAILABILITY OF COUNSEL

furter would set them right: "Watt, the inventor of the steam
engine. ' 3
Change in the profession, it may be said, is not a value or an
end in itself. This is true. Change should be debated and tested and
decided upon according to whether it advances the ends which the
profession exists to serve. There is, however, little likelihood of
hasty and ill-considered change. A profession is conservative by its
very nature. Illustrations abound from other groups-the guilds of
the Middle Ages which died of rigidity; the carpenters' union which
urges that anything that was once made of wood should remain with-
in its special jurisdiction; the supposed and derided generals who
continue to prepare for the last war; the physicians who oppose and
do not lead in the development of a wise system of medical care. We
lawyers are in special danger of rigidity and opposition to change.
We rightly value the elements of stability and continuity in human
affairs, and our system of precedent makes most of us look to the
past for guidance in the future.
Accepting the fact that many lawyers are conservative and
hold fast to that which they know, we can take heart from what is
no less a fact, that most movements for needed change and develop-
ment in the law have been led by foresighted lawyers. The joinder
of the two facts was noted by an Englishman who, looking across
the boundaries of nations and centuries, examined the enduring
elements in The Legal Mind:
And if it is true that the lawyers are in general conservative
in everything relating to their profession, it is none the less indis-
putable that movements for the radical reform of abuses have
in the past usually been agitated
4
and carried to a successful issue
from within the profession.

Public and PrivateRoles

The third preliminary fact about the profession is the para-
doxical combination of public and private aspects in the work of
the lawyer.
Law emanates from government, and its administration is
accepted as a public function. In a court of law this is made obvious
by the presence of the judge, a public official, as the chief functionary
and by the availability of other public officials, such as the sheriff
and the marshal, to enforce the judgment of the court. Yet the
most influential participant, even in the court room itself, is not the

3 PHr1rIPS, FELix FRANKFURTER Rr.iwiscEs 197 (1960).

4 Amos, The Legal Mind, 49 L.Q. REv. 27, 40 (1933).
 UCLA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12: 438

judge. It is the lawyer who presents the facts and argues the law on
which the court acts. In office matters, too, the lawyer as counsellor
and guide is the most influential participant in moulding and draft-
ing the myriad arrangements of our economic and social life. Wills,
contracts, sales, mortgages, corporate by-laws and so on-these
arrangements are essentially private laws that will be enforced by
the courts.
This most influential participant in the application and utiliza-
tion of the law is not an official retained and paid by the state. He is
privately retained and owes a special duty of loyalty to his clients,
and he makes his living through the fees he earns. Mr. Justice
Harlan has pointed out the aspects of the lawyer's work and
loyalties:
It is no less true than trite that lawyers must operate in a three-fold
capacity, as self-employed businessmen as it were, as trusted agents
of their clients, and as assistants to the court in search of a just
solution to disputes.5
The three-fold capacity to which Mr. Justice Harlan referred
can be seen as three sets of objectives for the lawyer which inter-
lock and are coordinated. The three are his individual ambitions,
his professional functions, and his social roles. Individual ambitions
begin with the immediately personal purpose of making a good liv-
ing for his family and himself through his earnings in practice.
They certainly extend to the desire to live a fully rounded life, and
despite the buffets of fate, to be true to himself and his own stand-
ards. The individual ambitions look outward beyond merely personal
matters to effectiveness in his chosen work as an attorney and to a
wider social contribution through leadership, whether in the admin-
istration of law or in public or community life.
The professional functions comprehend the functions the law-
yer performs for his clients. They can be summed up as individ-
ualization of the law. The vivid form is advocacy of the client's
case before a tribunal which will apply the law to the facts. Its more
usual form is the utilization of the law through counseling and
negotiating and then planning and drafting as an "architect of social
relations."
Beyond fulfilling his individual ambitions and his professional
functions, society counts on the lawyer to play a significant social
role. For the American lawyer this role includes public leadership in
the administration of the law and also in the wider areas of com-
munity and public life. This role is especially important in the

5 Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 124 (1961).

1965] AVAILABILITY OF COUNSEL 443

United States. Lawyers furnish much of the leadership of the nation

at every level of public life. It is so in political office whether elective
or appointive, in the formation of public opinion, in the guidance of
the economy, and in organizations which are public though not
political in nature, such as charities, churches, universities and
cultural institutions.

B. THE RESPONSIBILITY AND WHERE IT LIES:

THE INDIVIDUAL LAWYER OR THE ORGANIZED BAR

The facts outlined so far point to the conclusion that there is a

responsibility on the bar to make legal services available to those
who need them. The maxim, "privilege brings responsibility," can
be expanded to read, exclusive privilege to render public service
brings responsibility to assure that the service is available to those
in need of it. In dealing with monopolistic business enterprises that
have not heeded this caution, government has employed a variety of
measures, including compelled competition, state regulation and
even state operation of the enterprise. In the United States, the
professions have been almost entirely free from such measures. The
government has preferred to leave to the professions the responsi-
bility to develop and administer methods that will make competent
services available to those needing them.
In developing appropriate methods for provision of legal
services it is essential to bear in mind the recent social changes
and the effect the leveling up of income has had in increasing
the proportion of our population who need legal services but are not
accustomed to getting them. It is no less essential to give attention
to the combination of public and private aspects of the lawyer's
position. He is an instrumentality in the public function of the
administration of law, yet he is privately retained and subsists on
his earnings in private practice. With these facts in mind, attention
can be directed to the'question of where the responsibility lies to see
to it that legal services are available in fact; whether on the individ-
ual lawyer or on the organized bar.

The Individual Lawyer

All lawyers do some legal work without compensation. Good
lawyers reduce their fees for poorer clients without reducing their
devotion to the cases. Granted that many lawyers contribute their
service to those in need, should the responsibility of providing legal
services to those in need rest entirely upon individual lawyers?
When the question is put to the client the answer is clearly no.
 UCLA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12: 438

He is reluctant to look to individual charity. He does not wish to

run the risk of the uncertain charitable sense of the first one or half
a dozen lawyers he may call upon. He is unwilling to have an in-
competent lawyer represent him, whether it is the young lawyer
seeking experience or the expert in estate planning or corporation
finance who is a tyro in rent control or conditional sales.
When the question is put to the lawyer, the answer is also no. It
is unfair to put on any working group the burden of providing for
the needy out of its stock in trade. No one would suggest that the
individual grocer or builder should take the responsibility of provid-
ing the food and shelter needed by the poor. The same conclusion
applies to the lawyer. The lawyer's stock in trade is intangible-his
time fortified by his intellectual and personal qualities, and bur-
dened by his office expenses. To take his stock in trade is like strip-
ping the shelves of the grocer or taking over a subdivision of the
builder. It is especially unfair to the more charitable lawyer who
would give much of his stock in trade when the less charitable would
give little or none. It is unfair to the small solo lawyer, who is
closest to the problems of the poor and best able to handle them, for
he needs all the income his stock in trade can bring to win a decent
living for himself and his family. 6
The view here expressed that the individual lawyers should not
be expected to provide the legal services for those needing them does
not carry the conclusion that individual lawyers shall do nothing.
Quite the contrary. There is great need for leadership, and leader-
ship comes from individuals. If we look to organizations, whether it
be the organized bar or the state itself, we do not find a benevolent
organism that is self-starting and self-directing. We see a cumber-
some group that is given direction and movement through the efforts
of individuals who are leaders.
It is helpful to remind ourselves of the accomplishments of
some of our leaders. A few examples must suffice. The law on the
right to counsel was made possible by lawyers who pressed the key
cases to the Supreme Court of the United States from a sense of
professional duty. The measure of success in meeting the continuing
problem of the defense of the hated has been achieved by individuals
who were willing to face hatred themselves. Legal aid for the poor
has drawn on the best of the profession for leadership at national,
state and local levels. More directly on our point is the work of
individual lawyers in giving leadership to the organized bar. For it
is to the organized bar that we must look for effective measures in
making counsel available.

6 See CARLN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN (1962).

1965] AVAILABILITY OF COUNSEL

The Organized Bar

The organized bar has recognized by action and by statement
its responsibility to make competent legal services available in fact
to those in need of them. A listing of some of the committees and
activities of the American Bar Association makes this recognition
clear. A similar and even longer list could be made of notable under-
takings and accomplishments by some state and local associations.
To improve competence there are the Section on Legal Educa-
tion and Admission to the Bar, the Standing Committee on Con-
tinuing Education of the Bar, and the numerous Sections and Sec-
tion Committees with their publications on various fields of the law.
There is also the Joint American Law Institute-American Bar
Association Committee on Continuing Legal Education which
through the Final Statement of the first Arden House Conference,
1958, stressed professional responsibility as well as competence:
Programs for continuing education thus far have placed a major
emphasis on professional competence and have not always given .to
professional responsibility the attention it should have. In the future
these programs must also emphasize the professional responsibilities
of the lawyer. They must help the lawyer to fulfill a wide range of
professional responsibilities: to the courts, to the administration of
justice, to law reform,
7
to the law-making process, to his profession,
and to the public.

The Association has Standing Committees directly charged

with consideration of the availability of legal services. They are the
committees on Lawyer Referral Service, on Legal Aid Work, and
on Legal Assistance for Servicemen, as well as a Special Committee
on Defense of Indigent Persons Accused of Crime. Its research arm,
the American Bar Foundation, has completed and will shortly
publish a nationwide survey on the facilities and methods for the
defense of indigent accused throughout the country-a survey made
possible by the devoted efforts of reporters and advisers in each of
the fifty states. In the American Bar Center in Chicago are the head-
quarters of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association, which
stimulates legal aid and public defender work throughout the nation.
In areas where the public hatred of the accused makes it diffi-
cult to obtain counsel, the American Bar Association has taken
special measures. When the feeling against alleged subversives was
running high the Special Committee on Individual Rights as

7 CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE AND RESPONSI-

BILITY, REPORT OF THE ARDEN HOUSE CONFERENCE XIV-XV (1959). See also the
statement of the Second Conference, Broadening of Continuing Legal Education
Urged by Second Arden House Conference, 50 A.B.A.J. 136, 138 (1964).
 UCLA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12: 438

Affected by National Security drafted a notably fine resolution,

adopted by the House of Delegates, which reaffirmed the right of
defendants to the benefit of assistance of counsel "and the duty of
the bar to provide such aid even to the most unpopular defendants,"
and which requested all state and local associations to cooperate in
implementing these principles.' The Standing Committee on the
Bill of Rights in its 1962 report took up the matter of the reconcilia-
tion of Canon 31 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, which
reserves to every lawyer the privilege to determine on his own
responsibility whether he will take a case, with the principle of the
foregoing resolution on counsel for the unpopular. Its conclusion
was:
1. That while any lawyer should retain the right to decline em-
ployment under Canon 31, there is a group, if not an individual,
responsibility of the bar to see to it that defendants in unpopular
causes obtain competent counsel to defend them, and that such
counsel are not prejudiced or damaged by undertaking such repre-
sentation when requested.9

The Special Committee on Civil Rights and Racial Unrest re-

affirmed these policies by repeating at length the resolutions of the
Special and Standing Committees quoted above and emphasized the
special responsibility of lawyers to lead their communities in the
peaceful adjustment of differences."0 This special committee made
its specific contribution by dealing not with representation in court,
but by urging lawyers in their role as community leaders to assist in
seeking voluntary solutions of racial unrest, such as through better
communication among the races, and to concern themselves with the
educational and economic problems of the disadvantaged.
This bare outline of what the American Bar Association has
done shows the admission by the organized bar of its responsibility
and an impressive list of efforts to carry it. There remains, however,
a sizable gap at the point of legal services for the expanding middle
class. No effort to serve these individuals has been made that is
comparable in its scope or results to the methods employed to reach
the poor or to aid the hated.

8 Proceedings of the House Delegates, 78 A.B.A. REP. 118, 133 (1953); Board
of Governors, Report, 78 A.B.A. RE,. 178, 184 (1953); Special Committee on
Individual Rights as Affected by National Security, Report, 78 A.B.A. REP. 304 (1953).
9 Standing Committee on Bill of Rights, Report, 87 A.B.A. REP. 578, 580 (1962).
(Emphasis added.)
10 Special Committee on Civil Rights and Racial Unrest, Report, 88 A.B.A. REP.
416 (1963). The recommendation of the special committee was adopted by the
House of Delegates with one dissenting vote. Proceedings of the House of Delegates,
88 A.B.A. REP. 403, 423 (1963).
 AVAILABILITY OF COUNSEL .447
19651

C. OLD OBSTACLES, RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, AND THE

RECONSIDERATION MADE POSSIBLE

A full consideration of effective methods for making legal serv-

ice available has been limited by a standard of the profession men-
tioned earlier, the condemnation of lay intermediaries. The Canons
of Professional Ethics contain the condemnation.
Canon 35, "Intermediaries," provides:
or
The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled
exploited by any lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes
between client and lawyer. . . . A lawyer's relation to his client
should be personal and the responsibility should be direct to the
not
client. Charitable societies rendering aid to the indigents are
deemed such intermediaries.
as an
A lawyer may accept employment from any organization, such
render legal services in
association, club or trade organization, to
in which the organization, as an entity, is interested, but
any matter
this employment should not include the rendering of legal services
to the members of such an organization in respect to their individual
affairs.

Canon 47, "Aiding the Unauthorized Practice of Law," makes

work:
specific the condemnation of a lawyer who participates in such
to be
No lawyer shall permit his professional services or his name,
of
used in aid of, or to make possible, the unauthorized practice
law by any lay agency, personal or corporate.

The sweeping application of these Canons has been excellently

in his
described and sharply questioned by Mr. Henry Drinker
the validity and
leading book, Legal Ethics." In the past two years
by the Supreme Court
range of the two Canons has been challenged
thereby been opened for
of the United States itself, and the way has
of methods for making lawyers available for
a fresh consideration
them.
those who need
2 that
In the criminal law field Gideon v. Wainwright requires
in all cases. This unanimous
counsel be provided to indigent accused
line of decisions
decision is the natural and expected climax of the
years earlier with Powell
on the right to counsel which began thirty
4
v. Alabama" and Johnson v. Zerbst.' In the
3 area of civil cases,

See also CHEATHAM, A LAWYER

11 See DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 161-67 (1953).
WHEN NEEDED 73-86 (1963).
12 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
13 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
14 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
 UCLA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12: 438

however, the decisions in NAACP v. Button 5 and BRT v. Virginia 6

were a surprise to most lawyers.
The Button case involved the activities of the NAACP in en-
couraging and conducting through its legal staff litigation directed
against racial segregation in education and other public activities.
The state of Virginia, as a part of its avowed "massive resistance"
to integration, had passed two statutes which, while clearly aimed at
the NAACP, were general in terms and prohibited the stirring up
and conduct of litigation by "outsiders." The Supreme Court of the
United States, though divided in opinion, held the Virginia statute
unconstitutional in its application to the NAACP. The importance
of the case for the legal profession lies in the opinions rather than
in the decision itself. The decision could easily have been supported
on the ground that, given the facts of the case, such a manifest
effort by a state to nullify the law of the land must fall; but Mr.
Justice Brennan, speaking for five members of the Court, did "not
reach the considerations of race or racial discrimination." Instead
he explicitly placed the decision on the ground that the activities of
the NAACP were constitutionally protected "modes of expression
and association" which Virginia "may not prohibit, under its power
to regulate the legal profession, as improper solicitation of legal
7
business.1
The decision might also have been limited to situations in
which litigation is employed in the protection or furtherance of
political rights, for it was these which the case involved.' 8 But the

15 371 U.S. 415 (1963).

16 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
17 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1962).
18 The political character of the issue in the Button case is made clear by the
contentions of the NAACP. In the petition for certiorari the NAACP stated the
"Question Presented": "Whether a state, under the guise of regulating the practice of
law, may make criminal the activities of petitioner and its affiliates, in defraying the
costs and expenses of litigation instituted by Negroes who seek to vindicate their
constitutional right to be free of racial discrimination, where these activities are not
undertaken to promote any private or commercial interests.. . ." Again in the brief in
support of the petition: "Maintenance of the integrity of the legal profession is, of
course, a matter of appropriate concern for the state legislature. In dealing with Chap-
ter 33 [of the Virginia statutes], however, as it relates to petitioner's activities, it
should be recognized, petitioner submits, that far more than that abstract question is
present . . . .The petitioner organization, since its inception has been engaged in an
effort to secure equal civil rights for Negroes within the democratic process." And its
brief on the merits had as its first point: "I. Petitioner Uses the Technique of Test
Litigation for the Sole Purpose of Seeking to Obtain Equal Rights and Opportunities,
Under Law, for Negro Citizens."
It was the Virginia State Bar which opened the way for a wider dictum or
ground of decision. In the brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari and in the
brief on the merits, the State Bar relied on earlier state and federal court cases which
had involved individual and non-political controversies, such as those mentioned and
1965] AVAILABILITY OF COUNSEL

opinion intimated much more. In a deliberate and carefully worded

aside Mr. Justice Brennan opened wide the question of the constitu-
tional protection of lay intermediaries that furnish legal services.
After citing well known state cases that had condemned lay inter-
mediaries, he invited a challenge to those decisions, saying "we
intimate no view one way or the other as to the merits of those deci-
sions with respect to the particular arrangements against which they
are directed."' 9 Mr. Justice Harlan, in a dissent written for three of
the Justices, made clear the bearing of the decision, saying that it
"cannot be squared with accepted constitutional doctrine 20in the
profession. '
domain of state regulatory power over the legal
In the Railroad Trainmen case the Brotherhood, through its
Department of Legal Counsel, maintained a list of "Regional Coun-
sel" whom it recommended to injured Brotherhood members and to
the families of workers killed on the job, with the result that sub-
stantially all the workers' claims were channeled to the lawyers
chosen by the Brotherhood. In a suit by the Virginia State Bar the
Virginia courts enjoined the Brotherhood, an investigator, and a
lawyer designated as a Regional Counsel, from carrying on these
activities. The Virginia courts found that the activities constituted
the solicitation of legal business and the unauthorized practice of
law in violation of the common law, the Canons of Ethics of the
American Bar Association adopted into the rules of the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia, and Virginia statutes on the un-
authorized practice of law. The Supreme Court of the United
States, with the Justices divided six to two, reversed the Virginia
decision on the ground that it violated rights of "freedom of speech,
petition and assembly" guaranteed by the first and fourteenth
amendments. Speaking for the majority of the Court, Mr. Justice
Black declared that the state could not "keep these workers from
using their cooperative plan to advise one another." Tying the deci-
sion to the Button case, he intimated that constitutional protection
extends beyond the recommendation of lawyers and includes their
employment:
It is interesting to note that in Great Britain unions do not simply
recommend lawyers to members in need of advice; they retain coun-
sel, paid by the union, to represent members in personal lawsuits,
a practice similar to that which we upheld in N.A.A.C.P. v. Button,
supra.... In fact, in that case, unlike this one, the attorneys were

questioned in the opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan in the Button case and of Mr.
Justice Black in the Railroad Trainmen case.
19 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 442 (1962).
20 Id. at 448.
 UCLA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12: 438
actually employed by the association, which recommended them, and
recommendations were made even to nonmembers. 21

The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Clark distinguished the But-

ton decision on the ground that it involved a "form of political
expression," while the Railroad Trainmen case involved only per-
sonal damage claims. He stressed the length to which the majority
had gone: "By its decision today the Court overthrows state regu-
lation of the legal profession and relegates the practice of law to the
level of a commercial enterprise." 2
The measure of the surprise of the bar at the Railroad Train-
men decision is indicated by contrasting it with Gideon v. Wain-
wright. In Gideon the attorney generals of many states joined in a
brief which supported the right to counsel declared by the Court. In
the Railroad Trainmen case the American Bar Association sought to
appear as amicus curiae in opposition to the Court's ultimate deci-
sion, and joined with over forty state bar associates in a futile ap-
plication for a rehearing.

D. A RECONSIDERATION OF METHODS
Despite its surprise and disagreement with the decisions, the
organized bar has already determined to examine fundamentally the
availability of legal services. The Committee on Lawyer Referral
Service of the American Bar Association in its report this year
pointed out the exceptional importance of the two decisions:
Clearly, these decisions strike at the very heart of the traditional
standards of the profession, and they open the gates for lay organiza-
tions of all kinds to provide legal service to their members, with
little or no regard for the Bar's traditional ethical standard and con-
trols. In our view, the profession cannot afford to ignore the problem
thus presented to it.23

The Committee announced its plans to study the entire problem of

making legal services more readily available to persons of moderate
means, paying particular attention to the "urgent problem of lay
group legal service plans."
It may be of interest now to look back to earlier proposals and
actions, to outline and comment on several methods that might be
employed in making legal services available, and finally to stress
some pervasive factors that bear on the choice of methods.

21 BRT v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).

22 Id. at 9.
23 Am. Bar News, Aug. 15, 1964, p. 4.
.1965] AVAILABILITY OF COUNSEL

A Glance Backward
During the great depression of the 1930s two special commit-
tees of the American Bar Association, under the chairmanship of
Messrs. Karl Llewellyn and Lloyd Garrison, made reports on the
amount of needed legal services and of unused lawyers' time and
urged further methods to deal with the situation. The second report
gave an outline of facts that is still timely:
en-
[W]ith lay agencies, despite the efforts made to check them,
croaching here and there upon the practice in ways which sometimes
which
suggest that the bar itself is deficient in the kinds of service
renders in certain specialized fields; with growing evidence that
it
groups frequently go without legal assist-
people in the low income
think
ance because they cannot afford to pay for it, or because they
it, or because they distrust lawyers
they cannot afford to pay for
need ad-
or do not know any lawyers or do not know when they
vice .... 24

The report drew conclusions which, unfortunately, are equally

timely:
bar should
[1]n these circumstances we think it imperative that the
get at the facts more fully and to experiment
take action both to
striking out
with remedies. . . The time has come to be bold in
will
along new paths of group effort which, if properly safeguarded,
independence of the lawyer or the
not impair either the traditional
25
dignity of the profession.
the
In the 1940s, Mr. Reginald Heber Smith prepared for
various
Survey of the Legal Profession a report which dealt with
methods of meeting the needs, such as the lawyer reference plan,
service
the legal clinic, the neighborhood law office, and the legal
"Legal
office. The report stressed the last form, as its title26 indicated,
Service Offices for Persons of Moderate Means."
During this period much progress was made.referral The American
support to the lawyer service. 27
Bar Association gave strong
In Philadelphia there was developed the neighborhood law office
Bar
plan which is now under the supervision of the Philadelphia
8 Across the Atlantic, even during the strain of World
Association.

Special Committee on Economic Condition of the Bar, Report, 63 A.B.A.

24
REP. 390, 391 (1938).
25 Id. at 391-92.
26 Smith, Legal Services Offered for Persons of Moderate Means,
1949 Wis. L.
version was published under the same title in 31 J. AM. JuD.
REv. 416. A condensed
Soc'Y 37 (1947).
COMMITTEE ON LAWYER REFERRAL SERVICE, HANDBOOK
27 See A.B.A. STANDING
ON LAWYER REFERRAL SERVICE (4th ed. 1958).
28 See Abrahams, A Philadelphia"First", 25 THE SHNGLE
51 (1962); Abrahams,
The Neighborhood Law Office Plan, 1949 Wis. L. REv. 634.
 UCLA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12: 438

War II, Parliament enacted into law an imaginative plan developed

by English lawyers. Under the plan a person in need of legal serv-
ices can obtain them from a lawyer and the lawyer's fee will be paid
out of a public fund-all under the careful supervision of the
solicitors' organization, The Law Society. 9

Some Possible Methods

The methods that might be employed appear to fall into two
major groups-organizations to provide legal services and organiza-
tions to obtain the services-with the state as a third method or
source. The following table lists some possible methods:

I. Organizations to Provide Services.

A. Lawyers whether in firms or practicing alone.
B. Charitable organizations to provide services.
C. Lay organizations for profit from the legal services.
D. Lay organizations not for profit from the legal services, as:
1. An organization which employs law suits as a form of
political action.
2. An organization which recommends lawyers to its
members.
3. A labor union with fringe benefits for its members in
the form of legal services in their individual cases.
4. An employer with similar fringe benefits for its em-
ployees.

II. Organizations to Obtain Services for Its Members.

A. Cooperative Associations.
B. Trade Associations.

III. The State.

A. The State employs lawyers who aid individuals.
B. The State pays private counsel for services rendered to
individuals.
The first listed method of providing services, by lawyers
whether in firms or practicing alone, is of course the prevailing
method and it calls for only one comment. The lawyer reference
service, now widely developed, is an aid to this method, for it puts
prospective clients directly in touch with competent lawyers.

29 For a recent description of the range of legal aid, see Lord

Parker, The
Development of Legal Aid in England Since 1949, 48 A.B.A.J. 1029 (1962).
19651 AVAILABILITY OF COUNSEL

The second method, charitable organizations such as legal aid

societies, is of course beyond challenge.
The third method mentioned is illustrated by some banks and
trust companies that have carried on a probate practice through
salaried lawyers in their employ." It seems fairly plain that neither
the Button nor the Railroad Trainmen case extends its protection to
this commercial activity.
The fourth listed method, lay organizations not for profit from
the legal services, is a complex one. The Button case involved law
suits brought and defended as a form of political action and much of
Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion can be interpreted as limiting the
decision to that situation. But the opinion went on to challenge and
reopen situations which concerned ordinary private suits. The
Railroad Trainmen case is limited on its facts to the action of the
union in recommending, not providing, counsel for its members.
But when the two opinions are read together, they appear to go
much farther. They seem clearly to extend their protection to labor
unions with fringe benefits to their members in the form of paid
legal services in individual matters. They may go so far as to protect
similar fringe benefit programs provided by employers to employees.
On the second major heading in the above list, Organizations
to Obtain Services for Its Members, the Button and Railroad Train-
men decisions have no direct bearing. But the opinion of the majority
in the latter case uses the term "cooperative plan" and, as men-
tioned above, refers with interest to a described plan of British
labor unions under which "they retain counsel, paid by the unions,
to represent members in personal lawsuits, a practice similar to
that which we upheld in N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, supra."'1
On the third method or source listed above, the state, the two
decisions have no bearing. It does seem plain, however, that the
state may use its funds to pay counsel for enforcing or defending
individual claims or representing individuals in civil or criminal
cases. In civil matters the English Legal Aid and Assistance Plan
joins the client's retention' of lawyers in private practice with pay-
ment of their fees through public funds provided by Parliament. In
this country a similar practice has emerged through appropriations
of public funds to legal aid societies. The latest study of the methods
of providing counsel for indigent defendants emphasized the im-
portance of public funds for counsel, whether counsel be private
lawyers appointed by the court or salaried public defenders.
30 An illustration is shown in People v. People's Stock Yard State Bank, 344 Ill.
462, 176 N.E. 901 (1931).
31 BRT v. Virginia, 371 U.S. 1,7 (1964).
 UCLA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12: 438

Adequate Compensation of Counsel. Lawyers have peculiar responsi-

bilities for the just administration of the law, and these responsibili-
ties include providing advice and representation for needy persons.
To a degree not always appreciated by the public at large, the bar
has performed these obligations with zeal and devotion. The Com-
mittee is persuaded, however, that a system of justice that attempts,
in mid-twentieth century America, to meet the needs of the finan-
cially incapacitated accused through primary or exclusive reliance
on the uncompensated services of counsel will prove unsuccessful
and inadequate. . . . A system of adequate representation, therefore,
should be structured and financed in a manner reflecting its public
importance. . . . We believe that fees for private appointed counsel
should be set by the court within maximum limits, established by
82
the statute.

Some Pervasive Factors

In the reconsideration of methods, the first and starting factor

is the affirmative one that the methods must make legal services
available in fact to those who need them. Justice Traynor made this
the cardinal point in a dissent fifteen years ago which was taken up
and cited by the majority in the Railroad Trainmen case:
Given the primary duty of the legal profession to serve the public,
the rules it establishes to govern its professional ethics must be
directed at the performance of that duty. Canons of ethics that would
operate to deny to the railroad employees the effective legal assist-
ance they need can be justified only if- such a denial is necessary
to suppress professional conduct that in other cases would be in-
jurious to the effective discharge of the profession's duties to the
public.83

A second factor is financial support of the services. Individual

lawyers, the organized bar, private charity-no one of them nor
all together would suffice to finance the needed services. With the
higher level of income an increased proportion of our people can pay
for the legal services they need; what they need is an assurance of
usefulness and dependability. The use of cooperatives or of fringe
benefits or trusted organizations may be an appropriate source. If all
of these fail, there remains the source of public moneys, to which
most of us would prefer not to resort so long as private sources
suffice.

A third factor to be taken into account is the assured loyalty of

counsel, a loyalty that may be threatened by conflicting interests. A
conflict would obviously be present in the case of fringe benefits of

32 REPORT OF THE ATr'Y GEN'S COMM. ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF

CRIMINAL JUSTICE 41-43 (1963).
88 Hildebrand v. State Bar, 36 Cal. 2d 504, 522, 225 P.2d 508, 519 (1950).
19651 AVAILABILITY OF COUNSEL

legal services given by an employer when the employee has a claim

against the employer itself. It may often exist in the case of fringe
benefits given by a labor union to its members when the claim of the
particular member or class of members clashes with the claims of
other members or with the policy of the union officials.
A fourth factor that is important in any kind of group legal
services is that there be authorization and supervision by an appro-
priate body, whether the courts or the integrated bar or a commis-
sion. A system of cooperatives would offer wide opportunities for
harm by sharpers posing as benefactors, and they would seize the
opportunities quickly.
A fifth factor is the independence of counsel unimpaired by
any method of supervision. The legal profession has been the sub-
ject recently of the two groups of decisions by the Supreme Court of
4
the United States discussed above.1 A third group reveals the con-
cern of the Court or of some of its members with the independence
of counsel from various forces or groups.
Independence from control by the court is involved in some
cases. Mr. Justice Black, in holding that a lawyer is not an "officer
of the court" within the meaning of a summary contempt statute,
spoke for the full court when he quoted language a century old:
"The public have almost as deep an interest in the independence of
' 3 5 In other cases it is independence of the
the bar as of the bench.
lawyer from conformity to prevailing political and social views, and
6
from disclosure of their heterodox views and connections.s Yet
again, it is independence of the lawyer from control by his profes-
37
sional brethren even though they are acting as an integrated bar.
in
Authorization and supervision to insure competence and honesty
administration of group legal service must somehow be coordinated
.with assurance of unimpaired independence of lawyers in their work.
With the situation so fluid and the methods and factors so
numerous there will be unanimous concurrence in the comment of
Mr. Justice Harlan in his dissent in the Button case that "at this
writing it is hazardous at best to predict the direction of the fu-
ture." It is not hazardous to predict, however, that Canons 35 and
47 will no longer bar the development of wise and effective methods
for making legal services available to those in need of them.

34 See text accompanying notes 12-18 supra.

35 Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 407 (1956).
36 A vigorous statement on the need for an independent bar appears
in Mr.
Justice Black's dissenting opinion in In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
37 Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
 BIBLIOGRAPHY
CRIMINAL INDIGENT DEFENSE PROGRAMS

Books
ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID WORK, OBTAINING
JUSTICE
FOR THE INDIGENT DEFENDANT ACCUSED OF
CRIME. Do THE SCALES
BALANCE IN YOUR COMMUNITY?
BEANEY, EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
(1959).
BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN
COURTS (1955).
BLAUSTEIN, BIBLIOGRAPHY ON MATERIALS
ON THE LEGAL DEFENSE OF
PERSONS IN CRIMINAL ACTIONS (1956).
Hearings Before the Subcommittee No. 2 on Representation
for Indigent
Delendants in the Federal Courts of the House Committee
of the
Judiciary,86th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 13 (1959).
INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, PUBLIC
DEFENDERS (1956).
JOINT COMMITTEE ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
OF THE AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE AND THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, THE PROB-
LEM OF ASSISTANCE TO THE INDIGENT ACCUSED
(1961).
MANCUSO, THE PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM IN THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
(1959).
NATIONAL LEGAL AID ASSOCIATION, HOW TO
ORGANIZE A DEFENDER
OFFICE (1958).
Representation for Indigent Defendants in Federal Criminal Cases
Report
to the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives,
86th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL
CASES IN AMERICAN
STATE COURTS, A PRELIMINARY SUMMARY (1964)
(American Bar
Foundation).
SILVERSTEIN, REPRESENTATION OF THE INDIGENT DEFENDANT AND RE-
LATED MATTERS (1963) (bibliography).
SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY DEFENDER SYSTEMS,
EQUAL JUSTICE FOR
THE ACCUSED (1st ed. 1959).

Articles
Comment, The Public Defender System of Los Angeles County,
36 So.
CAL. L. REV. 125 (1962).
Comment, Representationof Indigents in California-A Field
Study of the
Public Defender and Assigned Counsel Systems, 13 STAN.
L. REV.
522 (1961).
Comment, Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 48 CALIF.
L. REV.
501 (1960).
Dimock, The Public Defender: A Step Towards a Police
State?, 42
A.B.A.J. 219 (1956).
Ervin, Uncompensated Counsel: They Do Not Meet the Constitutional
Mandate, 49 A.B.A.J. 435 (1963).
Gosset, Making Paper Rights Worth Something, 49 A.B.A.J.
641 (1963).
Grady, Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal
Justice, 42
MICH. S.B.J. 12 (July 1963).
19651 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Harrington & Getty, The Public Defender: A Progressive Step Towards

Justice, 42 A.B.A.J. 1139 (1956).
Hogan, A "Brief" for the Indigent Defendant, 44 J. Am. JUD. Soc'Y 175
(1961).
Kadish & Kimball, Legal Representationof the Indigent in Criminal Cases
in Utah, 4 UTAH L. REV. 198 (1954).
Kaufman, In Defense of the Advocate, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 351 (1965).
Note, Counseling the Indigent-An Analysis of Defender Systems, 38 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 310 (1964).
Note, The Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants in the Federal
District Courts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 579 (1963).
Prettyman, Three Modern Problems in Criminal Law, 18 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 187, 202 (1961).
Reardon & Vorenberg, New England Defender Conference-A Summary
Report, 47 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 159 (1964).
Simeone & Richardson, The Indigent and His Right to Legal Assistance
in Criminal Cases, 8 ST. Louis U.L.J. 15 (1963).
Stewart, The Public Defender System is Unsound in Principle, 32 J. Am.
JUD. Soc'Y 115 (1948).
The Right to Counsel: A Symposium, 45 MINN. L. REV. 693 (1961).

GROUP LEGAL SERVICES AND UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW

Cases
BRT v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
Atcheson, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Jackson, 235 F.2d 390 (10th Cir. 1956).
NAACP v. Patty, 159 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Va. 1958).
Vitaphone Corp. v. Hutchinson Amusement Co., 28 F. Supp. 526 (D.
Mass. 1939).
In re O'Neill, 5 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.N.Y. 1933).
Hildebrand v. State Bar, 36 Cal. 2d 504, 225 P.2d 508 (1950).
People v. Merchants Protective Corp., 189 Cal. 531, 209 Pac. 363 (1922).
Gunnels v. Atlanta Bar Ass'n, 191 Ga. 366, 12 S.E.2d 602 (1940).
In re BRT, 13 Ill. 2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958).
People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Chicago Motor Club, 362 Ill. 50, 199
N.E. 1 (1935).
Ryan v. Pennsylvania Ry., 268 Ill. App. 364 (1932).
In the Matter of Maclub of America, Inc., 295 Mass. 45, 3 N.E.2d 272
(1936).
In re Petition of Comm. on Rule 28 of the Cleveland Bar Ass'n, 29 Ohio
N.P. (n.s.) 291 (C.P. 1932).
Dworken v. Department [sic] House Owners Ass'n, 28 Ohio N.P. (n.s.)
115 (C.P. 1930).
Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Serv. Ass'n, 55 R.I. 122, 179 At.
139 (1935).
Doughty v. Grills, 37 Tenn. App. 63, 260 S.W.2d 379 (1952).
NAACP v. Harrison, 202 Va. 142, 116 S.E.2d 55 (1960).
State v. Merchants Protective Corp., 105 Wash. 12, 177 Pac. 694 (1919).
 UCLA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12: 456

Books
ABA COMMITTEE ON UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF THE LAW, INFORMATIVE
OPINIONS (1960).
ABA COMMITTEE ON UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF THE LAW, STATEMENTS
OF PRINCIPLES WITH RESPECT TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW (1956).
ABA JUNIOR BAR CONFERENCE, THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
(1962) (bibliography).
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, PROJECT ON UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE OF
THE LAW, UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE STATUTE BOOK; A COMPILATION
OF STATUTES ON THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF THE LAW (1961).
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE SOURCE
BOOK; A
COMPILATION OF CASES AND COMMENTARY ON UNAUTHORIZED PRAC-
TICE OF THE LAW (1958).
BAKER, HANDBOOK ON GRIEVANCES AND UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
(1956).
ILLINOIS STATE BAR ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE ON UNAUTHORIZED
PRAC-
TICE, PRACTICE MANUAL ON UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
IN
ILLINOIS.
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW,
NEW
YORK (1962) (text addresses of speakers).
OTTERBOURG, A STUDY OF UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW (1951).

Articles
A.B.A. Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law, Informative Opinion
No. A of 1950, 36 A.B.A.J. 677 (1950).
Bodle, Group Legal Services: The Case for BRT, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
306 (1965).
Bowman, Unauthorized Practice of Law, 27 OKLA. B.A.J. 807 (1956).
Cheatham, A Lawyer When Needed: Legal Services for the Middle Classes,
63 COLUM. L. REV. 973 (1963).
Collins, Automobile Club Activities: The Problem From the Standpoint
of the Clubs, 5 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROB. 3 (1938).
Comment, Union's Attorney Solicitation Program Unethical, 11 STAN. L.
-
REV. 394 (1959).
Enersen, Group Legal Services, 35 CAL. S.B.J. 11 (1959).
Group Legal Services, 34 CAL. S.B.J. 318 (1959).
Hecker, Hulse v. Brotherhood of RailroadTrainmen ... Corrected Abuse?,
28 UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE NEWS 136 (1962).
Johnstone, The Unauthorized Practice Controversy, A Struggle Among
Power Groups, 4 KAN. L. REV. 1 (1955).
Leviton, Automobile Club Activities: The Problem From the Standpoint
of the Bar, 5 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 11 (1938).
Note, Legal Aid Program of a Labor Union & the Unauthorized Practice
of Law, 20 U. PITT. L. REV. 85 (1958).
Note, The South's Amended Barratry Laws: An Attempt to End Group
Pressure Through the Courts, 72 YALE L.J. 1613 (1963).
Note, Unauthorized Practice of Law by Lay Organizations Providing the
Services of Attorneys, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1334 (1959).
Otterbourg, Study of UnauthorizedPractice of Law, UNAUTHORIZED PRAC-
TICE NEWS (Sept. 1951) (Special Issue).
1965] BIBLIOGRAPHY

Recent Developments, State Statute Barring Solicitation of Legal Work

Held to Violate Due Process As Applied to NAACP, 63 COLUM. L.
REV. 1502 (1963).
Schwartz, Foreword: Group Legal Services in Perspective, 12 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 279 (1965).
Simpson, Group Legal Services: The Case for Caution, 12 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 327 (1965).
The Practice of Non-Lawyers Before Administrative Agencies, 15 FED.
B.J. 99 (1955).
Turrentine, Legal Service for the Lower-Income Group, 29 ORE. L. REV.
20 (1949).
Weihofen, Practice of Law by Motor Clubs-Useful But Forbidden, 3 U.
CHI. L. REv. 296 (1936).
Weihofen, "Practice of Law" by Non-Pecuniary Corporations: A Social
Utility, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 119 (1934).

LEGAL AID PROGRAMS

Books
ALLISON, OFFICE MANAGEMENT MANUAL FOR LEGAL AID SOCIETIES
(1953).
ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID WORK, ORGANIZING AND
OPERATING A LEGAL AID OFFICE, LEGAL AID HANDBOOK (1947).
AMERICAN LAW STUDENT ASSOCIATION, LEGAL AID HANDBOOK (1955).
BAR ASSOCIATION OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, COMMISSION ON LEGAL
AID, REPORT (1958).
BRADWAY, THE DUKE UNIVERSITY LEGAL AID CLINIC HANDBOOK (1954).
BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES (1951) (1961 supp.).
BROWNELL, STOCK TAKING, FALL 1955 NATIONAL LEGAL AID ASSOCIATION
(1955).
CHEATHAM, A LAWYER WHEN NEEDED (1963).
GARIEPY, LEGAL AID AND SOCIAL WORK (1948).
JOHNSTONE, LAW SCHOOL LEGAL Am CLINICS (1951).
JOINT COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF LEGAL AID OF THE ASSOCIATION OF
THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK (1928).
Koos, THE FAMILY AND THE LAW (2d ed. 1952).
MONROE, LAWYERS WITHOUT CASES, CLIENTS WITHOUT LAWYERS, THE
CASE FOR A LEGAL AID AND LAWYER REFERENCE PROGRAM IN ILLI-
NOIS (1950).
NATIONAL LEGAL Am AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, HANDBOOK OF STAN-
DARDS AND RECOMMENDED PRACTICE FOR LEGAL AID OFFICES (1960).
AID
NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, SHARING LEGAL
EXPERIENCE (1960).
NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, STATISTICS OF LEGAL
AID WORK IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (1955).
SACHS, LEGAL AID (1951).
MEANS
SMITH, LEGAL SERVICE OFFICES FOR THE PERSONS OF MODERATE
(1950).
SMITH, THE COST OF LEGAL AID IN A METROPOLITAN AREA (1951).
 UCLA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12: 456

SURVEY REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR LEGAL AID SERVICES IN

Los
ANGELES COUNTY (1963).
TWEED, THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY, NEW YORK CITY, 1876-1951 (1954).

Articles
Avery, The Need for Legal Aid, 43 ILL. B.J. 874 (1955).
Bradway, Extension of Legal Aid Into Smaller Communities, 22 TENN.
L. REV. 490 (1952).
Bradway, Will Socialized Law Be Next?, 29 J. AM. JUD. SOC'Y 13 (1945).
Carlin & Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 381 (1965).
Chronology of Legal Aid History, 19 LEGAL AID BRIEF CASE 126 (1961).
Condee, Legal Aid in California, 33 CAL. S.B.J. 365 (1958).
Elson, The Rushcliffe Report, 13 U. C[I. L. REV. 131 (1946).
Gardiner, Defects In Present Legal Aid Service and the Remedies, 22
TENN. L. REV.505 (1952).
Hughes, Legal Aid Societies, Their Function and Necessity, 45 A.B.A.
REP. 227 (1920).
Jacoby, Legal Aid to the Poor, 53 HARV. L. REV. 940 (1940).
Marden, Equal Access to Justice: The Challenge and the Opportunity, 19
WASH.& LEE L. REV. 153 (1962).
Marden, The National Legal Aid Association: The Lawyers' Red Cross,
36 A.B.A.J. 265 (1950).
National Lawyers Guild Committee on Professional Problems, Availability
of Legal Services and JudicialProcesses to Low and Moderate Income
Groups and Proposalsto Remedy PresentDeficiencies, 10 LAW. GUILD
REV. 8 (1950).
National Legal Aid & Defender Association, LEGAL AID BRIEF CASE
(1942-date).
Parker, Development of Legal Aid in England Since 1949, 48 A.B.A.J.
1029 (1962).
Seligman, State Against Private Legal Aid, 21 N.Y.S.B. BULL. 90 (1949).
Silberstein, Estimated Cost of a Complete Legal Aid Service For the Low
Income Group, 12 LAW. GUILD REV. 24 (1952).
Sparer, The Role of the Welfare Client's Attorney, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
361 (1965).
Storey, Legal Profession versus Regimentation: A Program to Counter
Socialization, 37 A.B.A.J. 100 (1951).
Winkler, Legal Assistance for the Armed Forces, 50 A.B.A.J. 451 (1964).

LEGAL INSURANCE

Books
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, RESEARCH MEMORANDUM SERIES No. 2,
PREPAID LEGAL EXPENSE INSURANCE (1958).
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, RESEARCH MEMORANDUM SERIES No. 9,
SUPPLEMENTARY MEMORANDUM ON PREPAID LEGAL EXPENSE IN-
SURANCE (1960).
DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS (1953).
1965] BIBLIOGRAPHY

Articles
Barton, Legal Expense Insurance Plan-A New Approach, 1956 INS. L.J.
231 (1956).
Brown, Legal-Cost Insurance, 1952 INS. L.J. 475 (1952).
Sonneberg, Why Not PrepaidInsurance jor Legal Services, Case & Com.,
July-Aug. 1963, p. 36.
PROBLEM OF INFORMING PUBLIC

Books
ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC RELATIONS, BAR ASSOCIATION
LEGAL COLUMNS. FOR NEWSPAPERS; A HANDBOOK OF INFORMATION
AND GUIDANCE FOR STATE AND LOCAL BAR ASSOCIATIONS (1962).
ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC RELATIONS, PUBLIC RELATIONS
FOR BAR ASSOCIATIONS (2d rev. ed. 1953).
ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER REFERRAL SERVICE, PUBLICIZING
THE LAWYER REFERENCE SERVICE (1951).
BRADWAY, THE BAR AND PUBLIC RELATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PUBLIC RELATIONS FIELD OF THE BAR (1934).
DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS (1953).
MISSOURI BAR PRENTICE-HALL SURVEY (1963).
MORRIS, PUBLIC RELATIONS PROGRAMS OF THE BAR: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
PROBLEM AND THE SOLUTION (1952).
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, PUBLIC RELATIONS MANUAL FOR THE BENCH
AND BAR OF CALIFORNIA (6th ed. 1959).
STATE BAR OF TEXAS, COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC RE-
LATIONS HANDBOOK.
STONE, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY (1959).

REFERRAL SERVICES AND LEGAL SERVICE BUREAUS

Books
ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER REFERRAL SERVICE, DIRECTORY
OF LAWYER REFERRAL SERVICES (1961).
ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER REFERRAL SERVICE, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAWYER REFERRAL SERVICE (4th ed. 1958).
ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER REFERRAL SERVICE, PUBLICIZING
THE LAWYER REFERENCE SERVICE (1951).
ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER REFERRAL SERVICE, STATEMENT
OF POLICIES AND STANDARDS FOR LOCAL LAWYER REFERRAL OFFICES
(1963).
ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAW LISTS, LAW LISTS AND LEGAL DIREC-
TORIES (1963).
CLOSE, Do You NEED A LAWYER? (1954).
COCKSHUTT, THE SERVICES OF A SOLICITOR (1961).
Koos, THE FAMILY AND THE LAW (2d ed. 1952).
MONSMAN, MEMORANDUM ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LEGAL AID AND
LAWYER REFERENCE PLANS (1948).
PORTER, LAWYER REFERENCE PLANS, A MANUAL FOR LOCAL BAR ASSOCI-
ATIONS (1949).
 UCLA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12: 456

SMITH, LEGAL SERVICE OFFICES FOR PERSONS OF MODERATE MEANS

(1950).
SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND
THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1961).

Articles
Abrahams, Neighborhood Law Office Plan, 1949 Wis. L. REV. 634.
Abrahams, The Neighborhood Law Office Experiment, 9 U. CHI. L. REV.
406 (1941).
Bradway, Low Cost Legal Service Bureaus, 17 N.C.L. REV. 101 (1938).
Carrington, Lawyer Referral as Correlatedwith Other Bar Services, 45 J.
AM. JUD. Soc'Y 317 (1962).
Cheatham, A Lawyer When Needed: Legal Services for the Middle Classes,
63 COLUM. L. REV. 973 (1963).
Christensen, Lawyer Referral Service: An Alternative to Lay-Group Ser-
vices?, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 341 (1965).
Frankel, The Lawyer & the Middle-Class, 39 CAL. S.B.J. 385 (1964).
Gallantz, Lawyer Referral: A Brief History, 45 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 306
(1962).
Lafferty, Philadelphia'sLawyer Reference Service, 22 TEMP. L.Q. 195
(1948).
Madden & Christensen, A Lawyer Referral Service: A Sensible Approach to
a Difficult Problem, 49 A.B.A.J. 965 (1963).
Meyer, Current Development of Lawyer Referral in California, 45 J. AM.
JUD. Soc'Y 309 (1962).
Selected Annotated Bibliography on Lawyer Referral, 45 J. AM. JUD.
Soc'Y 324 (1962).
Smith, Legal Service Offices for Persons of Moderate Means, 31 J. AM.
JUD. Soc'Y 37 (1947).
Turrentine, Legal Service for the Lower-Income Group, 29 ORE. L. REV.
20 (1949).
Voorhees, The Lawyers Reference Plan, 19 PA. B.A.Q. 304 (1948).
Voorhees, The Outlook for Lawyer Referral Service: Much Remains to Be
Done, 38 A.B.A.J. 193 (1952).

SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR ATTORNEYS

Books
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, LAWYERS IN THE UNITED STATES: DIS-
TRIBUTION AND INCOME (1956-1958).
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, 1961 LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT (1961).
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE RATE OF INCREASE IN THE NUMBER
OF LAWYERS AND POPULATION GROWTH (1958).
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION RESEARCH MEMORANDUM No. 18, LAWYER
MIGRATIONS (1960).
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE 1958 DISTRIBUTION OF LAWYERS IN
THE UNITED STATES (1959).
BLAUSTEIN & PORTER, THE AMERICAN LAWYER (1954).
BRADWAY, HOW TO PRACTICE LAW EFFECTIVELY (1958).
1965] BIBLIOGRAPHY

BROWN, LAWYERS, LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PUBLIC SERVICE (1948).

CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN (1962).
CHEATHAM, A LAWYER WHEN NEEDED (1963).
HICKMAN, FUNCTIONS OF LAWYERS IN THE UNITED STATES (1959).
HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW (1950).
MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES (1964).
MILLER, PRACTICE OF LAW (1946).
MISSOURI BAR PRENTICE-HALL SURVEY (1963).
TWEED, THE CHANGING PRACTICE OF LAW (1955).

Articles
Carlin & Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 381 (1965).
Cheatham, Availability of Legal Services: The Responsibility of the In-
dividual Lawyer and of the Organized Bar, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
438 (1965).
Goodman, Shortage of Defenders of Those Accused of Crime Presents
Challenge to the Legal Profession, 27 DETROIT L.J. 117 (1959).
Kaufman, In Defense of the Advocate, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 351 (1965).
Lumbard, The Adequacy of Lawyers Now in Criminal Practice, 47 J. AM.
JUD. SoC'Y 176 (1964).
Malone, Lawyers-Supply and Demand, 38 TRUST BULL. 17 (1959).
Reardon & Vorenberg, The New England Defender Conference-A Sum-
mary Report, 47 J. Am. JUD. Soc'Y 159 (1964).
Schlossberg, Lawyers' Income and ProfessionalEconomics, 47 A.B.A.J. 968
(1961).
Schwartz, Foreword: Group Legal Services in Perspective, 12 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 279 (1965).
Segal & Fei, The Economics of the Legal Profession: An Analysis by
States, 39 A.B.A.J. 110 (1953).
Segal, A Current Survey, Lawyers in the National Economy, 42 A.B.A.J.
920 (1956).
Segal, A New Look: The Economics of the Profession, 43 A.B.A.J. 789
(1957).
Smith, Needed: A Bureau of Legal Economics, 46 A.B.A.J. 483 (1960).
Smith, The Bar Is Not Overcrowded: Some Facts About an Ancient
Legend, 44 A.B.A.J. 1054 (1958).